Full text of "Report"
37TH CONGRESS, ) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. ( REP. COM.
3d Session. ) (
REPORT
of
THE JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE
CONDUCT OF THE WAR,
IN THREE PARTS.
WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1863.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, March 2, 1863.
Resolved, by the Senate of the United States, (the House of Representatives concurring,) That
in order to enable the " Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War " to complete their
investigations of certain important matters now before them, and which they have not
been able to complete, by reason of inability to obtain important witnesses, be authorized
to continue their sessions for thirty days after the close of the present Congress, a-nd to
place their testimony and reports in the hands of the Secretary of the Senate.
Resolved, further, That the Secretary of the Senate is hereby directed to cause to be
printed, of the reports and accompanying testimony of the Committee on the Conduct of
the War, 5,000 copies for the use of the Senate, and 10,000 copies for the use of the House
of Representatives.
Attest : J. W. FORNEY, Secretary.
IN THE HOUSE or REPRESENTATIVES, March 2, 1863.
Resolved, That the House concur in the foregoing resolutions of the Senate to continue
the sessions of the "Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War" for thirty days, and to
direct the Secretary of the Senate to cause the printing of the reports, &c., with the fol
lowing amendment : insert at the end the words : "of the present Congress."
Attest : EM. ETHERIDGE, Clerk.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, March 2, 1863.
Resolved, That the Senate concur in the foregoing amendment of the House of Represen
tatives to said resolution.
Attest: • J. W. FORNEY, Secretary,
APRIL 6, 1863.
Mr. WADE, from the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, in accordance with
the preceding resolution, placed in the hands of the Secretary of the Senate the follow
ing report in three parts.
PART 1.— ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
PART 2.— BULL RUN— BALL'S BLUFF.
PART 3.— WESTERN DEPARTMENT, OR MISSOURI— MISCELLANEOUS.
REPORT ~ V,2>
OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR,
PART III.— DEPARTMENT OF THE WEST.
The joint committee on the conduct of the war submit the following report,
ivith the accompanying testimony in relation to the department of the west.
Your committee have been unable to take all the testimony necessary to
enable them to present a comprehensive report in relation to the administration of
affairs in the department of the west, more particularly while under the command
of General John C. Fremont. Compelled to remain in attendance upon Congress
during its sessions, they were unable to visit the department in order to take
the testimony of witnesses there. And they did not feel willing to call from so
great a distance the witnesses whose testimony was necessary to fully elucidate
all the facts, as their services were constantly required in the field. Throughout
their investigations your committee have strictly adhered to the rule adopted by
them from the first, to ask the attendance of those in the military service only
when no detriment to the public interests would result from a temporary ab
sence from their commands. When Congress closed its session last summer,
many of those who had been most actively engaged in the operations to which
your committee desired to direct their attention had been ordered to other parts
of the country ; some were in Tennessee and Mississippi, some in Arkansas,
some in the army of the Potomac^ and others in the department of the south
under General Hunter. Such testimony as was within reach your committee
have taken. But they are fully aware that their investigation upon that subject
has been far from complete ; and they, therefore, present but a brief report,
together with such testimony as they have obtained.
When the rebellion commenced Missouri was one of the most turbulent among
those States which the rebel leaders sought to gain over to their cause by the
connivance and treachery of the State authorities, and by the presence of armed
forces to operate upon the fears of the people. The number of federal troops
in that region was very small ; a great portion of our troops, stationed in the
Territories and at our military posts upon the western frontier, had been basely
surrendered by Twiggs to the rebels in Texas. St. Louis, the great commercial
emporium of the State, was preserved from falling under rebel control only by
the prompt and fearless course pursued by General, then Captain, Lyon, who,
not waiting for orders or authority, occupied the United States arsenal, when
threatened by the traitor governor of the State, and dispersed the rebel troops
who were collected under the specious name of State guards, in a camp of in
struction near St. Louis.
The difficulty under which our commanders there labored in obtaining supplies
of arms, clothing, &c., for volunteers, was far greater than was felt in any other
part of the country. Distant from all the principal depots, at a time when
the ability of the government was taxed to the utmost to arm and equip the
large number of volunteers called into the field, those who were, from time
to time, placed in charge of that department were compelled to act under
the greatest disadvantages. Q rl ~ 1
4 CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
Just previous to the appointment of General Fremont to the command of that
department, the state of affairs in Missouri had become very alarming. In
every portion of the State the rebel forces had appeared and assumed the offen
sive; all through the State they were committing their depredations, and Jack
son, the governor, had appeared with a large force of troops, furnished by the
r^bel authorities from Arkansas and Texas, in addition to those he had been
able to collect in Missouri. Pillow and other rebel generals had collected a
large force from Tennessee, Kentucky, &c., and were threatening the south
western portion of the State, and Cairo, at the mouth of the Ohio. General Lyon,
who was the highest officer in command, after the removal of General Harney,
had, with his limited means, been most active, and had taken the field for the
purpose of preventing Jackson, with his superior forces, from getting possession
of the northern portion of the State.
In July General Fremont was assigned to that command. He proceeded to
New York city, where he spent some days, endeavoring to arrange for supply
ing his department with the arms, &c., which were absolutely requisite. He
reached St. Louis on the 25th of July. General Pope, who had been assigned
the command in northern Missouri, was calling for troops to enable him to take
the field ; General Lyon, in the southwestern portion of the State, had been calling
for re-enforcements for some time ; General Prentiss, at Cairo, was also asking for
re-enforcements. General Fremont first re-enforced Cairo, as being the most impor
tant point, situated, as it was, at the junction of the Ohio and the Mississippi, and
controlling the navigation of those two rivers. The number of troops that he
could obtain for that purpose was small ; but the enemy were led to believe, by
the large number of steamboats that went down from St. Louis, that the
re-enforcement was far greater than it really was ; and Pillow, who had a force
estimated at 12,000 men, was deterred from making the attack he had contem
plated.
Cairo being re-enforced, General Fremont at once took steps to send troops to the
assistance of General Lyon. The number of the enemy opposed to General Lyon
was almost overwhelming. It was supposed by many that he would retire
before them until he should meet supports. He himself seems to have con
templated such a movement, for after the affair of Dug Springs he retired to
Springfield; and General Sturgis testifies that, at that time, General Lyon ex
pressed his convictions that re-enforcements could not be sent to him.
Upon reaching Springfield, General Lyon halted his forces, and after waiting
there some four or five days announced his intention to march out and attack
the enemy. What reasons influenced him in forming that determination are
not well established by the testimony. Some of the officers have expressed
their conviction that he apprehended that the enemy, should he retire further
from them, would fall upon his rear and cripple him, or force him to fight a
battle under great disadvantages. His brave spirit, doubtless, led him to meet
the enemy he had gone so far to reach, and endeavor to inflict such a blow as
would lead them not to press very closely upon him. Whatever his reasons
may have been, he determined upon the attack. The battle was fought at
Wilson's creek, on the 10th of August, and, though the enemy outnumbered
our forces four to one, our army was eminently successful.
General Lyon fell, leading on a regiment to the attack. His loss at that time
was most deeply felt. Dying as a brave soldier would wish to die, fighting for
the cause of his country against those who were seeking its destruction, his
example has exercised its influence upon those who have since won the glorious
victories which have made our armies in the west so illustrious.
After that battle our forces retired to Holla, the enemy being so severely
punished that they followed only at a distance. At Rolla they were joined by
the troops that had been started to their relief, but had been delayed for want
of transportation.
CONDUCT OF THE WAR. 5
In September, Colonel Mulligan, who had been upon an expedition in the
northern part of the State, was obliged to fall back before the forces of the
enemy advancing against him under General Price. Colonel Mulligan made a
stand at Lexington, and prepared to resist them, sending for re-enforcements.
General Fremont, upon hearing of Colonel Mulligan's situation, made arrange
ments to send troops to his assistance ; but from various causes they were un
able to reach him, and the enemy succeeding in cutting off his supply of water
he was compelled to surrender.
Shortly after this, General Fremont determined to take the field in person,
with all the forces he could collect together. He was deficient in transporta
tion, so much so that the adjutant general of the army reported to the Secre
tary of War that General Fremont would be unable to move. He did move,
however, and, by the first of November, succeeded in reaching Springfield.
The enemy, some 2,000 strong, had been driven from that place by Major
Zagoni, who, with barely 100 cavalry, made the most brilliant charge of the war.
Preparations were made to engage the enemy, who were understood to be in
force in the immediate neighborhood of Springfield. The day was fixed and
the order of the attack determined upon. Just then General Fremont was re
moved from the command and General Hunter appointed as his successor.
General Hunter testifies that he became satisfied that the enemy were not
so near as General Fremont had supposed. He determined, therefore, to with
draw to St. Louis, which was done, and active operations in the State were sus
pended for some time.
In relation to the administration of General Fremont much has been said
about the high prices paid by him for arms and other supplies ; the unnecessary
fortification of St. Louis ; delay in re-enforcing points threatened by the enemy ;
undue assumption of authority, &c. Your committee can but briefly notice
those different points, on account of their inability to obtain full evidence in re
lation to them.
This much, at least, appears to be established : General Fremont, upon tak
ing the command, was clothed with the most ample authority, and the exigen
cies of the department were such that much should be pardoned in one com
pelled to act so promptly, and with so little at his command. Whether that
authority was exercised, in all respects, as it should have been — whether Gen
eral Fremont was justified in all that he did by the circumstances under which
he was called upon to act — your committee do not undertake to express a posi
tive opinion.
In relation to the purchase of arms, &c., it appears that the department was very
destitute of supplies of all kinds ; the demand was most pressing, and the
government was unable to supply it. Some of the arms engaged by General
Fremont, for the soldiers in his department, were diverted to the army of the
Potomac, the primary object of the government the'n being to collect and equip
an army at Washington, as soon as could possibly be done. This rendered it
the more important that other arms should be obtained ; yet with all that General
Fremont deemed it proper to do his department long felt the want of adequate
supplies.
In reference to the fortifications about St. Louis, General Fremont but carried
out what General Lyon, before him, had deemed necessary. In reference to
the manner in which it was done — as the government has had its agents to ex
amine the contracts for that work, as well as other contracts — your committee
forbear expressing an opinion.
In regard to re-enforcing promptly those points threatened by the enemy, so
far as your committee have the evidence before them, they believe that General
Fremont acted with energy and promptness. He was peculiarly situated. The
first call — that of General Lyon — was pressed upon him so soon after he took
command of the department, and he was compelled to act so hastily, without
b CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
time for fully surveying the field before him, and ascertaining the extent of the
resources at his command, that even if he failed to do all that one under other
circumstances might have done, still your committee can discover no cause of
censure against him. But in regard to both General Lyon and Colonel Mulligan
your committee have discovered no evidence of any disregard for the public
interest, or want of energy or inclination upon the part of General Fremont.
Troops were collected by him as soon as could be done, and they were promptly
sent where the exigencies of the service demanded. Some of them were diverted
to other purposes than those for which General Fremont designed them. The
government called upon him for troops to be sent to the east at a time when he
was most earnestly engaged in procuring forces for the assistance of Colonel
Mulligan. Those that were left were sent promptly, and only failed to render
the assistance needed from causes over which General Fremont had no control.
General Fremont early turned his attention to the building of gunboats for
our western rivers. Whoever is entitled to the credit of originating the idea of
employing such means of warfare in that section of country, it is not to be de
nied that General Fremont perceived the advantage to result from them. Our
brilliant victories in the west will bear enduring testimony to the correctness of
his judgment in that respect.
But that feature of General Fremont's administration which attracted the
most attention at the time, and which will ever be most prominent among the
many points of interest connected with the history of that department, is his
proclamation of emancipation. Whatever opinion may be entertained in refer
ence to the time when the policy of emancipation should have been inaugurated,
or by whose authority it should have been promulgated, there can be no doubt
that General Fremont at that early day rightly judged in regard to the most
effective means of subduing this rebellion. In proof of that it is only necessary
to refer to the fact that his successor, when transferred to another department,
issued a proclamation embodying the same principle. And the President, as
commander-iii-chief of the army and navy, has applied the same principle to all
the rebellious States, and few will deny that it must be adhered to until the
last vestige of treason and rebellion is destroyed.
The administration of General Fremont was eminently characterized by
earnestness, ability, and the most unquestionable loyalty. In the exercise of
the almost unlimited power delegated to him, there was no evidence of any ten
derness towards treason, or any failure to fully assert the dignity and power of
the government of which he was the representative. The manner in which that
power was exercised was to be judged by the results, and the policy of con
tinuing him in command was a matter for the authorities above him to determine.
In order to pronounce a final judgment upon all the affairs in the western
department, much more information is necessary than is in the possession of
your committee. They have undertaken merely to state what seems to be borne
out by such testimony as they have been able to obtain.
B. F. WADE, Chairman.
Z. CHANDLER.
JOHN COVODE.
GEO. W. JULIAN.
As the testimony which the committee submit in relation to the western de
partment is so incomplete, the testimony of so many witnesses deemed material
by the whole committee being wanting, the undersigned decline to concur in the
above report, and for themselves prefer to submit the testimony without com
ment.
D. W. GOOCH.
M. F. ODELL.
TESTIMONY
WESTERN DEPARTMENT.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City,D. G., March 12, 1862.
SIR: I have the honor, in compliance with your request of the 28th ultimo,
to transmit herewith copies of the following papers, viz:
Report of Adjutant General Thomas upon the Western Department, and
The order discharging the body guard under Major Zagoni.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
Hon. B. F. WADE,
Chairman Joint Committee on the conduct of the present war.
HARRISBURG, PA., October 19, 1861.
GENERAL: When I did myself the honor to ask you to accompany me on
my western tour, it was with the view of availing myself of your expe
rience as adjutant general of the army. Finding that the result of my in
vestigations might (as I at first apprehended) have an important effect not
only uj[)on the army of the west, but upon the interests of the whole country,
I requested you to take full notes upon all points connected with the object
of my visit.
As you inform me that you have carefully complied with my wish, I now
respectfully request you to submit your report as early as practicable, in
order that the President may be correctly advised as to the administration
of affairs connected with the army of the west.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.
Brigadier General L. THOMAS,
Adjutant General of the United States Army.
WASHINGTON, D. C., October 21, 1861.
SIR: I have the honor to submit the report requested in your letter of the
19th instant:
We arrived at St. Louis, as you are aware, at 2J a. m. October llth.
After breakfast, rode to Benton Barracks, above the city. On the street
leading to the camp, passed a small fieldwork in course of construction.
Found the camp of great extent, with extensive quarters, constructed of
rough boards. Much has been said of the large sums expended in their
erection; but some one mentioned that General McKinstry, principal quar-
8 TESTIMONY.
termaster, who made the disbursements, gave the cost at $15,000. If so, it
was judicious. The actual cost should be ascertained. General Curtis was
in command. Force present 140 officers, 3,338 men; principally detach
ments, except the 1st Iowa cavalry, 34 officers, 904 men, having horses, but
without equipments.
General Curtis said of General Fremont that he found no difficulty in
having access to him, and when he presented business connected with his
command it was attended to. General Fremont never consulted him on
military matters, nor informed him of his plans. General Curtis remarked
that while he would go with freedom to General Scott and express his
opinions, he would not dare do so to General Fremont. He deemed Gen
eral Fremont unequal to the command of an army, and said that he was no
more bound by law than by the winds.
After dinner, rode to the arsenal below the city, Captain Callender in charge.
The garrison for its protection is under Major Granger, 3d cavalry. But very
few arms in hand ; a number of heavy guns, designed for gunboats and mortar-
boats. The captain is engaged in making ammunition. He said he heard that
some person had a contract for making the carriages for these guns; that if
so he knew nothing of it; and that it was entirely irregular, he being the
proper officer to attend to the case. This, in my opinion, requires investi
gation. He expected soon to receive funds, and desired them for current
purposes. Was fearful, however, that they might be diverted for other
payments.
Visited a large hospital not distant from the arsenal, in charge of Assist
ant Surgeon Bailey, United States army. It was filled with patients, mostly
doing well. In fine order and a credit to the service. The doctor had an
efficient corps of assistants from the volunteer service, and in addition a
number of sisters of 'charity as nurses. God bless these pure and disin
terested women!
Colonel Andrews, chief paymaster, called, and represented irregularities
in the pay department, and desired instructions from the Secretary for his
government, stating that he was required to make payments and transfers
of money contrary to law and regulations. Once, upon objecting to what
he conceived an improper payment, he was threatened with confinement by
a file of soldiers. He exhibited an order for the transfer of $100,000 to the
quartermaster's department, which was irregular. Exhibited abstract of
payments by one paymaster (Major Febiger) to 42 persons, appointed by
General Fre'mont, viz: 1 colonel, 3 majors, 8 captains, 15 first lieutenants,
11 second lieutenants, 1 surgeon, 3 assistant surgeons; total, 42. Nineteen
of these have appointments as engineers, and entitled to cavalry pay. — (See
paper No. 1.) A second abstract of payments was furnished, but not vouched
for as reliable, as the paymaster was sick, and is only given to show the
excess of officers of rank appointed to the major general's body guard of
only 300 men: the commander being a colonel, &c. — (See paper No. 2.) The
whole number of irregular appointments made by General Fremont was paid
by Colonel Andrews to be nearly two hundred.
The following is a copy of one of these appointments :
" HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
"St. Louis, August 28, 1861.
" SIR: You are hereby appointed captain of cavalry, to be employed in the
land transportation department, and will report for duty at these head
quarters.
"J. C. FREMONT,
" Major General Commanding.
" To Capt. FELIX VOGELE, Present."
(See paper No. 3.)
TESTIMONY. y
I also saw a similar appointment given to an individual on General Frd-
inont's staff, as director of music, with the rank and commission of captain of
engineers. This person was a musician in a theatre in St. Louis. Colonel
Andrews was verbally instructed by me not to pay him, the person having
presented the two papers and demanded pay. Colonel Andrews also stated
that these appointments bore one date, but directed payment, in some cases,
a month or more anterior thereto. He was then without funds, except a
small amount.
The principal commissary, Captain Haines, had no outstanding debts, and
expected funds soon. Major Allen, principal quartermaster, had recently
taken charge at St. Louis, but reported great irregularities in his depart
ment, and requested special instructions. These he deemed important, as
orders were communicated by a variety of persons, in a very irregular
manner, requiring disbursements of money. These orders are often ver
bally given. — (See paper No. 4, asking for instructions.) He was sending,
under General Fremont's orders, large amounts of forage from St. Louis to
the army at Tipton, where corn was abundant and very cheap. The dis
tance was 160 miles. He gave the indebtedness of the quartermaster's
department in St. Louis to be $4,506,309 73. — (See paper No. 5.)
In regard to contracts, without an examination of the accounts it would
be difficult to arrive at the facts. It is the expressed belief of many persons
that General Fremont has around him, in his staff, persons directly and in
directly concerned in furnishing supplies. The following is a copy of a
letter signed by Leonidas Haskell, captain and aide-de-camp. He, though on
General Fremont's staff, is said to be a contractor for hay and forage and
mules; the person named in his note, Colonel Degraf, being his partner.
" HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
" Gamp Lillis, October 2, 1861.
" SIR : I am requested by the commanding general to authorize Colonel
Degraf to take any hay that has been contracted for by the government,
his receipt for the same being all the voucher you require.
" Respectfully yours,
"LEONIDAS HASKELL,
" Captain and A. D. C?
(See Exhibit No. 6.)
What does this mean ? Contractors deliver forage direct to quartermas
ters, who issue the same; but here another party steps in, and, if a con
tractor, or the partner of one, to fill his own contract. This double transac
tion, it is difficult to suppose, is done without a consideration. The accounts
should be examined, and the price paid to Degraf compared with that paid
to the contractors whose forage was seized.
This same Captain Haskell, aide-de-camp, was a contractor for mules. He
desired Captain Turnley to receive his animals, good, bad, and indifferent, as
Captain Turuley said. This he would not do, and stated his prices for dif
ferent classes, wheel, lead, &c. Besides, he had more mules than he could
possibly send to the army. Notwithstanding all this, he received an order
to inspect and receive Mr. Haskell's mules as rapidly as possible. Captain
Turuley very soon received orders from General Fremont to leave St. Louis
and proceed to the interior. — (See paper No. 7, showing his great labor and
heavy responsibility.)
By direction of General Meigs, advertisements were made to furnish grain
and hay, and contracts made for specific sums — 28 cents per bushel for corn,
30 cents for oats, and $17 95 per ton for hay. In face of this, another party
at St. Louis, Baird, or Baird & Palmer, (Palmer being of the old firm in Cal-
10 TESTIMONY.
ifornia of Palmor, Cook & Co.,) were directed to send to Jefferson City, (where
hay and corn abound,) as fast as possible, 100,000 bushels of oats, with a
corresponding amount of hay, at 33 cents per bushel for grain, and $19 per
ton for hay. — (See paper No. 7 — Captain Turnley's letter.)
Captain Edward M. Davis, a member of his staff, received a contract, by
the direct order of General Fremont, for blankets. They were examined by
a board of army officers, consisting of Captain Hendershott, 4th artillery,
Captain Harris, commissary of subsistence, and Captain Turnley, assistant
quartermaster. The blankets were found to be made of cotton, and to be
rotten and worthless. Notwithstanding this decision, they were purchased,
and given to the sick and wounded soldiers in hospital. These facts can be
ascertained from the report of the board or the officers themselves, and the
bill of purchase.
Amongst the supplies sent by General Fremont to the army now in the
field may be enumerated 500 half barrels, to carry water, in a country of
abundant supply, and 500 tons of ice.
We examined the barracks in course of construction in St. Louis, near and
around the private house occupied by him as quarters — the Brant House,
rented at $6,000 per annum. These barracks have brick foundations and
brick outer walls, weatherboarded, and are sufficient as quarters and stables
for 1,000 men. Like those of Camp Benton, these barracks were not built
by contract or proposals; they are certainly more expensive and more per
manent than the quarters of a temporary army would require; and the ex
act expense, though perhaps difficult to ascertain, should be discovered.
A pontoon bridge has been thrown across the Ohio river at Paducah. A
ferry boat, in a region where such boats are readily procured, would be just
as efficient and much less expensive.
Contracts, it will be seen, were given to individuals without resorting to
advertisements for bids, as required by law and regulations.
Having received an intimation from another quarter of an impropriety, I
called on Captain McKeever, assistant adjutant general, for the facts, which
he gave me as follows: One week after the receipt of the President's order
modifying General Fremont's proclamation relative to the emancipation of
slaves, General Fremont, by note to Captain McKeever, required him to have
200 copies of the original proclamation and address to the army of same
date printed and sent immediately to Irontou, for the use of Major Gavitt,
Indiana cavalry, for distribution through the country. Captain McKeever
had the copies printed and delivered. The order is as follows :
" Adjutant general will have 200 copies of proclamation of commanding
general, dated 30th August, together with address to the army of same date,
sent immediately to Ironton for the use of Major Gavitt, Indiana cavalry.
Major Gavitt will distribute it through the country.
" J. C. F., Commanding General.
" SEPTEMBER 23, 1861.
"A true copy:
" CHAUNCEY McKEEYER,
"A&ttAdft Gen'l»
We left St. Louis, October 12, for General Fremont's headquarters, at
Tipton, 160 miles distant, passing the night at Jefferson City, the capital of
Missouri, 125 miles from St. Louis; General Price was in command of the
place with a force of 12,000 men. The 8th Iowa was there en route for Tip-
ton. At this place there were accumulated a large quantity of forage landed
from steamboats, and some wagons and mules for transportation; also the
half barrels for carrying water, and a number of mules, which Captain Turn-
TESTIMONY. 11
ley said ho could not get forward, having no control over the transportation
by railroad.
Leaving Jefferson City on the 13th, we arrived at Tipton at 9 o'clock a.m.
The Secretary of War was called upon by General Fremont, and upon the gen
eral's invitation accompanied him to Syracuse, five miles distant, to review
the division under General McKinstry, nearly eight thousand strong. This
body of troops is said to be the best equipped and best supplied of the whole
army. They certainly are, so far as means of transportation are concerned.
At Tipton, besides General Fremont and staff, his body-guard, &c., I found
part of General Hunter's 1st division, and General Asboth's 4th division.
The force designed to act against Price consists of five divisions, as fol
lows :
First division, Hunter's, at Tipton 9,750
Second division, Pope's, at Georgetown 9,220
Third division, Sigel's, at Sedalia 7,980
Fifth division, Asboth's, at Tipton 6,451
Sixth division, McKinstry's, at Syracuse 5,388
Total 38,789
As soon as I obtained a view of the several encampments at Tipton, I ex
pressed the opinion that the forces there assembled could not be moved, as
scarcely any means of transportation were visible. I saw General Hunter,
second in command, and conversed freely with him. He stated that there
was great confusion, and that Fremont was utterly incompetent; that his
own division was greatly scattered, and the force then present defective in
many respects; that he required one hundred wagons, yet he was ordered to
march that day, and some of his troops were already drawn out on the road.
His cavalry regiment (Ellis's) had horses, arms, (indifferent,) but no equip
ments; had to carry their cartridges in their pockets; consequently, on their
first day's march from Jefferson City, in a heavy rain, the cartridges carried
about their persons were destroyed. This march to Tipton (thirty-five miles)
was made on a miry, heavy earth road parallel to the railroad and but a little
distance from it. The troops were directed by General Fremont to march
without provisions, knapsacks, and without transportation. A violent rain
storm came up, and the troops were exposed to it all night; were without
food for twenty-four hours, and when food was received the beef was found
to be spoiled.
General Hunter stated that he had just received a written report from one
of his colonels, informing him that but twenty out of one hundred of his
guns would go off. These were the guns procured by General Fremont in
Europe. I may here state that General Sherman, at Louisville, made a sim
ilar complaint of the great inferiority of these European arms. He had
given the men orders to file down the nipples. In conversation with Colonel
Swords, assistant quartermaster general, at Louisville, just from California,
he stated that Mr. Selover, who was in Europe with General Fremont, wrote
to some friend in San Francisco that his share of the profits of the purchase
of these arms was $30,000.
When General Hunter, at Jefferson City, received orders to march to Tip-
ton, he was directed to take forty-one wagons with him, when he had only
forty mules, which fact had been duly reported to headquarters. At this
time, Colonel Stevenson's 7th Missouri regiment was, without General Hunt
er's knowledge, taken from him, leaving him, when under marching orders,
with only one regiment at Jefferson City fit to take the field. — (See paper
No. 9.) General Hunter showed me the order for inarching, dated October
10, which he only received the 12th. — (See paper No. 10. See Hunter's
12 TESTIMONY.
reply, showing the great wants of his command, marked No. 11.) The
same day the order was changed to one day's march. — (See paper No. 12.)
When General Pope, at Georgetown, twenty-five miles distant, received
this order of march, he wrote a private letter to Hunter, which I read. It
set forth the utter impossibility of his moving for the want of supplies and
transportation, and asked whether 'General Freinont could mean what he
said.
All of the foregoing goes to show the want of military foresight and
soldierly judgment on the part of General Fremont, in directing the neces
sary means for putting and maintaining in the field the forces under his
command.
General Hunter stated that, though second in command, he never was
consulted by General Fremont, and knew nothing whatever of his inten
tions. Such a parallel, I venture to assert, cannot be found in the annals of
military warfare. I have also been informed that there is not a Missourian
on his staff — not a man acquainted, personally, with the topography and
physical characteristics of the country or its people.
The failure of General Fremont to re-enforce General Lyon demands brief
notice. General Fremont arrived at St. Louis July 26, called thither from New
York by telegraph, stating- that General Lyon was threatened by 30,000 rebels.
At this time General Pope had nine regiments in north Missouri, where the
rebels had no embodied force, the confederate forces in the State being those
under Price and McCulloch, near Springfield, southwest Missouri, and those
under Pillow, Jeff. Thompson and Hardee, in southeast Missouri; two
regiments held Rolla, the terminus of the southwestern branch of the Pa
cific railroad, whilst Jefferson City, Boonesville, Lexington and Kansas City
had each a garrison of three or four hundred men, behind intreuchments.
Cairo and Bird's Point were fortified and defended with heavy artillery.
(Pilot Knob and Cape Girardeau were fortified after General Fremont's
arrival.) All these places could be re-enforced by railroad and river from
St. Louis and the northwestern States, and could hold out until re-enforced,
even if attacked by superior forces. On his arrival in St. Louis, General
Fremont was met by Captain Cavender, 1st Missouri, and Major Farrar, aide-
de-camp to General Lyon, with statements from the latter, and asking for
re-enforcements. Major Phelps, member of Congress from Springfield, Doctor
Miller, of Omaha, and many other citizens, having ample means of informa
tion, made the same representations and urged the sending of re-enforce
ments. To Governor Gamble he said : " General Lyon is as strong as any
other officer on this line." He failed to strengthen Lyon, and the result, as
is well known, was the defeat of that most gallant oflScer. The two regi
ments at Rolla should have been pushed forward, and the whole of Pope's
nine regiments brought by rail to St. Louis and Rolla, and thence sent to
Lyon's force. Any other general, in such an emergency, would have pur
sued this obvious course.
The battle of Springfield, (or more strictly Wilson's creek,) one of the
most desperate ever fought on this continent, took place August 10, when
the brave Lyon fell, and the troops, borne down by greatly superior numbers,
were obliged to fall back, but uupursued by a badly beaten foe
General Fremont called four regiments from North Missouri and went
with them to Cairo. It is evident that he had no intention of re-enforcing
General Lyon, for the two regiments at Rolla, 125 miles only from Spring
field, received no orders to march, and were not supplied with transporta
tion, and thirty or forty hired wagons, just returned from Springfield, were
discharged at Rolla August 4, seven days before the battle, and returned to
St. Louis.
After the news of the battle readied St. Louis, four other regiments were
TESTIMONY. 13
drawn from Pope in North Missouri and sent to Rolla. Better to have
called in these troops before the battle, as after the battle the whole revo
lutionary elements were called forth. The six regiments accomplished
nothing, and were not ordered to advance and cover the retreat of Lyon's
army, although it was supposed in St. Louis that Price and McCulloch
were following it, and that Hardee had moved up to cut off its retreat on
the Gasconade.
An advance of these regiments would have enabled the army to retrace
its steps, and to beat the forces of Price and McCulloch so badly that they
would have been unable to follow our forces in their retreat. It is said
that every officer in Lyon's army expected to meet re-enforcements, and to
return with them and drive Price and McCulloch from the southwest.
General Hunter arrived at St. Louis from Chicago, called thither on a
suggestion from Washington as an adviser. General Fremont submitted
to him, for consideration and advice, a paper called " Disposition for retaking
Springfield." It sets out out with a statement that Springfield is the strong
strategical point of that wide elevation which separates the waters of the
Osage from those of the Arkansas ; the key to the whole southwestern Mis
souri, commanding an area of nearly 60,000 miles. Why did not this enter
the brain of the major general before the fall of Lyon, and he strain every
nerve to hold that important key when in his possession ?
General Hunter, in answer to the paper, replied : " Why march on Spring
field, where there is no enemy and nothing to take ? Let me take the troops
and proceed to Lexington," in which direction Price was marching, and
where he expected to be joined by 40,000 rebels. Instead of this he was
sent to Holla, without instructions, and remained there until ordered to Jef
ferson City, still without instructions, and thence to Tipton, where we found
him. — (See Exhibit No. 13.)
No steps having been taken by General Fremont to meet Price in the
field, he moved forward his line of march, plainly indicating his intention of
proceeding to Lexington. When within some thirty-five miles of the place, he
remained ten or more days, evidently expecting that some movement would
be made against him. None being made, he advanced and, *with his much
superior force, laid siege to Lexington, defeated by Mulligan with 2,700
men September 12, and captured it the 21st, nine days thereafter.
Now for the facts to show that this catastrophe could have been pre
vented, and Price's army destroyed before or after that disastrous affair.
Before Price got to Lexington the forces to resist him were as follows :
Jefferson City, 5,500 ; at Rolla, 4,000 ; along the Hannibal and St. Joseph
railroad, about 5,000 ; western line of Missouri, under Lane, down near Fort
Scott, 2,300 ; Mulligan's force at Lexington, 2,700 ; a large force in Illinois,
along the Mississippi river, and on the Iowa line ; outside of St. Louis, some
17,000 ; in St. Louis, 18,000, but say 10,000.
Hunter's plan, up to Sunday, 22d September, was to concentrate from St.
Louis, Jefferson city, and Rolla; also from the Hannibal and St. Joseph
railroad, 20,000 men, and relieve Mulligan. He said that if Price was a
soldier, Lexington had then fallen, but he could, with energy, be captured
with all his baggage and plunder.
The objection that there was no transportation is idle. The railroads and
river were at command, and the march from Sedalia was only forty-five miles.
The force could, General Hunter supposed, be thrown into Lexington by
Thursday, as it appears, before it was taken.
General Fremont ordered Sturgis, in North Missouri, to Lexington, and
by crossing the river to re-enforce Mulligan. Sturgis had only 1,100 mqn,
and, on reaching the river opposite the town, found it commanded by Price,
and, of course, was compelled to fall back. Hunter's plan of moving these
14 TESTIMONY>
troops was to strike the river at a point below Lexington in our control,
cross, and march up to the place. In the interview with General Fremont
the question was asked whether any orders had been given to re-enforce
Mulligan, and the reply being in the negative, General Hunter suggested
orders to Sturgis, and had the order then been given by telegraph, he would
have reached the river before Price had taken possession of the north bank
and could have crossed. The order was not given until three days after
the interview. This loss of time was fatal.
Mulligan was ordered from Jefferson City, then garrisoned with 5,000
troops, with only one regiment, to hold Lexington until he could be relieved.
When Lexington fell, Price had 20,000 men, his force receiving daily aug
mentation from the disaffected in the State. He was permitted to gather
much plunder and fall back towards Arkansas unmolested, until we were at
Tipton, the 13th October, when the accounts were that he was crossing the
Osage. Fremont's order of march was issued to an army of nearly 40,000,
many of the regiments badly equipped, with inadequate supplies of ammu
nition, clothing and transportation. With what prospect, it must be in
quired, can General Fremont, under such circumstances, expect to overtake
a retreating army, some one hundred miles ahead, with a deep river between ?
General Hunter expressed to the Secretary of War his decided opinion
that General Fremont was incompetent and unfit for his extensive and im
portant command. This opinion he gave reluctantly, owing to his position
as second in command.
The opinion entertained by gentlemen who have approached and observed
him is, that he is more fond of the pomp than the stern realities of war;
that his mind is incapable of fixed attention or strong concentration; that
by his mismanagement of affairs since his arrival in Missouri the State has
almost been lost, and that, if he is continued in command, the worst results
may be anticipated.
This is the concurrent testimony of a very large number of the most in
telligent men in Missouri.
Leaving Tipton on the 13th, we arrived at St. Louis late in the evening,
and on the 14th the Secretary of War directed me to issue the following in
structions to General Fremont:
"ST. Louis, Mo., October 14, 1861.
" GENERAL: The Secretary of War directs me to communicate the following
as his instructions for your government:
" In view of the heavy sums due, especially in the quartermaster's depart
ment in this city, amounting to some $4,500,000, it is important that the
money which may now be in the hands of the disbursing officers, or be re
ceived by them, be applied to the current expenses of your army in Missouri,
and these debts to remain unpaid until they can be properly examined and
sent to Washington for settlement; the disbursing officers of the army to
disburse the funds and not transfer them to irresponsible agents; in other
words, those who do not hold commissions from the President, and are not
under bonds. All contracts necessary to be made to be made by the dis
bursing officers. The senior quartermaster here has been verbally instruct
ed by the secretary as above.
" It is deemed unnecessary to erect fieldworks around this city, and you
will direct their discontinuance; also those, if any, in course of construction
at Jefferson City. In this connexion it is seen that a number of commis
sions have been given by you. No payments will be made to such officers,
except to those whose appointments have been approved by the President.
This of course does not apply to the officers with volunteer troops. Colonel
TESTIMONY. 15
Andrews has been verbally so instructed by the Secretary; also, not to make
transfers of funds, except for the purpose of paying the troops.
" The erection of barracks near your quarters in this city to be at once
discontinued.
" The Secretary has been informed that the troops of General Lane's com
mand are committing depredations on our friends in western Missouri.
Your attention is directed to this, in the expectation that you will apply
the corrective.
" Major Allen desires the services of Captain Turnley for a short time,
and the Secretary hopes you may find it proper to accede thereto.
" I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"L. THOMAS, Adjutant General
"Major General J. C. FREMONT,
" Commanding Department of the West, Tipton, Mo."
Instructions were previously given (October 12) to the Hon. James Craig
to raise a regiment at St. Joseph, Missouri.
We left St. Louis October 14, and arrived at Indianapolis in the evening.
I remained at Indianapolis October 15, and conversed freely with Governor
Morton. We found that the State of Indiana had corne nobly up to the
work of suppressing the rebellion. Fifty- five regiments, with several bat
teries of artillery, had been raised and equipped; a larger number of troops,
in proportion to population, than any other State had sent into the field.
The best spirit prevailed, and it was manifest that additional troops could
easily be raised.
The governor had established an arsenal, and furnished all the Indiana
troops with full supplies of ammunition, including fixed ammunition for
their batteries of artillery. This arsenal was visited, arid found to be in
full operation. It was under the charge of a competent pyrotechnist.
Quite a number of females were employed in making cartridges, and I ven
ture to assert that the ammunition is equal to that which is manufactured
anywhere else. Governor Morton stated that his funds for this purpose
were exhausted; but the Secretary desired him to continue his opera
tions, informing him that the government would pay for what had been
furnished to the troops in the field. It is suggested that an officer of ord
nance be sent to Indianapolis to inspect the arsenal and ascertain the
amount expended in the manufacture of ammunition, with a view to reim
bursing the State.
Left Indianapolis October 16 for Louisville, Kentucky, where we arrived
at 121 o'clock p. m., and had an interview with General Sherman, command
ing the department of the Cumberland. He gave a gloomy picture of affairs
in Kentucky, stating that the young men were generally secessionists, and
had joined the confederates; while the Union men, the aged, and conserva
tives, would not enrol themselves to engage in conflict with their relations
on the other side. But few regiments could be raised. He said that Buck-
ner was in advance of Green river with a heavy force on the road to Louis
ville, and an attack might be daily expected, which, with the then force, he
would not be able to resist, but that he would fight them. He, as well as
citizens of the State, said that the border State of Kentucky must furnish
the troops to drive the rebels from the State. His force then consisted of
10,000 troops in advance of Louisville, in camp at Nolin river, and on the
Louisville and Nashville railroad, at various points; at Camp Dick Robin
son, or acting in conjunction with General Thomas, 9,000; and two regi
ments at Henderson, on the Ohio, at the mouth of Green river — (See paper
No. 14.) On being asked the question, what force he deemed necessary, he
promptly replied, 200,000 men. This conversation occurred in the presence
16 TESTIMONY.
of Mr. Guthrie and General Woods. The Secretary replied that he sup
posed that the Kentuckians would not, in any number, take up arms to
operate against the rebels, but he thought General Sherman over estimated
the number and power of the rebel forces; that the government would fur
nish troops to Kentucky to accomplish the work; that he (the Secretary)
was tired of this defensive war, and that the troops must assume the offen
sive, and carry the war to the firesides of the enemy; that the season for
operations in Western Virginia was about over, arid that he would take the
troops from there and send them to Kentucky; but he begged of General
Sherman to assume the offensive, and to keep the rebels hereafter on the
defensive. The Secretary desired that the Cumberland Ford and Gap
should be siezed, and the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad taken pos
session of, and the artery that supplied the rebellion east. Complaint was
made of the want of arms, and on the question being asked, " What became
of the arms we sent to Kentucky ?" we were informed by General Sherman
that they had passed into the hands of the Home Guards, and could not be
recovered; that many were already in the hands of the rebels, and others
refused to surrender those in their possession, alleging the desire to use
them in defence of their individual homes if invaded. In the hands of in
dividuals, and scattered over the State, these arms are lost to the army in
Kentucky. Having ascertained that 6,200 arms had arrived from Europe
at Philadelphia, 3,000 were ordered to Governor Morton, who promised to
place them immediately in the hands of troops for Kentucky. The remain
ing 3,200 were sent to General Sherman, at Louisville. Negley's brigade
at Pittsburg, 2,800 strong, two companies of the 19th infantry from Indian
apolis, the 8th Wisconsin at St. Louis, the 2d regiment of Minnesota volun
teers at Pittsburg, and two regiments from Wisconsin, were then ordered
to Kentucky, making in all a re-enforcement of about ten thousand men.
We left Louisville at 3 o'clock p. m. for Lexington, accompanied by General
Sherman and Mr. Guthrie. Remained there a few hours, and proceeded to
Cincinnati, arriving at 8 o'clock p. m. At Lexington, also, we found that
the opinion existed that the young men of Kentucky had joined the rebels;
that no large bodies of troops could be raised in Kentucky, and that the
defence of the State must necessarily devolve upon the free States of the
west and northwest.
Having accomplished the object of our visit to the west, we left Cincinnati
on the 18th and reached Washington on the 21st, having spent the 19th and
20th at Harrisburg.
Respectfully submitted.
L. THOMAS, Adjutant General.
Hon. SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.
[Paper No. 3.]
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 28, 1861.
SIR : You are hereby appointed captain of cavalry, to be employed in the
land transport department, and will report for duty at these headquarters.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
To Captain FELIX VOGELI, Present.
A true copy : C. McKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant General.
TESTIMONY. 17
[Exhibit No. 6.]
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Gamp Siller, October 2, 1861.
SIR : I am requested by the commanding general to authorize Colonel
Degraf to take any hay that has been contracted for by the government, his
receipt for the same being all the voucher you require.
Respectfully, yours,
LEONIDAS HASKILL,
Captain and Aide-de- Camp.
[Paper No. 9.]
HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION,
Jefferson City, Missouri, October 4, 1861.
COLONEL : Your letter of yesterday, ordering me to march this morning,
was only received this morning at ten minutes after two. You will see by
my report of transportation, sent you on the 2d instant, that for the forty-
one wagons in possession of my quartermaster he has only forty rnules.
It will therefore be impossible for him to take the forty or more wagons
agreeably to your order.
Colonel Stevenson, of the 7th Missouri regiment, informs me that he is
attached to Colonel Totteii's brigade of the fifth division. I must protest, in
the strongest terms, against this very unmilitary proceeding of depriving
me of the most important part of my command, when under marching or
ders, without giving me an official notice of the change. Detaching Colonel
Stevenson from my division will leave me but one regiment here fit to take
the field. . '
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. HUNTER,
Major General Commanding 1st Division.
Colonel J. H. EATON,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters Western Department, Jefferson City.
[Paper No. 10.]
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Camp Asboth, Tipton, Mo., October 10, 1861.
GENERAL : The following movements of the several divisions of the army
of Western Missouri, under my command, have been decided upon :
Acting Major General Pope, with the forces under his immediate command,
will march, by way of Otterville, to Sedalia, and from there by the most
direct route to Leesville.
Acting Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis will start on the 13th of
October from Georgetown, by Sedalia, with the troops belonging to General
Pope's division, and pursue the same direct road to Leesville, reaching his
destination on the 15th instant.
Acting Major General Sigel will start from Sedalia on the 13th, and pro
ceed in three marches by Spring Rock and Cole Camp to Warsaw, which place
he will occupy; commence .preparations immediately to cross the river the
next day, supported by Acting Major General McKinstry's forces, and cross
on the 16th at all hazards, if a position can be taken on the right bank under
the protection of which a bridge may be built.
Acting Major General McKinstry will start on the 13th, and proceed in
Part iii 2
18 TESTIMONY.
four marches, by Florence, How creek and Cole Camp, to Warsaw, where he
will co-operate with General Sigel.
Major Genera"! Hunter will also start on the 13th instant, and proceed in
four marches, by way of Versailles and Minerva, (Hibernia, ) to Duroc Ferry.
Acting Major General Asboth will start with his division on the 14th,
and march in three days to Cole Camp creek, by way of Wheatland and
Hibernia.
Generals Sturgis and Lane are expected to be at the same time in Clin
ton on our extreme right. You are therefore instructed to commence your
march on the day appointed for your troops to move, and proceed according
to the directions above laid down.
The state of the roads is such that trains may notunfrequentlybe delayed,
which renders it more than usually necessary that the troops should in all
cases have at least one day's rations in their haversacks. The commanders
of divisions will also in all cases where possible send forward, in advance
of the march, a company of pioneers, protected by cavalry, to repair the
bridges and roads wherever impassable.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Major General HUNTER,
Commanding First Division.
[Paper No. 4.]
QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE,
St. Louis, Missouri, October 11, 1861.
GENERAL: I take the occasion of the presence of the honorable Secretary
of War and yourself to make certain inquiries.
Is it competent for every member of the staff of Major General John C.
Fremont to issue orders in the name of the general, directed to me, and
involving an expenditure of money ?
Am 1 bound to recognize any other signature than that of Captain
McKeever, the regularly-constituted assistant adjutant general of the
western department ?
I desire to be instructed whether the simple approval of an account by
the commanding general carries with it the weight of an order.
There are heavy accounts, involving hundreds of thousands of dollars, that
have come under my observation, which are approved by Major General John
C. Fremont, but in direct terms are not ordered. It is doubtless the intention
of the general to order the payment. But as I understand the army regu
lations and the laws of Congress, an approval is not an order. If I am
mistaken in this, I desire to be corrected.
Great latitude is taken in verbal orders. And the general being in the
field, I cannot stop to question the authenticity of these orders, and feel it to
be my duty to see them executed, although I have not the authority on paper
necessary to carry these expenditures through the treasury.
Accounts involving hundreds of thousand of dollars have been presented
to me within the few days I have been here, informal, irregular, and not
authorized by law or regulations.
No quartermaster who understands his duty can pay this class of accounts
without involving himself in irretrievable ruin. 1 do not mean to say that
these accounts are not just, or should not be paid ; but as they are outside
of the regulations — in other words, extraordinary — they can be adjusted only
by extraordinary authority.
Some three days ago I telegraphed the quartermaster general, M. C.
Meigs, a message; and I give you an extract, from memory: "If the reckless
TESTIMONY. 19
expenditures in this department are not arrested by a stronger arm than
mine, the quartermaster's department will be wrecked in Missouri alone."
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
ROB'T ALLEN, Major and Quartermaster.
General LORENZO THOMAS,
Adjutant General United States Army.
JEFFERSON CITY, MISSOURI, October 11, 1861.
GENERAL: In June, 1855, 1 left St. Louis with seven steamboats, with stores
and troops for the Upper Missouri river. I remained there on duty until 1857.
I joined General Johnston, and went to Utah. I returned from Utah last
winter, on the first and only leave of absence I have had in twelve years.
While on my way to Washington, in April, I stopped at Harrisburg; and,
at the request of Governor Curtin, I remained there to assist in organizing
the troops there assembling into camps, and to put their commissariat into
order. From there I was on duty constantly, day and night, at various
posts — York, Cockeysville, Baltimore, Perrysville, and Annapolis. Finally,
about the 20th of July, I was ordered to report to General Fremont. I did
so at New York. I was ordered on duty at St. Louis, where I resumed
similar labors to those I had been at in the east, and have been on my feet
night and day since. A few days ago I received orders to report at this
place for duty in the field.
I left all my public accounts open, in an incomplete and exposed condition,
on my office table in St. Louis, besides a vast deal of property not turned
over. My health is so broken down that / am not able longer to stand up.
I desire, as an act of simple justice to me, I be allowed to resume the leave
of absence I surrendered in April, (it would have expired 15th June,) or else
that I be ordered permanently to a post where I can get some rest, and be
able to make up and forward to the Treasury Department my public accounts.
Your early reply to this is respectfully requested.
Respectfully,
P. T. TURNLEY, Assistant Quartermaster.
General L. THOMAS,
Adjutant General United States.
NOTE. — My unsettled and unadjusted accounts will reach over one million
and a half dollars.
[Paper No. 11.]
HEADQUARTERS IST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Tipton, Missouri, October 12, 1861.
COLONEL: I have received the general's order directing my division to
move in the morning. Ncrt one-half of my division has yet reported. Colonel
Ellis's cavalry are without ammunition, cartridge-boxes, swords, pistols,
and great coats, and many of them are greatly in want of clothing.
The men of the Indiana batteries are in want of great coats, clothing,
and ammunition.
Requisitions have been sent in for ambulances, but they have not been
furnished. Some of our mules are unshod, and we shall have them lame
and unservicable, unless we can be furnished with portable forges and
blacksmith's tools. About fifty tents are needed for the division. As we
shall have to send our teams back for provisions after four days' march, we
should not leave here with less than sixty thousand rations, as we cannot
20 TESTIMONY.
calculate on their return in less than fifteen days to our camp, even if we
should remain stationary at the end of our four days' march.
The cavalry regiment has not a wagon; and Colonel Palmer's and Colonel
Eland's have neither of them sufficient for their baggage.
To enable us to move efficiently we need at least one hundred wagons,
and the ambulances already ordered to be supplied to the division by the
general commanding.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully your obedient servant.
D. HUNTER, Major General Commanding.
Colonel J. H. EATON,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General,
General Fremont's Headquarters.
[Paper No. 12.]
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Camp Asboth near Tipton, Missouri, October 12, 1861.
GENERAL: In complying with the letter of instructions of yesterday,
General Fremont directs that you proceed from Tipton for the present, only
so far as the first convenient camp ground, for the purpose of bringing your
immediate command together and to enable you to organize the better,
your means of transportation. Colonel Woods, director of transportation,
will confer with you to supply, at the earliest moment practicable, what is
deficient. At a distance of two, three, or five miles, your, wagons can
return to Tipton for what is needed.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. H. EATON, A. A. A. G.
Major General D. HUNTER,
Commanding 1st division, Tipton, Missouri.
[Paper No. 7.]
JEFFERSON CITY, October 13, 1861.
GENERAL : On the 25th September ultimo, I opened the bids, in my office
at St. Louis, made under General Meigs's advertisement for furnishing grain
and hay. I made contracts in accordance therewith, and gave notice to
contractors of the amount I supposed would be required weekly. A day or
two after, another party (a Mr. Baird or Baird & Palmer) in St. Louis in
formed me they had received an order (per telegraph) from Colonel Woods,
or General McKinstry, then at Jefferson City with headquarters, to forward
as fast a possible to Jefferson City, one hundred thousand bushels of oats,
and a like or corresponding amount of hay. The contractors under advertise
ment objected to this order, because they said Baird got 33 cents for grain,
and $19 per ton for hay, while contractors got 28 cents for corn, 30 cents
for oats, and $17 95 per ton for hay. I then told contractors they need not
send any forage up the river; or if they did they-would be paid the same
that Bird was.
About 29th or 30th September, after the headquarters, western depart
ment, had left St. Louis, (I being left there highest in rank in my department
but no orders or instructions except the single remark of General Fremont
that he wished no delay or obstacle whatever in the forwarding of supplies,
&c.,) I was daily and almost hourly called upon by different persons arid
asked to have their mules inspected. All stated they were turning in mules
on Mr. Haskell's account. I called for the contract or order under which
Haskell furnished them, but never received any until I received a line from
General McKinstry, quartermaster, stating that General Fremont desired
me to inspect and receive Mr. Haskell's mules as rapidly as possible. I re-
TESTIMONY. 21
ceived mules from Mr. Haskell only as they were required to ship off for
field service. I received some from other parties in like manner.
I have good grounds for believing that in not receiving all Mr. HaskelPs
mules, I gave much offence to him and to his friends. But I believed then,
and do yet, that my action was for the best interest of the government.
Respectfully, P. T. TURNLEY,
Assistant Quartermaster.
General L. THOMAS, Adjutant General United States.
[Paper No.—.]
DISPOSITION FOR RETAKING SPRINGFIELD.
Springfield, the strategical point of that wide elevation which separates
the waters of the Osage from those of the Arkansas river, is the key to the
whole southwestern part of Missouri, commanding an area of nearly 60,000
square miles.
Around it is clustered a true and loyal population, large numbers of whom,
driven from their homes and firesides, and burning with a desire to revenge
their sufferings and recapture their homesteads, are eagerly awaiting the
opportunity to join an advancing army.
Not only, therefore, military strategy, but a wise and humane policy, de
mands the reoccupation of that place.
To effect this in the shortest and speediest way, a combined movement of
our troops should be made from Roll a and Jefferson City.
The column from the latter place, moving first, will cross, after two days'
marching, the Osage river at Tuscumbia. To prevent delay in crossing,
anchors, ropes, pulleys, and other portable necessaries for the construction
of raft bridges, should be taken along from Jefferson City.
Upon an appointed day after the passage of the river has been accom
plished, the column from Rolla will commence its march, and that place arid
Tuscumbia being each about one hundred miles from Springfield, in six days
the two forces will be able to unite at their destination.
As the lines of march converge upon their approach to Springfield, it will
be practicable at Lebanon and Cross Blain (ten miles' north of Buffalo) to
open communication between the columns. Strong scouting parties will
best effect this object, and each body will thus support and assist the other.
The Cole county home guards should occupy Tuscumbia. After the column
from Jefferson City had passed that place, a reserve should be left at Linn
Creek to cover the rear provision train, while Warsaw, the most important
point on the Osage, should be immediately occupied by the home guards of
Johnson, Pettis and Benton county, re-enforced by a volunteer regiment and
two pieces of artillery.
Rolla, Wanesville, and Lebanon can be occupied upon the withdrawal of
the other troops, by regiments of the United States reserve corps from St.
Louis, while Jefferson City can be placed in charge of an adequate force of
General Sigel's brigade, now under re-organization.
To co-operate with this combined movement, General Lane will be directed
to march from Fort Scott, in Kansas, to Springfield, by way of Lamar and
Greenville, re-enforced if possible.
The successful execution of this plan puts us in possession of the entire
eouthwesten portion of this State, forces the enemy to retire into Arkansas,
and enables us, immediately after the concentration at Springfield, to as
sume the offensive against that State.
The exhausted condition of the country through which our troops are to
pass, renders necessary the most particular attention to the organization
and protection of the provision trains; the commencement of cool weather
demands additional clothing for the men, and the sad experience of the past
warns us to make every necessary preparation to meet their wants. .
22 TESTIMONY.
[Paper No. 14.]
In camp at Nolin river and on the Louisville and Nashville railroad at various
points.
6th Indiana, Colonel Crittenden, Nolin river.
29th Indiana, Colonel Miller, Nolin river.
30th Indiana, Colonel Bass, Nolin river.
38th Indiana, Colonel Scribner, Nolin river.
39th Indiana, Colonel Harrison, Nolin river.
32d Indiana, Colonel Willich, New Han.
10th Indiana, Colonel Mansie, Bardstown.
19th Illinois, Colonel Turchin, Lib. Junction.
24th Illinois, Colonel Hecker, Colesburg.
34th Illinois, Colonel Kirk, Nolin river.
15th Ohio, Colonel Dickie, Nolin river.
49th Ohio, Colonel Gibson, Nolin river.
3d Kentucky, Colonel Rousseau, Nolin river.
4th Kentucky, (cavalry,) Colonel Board, Nolin river.
Stone's Kentucky light battery, four pieces, Nolin river.
Cotter's (Ohio) six rifled pieces will be in camp in two or three days at
Nolin river.
At Camp Dick Robinson, or acting in conjunction with General Thomas's com
mand.
Two Tennessee regiments, nearly full and nearly ready for service.
Four Kentucky regiments, in same condition as Tennessee regiments; one
regiment cavalry.
14th Ohio, Colonel Stedman, Nicholasville.
37th Ohio, Colonel Connell, Nicholasville.
33d Indiana, Colonel Coburne, Camp Dick Robinson.
38th and 35th Ohio, Camp Robinson.
Three batteries of artillery, Ohio.
Four Ohio regiments on line of Covington and Lexington railroad, acting
with General Thomas.
37th Indiana, Colonel Crufts, Owensboro'.
Also, three or four Kentucky regiments at Owensboro', under General
Crittenden, not full nor ready for the field, but probably 1,500 men could
turn out under arms.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI,
St. Louis, November 27, 1861.
Special Orders No. 13.]
*********
6. Brigadier General Sturgis is hereby directed to muster out of service,
to-morrow, the squadron of cavalry known as the Fremont Body-Guard. The
chief quartermaster and ordnance officer will direct proper officers to receive
and receipt for all property belonging to their respective departments now
in possession of the commander of the squadron.
** * * * ****
By order of Major General Halleck.
J. C. KELTON,
Assistant Adjutant General.
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, March 4, 1862.
Official.
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General.
TESTIMONY.
[Paper No. — .]
23
Name.
Rank.
Corps.
Emavic Meizaras
Captain
Fremont Hussars.
do
Do.
James \V<irin °*
1st lieut and q m
Do.
G. W. Ebbert
1st lieutenant. . . ...
Do.
Thomas W. Cooper. . . .
2d lieutenant
Do.
Randolph Blome
Major
Do.
C. Schaffer
Captain . * .
Do.
Charles Casselman ....
.... do
Do.
G. E. Warino-
Major t
Frdmont Body-Guard.
Hy. Chas. DeAlma
Colonel . ...
Do.
Charles Zagonge
Captain .
Do.
H. S. Newall
2d lieutenant
Do.
Napoleon Westerburg
do.
Do.
Louis Vanstein Kiste . .
Captain
Do.
Daniel Abby
Major .
Fremont Rangers
D. Addone
1st lieutenant. .
General Fremont's staff
A. Sacche
Captain
Do.
A. E. Kroner
2d lieutenant
Infantry
G. Masrsrner. .
Chief of .
United States artillery
A.. .Asboth.
Brigadier general
Volunteers
F. J. White
Capt and aide-de-camp
General Fremont
E W Davis
Capt and asst o in
Volunteer engineer pioneers
Anton Geister
Captain .
Engineer corps.
Hugh C. Lon°* . . .
do
Independent company vols
Alex. Silverpare
2d lieutenant
Artillery
Frank Kappner . .
Mai or . .
Engineers.
Turnley . . .
Rankin . . .
McKinstry
[Paper No. 5 ]
Davis
Gunboats, 40 mortar boats
$456,309 73
950,000 00
2,500,000 00
3, 906, 309 73
100,000 00
4, 006, 309 73
500,000 00
4,506,309 73
24
TESTIMONY.
Abstract of payments made ly P. M. Fcbiger, paymaster United States army,
for the months of .
No. of vouchers.
Date of pay
ment.
To whom paid.
Rank or grade.
Corps.
From Sept. 23
1st lieutenant
Missouri sappers and miners, 2d
to Oct. 12,
i861
2d lieutenant
voucher, engineers.
Jas. W. Savage
George D Friedlein
Captain
1st lieutenant.... ....
A. D. C. to General Fremont.
.... d*
Do.
Hans A De Werthern
do
Do
Assistant surgeon...
General Fremont's staff.
C S Verdi
Do do.
Lui<*i Viria
do . ..*
Engineers.
Captain
General Fremont's staff.
Charles S. Shelton
Engineers.
J. C. Woods
2d lieutenant .
A. D. C. to General Fremont.
Joseph Wevdenuycr
Captain .
Artillery.
John T Fiala
Colonel ....
General Fremont?cl staff.
Edward Linderman
1st lieutenant
Do. do.
Sebastian Volkner ...
... (JO
George Gordan DeLuna Byron .
Richard Flack .
Captain
Cavalry.
do
William H. C. Reinke
2d lieutenant ....
Do.
do
Do.
do.
Do.
Charles Zagonyi
Anton Guster
Major
Captain .
General Fremont's Body-Guard.
Do
Bernhardt Kroeger
Infantry.
H. C. Lon» ..
do
Do.
J. R. Muhleman .. .
1st lieutenant..
General Fremont's staff, 1st vouch
-
Major
er, Kukel's command.
General Fremont's staff.
Arden R. Smith
1st lieutenant ....
William Hoelke .
do
Itr inli old Pfenninghausen ...
Captain
Independent field battery, No. 4.
E. L.Jones
1st lieutenant
do
Engineers.
Do.
Charles Gerick
Independent field battery, No. 4.
Felix Vogeli
Captain
3d regiment United States reserved
corps, continued by Gen. Fremont.
WASHINGTON, January 9, 1862.
Colonel JOHN B. PLUMMER sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What is your rank in the army ?
Answer. My rank in the old army is that of captain. I am colonel of the
llth regiment of Missouri volunteers.
Question. Where have you served during the present war ?
Answer. In Missouri entirely.
Question. Under whose command ?
Answer. Under the general command of General Fremont for apportion of
the time, and subsequently under the general command of General Halleck ;
under the immediate command of General Lyon, and also of General Grant,
who now commands the district in which my present post is situated.
TESTIMONY. 25
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. You were in the battle at Springfield ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. At what time did you join General Lyon's column ; or did you
go under his command at that time ?
Answer. We arrived in the neighborhood of Springfield — 12 miles from
Springfield — on the 13th July. I joined General Lyon on Grand river about
a week before that time.
Question. You joined him early in July ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. You then marched with General Lyon's column to Springfield ?
Answer. Yes, sir; after joining him. The column I was with was Major
Sturgis's column, that left Kansas City on the 23d of June, and joined
General Lyon early in July on Grand river. We proceeded from there to
Springfield in pursuit of Price's army% We arrived 12 miles from Spring
field on the 23d of July. I remember that date, but not all the others.
Question. Will you give us, as briefly as may be, the movements of Gen
eral Lyon's column until the battle of Springfield was fought?
Answer. We lay there from the 13th of July until the 1st of August, wait
ing for re-enforcements.
Question. What was the strength of your army at that time ?
Answer. It was about 5,500, as was stated by General Lyon in a council
of war in which I was present. It was about that in round numbers — it
fell a little short of that. General Lyon was satisfied that the enemy was
too strong to pursue with the force he had, and he waited there for re-enforce
ments and supplies. He was short of supplies. We commanded the mills
for some ten or fifteen miles about, and got flour in that way. The last two
weeks of the time before the first of August we were without sugar and
coffee, and what we call in the army " small rations," such as beans, rice, &c.
We had fresh beef, and salt beef, and bread. On the 1st day of August the
army moved in pursuit of Rains, leaving a force in Springfield to guard the
train and town. We marched between twenty-five and thirty miles south
of Springfield. We had a little skirmish with the enemy the second day
out, at a place called Dug Springs, gave them a few shots, and there was a
charge of cavalry there. On the morning of the 4th of August General
Lyon called a council of war, at which 1 was present ; all the commanding
officers of battalions, regiments, and corps were present. I was at the time
in command of a battalion of regulars. He stated to the council our force ;
that we had no rations — we knew before that we were out of small rations ;
that we had only about one day's ration of bread ; that we would necessarily
lose the command of the mills where we had obtained supplies of bread if
we moved on ; we would be reduced to salt and fresh beef, of which we
could get a sufficient quantity; and that Rains had been retreating before
us, apparently luring us on. The question he proposed to the council was
whether we would pursue further, or fall back upon Springfield and wait for
re-enforcements and supplies, or after we got back to Springfield act accord
ing to circumstances. The unanimous vote of the council was that we
should fall back ; that as we had no supplies it would be folly for us to pur
sue Rains further, who was retreating before us constantly. General Lyon
stated the force of the enemy to be about 15,000 men, as near as he could
ascertain from his spies, which, I would remark here, fell far short of their
actual numbers.
Question. Was this council of war at Dug Springs ?
Answer. It was beyond Dug Springs. We went one day's march beyond
Dug Springs. We commenced the march back, and I think we arrived at
26 TESTIMONY.
Springfield either on the morning of the fifth or the sixth. We commenced
the march back on the fourth. I have been trying to recall whether we
were two days or three days in making our march back, but I will not be
"positive. The enemy, at the same time, were moving on a different road
south of us towards Springfield. I commanded the rear guard of six com
panies the day of our starting back, and I could see the dust raised by the
enemy's troops three or four miles on our left. They were evidently moving
up towards Springfield on another road. I think it was the morning of the
fifth that we reached Springfield. The question then arose, that morning,
whether we would remain at Springfield and defend ourselves until we re
ceived re-enforcements, or whether we would continue our retreat right on
towards Rolla or towards Fort Scott. Arriving at Springfield tolerably
early — about 10 o'clock in the morning — we could have made some ten or
fifteen miles further that day. General Lyon consulted several officers in
regard to that — among the number was myself. Those whom he had known
intimately he consulted. There were a great many prominent citizens of
the neighborhood came around him, good Union people, urging him to re
main. My own opinion was that we ought to remain a few days. We
could defend ourselves; or, at least, we did not anticipate an immediate
attack, probably not in four or five days. But my opinion was that we
should wait at least two or three days for re-enforcements. He stated that
he had repeatedly written for re-enforcements and was not expecting any.
That he stated in the first council. He made the remark to me — on one
occasion in private conversation — that he had written and telegraphed for
re-enforcements; that he was aware that regiments had been sent out of
Missouri after he had applied for re-enforcements, for what reason he did
not know. And he did not know why he had not received any re-enforce
ments. Whether that be the case or not, I cannot say. I merely state
what he said in conversation with me.
By the chairman:
Question. Did he say where they had been sent ?
Answer. No, sir. Only they had been sent out of Missouri. The day we
returned to Springfield our troops remained under arms, and waited some
three or four hours while this matter was being considered. After the con
sultation was concluded in regard to our movements, General Lyon ordered
the troops into camp; a decision which I believe was approved by all the
officers. , We lay there until the evening of the 9th, making one or two lit-
excursions out during the time in pursuit of detached parties of the enemy.
I think about that time we received a few wagon loads of supplies from
Rolla, which gave us some five or six days rations On the afternoon of
the 9th we received marching orders.
In the conversations of General Lyou with his officers the only questions
that arose were, whether we should intrench ourselves at Springfield and
wait for re-enforcements, or retreat upon Rolla; or rather, if we retreated,
whether we would retreat upon Rolla or upon Fort Scott, the distance to
each place being about the same. Fort Scott lay just on the other side of
the Missouri line, in Kansas : Rolla was at the end of a railroad. The determi
nation to fight the battle of Springfield was his own — at least he did not
consult me. I do not know whether he consulted other officers or not. But
I would remark here, that I was afterwards notified that General Lyon
adopted the wisest course. We had a valuable train, estimated at over
half a million of dollars. There w-as aboard that train between $200,000
arid $250,000 in specie. Had we retreated at once upon Rolla we would
probably have had to fight every day on our retreat. It was a bad road of
110 miles, and being encumbered with a very large train our retreat might
TESTIMONY. 27
have resulted in the loss of a large portion of that train. To have intrench
ed ourselves in Springfield, being in doubt whether or not we should get any
re-enforcements, and being in want of provisions, was a matter of perhaps
rather doubtful policy.
On the afternoon of the 9th of August we marched out to fight the enemy.
I do not think that General Lyon wag aware of their real strength. He es
timated them at 15,000 men. Our force with which we left Springfield was
about 4,800 men. We had about 5,500 men there; but we had to leave a
guard for the train in town, and then there were many of the men sick, and
on extra dut}7, &c., which reduced our marching force to about 4,800. Of
that number General Sigel had about 1,500: the two German regiments,
one battery of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry. And in the considera
tion of the battle itself, General Sigel's force should be thrown out entirety,
because his whole force was dispersed and his battery captured within a
half an hour after the fight commenced. So that the battle itself was fought
with about from 3,300 to 3,500 men against 23,000; for we ascertained
afterward that to have been their numbers. Of our forces there were seven
companies of regular infantry, and two batteries of artillery — I suppose
altogether not over 600 regulars — and the rest were volunteers: the two
Kansas regiments, the 1st Missouri, and the 2d Iowa, whose time had ex
pired at that time.
I have but little more to say in regard to the battle, except that we
whipped them. I was with my battalion in the advance that morning; we
marched out the night before, and just laid down in the bushes about 12 or
1 o'clock. It rained upon us, and we had nothing to eat the next morning.
I think very few of us had anything to eat that day — at least I did not.
The battle commenced about 5 o'clock in the morning. It was a complete
surprise; we surprised their camps. I drove 'in one of their pickets not
more than a half a mile from their camp, and they had not even time to give
the alarm in the camp before our guns opened upon them. The battle
lasted from 5 o'clock until about* hal£past 11. They came up four distinct
times to attack us, bringing up fresh troops each time.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. Each time in force ?
Answer. Yes, sir; each time in force', bringing up fresh troops.
By the chairman: •
Question. Why did General Lyon pursue Rains when you first started if
he had not a force sufficient ?
Answer. McCulloch and Rains had not united, and the object was to pre
vent their doing so.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. Will you give us the particulars of that fight ?
Answer. I cannot particularize it. I was on the left myself, and carried
forward the left attack. I was separated, with my battalion, from the main
portion of the army by a creek. I was a quarter or a half a mile from the
main portion of our army. I fought, for upwards of an hour, with 250 regu
lars, over 2,000 of the enemy, and was forced to retreat. I was severely
wounded, and in the course of an hour and a half was myself in an ambu
lance.
Question. You did not see the latter part of the action ?
Answer. No, sir. I can only state what officers have told me. My bat
talion was saved by Dubois's battery on that occasion. I found that I had
overwhelming forces against me, and that my left flank was going to be
turned. I had a creek behind me, with a dense chapparal bordering it on
28 TESTIMONY.
both sides, which was almost impenetrable except in one or two places. I
came to the conclusion to fall back. I lost 49 men, in the course of an hour,
out of 250.
Question Can yon state the casualties in our army ?
Answer. I have Major Sturgis's official report. The casualties I can state
to be over 1,200 — I think over 1,300 killed and wounded. There were not
certainly over 3,500 men of ours in action in the first place.
Question. Can you give a description of those four charges of the enemy
from hearsay; that is, from the accounts of the officers engaged; partic
ularly the last one ?
Answer. I do not know that I could give you a description of it. I have
heard officers speak of it ; but in ordinary conversation each one describes
the particular part of the field where he was himself; and it requires con
siderable reflection to put those different things together — to connect prop
erly the different incidents in the different parts of the field.
Question. I will say that Major Schofield stated to me that after the last
repulse it was a perfect rout; that the enemy fled in the wildest confusion.
Answer. Yes, sir; everybody says that.
Question. And he also stated that in attempting to ride forward to recon
noitre and see where the enemy were, their dead was piled up so thick that
he could not ride over them, but had to make a considerable detour.
Answer. There was a flag of truce sent out after our return to Springfield,
as I heard. A young doctor of the army went out with it, with a few men
and some wagons, to obtain the body of General Lyon, and to look for our
wounded left on the field. He told me that General McCulloch remarked
to a non-commissioned officer — a sergeant — who attended the party, " Your
loss was very great, but ours was four times yours;" and I think it but a
fair estimate to put their loss at least as high as four thousand men killed
and wounded.
Question. After this battle you retired ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Can you give us the particulars of that retreat ?
Answer. No, sir; except from hearsay.
Question. It was conducted in good order, and you were not pursued ?
Answer. Yes, sir; we were not pursued. The fact was the enemy was
completely crippled. We gained everything that General Lyon proposed
to gain.
Question. How many additional troops, in jfour estimation, would have
given you a victory and enabled you to have driven the enemy out of Mis
souri ?
Answer. My opinion is that our victory would have been perfect and com
plete with two additional regiments. They were running at the time. They
burned their trains — we saw them burning — so that they should not fall
into our hands. They did not burn the whole, but what they could con
veniently. If we had known it, we could have held the field as it was, for
afterwards we heard that they were out of ammunition; that is, they had
but a few rounds left.
By the chairman:
Question. How long did General Lyon wait at Springfield before he un
dertook his expedition against Rains ?
Answer. He waited from the loth of July till the 1st of August.
Question. Still his army was inferior to that of the enemy ?
Answer. Constantly inferior.
Question. Vastly inferior ?
Answer. Yes, sir; vastly inferior.
TESTIMONY. 29
Question. Why did he advance upon a foe so much his superior ?
Answer. The object of his advance I suppose was this: he had whipped
the enemy at Boonville and pursued Jackson. Following him up, he was
joined by the force at Kansas City and Leavenworth, with which detach
ment I was. His object was to overtake this force, whip them, and capture
them or crush them out. But they, in retreating towards the Arkansas line,
were constantly being re-enforced. When he commenced his pursuit they
were not so far superior to his forces as they were afterwards. If he could
have overtaken them on the Osage or the Grand river, he could have whipped
them and captured them. That was his object. The reason why he did not
do that was on account of the high water. The enemy burned the bridges
as they fled, and it had rained incessantly for several days, and the whole
country was flooded. We had to lay by two or three days at a time to get
across the streams. In the mean time the enemy was re-enforced with Ar
kansas, Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas troops. They had
troops from all those States.
Question. How long after you joined him at Springfield did he start on
this expedition ?
Answer. I joined him about a week before we reached Springfield.
Question. If I understand you, at the time he started upon that expedi
tion the enemy's force was not so much superior to his own ?
Answer. No, sir; he was pursuing the same -force that he whipped at
Boonville. Then there was a force that lay near Kansas City that joined
Price afterwards.
Question. Why did he wait so long for re-enforcements before he started
on this expedition ?
Answer. He did not wait for re-enforcements at that time. He was de
layed some three or four days getting transportation for his troops.
Question. He was not waiting for re-enforcements ?
Answer. No, sir; not at all. He only waited for re-enforcements after he
reached Springfield, and found out what their strength was. Then, instead
of advancing upon them, he waited for re-enforcements. The little advance
that he made on the 1st of August was because he had an idea that he could
divide their forces and whip them in detail. They had not united then.
Rains had a separate column, Price had another, and McCulloch was coming
up with re-enforcements. But at that time they were superior, very much
superior, to our forces. I mean when we reached Springfield.
Question. They were much your superior then ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Then why did he pursue from Springfield a force so much his
superior ?
Answer. He pursued there to attack a separate column. He was going
to adopt the idea of Napoleon to whip his enemy in detail, thinking he
could overtake Rains and whip his forces, and thus cripple them. But they
were all united at the battle of Springfield — Rains, Price, and McCulloch.
Question. Did I understand you that he did not wait for re-enforcements
at Springfield; and if not, where did he wait for them ?
Answer. He waited at Springfield for them.
Question. I asked you, first, why, when the enemy had a superior force,
he started on this expedition, for I understood you to say, just before that,
that the force of the enem}7 was vastly superior to that of General Lyon. I
understood you to say that the force was not so much superior when he
started on the expedition, but it accumulated on the way.
Answer. I misunderstood you. When you referred to the starting of the
expedition, I thought you referred to his starting from Boonville.
Question. I was trying to get at this. He had been waiting for re-en-
30 TESTIMONY.
forcements at Springfield which he did not get. I wanted to know why,
with an inferior force, he set out on the expedition from Springfield against
the enemy ?
Answer. I will explain that as I understand it. General Lyon was aware
that the combined forces of the enemy were vastly superior to ours. He
stated in the council of war that they had 15,000 men — about three to our
one. But he had his spies out, who gave him an idea where each column of
the enemy was. There were re-enforcements for the enemy coming up which
were within striking distance of there. When General Lyon marched from
Springfield he marched out in pursuit of Rains and his one detachment of
the enemy's forces, thinking he could overtake him and whip him before the
others could come up. But Rains retreated, drawing us on, arid as they
were pursuing the road which led them towards Springfield, we fell back
upon Springfield, because we could not abandon that place and our baggage
trains and supplies. I am speaking now of the expedition from Springfield
of the 1st of August. We returned, I think, on the morning of the 5th of
August.
Question. How far is Springfield from St. Louis ?
Answer. It is one hundred and ten miles from Rolla, and I believe Rolla
is about the same distance from St. Louis. Springfield is about two hundred
and twenty miles from St. Louis.
Question. You made a stand at Springfield. Were you under the necessity
of fighting a battle there, or could you have retreated still further from the
enemy ? You say your forces at Springfield were vastly inferior to those of
the enemy.
Answer. I will give you what I believe was General Lyon's idea at the
time.
Question. Could he retreat before them, and if so would it have been pru
dent to have done it ?
Answer. My opinion is that the wisest course was to fight in the way he
did fight. General Lyon was mistaken in the strength of the enemy. He
did not think they were over 15,000 men, when in fact they were over 20,000.
But the attacking force always has the advantage, in the moral effort upon
the troops and in everything. If you move forward troops even a hundred
yards in time of action it gives them courage. If you fall back that distance
it intimidates them. General Lyon's idea was to surprise their camp as we
did; to make a bold dash on them when our men were full of courage and
animation, and whip them or cripple them, which in fact was accomplished
with the loss of his own life.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. So that they could not pursue ?
Answer. Yes, sir. If we had retreated without that fight our forces would
have been intimidated, and we would have had to fight every day, and per
haps lost a valuable train.
By the chirman :
Question. You say that General Lyon got no re-enforcements, and yet re-
enforcements were sent out of the State. You understood General Lyon to
say so.
Answer. I understood General Lyon to say that regiments were sent out
of Missouri. He did not state where, and 1 do not know.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Do you know what forces were at St. Louis at that time ?
Answer. I do not.
Question. And you do not know why re-enforcements were not sent to
General Lyon ?
TESTIMONY. 31
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Had re-enforcements been sent when General Lyon first called
for them would they have reached him in time for this battle ?
Answer. Undoubtedly. He sent for them three or four weeks before. He
arrived at Springfield on the 13th of July, and the call for re enforcements
was made a few days after. The battle was fought on the 10th of August.
In a conversation with Colonel Wyman, he made the statement to me that
one regiment was ordered forward from Holla, and the colonel refused to
march for want of transportation. That was stated to me by Colonel
Wyman.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. How long would it have taken troops to have gone from St.
Louis to Springfield by railroad and march ?
Answer. Well, sir, in ordinary marching through the country it would
have taken seven or eight days. But I want to qualify that by stating that
on an emergency, forced marches could have been made. The distance,
allowing one day from St. Louis to Holla, on the railroad, and one hundred
and ten miles of marching from Rolla to Springfield, could have been easily
made in four days, if the men expected a battle. But if they did not expect
anything at the end of their journey, they might have taken six or seven
days. I would say they could have reached Springfield from St. Louis in
six days at the outside.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. You do not know whether it was in General Fremont's power
to have re-enforced General Lyon or not ?
Answer. I did not.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Did General Lyon ever tell you upon whom he called for re
enforcements ?
Answer. It is my impression that he did remark to me that he had tele
graphed to Washington for re-enforcements ; that he not only had written
to the headquarters of the department, but had sent telegraphic despatches
through to Washington.
Question. Did he not tell you that he had first telegraphed to the War
Department, and afterwards to Colonel Blair, to urge them to send on re-
enforcements or he would be overpowered ?
Answer. I could not state that. He may have said so. I had conversa
tions with him several times. He was a classmate of mine, and I had rather
frequent conversations with him, and the conversations I had with him at
different times left the impression upon my mind that he had repeatedly
written and telegraphed to St. Louis and Washington.
Question. Did he not tell you that he had repeatedly written and tele
graphed to the War Department and got no reply, and then he telegraphed
to Colonel Blair to urge it ?
Answer. The last part of your remark I do not remember about: that he
had telegraphed to the War Department and received no reply, I think he
did say. There was no telegraph in operation at that time from Springfield
to St. Louis. But he had sent telegraphic despatches through to be sent
over the wires from St. Louis or the first telegraphic station.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. Do you remember at what time General Fremont took com
mand at St. Louis — on what day he arrived ?
32 TESTIMONY.
Answer. No, sir; I cannot recall it.
By the chairman:
Question. If General Lyon had not pursued the enemy at Springfield, but
had waited there and intrenched himself, could he have defended himself ?
Answer. That is a matter of opinion. In my opinion it would have been
more difficult for him to have defended himself at Springfield against the
attacks of the enemy, than it was to whip them in the open field.
Question. Then you do not believe much in intrenchments ?
Answer. No, sir; I do not.
By Mr. Johnson:
Question. You think the stand you made was more effective than to havfc
waited for re-enforcements ?
Answer. Yes, sir; a thousand times.
WASHINGTON, January 10, 1862.
General JOHN C. FREMONT sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. What is your rank, and what was your position in the army
where you have commanded ?
Answer. My rank is that of major general in the regular army.
Question. What department did you command ?
Answer. I commanded what is called the western department.
Question. About what time did you assume the command ?
Answer. I assumed the command in the department on the 25th day of
last July.
Question. Please give a narration to the committee, in your own way, of
the conduct of the department while under your command ?
Answer. I have prepared no statement in relation to that subject. I have
here all the principal orders, communications, letters and despatches con
cerning the most important events and acts of the period referred to. And I
am ready to answer any questions which any member of the committee may
desire to ask me.
After some time passed in consultation by the committee,
The chairman: I perceive that you have a large number of documents
here which it will take some time to examine. The committee are of the
opinion that the better way would be for you to prepare a statement, as brief as
may be practicable, of such matters as you may deem important, connected
with your administration of the western department, and submit it to the
committee. If they should then desire to ask you any further questions
relating to the subject, they can tlo so
The witness: I will do so.
[Examination accordingly suspended for the present]
TESTIMONY. 33
WASHINGTON, January 17, 1862.
. General JOHN C. FREMONT — examination resumed.
The ^Biess proceeded as follows :
AgreeSoly to a suggestion from the committee, I make the following statement
concerning my administration of the western department :
Notwithstanding my unwillingness to engross the time of the committee, I
shall have to ask that they will take the trouble to look over the documents
which I have appended to this statement, and which comprehend the most im
portant letters, orders, and telegraphic communications, concerning some of the
most important events and acts of the period referred to. The magnitude of
the department and its interests, the amount of business required to be done,
the inadequacy of means, and the short space into which many events were
crowded, together with the many accusations and the strained and rigorous
account to which the western department has been held, make it quite impossible
to present the subject with fairness in a brief paper. ,
In my desire not to cumber this statement, and having respect to my character
of witness before your committee, I have omitted facts and considerations in
vindication of myself on points where I have been attacked, but into which I
shall ask the committee to examine. This paper is only directed to leading
points, leaving their details and what is more directly personal to myself to the
testimony of witnesses I have asked to have summoned, and* to the accompany
ing papers.
When, in July last, I was assigned to the command of the western depart
ment, it comprehended, with Illinois, all the States and Territories west of the
Mississippi river to the Rocky mountains, including New Mexico.
No special object was given me in charge to do, nor was I furnished with any
particular plan of a campaign. The general discussions at Washington resulted
in the understanding that the great object in view was the descent of the Mis
sissippi, and for its accomplishment I was to raise and organize an army, and
when I was ready to descend the river I was to let the President know. My
command was then to be extended over Kentucky and down the left bank of
the Mississippi. For military reasons it was judged inexpedient to do so in the
beginning.
Full discretionary powers of the amplest kind were conferred on me. Not a
line of written instructions was given me.
This leading object of the campaign being settled, the details of its accom
plishment and the management of my department were left to my own judgment.
While at Washington I informed myself fully of the unprepared condition of
the west, and its want of arms, from the governor of Illinois. Of the Illinois
contingent, seven thousand men were unarmed. Their cavalry was without
horses or sabres, their artillery companies had hardly any guns, and were
wholly without equipment. Upon this information I procured an order for seven
thousand stands of arms, which, upon my arrival in New York two days after,
I found had been countermanded. Upon my complaint to Washington, and
upon the direct interposition of the President, Major Hagner was sent to aid me
in procuring what I judged immediately necessary for the department. With
him I arranged for getting together from various arsenals, and forwarding to St.
Louis, arms and equipments sufficient for the complete equipment of an army
corps of twenty-three thousand men.
In the meantime the rebellion in the west was daily assuming a more threat
ening aspect; in the northwest aggravated disorders had broken out; General
Pope was urgently requesting to take the field with the remainder of the Illinois
contingent ; General Harding was asking reinforcements for Cairo and the south
east ; and General Lyon, for Springfield and the southwest.
Part iii 3
34 TESTIMONY.
Urged by this serious condition of affairs, I applied to General Scott for per
mission to take the field immediately, with any instructions he might have to
give me. Having received this permission, and being informed there were no
instructions for me, I left New York on the day following the battle of Manassas,
and reached my command, at St. Louis, on the 25th day of July.
At this time the State of Missouri was throughout rebellious. A rebel faction
in every county, at least equal to the loyal population in numbers, and excelling
it in vindictiveness and energy. The local government was in confusion and
unable to aid. St. Louis itself was a rebel city, and, as a rule, the influential
and wealthy citizens were friendly to secession.
Of the new levies of the federal troops few were in the field — the term of
enlistment of the three months men was just expiring — the troops in service had
not been paid, were badly equipped and badly supplied, and, in addition to the
rebel parties which swarmed throughout the State, a confederate army of nearly
fifty thousand men was already on its southern frontier.
General Pope was in North Missouri with nearly all rny disposable force ;
General Lyon was at Springfield, with about seven thousand eight hundred
men; and General Prentiss was holding Cairo with seven regiments. General
Lyon's troops was, in greater part, three mouths men, whose term of service
was ending, and all of General Prentiss's force was in the same condition.
The arms collected for me in New York had been diverted to Virginia, and I
had neither money nor credit. Want of arms and want of money were the chief
difficulties to be met, while the necessity to meet the enemy on three sides at
once was urgent and imminent. There was no lack of men. The loyal popu
lation of the west, and among them the Germans, with a noble unanimity, were
willing to come in mass to the standard of the Union.
The saving of time, demanded by these most urgent circumstances, made me
especially anxious to retain the services of the Home Guard regiments and three
months men, whose term of service was just expiring. These were themselves
anxious to remain in service, but the destitution of their families, made so by
their absence and failure to receive the pay due them, rendered this impossible.
In this necessity I directed the use of part 01* an unappropriated sum lying in
the United States treasury, and reported the reason and fact of my conduct to
the President, in the following letter :
[Unofficial.]
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, July 30, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR : You were kind enough to say that as occasions of sufficient
gravity arose I might send you a private note.
I have found this command in .disorder, nearly every county in an insurrec
tionary condition, and the enemy advancing in force by different points of the
southern frontier. Within a circle of fifty miles around General Prentiss, there are
about 12,000 of the confederate forces, and 5, 000 Tennesseeans and Arkansas men,
under Hardee, well armed with rifles, are advancing upon Ironton. Of these,
2,000 are cavalry, which yesterday morning were within twenty -four hours'
march of Ironton. Colonel Blarfd, who had been seduced from this post, is fall
ing back upon it. I have already re-enforced it with one regiment ; sent on
another this morning and fortified it. I am holding the railroad to Ironton, and
that to Rolla, so securing our connexions with the south. Other measures
which I am taking I will not trust to a letter, and I write this only to inform
you as to our true condition, and to say that if I can obtain the material aid I
am expecting, you may feel secure that the enemy will be driven out and the
State reduced to order. I have ordered General Pope back to North Missouri,
of which he is now in command. I am sorely pressed for want of arms. I
TESTIMONY. 35
.have arranged with Adams Express Company to bring me everything with
speed, and will buy arms to-day in New York. Our troops have not been paid,
and some regiments are in a state of mutiny, and the men whose term of ser
vice is expired generally refuse to enlist. I lost a fine regiment last night from
inability -to pay them a portion of the money due. This regiment had been in
tended to move 011 a critical post last night. The Treasurer of the United
States has here $'300,000 entirely unappropriated. I applied to him yesterday
for $100,000 for my paymaster, General Andrews, but was refused. We have
not an hour for delay. There 'are three courses open to me. One, to let the
enemy possess himself of some of the strongest points in the State, and threaten
St. Louis, which is insurrectionary. Second : To force a loan from secession
banks here. Third : To use the money belonging to the government, which is
in the treasury here. Of course, I will neither loose the State nor permit the
enemy a foot of advantage. I have infused energy and activity into the de
partment, and there is a thorough good spirit in officers and men. This morn
ing I will order the treasurer to deliver the money in his possession to General
Andrews, and will send a force to the treasury to take the money, and will di
rect such payments as the exigency requires. I will hazard everything for the
defence of the department you have confided to me, and I trust to you for
support.
With respect and regard, I am yours truly,
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
The PRESIDENT of the United States.
I respectfully ask the attention of your committee to this letter, because the
investigating committee, in their report, have made this act a serious charge
against me, holding me up to the reprobation of the country, as having acted
in a manner " arbitrary and illegal," dangerous to " constitutional liberty, and
in defiance of law and superior authority." — (Pages 78 and 116.) They fur
ther say that this act was " alarming, unjustifiable, and deserving severest cen
sure, especially as there was no pretence of any military or other necessity to
justify this outrage."
That no reply was made to the above-quoted letter, or objection made to the
act, will be sufficient to satisfy the committee that I was expected to do any act
which in my judgment the public service might • require, or, to use the words of
a cabinet minister in the confidence of the administration —
WASHINGTON, July 26, 1861.
DEAR GENERAL: I have two telegrams from you, but find it impossible now
to get any attention to Missouri or western matters from the authorities here.
You will have to do the best you can, and take all needful responsibility to
defend and protect the people over whom you are specially set.
TT # jfc # ^ #
Yours truly, and in haste,
M. BLAIR.
I ask the committee to couple the facts set out in these letters, and the dis
tress of General Lyon for want of money with which to retain his troops, with
the censure of the committee.
With what has been said concerning the situation of affairs in Missouri, a
glance at the map will make it apparent that Cairo was the point which first de
manded immediate attention. The force under General Lyon could retreat, 'but
the position at Cairo could not be abandoned; the question of holding Cairo was
one which involved the safety of the whole northwest. Had the taking of St.
Louis followed the defeat of Manassas, the disaster might have been irretrievable,
36 TESTIMONY.
while the loss of Springfield, should our army be compelled to fall back upon Holla,
would only carry with it the loss of a part of Missouri — -a loss greatly to be
regretted, but not irretrievable.
Having re-enforced Cape Girardeau and Ironton, by the utmost exertions I
succeeded in getting together and embarking with a force of 3,800 men five
days after my arrival in St. Louis.
From St. Louis to Cairo was an easy day's journey by water, and transporta
tion abundant. To Springfield was a week's march, and before I could have
reached it Cairo would have been taken, and with it, I believe, St. Louis.
On my arrival at Cairo I found the force under General Prentiss reduced to
1,200 men; consisting mainly of a regiment which had agreed to await my
arrival. A few miles below, at New Madrid, General Pillow had landed a force
estimated at 20,000, which subsequent events showed was not exaggerated
Our force, greatly increased to the enemy by rumor, drove him to a hasty
retreat, and permanently secured the position. To these facts the accompany
ing papers, and the testimony of General Prentiss and other officers, are offered
to the committee.
I returned to St. Louis on the 4th, having, in the meantime, ordered Colonel
Stephenson's regiment from Boonesville, and Colonel Montgomery from Kansas,
to march to the relief of General Lyon.
Immediately upon my return from Cairo I set myself at work, amidst incessant
demands upon my time from every quarter, principally to pfovide re-enforce
ments for General Lyon.
I do not accept Springfield as a disaster belonging to my administration.
Causes, wholly out of my jurisdiction, had already prepared the defeat of Gen
eral Lyon before my arrival at St. Louis. His letter to me of the 9th August,
with other papers annexed, will show that I was already in communication with
him, and that he knew his wants were being provided for. It will be seen that
I had all reasonable expectations of being able to relieve him in time, and had
he been able to adhere to the course indicated in this letter, a very short time
would have found him efficiently sustained.
SPRINGFIELD, Missouri, August 9, 1861.
GENERAL: I have just received your note of the 6th instant by special
messenger.
I retired to this place, as I have before informed you, reaching here on the
5th. The enemy followed within ten miles of here. He has taken a strong
position, arid is recruiting his supplies of horses, mules, and provisions, by
forages into the surrounding country; his large force of mounted men enabling
him to do this without much annoyance from me.
I find my position extremely embarrassing, and am at present unable to de
termine whether I shall be able to maintain my ground or forced to retire. I
can resist any attack from the front, but if the enemy move to surround me I
must retire. I shall hold my ground as long as possible, though I may, without
knowing how far, endanger the safety of my entire force with its valuable ma
terial, being induced, by the important considerations involved, to take this
step. The enemy yesterday made a show of force about five miles distant, and
has doubtless a full purpose of making an attack upon rue,
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
N. LYON,
Brigadier General of Volunteers, Commanding.
Major General J. C. FREMONT,
Commanding Western Department, St. Louis, Missouri.
Upon the I Oth of August General Lyon was killed in battle.
TESTIMONY. 37
The charge that General Lyon had in any way suffered from any neglect
was a surprise upon me. I heard nothing of it at the time, and believe it to
have been an after-thought. Further to disprove it, in connexion with what has
been said above, I refer to the statements of Adjutants General Harding and
Keltou, through whose hands the business of the department at that time passed.
Colonel Harding was General Lyon's adjutant general, charged with the manr
agement of affairs in Missouri during his absence. In the letter referred to he
says :
General Fremont was not inattentive to the situation of General Lyon's
column, and went so far as to remove the garrison of Booneville, in order to
send him aid. During the first days of August troops arrived in the city in
large numbers. Nearly all of them were unarmed ; all were without transporta
tion. Regiment after regiment laid for days in the city without any equipments,
for the reason that the arsenal was exhausted, and arms and accoutrements had
to be brought from the east. From these men General Lyon would have had
re-enforcements, although they were wholly unpracticed in the use of the musket
and knew nothing of movements in the field, but in the meantime the battle of
the 10th of August was fought.
CHESTER HARDING, JR.,
Late Assistant Adjutant General uj>on the
Staff of Brigadier General Lyon.
It was under this great necessity — a greater than which is not likely to occur
during this war — and to provide, among other demands, relief for General Lyon,
that on the 6th of August I made the purchase of Austrian guns, for which -I
am censured by a committee charged to "investigate frauds." — (Page 40.)
This committee will be enabled to judge whether the purchase of these arms
at this time can be appropriately called "a manifest improvidence."
I abstain from pursuing this subject further than to say that, although the
arm itself was not a matter of choice, as this telegram will show —
ST. Louis, July 29, 1861.
The agent of Adams's Express Company here has offered to bring me, by
passenger train, any arms directed to me. Send everything you have for me by
passenger trains, for which the express company will provide. Your letter of
24th received. There were no arms at the arsenal here to meet the order given
for the 5,000. We must have arms — any arms, no matter what.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding Western Department.
Major HAG\ER,
Fifth Avenue Hotel, New York.
it was still a good arm. Twelve thousand had been in service ; thirteen thousand
were new. They were percussion muskets, solid and strong ; pronounced by
Austrian, officers to be considered in that service a good weapon ; preferred by
General Asboth for his division in their unaltered condition, and were in the
hands of some of my best regiments, at Springfield, and scattered over the
country in various corps, although the committee say "they were not in use."
I think it due to myself to say that this committee came to St. Louis during my
absence in the field, and no notice was at any time given me that my military
acts were to be brought under examination, nor has any copy of the testimony
collected during their proceedings been furnished me, of which I might avail
myself in reply.
On the 13th August intelligence of the battle of Wilson's creek reached me
at St. Louis. In expectation of an immediate advance by the enemy, I in
formed the President and governors of the neighboring States, requesting that
38 TESTIMONY.
all the disposable force that could be spared should be sent at once to Missouri.
Fortunately, dissension in the camp of the enemy prevented them from using
their success, and gave time, which I used to carry on as rapidly as possible
the plan I had adopted for the defence of the State. This was to fortify
Girardeau, Ironton, Rolla, and Jefferson City, with St. Louis as a base, holding
these places with sufficient garrisons, and leaving the army free for operations
in the field. It certainly seems superfluous to speak of the importance of St.
Louis ; but as the expediency of fortifying it has been questioned, it may be
well to remind the committee that it was the first military position in the
western department. Many of the things I am required to prove are as self-
evident as this. St. Louis, then, is situated on the great highway of the Mis
sissippi river, at a point where it is crossed by all the principal roads from the
east, having itself seven different lines of communication to the interior and op
posite ends of the State ; that it is the great centre of politics and trade, and
the object to which the 'efforts of the enemy were constantly directed and in
vited by the powerful and wealthy rebel portions of the citizens. It was cer
tainly prudent to render permanently secure, beyond the reach of contingency,
this great depot for supplies and reserves, and safe retreat for an army in the
possible event of a disaster.
The importance of fortifying St. Louis had early occupied the attention of
General Lyou, who had decided upon a plan much the same as that now
adopted, and under the advice of the same officer by whom the present sites
were selected, but which he was unable to carry out.
The necessity of these fortifications was concurred in by officers of unim
peachable loyalty and capacity ; and such, also, was the judgment of the loyal
inhabitants, to whom they gave, for the first time, a sense of protection and
security. They were laid out with a view to command the city itself, as well
as the approaches to it. The defences which rest upon St. Louis constitute the
dike which separates the south from the northwest. It is easy, after a precau
tion has been successful, to say that it was not needed. I did not 'choose to
expose myself to the chances of a neglect, either at St. Louis or Paducah, for
both of which I have been censured, and with equal ignorance in either case.
The unfairness of this attack consists in judging what was necessary for St.
Louis then by its condition when I left the department.
I ask the committee to bear in mind that the plan for the defence of the
State, and my operations generally, were all conducted in reference to the
descent of the Mississippi, to which all preparations tended. To complete the
defence of St. Louis, after the withdrawal of the army, five regiments of in
fantry, with one battalion of cavalry, and two batteries of field artillery, were
considered amply sufficient.
It has been objected that I did not employ the troops under my command,
instead of hired labor for this work. I did this in the exercise of my judgment.
I did not consider it expedient to employ the volunteer troops in a work of this
magnitude, involving so much labor and exposure. The hot suns and heavy
dews of the unhealthy months of August and September need to be avoided in
that climate. 'The troops were so little acquainted with amis that all their
time was needed to fit them for the field, while, on the other hand, the employ
ment of hired labor was of great service in tranquilizing the city, and relieving
the wide-spread distress the war had entailed on it, and which private charity
had exhausted itself in endeavoring to relieve.
Concerning the contract for this work, the committee of investigation say that
it was made under the " special order and direction of General Fremont;'' and
concerning the payments, that they were made upon his " personal order." The
following extract will show that not only was I recognized to have this power,
but that I was, so late as the 3d of September, counselled to exercise it by the
quartermaster general, General Meigs :
TESTIMONY. 39
[Extract from letter of Hon. M. Blair, P. M. G ]
WASHINGTON, September 3, 1861.
Meigs begged me this afternoon to get you to order 15-inch guns from Pitts-
burg for your gunboats. He says that the boats can empty any battery the
enemy can make with such guns. He advises that you contract for them di
rectly yourself, telling the contractor you will direct your ordnance officer to
pay for them.
*"# # * # # # * # *
Concerning the contractor, the committee say that he is "a Californian who
followed Fremont to St. Louis."
I left California for Europe on the 1st of January. On the 1st of August,
I think, Mr. Beard left there, coming overland to St. Louis. I never wrote to
him, or in any way communicated with him, or knew of his intended coming.
His arrival was equally a surprise and pleasure to me. I knew him to be a
man of unusual energy and capacity, accustomed to the management of men
on large works, and immediately applied to him to undertake the building of
the fortifications. I sent an officer with him to make his examinations, and he
began his work, I think, on the second day after his arrival. I assigned him
one of my ablest officers to lay out and superintend the work, and to remain
constantly with him, gave him every facility he asked, and drove him to the
extent of his capacity. Six thousand men were employed upon it, working night
and day, and it was finished rapidly in a workmanlike and durable manner.
Extra pay was allowed to the laborers, forty cents per day, I think, and extra
expenses incurred under the pressure authorized. I was satisfied with him and
the work done by him. I asked no bonds from him, because he was a stranger
and could have given none. He began his work before the contract was made,
and accident delayed its execution by General McKinstry. When the prices
for his work were under discussion, and were referred to me by General McKin-
stiy, I directed this officer to reduce them to what was just and reasonable to
both parties, having reference to the circumstances under which the work was
done, and the extra prices that had been paid, so as to leave the contractor what
might be strictly a fair profit on his labor ; and his decision, whatever it was,
was approved by me. For costs of construction, and other details with which
I am not acquainted, I respectfully refer the committee to the testimony of the
quartermaster and the contractor, whom I have asked to have summoned.
To show their nature and value the report and testimony of the engineers
who planned and were superintending the work will be furnished the committee.
The object aimed at was the completion of the city defences in the shortest
possible time. The works were thoroughly and well built, covering- and com
prehending the city itself and the surrounding country on a length of about ten
miles, and the total cost is, I think, less than $300,000 !
In my judgment, having in view the time and manner in which they were
built, the money was well applied, and as a measure of expediency and policy
it was fully worth to the government what it cost.
And while examining into the conduct and events of the war, I think it right
to call the attention of your committee to the fact, that a committee charged to
"investigate fraud" came into a department which was under martial law, in
the midst of civil dissensions, encouraging insubordination, discrediting and
weakening the authority of the commanding general then absent in the field; and
I offer testimony to show that their conduct, whilst at St. Louis, created a public
opinion that their special object was to make out a case against myself, which
should justify my removal from that department. — (See page 79 of their report.)
And I offer testimony to show that they avoided and declined to receive, and
have suppressed, testimony which militated against this object, and, further, to
40 TESTIMONY.
show that there are in their report many inaccuracies and perversions and some
positire falsehoods.
The labors of the investigating committee appear to have resulted in a single
resolution, in which the purchase of certain arms by myself is made a promi
nent subject. With respect to the sale of these arms by the government I have
nothing to say. They were new, and I am told were sold without being con
demned. The contract price at which they Avere bought by the government
was, I believe, $17 50. The price at which they are set down in the ordnance
manual is $21. After they had been rifled and otherwise improved, I pur
chased them at $22. Taking into consideration the advance in price of arms
caused by the war, I submit that the purchase is not deserving of special cen
sure.
I have digressed from the rule laid down at the outset in this paper, but as
the passage of the resolution which is soon to be before the House would be a
vote of censure, and as the report itself, together with other official accusations,
have been broadly spread over the country, I respectfully ask that the commit
tee will cause this statement, together with the accompanying documents, to
have equal and immediate publicity given to them, in order that Congress may
act understandingly, and the censure asked for go where it properly belongs.
The turbulent condition of the State at the end of August rendered it, in my
judgment, necessary to issue a proclamation, extending martial law to the State
of Missouri, and enforcing some penalties for rebellion.
As explanatory of some " of the difficulties of my position, and of my ideas
concerning the conduct of the war in my department, I refer the committee to
the annexed correspondence with the President in this connexion.
So late as the 6th to the 10th September, as accompanying papers under this
date show, no immediate danger was apprehended for Jefferson City or Lex
ington.
Price was still on the upper Osage, and I was organizing as rapidly as pos
sible a force to march from Holla and from Jefferson City upon Springfield, with
the intention of forcing him to retreat, or cutting off his communications with
Arkansas. Want of transportation, arms, and money was delaying this move
ment. We had just effected lodgments . at Paducah and Fort Holt, and were
occupied in contesting with the rebels western Kentucky, for which re-enforce
ments were constantly required. The condition of North Missouri required a
vigorous effort -to suppress rebellion in that quarter, and an expedition which oc
cupied a considerable part of our real force was sent there under Generals Pope
and Sturgis.
These three points, on which we were actively engaged, fully taxed our re
sources. At this time I sent for General Hunter, to give him command of the
movement upon Springfield. On the llth it will be seen that General Pope,
with all the force under his command, was fully occupied in North Missouri.
On the same day I received the rumor — and only as a rumor — of General Price's
arrival at Clinton, more than 300 miles from St. Louis. Upon the 12th a de
spatch from General Davis informed me of Colonel Mulligan's arrival at Lex
ington. Colonel Mulligan reports a portion of his command, Colonel Marshall's
regiment of cavalry, as scouring the country. The same day another despatch
from him informs me that Price is reported near Warrensburg, with a force vari
ously estimated at from 5,000 to 15,000 men. He informs me measures were
being taken to begin fortifying Lexington. Finally, it appears that General
Davis was giving his attention vigilantly to that section of the country. It will
be seen from the telegrams of this day that Cairo was also requiring more troops.
On the 13th the regiments were ordered from St. Louis to Jefferson City, and
two others from Jefferson City to the relief of Lexington, (Lexington is 240
miles from St. Louis, and 115 miles from Jefferson City,) if, in the opinion of
General Davis, who occupied that place, it was deemed expedient. And gen-
TESTIMONY. 41
erally it will be seen that all possible activity and promptitude was used in sendr
ing- forward troops to the points threatened along the Missouri river, and *neet-
iug with all our disposable force the movements of General Price. It will be
seen that up to the 13th Boonesville, and not Lexington, was considered the
threatened point. On the 14th General Sturgis was directed to move with all
practicable speed upon Lexington. General Pope's despatch of the 16th gave me
every reason to believe as he did — that a re-enforcement of 4,000 men, with ar
tillery, would be there in abundant time; and, if the committee wrill take the
time to read the accompanying papers, it will be seen that from every quarter
where there were disposable troops the promptest efforts were made to concen
trate them on Lexington, but chance defeated these efforts. Also on the 14th,
in the midst of this demand for troops, I was ordered by the Secretary of War
and General Scott to " send 5,000 well armed infantry to Washington without
a moment's delay."
It will in some degree explain my condition to insert the following telegram :
[Vol. 2, page 96.]
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 15, 1861.
Reliable information from the vicinity of Price's column shows his present
force to be 11,000 at Warrensburg and 4,000 at Georgetown, with pickets ex
tending towards Syracuse. Green is making for Boonesville with probable
force of 3,000. Withdrawal of force from this part of the Missouri risks the
State; from Paducah, loses western Kentucky. At the best, I have ordered
two regiments from this city, two from Kentucky, and will make up the re
mainder from the new force being raised by the governor of Illinois.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND,
Ass't Adft Gen'l, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.
It is well to recall the fact that the State of which I had the task to obtain
possession, and which was in active rebellion, contained a white population of
over a million — equal to that of Virginia, and 150,000 greater than that of Ken
tucky — and that the difficulties were increased by the fact that the several im
portant points needed to be occupied for that purpose were very distant from the
centre of operations at St. Louis, with long lines of communication to be kept
open, in the midst of a brave and enterprising enemy.
To St. Joseph, 330 miles ; to Sedalia, 189 miles ; to Jefferson City, 125
miles; to Rolla, 118 miles; to Ironton, about 80 miles; to Cairo and Paducah,
200 miles.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
September 14, 1861.
Subjoined is a list of our total force, with its distribution :
St. Louis, (including Home Guard) 6, 899
Under Brigadier General Pope, (including Home Guard) 5, 488
Lexington, (including Home Guard) 2, 400
Jefferson City, (one quarter Home Guard) 9, 677
Rolla 4, 700
Ironton 3, 057
Cape Girardeau 650
Bird's Point and Norfolk. 3, 510
Cairo, (including McClernand's brigade) 4, 826
42 TESTIMONY.
Fort Holt, opposite Cairo, Kentucky shore 3, 595
Paducah : 7, 791
Under General Lane 2, 200
Mound City, near Cairo 900
Total of present and absent on detaclied duty 55, 693
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Hon. SIMON CAMERON,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.
To these difficulties began now to be added the loss of consideration and
credit, which the apparent withdrawal of the confidence of the government
caused. The visit of high officers charged with inquiring into the affairs of my
department, and the simultaneous and sustained attacks of leading journals,
accumulated obstructions to my movements until I was openly removed from
the command of the department. Except the victory, little advantage resulted
/ to Price from the capture of Lexington, exposed and resting upon a broad river,
which there was* no chance for a large army to cross in case of defeat. As a
military position, its occupation had no value for him. On the contrary, had I
possessed the means of transportation to move forward my troops rapidly, I
should have been well content to give up Lexington for the certainty of being
able to compel Price to give me battle on the north side of the Osage ; as he
could not cross the Missouri without exposing himself to certain defeat, no other
course would have remained open to him. In fact, when I did go forward, the
v appearance of my advance at Sedalia was the signal for his precipitate retreat.
I ask the attention of the committee to the unreasonableness of expecting a
general to be always successful. Admitting even that the western department
had been thoroughly well supplied with men and arms, it could scarcely have
been expected that no single casualty could have been met with in the course
of the campaign. And it would seem more reasonable to judge of the capacity
of the commander by the general results of his operations. From this state
ment, and the accompanying papers, the committee will form some idea of the
condition of the department when I assumed command at the end of July.
At the end of October, when I had succeeded in organizing and equipping an
•army, and was beginning to handle it in the field, we were everywhere, and
uniformly along the whole extent of our lines, successful against the enemy.
At Springfield one of the most brilliant actions, and at Fredericktown one of
the most admirably conducted battles of the war had been fought. Isolated
railroads had all been connected at St. Louis, and were in full and continuous
operation over their whole extent. Additional cars had been provided, and at
twenty-four hours' notice 10,000 men could be moved upon them from any one
point to the opposite side of the State. All our posts, so far as the railroad
went, had been fortified and connected by telegraphs, which were everywhere
in full operation, and the daily mails were running to Springfield, from which
place an officer, alone and in uniform, could ride through with safety to St.
Louis. Quiet and comparative peace had been restored to the State, and the
enemy was in full retreat before us to its southern boundary. A compact had
been entered into with him, under which the authority of the State and federal
courts was acknowledged, liberty of opinion and security of person were
guarantied to both sides, all guerilla parties suppressed, and the war strictly
confined to responsible officers and the armies in the field.
The State was in reality reclaimed, and in condition to leave the army free
for the especial object of descending the Mississippi. The rebels already
TESTIMONY. 43
acknowledged the inutility of resistance to the federal authority ; the doubtful
came to the side of power, and the loyal who had borne the brunt of war,
when to stand by the Union involved danger and losses, were everywhere
encouraged to new efforts, and rewarded for their past aid.
The fall rains were over ; the fine weather of the Indian summer had come ;
the hay was gathered and corn hardening, and we were about to carry out the
great object of our campaign, under the most favorable auspices, with fewer
hardships from exposure, and impediments from transportation, than at any
other season. The spirit of the army was high. It was mainly composed of
western men, whose interest as well as whose patriotism was involved in the
opening of the Mississippi river, for the preparations to which they had con
tributed every possible effort, and we had every reason to believe that the
campaign would open with a signal victory in the defeat or dispersion of the
rebel army, with a move on Memphis as the immediate result.
These were the circumstances under which, without reason assigned, I was
relieved of my command.
It is not grateful to me to have been myself compelled to set out the merits
of my administration ; but it was necessary in order to bring attention to points
which otherwise might not have been presented, and which are necessary to a
clear understanding of the subjects inquired into. Many acts which have been
censured were, I think, for the public good. I know they were with that
intention. I do not feel that in any case I overstepped the authority intended
to be confided to me. Myself and the officers and men acting with me were
actuated solely by a desire to serve the country. And I feel assured that this
is realized by the people of the west, among whom we were acting.
After consultation by the committee Mr. Gooch was instructed to take the
statement and papers submitted by General Fremont and examine them, with a
view to determine what further inquiries it might be deemed necessary to
make.
The witness was informed that when Mr. Gooch should have prepared him
self for the further examination the committee would call him before them.
The witness : I shall be ready at any time to answer any questions the com
mittee may desire to propound to me.
[Examination consequently suspended for the present.]
WASHINGTON, January 30, 1862.
General JOHN C. FREMONT — examination resumed.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Will you state concisely what powers were given you when you
were assigned to the command of the western department ?
Answer. No specific powers were given to me. But no restriction whatever
was placed upon me in taking command of the department.
Question. Did you understand that you had the right, or were expected, to
exercise, any powers other than those which you held by virtue of your com
mission as major general ?
Answer. I understood and expected to exercise any and whatever power was
necessary to carry out the work I was sent to accomplish.
Question. Whether strictly within the limits of the power conferred by your
commission or not 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. From whom did you derive your power in that respect ?
Answer. From the President, and from conversations with the Secretary of
44 TESTIMONY.
War and Mr. Blair, tlie Postmaster General ; neither of whom used any ex
pression which implied a restriction of power. On the contrary, the drift of the
conversation was to the effect that I should exercise any power required. I
have heard that the President said to the Illinois delegation — to Mr. Trumbull,
perhaps — that he had given me more power than he had himself. I would like
to remark, in passing, that I do not think it was clearly understood what was
the nature of the power which a general commanding a department had.
By the chairman :
Question. All the powers incident and necessary to carry out the object to be
obtained were given?
Answer. That is precisely the point.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Did you appoint military officers to act under you ; and if so, why,
and by virtue of what authority ?
Answer. I did appoint such officers, and because they were necessary to the
proper organization of the army, and the carrying out of the military operations.
I did it under the authority of the Secretary of War and of the President of
the United States, and under the general authority given to me.
Question. Do I understand that it was expected that, when you left Wash
ington to assume the command of your department, you would exercise that
power ?
Answer. If I thought of it at all, I did. The governor of Missouri hesitated
to appoint officers for the force raised in Missouri. A despatch was sent to the
President — or through a cabinet officer to the President — asking him if he
would confirm the officers appointed by me ; to that effect, I think. At all
events, the President replied that he would do so. And in all cases when I ap
pointed officers they were appointed subject to the confirmation of the Presi
dent; to be commissioned by him; so the commissions ran that I gave them.
If the Presidenfjyypproved the appointments, then they were to receive their
commissions. Their appointment was necessary to the organization of the force
in that department. We had to take officers wherever we could find them
throughout the country.
Question. When you left Washington for your department you knew, of
course, that you would find a great deficiency of arms in the department.
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you had an order for 7,000 stand of arms in New York ?
Answer. I had procured the order here.
Question. Will you state the facts in relation to that order ?
Answer. I learned from the governor of Illinois that 7,000 of the Illinois
contingent were unarmed. I went to the War Department and applied for arms
for them. General Thomas went with me to Colonel Ripley, and he agreed to
let me have 7,000 out of the number on hand, which, I think, was 25,000. He
was to send them to three different points, named by me, on the Illinois river.
I went on to New York, and the second day after reaching there I received a
letter from Colonel Ripley to the effect that he thought the governor of
Illinois was mistaken, and that those arms were not required, and, therefore, the
order had not been issued for them. I sent that letter to Washington, and in
reply I received a despatch informing me that the President would, himself, go to
the War Department and arrange the matter for me. And in pursuance of that
Major Hagner was sent to New York to endeavor to procure arms for the west
ern department. I subsequently received an order for 5,000 mnskets, to be
delivered to me from the St. Louis arsenal, but they were not there. I think,
when I got to St. Louis, the arms of all descriptions in the arsenal then did not
exceed 1,200 or 1,300.
TESTIMONY. 45
Question. What force did y.ou find subject to your control upon your arrival
at St. Louis 1
Answer. I found a nominal force of perhaps 25,000 men, but a real force not
exceeding 15,000 men; what I mean by that is, that of the three months men,
whose terms of sendee were just expiring, so that you could' not count upon
them at all ; there were about 10,000 men ; while of the three years' men who
were either in Missouri or going to it, there were, perhaps, 15,000 men. The
two would make about 25,000 men.
Question. How was the force armed ?
Answer. It was armed with all kinds of arms ; some with rifled guns, and
some with smooth bores. A small body of cavalry, of regular cavalry, I think,
were armed with sabres.
Question. Was the whole of this force in possession of arms that could be
used in the field ]
Answer. I suppose they were, all. except 7,000, for which, as I have before
stated, I had no arms at all.
Question. When you were in New York was your attention called to what
has since been known as the Austrian muskets ]
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you examine them ]
Answer. I looked at them. How far I examined them I do not recollect.
Question. Did you form an opinion of them at the time ]
Answer. I probably did.
Question. Can you state what that opinion was 1
Answer. I cannot state the opinion from recollection. I can state what I
suppose the opinion must have been. I probably did not take the muskets
then, because they differed somewhat from the arm in regular use in our service.
Question. Were those arms subsequently purchased ]
Answer. Yes, sir ; probably the same arms.
Question. Purchased in pursuance of your order ?
Answer. By my direct order.
Question. To whom was your order given for the purchase of those arms ?
Answer. I purchased them by telegraph from St. Louis, addressed to a firm
in New York, Kruse, Drexel & Schmidt, the firm that held them. They
offered me the arms, and after some interchange of despatches I purchased
them.
Question. What was the price agreed to be paid for them?
Answer. I think it was $6 50.
Question. Will you state the reason for purchasing those arms after having
seen them and considering that there were some objections to them 1
Answer. Because I was in very pressing need of arms. We had no arms to
furnish the regiments. We had plenty of men, but no arms. We were en
deavoring to send re-enforcements to different points to meet the enemy in the
field. We wanted arms for the troops to send to General Lyon, and for all our
military operations.
Question. There were 25,000 of those arms ?
Answer. Yes, sir. 13,000 new and 12,000 that had been in service.
Question. Was not your first proposition to purchase a part of them only ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was the reason that that was not done ?
Answer. Because they would not sell to me without selling the whole of them ;
and I was afraid to wait long, because I supposed they would go to some other
quarter to sell them.
Question. At that time was there not a great competition in the market for
arms ]
Answer. There was ; at least I could get none. And in my judgment there
could not have been — probably would not occur during the war — a greater ne-
46 TESTIMONY.
cessity for arms than there was then. "We were pressed in the State of Mis
souri, and about there, by the enemy. We had men, hut no arms to give them.
The troops sent there by the States came there unarmed.
Question. What proved to be the character and quality of these anus, as you
learned after receiving them ?
Answer. They proved to he a good, substantial arm. The German troops,
a number of whom had been accustomed to use that particular nvui, preferred
them — were well satisfied with them. When the question of altering them
came up, General Asboth asked me to let him have them unaltered for his divi
sion, as he preferred them in that way. They were strong ; the ban-els were
thick, so that they could be easily rifled, and those that were altered were ri
fled. The only difference between that arm and our arm consisted in this : that
instead of having a nipple upon which to put a percussion cap, there was a
primer to be put in, something like three-quarters of an inch long. A cover
was opened, the primer put in, and the cover shut down, precisely as in the old
flint-lock musket you threw back the battery, poured in the powder for priming,
and shut down the battery or pan again. 1 have seen it stated that the ammu
nition was different. The cartridge was exactly the same as for our musket.
The only difference was, that instead of putting on a percussion cap, you put
in a primer of the same material as the percussion cap.
Question. Then it is not true that the ammunition used must be different I
Answer. Not at all, except in using a primer instead of a cap.
By the chairman :
Question. Which could be handled in the shortest time, our gun or that kind?
Answer. I should think there was very little difference between them in that
respect. The primer was long, and the cap is short and small. I should think
that when a man's fingers were cold he could more readily handle the primer,
three-quarters of an inch long, than to handle the cap. There were no more
motions to go through with in the one case than in the other. There was one
advantage : this cover shut down with a spring over the primer, so that it pro
tected it from getting wet.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. So that after the primer was put in, it remained protected and fit
for use for almost any length of time ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And the hammer struck on the primer cover ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. The hammer came down upon the cover of the primer as it used to
strike the steel in the old-fashioned flint-lock musket ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. And the compression ignited the powder, as in the case of the per
cussion cap ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; a regular percussion hammer came right square down on the
cover of the primer. I had with me an excellent officer, Colonel Albert, who
had been for years in the Austrian service. He said that in that service they
considered it a good weapon. I think he used a stronger expression than that,
but I will stop with that.
Question. Did you have with them the primer, so that they could l?e used ?
Answer. Yes, sir. When the muskets first got out there the primers did not
come with them. Two boxes of primers were sent out first, but, in consequence
TESTIMONY. 47
of careless handling, they exploded somewhere near Pittsburg, and killed some
two or three men, and that caused some delay.
Question. How long after yon received the gnus before yon received the
primers ?
Answer. I do not know. Perhaps some ten days.
Question. Were any of those guns put in nse in your army without any al
teration being made in them ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How many of them ?
Answi/r. I think it was so arranged that probably 15,000 of them were dis
tributed or subject to distribution, I think, were distributed, and 10,000 of them
were set aside for alteration. The understanding was, that as fast as they were
altered they should be distributed to the troops, and those that were unaltered
recalled, so as to gradually get them all altered.
Question. Were they all altered ?
Answer. I think not. I think the house in Cincinnati that had contracted to
alter them refused to alter any more after my removal, from fear they would not
get their pay. They had made arrangements to alter them at first at the rate of
200 a day, and then to increase it to 500 a" day ; and I was informed they had
reached the point of 500 a day at the time of my removal, when they stopped
work upon them.
Question. So that, previously to the alteration, you considered them an effi
cient arm ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was the cost of the alteration.
Answer. Between four and five dollars ; four dollars and a half, I think.
Question. The gun having been altered, and having then cost the government
eleven dollars, what was the value of the weapon then ?
Answer. It would cost the government eleven dollars.
Question. Would it be a good arm at that price ?
Answer. I should call it a thoroughly good arm at that price. It became
then a" rifled percussion musket of our pattern.
Question. Do you know the previous history of these muskets ?
Answer. No, sir. All that I have seen about that is in the published report
of the investigating committee of the House of Representatives. In respect to
these muskets, I have a letter here, written to one of my staff from St. Lonis,
under date of January 21, 1862. The letter is written by Captain Hoskin,
and this is what he says about these muskets : " Apropos of the long stories
concerning the Austrian muskets, &c., which were so freely circulated in the
newspapers, it is a very curious commentary on their alleged want of value,
that I was last week ordered to go to Beuton barracks, on the suggestion of
Colonel Callender, to prove some of those very muskets, which had been issued
to the troops. I need not say to you that the trial was a very conclusive one,
and that two regiments, armed with them, marched next day for Cairo. The
men had heard enough against those arms to make them feel very unwilling
to take them ; but, after the proving and trial, I judge they were very much
better satisfied, Indeed, if it were not for these same despised weapons many
of the regiments would have still remained unarmed ; for the department of
Missouri has been much neglected in that respect, as well as the department of
the west, with a fair opportunity to solve the old task-work riddle of making
bricks without straw."
By Mr. Odell :
Question. How many of these 25,000 Austrian muskets are now in use ?
Answer. I presume all of them, probably, except those being altered. I
tried in two places, Philadelphia and Cincinnati, to get these guns rifled and
48 TESTIMONY
the locks altered. The Philadelphia house estimated the cost of alteration at
something over five dollars, and I would have preferred their being altered as
proposed by the Philadelphia house, even at the higher price ; but I submitted
the question to Captain Callender, the ordnance officer having charge of the
arsenal there, and his judgment was that it would make a very good gun altered
as the Cincinnati house proposed to alter it, and as they proposed to do it for a
lower price, I contracted to have them altered there ; but I think it would have
been made a much better weapon to have been altered in Philadelphia, even at
the greater price.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. I desire now to call your attention to the Hall carbines, as they
are called. Some of them were .purchased in New York in pursuance of your
order, were they not 1
Answer. All of them, I think.
Question. Will you state the particulars of that transaction 1
Answer. In brief, I received a despatch from Mr. Simon Stevens offering me
carbines, and I purchased them at once.
Question. Did you know the character of that weapon at the time you pur
chased it, or the history of it ?
Answer. I supposed it to be the usual Hall carbine which I had used in a
journey overland on one occasion.
Question. You were familiar with it ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was the price paid for them 1
Answer. I think it was $22.
Question. How did the gun prove itself — to be a good arm ?
Answer. It proved to be a good arm. It was proved at the arsenal, and I
think they had Captain Hoskin's report in regard to it, and he said it fired with
reasonable accuracy. It proved to be, I supposed, an ordinarily good weapon.
Further than that I do not know, It is a weapon for cavalry, and of course for
close quarters. I have here an ordnance manual in which the regulation price
is stated.
Question. What is the regulation price 1
Answer. It is $21, (turning to the price as fixed in the manual.)
Question. Is that the price of the weapon after it was altered, or the original
price ?
Answer. The original price is $21. The alteration cost something over a dol
lar, as I have understood ; I do not know.
Question. Was the alteration an improvement 1
Answer. Yes, sir. It was rifled, so far as you may consider that an improve
ment of a short arm ; and I think there was some contrivance put on for open
ing it more readily ; and then the chamber was enlarged.
Question. Were you in need of these arms for immediate use at the time they
were purchased ?
Answer. Very much, indeed. I had cavalry in the field, and no arms what
ever for them.
Question. Was Stevens an agent of the government at that time, or did he
hold any appointment under you ?
Answer. Not at that time.
Question. Not at the time of the purchase 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Was he subsequently an aide-de-camp to you ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did he make any purchase in behalf of the government after he
was appointed on your staff?
TESTIMONY. 49
Answer. He was instructed to make some contracts — I think a contract with
Mr. Wiard for some artillery. But I am not clear as to whether he made any
purchase or not after his appointment.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. What was his rank on your staff 1
Answer. That of Major.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Do you know anything in relation to the sale of those arms by the
government — of their being condemned and sold 1
Answer. Nothing whatever.
Question. You purchased them as carbines in the market ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And, of course, as of good quality 1
Answer. Yes, sir. I supposed they were about what such arms usually are.
I am not very familiar with them.
Question. They proved to be so 1
Answer. I think so.
Question. Did you confer with Major Hagner about the purchase of arms in
New York ?
Answer. After I had been some little time in the west I did not ; first, because
he permitted the arms which had been collected by him for me, under the ar
rangement I had with him, to be diverted to Virginia, the greater part of them —
I do not remember that all were ; secondly, because I could not get my wants
attended to by him. I therefore left him entirely alone, and set to work to get
what I wanted myself. I was entirely unsatisfied with Major Hagner's conduct
in relation to my needs in the west, and on that account ceased to employ him,
and sent him a message to that effect. This fact is to be considered in connex
ion with this question of obtaining arms. We had very few of them indeed.
When I came to Washington and got the order for 7,000 muskets, I went from
General Ripley over to Mr. Cameron, and said to him, "You have only 25,000
stand of arms altogether in your armories." He said, "You must be mistaken."
I told him I was not, and asked him to send for General Ripley. He sent for
General Ripley, and asked him if it was true that there were only 25,000 stand
of arms in the government armories. General Ripley said that such was the
case. General Cameron then turned to me and said, " I have learned more from
you, General Fremont, in respect to our arms than I have been able to learn
before since I have been in office here."
Question. Will you state the reasons which led you to erect fortifications
around St. Louis'?
Answer. The necessity for them consisted, first, in the fact that St. Louis was
the base and centre of my department. It was to be my depot for supplies—
the place for my reserves, from which all my operations were to be made. I
wished to make St. Louis secure for a double reason. First, I considered it a
rebel city, and that it was necessary to defend it from rebels inside as well as
from attacks from without. It was constantly the object of the enemy to obtain
possession of that city. For these reasons it was necessary to make it secure.
Such was my opinion, and such was the opinion of officers whom I consulted
in regard to our operations there. They considered it as a necessity about which
there could possibly exist no doubt. My second reason was, that I was prepar
ing to go down the Mississippi river, in which case I should take with me all
my available force. My plan had been to fortify St. Louis, Cape Girardeau,
Ironton, Rolla, and Jefferson City, provisioning them and holding them by gar
risons during my absence ; of course, thereby requiring a comparatively small
force to hold the State tranquil after it had once been reduced to order. The
Part iii 4
50 TESTIMONY.
fortification of St. Louis was the centre of the whole plan. To make that place
strongly secure by fortifications was a necessity, because it was the centre of all
our operations. Really, the difficulty under which I seem to labor in many
cases like that is, that I seem to be required to prove what is self-evident, what
was merely an ordinary measure of precaution. The cost, in the first place,
being in fact less for holding St. Louis by garrison with fortifications — very
much less — that appeared to me to be a measure of ordinary necessity. The
right wing of our entire force was resting on that point. From there we were
going down the Mississippi, leaving that point in the midst of a State so actively
rebellious as that one is. The plan was to fortify St. Louis, and hold it with a
moderate force, and fortify some of the other positions about the State, and gar
rison and provision them, in order to keep the State secure. Those points com
manded the railroads, occupied and defended the various lines of communications
in the State. Just before I left the State I had succeeded in making the sys
tem of communication perfect. I had so arranged it that each railroad and each
bridge on the line of the road were protected. I had had little barracks built
at each important bridge, in which the men were to winter. St. Louis was the
central support, the base upon which everything rested; not only St. Louis, but
down the river.
Question. Was there the same necessity for fortifications there that there
would be in any rebel territory where it Avas desirable to take and hold important
strategical points ?
Answer. Exactly and undoubtedly so.
Question. Did you consult with any officers connected with the engineer de
partment of the government in relation to those fortifications ?
Answer. I do not think I did. I doubt if there were any in the department,
and I had full confidence in those officers who were with me. I had with me
men who had seen many years' service in actual field operations ; who in the line
as well as in the capacity of engineers had done work with armies in the field.
Therefore if I had had engineers of the regular army with me I should, probably,
have given preference to these experienced officers.
Question. You considered them more competent to judge ?
Answer. I did ; because they had had the benefit of experience in absolutely
practical operations.
Question. They had both the theory and the practice, instead of the theory
only?
Answer. Yes, sir; and therefore naturally I would like to have the benefit of
their experience.
Question. At most other points — and I do not know but at all — fortifications
have been erected Toy the soldiers themselves. Why was not that done at St.
Louis 1
Answer. For several reasons. One was that, as a matter of judgment, I pre
ferred to employ hired labor. It was with difficulty that the men could be in
duced to labor on fortifications, and in places where they did do it the work went
on very slowly indeed ; and my judgment was that it was better to employ the
men in what they considered more particularly a soldier's duty, in preparing
and instructing them for the field, rather than in that kind of hard labor, for
which many of them considered they had not enlisted ; and I wished to have
the good will of the army, to put them in a good disposition to fight the enemy ?
that they should go into the field with all the feelings of patriotism and zeal
with which they had enlisted. Practically that was one of the principal reasons.
The condition of my department was such that the men were wanted as imme
diately as they could be armed. Another reason was, that it was much better
for the health of the men not to expose them to the heat of the day and the dew
of the night at that season of the year. And another reason having considerable
force with me at the time was, that in the city was a large unemployed popula-
TESTIMONY. 5!
tion of men whose families were in great want ; and by the employment of that
hired labor I conciliated a large body of men by giving them occupation, and, I
think, produced a tone of feeling very favorable to the government in a class
which in cities are generally inclined to be turbulent, and likely to be the first
to be engaged in any difficulty.
Question. Was the condition of things in St. Louis at that time such that you
felt that to be a desirable object to be secured on the part of the government 1
Answer. Decidedly so ; and in that opinion I know I have the concurrence of
the most respectable citizens of St. Louis.
Question. State concisely what arrangements you made for the construction*;
of the forts. I do not mean the form and number of the forts, but the arrange
ments for building them.
Answer. When the work was first commenced it was placed under the super
intendence and direction of Colonel Hassendenbel ; subsequently under the direc
tion of Major Kappner, whose operations, I think, were confined to the five south
ern forts. Afterwards Mr. Beard — a gentleman whom I had known as a con
tractor of large experience, and a man of uncommon energy and activity — arrived
at St. Louis at a time when I was dissatisfied with the progress of the work,
which did not go on as I desired it. I addressed myself to him to take charge
of the fortifications and urge them forward with as much speed as was in any
way possible.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. This Mr. Beard was from Indiana, was he not 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; he had been a contractor on the Wabash and Erie canal.
He has been on quite a number of works. He is really very remarkable for his
ability to control large bodies of men in work of that sort. He is a man of un
usual force in that respect, and when he came to St. Louis I regarded it as
quite a favorable accident to me, and put him on these works.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. How were your forts designated — by numbers 1, 2, 3, &c.?
Answer. Yes, sir, I think so.
Question. The first five were built by Major Kappner ?
Answer. He was one of the principal engineers on them ; the latter part of
the time he superintended them.
Question. Did he have the whole direction of the work, the hiring of the
men, &c. ?
Answer. Entirely. He had the direction of the work, the hiring of the men,
having them attended to and paid, so that I know nothing of the building of the
works as regards details.
Question. How did the five forts built by Major Kappner compare in size
and cost of construction with those built by Mr. Beard ?
Answer. As I have learned the forts built by Beard exceeded very much in:
price those built by Kappner. That would be the natural result of the manner
in which they Avere built. Mr. Beard was directed to finish them forthwith.
Question. Were the five forts built by Major Kappner as large and extensive
as those built by Mr. Beard, and would they have been as expensive if con
structed in the same manner?
Answer. What was the relation of the different forts to each other, as to size,
I am not certain. They were built of different sizes, according to locality, &c.
I have asked for and endeavored to get a report on here, so as to be able to
show the committee the character and size of the works, but I have not yet
received it.
Question. Do you know the cost of the five forts built by Major Kappner?
52 TESTIMONY.
Answer. I have seen it stated at about $60,000 in the report of the investi
gating committee.
Question. You do not know it otherwise ?
Answer. I do not. I had no report made to me about the cost of those forts
before I left the department.
Question. It has been stated that the forts built by Mr. Beard were no better
or larger than those built by Major Kappner, though costing four or five times
as much.
Answer. That, I think, is not true. I have no doubt they cost a great deal
more, but not to that extent.
Question. Can you state the difference in their cost?
Answer. I cannot. I have seen-a statement of Major Kappner, in which he
said I did not know, and could not have known, the prices he was paying, for
he never made any statement or report to me in connexion with the matter;
and so it was with Mr. Beard. I never had a report from either of them as to
the cost of their works. I will state the difference in regard to the manner in
which those forts were built. Mr. Beard built five forts and seven outworks.
In the contract with him I caused a stipulation to be inserted that each fort
should be finished within five days after the engineers had laid it out, because
it was a great point with me to have the city garrisoned when I should leave.
Finally, when I was about to take the field at the head of the army, I sent for
General Asboth, who was the chief of my staff, and told him that those forts
must be finished; that I would give Mr. Beard five days to finish his forts, and
I would give Major Kappner fifteen days to finish those he was constructing.
I told him to send for them and inform them what I had determined upon. He
sent for Mr. Beard, and he agreed to finish the forts in that time. They were to
be finished, guns mounted, magazines stored, and colors flying, in five days.
Major Kappner informed me that he could not undertake to finish his works in
fifteen days, but he would do it in twenty days. I then directed the order to
be made out to him to that effect ; that within twenty days from that date those
five forts were to be finished, guns mounted, magazines stored, and colors flying.
I told Major Kappner that if he failed to comply with that order I would dis
miss him from the service; that if he took that order, he took it subject to that
condition. He agreed to take it. I mention this to show the different manner
in which these forts were built. I did not wish to disturb Major Kappner and
the engineers on the works he had in charge, and I gave the time he desired.
Question. Was the reason for the difference in the cost of the forts that in
the one case the forts were built without any great pressure for time, and in the
other they were built in the shortest possible time ]
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. That is your explanation of the difference of cost, so far as there
was a difference of cost, in the building of those forts ?
Answer. That is all the explanation I know of — that of hurry and press of
time — the point with me being one of time, and the cost became greater.
Question. Did Mr. Beard commence the work before any contract was made
with him ?
Answer. He commenced it before any contract was drawn out. I put him
immediately on the work, as soon as he agreed to do it, and left the contract to
be made afterwards between him and General McKinstry, supposing, of course,
that everything would be done correctly.
Question. And that contract was subsequently made out and signed by the
parties ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. In relation to the payments, can you state in what sums, and at
what times, the money was paid to Beard on his contract 1
Answer. I cannot from memory. I can give a general statement in regard to
TESTIMONY. 53
the matter. The payments were made something in this way : there was a
great scarcity of money, and each contractor and each man to whom money was
due endeavored to obtain a portion for himself out of whatever happened to be
on hand : and in Mr. Beard's case, as I judge from what I have seen there, mo
ney was given to him when it could be had, in order that he might have some
on hand to meet the demands upon him when they should arise. He would get
an order for the money, and if he could not get the money of the quartermaster
he would go and negotiate in the city for it. General McKinstry might obtain
money from some of the banks, and would apportion it out to meet the demands
for it. We had very little money, and what we could get we divided out over
the whole department. Of course the man who could get the most did the best
for himself. In Beard's case, having a large number of men employed, his point
was to have on hand as much money as he could for his men, because the next
time he applied for money there might be none for him. For a long time all
the money we got there we obtained from the banks by borrowing, taking and
using their currency, such as it was.
Question. Was money paid to Beard in advance of the amount due him ?
Answer. I have no doubt it was, in order that he might have a provision
made to meet the demands on him when they should arise. I have seen printed
what purported to be orders written by me for money to be paid to Mr. Beard.
I never wrote out any order. Beard would come with a statement of the rea
sons why he wanted the money, and those statements were probably copied
into the orders made out for him which I signed. For myself, when I ordered
anything, I gave no reasons why I wanted it to any of my subordinate officers.
But I can easily understand how some of these orders which I signed came to
be made out as they were. Mr. Beard would present his reasons for the money,
and the secretary in writing out the order would transfer the reasons into the
order as an explanation to General McKinstry or whoever had the money to
give, and he would regard it as a reason for giving more than he otherwise
would.
Question. You did not write the order, but you signed it ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I do not think there are any orders in my own hand
writing.
Question. Before those payments were made, were there any estimates made
or accounts rendered of the amount of work done by Mr. Beard ?
Answer. No, sir ; I do not think I ever received a statement of the amount
of work done by Mr. Beard ; nothing except information that such and such
a fortification was in such a condition, when he would ask me to go out and in
spect it, which I did. While I was in town I used to visit the fortifications, and
see the progress of the works. In neither case, either of Major Kappner or
Mr. Beard, was a statement ever made to me of that nature during the progress
of the works.
Question. Were you at any time ordered to discontinue the field-works
around the city of St. Louis ? *
Answer. I was.
Question. And not to pay any more money on account of them ?
Answer. I was.
Question. From whom did that order issue ?
Answer. From the Secretary of War, through General Thomas.
Question. Was that order complied with?
Answer. By me, no sir. Perhaps I better state the circumstances under
which I received that order. I was at Warsaw, at the head of my army, on
the way to Springfield, when I learned by report, somewhere, I suppose, about
the 16th of October — thereabouts, I will not be certain as to date — that such
an order had been issued. I wrote to Captain McKeever, my adjutant general,
to protest against such an order as that, if any such had been issued, for the
54 TESTIMONY.
i
reason that St. Louis, as I have already stated, was the base of all my opera
tions, upon the safety of which might depend the safety of my entire army,
and the success of all my operations in the department. I considered the issu
ing of such an order as something extraordinary, unjustifiable, and not sustain
able, as regards myself. I considered that the Secretary of War might as well
have come to me in the field, when I was in face of the enemy and engaged in
battle, and order me to discontinue the march of one column here, and an
other there, as to have made that order while I was in the" field, as it struck at
the base of my operations. Having directed my adjutant general to protest
against that order, and to state to him that I would do so formally if I received
any such written order, I let the matter stand. I think that on or about the
19th or 20th of October a letter came to me, not in the usual form or manner,
through my adjutant general, but directly to me, from General Thomas. That
letter I have not been able to find. It was directed, I think, to two points — the
discontinuance of the fortifications, and, I think, the payment of the money.
Having already stated my views by protesting against such an order, I simply
neglected the matter, and let it stand as it was. 1 acted, I thought, in my right
as commanding general of that department, carrying on military operations. I
considered the stoppage of these fortifications as inexpedient, and possibly dan
gerous for the army in the field, and all my other positions ; and having pro
tested against it, as I have said, I let the matter rest there.
Question. You say you received a letter. Did that letter contain a peremptory
order to discontinue those works ?
Answer. I am not clear as to the form of the letter, whether it directed me to
issue an order discontinuing those operations, or whether it informed me that the
Secretary of War had issued such an order. At all events, my operations had
been so much interfered with in my department ; my remaining in command was
so doubtful at that time ; and my position as commanding general had been so
much discredited and weakened, that I simply neglected acting further in the
matter, arid left it to the Secretary who had issued the order to have it carried
out, if he saw fit to do so after my protest.
Question. If such an order was directed to you from the Secretary, would it
not have been your duty to have promulgated an order to discontinue those
works ?
AnsAver. Under ordinary circumstances it might. But, as a matter of judg
ment, I am doubtful about it without consultation.
Question. You say you directed your adjutant general to protest against the
order ?
Answer. I wrote him a letter to that effect ; but in what form I am not now
certain, because I have not since conversed with him in relation to it.
Question. Do I understand that you directed Captain McKeever to notify the
Secretary of War that you thought it not advisable ?
Answer. That was the effect of my letter, in which case I should have been
justifiable, and, in any case, to wait until I heard further from the Secretary. In
tfie same way as General Lyou, being at Springfield, protested against the with
drawal from him by the Secretary of War of the little regular force which he
had there, telling the Secretary that it was dangerous to do it, and until he
heard further from him he would not obey the order, but would retain the
troops.
Question. Did you receive any further order from the Secretary of War 1
Answer. Nothing further.
Question. The order which you did receive is said to have directed the dis
continuance of those works, and also to abstain from any further payment of
money on account of those works.
Answer. I have seen it stated that it was so. I do not clearly recollect the
purport of the letter I received. On the contrary, as regards the impression
TESTIMONY. 55
upon my mind of the purport of the letter, it was not that the Secretary of War
directed me to order the discontinuance of the work, but rather it informed me
that the Secretary had directed it to be discontinued. I have been trying to
find that letter in order to ascertain what was the character of it, but I have
not been able to do it.
Question. Your impression is that the communication which you received in
formed you of the fact that the Secretary of War had directed the discontinuance
of those works 1
Answer. That has been my impression. I must sayfit is not so clearly my
impression now as it has been up to the time when I saw this statement in re
gard to it.
Question. How could he direct it ? Could he make such a direction to any
one but yourself?
Answer. Not properly to any one else.
Question. Do you know whether any money was paid after this time on ac
count of those works 1
Answer. I do not know anything about that.
Question. It has been stated that after this order you gave a peremptory
order to Major Allen to pay over $66,000 to Mr. Beard; that he declined to do
so, and communicated the fact to the department at Washington, and was told
not to pay the money. Do you know whether that is so or not?
Answer. I do not know anything about that.
Question. Did you, in the contract made with Mr. Beard, fix the prices that
he was to receive ?
Answer. Not in detail. It was arranged and the price was determined upon
between General McKinstry and Mr. Beard. Further than that I do not know.
Question. Was it left to General McKinstry to determine what would be a
fair price for doing the work ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. General McKinstry was assistant quartermaster there, was he not ?
Answer. He was quartermaster, at the head of the quartermaster's department,
in that department.
Question. By whom appointed ?
Answer. By the government. He was a quartermaster in the regular army,
and had been there nearly two years before he was removed. I had him re
moved from the office. I applied to the President — knowing him to be a good
soldier, and one who had really distinguished himself in Mexico — I applied to
the President to give him a commission as brigadier general, which he did. I
told the President he would be much more serviceable in the field at the head
of a brigade than as a quartermaster.
Question. It was not at your solicitation that he was appointed quartermaster ?
Answer. No, sir ; not at all. I found him there as quartermaster. He had
been there, I suppose, eighteen months when I got there.
Question. So that you were in nowise responsible for the acts which he did
legitimately within his jurisdiction as quartermaster ?
Answer. Certainly not. He was responsible to the government.
Question. He fixed the prices at which this labor was to be done ?
Answrer. Yes, sir ; and I approved them.
Question. He agreed upon the price ?
Answer. Yes ; so I understood it.
Question. You did not fix the price, but simply approved it after the rest had
been fixed by the quartermaster ?
Answer. General McKinstry was, in the first instance, ordered by me to make
the contract with Mr. Beard. When this contract, with the conditions desired
by Mr. Beard, was presented to him, he referred the question of prices to me.
I told him I would approve whatever he determined to be right, and I did so.
56 TESTIMONY.
He told me the prices claimed by Mr. Beard had been too high, and I told him
to put them at what he thought proper, having regard to the nature of the work
and the peculiar circumstances under which it was done.
Question. Then it is not true that you fixed the prices between the quarter
master and the contractor ?
Answer. Not true at all.
Question. l]hey were approved by you after they had been fixed by Quarter
master McKinstry at what he deemed fair rates ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; so I understand. That is my recollection.
Question. Is it within the duties of the quartermaster to make contracts for
the erection of fortifications ?
Answer. Perhaps not strictly. I suppose it should come more under the
direction of the engineer department, if there were such there. It would come
under the direction strictly of the quartermaster's department to build barracks,
and, under circumstances, fortifications. Certainly, under the circumstances,
then, I think it might be considered that he was the proper officer to do that
work. I am not familiar enough with the customs of our service to say who
should properly attend to that work. Such works as barracks — quarters for
the troops, of any kind — come under the direction of the quartermaster. I do
not know but that strictly the whole of this may be considered to be within his
department.
Question. Did you regard it at the time as within his department I
Answer. Yes, entirely so.
Question. Did he accept the service, and perform the duty as a part of the
duty of the department ?
Answer. I have no recollection of his having made any opposition to under
taking the work. If he did so I overruled it, certainly; but I have no recollec
tion of it. I do not think he would have made any after having been directed
by me to attend to it. I gave him positive orders to do so, and left him without
any alternative.
Question. What position did Captain Turnley hold ?
Answer. He was a quartermaster under General McKinstry, and succeeded
him upon his appointment as brigadier general. He ranked next to General
McKinstry, I think.
Question. In relation to the fund from which the money was to be taken to
pay for these fortifications : from what source did you understand that that
money was to be obtained ?
Answer. From any source that it could be obtained from, whether quarter
master, or commissary, or anything else.
Question. You deemed you had the right to take money from the quartermas
ter's department to pay for the construction of these fortifications 1
Answer. Certainly ; and in that connexion I want to call the attention of the
committee to the fact which renders that suggestion of no force, as it might have
if the different departments had been supplied with money by the government ;.
but, on the contrary, we ourselves a greater part of the time had to provide money
by borrowing it, and then I directed it to be delivered to the quartermaster, the
commissary, or other officer who most needed it. The money came from a
general source, that is, from our credit and ability to borrow it. The govern
ment supplied us with very little money, in no way adequate to our necessities ;
all distinctions were lost; none existed, none were regarded. The money,
wherever it was, was taken by me to pay any and the most pressing demands
in any branch of the service, where I thought it was necessary.
Question. And obtaining the money as you did, you did not feel under obli
gations to confine it to the expenses of any particular department?
Answer. Not the slightest ?
TESTIMONY. 57
Question. In relation to the purchase of horses and mules for your depart
ment : by whom were those purchases made ?
Answer. Made mainly by the quartermaster — some under special contracts ;
some were bought in Ohio, I think, under special contracts; some were intended
to have been bought in Canada, or wherever they could be had. The quarter
master's business is to provide the horses.
Question. Did you have any immediate personal knowledge of those contracts 1
Answer. Some of them not much personal knowledge, but some knowledge.
Of some I had direct personal knowledge. '
Question. Please state in regard to those contracts of which you had knowl-
Answer. That of which I had the most particular knowledge is a contract
with a man named Gustavus A. Sacchi, of New York. With the others I had
so little to do, I do not think I had any information that would be of service
to you.
Question. Did you order the purchase of a thousand Canadian cavalry horses
by Augustus A. Sacchi, of New York ; and if so, will you state the particulars
of that transaction ?
Answer. I did. Mr. Sacchi came to St. Louis and procured an interview
with me for the purpose of offering to make that contract. It struck me as a
good thing to be done. I knew that Canadian horses were valuable, for I had
used them in the field. I knew them to be an unusually tough horse, easy to
be got along with on the prairie where food was scarce ; and I directed a con
tract to be made with him for the purchase of a thousand of them.
Question. Do you remember the price ]
Answer. It was $120, I think.
Question. Were those horses delivered ?
Answer. No, sir ; I think two were.
Question. Only two ?
Answer. That was all, I think. More were offered but only two were ac
cepted.
Question. Are there any further particulars in relation to that transaction
that you desire to state ?
Answer. It has been stated that Mr. Woods intervened between the contractor
and myself. I will state in regard to that that Mr. Woods had no power of
intervention any further than this : after Mr. Sacchi had come to see me, which
he did through another person — I think he was introduced to me by General
Asboth — I sent for Mr. Woods, after the contract was decided upon, and told
him to send for Captain Turnley and to say that that contract had been made.
That was all that Captain Woods had to do with the matter in any connexion.
It is also stated that Mr. Sacchi had difficulty in speaking English, so much so
that Captain Turnley had to speak with him in Spanish. The fact is, that Mr.
Saechi speaks English correctly, and about as fluently as foreigners get to speak
our language, and, as I am informed, he cannot speak Spanish at all, and knows
very little about it. I spoke English with him without the least difficulty
whatever.
Question. Did this Mr. Sacchi ever receive an appointment upon your staff ?
Answer. No, sir ; he never was on my staff. There was a Captain Sacchi
on my staff at Springfield, who came from Italy for the purpose of serving with
us. He was an officer who had been distinguished under Garibaldi, and deco
rated for gallantry ; but he was not the man with whom I made the contract
for horses.
Question. Did you have any reason to suppose that there was any collusion
between Colonel Woods, of your staff, and Mr. Sacchi ?
Answer. Not the slightest at all. I do not think there ever was the slightest.
I have here a statement from Mr. Sacchi, who had seen those statements, and
58 TESTIMONY.
if the committee will examine they will perceive that they are without the
slightest foundation whatever.
(Statement handed to the committee.)
Question. Did you order Colonel T. P. Andrews to make a payment to Cap
tain Schwartz?
Annswer. I did.
Question. Please state the circumstances and the reasons for requiring Col
onel Andrews to make that payment ?
Answer. I had directed Captain Schwartz to recruit men for a battery, of
which he was to have the command. I will state in this connexion that he
was an artillery officer who had seen service. He is mentioned with distinc
tion on account of his behavior at the battle of Belmont. I had directed him to
recruit men for his battery. He brought me in a bill which he required to be paid
of something over $200; I do not remember now how much it was. I sent him
to the paymaster whom I directed to pay it, following out my general course of
ordering money to be paid wherever it could be found. The paymaster sent
back the paper with an indorsement on the back of it, that he had been in
the service forty years and had never received such an order before, and refused
to pay it. Before that came to me Captain Schwartz had left the house. I sent
for him, and the next day sent him with another order to the paymaster direct
ing him to pay that money; and I sent Captain Zagoni with a file of men, and
gave him written instructions to the effect that if Colonel Andrews did not obey
that order to arrest him and place him in confinement ; to deliver him to Colonel
McKinley, and have him confined in the town hall — that is to say, at the city
garrison. Captain Zagoni went with Captain Schwartz ; the order was pre
sented, and Colonel Andrews again refused to pay it, and Captain Zagoni
arrested him. After being arrested in that way Colonel Andrews paid the order.
Question. Was the money in Colonel Andrews's hands at that time money
that had been obtained by you in the same manner as the sums to which you
have before referred1?
Answer. I do not know. I intended the order to be against any money he
might have on hand, from whatever source it might have been obtained.
Question. Intending to be governed in your department according to the
necessities of the case, without regard to restrictions ?
Answer. Exactly.
Question. Did you at any time order or demand money of the assistant
treasurer of the United States at St. Louis ?
Answer. I did.
Question. Under what circumstances, and for what reasons 1
Answer. Shortly after I went to the department, there being no money at all,
the troops being about to disband and refusing to re-enlist because they were
not paid, and there being an immediate demand for troops, I applied to the
treasurer, who I understood to have about $300,000 then on hand, for $100,000.
He declined to do so. I sent for him and had a conversation with him, in which
I urged upon him the expediency and necessity of using that money, or a por
tion of it, in that way. He, however, after reflection, decided that he could not
do it. I then ordered my adjutant general to take with him as much force as
might be necessary and go and take the money, and deliver it to the paymaster,
to be used as circumstances might require. I did that in the exercise of the
power I understood myself to have, and which I believed I did have. I in
formed the President that I was about to do it, and should do it.
Question. Did you ever receive any reply in answer to that communication?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. In relation to orders for ice to be sent from St. Louis to Jefferson
City. Will you state what order was given in relation to that matter, the neces
sity for the order, and what was done in pursuance of it?
TESTIMONY 59
Answer. A requisition was made upon me for ice by Doctor Tellekamp, who
was my first medical officer, and I approved the requisition, of course, in the
confidence that his judgment was correct as to the quantity of ice that would
probably be required in the events that were then expected to take place. He
made the requisition in anticipation of a battle between Sedalia and Lexington,
in which 70,000 men would be engaged — that being about the number to which
the forces on both sides amounted. In that event, there would be many killed
and wounded, and that would necessitate the use of a large quantity of ice ; and
in order to be certain to have enough, he made a requisition for 500 tons so as
to secure it at St. Louis. I believe that only a small quantity of ice was sent
up, and only what the service actually required. I have no doubt myself that
the order, though a large one, was a reasonable requisition on his part under the
circumstances. At all events, I was guided by the opinion of the medical offi
cer who made the requisition. I think it is clear, however, that when 70,000
men are engaged in battle, as was his expectation would be the case, there will
be some use for ice on such an occasion. It is hardly necessary for me to say
that that was the purpose for which it was ordered, and the only purpose for
which it was ordered — for the use of the wounded and sick.
Question. Did Mr. Lanion, sometimes called General Lamon, make any appli
cation to you for any force to be sent under him into Western Virginia at any
time during your administration of the western department ?
Answer. He did.
Question. Will you state the circumstances in relation to that ?
Answer. General Lamon overtook me on horseback on the road somewhere
south of Warsaw. He brought with him a letter from the governor of Illinois,
informing me of the purpose for which he came, which was to get the Yates
Phalanx, a regiment which had recently come to St. Louis from Illinois. As
nearly as I can now recollect the letter, it was an urgent one from Governor
Yates, requesting me to let General Lamon have that regiment, stating that it
would please him ; would please the regiment, and would also please the
President. The governor of Illinois had furnished a large body of troops for
Missouri, and had always been very solicitous to aid our operations there in
every way. And it did not occur to me to hesitate to agree at once to his
request, and order the regiment to be turned over to General Lamon. It may
be as well for me to remark here in this connexion, also, that at that time I was
in expectation of being removed from the department ; and, as you may have
noticed, things were done a little loosely ; I mean, referring in all cases to
myself, not done with all the strictness that generally pervades a department
like that. And I, probably, acceded to a request of that kind the more readily,
and without as much formality as if I had been expecting to remain in com
mand. At all events, I looked upon the presence of General Lamon there,
with the letter from Governor Yates, much the same as a request from the
President; knowing, as I did, the relations General Lamon bore to the
President.
Question. Do I understand you that you considered the request of General
Lamon, knowing the relations between him and the President, as having the
sanction of the President ?
Answer. I did.
Question. And that was the reason you complied with it 1
Answer. That was one of the reasons, though General Lamon did not say
anything about his relations with the President.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. What was Lamon's rank at that time 1
Answer. I supposed his rank to be a brigadier general. He had on the
60 TESTIMONY.
uniform of a brigadier general. I understood from the governor's etter that
he was to command a brigade.
Question. Do you know what became of that regiment ?
Answer, I do not know. When I reached St. Louis again I was not in
command, and it did not occur to me to inquire.
Question. At that time did you have an excess of troops, so that you could
well spare this regiment ?
Answer. No, sir. There never was an occasion when I could spare any
troops. I remarked to General Lamon at the time that of course he could
have the regiment, but that I need not say to him that it was not an agreeable
thing to me to let any of my regiments go.
Question. Was there not a military, necessity why you should not have let
that regiment go ?
Answer. Not strictly, I think. If there was not a military necessity for con
tinuing the fortifications at St. Louis, there was not certainly a military necessity
to keep one regiment, more or less, there.
Question. That regiment was at St. Louis at that time.
Answer. Yes, sir. There were other regiments to replace them. Very prob
ably the governor suggested in his letter that other regiments would replace
that one.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. In complying with that request, did you feel that you took the
responsibility of ordering that regiment from St. Louis to Western Virginia ?
An|wer. No, sir, I did not. The question of responsibility did not occur to
me. I supposed, from the manner in which the thing was presented to me, that
I was doing a thing of course. Business in our service is not done with the
strictness which that would imply. If you remember, there was a great deal
done in the western department which was not consistent with strict military
propriety ; a great deal. And in my condition, then, going south with my army,
and not expecting to be retained in command long, it was not a matter to me of
very great importance whether that regiment was retained or not, if others
thought it best to send it somewhere else. So far as I can now recollect, I
thought, when General Lamon overtook me and brought me that letter, that it
was a thing I was expected to do, and I did it. And to take the opposite view
of it, it would not have been very agreeable to me to refuse to do what I had
reason to suppose would be agreeable to the President, and which the governor
of Illinois told me would be agreeable to the President.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. It could not be done without a great expenditure of money, could it ?
Answer. That was not for me to consider at all. If it was agreeable to the
President, and pleased him, that was all that concerned me. I knew that a
fine regiment had been ordered from me at St. Louis a short time before that to
go to Washington. And consequently that would not probably have been con
sidered by me to be a matter of importance.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. As you have alluded to those five regiments, will you state what
became of them ? Did they come through to Washington ?
Answer. No, sir. On their way from the point where they had been station
ed — which was Fort Holt, in Kentucky, on the Mississippi river — before they
reached Cincinnati, a bridge gave way, and there were some 140, more or less,
of the men belonging to those regiments killed and wounded. They then went
on to Camp Dennison and stopped there. I, in the meantime, had applied to
the government, and urged the government not to take those regiments ; not to
TESTIMONY. 61
take any more ; and suggested that they should take two regiments of cavalry,
which I could not arm, and leave me the other regiments. And, upon my rep
resentations, the result finally was that the government did not press for the
five regiments, and permitted these regiments to remain. And seeing that Gen
eral Anderson had need at the time of forces in Kentucky, as they had gone
that far, I ordered them to join General Anderson.
Question. Did the five regiments leave you at that time ?
Answer. Only these two.
Question. Was that at a time when you could spare the troops ?
Answer. Not at all.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. From whom did you receive the order to send those five regiments
on here ?
Answer. From General Scott, and from the Secretary of War, both.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. You constructed railroads and equipped them, purchased cars, &c.
Will you state to the committee the reasons which led you to construct those
railroads, and whether or not any advantages were derived from that work ?
Answer. I ordered our superintendent of roads to examine the rolling stock
of all the railroads, and ascertain what amount there was, in order to know
what force could be moved at any time upon those roads. His report showed
that the quantity of rolling stock was not at all equal to what our requirements
demanded. I applied to the president of the Pacific railroad to ascertain if
any, and what, arrangements could be made to provide more stock. It was
found upon examination that it could not well be done through him, mainly be
cause we had no money to give him to enable him to provide additional stock,
even if that would have answered the purpose. I therefore had the matter
further inquired into, and after some examination I ordered a contract for cars
to be made, which was given to a Mr. Murray, of Cincinnati, who had fbunderies
both at Cincinnati and St. Louis. And growing out of the same investigation,
I suppose, it became apparent that great advantages would be derived if all
those roads could be connected. At the extremities of the roads were our posts.
The roads led through portions of country, or to points, which we supposed to
be threatened by the enemy at any time, and a junction of the roads, with a
sufficient quantity of rolling stock, would enable us to throw from any one or
more points to any other point a force to meet any emergency. I therefore
ordered a junction to be made which connected the road running from Irouton
to St. Louis, the Pacific road, the road that runs to Rolla, and the road that
runs through the northern part of the State, so that all the roads were con
nected ; and the result of the whole arrangement was that with twenty -four
hours' notice 20,000 troops could be moved from St. Louis to any point which
might be threatened. It had this further advantage, the railroad was brought
right along the river bank at St. Louis, so that upon the arrival of troops from
Illinois, or any other State east, they could be brought over in the steamer
always kept in readiness there and transferred directly to the railroad — they
and their equipments and their supplies — and sent off immediately to any one
of our posts, or to the interior of the State. Formerly the quartermaster's de
partment had to hire wagons, sometimes hauling equipments and supplies two
and two and a half miles through the city to the different depots, and troops
arriving there had to move from one point to another with all their supplies. In
this case, as we often had occasion to employ it, a regiment embarked at Iron-
ton, for instance, and passed right through St. Louis, with all their equipments,
&c., and proceeded directly to Jefferson City, or any other point where they
were needed; or a regiment from any one of the posts would come to St. Louis
62 TESTIMONY.
and pass right through on the cars, without stopping at all in the city, and go
to any other place where they were needed. And so with regiments arriving
by the river boats.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Where did you connect these roads ?
Answer. In the city of St. Louis. They were all brought to a common land
ing place on the river. As an instance in point : the rebels tore up about 100
miles of track, more or less, on the North Missouri railroad, which runs to St.
Joseph. Probably a part of the rolling stock of that road was on one side of
that break and a part on the other. The military authorities went to the Pacific
railroad and took 35 of these very cars which I had made as the best cars to be
used, and transferred them to the North Missouri road, and no doubt that single
operation was worth more to the government than the entire cost of all those
cars.
Question. By this connexion you made the stock on all the roads available
for any one road ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I first sent across the river, before I ordered any cars to
be made, to see if stock could be secured from the Illinois roads. But I found
they would not answer, as the gauge was different, and I was obliged to have
cars constructed. It gives this advantage to Missouri : that at any time, with
24 hours' notice, you can transport as large a body of troops as 20,000 men
from one part of the State to any other part.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. You say the government has availed itself, and is still availing
itself, of the advantages of this connexion ?
Answer. Unquestionably it is. It is an important advantage to the entire
State and to the government in its operations there. It is but recently that the
instance occurred to which I have referred, when 35 cars were taken from the
Pacific road and used on another road.
Question. How many cars did you order to be made ?
Answer. Fifty, I think.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Do you remember the price 1
Answer. I think somewhere near $800 a car. But I do not know exactly.
I would not like to be positive.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Can you tell me how many regiments were stationed in Northern
Missouri, under General Pope, at the time you took charge of the western de
partment ?
Answer. Not exactly; probably from five to seven regiments. I do not now
remember the number. I had just reached the State then. The disposable
force, whatever it was — all our Illinois disposable force — was ordered into North
ern Missouri at General Pope's request.
Question. Do you know where those troops were stationed — at what points ?
Answer. Along the line of the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad, north of
the road — scattered about the interior there.
Question. How many troops did you find at St. Louis at that time ?
Answer. Few, if any ; a regiment or two, possibly, and some home guard
regiments.
Question. On what day did you arrive at St. Louis and take^command ?
Answer. On the 25th of July.
Question. And the battle of Wilson's Creek was on the 10th of August 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
TESTIMONY. 63
Question. When did you first learn that General Lyon was threatened by a
superior force of the enemy 1
Answer. While in New York city, I think.
Question. In what manner 1
Answer. By a telegraphic despatch to the effect that he needed re-enforce
ments. That, I think, was about the 18th of July. A large part of the dispo
sable force was then with him.
Question. Was it in your power at that time to have ordered any troops to-
the assistance of General Lyon ?
Answer. No, sir ; not under the circumstances.
Question. Did you at any time order any troops to his assistance ?
Answer. About the 3d of August, I think, I ordered the regiment under Col
onel Stephenson — one of our best regiments — and Colonel Montgomery, with
his mounted command, from Kansas, both to march to the relief of General
Lyon. And on my arrival at St. Louis I also ordered Colonel Wyman to march
with his regiment from Holla. Colonel Stephenson, who was at Boonville, got
as far as Rolla on his way to General Lyon ; and there were three regiments
under marching orders to join General Lyon when he was defeated.
Question. Did those regiments have sufficient means of transportation to en
able them to go to the relief of General Lyon ?
Answer. That depends upon what would be considered sufficient. Colonel
Stephenson did move from Boonville to Rolla. I received a letter from him in
forming me that he did not consider the transportation at Rolla sufficient ; that
he thought it inexpedient, or dangerous, to march from that point to the relief
of General Lyon, because of the force of the enemy which he apprehended
would be between him and the Mississippi river, and which would expose his
force to great danger ; and he and Colonel Wyman did not march from Rolla.
I ordered Colonel Stephenson from Rolla to St. Louis, upon receiving his letter
stating the reasons for his not having marched to the relief of General Lyonr
intending to place him under arrest ; but I admitted his reasons so far as not to
do that. Colonel Wyman was already at Rolla with his regiment ; and after
Colonel Stephenson's regiment had arrived there, there were two regiments at
that point which I had ordered to go to General Lyon.
Question. Was there sufficient transportation at Rolla, or transportation with
which it would have been possible for those two regiments to have moved to-
the relief of General Lyon ?
Answer. I should certainly consider it possible for those two regiments to
have moved ; that is to say, I would have moved those two regiments myself,
if I had been there. I consider it would have been possible — not convenient
probably. The men would have been exposed to some suffering, no doubt. But
that is a matter for the judgment of the officer there.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. What is the distance from Rolla to Springfield ?
Answer. 1 think it is 118 miles.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. There is no railroad from Rolla to Springfield ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Had any of the transportation been ordered from Rolla to St. Louis-
prior to that time ?
Answer. No, sir. The difficulty about transportation there was in this, as I
remember it : General Lyon had retained the transportation at Springfield — had
not sent back the supply train to Rolla. With that supply train there would
have been abundant transportation, because the transportation afterwards gath
ered there amounted probably to between three hundred and four hundred
64 TESTIMONY.
wagons, large and small. There was abundant transportation if they could
have had it there at that time.
Question. The transportation was with General Lyon at Springfield instead
of at Holla ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And no transportation was ordered from Holla to St. Louis ?
Answer. I have no recollection of any such thing, and know no reason why
any should have been so ordered.
Question. Either from Rolla or from any other point from which it might
have gone to Rolla to have aided those two regiments to have moved to the
support of General Lyon 1
Answer. I have no recollection of that. Bear in mind the transportation was
very deficient at that time. We had very little in the department compared
with our requirements.
Question. Were you fully advised in relation to the situation of General Lyon
for some days prior to the battle of Wilson's Creek ?
Answer. I was advised as to his condition, I think ; perhaps fully — I cannot
say how fully. I knew generally of his condition ; and you will see from his
letter of the 9th of August what his condition was. And I had understood his
condition to be about as he states it there. I knew he was in need of supplies
and in need of re-enforcements, and we were doing everything it was possible
to do to send him both. Bear in mind, in going along over this subject, that
the first necessity had been to re-enforce Cairo. In the interim between arriving
at St. Louis and the defeat of General Lyon I had gathered a force and taken
it to Cairo to relieve General Prentiss.
Question. Did you deem it more advisable that Cairo should be strengthened
than that General Lyon should be re-enforced ?
Answer. Clearly so.
Question. State your reasons for that.
Answer. Cairo, as you are aware, is a permanent post, necessary to be held
for the safety of St. Louis. It was occupied by General Prentiss with a force
that was being disbanded, and was threatened by a largely superior force of the
enemy. The danger to Cairo, therefore, was exceedingly imminent. General
Lyon had something near 7,000 men with him, as I then estimated his force ;
and it was supposed that in case of extreme difficulty he would fall back. The
whole point, in my mind, was whether General Lyon would choose to remain at
Springfield or to retreat. General Prentiss could not retreat, and therefore I
took the first relief to Cairo ; went down with it myself. General Prentiss told
me I was just in time. He said he had felled trees and barricaded the roads,
and was hourly expecting an attack. In fact he said, I remember, that General
Pillow was just forty-eight hours too late. Why he used the expression "forty-
eight hours" I do not know. That was the expression he and his officers used.
At all events, he had but 1,200 men under arms there, and informed me then,
and has since told me, that the place would have been taken if I had not arrived
in time. I considered the first necessity was to re-enforce Cairo. That was
done, although with a very inadequate force. Still it was sufficient, as it
proved. About 3,000 men was all I could take there.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. At what time did you re-enforce General Prentiss 1
Answer. I left St. Louis on the 1st day of August, and was back again on
the 4th of August, having before I got back sent orders to re-enforce General
Lyon with the two regiments of Stephenson and Montgomery. As soon as I
reached St. Louis I went to work to get what force I could in order to send it
to General Lyon. I think it is very clear that if General Lyon had decided to
TESTIMONY. 65
fall back upon Rolla, instead of engaging the enemy, there would have been no
disaster, except losing that part of the State.
By Mr. Goocli:
Question. You considered it in the power of General Lyon to have fallen back
to Rolla?
Answer. General Lyon so says in his letter of August 9. It is always sup-
posable that an officer will not allow himself, if he can avoid it, to get in a situ
ation where he cannot fall back.
Question. Did you receive any despatch or communication, or intelligence in
any way, that led you to suppose that it was not in General Lyon's power to
fall back upon Rolla?
Answer. No, sir: on the contrary, our information was to the effect that Gen
eral Lyon had had a successful skirmish with* the enemy. General Lyon un
doubtedly acted as he judged was best under the circumstances.
Question. Did you send any men to Cape Girardeau 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I re-enforced Cape Girardeau at that time.
Question. Do you recollect how many men you sent there?
Answer. A regiment, I think. I am not clear, however, when I re-enforced
that place.
Question. You say you regarded the obstacles in the way of Colonel Stephen-
son were so great as to excuse him in not going to the relief of General Lyon,
although you think if you had been in command yourself there you would have
pursued a different course ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I think I might have done so.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Does that apply to both regiments at Rolla?
Answer. Yes, sir; to the entire force there.
Question. The regiments were not both from the same point?
Answer. Xo, sir; Stephenson's and Wyman's regiments were at Rolla; that
is, after Stephenson had arrived there from Boouville, Wyman had for some
time previously been at Rolla, and I ordered him to go to General Lyon after
I reached St. Louis. Colonel Montgomery I had previously ordered from
Kansas.
Question. You only refer to Colonel Stephenson as disobeying orders?
Answer. Colonel Wyman joined with Colonel Stephenson in that matter.
Question. How about Colonel Montgomery?
Answer. Colonel Montgomery did not succeed in getting to General Lyon.
Question. Was he on hig way there?
Question. I suppose so. The order was directed to be communicated to him.
But the distance was considerable between St. Louis and Montgomery's position
in Kansas ; and the 10th of August came very quickly. I think you will find
in the documents I have submitted all the circumstances under which Cape
Girardeau was re-enforced. It seemed to be especially the object of attack of
Jeff. Thompson, who was near there with 5',000 men, and Hardee was between
there and Cairo with 7,000 or 8,000 men. You will see by that the exigency
under which Prentiss and Marsh, commanding at Girardeau, supposed them
selves to be. You will find all these matters fully set forth in the papers I
have submitted.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Did you re-enforce Pilot Knob about this time — the 1st of August
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. With what force ?
Answer. I think with a regiment.
Part iii />
66 . TESTIMONY.
Question. Will you state your reasons for strengthening Girardeau and Pilot
Knob at that time ?
Answer. They were the outposts of St. Louis. Cape Girardeau was one of
the few high lands on the river — one of the points considered necessary to be
held. It was a point which the enemy had endeavored to gain possession of;
they directed their special attention to that object. And if the enemy had ob
tained the possession of that point upon the river they could have interrupted
communication, by river, between St. Louis and Cairo.
Question. Did you send re-enforcements to Holla, after the news of Lyon's
defeat reached you I
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How soon?
Answer. As soon as I could get them there.
Question. Could that force -have been sent before and in season to have re-
enforced General Lyon ?
Answer. No, sir ; we had sent before all we could.
Question. Did you order Colonel Mulligan to occupy and hold Lexington; if
not, what order did you give him in relation to his movements I
Answer. It is difficult for me to recollect the orders I did give, without my
order-book, which has been retained by General Halleck at St. Louis, contrary
to my request.
Question. Those orders will not appear in the documents you have submitted
to the committee? •
xVnswer. No, sir. If any order of that kind was given to Colonel Mulligan —
which I cannot now recollect — it will be in my order-book. Colonel Mulligan
was more especially under the command of General Davis, who was acting briga
dier general, and holding Jefferson City with a large body of our force, and con
trolling that part of the State. Colonel Mulligan was subject to the command
of General Davis, and the command of General Pope. The county in which
Lexington lies belonged to General Pope's command. General Pope had been
assigned to the command of North Missouri, including the counties on both sides
of the Missouri river, except St. Louis. General Davis had been sent to Jeffer
son City with a considerable body of troops, increased to 9,000 men, when
Lexington fell. Colonel Mulligan would be more immediately under his order.
General Davis was also in direct communication with him, General Pope being
actively employed in the northwestern part of the State. That Avas the condi
tion of affairs when Colonel Mulligan was at Lexington. Colonel Mulligan had
been sent, I think, to some of the Osage towns to take the money from the
banks at those places, to prevent it falling into the hands of the secessionists, and
he was then returning from that expedition, when Price followed him up so
closely and so rapidly that I think he reached Lexington nearly as quickly as
Mulligan did — not much difference of time between them.
Question. Then you cannot state now, from recollection, Avhether you gave
any order, either through General Davis or General Pope, or directly to Colonel
Mulligan, for Colonel Mulligan to take and hold Lexington until he should re
ceive re-enforcements 1
AnsAver. Not any more clearly than you will see set forth in the telegraphic
despatches and communications which I have laid before you. They comprise
all the orders and all the despatches relating to that subject Avhich I have in my
possession. Whatever others there may be will be found in the order-book
Avhich General Halleck has. I think you Avill find these despatches here Avill
carry on the account very connectedly and very clearly.
Question. Can you state how many troops you had under your command,
and Avhere they Avere stationed at the time that Colonel Mulligan was at Lex
ington ?
TESTIMONY. 67
Answer. No further than I have already given it in the statement I have
submitted to the committee.
Question. Have you in that statement given the reasons for not re-enforcing
Colonel Mulligan ?
Answer. I have stated there that Davis was supporting him, and that re-en
forcements were sent to him, but part of them failed to reach him.
Question. You have stated there all that was done towards re-enforcing
Colonel Mulligan, and that the re-enforments sent failed to reach him ]
Answer. I have stated the efforts made to re-enforce him, and what the re
sult was.
Question. Were all the efforts made that could be made ?
Answer. Yes, sir; all that were deemed necessary to make were made.
Question. Had you made any preparations at the time Price was at Lexing
ton to cut off his retreat ?
Answer. I was organizing a force to move south with the intention of occu
pying Springfield, and at the same time cutting off his line of retreat, when his
sudden advance upon Lexington rendered different arrangements necessary. As
I have said we were there in a state of preparation all the time. The case
would have been vastly different if I had had a disposable force there. If I
could have found on my arrival there a disposable force of 30,000, there would
have been a very different account rendered of the condition of affairs there.
When I reached St. Louis, 30,000 men would have enabled me to re-enforce
Lyon, sustained Prentiss, and taken New Madrid and Memphis. But the whole
difficulty consisted in the fact that while we were talking about re-enforcing we
had nothing to do it with. It was impossible to do anything more towards re-
enforcing General Lyoii than was done. I do not think it was possible, except
by means that I did not then see, and which nobody there saw, to re-enforce
Lyon, sustain Cairo, or assist Mulligan. A great deal must depend upan the
officer himself who is to be re-enforced. When an officer is two hundred miles
in advance of his supports, he must do a great deal for himself. Fully as much
depends upon his judgment and upon his action as upon those who are to re-en
force him. That was our case. Had General Lyon been able to retire — had
Colonel Mulligan been able to preserve his boats, we could, of course, have re-
enf breed him. Had Colonel Mulligan retired towards Sedalia instead of entering
Lexington, we could have re-enforced him. But nothing could possibly have
enabled re-enforcements to have reached him any sooner under the circumstances
than they did, from the time it was known to us that that was the point of at
tack, and that that was the place to be re-enforced. General Davis telegraphed
to me several points that he said were threatened. And up to a very late hour,
I think, several days after Price's march down towards Lexington, General
Davis telegraphed to me that Boonvillc appeared to be the point threatened, and
not Lexington. And he was a great deal nearer than I was.
Question. Was Colonel Mulligan acting under any instructions from you that
rendered it imperative upon him to take and hold Lexington ?
Answer. He may have been. I do not bear in mind whether he was or not.
I have not seen my order-book since that date.
Question. Was any order given by you at any time to General Lane to foil
back from Kansas City to Leavenworth and destroy his baggage trains,
stores, &c. ?
Answer. Destroy his baggagge trains ? No, sir.
Question. Or to destroy his stores 1
Answer. No, sir ; I perceive to what transaction your inquiry refers. It be
came at one time a matter of expediency, so it was thought, to retire our force,
which was cut off from our main body, and throw it around to St. Joseph, and
on the railroad to Chillicothe, which formed a part of our line. I wished to
withdraw the force at Kansas City and throw it on the north side of the Mis-
€8 TESTIMONY.
souri river, on the line of the railroad to Chillicothe, where it could be connected
Avith our army. Our army was stretching, and intended to stretch, at that time
from the Osage river across the State to Chillicothe. We were occupying a sort
of crescent-shaped line, intended to enclose General Price ; and we were sep
arated from these small forces by the Missouri river. Such as General Sturgis's
command. The intention was to throw General Sturgis and his force from his
position at Kansas City around to Chillicothe, and bring him upon the extreme
right of our line, and connected with the rest of our force, so that there might
be no more of these surrenders of small detached bodies of troops. It was
doubtful whether or not they had any stores at Kansas City ; the result of the
best inquiries we could make was that there were none ; but in directing Gen
eral Sturgis to fall back and come around to Chillicothe I directed him, if he had
any stores there to destroy them, rather than have them fall into the hands of
the enemy. It was considered better, after a great deal of deliberation, to throw
General Sturgis around, and have him in connexion with us, than to leave him
there. General Lane I did not succeed in having much communication with.
He was very difficult to communicate with. I never gave him any orders to de
stroy his baggage or provisions ; and I think I gave none to him in regard to
Kansas City.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. You do not remember to have authorized him to destroy the city ?
Answer. To destroy the city ! no, sir ; I do not think I communicated with
him, for General Sturgis was his superior officer. No order was given to de
stroy the city, but only any stores which might belong to us which were there.
As I have already stated, it was very doubtful whether there were any stores there,
but if there were any such General Sturgis was directed to destroy them rather
than they should fall into the hands of the enemy. The order was not obeyed,
however, because it did not reach General Sturgis. Our force was so scattered
at that time that I frequently took the trouble and precaution to duplicate, and
even triplicate the orders, to send different despatches, as they were very fre
quently intercepted by the enemy. Sometimes despatches reached General Lane,
and sometimes they did not.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Were these orders given to destroy stores at any other point, or to
burn any place on the retirement of our troops ?
Answer. No, sir. It was after a great deal of discussion that this order to
General Sturgis was determined upon. It was one of those cases in regard to
which doubt existed. It was doubtful whether we should risk General Sturgis
there, instead of ordering him to move around to the other position. But finally,
as one disaster, as it was considered, had been suffered, it was decided to move
him around.
Question. In regard to the suppression of newspapers in your department,
will you state to the committee what was done in that respect ?
Answer. I think there were three or four suppressions.
Question. For what reasons 1
Answer. Because they were considered detrimental to the service there. We
had but little of that to do. 'The most of that that was done was upon the
declaration of martial law. It was generally acceded to, generally considered
to be right. We gained over some papers. We treated the St. Louis Republi
can, having a large circulation, with a great deal of consideration, and it finally
became, earnestly and emphatically, one of the supporters of the administra
tion. I have always considered that one of the most important papers in Mis
souri. It was a hostile paper when I got there, but afterwards became a
friendly paper.
TESTIMONY. 6#
Question. That paper was not suppressed ?
Answer. No, sir. The object was to make it a friendly paper. Although
it had been an opposing paper, it had never used violent language, or done any
thing with an obvious design and purpose to stir up the people against us. It
had always taken a fair political stand. During the latter part of my adminis
tration there was nothing of the kind done there.
Question. There have been frequent rumors and statements that persons who
came to you as messengers from officers in the field, and other persons having
important communications relative to the conduct of the war in the western de
partment, found it impossible to gain access to you while you were in command
there. f
Answer. I do not believe that such was the case at all. I think that all offi
cers having reason to see me, having business with me, could readily find access
to me, taking their turn. I always occupied from very early in the morning
until very late at night with those things which were most pressing and neces-
to be attended to.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. When you say, " taking their turn," do you mean that we should
infer that it was a matter of two or three days for a man to get to see you ?
Answer. No, sir ; not any one having business in reference to the department,
when I knew of it. I dare say there were men who waited two or three days, or
even a week, to see me there ; that may have been. But there was a standing order
that an officer coming to see me, no matter what his business was, should come
up without any hindrance. The business pertaining to the department I
attended to first, and all other business as I could find time to dispose of it.
The orders issued to the commanding officer of the guard were of such a nature
that they could be easily ascertained by applying to him at any time.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. It has been stated that the house occupied as your headquarter8
was unnecessarily expensive to the government. Will you state the facts in
relation to that ?
Answer. I do not think the quarters occupied were unusually expensive.
They were comfortable and commodious, but I do not think that the resulting
expense to the government was greater than would have been for any number of
smaller houses which the department might have required. It was pretty well
occupied by officers. The fact of that particular house having been taken
happened in this way : On our arrival at St. Louis, and even before our arrival
there, we were invited by Mrs. Brandt, who Avas Mrs. Fremont's cousin, to oc
cupy her house. It was then vacant, she being absent from the city, and about
to start for Europe. We occupied the house for some time without paying any
rent, and then decided that it was so commodious and so suitable for headquar
ters that it should be hired. And it accordingly was hired. How the price
paid for it would compare with other houses in other parts of the town I do
not know.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Do you remember the price paid ?
Answer. It was $6,000. In it were accommodated all my working staff
officers with myself; quite a number of them. It was made the central head
quarters. The telegraph wires were brought there ; and it was about such a
house, and had about such accommodations, as a department of that size would
require. At all events, it never occurred to me that we were incurring any un
usual expense until I saw it afterwards questioned.
70 TESTIMONY.
By Mr. Goocli :
Question. Will you sftite to the committee the reasons which induced you to
make the proclamation which has been so much talked of since, and all the
facts connected with that proclamation, so far as you remember them ?
Answer. I judged it expedient to make the proclamation because I began to
find myself pressed to meet what I considered serious dangers. Our means
there were all the time very inadequate, and I thought that the time had come
when it was necessary to strike some decided blow against the enemy, and I
judged that the measures proposed by the proclamation were such as would
give us a great and important advantage over our enenw. Without going into
detail, I judged that the condition of the country, the activity and the uni
versality of the rebellion, and the strength of the force against us, rendered it
necessary that I should take the best measures I could to suppress the rebellion
there.
By the chairman :
Question. How did it operate while it was in force ?
Answer. It operated admirably while it was in force. The effect it produced
fully satisfied me that it was a good measure.
By JVIr. Julian :
Question. What was the effect of the modification of it 1
Answer. It was, in my judgment, injurious, so far as my observation Avent.
I made the proclamation as a war measure, judging that its effect would be im
mediate and beneficial ; and it proved so, so far as I had an opportunity to
judge ; and, except in one of the clauses, I think the terms of that proclamation
have been carried out since I left the department. The reasons for issuing that
proclamation may be generally embraced in the statement that I then thought
the condition of the department had become critical, and that decided measures
and effective, such as I judged those to be, which would strike home, ought to
be adopted at once. I came to the determination of issuing that proclamation,
and immediately notified the President of the United States of its issue. For
his answer, and the terms in which he modified that proclamation, I refer to
the papers accompanying my statement. It will be there seen that the President
modified the proclamation in two particulars : first, as regards freeing the slaves
of rebels ; and, secondly, as regards shooting rebels who should be taken in
arms within our lines. His letter to that effect, and mine in answer, are among
the papers I have submitted. That was the first act which met the disappro
bation of the Executive in any way ; and the President himself, in his letter
suggesting or directing modifications, states that he does not imply any censure.
About that time, however, as these papers will show, the confidence of the
administration was withdrawn. The first committee of investigation came to
my department shortly afterwards. I believe the committee — Mr. Blair and
General Meigs — left Washington about the 6th of September. Up to that time
I had the confidence of the administration, so far as indications were given to
me. At least there was nothing to lead me to suppose that there had been any
withdrawal of the confidence of the administration.
By Mr. Julian :
Answer You never heard of any dissatisfaction until the publication of that
proclamation ?
Answer. No, sir; and I think the papers I have submitted to the committee
will show that up to that time no dissatisfaction on the part of the administra
tion had been shown, and between the publication of that proclamation and the
arrival of the first committee of investigation there had been no act of any
marked importance in the department to call for any expression of opinion.
TESTIMONY. 71
Colonel Blair's letter was dated the first day of September. The third day of
September Montgomery Blair wrote me the letter which I have submitted. It
was through him that I usually communicated with the administration here.
Consequently, up to the third day of September, there would appear to have
been nothing against my administration of affairs there.
Question. When the congressional committee came out there, had you any
knowledge of its coming, or any opportunity to present facts before it 1
Answer. I had no knowledge whatever of its coming, and no opportunity was
afforded to me to present anything before it.
Question. You were in the field at that time ?
Answer. I was in the field then. I never had any communication whatever
of any kind with the committee. As to the proclamation I will remark that I
issued it, having consideration to the exigencies of the department at that time,
and considering it within the powers of a general commanding.
By the chairman :
Question. It is said that you organized a body guard that was in some mili
tary sense objectionable or unusual. Will you explain that ?
Answer. It is altogether wrong to say that it was unusual, because every
general has a body guard, or may have it, and ought to have it .in the field, and
this was organized as something necessary to a general. At first it consisted of
one company only, and in nowise differing from ordinary body guard's assigned
to generals, that I am aware of. There was nothing unusual in the manner of
their enlistment. They were enlisted like other troops for three years, and in
precisely the same way. It has been said that their uniforms were something
extraordinary, showy, and magnificent. Their uniform was as modest a one
and as plain as well could be. As to their duties, they were important and ar
duous. They were liable to be called out at any hour of the day or night for
any service. One among other reasons for forming this body guard was that
we wished to have -cavalry officers instructed, and this guard was considered a
good school for cavalry officers. They were regularly instructed in all the duties
of cavalry officers. Gradually, when we found that it was a success, it was
increased to four companies. But the captain commanding the corps did not
obtain the appointment of major until Ave were going to take the field. We
never had, as has been stated, a greater number of officers for that corps than
such a body of men were entitled to. There was a smaller number of officers,
in fact. Results have shown how good a body of men they were; how success
ful they were in the field.
Question. It proved to be a* success, did it ?
Answer. It proved to be a thorough success. It was held by all officers,
volunteers and regulars, that it was the best cavalry in the service. That was
the opinion of Colonel Eaton, and other officers there, who resisted its being
disbanded, and endeavored to have it retained in the service after the order for
disbanding it had been issued. To show the class of men of which it was com
posed, a sergeant of that cavalry is now a lieutenant colonel, and other men are
captains, scattered around the country.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Made captains by your creation?
Answer. No, sir; have become so since I left.
By the chairman :
Question. How came it that such a body of men, who had so distinguished
themselves, was disbanded ?
Answer. They werA disbanded, as I was informed by General McClellan,
because they had expressed sentiments at Springfield which made it of doubt.
72 TESTIMONY.
ful expediency whether or not they should be retained in the service. Although
I had been removed from that department, I expected, of course, to go into the
service again. I applied to General McClellan to allow me to retain that guard.
I knew that a better body of men than that I could not find ; and that in the
field it is very important to have a body of men who would do Avhat they were
told to do, and do it thoroughly. In reply to my request he gave me that
answer, and asked me to reply to it. I replied to him, and stated that I was
not informed of any expression used by the guard at Springfield which made it
of doubtful expediency whether or not they should be retained in the service
of the country; but, on the contrary,- that the gallantry of their conduct at
Springfield had entitled them to the favorable consideration of the government;
and I asked him, if any harsh measures had been directed against them, that
he would reconsider the case, in view of these facts. To that the general never
returned any answer, and they were disbanded. I am told that General Sturgis,
when he went out to disband them, after the order had been issued, and they
had been paraded for that purpose, when he saw them drawn up before him
said that he would not disband them, but would go back to General Halleck
and endeavor to get the order rescinded. He did go to him, but the order was
carried out. It must be said that the men by that time had got into a very dis
organized condition. They considered that they had been insulted arid degraded.
When they got back to St. Louis they could obtain no pay, and were allowed
no food for their horses or rations for themselves. It was a severe shock to
them. They had thought that on account of their conduct they had a right to
be well considered. They thought, probably, that they would be promoted, or
rewarded in some way ; and when they met the order to disband, as though they
had done something injurious to the country, they naturally were angry, and
they refused to stay any longer. Those men were enlisted for three years, and
enlisted regularly. They and their officers were mustered into the service by
an officer of the regular army. They certainly did their duty. No application
was ever made to me to know whether they had done their duty, or whether
they had been guilty of any misconduct.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. How many of those men made that charge at Springfield ; three
companies 1
Answer. There were three companies of cavalry there belonging to what was
called " the prairie scouts," Irish dragoons. They went with this guard down
the lane. There were 149 or 150 of the guard, and then three companies of
the others. At the head of the lane, where they emerged from the wood, they
met so heavy a fire that it disorganized the three companies, but a portion of
one of the three companies continued on with the guard ; and some of the
officers of one of those three companies jumped their horses over a very high
fence that was there. I think some eight or ten men fell at that place. The
three companies wheeled and took the road around another way. But the
guards, when they failed to get through the fence — Major Zagoni found it was
too severe there — charged .down the lane some 150 or 200 yards, took the fence
down, formed inside, and charged up the hill where the enemy was drawn up
in line. About 149 of the guard made that charge, and there the principal
fight took place. The enemy had some 500 cavalry, and the rest were foot.
By the chairman :
Question. And they routed the whole of them ]
Answer. Yes, sir; they broke them up and dispersed them; they drove
them into the woods, and charged upon them and fought them there ; they
drove them into the town, and charged upon them there and fought them through
the town.
TESTIMONY. 73
Question. Were you informed what those expressions were for which they
were disbanded ?
Answer. No, sir ; I never have been informed. The correspondence between
General McClellan and myself terminated at that point. He telegraphed to me
to this effect : "I am officially informed that the body of cavalry known as
your body guard expressed sentiments at Springfield which renders it of doubt
ful expediency whether or not they should be retained in the service. In con
sequence of that, I had, before receiving your request, already directed that
they should be dismissed the public service." I think that is the substance of
his communication. I telegraphed back, and informed him that I had not been
informed of the expression of any sentiments by my guard at Springfield which
would make it of doubtful expediency whether or not they should be retained
in the service. But I stated that, on the contrary, I thought the gallantry of
their conduct at Springfield entitled them to the favorable consideration of the
government.
Question. To which he made no reply ?
Answer. He made no reply at all. I asked him to reconsider the case, leav-
it open to him, if he should reconsider it, to apply to me, as they were my
guard, under my command, to learn what they had done to justify measures so
harsh. I asked him, in view of these facts, to reconsider the case, in the event
of any harsh measures having been directed against them.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Where were these men from ?
Answer. From Kentucky, mainly ; some were from Ohio, and some from
Missouri. There were LOO picked men from Kentucky, who came in a body.
They certainly were as fine looking a body of men as you could meet any
where. They were really a remarkable body of men.
By the chairman :
Question. Were they offered any court-martial, or court of inquiry, to ascer
tain what they had done to merit this treatment ?
Answer. Nothing more than I have told you.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Did they know anything about what they were charged with ?
Answer. Nothing ; nobody knows more than I have told you now. Major
Zagoni is really a soldier, and a thorough one. For a man of his age he is
really distinguished. He rose in the Hungarian army from a lieutenant to a
captain ; lae fought his way up, and did good service there. He was an officer
in a corps about the size of this guard, of about 300 or 400 men, and when Bern
was surrounded they cut their way through two Austrian regiments that blocked
up the road and carried Bern off. They lost nearly all their command, but they
succeeded in carrying him off.
By the chairman :
Question. I want to inquire of you how far you had advanced with your
army, what you expected to accomplish, and where was the enemy when you
were superseded by General Hunter ?
Answer. I was at Springfield when the order superseding me reached me on
the 2d day of November. I was within nine miles of General Price's advance
guard.
Question. What was the strength and condition of your army at that time ?
Answer. It was in good fighting condition — in thoroughly good fighting con
dition. I should have gone into action on the morning of the 4th with 21,000
74 TESTIMONY.
effective men. The other division, which had not then got up, would not have
joined in that action. General Hunter would not have been in that action.
Question. What was the strength of the enemy, so far as you understood, at
that time ?
Answer. The reports sent in to me by General Sigel and General Asboth 011
the afternoon of the 3d stated the enemy to be 40,000 men, according to their
best information. The report of General Asboth, late in the afternoon of the
3d, was that the enemy had advanced 7,000 men to Wilson's creek, which was
nine miles from Springfield, and that all the roads and paths were filled with
moving troops, and the whole number of the enemy was estimated at 40,000
men. I had turned over my command then ; but the generals of division wrote
me a letter, which I have, asking me not to give up the command of the army
until after the battle should have been fought, but to hold command of the army
and go on and fight the battle. In consequence of their address to me, and the
request of many officers, I told them that if General Hunter did not arrive before
the next morning I would take the army to battle. Accordingly, that evening
I called a council of generals of divisions and brigades, and some of the colonels,
at my headquarters, and we there decided upon the plan of the action to take
place the next morning. General Sigel was to march at 6 o'clock ; General
McKinstry was to march at 6 o'clock ; General Asboth was to march at 7 or 7J
o'clock, I forget now which, and General Pope was to have command of the
reserve. The positions to which they were to march were assigned to them —
the positions they were to occupy at Wilson's creek, where we supposed the
enemy's whole force would be when we arrived. Eleven o'clock the next morn
ing was designated as the hour at which that action was expected to take place.
About 10 o'clock that night General Hunter came into my headquarters. The
officers were all present. I handed him the order to march and the plan drawn
up for the battle of the next day, gave him all the information I could, and left
the matter in his hands. Most of the officers supposed that, in the condition of
things, General Hunter would not take the command at that time, but leave it
to me until after the battle had been fought. He did take the command, and I
left the next day.
At 12 o'clock General Hunter called a council of war, on which occasion he
read a letter from the President suggesting the expediency of retiring and falling
back upon St. Louis '; but the President went on to say that at that distance he
could not tell what ought to be done. General Hunter proposed to the officers
to say whether they would retire or go forward and fight. They unanimously
expressed themselves in favor of going forward. They knew the army was in
good condition to fight ; that it was in sufficient force ; and that they would, in
all probability, gain a signal victory. The council separated, all the officers under
the impression that the battle would take place ; but the next morning they had
orders to retire.
Question. Was there any doubt about your coming up with the enemy and
having a fight the next day 1
Answer. I do not think there was any.
Question. Were your troops in high spirits 1
Answer. They were in admirable spirits, and had been all the way along.
A battle had been fought at Fredericktown with great success ; an action had
taken place at Wet Glaze, in which sixty of the enemy had been killed ; Lex
ington had been entered by Major White, and the prisoners there liberated; and
the brilliant action of Major Zagoni at Springfield had been fought, all in the
same week. The troops were all in high spirits, and desirous of emulating what
had already been done. To show the spirit of the troops, the officers of three
or four regiments came to me and said that their men did not want to go into
action with more than three or four rounds of ammunition ; they preferred to use
the bayonet. I do not think Price could have stood against them a half an hour.
TESTIMONY. 75
Question- What was your intention . if you had fought that battle aiid gained
a victory ?
Answer. It was understood that if Price was defeated he would probably go
oft' down into Arkansas with the remainder of his force. Price and myself had
just then made an agreement by which we each agreed that the fighting should
be confined to the armies in the field ; that is, that all guerilla parties should be
suppressed ; and both he and I agreed to lend our aid to suppress them. He and
I invited the people to return to their homes, under our joint guarantee that no
man should be arrested or considered subject to arrest for mere political opinions,
or the private expression of political opinions, but should be left to the ordinary
course of the legal tribunals if he did anything wrong. I think that was con
sidered to be preparatory to his leaving the State. It was understood that the
15,000 Missourians he had with him would return home.
I had directed Commodore Foote to prepare for an attack upon Columbus,
Belmont, and New Madrid. I was to move, after the battle which we expected,
according to instructions to be then .forwarded to them, so as to effect a junc
tion with them at Bird's Point, and together attack those positions going on
down to Memphis, or they Avere to go on and make the attack while the army
under me proceeded directly to Memphis. General Prentiss had come to my
camp by my order, after I had started on the road to Springfield, and it was
arranged that he should go back and raise a brigade to replace his own troops
at Cairo, and to have that much additional strength to make this movement.
The movement was in that way a concerted one, to attack and carry Belmont,
New Madrid, and Columbus, and go on to Memphis. And it was the opinion
of all of us that that could be done.
Question. In the course of your command did you meet with any particular
check or reverse 1
Answer. I never met with one myself. The reverses at Springfield and Lex
ington I considered as accidents, coming up in the combination of which I had
not then fully obtained the control. There was never anything which stopped
the onward movement which we had c.ommenced.
Question. Do you know why you were superseded, and your army placed
under the command of another just on the eve of battle?
Answer. I am not clear in my own mind as to the reasons. I think that
several causes operated to bring that about. I believe the excuse or reason, by
means of which the movement against me was originated, was in the sugges
tions from Colonel Blair. I believe the dissatisfaction with me commenced
there.
Question. About what?
Answer. Well sir, in brief, I believe I never should have had any difficulty
in that quarter, if I had been willing to have allowed the moneyed and po
litical power of the department to be used for individual benefit. That I re
fused to do. I believe the first split came up on a contract for the supply of
40,000 men, which two gentlemen, introduced to me by Colonel Blair, de
manded to have. I discussed that with them for a couple of days, refused to
give them the contract in full, but finally consented to allow a contract to be
made for one-third that number of men, provided one-half of the work should
be done in St. Louis. The restriction to one-third was made on the estimate of
supplies to be furnished, on its margin. I agreed to that extent to indorse the
contract over to General McKinstry, to whom I referred it, and recommended
that such a contract be made. General McKinstry refused, and thereupon the
contest began.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. What was the contract for?
Answer. They asked for a contract to furnish equipments, clothing, &c., for
40,000 men. Though I expected to need that much in time, I did not like to
76 TESTIMONY.
order so large an amount at that time, and of any one party. And then, proba
bly following that, the proclamation was brought up as a reason why I should
be removed. But as a matter simply of judgment and belief, I think that
would not have been used but for suggestions growing out of the contract move
ment. In other words, I think if I had been willing to have made the con
tracts asked I should have had no difficulty. That is as near a statement of
the reasons as they appear to my own mind as I am now able to give.
By the chairman :
Question. You agreed that they might have a contract for furnishing one-
third of 40,000 men ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you say that General McKinstry vetoed that ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Was it within his province to supersede you in a matter of that
kind?
Answer. No, sir, not if I had made the order. I recommended it to him,
and I think that in addition to other reasons that he may have had for his ac
tion, he felt that I had been annoyed by the pressure upon me for this contract,
and thought that if he refused it would not be disagreeable to me. And I
judge too, that General McKinstry supposed that if he had more time in which
to make contracts they could be made to better advantage. We already had
contracts out for a certain number of men. I recollect that was one of the ob
jections I urged to making such a contract as that asked for; that a contract
once ordered was a committal to that extent for that amount. I wished to have,
and probably General McKinstry had that idea also, the power to buy in smaller
quantities.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Then you refused the contract, and used McKinstry to do it with ?
Answer. I certainly did not contemplate that.
Question. It seems to me that that will be the inference drawn from your
statement of the transaction ?
Answer. I certainly do not want any such inference as that to be drawn from
anything I have said.
The chairman : It seems to me that the statement made by GeneralFremont
will not bear any such construction as that.
Mr. Odell called for the reading of what had been stated in reference to the
matter.
It was accordingly read.
Mr. Odell : It is a matter with General Fremont entirely. If he is willing to
have such a statement upon record, I shall not object. I thought it but right
to call his attention to it, for I certainly should not like, if I was in his place,
to make up such a record as that against myself.
The witness : I am much obliged to you for calling my attention to the mat
ter. If any member of the committee thinks that any such construction can be
or will be placed by any one upon what I have said, I certainly do not want it
to stand. I was willing to let them have a contract for that amount. There
was no positive order for the contract; I only made a recommendation to Gen
eral McKinstry to make it. There is a great deal of difference between a posi
tive order to him to make the contract, and merely recommending him to make
it, leaving it to his discretion to make it or not, as he pleased. So far as I was
myself concerned, I was willing to consent to a contract for one-third of the
amount they asked, for I knew we were then requiring, or would soon require,
supplies to an amount which might render such a contract to some extent expe
dient. I did not give a positive order to General McKinstry to make the con-
TESTIMONY. 77
tract, but so far as I was concerned, I recommended a contract to be made for
one-third the amount originally asked. It was then General McKinstry's pro
vince to refuse it or make it, as he considered best. If he had considered that
I had given an imperative order, he would no doubt have made the contract ;
but I gave no order.
By the chairman :
Question. You speak of General McKinstry. We have heard that he has
been imprisoned for a long time. Do you know the cause of his imprisonment,
or anything about it?
Answer. I do not know the reason. No reason for his arrest has been com
municated to me. 1 have not heard from any source entitled to credit why he
was arrested. I have, of course, heard many surmises, but I know of no reason
for his arrest; certainly none in his conduct there, so far as I am acquainted
with it.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. How came General McKinstry to know it would be agreeable to
you if he would refuse this contract ?
Answer. I suppose he had heard me say, while we were arguing it for those
two days, that I did not want to make that contract. He knew, of course, that
it had been pressed upon me for two days, before I consented to it.
Question. After you had consented that this contract should be made for one-
third of the amount asked, did you have any communication with General Mc
Kinstry upon the subject, before he decided the matter?
Answer. None at all ; they went directly to him.
Question. You mean to say that the contract for the one-third was not declined
by General McKinstry at your instance ?
Answer. Certainly; I said nothing to him about it.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Would Mr. Blair's friends, in your opinion, have been satisfied with
the one-third contract, or did they want the whole ?
Answer. I think they wanted the whole. They wanted, I think, an uninter
rupted dictation in the matter of contracts.
Question. Was there any interference with you here, on the part of Mr. Mont
gomery Blair, previous to the failure to get this contract ?
Answer. No, sir. Up to the 3d of September, the date of the last letter from
Mr. Montgomery Blair, our relations were of the friendliest kind.
Question. Can you explain so sudden a change in the correspondence between
you and Mr. Blair ? Was it produced altogether by the failure to get that con
tract?
Answer. That was one of the reasons, I think.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Who were the parties who came to you with Colonel Frank Blair
for the contract ?
Answer. I think they were Mr. Gumey and Mr. Howe.
Question. Were they practical mechanics in St. Louis ?
Answer. I think Mr. Howe resided in St. Louis and Mr. Gurney in Chicago.
Question. Had they the means of complying with what they proposed to do ?
Answer. I think so, fully — I presume so.
Question. And so far as you know, they were all proper and right in their
prices ?
Answer. So far as I know. I estimated that one-third of 40,000 men was
about what it would be expedient to make a contract for at that time.
78 TESTIMONY.
The following telegrams, military reports, and despatches, letters, orders
arid other authentic papers are submitted by General Fremont, in connexion
with his testimony, as explanatory of the conduct -of affairs in the depart
ment of the west while under his command.
[By telegraph from Cairo, June 13, 1861.]
ST. Louis ARSENAL, June 13, 1861.
If you wish more troops from Illinois inform me at Cincinnati. Don't
telegraph direct to any of my subordinates unless danger is imminent.
G. B. McCLELLAN, Major General U. S. Army.
Brigadier General N. LYON.
[By telegraph from Cincinnati, June 17, 1861.]
ST. Louis ARSENAL, June It, 1861.
Colonel B. F. Smith, now at Quincy, has beenordered to re-enforce Colonel
Curtis, on the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad, with the companies of his
regiment now at Quincy. No other assistance can be offered by me at
present.
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major General Commanding.
Captain CHESTER HARDING,
Assistant Adjutant General.
HEADQUARTERS ON WALNUT STREET,
St. Louis, June 17, 1861.
DEAR SIR : I enclose you despatch from Colonel Brown, which he sent me
this morning. We should have tents enough to keep our guns dry at least,
and utensils for cooking for the men. It is impossible to inarch any great
distance without. Our men are in fine spirits and anxious for duty. There
is a memorandum on the back of the despatch of the items needed. Colonel
Sigel moved on this morning.
Very respectfully, yours,
J. B. SHAW,
Major 4th Regiment U. S. Reserve Corps.
Brigadier General SWEENY.
[Colonel Brown's report, enclosed.]
HEADQUARTERS 4TH REGIMENT U. S. RESERVE CORPS, AT ROLLA.
SIR : I have to report that, in obedience to orders, I marched with ten
companies of my regiment, (825 men and officers,) leaving St. Louis at 2
o'clock, and reaching this place at 12 o'clock at night. I find here neither
provisions, water, tents, cartridge-boxes, nor any other material. It will be
absolutely necessary that they be provided for, and I send back one of my
officers to try and urge forward the necessary supplies.
I remain, sir, yours, respectfully,
B. GRATZ BROWN,
Colonel tth Regiment U. S. Reserve Corps.
Brigadier General T. W. SWEENY,
Commanding U. S. Reserve Corps.
Tents and cooking utensils; cartridge-boxes, belts, and bayonet scabbards;
500 blankets; 50 canteens, to replace others that leak; ropes and forage for
five horses.
TESTIMONY. 79
BOONVILLE, MISSOURI, June 18, 1862.
DR. HARDING : You have heard of us and our leaving Jefferson City* on
the 16th. We debarked next morning a little above Rockport, and had not
proceeded more than two miles before we met their advanced pickets, and
soon after their whole force. At first the secessionists made a weak effort,
which doubtless was intended to lead us on to their stronghold , where they
held on with considerable resolution, and gave us a check for a short time
and made some havock. On moving forward, however, a straggling fire
from the right and left made it necessary to move on with caution and
slowness, and we reached the city about 2 o'clock p. m., where we were met
by many people, under consternation from the erroneous impression that
great violence would be perpetrated upon persons and property. I have
been engaged more or less in removing this impression. I regret much
that my proclamation was not published promptly, so that I could have had
it here for distribution. I get no news of what is going on around us, but
much fear the movement from Texas, and hope the subject will engage the
attention of the general government. Keep McClellan advised upon the
matter. I had hoped some of our Iowa troops would have been in this region
by this time, but hear nothing of them. My suspense just now is painful.
Yours, truly,
N. LYON, Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF OHIO,
Cincinnati, June 18.
Have received order placing Missouri under my command. Will leave for
St. Louis to-morrow. If more troops are needed telegraph me details of case.
G. B. McCLELLAN, Major General.
CHESTER HARDING, Jr.,
Assistant Adjutant General.
JEFFERSON CITY, June 21, 1861.
Please telegraph General McClellan as follows :
" BOONVILLE, MISSOURI, June 20, 1861.
" GENERAL MCCLELLAN : I have notice that Missouri is assigned to your
command. This Boonville is an important point, and should have at least a
whole regiment, with an advance post at Warsaw, which is a nest of rebels,
who have massacred at Cole Camp Union men. These will permit the 2d
Missouri volunteer regiment to concentrate at Jefferson City. I would have
you send a regiment here with a large supply of stores.
"X. LYON."
Colonel CHESTER HARDING, \
Assistant Adjutant General.
k[By telegraph from Boonville— 24, 1861.]
ST. Louis ARSENAL, June 24, 1861.
Hope to get off on the 26th. Think provisions now coming up will be
enough for some time. About four companies more should be here. A force
can go to Cape Girardeau ; but an expedition to Pocahontas should be made
with care. It might be cut off.
N. LYON, Commanding.
Colonel HARDING.
80 TESTIMONY.
[By telegraph from Boonville— 26, 1861.]
ST. Louis ARSENAL, June 27, 1861.
The interests of the government require that no boats ply along the river
between this and Kansas City for the present, and you will notify the col
lector that no boats will be allowed to pass above here until further orders.
Much confusion attends my train arrangements, and delay is unavoidable.
Shall try to get off to-morrow, but am not certain. I want Colonel Steven
son to come here and take command with some of his companies. Schofield
arrived this afternoon.
N. LYON, Commanding.
Colonel HARDING.
[By telegraph from Grafton, Virginia— 27, 1861.]
ST. Louis ARSENAL, June 27, 1861.
How many troops have you in St. Louis, and how many do you consider
necessary for its defence ? Answer at once.
G. B. McCLELLAN.
CHESTER HARDING, Jr., Adjutant General.
[By telegraph from Grafton, Virginia — 28. 1861.]
ST. Louis, June 28, 1861.
Have ordered three Illinois regiments to move to Cairo whenever called
for by General Prentiss, who will look out for the southeast, and also tele
graphs "*No rebels at Bloomfield." Will not a movement from Bird's Point
do the best ?
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major General V. S. Army.
CHESTER HARDING, Jr.
[By telegraph from Boonville— 27, 1861.]
ST. Louis ARSENAL, June 27, 1861.
Colonel Stiefel's command and four companies 7th regiment arrived. Pro
visions wanted. Send at once to Hermann, by first train 400 barrels hard
bread, 90 bushels beans, 3,350 pounds rice, 2,000 pounds sugar, and 600
pounds coffee. The rains are terrible. I cannot get off. Steamer goes down
to meet provisions. Answer.
N. LYON, Commanding.
Colonel HARDING.
[By telegraph from Boonville, July 1, 1861.]
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 1, 1861.
What is going on in the southeast? You sent me word that McClellan
would attend to that quarter. He says I may have one regiment from Quincy
and one from, Caseyville, and Prentiss is authorized to call for four more regi
ments if he wants them. Cannot all these be put in movement to meet the
danger threatened? See what Prentiss says and send word to McClellan.
N. LYON, Commanding.
Colonel HARDING.
TESTIMONY. 81
BOONVILLE, Missouri, July 2, 1861.
DEAR COLONEL : I hope to move to-morrow, and think it more important
just now to go to Springfield. My force in moving from here will be about
2,400 men. Major Sturg'is will have about 2,200 men, and you know what
force has gone to Springfield from St. Louis, so that you see what amount
of provisions we shall want supplied at that point. Please attend to us as
effectually as possible. Our line should be kept open by all means. I must
be governed by circumstances at Springfield. You will, of course, have due
attention to the southeast. The State Journal is outrageous and must be
stopped; you will take such measures as you think best to effect this. Our
cause is suffering from too much indulgence, and you must so advise our
friends in St. Louis. Colonel Stevenson must have pretty strong garrisons
at the points he occupies on the river, and he must have support from other
States as occasion seems to require. Colonel Curtis is, I suppose, on the
Hannibal and St. Joseph road; rigorous measures should be shown the dis
orderly in that region. Our operations are becoming extensive, and our staff
officers must keep up with our emergencies. We need here a regular quar
termaster and commissary. Cannot something be done for us from Wash
ington ?
Yours, truly,
N. LYON, Commanding.
Colonel HARDING, St. Louis Arsenal.
P. S. — I cannot spare more than 300 stand of arms for home guards at
Jefferson. I shall not be able to supply other portions of the State with the
same proportion. • N. L.
CAMP CAMERON, July 2, 1861.
DEAR COLONEL : Please forward to Washington the enclosed return, or in
corporate it in a department return to be sent there. Also, it would be well
to make a report to the adjutant general of movements of troops in the State.
Yours, very truly,
J. M. SCHOFIELD.
Colonel CHESTER HARDING.
HEADQUARTERS MISSOURI VOLUNTEERS,
Camp Cameron, July 2, 1861.
General Orders No. 4.J
The following troops, under command of Brigadier General N. Lyon, will
take up the line of march for the south at 7 o'clock a. m. to-morrow, viz:
Officers. Men.
Brigadier general and staff 4
Company B, second infantry 61
Company F, second artillery 1 60
Recruits, United States army 1 134
First regiment Missouri volunteers 29 866
Two companies second regiment Missouri volunteers 6 205
Pioneer detachment 1 46
Artillery 1 13
First regiment Iowa volunteers 34 892
Total 77 2,277
Aggregate 2, 354
Part iii-
82 TESTIMONY.
The following troops will remain for the present at this place :
Comp's. Officers. Men.
Second regiment Missouri volunteers 4 10 381
Seventh regiment Missouri volunteers 4 13 349
Fifth regiment reserve corps 8 30 558
Total 53
Left behind sick . .
The troops which take the field under General Lyon will be joined by a
force of 2,200 regulars and Kansas volunteers, under command of Major
Sturgis, United States army, at Osceola, Missouri. The united command
will then proceed toward Springfield, Missouri. Colonel Chester Harding,
adjutant general Missouri volunteers, will forward to Springfield the com
missary supplies necessary for this command, in addition to that already in
the field in that portion of the State. Colonel Harding is also charged with
the duty of forwarding supplies for the troops that remain at this and other
points on the river.
Special orders No. 1, dated June 29, 1861, from these headquarters, are so
far modified as to authorize Colonel John D. Stevenson to retain at this post,
or at Jefferson City, such companies of the 2d regiment as may wish to
remain in the service for three years, but not necessarily in the regiment to
which they now belong.
Such companies will be reorganized at once, and incorporated into regi
ments as soon as may be.
By order of General Lyon.
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Assistant Adjutant General
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF OHIO,
Buckhannon, July 5, 1861.
Communicate freely with Prentiss. If he does not need Wyman, you can
take him. Telegraph to General Pope, at Alton, to give you a regiment;
and to Hurlbut, at Quincy, to give you another.
Do not lose sight of importance of Cairo, and of its operations in South
eastern Missouri. Write to me fully.
G. B. McCLELLAN, Major General, U. S. A.
CHESTER HARDING,
Assistant Adjutant General.
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 5, 1861.
General Lyon is moving down from Boonville toward Springfield, Greene
county, Missouri, with 2,400 troops. Major Sturgis is on the way from
Fort Leavenworth with 2,200. There are 3,500 on the southwest branch of
Pacific railroad and the line thence to Mount Vernon, beyond Springfield.
In a day or two another regiment will be moved down. There is a depot
for supplies at Holla, the terminus of the southwest branch; another must
be established at Springfield. All the supplies for, say 10,000 troops, must
take that direction. From Rolla on for 60 miles the country is mountainous
and barren'. Teams have to take their own forage. It is absolutely neces
sary that a large amount of wagon transportation should be immediately
provided. Will you see that the necessary orders are given by the quarter
master general, by telegraph, to Major McKinstry, early in the morning ?
TESTIMONY. 83
General Lyon urges that regular quartermasters and commissaries be sent
him at once.
CHESTER HARDING, JR.,
A. A. G. Missouri Volunteers.
General THOMAS,
Adjutant General, Washington.
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 5, 1861.
Order Schittiier's regiment home. A boat will be there to-day to take
them.
CHESTER HARDING, JR.,
A. A. G. Missouri Volunteers.
General PRENTISS, Cairo.
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 5, 1861.
Wa
ill telegraph again.
Just received despatch from McClellan, which may change order for
Wil
C. HARDING.
General PRENTISS, Cairo.
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 6, 1861.
General Lyon has sent Wyman's regiment to southwest. This, with the 700
troops now there, will be enough for the present. Colonel Wyman is in com
mand, with instructions to keep open the line of communication, on which all
supplies will be sent hereafter. General Lyon has moved down towards
Springfield with 2,400 men, and Major Sturgis with 2,200 on the frontier.
Sweeny is there, and atMt. Vernon, beyond there, with 2,500, besides guards
at posts on line. Marsh's Alton regiment is here. I will equip them. They
will go to Cape Girardeau and be subject to General Prentiss's call in case
of necessity. The Quincy regiment will go to Ironton, and thence to Green
field. I will write particulars to-night. Think the force sufficient, and will
not order more unless necessary.
CHESTER HARDING, JR.,
A. A. G. Missouri Volunteers.
General MCCLELLAN, Buckhannon, Virginia.
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 9, 1861.
Schittner's enlistment expires about the 22d instant. I want them for
reorganization. The City of Alton goes down to day to carry Marsh to Cape
Girardeau. He was delayed by want of mules, now furnished. Will you
let Schittner come up by same boat after reorganization ? I can send you
a full three-year regiment made up of Schittner's and others, under good
officers.
C. HARDING, JR.,
A. A. G. Missouri Volunteers.
General PRENTISS, Cairo.
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 9, 1861.
Buell's battery, raised under order of General Lyon, needs equipment
for immediate service. Will you authorize the muster ? Very efficient
company.
CHESTER HARDING,
A. A. G. Missouri Volunteers.
General MOCLELLAN, Buckhannon, Virginia.
84 TESTIMONY.
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 11, 1861.
I hope Grant's regiment will be allowed to come. He arid Marsh can aid
Cairo and Bird's Point effectually by operations in Cape Girardeau, Scott,
Stoddard, Wayne, and Butler counties. Bland's regiment (6th Missouri)
will be with them. Wynian is at and below Rolla; Buell's battery was
wanted for Grant. Department has not answered in regard to it.
CHESTER HARDING, JR.,
A. A. G. Missouri Volunteers.
Major S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G., Buckhannon.
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 13, 1861.
With cavalry on our prairies we could crush secession in our State
within two months. The want of it has not only embarrassed us, but lost
us the fruits of hard-earned victories. The rebel General Harris would now
be a prisoner if we had mounted forces. Two regiments are needed. What
may we do ? Colonel F. P. Blair can explain. We hope to catch Harris in
any event.
CHESTER HARDING, JR.,
A. A. G. Missouri Volunteers.
Hon. SIMON CAMERON,
Secretary of War, Washington.
HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST EXPEDITION,
Springfield, Missouri, July 13, 1861.
SIR: I arrived at this place early this evening two or three hours in ad
vance of my troops, who are encamped a few miles back. I have about
5,000 men to be provided for, and have expected to find stores here, as I
have ordered. The failure of stores reaching here seems likely to cause
serious embarrassment, which must be aggravated by continued delay, and
in proportion to the time I am forced to wait for supplies. * *
I shall endeavor to take every due precaution to meet existing emergencies,
and hope to be able to sustain the cause of the government in this part of
the State. But there must be no loss of time in furnishing me the resources
I have herein mentioned. I have lost in reaching this place about four days'
time, by the high waters in Grand and Osage rivers, which made it neces
sary to ferry them. The same difficulty prevented Sturgis from co-operating
with Sigel in time to afford any aid. Please telegraph to McClellan and to
Washington anything in this letter you deem of importance to these head
quarters. Shoes, shirts, blouses, &c., are much wanted, and I would have
you furnish them, if possible, in considerable quantities.
Yours, truly,
N. LYON, Brigadier General Commanding.
Colonel CHESTER HARDING, Si. Louis Arsenal.
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 15, 1861.
We have here Captain Buell, an old artillery soldier, who was authorized
by General Lyon to raise a full battery — six pieces. He has 130 experi
enced men, and wants 20 more, with 1 10 horses. It is absolutely necessary
that he should be equipped. There will be hot work here before the end of
the month, and our three batteries (four pieces each) are now in the south
west. Send order to equip Buell and to raise his force to full complement.
You are needed here. About 2,500 men, in three columns, are now on an
TESTIMONY. * 85
expedition to kill secession in Northeast Missouri. Our operations are be
coming large.
CHESTER HARDING, JR.,
A. A. G. Missouri Volunteers.
Major General FREMONT, New York.
Copy of the following was sent to assistant adjutant general at Washing
ton, to General Frdmont, New York, and to Colonel Blair, Washington:
SPRINGFIELD, Missouri, July 13, 1861.
My effective force will soon be reduced by discharge of three months vol
unteers to about 4,000 men, including the Illinois regiment now on the
march from Rolla. Governor Jackson will soon have in this vicinity not less
than 30,000. I must have at once an additional force of 10,000 men, or
abandon my position. All must have supplies and clothing.
N. LYON, Brigadier General Commanding.
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 15, 1861.
Have you received General McClellan's despatch of to-day ? If so, what's
your plan? Will aid you in any way, but think best aid is to operate as
before indicated. Have you official notice that General Fremont is our de
partment commander ?
CHESTER HARDING, JR.,
A. A. G. Missouri Volunteers.
General PRENTISS, Cairo.
[By telegraph from Chicago, July 15, 1861.]
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 15, 1861.
Have despatched condition of affairs to General Fremont, and asked authority
to take the field in Northern Missouri with five more regiments. Expect answer
to-night. Will go down and confer with you as soon as I hear. How did you
succeed with Harris ?
JOHN POPE, Brigadier General.
CHESTER HARDING, Jr.
[By telegraph from Cairo, July 15, 1861.]
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 15, 1861.
I have received McClellan's despatch. My plan would be to start a strong
column across Missouri from this point, leaving it well guarded; at the same
time, advance from Cape Girardeau and Greenville, concentrating with Lyon,
or Missouri forces, and drive them back. It would be better first to break up
rebel encampment at Union City, in Tennessee, to prevent their crossing at
Hickman or Madrid to get in our rear. All of which I could do if ordered by
major general commanding. I must await orders. I have not been officially
informed that Fremont commands us.
B. M. PRENTISS, Brigadier General
CHESTER HARDING, Jr.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE WEST,
Springfield, Missouri, July 15, 1861.
COLONEL: General Lyon is nowhere with about 7,000 men. Of these fully
one-half are three months volunteers, whose term of service has nearly ex
pired — the latest expiring on the 14th August. Governor Jackson is con
centrating his forces in the southwestern part of the State, and is receiving
large re-enforcements from Arkansas, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Texas.
86 TESTIMONY.
His effective force will soon be certainly not less than 30,000 men — probably
much larger. All idea of any further advance movement, or of even main
taining our present position, must soon be abandoned unless the government
furnish us promptly with large re-enforcements and supplies. +0ur troops
are badly clothed, poorly fed, and imperfectly supplied with tents; none of
them have yet been paid; and the three months volunteers have become dis
heartened to such extent that very few of them are willing to renew their
enlistment. The blank pay-rolls are not here; and the long time required to
get them here, fill them up, send them to Washington, have the payment
ordered, and the paymaster reach us, leaves us no hope that our troops can
be paid for five or six weeks to come. Under these circumstances, there
remains no other course but to urgently press upon the attention of the
government the absolute necessity of sending us fresh troops at once, with
ample supplies for them and for those now here. At least 10,000 men
should be sent, and that promptly. You will send the enclosed despatch by
telegraph to General McClellan, and also to the War Department, and for
ward by mail a copy of this letter. Lose no time in fitting for the field the
three years volunteers now at the arsenal, and send them here as soon as
possible. Call for Colonel McNeil's regiment of home guards to garrison at
the arsenal; and allow him to organize, if for the regular three years service,
if he desires to do so. It is believed that the remaining home guards will
be sufficient for the city. Should it be necessary, their term of service can
be renewed for a short period, for the purpose of a city garrison. The gen
eral is not aware whether Colonel Smith's regiment has yet taken the field.
If not, he presumes that both his and Colonel Eland's regiments may be sent
here without dela}'. You may doubtless leave the care of the southeast part
of the State to General Prentiss. Should St. Louis be in danger from that
direction, troops could easily be called from Illinois and Indiana for its de
fence. Moreover, a force moving on St. Louis from the south would be
exposed to attack in rear from Cairo. Hence there seems little or no danger
from that direction. Unless we are speedily re-enforced here, we will soon
lose all we have gained. Our troops have made long marches, done much
effective service, and suffered no small privations. They have received no
pay nor clothing from the government, and the small stock furnished by
private contribution is now exhausted; so that unless the government gives
us relief speedily, our thus far successful campaign will, prove a failure.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Captain llth Infantry, Assistant Adjutant General
Colonel CHESTER HARDING, •
Adjutant General Missouri Volunteers, St. Louis Arsenal, Missouri.
P. S. — Cannot Colonel Curtis's regiment be spared from St. Joseph ? And
if so, send it forward.
N. LYON, Commanding.
WASHINGTON, July 15, 1861.
The President is going in person to the War Department to arrange
matters for you.
M. BLAIR.
Major General FREMONT, Astor House.
TESTIMONY. 87
[By telegraph from New York, July 16.]
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 16, 1861.
Have Captain Buell's force raised to full complement and equipped.
General Pope will go to Alton to-morrow. Keep me fully advised by tele
graph.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Assistant Adjutant General CHESTER HARDING.
WASHINGTON, July 16, 1861.
The arms will be sent immediately to Illinois. Major Hagner will call on
you with authority to supply your wants. War Department will advise
you particularly.
LYMAN TBUMBULL.
General JOHN C. FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE WEST,
Springfield, Missouri, July 16, 1861.
Special Orders No. 18.]
Colonel Brown's regiment (4th) United States reserve corps will proceed
to the city of St. Louis, where it will, at the expiration of its three months
term, be mustered out of service.
By order of General Lyon.
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Assistant Adjutant General.
DEAR Miss : I have not heard from you yet, but make free to trust
this to your care :
HEADQUARTERS RIPLEY COUNTY BATTALION,
Camp Burrows, July 16, 1861.
DEAR SIR: If there is any way to communicate with the governor through
any person in St. Louis, please let me know it. I am advancing, and Gene
ral Yell will follow me in a few days with 5,000 men. He will take posi
tion between Rolla and Ironton, and act as circumstances dictate. General
Watkins will move up, sustained by General Pillow, and if proper energy
is exercised we can drive the enemy north of the Missouri and into St.
Louis in thirty days. You will please let me hear from you, verbally or
not, through the person through 'whom this passes ; and please send The
Daily Journal for a short time to Doniphan, as it will be sent to me by my
couriers.
Yours, respectfully,
M. JEFF. THOMPSON,
Commanding Ripley County Battalion.
JOSEPH TUCKER, Esq.,
Editor of The State Journal, St. Louis.
SPRINGFIELD, Missouri, July 17, 1861.
SIR: I enclose you a copy of a letter to Colonel Townsend on the subject
of an order from General Scott, which calls for five companies of the 2d
infantry to be withdrawn from the west and sent to Washington. A pre
vious order withdraws the mounted troops, as I am informed, and were it
88 TESTIMONY.
not that some of them were en route to this place they would now be in Wash
ington. This order carried out would not now leave at Fort Leavenworth
a single company. I have companies B and E, 2d infantry, now under orders
for Washington; and if all these troops leave me, I can do nothing, and
must retire in the absence of other troops to supply their places. In fact, I
am badly enough off at the best, and must utterly fail if my regulars all go.
At Washington troops from all the northern, middle, and eastern States are
available for the support of the army in Virginia, and more are understood
to be already there than are wanted ; and it seems strange that so many
troops must go on from the west and strip us of the means of defence. But
if it is the intention to give up the west, let it be so; it can only be the
victim of imbecility or malice. Scott will cripple us if he can. Cannot
you stir up this matter and secure us relief. See Fremont, if he has arrived.
The want of supplies has crippled me so that I cannot move, and I do not
know when I can. Everything seems to combine against me at this point.
Stir up Blair.
Yours, truly,
N. LYON, Commanding.
Colonel HARDING, St. Louis Arsenal, Mo.
[By telegraph from Chicago, dated July 16, 1861.— Eeceived July 17, 1861.]
I am again urgently solicited by adjutant general in St. Louis to take
command in North Missouri. What shall I do ? The forces are gradually
closing around Harris. I think a vigorous campaign of a week will settle
secession in North Missouri, and leave the troops at your disposal for other
service. Please answer to Alton. We need arms much.
JOHN POPE, Brigadier General.
Major General FREMONT, New York.
[By telegraph from Quincy, dated July 17.— Received July 17, 1861.]
I am ordered to hold the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad. I have three
regiments posted along the road, in communication at the west with Iowa
troops, for detached service and breaking up camps of rebels. I need better
arms than the smooth musket. I have one regiment wholly unarmed in
camp here, and can get no arms in St. Louis or Springfield. Can you send
me Minies and ammunition ?
S. A. HURLBUT, Brigadier General.
Major General FREMONT, New York.
[By telegraph from Chicago, dated July 17. — Received July 17, 1861.]
We need specially, to fit out one or two regiments of cavalry, sabres and
revolvers. There are absolutely none in this part of the country.
JOHN PO-PE, Brigadier General.
Major General FREMONT, U. S. A., New York.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE WEST,
Springfield, Missouri, July 17, 1861.
SIR : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Special Order No.
1 1 2, from headquarters, under date of July 5? directing the removal from the
department of the west of companies B, C, F, G, and H, 2d infantry, and of
Captain Sweeny, now acting brigadier general by election of volunteers.
The communication reached me yesterday at this place.
I have been drawn to this point by the movements of the rebel forces in
this State, and have accumulated such troops as I could make available,
TESTIMONY. 89
including those in Kansas. My aggregate is between 7,000 and 8,000 men,
more than half of whom are three months volunteers, some of whose term
of enlistment has just expired ; others will claim a discharge within a week
or two, and the dissolution of my forces from this necessity, already com
menced, will leave me less than 4,000 men, including companies B and E,
2d infantry, now with me. In my immediate vicinity it is currently re
ported there are 30,000 troops and upward, whose number is constantly
augmenting, and who are diligently accumulating arms and stores. They
are making frequent lawless and hostile demonstrations, and threaten me
with attack. The evils consequent upon the withdrawal of any portion of
my force will be apparent ; loyal citizens will be unprotected, repressed
treason will assume alarming boldness, and possible defeat of my troops in
battle will peril the continued ascendency of the federal power itself, not
only in the State, but in the whole west. If the interests of the govern
ment are to be sustained here, and in fact the whole valley of the Mississippi,
large bodies of troops should be sent forward to this State, instead of being
withdrawn from it, till by concentration there may be ability to overpower
any force that can be gathered in the west to act against the government.
Troops properly belonging to the valley of the Mississippi from Wisconsin,
Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio, have already been withdrawn to the east. The
moral effect of the presence of the few regulars in my command is* doubtless
the main consideration that holds the enemy in check, and with them I may
be able to retain what has already been achieved until I am strengthened ;
but any diminution will be imminently hazardous.
The volunteers with me have yet had no pay for their services, and their
duties have been arduous. Their clothing has become dilapidated, and as a
body they are dispirited. But for these facts they would probably nearly all
have re-enlisted. I have no regular officers of the pay department, nor the
commissary and quartermaster; the affairs of both the last are, consequently,
indifferently administered, from want of experience. Nothing but the im
mense interests at stake could have ever induced me to undertake the great
work in which I am engaged, under such discouraging circumstances. In
this state of affairs, presumed to have been unknown when the order was
issued, I have felt justified in delaying its execution for further instruction,
so far as the companies with me are concerned.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
N. LYON, Brigadier General Commanding.
Lieutenant Colonel TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General, &c.
[Received July 18, 1861.]
SPRINGFIELD, Illinois, July 18, 1861.
All the Illinois forces are in Missouri, excepting the Irish regiment and
three companies of cavalry at Quincy, and three regiments of infantry, two
companies of cavalry, and battery of artillery at Alton. Shall assume com
mand at once. Moving with the force from Alton to St. Charles to-night,
and that at Quincy, will take position on line of Hannibal and St. Joseph
railroad to-day, and will put the entire force in North Missouri into action
immediately.
JOHN POPE, Brigadier General Commanding.
Major General JOHN C. FREMONT, New York.
ASTOR HOUSE, New York, July 18, 1861.
North Missouri railroad torn up and obstructed by State forces. Mails
cannot be transported. Tracks torn up behind the United States troops.
90 TESTIMONY.
Some fighting between these and State forces. I have ordered General Pope
to take the command in North Missouri with three regiments from Alton.
He moves this morning. General Lyon calls for re-enforcements.
J. 0. FREMONT, Major General. Commanding.
Colonel TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
[Received at the Astor House, 4.30 p. m.]
WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, July 18, 1861.
Your letter of 16th and telegram of 18th received. The general-in-chief
says please proceed to your command without coming here. He has no par
ticular instructions for you at present. He adds, for your information, the
term of service of three months volunteers began with date of reception
and muster into service.
E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant General.
General FREMONT, United States Army.
[Received July 18, 1861.]
SPRINGFIELD, Illinois, July 18, 1861.
No force at St. Louis except necessary guard for arsenal and city. I leave
for Missouri in a few minutes.
JOHN POPE, Brigadier General.
Major General FREMONT, New York.
ST. Louis, July 19, 1861.
Governor Yates has referred your despatch to me. The fourteen guns
need caissons, harness and equipments. Only available regiment for imme
diate service is Mulligan's, at Quincy, but it has no arms; will get them
here. I open North Missouri road to-morrow. Three Alton regiments landed
there to-night. Several regiments will be available in three days.
JOHN POPE, Brigadier General.
Major General FREMONT, United States Army.
ST. Louis, July 19, 1861.
It was the design to occupy Southwest Missouri, cutting off all approaches
from Arkansas by way of Pocahontas, to occupy Poplar Bluffs, Bloomfield,
Greenville, and the line of the Cairo and Fulton railroad. Accordingly one
regiment is at Ironton, ready to advance when re-enforced. Grant was under
orders, but his orders were countermanded. Marsh is at Cape Girardeau,
instructed to keep open communication with Bloomfield, where Grant was
to be. General Prentiss has eight regiments at Cairo, and could spare five
of them to go into that country. If we once lose possession of the swamps
of that region, a large army will be required to clear them, while if we get
possession first and hold the causeway, a smaller force will do. General
McClellan telegraphed that he had authentic intelligence of a large army
gathering at Pocahontas, according with what I have advised for weeks.
Expecting you here daily, I have not telegraphed before ; but if you do not
come at once, will you take into consideration the importance to Cairo that
the southeast should be held by us ?
CHESTER HARDING, JR.,
Assistant Adjutant General.
Major General FREMONT.
TESTIMONY. 91
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE WEST,
Springfield, Missouri, July 19, 1-861.
SIR : The 4th and 5th regiments of Iowa volunteers are reported to me as
available for service. They are at present at Burlington, in that State, and
it is desirable to have them actively at work. If they are not otherwise
needed, I wish you to order them forward to join my column, with all pos
sible despatch.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
N. LYON, Brigadier General Commanding.
Colonel CHESTER HARDING, Jr ,
Assistant Adjutant General, St. Louis Arsenal.
[By telegraph from Washington, July 20, 1861.]
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 20, 1861.
General Thomas authorized me to say that you can accept as many three
years regiments as shall offer, until further notice.
F. P. BLAIR, Colonel 1st Regiment.
Colonel CHESTER HARDING,
Assistant Adjutant General.
[By telegraph from New York, July 20, 1861.]
ST. Louis ARSEXAL, July 20, 1861.
Have you later reliable intelligence from General Lyon ?
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel HARDING, Assistant Adjutant General.
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 20, 1861.
Nothing later from General Lyon, but I have obtained authority to accept
'regiments as fast as offered. Can soon re-enforce him. Will begin next
week. When will you start ?
CHESTER HARDING,
Assistant Adjutant General.
Major General FREMONT, New York.
[By telegraph from Cincinnati, July 20, 1861.]
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 20, 1861.
In case of attack on Cairo, have none but Illinois troops to re-enforce, and
only 11,000 arms in Illinois. Will direct two regiments to be ready at
Caseyville, but you will only use them for defence of St. Louis and in case
of absolute necessity. Telegraph me from time to time.
G. B. McCLELLAN, Major General V. S. Army.
CHESTER HARDING, Jr., Assistant Adjutant General.
[By telegraph from New York, July 20, 1861.]
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 20, 1861.
Can clothing, camp equipage, and other ordinary supplies be had in St.
Louis ? I corne on immediately.
J. C. FREMONT, Major General Commanding.
Colonel HARDING, Assistant Adjutant General.
92 TESTIMONY.
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 21, 1861.
GENERAL : Before referring to your recent communications, allow me to ex
plain the state of affairs in other parts of Missouri outside of your line of
operations.
Before you left Boonville I had the honor to advise you that large forces
were gathering at Pocahontas. In accordance with your instructions, I
communicated freely by telegraph with General McClellan, and, as I sup
posed, succeeded in having placed at your disposal sufficient troops from
Illinois to hold the swamp counties of the southeast. Accordingly, I com
menced by sending Brand's regiment to Ironton, with directions to proceed
as far as he could, with entire safety, in the direction of Greenville. At the
same time Colonel Grant's regiment was ordered here, to proceed to Bloom-
field, and Colonel Marsh to Cape Girardeau, where he could have easy com
munication with either Cairo or Bloomfield. I armed 800 home guards in
Cape Girardeau and Scott counties, to act as skirmishers, scouts, and guides
in the marshes, and obtained authority from the Secretary of War to raise a
force of mounted scouts. With these forces, and with arms for home guards
in Wayne, Stoddard,' and Butler, I expected to keep down local rebellion in that
region, encourage Union men, hold the causeway through the swamps, and
prevent the approach of an army from Pocahontas until the commanding
generals and the authorities at Washington became convinced that it was
the design of the enemy to march upon Bird's Point and St. Louis as soon as
sufficient strength was gathered.
General McClellan countermanded his order to Grant. I could get no
answer in regard to equipping Buell's battery, (though now the authority is
here and a portion of the battery in service on the Missouri river,) and
Bland and Marsh are at the points which they were sent to, without the
force to accomplish the object named. General McClellan's reason for counter
manding the order to Grant was that Cairo was threatened. Therefore,
instead of occupying the country through which the enemy must come, eight
regiments are lying in that sickly hole, Cairo, where General Prentiss can
see the whole of them at once. He also has cavalry and two light batteries.
A week since General McClellan telegraphed that he had the same definite
information of troops crossing from Tennessee and coming up from all parts
of Arkansas to Pocahontas, which I had learned from our scouts and spies
(one of them a pilot on a Memphis boat which had conveyed some of the
troops over,) and had sent to him.
Now, in the southeast we stand thus: two regiments, not in communica
tion with each other; no artillery, and a few home guards, against, what they
expect to be, 20,000 men, (regular troops, well provided,) who design march
ing upon St. Louis.
I have explained all this to General Fremont, who will be here Tuesday,
and who (as does General Pope) understands the threatened movement, and
will take vigorous measures to meet it.
So much for the southeast. Meanwhile, your departure from Boonville,
and the necessity of having 1,800 troops to garrison Jefferson City, Boou-
ville, and Lexington, encouraged the rebels in Northeast Missouri. Briga
dier General Tom Harris gathered a force below Monroe Station, in camp.
I took the liberty of ordeii,ng Colonel Smith, of Illinois, who was lying
eighteen miles from him, to break up the camp. He waited a day or two
until Harris had got together 1,600 men, proceeded part way, shut himself
tip in a seminary, and sent back for re-enforcements, as his men had been
marched off in'such a hurry that they forgot to fill their cartridge-boxes and
had only four rounds apiece. He was relieved, and Harris, marched south-
TESTIMONY. 93
westwardly, on his way through Galloway county, to make a combined at
tack upon Jefferson City, with forces from Pettis, Osage, and Linn counties.
To check this I ordered up Schlittner's regiment from Cairo As soon as
the boat arrived I gave Colonel Schiittner his marching orders, and imme
diately went to work to equip his regiment. McKinstry helped, and both
of us worked all night. The field officers, except Hammer, and nearly all
the company officers went up town, and McKinstry and I were colonels,
captains, adjutants, and quartermasters, as occasion required. I finally got
them off, to go to Jefferson City, to cross there. As the regiment was in the
worst possible state of discipline, and as Hammer is no soldier, (Schiittner
and the balance I put in arrest as soon as they appeared at the gate at
reveille,} I couldn't trust him, and ordered McNeil to take seven of his com
panies and follow him and take command. Hammer had with him forty-two
mounted orderlies. The two commands united were to proceed from Jeffer
son City, via Fulton, to Mexico, between which two places last named Harris
was.
At the same time Colonel M. L. Smith, 8th regiment, with two companies,
and four companies of the 2d, under Schaeffer, were sent up to Mexico by
rail, where it was arranged with Hurlbut that either Palmer's or Grant's
regiment should join them and scour the country down toward Jefferson.
After fully entering into the plan, and after I had sent off our forces, Hurl-
but sent Palmer on to guard the Chariton Bridge with his entire regiment,
arid left Smith to do the best he could. I, of course, immediately re-enforced
him. Meanwhile the enemy burned the bridge above Mexico.
Hammer telegraphed from Hermann that he concluded to leave the river
there, as transportation was easily procured, and that he had made arrange
ments to effect a junction with McNeil. The next I heard of him he was at
•New Florence, on the railroad, and McNeil, with 460 men, was near Fulton,
where I then knew he would meet Harris. You can imagine my anxiety,
and afterward my relief, when I heard from that brave fellow McNeil that
he had fought and routed the rebels.
The next day after this affair General Pope sent me word that he would
go into Northeast Missouri with a large force. He has done so. He ex
pects to have 7,000 men there, two batteries, and four companies of cavalry.
McNeil still lies at Fulton. Hammer came down from the railroad, and Mc
Neil has ordered him here. Everything quiet in Galloway. The northeast
may be considered secure.
From Jefferson I have had nothing but trouble. It being impossible to
supply the places of Boernstein's six companies, I have left him there, and —
but I won't stop to mention his performances.
At home our friends are alarmed, and the city is uneasy. I receive about
five deputations per diem, warning me that I ought not to send away so
many troops, (2,200 United States reserve corps left,) and sometimes hint
ing that 1 will be overhauled by higher powers for doing so. The only
danger is in case of an advance from Arkansas. But the first demonstra
tion will result in clearing St. Louis of its secession element.
As far as your command is concerned, I fear that you think' I have been
neglectful of my duties, but I cannot admit the fact. Every order that you
have sent I have immediately put into execution, and have seen it executed,
so far as I could give my personal supervision to it. Mismanagement of
transportation at Roll a, to which place 110 wagons had been sent before
Brown moved, and probably the inferior kind of transportation furnished,
accounts for the delay in getting supplies forward. Arms, ammunition, and
provisions were lying for weeks at Rolla, while I supposed they were going
forward, and I was not informed of the fact. When I did learn it I tele
graphed to Washington, and had instructions sent to McKiustry to buy
94 TESTIMONY.
everything I required. McKinstry has also had sent to Roll a, at my re
quest, one of Van Vliet's experienced clerks, Thomas O'Brien, to whom I
have given the entire control of quartermaster's affairs from Rolla onward.
A large number of army wagons, with mules, have been bought and sent
down, and I trust that there will be no more trouble there. 250,000 rations
were ordered on the 6th; 4,000 shoes and clothing to match were ordered
on receipt of your letter of the 13th, and I presume are all on the way. I
know that part have been shipped.
The line of communication from Rolla to Springfield is kept open by Wy-
man and Bayles. Wy man's is a splendid regiment, and I am trying to get
other troops to supply his place and send him forward; but I am embar
rassed by conduct which I scarcely think meets your approval, although I
am informed that you gave your consent to it. Lieutenant Colonel Hassen-
deubel, who arrived here yesterday, but has not reported himself, brought
up with him one of Bayles's companies, (company L, rifles, 4th regiment
formerly, but since organized with others as a battalion,) and has ordered
company M up, also, for the purpose of forming a three years regiment, of
which he is to take the command.
I have been strengthening Bayles all I could. There are three companies
here now, mustered and ready to go down as soon as armed, (by Tuesday
at furthest,) and the other two companies will be ready during the week, in
all probability. The ten companies were to be commanded by Saxton. He
is said to be on his way here at this time, and Saxton would be inval
uable, either in command on the line or with you. When Lieutenant Col
onel Hassendeubel reports I shall send that company back, unless I am
satisfied that he had good authority for his action.
As to re-enforcements I shall reorganize the 2d and 4th under their cap
tains, and put the first ten companies formed into one regiment, without
regard to the preferences of individuals. This can be done during the week,
as Boern stein, Schaeffer, and Hammer are all to come here to-morrow.
The surplus can be organized under a temporary battalion organization,
sent to the field, and afterwards filled up.
Smith's 8th can go down during the week, and a splendid regiment it is.
Last night the adjutant general gave me authority to accept any regi
ment that offered. Two are formed in the country. Both will be ready in
two weeks. Others will come. I have caused the notice of the authority
to be published. Bland can't be spared; nor can Curtis's men. St. Jo and
the surrounding country are reported to be ready to rise. In fact, the
whole State is.
McNeil can doubtless raise a regiment without ctffficulty. He is ordered
home as soon as Pope relieves him.
The 9th and 10th are filling up fast, and can be ready in two weeks,
probably. These statements are made upon the supposition that arms and
equipments will be here as ordered.
Mulligan's regiment of Illinois volunteers, I forgot to say, arrived here
yesterday for arms. I sent some companies to Jefferson to-day, and the re
mainder will go up Tuesday.
But, better than all, General Fremont telegraphed me last night that he
would start for St. Louis immediately, and when I can have the opportunity
of going over the map with him I trust that he will use his power to fill this
State with troops. A few weeks' delay would make the whole State a battle
field.
And now, general, I can say that to be relieved of the responsibility which
I have had upon me since you left, without the authority, after the change
in the department command, to do what I saw was necessary, with my rep
resentations to the department generally unnoticed, and without even a
TESTIMONY. 95
competent clerk to aid me in the ordinary routine of business, is truly a re
lief ; and no one can be so glad that Fremont is coming as I am. I have
never before had the time to write you fully, and I presume that now the
office is full of people, who are waiting upon the same errands with which
you were formerly so much annoyed.
I shall always feel proud of the confidence which you have placed in me,
and I hope you will think that I have endeavored to justify it.
Very respectfully and truly,
CHESTER HARDING, JR.
Brigadier General LYON, Commanding.
[By telegraph from Coshocton, Ohio, July 23, 1861 ]
JULY 23, 1861.
Telegram received, and will be attended to. Will be in St. Louis Thurs
day morning.
J. C. FREMONT, Major General.
CHESTER HARDING,
Assistant Adjutant General.
[By telegraph from Cairo, July 23, 1861.]
ST. Louis ARSENAL, July 23, 1861.
Have but eight (8) regiments here. Six (6) of them are three (3) months
men. Their time expires this week ; are reorganizing now. I have neither
tents nor wagons, and must hold Cairo and Bird's Point. The latter is
threatened. I have but two guns equipped for moving. Thus you see I
cannot comply with request. Again, news of this morning changes policy
of rebels in Kentucky. They are organizing opposite. Watkins is en
camped with 2,000, seven miles from Bloomfield. He has no cannon, and
poorly armed. This may be the force you have heard from.
B. M. PRENTISS, Brigadier General.
CHESTER HARDING.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE WEST,
Springfield, Missouri, July 26, 1861.
Your order relative to the State Journal meets with the general's appro
bation. The general would like you to join him as soon as you can be
spared by General Fremont. No doubt General F. will need you for a while,
till he becomes familiar with the details of affairs in the State ; but he will
have a full staff of regular officers, and must be able to spare you soon.
You are much needed here, and will be more so soon. It will soon be very
necessary for me to be with my regiment, and officers fit for staff duties are
very scarce here. We have heard of the defeat of our troops in Virginia,
though hardly enough to judge of its extent. I fear this will prevent our
getting re-enforcements. If so, the next news will be of our defeat also.
Re-enforcements should be sent on at once. Our men are very much in
need of clothing, particularly shoes. Many of the men are entirely bare
footed, and hence unable to march. I hope something can be done for us
soon.
Yours, very truly,
J. M. SCHOFIELD.
Colonel CHESTER HARDING, ,
Adjutant General Missouri Volunteers, St. Louis Arsenal.
TESTIMONY.
WASHINGTON, July 26, 1861.
DEAR GENERAL: I have two telegrams from you, but find it impossible now
to get any attention to Missouri or western matters from the authorities
. here. You will have to do the best you can, and take all needful responsibility
to defend and protect the people over whom you are specially set. * * *
Yours, truly, and in haste,
M. BLAIR.
CAIRO, July 26, 1861.
Five steamers were to leave Memphis last night to take troops from Ran
dolph to New Madrid. Union city troops are under orders to cross Missis
sippi. If they fail to assail us, Ironton and Cape Girardeau will need re-
enforcements. Colonel Marsh has no battery. I have none to spare and no
transportation to intercept rebels. I arn of opinion that Bird's Point is their
destination.
B. M. PRENTISS, Brigadier General
Colonel HARDING, Jr.,
Assistant Adjutant General.
SPRINGFIELD, Missouri, July 27, 1861.
DEAR SIR: I have your notes about matters in St. Louis, £c., and your
proceeding seems to me perfectly correct. Now that matters north seem
more quiet, cannot you manage to get a few regiments this way ? I am in
the deepest concern on this subject, and you must urge this matter upon
Fremont, as of vital importance. These three months volunteers would re-
enlist if they could be paid, but they are now dissatisfied, and if troops do
not replace them, all that is gained may be lost. I have not been able to
move for want of supplies, and this delay will exhaust the term of the three
months men. Cannot something be done to have our men and officers paid
as well as our purchases paid for ? If the government cannot give due atten
tion to the west, her interests must have a corresponding disparagement.
Yours, truly,
N. LYON, Brigadier General Commanding.
Colonel C. HARDING, St. Louis Arsenal, Mo.
Memorandum by Colonel Phelps, from General Lyon, to General Fremont,
July 27.
See General Fremont about troops and stores for the place. Our men
have not been paid, and are rather dispirited; they are badly off for clothing,
and the want of shoes unfits them for marching. Some staff officers are
badly needed, and the interests of the government suffer for the want of
them. The time of the three months volunteers is nearly out, and on return
ing home, as most of them are disposed to, my command will be reduced
too low for effective operations. Troops must at once be forwarded to supply
their place. The safety of the State is hazarded; orders from General Scott
strip the entire west of regular forces, and increase the chances of sacrificing
it. The public press is full of reports that troops from other States are
moving toward the northern border of Arkansas for the purpose of invading
Missouri.
JEFFERSON CITY, Missouri, July 27, 1861.
Surgeon Boemer, of 3d regiment reserve corps, left at Fulton by Colonel
McNeil, reports this morning that, by the evacuation of that place by Colonel
McNeil, the rebels are again gathering, and threatening Union men with
TESTIMONY. 97
vengeance. Either a battalion of General Pipe's brigade, or some other
force, should immediately occupy the town. I am also advised of a g'ather-
ing of a large force at Warsaw, estimated at 10,000 and increasing. Also,
an encampment, eight miles from Glasgow, of 2,000. With an additional
regiment, so as to leave a garrison force of 500 men at Boonville, I will be
able to disperse both forces. If they are promptly met they can be easily
dispersed with the force indicated.
JOHN B. STEVENSON, Col Com. Missouri Ewer.
Maj Gen. JOHN C. FREMONT.
WASHINGTON, July 27, 1861
What disposition was made by you of the arms which you purchased in
Europe ? We are without information on that point, which is very desira
ble. Please answer at once by telegraph and by letter. Send an invoice
of the articles.
WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
JOHN C. FREMONT.
ST. Louis, July 28, 1861.
I ordered the arms shipped to New York to my order, expecting to for
ward, on the arrival, to my department. I trust you will confirm this dis
position of them. The rebels a-re advancing in force from the south upon
these lines. We have plenty of men but absolutely no arms, and the con
dition of the State critical.
J. C. FREMONT, Major General Commanding.
Hon. W. H. SEWARD, Washington.
CAIRO, July 28, 1861.
Rebels from Tennessee are concentrating at New Madrid, Missouri, with
the avowed intention of assaulting Bird's Point. They may intend going
to Cape Girardeau. Colonel Marsh has no battery. I have none to spare.
My command is merging from three months to three years service on half
recess. Mustering in yesterday and to-day. I have but two 6-pounders
prepared to move. I can hold Cairo and Bird's Point, but cannot move to
intercept a large force going to Cape Girardeau. I suggest that Colonel
Marsh, if not re-enforced, be sent to Bird's Point. Entire force at Cairo and
Bird's Point, 6,350.
B. M. PRENTISS, Brigadier General
Major General FREMONT.
CAIRO, July 28, 1861. (Received ST. Louis, July 29, 1861.)
On yesterday 3,000 rebels, west of Bird's Point 40 miles; 300 at Madrid
and three regiments from Union City ordered there; also troops from Ran
dolph and Corinth. The number of organized rebels within 50 miles of me
will exceed 12,000 — that is including Randolph troops ordered and not in
cluding several companies opposite, in Kentucky.
B. M. PRENTISS, Brigadier CWr~/
Major General FREMONT.
ST. Louis, July 29, 1861.
The agent of Adams's Express Company here has offered to bring me by
passenger train any arms directed to me. Send everything you have for
rue by passenger trains, for which the Express Company will provide. Your
Part iii 1
98 TESTIMONY.
letter of 24th received. There were no arms at the arsenal here to meet
the order given for the 5,000. We must have arms^-any arms, no matter
what.
J. C. FREMONT, Maj. Gen. Com'g W. D.
Major HAGNER, Fifth Avenue Hotel, New York.
[Unofficial.]
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, July 30, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR: You were kind enough to Bay that as occasions of sufficient
gravity arose, I might send you a private note.
I have found this command in disorder, nearly every county in an insur
rectionary condition, and the enemy advancing in force by different points
of the southern frontier. Within a circle of fifty miles around General Pren-
tiss, there are about 12,000 of the confederate forces, and 5,000 Tennesseans
and Arkansas men, under Hardee, well arrned with rifles, are advancing
upon Irouton. Of these, 2,000 are cavalry, which yesterday morning were
within 24 hours march of Ironton. Colonel Bland, who had been seduced
from this post, is falling back upon it. I have already re-enforced it with
one regiment; sent on another this morning, and fortified it. 1 am holding
the railroad to Ironton and that to Holla, so securing our connexions with
the south. Other measures, which I am taking, I will not trust to a letter,
and I write this only to inform you as to our true condition, and to say that
if I can obtain the material aid I am expecting you may feel secure that the
enemy will be driven out and the State reduced to order. I have ordered
General Pope back to North Missouri, of which he is now in command. I
am sorely pressed for want of arms. I have arranged with Adams's Express
Company to bring me everything with speed, and will buy arms to-day in
NeWvYork. Our troops have not been paid, and some regiments are in a
state of mutiny, and the men whose term of service is expired generally
refuse to enlist. I lost a fine regiment last night from inability to pay them
a portion of the money due. This regiment had been intended to move on a
critical post last night. The Treasurer of the United States has here $300,-
000 entirely unappropriated. I applied to him yesterday for Si 00,000 ior
my paymaster general, Andrews, but was refused. We have nut an hour
for delay. There are three courses open to me. One, to let the enemy pos
sess himself of some of the strongest points in the State, and threaten St.
Louis, which is insurrectionary. Second, to force a loan from secession
banks here. Third, to use the money belonging to the government, which is
in the treasury here. Of course I will neither lose the State or permit the
enemy a foot of advantage! I have infused energy arid activity into the
department, and there is a thorough good spirit in officers and men. This
morning I will order the treasurer to deliver the money in his possession to
General Andrews, and will send a force to the treasury to take the money,
and will direct such payments as the exigency requires. I will hazard
everything for the defence of the department you have confided tg me, and
1 trust to you for support.
With respect and regard, I am yours truly,
JOHN C. FKEMONT, Major General Commanding.
The PRESIDENT of the United States.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Si. Louis, July SI, 1861.
At Camp Monroe, near Cincinnati, there is company C, 4th artillery, (reg
ulars,) under 1st Lieutenant E. V. W. Howard j aggregate 76 men. Also?
i * TESTIMONY. 99
another company at Cincinnati in charge of Captain Kingsbruy, 6 rifled
Parrott guns, I have asked Adjutant General Thomas if these can be ordered
to me.
J. C. FREMONT, Major General,
Hon. MONTGOMERY BLAIR,
President's Square, Washington City.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis July 31, 1861.
At camp Monroe, near Cincinnati, there is company C, 4th artillery, (regu
lars,) under 1st Lieutenant R. V. W. Howard, aggregate 76 men. Also, another
company at Cincinnati, in charge of Captain Kingsbury — six rifled Parrott guns.
Can these be ordered here ?
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Adjutant General THOMAS,
War Department, Washington.
[By telegraph from Cairo, August 1, 1861.]
The following just received from Colonel Marsh, with request to send to you
by telegraph. A scout of his from Pillow's camp brought the information ; also
a proclamation of Pillow's, who says no quarters to be given those in arms
against him.
B. M. PRENTISS,
Brigadier General.
Major General FREMONT, St. Louis.
[By telegraph from Cairo, August 1, 1861.]
Tne following information just received is, I believe, reliable. General Pillow
was at New Madrid on the morning of the 31st, with 11,000 troops well armed
and well drilled; two regiments of cavalry splendidly equipped; one battery of
flying artillery, 10-pounders, and ten guns, manned and officered by foreigners ;
several mountain Howitzers, and other artillery, amounting in all to 100. 9,000
more moving to re-enforce. He has promised Governor Jackson to place 20,000
men in Missouri at once. I have a copy of his proclamation and also one of
his written passes.
C. C. MARSH,
Colonel Commanding Camp Fremont.
Major General FREMONT, St. Louis.
Upon this day, August 1, General Fremont went in person to re-enforce
Cairo, with what troops he could gather, and with as much display as possible,
in order to increase the apparent size of his small force.
[By telegraph from St. Louis, August 2, 1861.]
General Scott has telegraphed that two batteries of artillery have been sent
from Cincinnati. Shall I forward them to you when they arrive ? Genera*
Lyon wants soldiers — soldiers — soldiers ! So says General Hammer, who has
just arrived from Springfield.
J. C. KELTON,
Assistant Adjutant Gewrd.
General FREMONT, Cairo.
100 TESTIMONY.
[By telegraph from Washington, August 2, 1861.]
This despatch was sent yesterday to commanding officer, Department Ohio,
Cincinnati. Order two (2) companies fourth artillery, with their batteries, under
Howard and Kingsbury, to St. Louis, without delay.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
M. BLAIR,
Post Master General.
Majer General J. C. FREMONT, Cairo.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 2, 1861
Since ordering the two batteries for you yesterday, it appears one company
has no guns and the other is in Western Virginia; neither can be withdrawn
The order is countermanded.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
HEADQUARTERS,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, August 3, 1861.
SIR: From a communication this day received from Lieutenant Colonel 0. E.
Learned, I am informed that General Lyon relies upon the 3d regiment Kansas
volunteers, under your command, to take charge of at Fort Scott and conduct to
his (the general's) headquarters, the supply train now en route to Fort Scott,
under the command of Colonel William Weer, 4th regiment Kansas volunteers.
This is an important supply train, and the operations of General Lyon are, in
a great measure, dependent upon an early reception of it. You will, therefore,
please perfect, at the earliest possible moment, your arrangements to move with
your command upon Fort Scott, with a view to carry out the intentions and
orders of General Lyon. I shall direct the commissary at this post to turn over
to you two months' supplies for your regiment, which, with the other supplies
intended for your command, will be placed under your orders and directed to
proceed to Fort Scott, via Lawrence, Kansas. To more fully understand the
terms of the contract entered into by the War 'Department and Messrs. Irwin,
Jackman & Co., respecting the transportation of army supplies, I enclose a copy
of paragraph viii of that contract, for your information.
Please report to me the name of the officer selected by you as the commissary
of your regiment, in order that the supplies may be duly invoiced to him.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. E. PRINCE, Captain 1st Infantry.
Colonel MONTGOMERY,
3d Regiment Kansas Volunteers.
Copy respectfully submitted for information of General Fremont.
W. E. PRINCE, Captain, ty.
The following despatch was sent to General Fremont, at Cairo, the messeia-
ger .'having arrived at St. Louis, from General Lyon, in General Fremont's
absence. The original despatch is in cipher :
ST. Louis, August 3, 1861.
General Lyon has sent a special messenger, Colonel Hammer, to say that he
needs re-enforcements; that Jackson's army is in Jasper and adjacent counties,with
not less than 20,000 men; that Lyon's force is not much more than one-fourth ;
that the inhabitants are moving this way as fast as their teams will carry them,
leaving homes and crops desolated ; that to insure a continuous and safe trans-
. TESTIMONY. 101
port of provisions and supplies, the road from Holla should be well protected.
I have referred him to Captain Kelton.
E. M. D.
Captain DAVIS, of the. staff of General Fremont.
(August 4, Fremont returned to St. Louis.)
CAIRO, August 4, 1861.
Information last night of a large force at Bloomfield, reported from eight (8)
to ten thousand (10,00 ;) at Garrison Mills, on Picket road, five hundred (500;)
at Castor Mills, five hundred (500;) at Strong's Mills, on Castor river, five
hundred (500 ;) about five miles above Strong's Mills they are herding, beef
cattle. On 1st and 2d August they had orders to cook four days' rations of
bread.
C. C. MARSH,
Colonel 2Qtk Illinois Volunteers, Commanding.
Major General J. C. FREMONT.
INDIANAPOLIS, August 4, 1861.
Can send five regiments, if leave is granted by the department, as I am
ordered to send them east as fast as ready. They are mostly river men, and
are well adapted to your expedition. They have been promised rifles by the
department which have not arrived as yet. What kind of guns will you give
them, and where are they at ? Will telegraph the department.
0. P. MORTON.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTRS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 4, 1861.
The governor of Indiana, in answer to my urgent request for troops, informed
me by telegraph, that he has five regiments ready, chiefly made up of river
boatmen, but they are under orders for the east. He will ask for them to be
kept on western duty. They cannot be more urgently needed at any place
than here, and I ask for them as immediately as the order can be given. Answer
by telegraph.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Honorable MONTGOMERY BLAIR, Washington City.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 4, 1861.
Seeing that the Secretary at War is absent from Washington, I telegraphed
to you to ask that the five Indiana regiments, now under orders for the east,
may be sent at once to me for immediate duty in this State. Governor Morton
joins me in this request. Nowhere can they be more urgently needed, and
nowhere can the river boatmen, from whom they are largely recruited, be so
useful to the cause.
J. C. FRfiMONT, '
Major General Commanding.
Honorable JAMES A. SCOTT,
Acting Secretary at War, Washington City.
102 TESTIMONY.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 4, 1861.
The general commanding desires me to say to you that an urgent application
goes to-morrow to the War Department, for 3,000 California troops, to be placed
as speedily as possible at El Paso, to keep Texas troops from aiding Arkansas.
See the Postmaster General and Secretary of War, and answer by telegraph.
I. 0. WOODS.
Honorable M. S. LATHAM,
United States Senate, Washington City.
[Received St Louis, 5th.]
CAPE GIRARDEAU,
August 4 — 11 a. m., via Joncsborougli.
Thompson is advancing within sixteen miles of me. Am fortifying the hill
in rear of Mills. Send me re-enforcements and ammunition. Express waiting
for reply.
C. C. MARSH,
Colonel 2Qtk Illinois Volunteers, Commanding.
Major General FREMONT.
CAPE GIRARDEAU,
August 5 — 9 p. m., via Jonesborough.
Enemy close on me, over 5,000 strong. Will be attacked before morning ;
send me aid.
C. C. MARSH, Colonel.
Major General FREMONT.
CAIROJ August 5, 1861.
The following despatch was just received :
" Cape Girardeau, August 4 — 11 p. m.
" GENERAL PRENTISS : Enemy advancing within sixteen miles of me. Help
me if you can.
" C. C. MARSH."
B. M. PRENTISS,
Major General.
Major General FREMONT.
BY TELEGRAPH FROM THE ARSENAL,
August 5, 1861.
There are now in the arsenal 2,933 men, besides Smith's 630 at the barracks-
Smith's and Coler's men don't know the facings and marchings. Ought not
Coler to go to the barracks, and should not the officers of the 13th regulars be
instructed to drill both regiments 1
CHESTER HARDING, JR.
General FREMONT, St. Louis
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 5, 1861.
1. The commanding officer directs that Colonel Montgomery's force joins
General Lyon's command, at Springfield, Missouri, immediately.
TESTIMONY. 103
2. The force under Colonel Dodge, at Council Bluff, is ordered to St. Joseph
forthwith*. On its arrival at that point the commanding officer of the regiment
will report to these headquarters for orders.
J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.
Forward these orders with the utmost despatch.
J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.
Captain PRINCE, Fort Leavenwortk, Kansas.
[By telegraph from Washington, August 5, 1861.]
The President desires to know briefly the situation of affairs in the region of
Cairo. Please answer.
JOHN G. NICHOLAY, Private Secretary.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 6, 1861.
I re-enforce you this morning with a heavy battery of 24s and one regiment.
General Prentiss re-enforces you from below. Keep me posted.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel C. C. MARSH, Cape Girardeau.
WASHINGTON, August 6, 1861.
All the troops are ordered out of New Mexico. The first detachment will
leave about the loth. Volunteers received in New Mexico are reported unre
liable in defending the large amount of United States property there. Those
stores cannot be moved east. There is danger of their falling into the hands
of the Texans. Nevertheless, the regulars must come away as ordered. At
least two regiments of volunteers, say from Kansas, should be sent' without de
lay to New Mexico, with a competent officer for the immediate command of all
the troops there. Confer with the governor of Kansas, and arrange for the
safety of New Mexico as soon as possible.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 6, 1861.
COLONEL : I send by special engine Mr. Edward H. Castle for any informa
tion you may have of General Lyon's position. Mr. Castle will inform you what
progress Colonel Stevenson has made, who', with his regiment, is on his way to
General Lyon's camp. Communicate to me through Mr. C., who is instructed
to return with any information you may have — all of which you may safely
intrust to him.
Enclosed letters to be forwarded as immediately as possible to General Lyon.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel WYMAN, Rolla.
[By telegraph from Cairo ]
ARSENAL, August 6, 1861.
I have just ordered four companies, with two 6-pounders on board steamer, to
gend. They are, no doubt, fighting now. See general. If not countermanded,
104 TESTIMONY.
will Lurry tLcm forward. MarsL Las called for Lelp again. Enemy, 5,000 and
over. Citizens Lave left Cape Girardeau. Answer if I must send tLern.
B. M. PRENTISS, Brigadier General
CHESTER HARDING.
ARSENAL, August 6, 1861.
Prentiss telegraphs tLat Lot fighting is no doubt going on at Cape Girardeau,
and tLat Le Las on board, ready to start, four companies and two 6-pounders to
go to Lis aid. He asks if lie shall send tliem. Please answer Lim. Ought Le
not to increase the re-enforcements. Enemy 5,000 strong.
CHESTER HARDING, JR.
Major General FREMONT.
CAIRO, August 6, 1861.
Colonel McArthur, witL six companies and four field-pieces, left for Cape
Girardeau 7J a. m. Will Lurry intrencLments at Bird's Point.
R. M. PRENTISS, General Commanding.
Major General FREMONT.
WASHINGTON, August 6, 1861.
Orders have been sent Governor Morton to forward five regiments to your
department. Hoffman's battery of artillery, from Cincinnati, have been ordered
to report to you for orders.
THO'S A. SCOTT,
Acting Secretary of War.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS, August 6, 1861.
Heavy battery of six 24-pounders and 1,000 men left at midnight for Girar
deau under an experienced officer.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Brigadier General B. M. PRENTISS, Cairo.
DECATUR, August 7, 1861.
Six companies of rebels (three from Williamson, two from Franklin, and one
from Jackson county, in this State,) are reported as ready to join Thompson at
Cape Girardeau to invade Illinois. They are drilled and uniformed, and pretend
to be Union men. They ought to be looked after by you. They are armed.
You may, if you desire, reach me until to-morrow morning at Centralia, Illinois.
R. S. PHILLIPS,
United States Marshal.
General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS FORT LEAVENWORTH,
Kansas, August 7, 1861.
COLONEL : I herewith enclose you a copy of the telegram received and shown
you last night, to wit :
" HEADQUARTERS OF THE WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
"St. Louis, August 5, 1861.
" CAPTAIN PRINCE : The commanding officer directs that Montgomery's force
join General Lyon's command at Springfield immediately."
Independent of the reasons set forth in my communication to you of the 3d
instant, you will see the necessity for adopting at once the most active measures
TESTIMONY. 105
to unite your forces with those of General Lyon. The train is now loading, and
the mule wagons intended for your regiment have, I believe, been turned over
to you. I would therefore suggest that these mule wagons be loaded with arms
and ammunition intended for the home guards at Fort Scott, with the rations of
Colonel Weer's command, and such rations for your own command as will fill
them up. By this arrangement you will be able to detach, if necessary, the
mule teams for a more rapid march. I would also suggest the propriety of pro
ceeding in advance of your command, with Lieutenant Hollister, United States
army, the officer detailed to complete the muster of your regiment. This officer
will leave this morning, and will move with rapidity, and I do not wish his
labors delayed, upon his arrival at Mound City. This officer is charged also
with the mustering in of home guards at Fort Scott, and is directed to apply
to you for the arms received by you from the governor of the State, which will
be turned over to the guards. Please respond to his requisition, and aid him in
the performance, if necessary, of this duty.
To carry out with the utmost promptitude, twenty mule wagons will be turned
over to you for the transportation of these supplies. This will enable you to
take ten days' rations for eight hundred men, besides the supply ordered for
Colonel Weer's command, and the arms and ammunition for the home guard.
I understand you have camp women to transport ; if so, and such is your in
tention, they should be transported in ox teams, so as not to encumber the mule
wagons.
Respectfully,
W. E. PRINCE, Captain 1st Infantry.
Colonel MONTGOMERY,
3d Regiment Kansas Volunteers.
HEADQUARTERS OF FORT LEAVENWORTH, August 8, 1861.
Copy respectfully submitted for the information of the commanding general.
W. E. PRINCE, Captain 1st Infantry.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE WESTERN DEPARTMEIVT,
St. Louis, August 8, 1861.
In consequence of unfounded rumors, I send you the following despatch :
Intelligence just received of a battle fought, Friday, at Dug Springs, nine
teen miles south of Springfield, between Lyon's forces, eight thousand strong,
and troops of McCulloch, estimated at fifteen thousand. Lyon's loss, eight
killed, thirty wounded; McCulloch's, forty killed and forty-four wounded.
Lyon seized eighty stand of arms, fifteen horses and wagons of provisions.
Twenty-seven United States cavalry came suddenly on the enemy's infantry,
estimated four thousand, rode on them, created a stampede among the infantry,
cut their way through, and came back with the loss of five men. Cavalry
charge most brave. Enemy found with their heads cloven entirely through by
force of sabre strokes. Enemy retreated during the night to McCulloch's store,
a few miles south. Lyon took possession of the battle-field. Pickets fired on
Saturday morning. Fight momentarily expected. Reports Sunday morning
of a battle going on ; not authentic. Rumors of a large force of rebels west of
Springfield. Attack expected.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President of the United States, Washington.
106 TESTIMONY.
BIRD'S POINT, August 8, 1861.
The men want to go home, and if detained much longer the worst conse
quences may be feared. Their time of service expired yesterday. Provide for
their return. They are of little use in their present spirit. I wait your answer
ROBT. ROMBAUER.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 9, 1861.
General Lyon not defeated ; had a brilliant and successful skirmish. Sent
telegram to Major SideK.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
LOVELL H. ROSSEAU,
Camp Joseph Holt, Jsjfersonville.
[By telegraph from Cairo, August 9, 1861.]
ST. Louis ARSENAL, August 9, 1861.
Full statement forwarded by mail.
B. M. PRENTISS,
Brigadier General.
Colonel CHESTER HARDING, jr.
SPINGFIELD, Missouri, August 9, 1861.
GENERAL : I have just received your note of the 6th instant by special
messenger.
I retired to this place, as I have before informed you, reaching here on the
5th. The enemy followed to within ten miles of here. He has taken a strong
position, and is recruiting his supplies of horses, mules, and provisions by for
ages into the surrounding country ; his large force of mounted men enabling
him to do this without much annoyance from me.
I find my position extremely embarrassing, and am at present unable to de
termine whether I shall be able to maintain my ground or be forced to retire.
I can resist any attack from the front, but if the enemy move to surround me I
must retire. I shall hold my ground as long as possible, though I may, without
knowing how far, endanger the safety of my entire force, with its valuable ma
terial, being induced, by the important considerations involved, to take this step.
The enemy yesterday made a show of force about five miles distant, and has
doubtless a full purpose of making an attack upon me.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
N. LYON,
Brigadier General of Volunteers Commanding.
Major General J. C. FREMONT,
Commanding Western Department, St. Louis, Mo.
Upon the 10th of August General Lyon was killed in battle.
TESTIMONY. 107
The Assistant Adjutant General's official statement of General Ly&n's com
mand :
First brigade, Major Sturgis :
Four companies cavalry, one company dragoons 250
Four companies first infantry 350
Two companies Missouri volunteers 200
One battery 84
Total.. 884
Second Brigade, General Sigel :
Third Missouri .' 700
^ Fifth Missouri \ 600
viVo batteries 120
Total.. 1,420
Third brigade, Colonel Andrews :
First Missouri 900
Four companies infantry (regulars) 3$0
One battery 64
Total.. 1,264
Fourth brigade, Colonel Deitzler :
Two Kansas regiments 1, 400
First Iowa regiment 900
Total 2, 300
RECAPITULATION.
First brigade 884
Second brigade 1, 420
Third brigade 1, 264
Fourth brigade 2, 300
Total.. 5,868
J. C. KELTON, Assistant Adjutant General.
General FREMONT, Commanding Department.
CAIRO, August 10, 1861.
The rebels are concentrating at Madrid. The least number reported me
10,000. They are procuring wagons, mules, and horses, by seizure from inhabi
tants, and are intrenching at Madrid. I have a man with them who will return
on Sunday night. The force that was near Charleston is reported now to be at
Madrid. They seem to await our coming.
B. M. PRENTISS, Brigadier General
Major General FREMONT.
108 TESTIMONY.
CAIRO, August 12, 1861.
A scout sent out several days ag» from here has just returned. He left New
Madrid on Saturday evening at six o'clock. He reports that the forces there
are embarking to return to Memphis. Two- steamers had left for beloAv, loaded
with troops, and some others were loading with troops and munitions. All the
field artillery, some twenty or thirty pieces, were shipped. I think the infor
mation reliable. Scout came up through the country. Saw no indications of
troops after leaving New Madrid. Other of our scouts were in Charleston this
morning and report that there are no troops there or in that vicinity. The
reason assigned for this movement, according to his statement, is that the con
federate officers had information that General Fremont was preparing a move
on Tennessee by way of Columbus and the railroad to Union city.
W. H. L. WALLACE, Colonel Commanding.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
August 12, 1861.
Will you ask the Secretary of War to send me Captain A. Baird with Cap
tain Fry, as assistant adjutant generals. Work is heavy and aid of experienced
officers is necessary.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Hon. MONTGOMERY BLAIR,
Washington, D. C.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
August 12, 1861.
Will you order the Groesbeck regiment, 39th Ohio, now at Camp Denuison,
to be transferred to me ? The regiment is willing to come.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Hon. Mr. CAMERON,
Secretary of War, Washington City.,
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 13, 1861.
Despatch received. Our soldiers are not promptly paid, partly from the
small force of paymasters, more from want of money, which fatally embarrasses
every branch of the public service here. I require this week three millions for
quartermaster's department.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Hon. THOMAS A. SCOTT,
Assistant Secretory of War.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 13, 1861.
Let the governor of Ohio be ordered forthwith to send me what disposable
force he has. Also governors of Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin. Order the
utmost promptitude. The German Groesbeck, 39th Ohio, regiment, at Camp
Dennison, might be telegraphed directly here. We are badly in want of field
artillery, and up to this time very few of our small arms have arrived.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
The SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington City.
TESTIMONY. 109
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
August 13, 1861.
Will the President read my urgent despatch to the Secretary of War ?
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
The PRESIDENT of the United States.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
August 13, 1861.
See instantly my despatch to the Secretary of Waj. My judgment is that
some regiments with arms in their hands, and some field artillery ready for use,
with arms and ammunition, ought to be expressed to this point. The report of
the action comes from General Lyon's aid, Major Farrar. If true, you have no
•time to lose.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Hon. MONTGOMERY BLAIR, Washington City.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 13, 1861.
Will you order company of regular artillery at Cincinnati to report to me
forthwith, together with the battery at Bellair ?
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Hon. THOMAS A. SCOTT,
Assistant Secretary of War.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 13, 1861.
Severe engagement near Springfield on 10th. Our force 8,000 ; enemy 23,000
strong. Our loss 800 killed aufi wounded. General Lyon killed. Enemy's
loss 1,500, including McCulloch and Price killed. Sigel retreated to Springfield,
whence next morning continued retreat toward Rolla, bringing with him his
baggage-trains and $250,000 in gold from Springfield Bank. I am sending re-
enforcements to Rolla.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Brigadier General B. M. PRENTISS, Quincy, Illinois.
BIRD'S POINT, August 13, 1861.
Three more secessionists, two of them belonging to a Missouri company and
one to a Mississippi company, all mounted and armed, were captured this morn
ing at daylight, two *niles south of Charleston, by Sergeant Canon and two men
belonging to Captain Burns 's cavalry of my command. One of them says he
left New Madrid Sunday p. m. ; that six steamboats had arrived from below
with some 5,000 of the same troops that left on Saturday evening. The cavalry
had also returned. Rumors from other sources say that the confederate forces
all landed at New Madrid last night. Rumor that Jeff. Thompson's force is
advancing on Cape Girardeau.
W. H. L. WALLACE,
Colonel Commanding.
Major General FREMONT.
110 TESTIMONY.
JEFFERSON CITY, August 13, 1861.
Rumor here from across the country of fight at Springfield, with great loss on
both sides. If State forces are in possession of Springfield we ought to have
20,000 men here in two days. Answer.
THOS. L. PRICE.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQI ARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 13, 1861.
General Lyon, in three columns, under himself, Sigel and Sturgis, attacked
the enemy at half past 6 o'clock on the morning of the 10th, nine miles south
east of Springfield ; engagement severe. Our loss about 800 killed and wounded.
General Lyon killed in charge at head of his column. Our force 8,000, inclu
ding 2,000 home guards. Muster-roll reported taken from the enemy, 23,000,
including regiments from Louisiana, Tennessee, Mississippi, with Texas Rangers
and Cherokee half-breeds. This statement corroborated by prisoners. Their
loss reported heavy, including Generals McCulloch and Price. Their tents and
wagons destroyed in the action. Sigel left one gun on the field, and retreated
to Springfield; whence, at 3 o'clock on the morning of the llth, continued his
retreat upon Rolla, bringing off his baggage trains and $250,000 in specie from
Springfield Bank. I am doing what is possible to support him, but need aid of
some organized force to repel the enemy, reported advancing on other points in
considerable strength.
J. C. FREMONT, Maj. Gen. Commanding.
Colonel E. D. TOWNS END,
Assistant Adjutant General, Washington City.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 13, 1861.
Severe engagement near Springfield reported ; General Lyon killed ; Sigel
retreating in good order on Rolla. Send forthwith all disposable force you
have, arming as you best can for the moment. Use utmost despatch.
J. C. FREMONT, Maj. Gen. Commanding.
Gov. YATES, Springfield, 111.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 13, 1861.
Severe engagement near Springfield reported ; General Lyon killed ; Sigel
retreating in good order on Rolla. Send forthwith all disposable force you
have, arming them as you best can for the moment. Use utmost despatch.
J. C. FREMONT, Maj. &en. Commanding.
Gov. MORTON, Indianapolis.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 13, 1861.
A severe engagement near Springfield reported ; heavy loss on both sides ;
General Lyon killed ; Sigel retreating on Rolla. Get the Groesbeck regiment
ordered here forthwith ; get it from the governor.
J. C. FREMONT, Maj. Gen. Commanding.
Hon. J. A. GURLEY, Cincinnati, Ohio.
TESTIMONY. Ill
HEADQUARTERS WESTE'BN DEPARTMENT,
August 13, 1861.
Severe engagement reported near Springfield ; General Lyon killed ; Sigel
retreating in good order on Rolla. Send forthwith all disposable force you
have, arming as you best can for the moment. Order Warren's cavalry here at
once. Use utmost despatch.
J. C. FREMONT, Maj. Gen. Commanding.
Adjt. Gen. BAKER, Burlington, Iowa.
Also telegraph to the same effect to Governor Dennison, Columbus, Ohio.
Subsequent despatches show how unsatisfactory was the actual response (not
verbal) to these demands for aid.
The following despatch was sent to Mr. J. T. Howard, of New York, who, at
General Fremont's request, was endeavoring to procure certain arms from the
Union Defence Committee of that city :
ST. Louis, August 13, 1861.
Despatch received ; send the arms without further bargaining, and also send
your address. Ship per Adams & Co.'s fast freight, who collect here on deliv
ery. Good men are loosing their lives while the men whom they defend are
debating terms. Answer.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
J. T. HOWARD.
Disposition for the protection of St. Louis.
AUGUST 13, 1861.
In Lafayette Park a camp is to be established for a regiment.
The heavy guns to be put in position and a regiment encamped under the
reservoir.
On the height south of the arsenal, called Jacques's Garden, two guns with
a howitzer to be planted.
The 3d and 4th home guard regiments to be paid off and reorganized im
mediately. After the arrival of the combined regiment under Lieutenant Colo
nel Rombauer from Bird's Point, the 1st and 2d home guard regiments, and
also the 5th, under Colonel Stifel, to be paid a*hd reorganized.
Martial law to be proclaimed at once. The secret police increased and sys
tematically organized. A provost marshal shall be appointed with a staff. The
reserve home guard, under Filley and Hill, to be organized in accordance with
suggestions contained in the orders to the different colonels.
Captain Kowald's artillery company, 100 men strong, to be fitted out imme
diately, and the company from Belleville to be ordered in. Captains Voerster's
and Center's pioneer companies to be completed and set at work on the fortifi
cations. Laborers also to be employed.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding,
Disposition for iJie State.
AUGUST 13. 1863.
Rolla, the receiving point of the southwestern army, must be occupied with
a large force, in order that the retiring army of Springfield can find a place
of rest ; and from this place the offensive ca» be assumed in case that Spring-
112 TESTIMONY.
field is to be retaken. The commuication from Holla to Sigel's troops must be
kept open, scouting parties sent out as far as Salem, in Dent county, to ascer
tain if any attack is intended from the centre column of the enemy on Holla,
The protection of the bridge and road of the S. W. B. P. railroad to be kept
constantly in view.
Warsaw, on the Osage river. Under the present circumstances it is of great
importance to have the Osage river line protected, because this is the natural
defence line and secures us all the counties lying between the Missouri and
Osage rivers. If we give up or lose this line then all cities and towns of the
Missouri river, of which many are of great importance, will be endangered, and
the enemy can open the communication with the country nortk of that river.
W^arsaw is the most important crossing place on the Osage river, and should
be occupied by troops. Kansas City, Lexington, Boonville, and Jefferson
City are to be occupied by volunteer troops, who are to act in concert with the
home guards, in order that the secessionists may not gather in larger forces, and
to secure uninterrupted communication on the river.
The home guards between the Osage and Missouri rivers should be con
centrated at Cole Camp. A second camp should be formed in Georgetown as
reserve position of the troops in Warsaw, and the places along the river.
From these camps the Union men can be protected from the assaults of
secessionists.
Tuscumbia, on the Osage river. This is the second (to Warsaw) importan
position, a commanding place, and protecting Jefferson City. It is situated
on high ground and commands the river.
Linn creek, county seat of Linn county. There should be situated an ob
servation force at this place. It is not probable that the enemy will try to
effect a crossing, on account of the broken, hilly, steep country of the
neighborhood.
The fortifications of Ironton, and the placing of the guns therein, should
be pushed forward to completion as quickly as possible. One or two artillery
companies should be sent out to manage the cannons, and to have the light and
heavy batteries thoroughly organized. Centreville and Frederickstown should
be occupied by our forces, for the protection of the flanks of our troops at
Pilot Knob, and one moving column sent out on the road to Greenville to make
reconnoissances of the enemy's intentions, strength, &c.
Caledonia and Potosi. — The home guards of these places to send out frequent
patrols to Fourche-a-Courtois mines.
Cape Girardeau. — Scouting parties to be sent to Jackson and Dallas, to
watch the secessionists and their movements. There is no doubt that the enemy
intends to reach the Missouri river and take , possession of Lexington, Boon
ville, or Jefferson City — most probably the latter place. This can only be
avoided by strengthening our forces at Rolla, and all along the Osage line ;
therefore all our available force should be sent to those points.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 14, 1861.
General Grant, commanding at Ironton, attacked yesterday at 6 by a force
reported at 13,000. Railroad seized by the enemy at Big River Bridge, on this
side of Ironton. The governor of Ohio postponed my urgent request for aid
until ordered by you. Will you issue peremptory orders to him and other
governors to send me instantly any disposable troops and arms ? An artillery
company of regulars at Cincinnati, which has been there three months. I have
applied for it repeatedly. The enemy is in overpowering force, and we are very
weak in men and arms. We have neglected nothing, and will do all that is
possible, but not one moment should be lost in giving us any possible aid in
TESTIMONY. 113
fixed artillery, arid men with arms in their hands. A little immediate relief in
good material might prevent great sacrifices.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
The PRESIDENT of the United States.
ST. Louis, August 4, 1861.
Yours of the 4th received to-day. See despatch to President. I have made
a loan from the banks here. Send money. It is a moment for the government
to put forth its power.
J. 0. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Hon. MONTGOMERY BLAIR, Washington City.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
August 14, 1861.
Your letter of the 4th received this day. All your suggestions will be fully
attended to. But this department should be largely supplied with funds to pre
vent a recurrence of what you speak of.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Hon. S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
WASHINGTON, August 14, 1861.
Your message to President read. Positive orders were given yesterday to
Governor Dejmison, and to governors of Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, to send
all their organized forces, with full supply of artillery and small arms. Gov
ernor Dennison replies that Groesbeck's regiment will be promptly forwarded.
SIMON CAMERON.
General J. C. FREMONT.
WASHINGTON, August 14, 1861.
All the governors designated in your message were immediately advised to
forward regiments and arms. Governor Dennison was instructed to send the
Groesbeck regiment without a moment's delay.
THOS. A. SCOTT,
Assistant Secretary of War.
General J. C. FREMONT.
WASHINGTON, August 14, 1861.
Mr. Leslie tells me orders have been issued to Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and
Michigan to forward all available forces to you.
M. BLAIR, Postmaster General.
General J. C. FREMONT.
WASHINGTON, August 5, 1861.
Been answering your messages ever since day before yesterday. Do you re
ceive the answers 1 The War Department has notified all the governors you
designate to forward all available force. So telegraphed you. Have you re
ceived these messages 1 Answer immediately.
A. LINCOLN.
Major General FREMONT.
Part iii 8
114 TESTIMONY.
WAR DEPARTMENT, August 14, 1861.
SIR : Your letter of the 9th instant, to the Hon. Montgomery Blair, has been
submitted to me by him.
With a view to place the raw troops under your command in a state of effi
ciency for active service in the shortest possible time, you are authorized to carry
into effect your suggestion of accepting the services of instructed officers and
men who have seen service, to form the skeleton or framework for the organiza
tion of your forces.
Let the captains of companies thus begun procure transportation from the
railroad companies, and give their receipts to the road as vouchers.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
SIMON CAMERON,
Secretary of War.
Major General JOHN C. FREMONT,
Commanding Department of the West, St. Louis, Mo.
CINCINNATI, August 6, 1861.
War Department has despatched Adjutant McLean; that they cannot let Hoff
man have guns, and suggests that the company had better be retained here until
further orders. This will not do, if you can supply them with guns. They
want to come to St. Louis as soon as mustered. What shall I do 1 Answer
quickly.
R. M. CORWINE.
Major General FREMONT.
WASHINGTON, August 16, 1861.
Every available man and all the money in the public chest have been sent,
We will send more money immediately, our financial arrangements at New
York having been perfected. Let our fellows cheer up — all will be well.
M. BLAIR, Postmaster General.
Colonel BLAIR.
CINCINNATI, August 16, 1861.
E. D. Townsend despatches me the following in reply to your telegram to
the President : General Scott says the battery of company E, fourth artillery,
cannot be spared from the department of the Ohio.
R. M. CORWINE.
Major General FREMONT.
WASHINGTON, August 16, 1861.
General Scott says : Take steps to replace two companies of fourth artillery,
at Fort Randall, by a sufficient number of volunteer companies from Kansas
and Iowa, and bring the regulars to Cincinnati, to be subject to General Robert
Anderson's order. Arrange so that least tune possible shall be lost. Benham
is with Rosecrans. C. F. Smith is not brigadier general.
E. D. TOWNSEND.
Major General FREMONT.
ST. Louis, August 19, 1861.
It is necessary, in order to facilitate the organization here, that Major General
Fremont have power to commission officers, as Governor Gamble has neglected
to accede to a request to do it, much to the detriment of the public service.
TESTIMONY. 115
If the President telegraphs that he will appoint the officers General Fremont
commissions, it will remove a great stumbling-block from our path. "
FRANK P. BLAIR, JR.
Hon. MONTGOMERY BLAIR.
Washington, D. C.
In answer to this, Mr. Montgomery Blair telegraphed that if Governor Gam
ble would not commission officers the President would ; but some mistake ren
dering the despatch incomprehensible, the President repeated it himself, as-
follows :
[By telegraph from Washington, 21st, 1861.]
I repeat I will commission the officers of Missouri volunteers.
A. LINCOLN.
Colonel BLAIR.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
August 21, 1861.
DEAR MR. BLAIR : Quartermaster Turnley brought me this morning a
despatch to himself, from General Meigs, informing him that the Secretary of
Wai^ disapproved a purchase of horses ordered by me ; and, still further, going
to impute to me a disposition to extravagance in my expenditures here. If
there should be here any act of mine wrong enough to merit the censure of the
administration, and grave enough to justify them in making it, I think that it
should be made to me directly, and not through the medium of an inferior, to
one of his subordinates, who is under my command. Such a course is intol
erable, not because it is derogatory and humiliating, but also because it seri
ously impairs my efficiency, by lessening the respect in which my conduct is to
be held by the officers of my command, and also by the discouragement it in
flicts on myself. To give full efficiency to my acts no one here should be able
to suppose a possibility of my ordinary administrative acts, or, indeed, of any
other, being questioned. I have not written to General Meigs, judging it better
to ask the attention of the President to this want of official courtesy. I am not
only willing, but I am happy to devote my best energies to the service of the
country and the President. But I trust that he will at once put his foot upon
any attempt to impair my usefulness, or cause me mortification in the discharge
of my duties here. I trouble you often ; will you allow me to ask that you
acquaint the President with this occurrence, and oblige,
Yours, very truly,
J. C. FREMONT.
Hon. MONTGOMERY BLAIR, Washington City.
WASHINGTON, August 24, 1861.
DEAR GENERAL : Don't suppose that I don't attend to your matters, and do
all that I can to forward them because I do not write frequently. I am to be
interrupted, if I take up a pen, by people that have the run of my office or
house, and so I keep out of both, and go after your business in person, and
effect it if I can.
I write now, to-day, in reply to your letter about Meigs, that you must not
suppose that he intended by his telegram to Turnley to reflect upon you. Far
from it. I happened in his office when he opened Turnley 's requisition, and
remarked to me, substantially, what he telegraphed to Turnley. But he did
not know that Turnley had any instructions from you to get horses of any su
perior quality. No such suggestion accompanied the requisition, and I will
1 1 6 TESTIMONY.
guarantee that if Tumley makes any explanation, which puts the responsibility
on you, it \fill be satisfactory to Meigs.
I say this without having seen him at. all since the receipt of yours on the
subject ; but, I think, I understand him fully. I heard him say to General
Scott, some time ago, that if he would name a day when he must have horses
they should be ready. ' " If next week, they would cost $150 ; if the week
after, $125. The price was nothing. A horse might be worth the price many
times to the government if ready when wanted, and of course of no value if
not." This is the style of man he is, and you will have; and I believe have
not had any delay or difficulty from him. The trouble is elsewhere. Chase has
more horror of seeing treasury notes below par than of seeing soldiers killed,
and, therefore, has held back too much, I think. I don't believe at all in that
style of managing the treasury. It depends on the war, and it is better to get
ready and beat the enemy by selling stocks at fifty per cent, discount than wait
to negotiate and lose a battle. I have got you a splendid officer for your navy
department and guns. He will be en route, for yoii in a day or two, when he
will be posted up and call for what you want. You will have credit at the
N avy Department when you get him under you.
I showed the President Billings's letter, and read him yours about Adams.
He said that you were right in saying that Adams was devoted to his money
bags.
Schuyler had already gone to Europe about arms when I wrote and tele
graphed you, and your letter in reply was handed to Mr. Seward, to be for
warded to him. I suppose it would put him in relation with Billings, which
would bring about your wishes. If I had known when you were here what you
communicated to my father, I think from my knowledge of Meigs, with your in
dorsement, I could have turned the whole matter over to him. At the same
time you must not expect too much of me in the cabinet. I have, as you know,
very little influence, and even now, when the policy I have advocated from the
first is being inaugurated, it does not seem to bring me any greater power over
the administration. This, I can see, is partly my own fault. I have been too
obstreperous, perhaps, in my opposition, and men do not like those who have
exposed their mistakes beforehand, and taunt them with them afterwards. The
main difficulty is, however, with Lincoln himself. He is of the whig school, and
that brings him naturally not only to incline to the feeble policy of whigs, but
to give his confidence to such advisers. It costs me a great deal of labor to get
anything done, because of the inclination of mind on the part of the President
or leading members of the cabinet, including Chase, who never voted a demo
cratic ticket in his life. But you have the people at your back, and I am doing
all I can to cut red tape and get things done. I will be more civil and patient
than heretofore, and see if that won't work.
Yours, truly, M. BLAIR.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, August 25, 1861.
Jefferson C. Davis, a lieutenant in the United States army, was sent here by
the governor of Indiana in command of a regiment. He is informed by Adju
tant General Thomas that he cannot retain his command.
Will you ask if he, and a few army officers I have found, may be allowed to
retain command of their regiments ?
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Hon. MONTGOMERY BLAIR,
Postmaster General, Washington City, D. C.
TESTIMONY. 117
CINCINNATI, August 26, 1861.
In answer to a despatch directing the Gibson regiment to go to St. Louis by
the northern route, our governor sends the following: We can spare at present
only Colonel Paschner's regiment for General Fremont's command, in addition
to the force already sent. Gibson's will be sent to Western Virginia.
JOHN A. GURLEY.
Major General FREMONT.
LOUISVILLE, August 24, 1861.
It is earnestly requested by the Union men to permit Colonel Rousseau's
brigade to remain where they are twenty or thirty days.
G. D. PRENTICE.
J. H. HARNEY.
General J. C. FREMONT.
General Fremont refused this request through Major Corwine, and repre
sented to these gentlemen the imperative necessity for the movement of these
troops.
CINCINNATI, August 26, 1861.
Colonel Rousseau despatches me that he will leave between 3 and 4 o'clock
p. m.
R. M. CORWINE.
Major General FREMONT.
WASHINGTON, August 26, 1861.
Intelligent gentlemen at Louisville say the presence of Rousseau's regiment
is needed there. Pardon us for countermanding your order to him to join your
department.
A. LINCOLN.
General FREMONT.
CINCINNATI, August 28, 1861.
General Rosecrans ordered the Poschun regiment to Virginia. Reason, Ty
ler's defeat. Governor Dennison sends them to-day.
JNO. A. GURLEY.
Major General FREMONT.
WASHINGTON, August 27, 1861.
Greenleaf discharged when appointment in volunteers sent here. Jefferson
C. Davis can remain.
M. BLAIR.
To Colonel BLAIR.
General Fremont was furnished with only a copy of the following letter, and
was not shown the original :
QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, August 28, 1861.
DEAR COLONEL : Your brother, the Postmaster General, has handed me
your letter of the 21st August. I asked him to let me have it that I might, by
a few words, strengthen your hands and General Fremont's, and disabuse both
him and you of some errors which may give trouble.
118 TESTIMONY.
If there is any deficiency in the quartermaster's department of Missouri, the
blame does not rest here. All requisitions have been promptly met here, and
the officers have been instructed to spare no effort and no means of this depart
ment in aiding, to the extent of their power, General Lyon's movements. There
may be reasons of time, of quality, which induce a general to order a purchase
at a higher rate ; and while I communicated to the quartermaster as to the ruling
prices of horses, the market rates, I called upon the treasury to send all the
money he asked for.
Tell General Fremont that no man more than myself desires to sustain him,
no one is more ready to take the responsibility to assist him, and that he has, in
my opinion, already the power which you say ought to be conferred upon him
by. the President. Whatever a general commanding orders, the subordinates of
his staff are, by regulations, compelled to do if possible.
The general is charged with saving the country. The country will be very
careful to approve his measures, and will judge his mistakes, if any, very ten
derly if successful. Success crowns the work, and let him spare no respon
sibility, no effort to secure it.
All the requisitions for money in Missouri have been promptly passed through
this office. The delay, if any has occurred, is at the Treasury Department,
which has allowed the department to fall in debt in Cincinnati and Philadelphia,
each about a million of dollars for clothing and camp equipage.
There are wagons making in Cincinnati, which Captain Dickinson will send
to St. Louis, if wanted. Those made at Milwaukie I ordered to St. Louis
long ago.
A number of wagons are ordered to be made in St. Louis, and authority
given to Major McKinstry to provide all that might be required for moving the
armies of that department.
In regard to advertising and delivery, the law of 1861 and the regulations
expressly provide that in case of public exigencies, supplies are to be bought in
open market or between individuals. Exercise this power. Moreover, adver
tisements or public notice does not require postponing, opening of bids for a
month, or a week, or two days. If forage-wagons, horses, are wanted, the law,
the necessity, are fully met by putting a notice in the papers, and purchasing
as fast as offers come in. The next day, or the same day, take the then
lowest bidder, or the then most advantageous offer. The day after you
will have a still better 'offer ; take that for a portion of your supplies, and so on
till you have all you need. By this system I have brought down the price of
horses from $128 to $120, of wagons from $111 to $108 since I came here, and
have got abundant supplies.
These explanations will, I hope, remove many difficulties from the way of
our armies in Missouri. Count upon me as ready to aid in what I believe the
right, cheap, strategic, statesmanlike mode of conducting the war — that which I
am sure the people desire, and the want of which they censure — the most rapid
possible concentration of overwhelming forces by the United States.
Yours, very truly,
M. C. MEIGS.
Hon. F. P. BLAIR, St. Louis, Missouri.
WASHINGTON August 30, 1861.
The President hesitates about Smith, but if you say so, he will appoint him
a brigadier general.
M. BLAIR.
General FREMONT.
TESTIMONY. 119
[Rough draft of a letter to Montgomery Blair.)
AUGUST 9, 1861.
[The letter as sent does not differ from this in any material point. No copy
of it is in General Fremont's possession.]
The greater part of the old troops, especially the foreign element, is going
out of service. The new levies are literally the rawest ever got together. They
are reported by the officers to be literally, entirely, unacquainted with the rudi
ments of military exercises. To bring them face before the enemy, in their
present condition, would be a mere unmanageable mob. 1 can remedy this if I
can be authorized by the President and Secretary of War to collect throughout
the States instructed men who have seen service. With them I could make a
skeleton — meagre — but still a framework on which to form the army. This
authority ought to be allowed and the cost of transportation. Don't lose time,
but get it quick. I assure you it will require all we can do, and do it in the
best manner, to meet the enemy. I ought to be supplied here with four or five
millions of dollars in treasury notes, and the disbursing officers allowed to sell
them at the ruling discount.
All such equipments as I can procure abroad in much less time than I could
get them here I ought to be allowed to send for.
These are my suggestions. They are valuable. Pray act upon them, and
what you do, do quickly. It would subserve the public interest if an officer
were directed to report to me, to have command of the operations -on the Missis
sippi. Show this to the President. The contest in the Mississippi valley will
be a severe one. We had best meet it in the face at once, and by so doing we
can rout them. Who now serves the country quickly serves it twice.
JOHN C. FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 17, 1861.
CAPTAIN : The general directs me to say to you that Major Farrar, late of
General Lyon's staff, states publicly in the city that he came to these head
quarters and applied for re-enforcements for General Lyon ; that the re-enforce
ments were refused, and that from the manner of refusal the intention was to
leave General Lyon to his fate. What are the facts iu the case 1
Respectfully, -
J. H. EATON,
Major U. S. Army and M. S.
Captain J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.
To which Captain Kelton replied as follows :
SEPTEMBER 21, 1861.
MAJOR : You* note was not read till this moment. I have no recollection of
Major Farrar bringing application for re-enforcements to General Lyon. That
every effort was made to send General Lyon additional troops, after the arrival
of General Fremont, I do know. It was found impossible to do so and keep
open the railroad communication extending toward Springfield, and at the same
time to meet the threatened advance up the Mississippi. I do not know any
thing of the manner in which the refusal to send re-enforcements was made. I
.can only recall, now, Major Farrar in connexion with his application to rne for
a pass over the Pacific railroad for his horses, which I declined, after the quar
termaster had informed me it could not be authorized. If I had any conversa-
120 TESTIMONY.
tion with Major Farrar on the subject to which your note alludes, it has escaped
me entirely.
Very respectfully,
JNO. 0. KELTON,
Late A. A. G., Colonel 9th Reg. M. V.
The following is an extract from a statement voluntarily drawn up and offered
to General Fremont by Colonel Chester Harding, assistant adjutant general
to General Lyon :
PACIFIC, October 5, 1861.
* * Looking, ffaen, to the position of affairs in this State on
the 26th July, 1861, it will be found that General Lyon was in the southwest
in need of re-enforcements. There was trouble in the northwest, requiring more
troops than were there. In the northeast there were no more troops than were
required to perform the ta.sk allotted to them, while in the south and southeast
there was a rebel army of sufficient force to endanger Bird's Point, Cape Girar-
deau, Ironton, Holla, and St. Louis, and no adequate preparation was made to
meet it.
General Fremont sent the 8th Missouri to Cape Girardeau, and the 4th United
States reserve corps (whose term of service was to expire on the 8th of August,)
to re-enforce Bland at Ironton. He took some of General Pope's force from
him, added to it two battalions of the 1st and 2d United States reserve corps,
(whose term of service was to expire on the 7th of August,) equipped Buel's
light battery, and started about the 1st of August for Bird's Point with the
troops thus collected, being something less than 3,800 men, and being also all
the available troops in this region, expecting to find an enemy not lees than
20,000 strong.
Subsequent events showed that the rebel force was not overestimated, and
nothing but the re-enforcements sent to the points above named, and the expe
ditions down the river, prevented its advance upon them. Common report
greatly magnified these re-enforcements ; and it was gemerally believed in the
city, and no doubt so reported to the rebel leaders, that Fremont had moved
some 10,000 or 12.000 troops to the southeast, while in fact he did not have
over 5,500 to move, and was not strong enough at any point to take the field
and commence offensive operations.
General Fremont was not inattentive to the situation of General Lyon's
column, and went so far as to remove the garrison of Boonville, in order to send
him aid. During the first days of August troops arrived in the city in large
numbers. Nearly all of them were unarmed ; all were without transportation.
Regiment after regiment laid for days in the city without any equipments, for
the reason that the arsenal was exhausted, and arms and accoutrements had to
be brought from the east. From these men General Lyon would have had re-
enforcements, although they were wholly unpracticed in the use of the musket,
and knew nothing of movements in the field ; but in the meantime the battle of
the 10th of Augusj; was fought.
CHESTER HARDING, JR.,
Late Ass't Adft General upon the Staff of Brig. Gen Lyon.
[This series of papers embraces the time between September 1 and September
23, having especial reference to the affair at Lexington, and the contemporaneous
complications in the department of the west.] .
[Personal.]
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, September 4, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR : Your note of the 19th was handed me by Judge Evans, who
was here with me at the same time with Judge Watts, of New Mexico. Agree-
TESTIMONY. 121
ably to your desire I conferred fully with them, and made such arrangements
for co-operation and communication as is just now possible. They are undoubt
edly both able to render efficient service, and both seem to understand well the
necessities of their respective States. Judge Watts I retained here for one day,
which did not, however, in any way retard his arrival in New Mexico.
Judge Evans is so well known that it would be scarcely possible for him to
reach Texas through the Missouri country. I endeavored to find a way for
him through New Mexico, but his journey that way would be very laborious
and almost equally unsafe. I therefore advised him to go by way of Tampico,
whence he would have a good road of only 500 miles, and would have an oppor
tunity to ascertain what supplies and war munitions are being carried by that
route to the confederates.
In this Judge Evans agreed with me, and accordingly left yesterday for
Washington. All accounts from the south show great activity, and their re
cent movements indicate that the confederates are now giving great attention
to the Mississippi valley. Their recent operations show that better officers
have recently been sent to the Memphis district.
I would be glad to benefit sometimes by your leisure moments, if you can
find any sometimes for a few lines, and am, meantime,
Yours, truly,
J. C. FREMONT.
Hon. Mr. SEWARD, Washington, D. C.
[Translation.]
ST. Louis, September 5, 1861.
The Kentucky side opposite Cairo should be fortified, and at once. Step's
should be taken forthwith. From Cape Girardeau, Cairo and Bird's Point six
infantry regiments, cavalry, and a section of artillery will be sent at once. The
requisitions of Captam Brintz for ammunition will be attended to immediately.
Paducah is to be occupied, if possible. If not on the opposite shore, facing
the mouth of the Tennessee, to be very closely watched.
In a fortnight four regiments will be sent there. I advise you to watch,
with the greatest care, Belmont, Charleston, Sykeston, and New Madrid.
[To Washington, for the President, through a Hungarian gentleman.]
ST. Louis, September 5.
You will communicate to the President that the enemy's gunboats are covered
with sheet iron, and equipped with cannon in the best way, and a great deal
lighter draught and swifter than ours. Their officers are all from our navy, and
ours are inexperienced, including the artillery. The consequence will be, that
when they meet, ours will be captured. In Cairo we need immediately heavy
artillery. I send Rodgers to the President, that he shall see to having the ar
tillery hurried up.
The enemy begins to occupy, on the Kentucky side, every good place between
Paducah and Hickman. I think the time has come to extend my command.
J. C. FRfiMONT,
Major General Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS JEFFERSON CITY, MISSOURI,
September 5, 1861.
GENERAL : The steamers which transported Colonel Worthington's command
up the river returned yesterday, bringing considerable property, which they had
taken, and some prisoners. Harris is in that section, beyond doubt, and I hope
Worthington may find him.
122 TESTIMONY.
I have despatches from Colonel Marshall, at Lexington. This place is for
the present perfectly safe.
Colonel Mulligan's command is progressing well, and nothing is to be appre
hended from him— other than success.
News from the country south and west of this confirm my reports of yes
terday.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JEFF. 0. DAVIS,
Colonel 22d Indiana, Commanding.
Major General J. C. FREMONT, St. Louis, Mo.
HEADQUARTERS JEFFERSON CITY, MISSOURI,
September 6, 1861.
GENERAL : The news since yesterday is still more convincing that Price,
Parsons, and Rains are directing their movements up the Osage, with the view
•eventually, 1 think, of taking position somewhere on the river above here —
probably just below Lexington.
Their movements certainly threaten Fort Scott, and they may attack it ; but
their intention is, in my judgment, to take a strong position on the river and cut
us off from the forces above. This is necessary for them to do, in* order to get
the forces and supplies now raised in Northeast Missouri across the river.
In my communications to General Pope, Some days ago, I ventured to sug
gest the propriety of sending a reliable force to occupy Warsaw, or some point
in that vicinity. A well-managed force at this point would in a great measure
prevent recruits and supplies being raised there for McCulloch's forces.
It would render Price's movements very insecure, as he would be nearly if
not quite cut off from McCulloch, and might, if he moves further north, be easily
captured by a concentrated movement of troops upon him from this place, Fort
Scott, Warsaw, and Lexington.
The plan submitted to you by Major Kraut for the defence of this place
meets with my approval. A few well selected sites for field-works, flanked and
supported by a series of block-houses, abatis, &c., seem to be the best I could
recommend. The material for building here is abundant, and sites which would
secure them from the range of the enemy's artillery can generally be found.
-Should you think proper to order these works to be commenced it would do
much to allay the fears of the citizens of this place. There seems to be no
grounds of fear from immediate danger ; but they think so.
The home guards give me much trouble on account of not being clothed ancJ
equipped. When called upon for duty they make this a complaint.
Reports (not very reliable) last night state that Colonel Worthington had
taken possession of Columbia. The rebels evacuated it at his approach, but
had made a stand, some four miles from there, in such force that he was doubt
ful about attacking them. I have a regiment and boats in readiness to succor
Mm at once should it be necessary.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JEFF. C. DAVIS,
Colonel 22d Indiana Volunteers.
Major General J. C. FREMONT,
St. Louis, Missouri.
HEADQUARTERS, MEXICO, Mo., September 9, 1861.
SIR : I have the honor to inform you of my arrival at this place to-day at
10 o'clock a. m.. with my entire command, except the cavalry and baggage
wagons, none of which have arrived, nor will it before to-morrow.
The supply of engines and cars was not sufficient to reach this point earlier
TESTIMONY. 123
or to bring it all. The consequence is that we may not be able to move as soon
as might be hoped. From all I can learn Green's band is some place in the
vicinity of Florida. Nothing has reached me yet from General Pope. Con
sidering the raw character of the troops under my command, I would respect
fully suggest that if a few companies of regular infantry could be spared from
Rolla they would add greatly to our hopes of success in case we should fall in
with the whole rebel force. The rebels, furthermore, are all, or nearly so,
mounted ; and should they feel disposed to scatter (which they are sure to do
if we are too strong for them) it will be impossible to overtake them with in
fantry, and therefore more cavalry (particularly regular) is very desirable.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your, obedient servant,
S. D. STURGIS,
Brigadier General Com?nanding.
Captain J. C. KELTON,
Assistant Adjutant General, Western Department.
NEW ALBANY, September 9, 1861.
Pillow is marching upon Paducah, Ky., with about 7,000 men and artillery.
Look out for him. I have this from a Tennessee officer in Louisville. The
Tennesseans are going to make a forward movement to-night, or to-morrow, to
Kentucky, per Louisville and Nashville railroad. This news is reliable. * *
A secret agent of the government.
Major General FERMONT.
ST. Louis, September 6, 1861.
SIR : According to the report received at these headquarters, Colonel Wil
liams, with his command of 800 men, has been forced to retreat from Shelbina
to Macon City, (Hudson,) by a band of rebels, under Green, numbering about
3,000, where he is now cut off from all lines of communication east of his po
sition.
In order to arrest the constant depredations of the rebels in Marion, Monroe,
Shelby, Macon and adjoining counties, and to visit on them the whole rigor of
martial law, I have resolved upon a combined attack on Green's men, and their
total annihilation.
To effect this object you will be re-enforced by the first Kansas regiment and
the twenty-third Indiana regiment.
Brigadier General Sturgis will advance on Macon City (Hudson) with the
seventh Ohio regiment ; Colonel Groesbeck's thirty-ninth Ohio regiment ; one
squadron Fremont Hussars, under Captain Von Blume, and Captain Schwartz's
full battery, under command of the first lieutenant.
You will leave a comparative reserve at Palmyra, and then advance west to
wards Salt river, and you will, under any circumstances, endeavor to put your
self in communication with the command of Brigadier General Sturgis, who will
operate towards the east against Shelbina.
It will be your object not only to disperse the enemy, but to follow him into
his hiding places and annihilate him.
After having put yourself in communication with Brigadier General Sturgis,
by means of a reliable messenger, and after General Sturgis has advanced east
towards Shelbina, you will force the passage of Salt river, (should the bridge
be destroyed, you will find a suitable bridge towards the north or south,) and thus
make a combined attack on the rebels.
After the junction of the forces has been accomplished, Brigadier General
Sturgis will be under your command.
As communication between you and General Sturgis will be subject to the
124 TESTIMONY.
constant hazard of interruption, you will report by telegraph as often as neces
sary, to these headquarters, whence despatches may be sent to him.
I enclose a copy of the order addressed to Brigadier General Sturgis.
J. C. FREMONT, Major General Commanding.
Brigadier General POPE.
ST. Louis, September 6, 1861.
STR : In order to put a stop to the robberies and violences committed by the
rebel hordes under Green, who are now assembled at Shelbina to the number of
about 3,000, and who have cut off Colonel Williams from his eastern commu
nication lines, I have resolved upon a combined attack on the rebels and their
annihilation.
General Pope will endeavor, with his disposable force, re-enforced by the 1st
Kansas and the 23d Indiana regiment, to force a passage across Salt river, or
to gain a crossing by some other means. Further details concerning the general
plan and the junction of the forces General Pope will endeavor to transmit to
you by a reliable messenger.
To carry out this combined attack you will assume command of the following
forces :
The 27th Ohio regiment, Colonel Foster.
The 39th Ohio regiment, Colonel Groesbeck.
One squadron of Fremont hussars, Captain M. Blume.
Captain Schwartz's full battery, under command of the first lieutenant.
Your main endeavor will be to cut off the enemy from the road leading to
Shelbyville, and generally to render impossible the dispersion of his forces by
squads, and to annihilate the gang of rebels as a whole.
As the communication between you and General Pope will be subject to the
constant hazard of interruption, you will report as often as necessary by tele
graph to headquarters, whence despatches can be sent to him.
I enclose a copy of the order addressed to Brigadier General Pope.
J. C. FREMONT, Major General Commanding.
Brigadier General STIJRGTS, Commanding at Arsenal.
HEADQUARTERS, ST. CHARLES,
September 7, 1861— 11% p. m.
SIR : Your letter is just received. We have been delayed here, which my
previous letter will explain. Green is evidently fallen down to Mexico with the
view to destroy the bridge at that point. The 2d regiment will start at day
light. In view of the present condition I will order them to take position in
the advance at the bridge, and hold it until we can get the cars and artillery.
They have not reached this point. • *
Respectfully, S. D. STURGIS,
Brigadier General Missouri Volunteers.
Major I. C. WOODS, Department Headquarters.
HEADQUARTERS, September 8, 1861.
GENERAL: I have just received despatches from Boonville. Affairs there
are progressing very satisfactorily.
I have also despatches from the command (Colonel Golden) I sent in the
direction of Linn creek. I have some hope that the party who confiscated
Colonel McClurg's property are nearly overtaken, as they are being closely
pursued.
I have sent five companies of Illinois volunteers to make a scout on the east
side of the river, opposite Portland, and there to take post on the bridge until
relieved.
Your obedient servant, JEFF. C. DAVIS,
Major General FREMONT.
TESTIMONY. 125
KANSAS CITY, September 9, 1861.
In accordance with Colonel Peabody's order, I forward to you the following
information, which was received 7 o'clock p. m. yesterday evening: Colonel
Peabody marched from Lexington towards Warrensburg on Sunday, intending to
camp at said point last night, where the Irish brigade awaits them. When the
junction is formed the strength of combined forces will be 4,000. Colonel Pea-
body, acting under the impression that General Lane is retreating on this point
before Price, says that he will "form a junction with General Lane twenty -five
or thirty miles south of this point ; also that I must move from here to keep the
communication open between him, General Lane, and Colonel Marshal, in com
mand at Lexington. Should the forces leave here at this time, we give the town
up to pillage. West of Warrensburg, thirty miles, the enemy is gathering
around in parties from 200 to 300. Rains's advance is at Barinsville. I for
warded a copy of Colonel Peabody's command to General Lane. Have been
on the road twelve hours.
M. T. BERRY,
Major Commanding.
Captain W. E. PRINCE.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
September 9, 1861.
Has General Smith gone to Paducah 1 I am credibly informed from Louisville
that Pillow, with 7,000 men and artillery, is marching on Paducah ; also that
the Tennesseeans are going to make a forward movement to-night or to-morrow
to Kentucky. Has the re-enforcement from St. Louis reached Cairo 1 Inform
General Smith, at Paducah, that I direct him to place a battery at the marine
hospital immediately, and the other on the heights near Cross creek, and prepare
for forward movements towards May field, as soon as re-enforcements arrive.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Brigadier General U. S. GRANT.
ST. Louis, September 9, 1861.
COLONEL : I am instructed by Colonel Jefferson C. Davis, commanding at
Jefferson City, to ask two additional regiments of infantry, (Indiana,) two bat
teries 8th artillery, (Indiana,) and some heavy guns for the field-work now under
construction at that place. Colonel Davis instructed me to say that this force
will be necessary to the execution ofv his plans touching Warsaw and other
places in that direction. He would like to have the Indiana cavalry, if ready
for setvice. •
Respectfully,
GORDON TAVENER,
Major 22d Indiana Volunteers.
Colonel J. H. EATON,
Military Secretary, St. Liouis.
HEADQUARTERS KANSAS BRIGADE,
Fort Lane, Barinsville, September W, 1861.
SIR : I am thus far on my inarch eastward. I propose to march east as far
as Papinsville, if possible, clearing out the valley of the Osage. I will from
there turn north, clearing out the valleys of the Marie-de-Cygnes, Butler, Har-
risonville, Osceola and Clinton, and proceed in that direction until I hear from
the column under Peabody. If attacked by an overwhelming superior force I
will, of course, fall back on Kansas.
126 TESTIMONY.
I am moving with a column of about 1,200 infantry, 800 cavalry, and two
pieces of artillery. I will leave at Fort Scott about 200 cavalry, at Fort Lin
coln 300 infantry and cavalry, at Barinsville, Fort Lane, 200 infantry and
cavalry, which I think sufficient to protect these points.
I will camp in the neighborhood of Ball's Mill to-night, and in the neighbor
hood of Papinsville to-morrow.
J. H. LANE,
Commanding Kansas Brigade.
Captain W. E. PRINCE,
Commanding Post, Fort Leavenworth.
HEADQUARTERS IRISH 'BRIGADE,
Lexington, September 10, 1861.
COLONEL : I enclose you a copy of a letter this morning received by Colonel
Marshall. If true, and Colonel M., who is acquainted with the writer, feels confi
dence in this statement, stores, both ordnance and provision, cannot be too rapidly
pushed to this point. If Colonel M.'s command and also Colonel Peabody's,
now in Warrensburg, reunite with us, as I have no doubt they will, our force
would reach 2,700 men. We have about 35 rounds to a man. This morning I
commence marching. We will hold out to the last.
Truly yours,
JAMES A. MULLIGAN.
Colonel JEFF. C. DAVIS,
Commanding Jefferson City.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 10, 1861.
My mail for you to-day, I have just learned, was left. It was not very im
portant. A detachment I sent up the river two days ago has returned without
firing a shot. Thought they heard the enemy move ahead of them. I have
ordered them back peremptorily.
JEFF. C. DAVIS, Colonel Commanding.
Major General J. C. FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
September 10, 1861.
Despatch received. Your promptitude is approved.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding,
Colonel JEFF. C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
*
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
September 10, 1861.
Despatch received. Push forward actively on the Missouri side. Move the
gunboats cautiously in concert with the troops on shore, and confine yourself to
holding the positions we have taken in Kentucky. Gratified to know that
Fort Holt is progressing well. Inform General Smith that the llth Indiana
regiment, with three companies of regular cavalry and one of volunteer cavalry,
left for Paducah this morning at four.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Brigadier General GRANT, Cairo.
TESTIMONY. 12 7
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
September 10, 1861.
Report from General Grant, at Cairo, says that " gunboats engaged batteries
at Lucas Bend all day. Found sixteen guns on Missouri shore. Rebel batte
ries all silenced. Qne man on the Conestoga wounded. The gunboat Yankee
was disabled, and would have been taken but for land batteries near Columbus.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Adjutant General THOMAS,
War Department, Washington City.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 10, 1861..
*» Will your health permit you to come here within a few days ? There is ser
vice required which I would like you to undertake.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding..
Major General HUNTER, Chicago, Illinois.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 11, 1861.
Report of General Pope to-day from Hunnewell. Made night marches on
Green, Sunday night, who, however, got notice of his approach, but was suc
cessful in causing the dispersion of Green's 3,000 rebel force, leaving behind
them much baggage, provisions, and forage, and the public property captured by
Green at Shelbina. Pope's infantry too much fatigued to pursue; the horsemen
followed in pursuit ten or fifteen miles until the enemy scattered ; he starts west
with 16th Illinois ; was to continue pursuit immediately, but as Green's force is
mounted, infantry cannot do much in overtaking them. Railroad east of Brook-
field is open, and no more secession camps will be made within twenty miles.
General Grant telegraphs from Cairo that the first gun is in position at Fort
Holt, Kentucky.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, Ass't Adjutant General,
Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Sf. Louis, September 11, 1861,
Is h-impossible for you to get me some sabres and dragoon revolvers ?
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Command-ing.
Hon. MONTGOMERY BLAIR, Washington, D. C.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 11, 1861.
Can you spare for a time T. J. Rodman, captain ordnance department, for
duty here ? I think it would be very much to the advantage of the service here
iT it could be done.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Hon. SIMON CAMERON,
Secretary of War, Washington.
[This request was not granted.]
128 TESTIMONY.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 11, 1861.
It is rnmored that General Price has arrived with 5,000 men at Clinton.
Whether true or not I shall find out at once.
JEFF. C. DAVIS, Colonel Commanding.
Major General J. C. FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 12, 1861.
Despatch received and will have attention.
J. 0. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel J. C. DAVIS. Jefferson City.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 12, 1861.
The 'folio wing information, received here from General Pope, at Hudson, to
day : Illinois 16th and Kansas 2d, 1,100 strong, with two pieces of artillery, go
this morning to St. Joseph. Green and Bevere are aiming to cross the Missouri
at Glasgow, in three columns, from Hudson, Brookfield, and Sturgeon. I shall
march upon Glasgow when Platte River bridge is repaired ; small squads from
Green's command at Florida.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel JEFF. C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 12, 1861.
Received despatch last night from Lexington, by the hands of Lieutenant
Pease, dated 9th. Colonel Mulligan had arrived all safe, and Colonel Marshall
was scouring the country. Despatches from Warrensburg leave no doubt but
that Price is there in strong force, and is moving on towards Lexington ; some
of his cavalry took possession of Georgetown Tuesday, causing great conster
nation among the people. Boonville is menaced by a small force, but if the
troops I sent yesterday do their duty they have landed there by this time.
JEFF. C. DAVIS, Colonel Commanding.
Major General J. C. FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 12, 1861.
What is your effective force, and how located 1
J. C. FREMONT,
M.ajor General Commanding.
Colonel JEFF. C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 12, 1861.
Two Indiana regiments, 1,986; 25th Illinois, 860; 5th Iowa, 850; Davidson's
battery, 4 pieces, 4 horses each and 99 men; Home Guards, 1,362, not efficient;
want of organization and equipments. Some ammunition wanted for all. Will
present requisition.
JEFF. C. DAVIS.
Major General J. C. FREMONT.
TESTIMONY. 129
JEFFERSON CITY, September 12, 1861.
I have just received the following, latest from Colonel Mulligan at Lexington :
" Ten or fifteen thousand men, under Price, Jackson & Co., are reported near
Warrensburg, moving on to this post. We will hold out. Strengthen us ; we
will require it." The expressmen had his horse taken from him, but saved his
despatches.
JEFF. C. DAVIS, Colonel Commanding.
Major General J. C. FREMONT.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 12, 1861.
GENERAL : I have been in hourly receipt of despatches from above. Much
confusion exists in the different accounts, but that Price is at Warrensburg with
considerable force, and moving in the direction of Lexington is now beyond
doubt. Many persons are coming in hourly from that vicinity, confirming the
fact.
His force is variously estimated at from 5,000 to 15,000. His cavalry took
possession of Georgetown on Tuesday. The commander at Boonville sent me
two despatches last night, asking for re-enforcements, as that place was also
threatened by 600 men. I had, however, anticipated this, and sent a detach
ment up the river yesterday, sufficient to drive them off if they do their duty.
Lieutenant Pease, a very intelligent officer, arrived last night with despatches
from Colonel Mullegan, at Lexington, and reports all quiet there. They had not
heard of Price's advance, but the colonel informed me that he had secured the mo
ney in the bank at that place, and was taking steps to secure that of other banks,
in obedience to my orders. I also ordered him, immediately after his arrival, to
commence fortifying Lexington, which he informs me he is doing. No troops
from Kansas, except about 300, had arrived. Nothing was known there of
General Pope's movements. Affairs south of this, and in Calloway county, are
being vigorously straightened out by some detachments I sent out some days
ago.
The mail closes.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JEFF. C. DAVIS,
Colonel Commanding.
Major General J. C. FREMONT,
St. Louis, Missouri.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 12, 1861.
I will send you more troops ; keep me informed minutely.
J. C. FREMOFT,
Major General Commanding.
Brigadier General U. S. GRANT, Cairo.
HEADQUARTERS, Washington, D. C., Sept. 12, 1861.
Your telegram to Secretary of War received. The Utah troops cannot be
deviated from their destination. Given in Specials 143; of August 28.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
Major General J. C. FREMONT.
Part Hi 9
130 TESTIMONY.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 12, 1861.
Cannot re-enforcements be sent by the Hannibal and St. Joseph road, to march
from Utica 1 I shall to-night put 300 men to work on Lamine bridge.
JEFF. C. DAVIS.
Major General FREMONT.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 12, 1861.
When General Pope arrives at Glasgow how will he cross the river, the boats
having been withdrawn recently ? Shall I send one 1 Do you not mean Lex
ington, instead of Glasgow, that you intend to march upon ] Telegraph con
fused.
JEFF. C. DAVIS,
Colonel Commanding.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 13, 1861,
In my despatch to you I was quoting General Pope's words ; refer to it.
Pope did not say when Battle Bridge would be finished. I send you to-day
two regiments to remain at Jefferson City. In the mean time, send forward im
mediately two regiments to the relief of Lexington, provided nothing has oc
curred since your last despatch to render it inexpedient. Perhaps they may aid
General Pope at Glasgow. Nothing heard from General Sturgis for several
days. Move promptly. Inform me minutely.
J.C.FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel JEFF. C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 13, 1861.
The general commanding desires to say that two Indiana regiments leave for
Jefferson City to-night or to-morrow early ; a third regiment leaves to-morrow,
and probably two batteries of artillery. Brigadier General Sturgis will be or
dered from Mexico to move on. Have you forwarded the two regiments to
Lexington 1 What other news 1
I. C. WOODS,
Major and Aide-de-Camp,
Colonel JEFF. C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 13, 1861.
SIR : Information having been received at these headquarters of an intended
attack on Boonville, you are hereby ordered to move at once by the shortest
possible route, and with all practicable speed, direct to that place with your
force of infantry and artillery.
'J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Brigadier General STURGIS, Mexico.
TESTIMONY. 131
General Pope having gone on to Macon City after the sending of the above,
rendered a change of orders necessary for the 14th.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 13, 1S61.
Received a courier from Lexington to-day; Union troops burning the bridges
ahead of Price ; his force still estimated 10,000 to 15,000 ; shall send a regiment
on the War Eagle, with some cannon, to Arrow Rock and Glasgow ; hope to
prevent Green's crossing.
JEFF. C. DAVIS, Colonel Commanding.
Major General FREMONT.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 13, 1861.
Express from Colonel Eads, commanding at Syracuse, says that about 3,000
from Price's column are advancing to Boonville, and later information indicates that
as the most threatened point. Large re-enforcements for future operations from
this point can no longer be delayed. A force of sufficient strength to give the
enemy a successful battle in his rear would settle all trouble about here.
JEFF. C. DAVIS.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 13, 1861.
Despatch received. Have you sent off the two regiments as directed ?
J. F. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel JEFF. C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 13, 1S61.
Despatch from Boonville since 6 o'clock this morning; the home guards
were still defending their intrenchments ; enemy 600 or 800 strong. I shall re-
enforce Boonville to-morrow, but think it probable that that point is Price's
aim ; all day goes to confirm it.
JEFF. C. DAVIS.
Major General FREMONT.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 13, 1861.
SIR : I left Boonville this morning at half-past 6 o'clock ; at that time the
federal troops, numbering 150, were attacked by about 800 or 1,000 secession
ists. The firing continued until I was out of hearing of the place. What the
result, I know not, but I fear our troops have been taken.
Respectfully yours,
J. 0. REAVERPLA, Captain.
Major General FREMONT.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 13, 1861.
Green has crossed at Arrow Rock, and is marching on to Boonville. The
Iowa fifth leaves early to-morrow morning, on the War Eagle* to that place
The Indiana regiments I shall send to Syracuse, and make a forced march to
morrow night, so as to get in Green's rear, with a view to capture him. Send
me the troops and I will take care of this place and Boonville. Let General
Sturgis operate higher up the river and support Lexington. Let Sturgis send
a courier to me when he leaves the Hannibal and St. Joseph road, informing me
where he will strike the river.
JEFF. C. DAVIS, Colonel Commanding.
Major General FREMONT.
132 TESTIMONY.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 14, 1861.
COLONEL : You are hereby ordered to leave immediately with your regiment,
per railroad, to Jefferson City, and report yourself to Colonel Jeff. C. Davis
commanding.
By order of Major General Fremont.
ASBOTH.
Colonel FRIED. SCHAEFFER.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 14, 1861.
SIR : As a column of the enemy's forces is moving upon Lexington, you are
hereby directed immediately to order two of the regiments under your command
to the re-enforcement of that place. Orders have already been issued to two
regiments in this city to proceed to Jefferson City, and re-enforce your command.
Brigadier General Sturgis, now at Mexico, will also repair to Jefferson City
with his entire force of infantry and a battery of artillery. On his arrival he
will assume command of all the troops at that place.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel JEFF. C. DAVIS,
Colonel Commanding at Jefferson City.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 14, 1861.
SIR : You are hereby directed to move, via Utica, with all practicable speed
to Lexington, on the Missouri river, with your force of infantry and artillery.
You will send back the three companies of the Fremont Hussars, under Captain
Blume, to St. Louis.
The most practicable route from Utica to Lexington for you will be by Aus-
'tinville, Finney's Grove, and Morton.
J. C. FREMONT, Maj. Gen. Commanding.
Brig. Gen. STURGIS, Mexico.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 14, 1861.
Rumor states that the troops at Boonville have surrendered ; the War Eagle
is off for there; I shall have 1,200 men ready to march from Syracuse to-night.
The heavy rains of the last thirty-six hours have caused some delay ; push
forward re- enforcements.
JEFF. C. DAVIS, Colonel Commanding.
Major -General FREMONT,.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
September 14, 1861.
Despatch received. Colonel Veetch, 25th Indiana, and Colonel Schaeffer,
2d Missouri, are now at depot, to leave to-night for Jefferson City. Battery
goes to-morrow.
I. C. WOODS, Major and Aide-de-Camp.
JEFFERSON C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 14, 1861.
Major Eppstein has held his position at Boonville. The rebels had given
up the fight and waiting for Green. All right to-night if my troops get in his
TESTIMONY. 133
rear. The detachment I ordered back a few days ago to retrieve their conduct,
gave battle to Green's forces while crossing the river at Glasgow. They ex
changed fire half an hour, when a battery opened upon them and they retreated
here to-day. Green had captured the steamer Clara Bell. Probable rebel loss
at Boonville, 12 killed and 40 wounded. Eppstein's, one killed and four
wounded ; the rebels lost some at Glasgow, we hear.
JEFF. C. DAVIS, Colonel Commanding.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
September 14, 1861.
Send forward at once to junction of North Missouri road the necessary trans
portation to move Brigadier General Sturgis, with his command of 1,700 in
fantry arid a section of horse artillery, to Utica on your road. Answer by
telegraph.
J. C. FREMONT, Major General Commanding.
T. R. HARDWOOD,
Superintendent Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad, Hannibal.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
September 14, 1861.
COLONEL VEETCH : 25th Indiana regiment, under marching orders, report?
no transportation arrived at camp at half past ten o'clock.
I. C. WOODS, Major and Aide-de-Camp.
Brigadier General J. McKiNSTRY,
Quartermaster, United States Army.
HEADQUARTERS, September 14, 1861.
I have just come in from Camp Benton ; find your orders for battery to go to
Jefferson City ; what train takes it 1 Where is Castle 1
TURNLEY.
Captain KELTON.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 14, 1861.
Re-enforcements will be sent you to-day ; the 8th Indiana left at six a. m. this
morning for Jefferson City; other regiments will follow to-day. Sturgis will
move forward. We will telegraph you further respecting his movement. General
Pope, with some force, is at or near St. Joseph.
J. C. FREMONT, Maj. Gen. Com'g.
Colonel JEFFERSON C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
WASHINGTON, September 14, 1861.
On consultation with the President and head of department, it Avas deter
mined to call upon you for five thousand well-armed infantry, to be sent here
without a moment's delay. Give them three days' cooked rations. This draft
from your forces to be replaced by you from the States of Illinois, Iowa.
Kansas, &c. How many men have you under arms in your district? Please
answer fully and immediately.
SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.
Major General FREMONT.
134 TESTIMONY.
WASHINGTON, September 14, 1861.
Detach five thousand infantry from your department, to come here without
delay, and report the number of the troops that will be left with you. The
President dictates.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Si. Louis, September 14, 1861.
I am preparing to obey the orders received this evening for the five regiments.
J. 0. FREMONT, Maj. Gen. Com'g.
Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General, Washington City.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 14, 1861.
I am preparing to obey the orders received this evening from the Secretary
at War for the five regiments. I also send messenger.
J. C. FREMONT, Maj. Gen. Com'g.
General THOMAS, Adjutant General, Washington City.
The following despatches were answers to inquiries addressed thereupon to
the governors of various States :
INDIANAPOLIS, September 14, 1861.
We have received orders to send all available forces to Washington.
0. P. MORTON, Governor of Indiana.
COLUMBUS, September 15, 1861.
No troops are ordered to Eastern Virginia. All our troops are ordered to
Western Virginia. Dennison is in Washington.
W. T. COGGESALL.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
September 14, 1861.
Subjoined is a list of our total force, with its distribution :
St. Louis (including home-guard) 6,899
Under Brigadier General Pope (including home-guard)'. 5,488
Lexington (including home-guard) 2,400
Jefferson City (J home-guard) 9, 677
Rolla 4,700
Trenton 3,057
Cape Girardeau 650
Bird's Point and Norfolk 3,510
Cairo (including McClernand's brigade) 4,826
Fort Holt, opposite Cairo, Kentucky shore 3,595
Paducah 7,791
Under General Lane 2,200
Monroe city, near Cairo 900
Total of present and absent on detached duty 55,693
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Hon. SIMON CAMERON,
S( wretarn of War. Washington. D. C.
TESTIMONY. 135
HEADQUARTERS, September 15, 1861.
Embark with as little delay as possible on the Illinois railroad, at Cairo, for
Sandoval, the regiments of Colonel Hecker, twenty-fourth Illinois ; Colonel
Turcliin, nineteenth Illinois. Transportation will await them there. By order
of the President.
Answer on receipt of this ; telegraph when they will be there.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Brigadier General U. S. GRANT, Cairo*
CAIRO, September 15, 1861.
Your despatch just received. Colonel Hecker's twenty-fourth is at Fort
Holt, the nineteenth regiment at Fort Jefferson. They will be despatched at
once.
U. S. GRANT,
General J. C. FREMONT.
WASHINGTON, September 15, 1861.
Your message received. When does force leave for Washington '? Please
answer.
SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.
General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS, September 15, 1861.
Colonel Schaffer's regiment left here at daylight this morning for Jefferson
City. Telegraph me calibre of guns and amount ammunition requisite. What
movements do you make to-day ? What intelligence have you from Lexington
and Boouville 1
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
JEFFERSON C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
HEADQUARTERS, September 15, 1861.
What is the strength of Price, according to latest accounts ?
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
JEFFERSON C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 15, 1861.
Information, reliable, just received shows Price at Warrensburg with 11,000;
Parsons at Georgetown with 4,000. Green had not probably crossed the
Lamine near Boonville last night, so I ordered my troops not to make the march
from Syracuse until to-night, as soon as he has crossed. I have ordered the
bridge destroyed. Two Indiana regiments have arrived.
JEFF. C. DAVIS.
Major General FREMONT.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 15, 1861.
Reliable information from the vicinity of Price's column shows his force to be
11,000 at Warrensburg and 4,000 at Georgetown, with pickets extending in the
direction of Syracuse. Green is making for Boonville
JEFF. C. DAVIS
Major General FREMONT.
136 TESTIMONY.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 15, 1861.
Reliable information from the vicinity of Price's column shows his present
force to be 11,000 at Warrensburg and 4,000 at Georgetown, with pickets ex
tending toward Syracuse. Green is making for Boonville with probable force
of 3,000. Withdrawal of force from this part of the Missouri risks the State ;
from Paducah, loses Western Kentucky. As the best, I have ordered two regi
ments from this city, two from Kentucky, and will make up the remainder from
the new force being raised by the governor of Illinois.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding,
Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND,
Asst. Adj. Gen. Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.
HEADQUARTERS, September 15, 1861.
What is the strength of the regiment at Centralia ? Are they armed and
clothed 1
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Hon. RICHARD YATES, Springfield.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 15, 1861.
Information of such positive character has come to my knowledge implicating
Colonel F. P. Blair, jr., 1st Missouri volunteers, in insidious and dishonorable
efforts to bring my authority into contempt with the government, and to under
mine my influence as an officer, that I have ordered him in arrest, and shall
submit charges to you for his trial.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND,
Ass't Adj't General, Headquarters of the Army, Wash ing ton, D. C.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 15, 1861.
Captain Kean's Indiana battery, six 6-pounders, left per Pacific railroad at
2 p. m. to-day.
I. C. WOODS, Major and Aide-de-Camp.
JEFF. C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
[Memorandum.]
General Fremont desires Colonel Eaton to draw up a letter to the War De
partment at Washington, based upon the within letter. Making points of the
facts that this department is deficient in artillery officers, and that Major Schoepf
is experienced and likely to be efficient in that arm of the service; requesting
his appointment.
J. R. HOWARD.
SEPTEMBER 16, 1861.
(Request not granted.)
TESTIMONY. 137
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Jefferson City, September 16, 1861.
Colonel Hovey left by Pacific railroad to-day. Colonel Wheatley left on two
steamers for Lexington to report to General Sturgis ; each steamer lias two ship
guns complete. Colonel Wheatley is to be ordered to recapture steamers seized
by Green.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
JEFF. C. DAVIS.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 16, 1861.
Boonville tranquil. Indiana troops marched across the country last night
from Syracuse. No intelligence from Lexington to-day. Green is augmenting
his forces from the other side of the river. Secession feeling increasing and
people rising, particularly in Howard county. Rains have been excessive for
the last four days, but we are persevering in our works.
JEFF. C. DAVIS.
General J. C. FREMONT.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 16, 1861.
Have just received despatches from Glasgow, Arrow Rock, and Boonville,
by the hand of a man who escaped from the steamer Sunshine. This proves to
be the boat captured and used by Green at Glasgow, and not the Clara Bell, as
reported. Green has not crossed the bridge. This boatman helped to cross
Green, and reports the numbers at 3,000, and 1,200 more ready to cross — all
horsemen, with two pieces of artillery. He reports Lexington as having been
attacked with 10,000 men on Thursday, but held the work. Subsequently it
was reported as having surrendered. This is improbable.
JEFF. C. DAVIS, Colonel Commanding.
Major General J. C. FREMONT.
HUDSON, September 16, 1861.
Just arrived here on my way to Keokuk. Ohio regiments on their way
to Utica. If you can send Tiudall's regiment to Chilicothe immediately, the
sixteenth Illinois and third Iowa can also be forwarded to Lexington. There
will be no more considerable trouble in north Missouri.
JNO. POPE, Brigadier General.
General FREMONT.
PALMYRA, September 16, 1861.
From paper just handed me I learn, for first time, that important matters are
occurring at Lexington. The troops I sent to Lexington will be there the day
after to-morrow, and consist of two full regiments of infantry, four pieces of
artillery, and 150 irregular horse. These, with the two Ohio regiments, which will
reach there on Thursday, will make a re-enforcement of 4,000 men and four
pieces of artillery. Do you wish me to come down to St. Louis or go to Canton
and Keokuk to finish matters in this section ? The following force along this
road at Hannibal : at Kansas, 480 ; at Palmyra, 320 of twentieth Illinois ; at
Hudson, 450 of Taster's men ; at Brookfield, 650 of Morgan's regiment ; at
St. Joseph, coming east, 3,000 Iowa and Missouri irregular troops. Please
answer to Quincy.
JNO. POPE, Brigadier General.
Major General FREMONT.
138 TESTIMONY.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 16, 1861.
My spy has just returned from Pryor Camp, not far from Lexington. He-
left Warrensburg yesterday, and says they report their number at 14,000. The
fight at Lexington was a sortie made by Mulligan on Thursday. A regular
attack had not been made until Saturday.
JEFF. C. DAVIS, Colonel.
General J. C. FREMONT.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 16, 1861.
Send forward teams ; have not enough for camp purposes. Forward thirty
sets»of harness, and I can organize that many teams at once. See Major Neville
at Everett House for particulars.
JEFF. C. DAVIS, Colonel Commanding.
Captain JAS. BRADSHAW, Assistant Quartermaster.
HEADQUARTERS, September 16, 1861.
Send back our engines and cars as soon as possible. Answer by telegraph.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel JEFF. C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
The engine and cars will be sent back promptly. Later intelligence reports
Colonel Mulligan as having repulsed a vigorous attack of Thursday, and the
fight renewed on Friday. This news comes through secession channels. .
JEFF. C. DAVIS,
Major General FREMONT.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 17, 1861.
I yesterday ordered the troops at Boonville to make an expedition against
Green, and sent the latan as an additional transport. This was done just
before your despatch was received.
J. C. DAVIS.
General FREMONT.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 17, 1861.
Send forward troops and supplies, and let me move forward to Georgetown
and get in rear of enemy. If General Pope sustains Lexington, a move of
this kind is all that is now required. I am determined to move in four days.
I have this place so intrenched that a small force will suffice to hold it.
J. C. DAVIS, Colonel.
General J. C. FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS, September 16, 1861.
We were at this moment giving you the order to move forward and attack
Georgetown. Do so, and do not delay at all with a view to re-enforce Lexing
ton. Exercise your own judgment. Send despatches frequently.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel JEFF. C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 17, 1861.
I have detached the 19th and 24th Illinois regiments under your requisition.
They are in Cincinnati to-day. Information of the most reliable character
TESTIMONY. 139
reaches me that General Johnston has arrived at Columbus, Kentucky, and
taken command. He is threatening our lines with superior forces. At the same
time the enemy, in separate bodies, numbering upward of 20,000, is hovering
between Lexington and Boonville. I need all the troops now here and ex
pected. I ask the department most urgently to permit me to retain the re
mainder of the 5,000 infantry called for, and to substitute these for two regi
ments of Illinois cavalry, accepted by the War Department, and which I am
unable to arm. The other troops will take away just so many arms from me,
which I cannot for some time replace.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND, A. A. G.,
Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 17, 1861.
Have sent forward Hovey's regiment to Lamine. Shall forward more as fast
as possible, and forward supplies. Send Superintendent McKissock up at once.
He is entirely too slow.
J. C. DAVIS, Colonel Commanding.
General J. C. FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 17, 1861.
Where are the 1st and 2d Kansas 1 Can the 3,000 men referred to in your
despatches as corning from St. Joseph go also to Lexington ?
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Brigadier General JOHN POPE,
Palmyra, (to follow him if not there.)
CAIRO, September 17, 1861.
The taking of two regiments from this command makes me deem it prudent
to withdraw troops from vicinity of Fort Jefferson to Fort Holt. The order is
given. *
LT. S. GRANT, Brigadier General.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS, September 17, 1861..
Brigadier General Pope says a portion of his force from Utica will be at Lex
ington to-morrow, the 18th; balance on the 19th — 4,000 men in all.
I. C. WOODS,
Major and Aide-de-Camp.
Colonel JEFF. C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
WASHINGTON, September 18, 1861.
General Scott acquiesces to your wishes in your proposition to retain troops
riot already forwarded. He has telegraphed order to retain the two regiments
which have left to Cincinnati to wait orders for a few days, if they have not
passed beyond that city.
E. D. TOWNSEND.
Major General FREMONT.
140 TESTIMONY.
JEFFERSON CITY, September IS, 1861.
Positive news from Lexington Sunday evening. Main attack had not been
made. I have sent two regiments to Arrow Rock, with orders to take part, in a
day or two, opposite Glasgow. Sent a regiment to Syracuse last evening. Will
send more to Boonville. Forward harness and wagons ; can't do anything with
mules without them.
J. C. DAVIS, Colonel Commanding.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS, September 18, 1861.
"We have positive information that the " Sunshine" was at Cambridge the 16th,
disabled. The rebels have carried off cylinder head, and throttle valves throAvn
in the river.
I. C. WOODS,
Major and Aide-de-Camp.
Colonel JEFFERSON C. DAVIS, Jtferson City.
[Received at St. Louis September 18, 1861.]
FORT LEAVENWORTH,
September 7, 1861, via Omaha and 'Burlington.
The communication by railroad and wire entirely cut off on the Hannibal and
St. Joseph. Lane reports enemy's column marching on Lexington. Can a force
attack from Jefferson City while Lane attacks from the west 1
W. E. PRINCE.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 18, 1861.
SIR : You are hereby directed to increase your forces at the crossing of the
Pacific railroad over Lamine creek to the number of 5,000, adding artillery and
cavalry according to your judgment, and march upon the enemy stationed at
Georgetown.
All the information received at these headquarters leads to the conclusion that
the force of the rebels at that place does not amount to more than 3,000 to 4,000
men. of whom most are poorly armed, and over whom a victory may be certainly
anticipated. After putting them to flight, take, with your main body, the road
toward Lexington, directing your cavalry to pursue the enemy some miles on
their line of retreat toward Warrensburg, and to unite again by the first cross
road. Brigadier General Sturgis, commanding at Lexington, will be informed
of this order and directed to co-operate with you in such a manner as, if possible,
to make with you a combined attack upon the enemy that now surrounds Lex
ington.
It is confidently expected that, even if you should fail to defeat the enemy,
you will be at least strong enough to break through his lines and effect a junction
with our forces at Lexington, which, by your aid and that of other re-enforce-
inenti ordered to that point, will then be strong enough not only to defend that
place successfully but to assume the offensive.
It is expected that General Lane, who will be kept fully informed of these
movements, will be able to act in concert with you from Kansas City; but should
the rebel forces change their line of operations and attack that place you will
unite with him and General Sturgis in its defence.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel JEFFERSON C. DAVIS,
Commanding at Jefferson City.
TESTIMONY. 141
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMEMT,
St. Louis, September 18, 1861.
SIR : Colonel Jefferson 0. Davis, commanding at Jefferson City, has been
this day ordered to increase his forces at the crossing of the Pacific railroad over
Lainine creek to 5,000 men, adding, according to his judgment, artillery and
cavalry, attack the rebels at Georgetown, and after defeating them take the road
to Lexington.
Should he fail to defeat the enemy it is still confidently expected that he will
be able to break through his lines, and, in co-operation with you, make a com
bined attack upon the forces now surrounding Lexington.
It is expected that General Lane, who will be kept fully informed of these
movements, will be able to act in concert with you from Kansas City.
J. C. FREMONT,
J\lajor General Commanding.
Brigadier General STURGIS,
Commanding U. S. forces at Lexington.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 18, 1861.
SIR : Colonel Jefferson C. Davis, commanding at Jefferson City, has been
ordered to increase his forces at the crossing of the Pacific railroad over Lamine
creek to 5,000 men, adding, according to his judgment, artillery and cavalry,
attack the rebels at Georgetown, and after defeating them take the road to
Lexington.
Should he fail to defeat the enemy, it is still confidently expected that he will
be able to break through their lines, and, in co-operation with the forces stationed
at Lexington, make a combined attack upon the rebel forces now menacing that
place.
You are therefore directed to march with your forces on the State line road
to Kansas City, put yourself immediately in communication with Brigadier Gen
eral Sturgis, commanding at Lexington, and co-operate with him to defeat the
enemy.
If the rebel forces should change their line of attack, and advance upon
Kansas City, the above-mentioned commanders will co-operate with you in the
defense of that place.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
General J. LANE,
Commanding Kansas Brigade.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 18, 1861.
News just received from Lexington — probably reliable. The fight commenced
on Monday; was very severe all day. Price assaulted the works and was
repulsed with heavy [loss] on yesterday morning. The fighting was very feeble
when courier left. Lane was marching for Lexington, and was at Johnstown
on Monday morning. The rebel loss is reported at 4,000 — ours at 800. This
is evidently exaggerated.
JEFF. C. DAVIS.
Major General FREMONT.
142 TESTIMONY.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 19, 1861.
Colonel J. C. Davis, at Jefferson City, telegraphs to me on 18th as follows : —
(See above telegram.)
From Cincinnati telegram as follows : " Colonels Hecker and Turchin's com
mands in Camp Dennison ; wounded all in Marine Hospital ; dead buried in
Spring Grove to-day."
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel E. D. TOWXSEND,
Adjutant General, Headquarters, Washington, D. C.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 19, 1861.
No further news from Lexington. McKissock, railroad superintendant, in
forms me that the bridge will be brought forward to-day. Means of transporta
tion is all required to move forward. I have a number of mules but no harness.
JEFF. C, DAVIS,
Major General FREMONT.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 19, 1861.
News just come in says Lexington is taken. I hardly think it reliable. I
have received your order directing me to take Georgetown. This place is and
has been, except a few hours some days ago, in my possession. There are no
rebel troops now threatening. I have and am sending forward troops, but I
cannot take permanent position with any considerable force until I get means,
either by rail or wagons, to get forward supplies. I wrote you on the subject
of McKissock's conduct in regard to the bridge, also on the subject of mules
and wagons and harness. My troops will all be in advance of the means of
transportation. Let it be furnished at once.
JEFF. C. DAVIS, Colonel Commanding.
Major General FREMONT.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 19, 1861.
The rumored surrender at Lexington is this evening discredited.
JEFF. C. DAVIS.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS, JEFFERSON CITY,
September 19, 1861.
GENERAL : The news last night from Lexington I telegraphed you. Noth
ing since has been received. I shall continue to throw forward troops so as to
concentrate them in a few hours at Georgetown. I have a small detachment
there now of cavalry. I hope you will send me more cavalry.
If the rebels have been defeated at Lexington, they will, in my opinion, retire
to the Osage, in order to be supported by McCulloch.
That would be difficult if Warsaw were occupied, and I cannot get there
without transportation. I am exerting every effort to get teams organized to
make a move in that direction. If I were now at Georgetown I could cut off
his retreat. The bridge across the Lamine is now the great obstacle to progress
in that direction to Sedalia. I shall overcome that as soon as possible.
I am, very truly, your obedient servant,
JEFF. C. DAVIS.
General J. C. FREMONT, St. Louis, Missouri.
TESTIMONY. 143
SEPTEMBER 20, 1861.
Mr. King left Lexington last Wednesday niglit, after the attack by Price,
and Mulligan was still in possession of his fortifications ; he is well fortified on
a high bluff. Price made an attempt to get possession of ferry-boats and small
steamer, but. with large loss. Mulligan's intrenchments are good, and he can
hold out against any force if his ammunition is not exhausted. Major Sturgis
expected to re-enforce Mulligan on Wednesday night, Jim Lane on Thursday
night. Mulligan's batteries could not defend the river well, where the boats
lay ; that was the reason that Price obtained possession of them. Messenger
saw a large number of Price's men wounded that were being conveyed up the
river.
CHAS. NOTES, Secret Agent.
Major General FREMONT, Headquarters, Western Department.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 20, 1861.
No expedition has gone from Georgetown, except a home guard as scouts.
JEFF. C. DAVIS, Colonel Commanding.
General J. C. FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS, September 20, 1861.
Can you break through the rebel lines and effect a junction with Mulligan ?
ASBOTH.
Colonel JEFF. C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 20, 1861.
I can drive the rebels to the Osage if I can get to them, but I have no means
of transportation here. My boats are up the river with troops. I have no
teams.
JEFF. C. DAVIS.
General ASBOTH.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 20, 1861.
Send me all the cavalry you can spare. I can furnish them with carbines
and ammunition.
JEFF. C. DAVIS,
Acting Brigadier General.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS, ST. Louis, September 20, 1861.
How many carbines and how much ammunition can you furnish ?
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel JEFF. C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 20, 1861.
The guns I have are those issued to Colonel Nugent's Missouri cavalry. I
don't know the number, but I can arm a regiment some way or ojtlier. The
colonel, when he left, told me there was a full supply of ammunition.
JEFF. C. DAVIS,
Acting Brigadier General.
Major General J. C. FREMONT.
144 TESTIMONY.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 20, 1861.
Concentrate a force strong enough, in your judgment, at Georgetown, and
push fonvard to relieve Mulligan. I trust that you can take provisions for two
days with the means of transportation which you have. Order back your boats
to Jefferson City, and send provisions and troops by them to Lexington. Two
hundred wagons will be sent from here to-night to Syracuse, which will follow
you. Troops are going from here. Answer.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel JEFF. C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
•
JEFFERSON CITY, September 20, 1861.
I will send on the troops as fast as possible. Two days' provisions from
Syracuse won't answer to reach Lexington and engage an enemy. I will at
tempt it, however.
JEFF. C. DAVIS, Acting Brigadier General.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS, September 20, 1861.
Despatch received. Take as much provisions as will answer. Never let the
men go into action without food. We, on our part, intend to move promptly
from here. Use your judgment for details.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Acting Brigadier General JEFF. C. DAVIS,
Jefferson City.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 20, 1861.
Fort Leavenworth despatch received. Will send instructions as to Delawares.
Where is the 2d Kansas by to-day ? Where is General Lane 1
J. H. EATON, Major U. S. A. and M. S.
Captain W. E. PRINCE.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 20, 1861.
SIR : It is reported that Lexington is surrounded by an overwhelming rebel
force of 16,000, and that our re-enforcements from tjtica and Liberty, under
command of Brigadier General Sturgis, are opposite Lexington, and prevented
from crossing the river by two rebel batteries. To assist Colonel Mulligan and
his brave little band of two thousand, General Lane will harass the enemy by
sudden attacks upon exposed posts upon his flank and rear ; and you will act
according to the order of the 18th, and will endeavor to break through the
enemy's lines. Should you not succeed in effecting a junction with Colonel
Mulligan, at Lexington, you are to retreat, and take such a position as your
own strength and the movements and force of the enemy may render advisable.
Should the whole force of the enemy be concentrated around Lexington, it
may be sufficient to retreat to Davis's creek, or, at furthest, to Dunkburg, in
either of which cases a junction with the forces of General Lane (consisting of
2,200 volunteers, with a large home guard force) may be effected.
Should the rebels hold Warrensburg with a larger force than yours, or if
TESTIMONY. 145
reliable information should reach you that McCulloch is also operating towards
Lexington, you will take position at Georgetown or Sedalia.
Should McCulloch operate towards Jefferson City, but not be able to reach
that place before I can re-enforce it, (and I will start on Monday,) it should not
detain your forward movements from Georgetown to Lexington.
You will keep me constantly informed of your own movements and those of
the enemy, and will watch constantly the re-enforcements pouring in on the
Pacific railroad, so that you may direct them immediately to their destination,
and avoid confusion.
A corps of observation will be left at Holla ; all other troops now stationed at
that place will -also be drawn to Jefferson City, to operate with the main body
of the corps of army.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Acting Brig. General JEFFERSON C. DAVIS,
Commanding at Jefferson City.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 20, 1861.
SIR : It is reported that Lexington is surrounded by an overwhelming rebel
force of 16,000, and that our re-enforcements from Utica and Liberty, under
command of Brigadier General Sturgis, are opposite Lexington, and prevented
from crossing the river by two rebel batteries. To assist Colonel Mulligan and
his brave little band of 2,000, you will harass the enemy as much as possible
by sudden attacks upon his flank and rear.
Should Acting Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis not succeed in effecting
a junction with Colonel Mulligan at Lexington, he will retreat, and take such a
position as his own strength and the movements and force of the enemy may
render advisable.
In case the whole rebel force is concentrated around Lexington, he will prob
ably retreat to Davis's creek, or, at furthest, to Dunkburg, at either of which
places a junction with your forces may be effected.
Should the rebels hold Warrensburg with a larger force than that of Acting
Brigadier General Davis, or should he ascertain that McCulloch is also ope
rating towards Lexington, he will take position at Georgetown or Sedalia.
You will keep me constantly informed of your own movements and those of
the enemy.
J. C. FREMONT, Major General Commanding.
General J. LANE, in the field.
(Sent through Captain Prince, Fort Leavenworth.)
SEPTEMBER 20, 1861.
How many horses, wagons, harnesses, and mules have you ? Give me the
order, and I will make every effort to hire teams for you, if not on hand.
I. C. WOODS,
Colonel, A. D. C., and Director of Transportation.
Colonel J. C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 20, 1861.
I can to-morrow start 50 teams on the road. The 8th Indiana leaves to
night for Syracuse; a battery to morow.
JEFF. C. DAVIS.
Colonel I. C. WOODS.
Part iii 10
146 TESTIMONY.
HEADQUARTERS, September 20, 1861.
We have news of Lexington being burned. Rebels with guns planted at
ferry; our troops intrenched on College Hill and surrounded. Have you
thrown forward a column for their relief. Telegraph particulars.
J. H. EATON, Major U. S. Army and M. S.
Colonel JEFFERSON C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
SEPTEMBER 20, 1861.
Mr. E. Farmer, clerk of the quartermaster's department at Springfield, Illi
nois, reports to me his arrival in the city of St. Louis at 9.20 o'clock last
evening, (Thursday.) Left Jefferson City at 12 o'clock same day. Messenger
at Jefferson City just arrived from Lexington as he left. Reports Colonel Mul
ligan's command strongly intrenched, with the assistance of 2,000 home guards
and the Iowa 5th regiment, the latter having one 64-pounder howitzer, besides
several small pieces of ordnance.
Colonel Mulligan had repelled Price and his command, estimated at 14,000
to 20,000 strong, and believed he could hold and strengthen himself in the
iutrenchments until re-enforced. Major General Sturgis was expected to arrive
with from 6,000 to 8,000 by Thursday last. General Lane reported approach
ing from the southeast, forty miles distant, with 5,000 troops, to Colonel Mulli
gan's assistance. It was believed that Price and Rains would be surrounded
and cut off from a retreat. Nothing known of McCulloeh's movement that is
now reported at Jefferson City.
Yours, £c., CHARLES NOTES,
A Secret Agent.
Major General J. C. FREMONT,
Commanding Western Department.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 20, 1861.
I shall leave about 3,000 home guards and Iowa 6th to take care of this
place. I would recommend some one of energy be appointed to command them.
General Thomas Price, who is now in St. Louis, would be an excellent man.
They must be kept at work on these field-works, &c.
JEFFERSON C. DAVIS,
Acting Brigadier General Commanding.
General J. C. FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTER* DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 21, 1861.
GENERAL : By a telegram of to-day, sent to Captain W. E. Prince, of Fort
Leavenworth, the officer in command of the 2d Kansas regiment has been
directed to take the steamer West Wind, or any other steamer, and proceed at
once carefully down the river to join you.
You will, therefore, send a messenger up the river to communicate to the
commander of the 2d Kansas regiment such orders as you may deem proper to
secure a safe landing of the boat, and then make every effort to cross the river
and effect a junction with Colonel Mulligan. Acting Brigadier General Jeffer
son C. Davis, of Jefferson City, will also endeavor, with his force, to join Colonel
Mulligan from Georgetown by land, and from Glasgow by steamer. Every
effort, therefore, should be made to retain the post of Lexington,
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Brigadier General S. D. STURGIS,
Opposite Lexington.
TESTIMONY. 147
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 21, 1861.
Carlin's battery, six pieces, to remain in Jefferson City ; and Bissell's com
mand, (300 mechanics,) for Lamine bridge, left here 2 p. m.
I. 0. WOODS,
Colonel, and Director of Transportation.
Acting Brigadier General JEFFERSON C. DAVIS,
Jefferson City.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 21, 1861.
The War Eagle and latan have just returned. The three Indiana regiments
took possession of all points as far as Glasgow, but unfortunately for their repu
tation as soldiers, their scouts fired into each other, severely wounding Major
Tanner and several others, and killing three. They retook the steamer Sun
shine, ten miles above Glasgow. The 26th Indiana proceeded on for Lexington.
JEFFERSON C. DAVIS,
Acting Brigadier General Commanding.
General J. C. FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 22, 1861.
Hold yourself in readiness to move forward to Kentucky when telegraphed
for bv General Anderson.
J. C. FRfiMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Colonel HECKER,
Camp Dennison, near Cincinnati.
HEADQUARTERS, September 22, 1861.
I have placed the two Illinois regiments, commanded by Colonels Hecker and
Turchin, under your orders. They are now at Camp Dennison, Cincinnati.
Answer.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Brigadier General ROBERT ANDERSON,
Louisville, Kentucky.
LOUISVILLE, KY., September 22, 1861.
Accept my thanks for the two regiments placed subject to my order.
ROBERT ANDERSON, Brigadier General.
Major General FREMONT, St. Louis
ST. Louis, September 22, 1861. )
INDIANAPOLIS, September 22, 1861. )
I much regret that subsequent events have prevented me from sending you
the troops. Reliable advisers on Friday show an advance on Louisville by a
force of not less than 10,000 men, and Anderson had not more than 3,000. An
derson begged for troops. Our own safety required that they should be furnished.
We have sent him four regiments, and one to Evansville. We are out of arms.
Can you not lend us 5,000 for the time 1 Louisville is considered in great dan
ger this morning, and many doubt whether it can be saved. Please send us
arms by special train.
0. P. MARTIN, Governor of Indiana.
Major General J. C. FREMONT.
148 TESTIMONY.
ST. Louis, September 22, 1861.
You did not state how many men yon send in this direction or when they
leave. General Fremont says you make a mistake in sending men in the direc
tion of Kentucky from your place, and urges all the men to be sent here that
you can raise. Please keep him posted.
D. G. ROSE.
Governor MORTON.
CHICAGO, September 22, 1861.
Great anxiety here to know the fate of the Irish brigade and Tom Marshall's
cavalry. Have they surrendered ?
CHICAGO TRIBUNE.
Major General FREMONT.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 22, 1861.
Your communication of the 20th, directing me to move forward, just received.
I am throwing forward troops to Arrow Rock, Boonville, and Syracuse as fast
as possible. This I have been doing since the 18th. Troops cannot reach
Lexington without some teams. The harness for these arrived in part only
night before last. Yesterday all that could be possibly gotten together were
sent forward to these different points. More is learing to-day and will continue
to leave until I can move on Lexington.
JEFF. C. DAVIS,
Acting Brigadier General.
Major General FREMONT.
CHICAGO, Septe??iber 22, 1861.
Intense excitement here to know the fate of Colonel Mulligan. If consistent,
may I know if he has surrendered ?
OWEN LOVEJOY.
General J. C. FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 22, 1861.
Colonel Mulligan has not surrendered by latest reports. It is believed he is
sustaining himself in his position. Re-enforcements are moving from four points
of the compass — from all directions.
J. C. FREMONT.
Colonel OWEN LOVEJOY, Chicago, Illinois.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 22, 1861.
Your despatch received. I am informed by the President that the rebels
have seized Owensboro'. Direct Captain Foote to use gunboats to drive the
rebels from there and to protect the Ohio river. Have Noble's cavalry reached
Fort Massac 1 Direct him to report for orders to General Smith.
Send forward three heavy guns to General Smith, to be placed at Smithland.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Brigadier General U. GRANT, Cairo.
WASHINGTON, September 22, 1861.
Governor Morton telegraphs as follows : Colonel Lane, just arrived by special
train, represents Owensboro', 40 miles above Evansville, in possession of seces-
TESTIMONY. 149
sionists. Green river is navigable. Owensboro' must be seized. We want a
gunboat sent up from Paducah for that purpose. Send up the gunboat if, in
your discretion, you think it right. Perhaps you had better order those in
charge of the Ohio river to guard it vigilantly at all points.
A. LINCOLN.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 22, 1861.
Your despatch received. I have immediately ordered Captain Foote with
gunboat to dislodge the rebels from Owensboro', and will take measures to guard
the Ohio.
Have placed my two Illinois regiments at Camp Dennison, near Cincinnati,
at the disposal of General Anderson, and so informed him by telegraph.
T c< TT|"R^Arrk"\rrr
J . \j. x Ix-cjiVlUJN 1 ,
Major General Commanding.
A. LINCOLN, President, Washington.
JEFFERSOF CITY, September 22, 1861.
Price has arrived, and I have turned over the home guards and the fortifi
cations to his charge. This will enable me to move forward myself to-night or
to-morrow. If you are coming on to-morrow I will proceed to Arrow Root, and
start from there to Marshall. If you do not come, it will be better for me to
start from Syracuse on the march. Please answer at once.
JEFF. C. DAVIS,
Acting Brigadier General Commanding.
Major General FREMONT.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 22, 1861.
I am informed that the Lamine bridge will be finished on Tuesday. News
from Lexington this evening states that place not taken up to Friday.
JEFF. 0. DAVIS,
Acting Brigadier General Commanding.
Major General J. C. FREMONT.
JEFFERSON CITY, September 22, 1861.
Reliable. U.- D. Fields, of Lexington, released prisoner from Price's army,
here to-night, reports fighting at Lexington Thursday noon. Mulligan not
taken ; thinks if water holds out he is safe for some days yet. If efficient and
prompt movements be made he may be saved. Everything depends on what
we can do in the next few days. McCulloch last Monday in Barton county,
moving on Lexington. He must be drawing close on by this time. Price's
force estimated at nearly 20,000.
THOS. L. PRICE.
Major General J. C. FREMONT.
BROOKFIELD, September 22, 1861.
I have just arrived here from Quincy, and have 100 of our men that were in
the battle at Lexington ; 2,000 more are at Hamilton, fifty miles west of this.
Colonel Mulligan surrendered at 4 p. m. Friday. Water cut off. The entire
command, after surrendering, were disarmed ; non-commissioned officers and pri
vates sworn and released ; commissioned officers are held as prisoners. Federal
loss, 39 killed and 120 wounded ; rebels, 1,400 killed and wounded. I send
150 TESTIMONY.
provisions forward to our gallant soldiers that have not been fed for two days.
They were not re-enforced.
B. M. PRENTISS.
Major General J. C. FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 23, 1861.
GENERAL: Your despatch received. The surgeons of my staff and the sani
tary commission are directed to communicate with you in regard to the wounded.
Keep me fully informed of facts in relation to them, so that then- wants may be
provided for as promptly as possible.
J. C. FREMONT, Major General.
Brigadier General B. M. PRENTISS, Quincy, Illinois.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 22, 1861.
GENERAL : As Lexington surrendered on Friday, and a combined attack on
the rebel force will be made without delay by my command, you are hereby
directed to prevent, by all means, the enemy crossing the Missouri river; to
co-operate with me upon my approach, and to keep me, as I advance, constantly
informed, by frequent reports, of the strength and movements of the enemy.
J. C. FREMONT, Major General Commanding.
Brigadier General STURGIS.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 22, 1861.
GENERAL : Lexington having surrendered, a combined attack upon the rebels
infesting the country between Springfield and Lexington will be made by the
troops under my command without delay. You are directed to watch the enemy
as narrowly as possible, to hold Kansas City at all hazards, and to keep me con
stantly informed of his and your movements.
J. C. FREMONT, Major General Commanding.
General J. LANE, Commanding Kansas City.
HEADQUARTERS, September 22, 1861.
Lexington surrendered on Friday afternoon for want of water. Hold George
town and Glasgow. Sturgis will prevent the enemy's crossing the river. Lane
will watch Kansas City and defend it if attacked.
J. C. FREMONT, Major General Commanding.
Acting Brigadier General JEFF. C. DAVIS, Jefferson City.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 23, 1861.
I have telegram from Brookfield that Lexington has fallen into Price's hands,
he having cut off Mulligan's supply of water. Re-enforcements, four thousand
strong, under Sturgis, by capture of ferry-boats, had no means of crossing the
river in time. Lane's force from the southwest, and Davis's from southeast,
upwards of eleven thousand in all, could not get there in time. I am taking the
field myself, and hope to destroy the enemy either before or after the junction
of forces under McCulloch.
Please notify the President immediately.
J. C. FREMONT, Major General Commanding.
Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND, A. A. G.,
Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C. ^
TESTIMONY. 151
WASHINGTON, September 23, 1861.
"What further news have you from Lexington 1 Can you give us results ?
SIMON CAMERON Secretary of War.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis September 23, 1861.
Nothing since my despatch of this morning; our loss, thirty-nine killed and
one hundred and twenty wounded ; loss of enemy, one thousand four hundred
killed and wounded. Our non-commissioned officers and privates sworn and
released; commissioned officers held as prisoners. Our troops are gathering
around the enemy. I will send you, from the field, more details in a few days.
J. C. FREMONT, Major General Commanding.
Hon. SIMON CAMERON,
Secretary of War, Washington City.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., September 13, 1861.
Your despatch of this day is received. The President is glad you are has
tening to the scene of action. His words are, he expects ^ou to repair the dis
aster at Lexington without loss of time.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
Major General FREMONT, Headquarters.
[Private.]
WASHINGTON, D. C., September 2, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR : Two points in your proclamation of August 30 give me
some anxiety.
First. Should you shoot a man, according to the proclamation, the confederates
would very certainly shoot our best men in their hands, in retaliation ; and so,
man for man, indefinitely. It is, therefore, my order that you allow no man to
he shot, under the proclamation, without first having my approbation or consent.
Second. I think there is great danger that the closing paragraph, in relation
to the confiscation of property, and the liberating slaves of traitorous owners,
will alarm our southern Union friends, and turn them against us ; perhaps ruin
our rather fair prospect for Kentucky. Allow me, therefore, to ask that you
will, as of your own motion, modify that paragraph so as to conform to the
first and fourth sections of the act of Congress entitled " An act to confiscate
property used for insurrectionary purposes," approved August 6, 1861, and a
copy of which act I herewith send you. This letter is written in a spirit of
caution, and not of censure. I send it by a special messenger, in order that it
may certainly and speedily reach you.
Yours, very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
Major General FREMONT.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 3, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR : Your letter of the 2d, by special messenger, I know to have
been written before you had received my letter, and before my telegraphic de
spatches and the rapid development of critical conditions here had informed you
of affairs inihis quarter. I had not written to you fully and frequently ; first,
152 TESTIMONY.
because in the incessant change of affairs I would be exposed to give you con
tradictory accounts ; and, secondly, because the amount of the subjects to be
laid before you would demand too much of your time.
Trusting to have your confidence, I have been leaving it to events themselves
to show you whether or not I was shaping affairs here according to your ideas.
The shortest communication between Washington and St. Louis generally in
volves two days, and the employment of two days in time of war goes largely
towards success or disaster. I therefore went along according to my own judg
ment, leaving the result of my movements to justify me with you. And so
in regard to my proclamation of the 30th. Between the rebel armies, the pro
visional government, and home traitors, I felt the position bad and saw
danger. In the night I decided upon the proclamation and the form of it. 1
wrote it the next morning and printed it the same day. I did it without con
sultation or advice with any one, acting solely with my best judgment to serve
the country and yourself, and perfectly willing to receive the amount of censure
which should be thought due, if I had made a false movement. This is as
much a movement in the war as a battle, and in going into these I shall have
to act according to my judgment of the ground before me, as I did on this
occasion. If, upon reflection, your better judgment still decides that I am
wrong in the article respecting the liberation of slaves, I have to ask that you
will openly direct me to make the correction. The implied censure will be
received as a soldier4 always should the reprimand of his chief. If I were to
retract of my own accord it would imply that I myself thought it wrong, and
that I had acted without the reflection which the gravity of the point demanded.
But I did not. I acted with full deliberation, and upon the certain conviction
that it was a measure right and necessary, and I think so still.
In regard to the other point of the proclamation to which you refer, I desire
to say that I do not think the enemy can either misconstrue or urge anything
against it, or undertake to make unusual retaliation. The shooting of men who
shall rise in arms against an army in the military occupation of a country is
merely a necessary measure of defence, and entirely according to the usages of
civilized warfare. The article does not at all refer to prisoners of war, and
certainly our enemies have no ground for requiring that we should waive in
their benefit any of the ordinary advantages which the usages of war allow to
us. As promptitude is itself an advantage in war, I have also to ask that you
will permit me to carry out upon the spot the provisions of the proclamation in
this respect. Looking at affairs from this point of view, I am satisfied that
strong and vigorous measures have now become necessary to the success of our
arms ; and hoping that my views may have the honor to meet your approval,
I am, with respect and regard, very truly yours,
J. C. FREMONT.
The PRESIDENT.
[Private.]
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
September 8, 1861.
MY DEAR SIR : I send by another hand what I ask you to consider in re
spect to the subject of the note by your special messenger.
In this I desire to ask your attention to the position of affairs in Kentucky.
As the rebel troops, driven out from Missouri, had invaded Kentucky in con
siderable force, and by occupying Union City, Hicknian, and Columbus, were
preparing to seize Paducah and attack Cairo, I judged it impossible, without
losing important advantages, to defer any longer a forward movement. For
this purpose I have drawn from the Missouri side a part of the force which had
*
TESTIMONY. 153
been stationed at Bird's Point, Cairo and Cape Girardeau, to Fort Holt and
Paducah, of which places we have taken possession. As the rebel forces out
number ours, and the counties of Kentucky between the Mississippi and Ten
nessee rivers, as well as those along the latter and the Cumberland, are strongly
secessionist, it becomes imperatively necessary to have the co-operation of the
loyal Union forces under Generals Anderson and Nelson, as well as of those
already encamped opposite Louisville, under Colonel Rousseau. I have re-en
forced, yesterday, Paducah, with two regiments, and will continue to strengthen
the position with men and artillery. As soon as General Smith, who commands
there, is re-enforced sufficiently to enable him to spread his forces, he will have
to take and hold May field and Lovelaceville, to be in the rear and flank of
Columbus, and to occupy Smithland, controlling in this way the mouths of both
the Tennessee and the Cumberland rivers. At the same time Colonel Rosseau
should bring his force, increased, if possible, by two Ohio regiments, in boats
to Henderson, and taking the Henderson and Nashville railroad, occupy Hop-
kinsville, while General Nelson should go with a force of 5,000 by railroad to
Louisville, and from there to Bowling Green. As the population in all the
counties through which the above railroads pass are loyal, this movement could
be made without delay or molestation to the troops. Meanwhile General Grant
would take possession of the entire Cairo and Fulton railroad, Piketon, New-
Madrid and the shore of the Mississippi opposite Hicknian and Columbus. The
foregoing disposition having been effected, a combined attack will be made upon
Columbus, and if successful in that, upon Hickman, while Rousseau and Nelson
will move in concert, by railroad, td Nashville, Tennessee, occupying the State
capital, and, with an adequate force, New Providence. The conclusion of this
movement would be a combined advance toward Memphis, on the Mississippi,
as well as the Memphis and Ohio railroad, and I trust the result would be a
glorious one to the country. In a reply to a letter from General Sherman, by
the hand of Judge Williams, in relation to the vast importance of securing pos
session in advance of the country lying between the Ohio, Tennessee and Mis
sissippi, I have to-day suggested the first part of the preceding plan. By ex
tending my command to Indiana, Tennessee and Kentucky, you would enable
me to attempt the accomplishment of this all-important result; and in order to
secure the secrecy necessary to its success, I shall not extend the communica
tion which I have made to General Sherman, or repeat it to any one else.
With high respect and regard, I am, very truly, yours,
J. C. FREMONT.
The PRESIDENT.
[Extracts from letters of Hon. M. Blair, Postmaster General.]
WASHINGTON, September 3, 1861.
"Meigs begged me this afternoon to get you to order 15-inch guns from
Pittsburg for your gunboats. He says that the boats can empty any battery
the enemy can make with such guns. He advises that you contract for them
directly yourself, telling the contractor you will direct your ordnance officer to
pay for them."
********
" I think you will find General Hunter an able, and at the same time an
agreeable, co-operator. He has considerable energy and much good sense, and
his influence with the President may be useful to secure you support here."
154 TESTIMONY.
WASHINGTON, February 5, 1862.
Honorable MONTGOMERY BLAIR sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. We have been ordered to inquire as to the war in the western de
partment. It is a very general subject, but we know that you are very fully
acquainted with it, and you will please, therefore, tell us, in your own way, what
you may consider pertinent to the inquiry.
Answer. I have taken special interest in the western department. I resided
in Missouri many years. This and my brother's position there created this in
terest, and for that reason I became active in reference to military affairs there
even before the change of administration. Having learned from my brother the
design of the conspirators to seize the arsenal, I induced General Scott to order
General (then Captain) Lyon from Fort Scott to St. Louis, knowing Lyon's
determination of character. I acted here in concert with the tried men in St.
Louis, and none have ever been more thoroughly tried. They spoke to me
generally through my brother, who has 'had their confidence more than any other
person for many years. But I had many other correspondents in the State. I
obtained, at my brother's instance, and wrote the orders for arming the troops
there, for superseding Harney because he disobeyed it or put obstacles in the
way of executing it, for the capture of Camp Jackson, and under which he was
about to capture Governor Jackson and his legislature at Jefferson, when Harney
was permitted, without my knowledge, to reappear on the scene, supersede
Lyon, and suspend his operations for about a month, and till Harney could
be again got rid of. Harney, on being superseded the first time, came on to
Washington and wrote and published a letter protesting his loyalty. I did not
believe and do not now believe he was disloyal, but his associations were with
a class whose sympathies or fears enabled the conspirators to dupe them into the
belief that Lyon and those who were not so deceived were the dangerous men.
to the peace of the country. It was most unfortunate that just after Lyon struck
his first blow, and before he could finish the work by the capture of the con
spirators at Jefferson City, that Harney was sent back to supersede him by Mr.
Cameron, without the knowledge of the President. After it was notorious that
Price was organizing a military force, under a law which Harney himself had
pronounced unconstitutional, he was influenced by the class of persons I have
mentioned to treat with Price, who was Jackson's major general, under it.
And even after Harney was again superseded for this and other mistakes, and
Lyon had fought their organized army at Boonville, many sincere Union men
of that class, here and in Missouri, continued to oppose his policy and his being
retained in the command of the department; and it was by such influences
Missouri was put in McClellan's department, although McClellan was, at the
time occupied in Western Virginia, and Lyon was operating in Western Missouri,
and was an older soldier and more experienced commander in the field than
McClellan. I made many efforts but failed, even though seconded warmly by
Governor Chase, to get the general-in-chief to revoke this order. It was neces
sary to have a general in the department, and as this prejudice against Lyon
prevented his having the place, and as General Fremont had a reputation suf
ficiently great to secure it, I and all the advocates of Lyon's policy were grati
fied in having it assigned to him. I believed that he would not only sustain
Lyon's vigorous policy, but give fresh impulse to it. The sequel proved that
those of us who were most solicitous for his promotion overestimated his quali
fications for military command.
As soon as he was appointed I urged him to go to his department. I did so
both on my own judgment and because the President expressed to me, every
TESTIMONY 155
day he delayed, a growing solicitude for Lyon's command. Frdmont, however,
after his appointment, went to the city of New York and remained some time —
I forget how long. It seemed to me a very long and most unaccountable delay.
The President questioned me every day about his movements. I told him so
often that Fremont was off or was going next day, according to my information,
that I felt mortified when allusion was made to it, and dreaded a reference to
the subject. Finally, on the receipt of a despatch from Lyon by my brother,
describing the condition of his command, I felt justified in telegraphing General
Fremont that he must go at once. But he remained till after Bull Bun,
and even then, when he should have known the inspiration that would
give the rebels, he travelled leisurely to St. Louis. He stopped, as I
learned, for the night on the mountains and passed a day at Columbus.
And after all, when he reached St. Louis, he did not even attempt to succor
Lyon, the object which was nearest the heart of the President and the whole
country, and the most obvious necessity to all observers. In urging him to go
at once, I told him I would attend to everything for him here, and frqni my
greater familiarity with the bureaus and departments, I thought I could do
better for him than he could do for himself. I kept this promise. I spent the
greater part of my time, from the date of his appointment till September, in
forwarding his wishes in that respect. I did not succeed always to my satisfac
tion, but my whole heart was in the work, so much so that I scolded or growled,
as General Cameron called it, unreasonably at delays and obstacles. That the
administration did everything it could in fact to sustain Fremont, the committee
may judge by the fact that on one occasion the Secretary of the Treasury sent
Fremont a considerable sum of money, being every dollar there was at the time
in the treasury. We did not meet his demands, it is true, as I wanted them to
be met at the time ; nevertheless he obtained actually an immense force and
means, but made no effective use of them for the public service, as I soon began
to discover. With the news of the death of Lyon, and thence on till about the
end of August, information came from the most reliable men in Missouri, showing
this. The retreat of Lyon's command from Springfield produced the result
which he had foretold in a paper laid before Fremont about the 26th of July,
by Colonel Phelps. Price advanced ; his adherents rose ; and the State was
" devastated." Finally, on the 1st September, my brother wrote the letter to
me which has been published, showing that he, too, was forced to concur in the
general opinion of the well-informed men of the State, that Fremont was making
no use of the means put into his hands by the people, the banks, the States,
and general government, to repress the rebellion. I laid this letter, and the
letters previously received from other gentlemen, before the President. He
directed General Meigs and myself to proceed to St. Louis. We arrived there
on the 12th September. Meigs made some inquiries in regard to the quarter
master's department. I waited on General Fremont and stated the anxiety felt
by the President at the condition of his department, and inquired of him what
orders he had given to meet the movement of Price on Lexington, the extent of
his force, and what he proposed to do. As respected the orders already given,
he said he had instructed Colonel Jefferson C. Davis, commanding at Jefferson
City, to take care of the Upper Missouri. To the question whether he had
given any specific instructions in view of Price's advance, he replied he had not.
I then asked whether Davis had reported to him what he intended to do. He
replied that he had not. He stated in detail the number and position of his
troops. He had, according to my recollection, more than 20,000 men in Mis
souri at his disposal, for the protection of Lexington, and means to put them
there in less than a week. To the question what he proposed to do, he replied
by sending for General Asboth, who brought in a brief paper addressed to
General Hunter, entitled " dispositions for the reoccupation of Springfield."
Having learned that General Hunter was to command, I proposed that the
156 TESTIMONY.
general, who was seated in the passage at the time I came to the house, should
be called in to take part in the conversation. He acceded to this, and General
Hunter came in, I expressed the opinion that Price was at that moment before
Lexington, and probably bombarding it. He was announced as at Warrens-
burg, only 40 miles off, before I left Washington. I thought that a movement
on Springfield was not the proper way to meet the emergency. That all his
disposable force should be sent at once to Lexington. General Hunter concurred
in this, thought the disposable force, if so applied, ample, and wanted the com
mand. It was a far greater force, and much better armed than Price's army,
and was four times greater than the force with which Lyon had defeated a larger
army under Price at Springfield, than he had at Lexington. General Fremont
made no reply. He seemed to be bewildered. Afterwards he seemed to adopt
the suggestion made to him by General Hunter and myself, but did not move
with promptitude, and not at all until he had got an army of near 40,000 men,
which was certainly three times greater than there was the least necessity for,
and than has "been since deemed necessary by General Halleck. It must have
been known at St. Louis that Price was moving on Lexington""for a week before
this conversation, which was on the 13th of September, I think, and he was
there for nineteen days afterwards. Being convinced that General Fremont was
unequal" to so great a command, I joined in recommending his removal from the
western department. But after stating the facts and giving my opinion, 1 have
deemed it proper on all accounts there to leave the matter, and have since for
borne to mention the subject to the President.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. What do you know about the expenditure of money in Missouri by
General Fremont ?
Answer. No particulars. I knew before Fremont went to St. Louis that he
was not a capable man in money transactions, and never supposed that he would
interfere in that business in Missouri.
WASHINGTON, February 7, 1862.
Hon. FRANK P. BLAIR sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. Will you state, in your own way, what you know concerning
the administration of the military department of the west ?
Answer. I was, as is well known to the committee, living1 in that depart
ment, at St. Louis, at the beginning of the outbreak of this rebellion. As
soon as. Mr. Lincoln was elected, and the demonstrations were made at the
south to break up the government — seizing the forts, arsenals, armories, and
the treasure everywhere that belonged to the country — I knew very well
that it was the design of the secessionists in Missouri to seize the arms and
munitions of war in St Louis belonging to the government, and also the
treasure belonging to the government, of which there was a considerable
amount there. I made representations at once to persons here in Washington
in regard to it.
In addition to that, having no sort of confidence in Mr. Buchanan's admin
istration, and believing from what had transpired that he was rather con
niving at these seizures than otherwise, I felt that it was necessary that we
should take some steps for our own protection. And the Union, men in St.
Louis raised a considerable force of men, and put them under regular drill.
As the winter progressed both parties commenced arming in St. Louis, one
with the purpose of seizing the arsenal, where there were 60,000 stand of
TESTIMONY. 157
arms and munitions of war of more than a million of dollars in value. We
raised, principally among the Germans, a large force — probably nearly equal
to four regiments.
About the middle of January, I think, Captain Nathaniel Lyon was ordered
to St. Louis from Kansas with his company. I believe my brother was the
means of having him ordered there. He was ordered there because Major
Bell, who was then in command of the arsenal, was not regarded as a safe
man. In fact, he had avowed his intention, if an overwhelmning force de
manded the surrender of the arsenal, to surrender it. He afterwards resigned
his commission in the army, and went probably over to the secessionists. I
never have heard of him since.
Captain Lyon came down there, and we immediately communicated with
him. We received the assurance from him that, whether the government
ordered him to give arms to the citizens or not, if we had such an organiza
tion as I assured him we had, if the arsenal was attacked he would consider
it his duty to deliver arms to the citizen^ and receive their assistance to
repel any attack that might be made. I took him to see our regiments and
to review them. He agreed to take command of them, without any authority
from the government, and to arm them.
This state of affairs went on. The secessionists in my State called a con
vention, and the Union men determined to contend for the mastery in that
convention These troops that we raised in the city were raised not only with
the view of defending the arsenal, but also to protect the Union men, in their
privilege of voting, from the violence which was, threatened. The city of St.
Louis gave, I think, 5,000 or 6,000 majority for the unconditional Union
ticket against the pretended conditional Union ticket, but which was, in
fact, a secession ticket. The decisive result in St. Louis, with the unex
pected Union majorities throughout the State for the convention, checked
ior a moment the tide of secession in the State, and no doubt delayed their
determination to seize the arsenal, which was their primary object, so as to
arm themselves and deprive the northwest of arms.
I mention these matters more particularly, because I want to do justice
to General Lyon, to whose efforts I think the government owes the salvation
of our State. I think the State of Missouri would now be in the condition
of Georgia if he had not come there. The stand which he took came to be
understood by the secessionists in our midst. He was regarded as the great
obstacle in their way, and efforts were made to have him superseded and sent
away from there. These efforts were insidiously made, and he was at one
time, actually after Mr. Lincoln came into the government, ordered away
upon the pretence of a court of inquiry in Kansas. I think it was in some
remote place out there. It was upon some old affair which had occurred six
months before, and of which no notice was taken at all until it got to be
known that he was an obstacle in the way of the secessionists. As soon as
the matter was represented to the government, however, the order was in
stantly countermanded, and he was allowed to remain in command there.
When Fort Sumter fell, the governor of our State refused to respond to
the call of the President for volunteers, and sent him an insulting despatch of
refusal. I was here at the time of the fall of Fort Sumter. I returned home
and immediately sent a despatch to the Secretary of War, informing him
that if he would receive volunteers, we would raise the quota from Missouri,
notwithstanding the governor had refused to furnish them. A despatch im
mediately came from the Secretary of War — the response was almost in
stantaneous — saying that volunteeres would be accepted and mustered into
service. We brought our men up to be mustered in, and General Harney,
who was then in command of that department, refused to have them mus
tered in or armed. The riot in Baltimore having at that time broken up
158 TESTIMONY.
railroad and telegraph communication between Washington and the north,
by way of Baltimore, I telegraphed the fact of the refusal of General Harney
to Governor Curtin, of Pennsylvania, then at Harrisburg, and requested
him to seed it through to Washington by an express. He did so, and re
turned an answer that the government relieved General Harney from the
command there, and directed the men to be taken into service. In one week
we mustered in four regiments, which was the quota of Missouri. I had
sent on a memorial asking the government to give us five other regiments
as home guards, which was granted; and in a week more we mustered
them all in.
In the meantime the secessionists in the State were making every prep
aration for carrying out their schemes. The legislature had been called
together in extra session, and were sitting with closed doors, passing acts
all looking to the secession of the State and preparations for that event.
Their troops were being marshalled in what they called camps of instruc
tion throughout the State. At St. Louis they had one of those camps, called
Camp Jackson, which was situated within the city limits. They called to
gether a body of men, among others, men they had been mustering in during
the winter, called minute men, and such of the old volunteer State militia as
they could induce to go into their organization, after weeding out the Union
men. They were receiving arms from the south. They received a large
assortment, a cargo of arms from the Baton Rouge arsenal, which had been
seized by the secessionists. I think they sent up 9 cannon, 600 or 700 stand
of arms, and other descriptions of arms, such as sabres and pistols. ' This
cargo of arms was landed on the levee at St. Louis, I think, on Thursday,
the 9th day of May. They had passed Cairo safely; they did not appear to
make very strict examination there, but let these packages of arms pass, as
they were marked " marble." They were landed on our levee, and carried
by the city police out to Camp Jackson and deposited there, and they raised
a grand shout of jubilee over it.
Captain Lyon was then in command of the department, there being no
officer senior to him in the department, Harney having been relieved of his
command and called to Washington. As soon as this landing of arms from
the south was made known to Captain Lyon, he determined to take this
camp, take those there prisoners and take their arms from them. The
arms were landed on the 9th of the month. The next day Captain Lyon
ordered out his command, marched them to Camp Jackson, and gave the
rebels there 15 minutes to surrender unconditionally. They surrendered,
and he marched them to the arsenal and took away from them all their
arms of every kind and description — both those which they had had
brought up from Baton Rouge, and those they had obtained in other ways.
There was immediately an effort made to have Captain Lyon superseded in
his command; and another effort was made on the part of some of us to
have the government acknowledge his services by promotion. General
Harney, by some unexpected means, returned the next day to the city of
St. Louis, and assumed the command of the department. It was Lyon's
intention to' have seized the legislature on the next day. They had got an
inkling of the fact, and had burned the railroad bridges. But Lyon's deter
mination was to have taken steamboats and gone up and seized the legis
lature and the governor of the State, because we had absolute knowledge
of the fact that they were contriving all sorts of treasonable schemes.
Harney, however, got back the next day, and although I have always
believed, and still believe, he was a Union man, yet he did not think there
was any necessity for doing this to save the Union ; thought it was not best
to make any body mad by interfering with the schemes of these secession
ists. The truth was, that General Harney, whilst a loyal man himself as I
TESTIMONY. 159
believe, and always shall believe, unless I have other evidence, had friends
and connexions who were men that, whilst professing to be Union men,
sympathized silently with this movement against the government; and
they probably imposed upon his better judgment, and led him to believe
that these men did not mean anything by all this business they were carry
ing on, but would agree to some compromise, lay down their arms, and
become good citizens again if we did not do anything to irritate them. In
accordance with these views Harney attempted to pacify the State by an
agreement with the governor, who was represented in the conference by
General Price. They entered into an agreement, the exact terms of which
I do not now remember, not having the agreement before me. I was
familiar with it. It was understood that the government would make no
further attempt to put down this spirit in Missouri by force. On the other
hand, the secessionists through General Price, agreed that the State gov
ernment would cease its preparations. It was notorious, however, to all of
us who had any observation of events there, that they did not cease at all.
They went on organizing with great rapidity throughout the State under a
secret act of the legislature, which compelled them to swear allegiance to
the State government alone, without any reference to the general govern
ment; they selected and appointed their officers, all of a stripe they could
rely upon. Union men were constantly being driven from their homes,
and came down to make their complaints. General Harney was told of all
this, but he thought it was incredible that there was any such bad faith on
the part of these people. He would refer the complaints to General Price,
who made plausible excuses, &c., &c., and this thing went on until the
government here at Washington found that the policy of General Harney
would not suit them, and they relieved him again from his cornmand there.
They had previously made Captain Lyon a brigadier general of volunteers.
When Harney was relieved, General Lyon immediately set to work to for
ward the preparation of Union troops as far as he could. And it was so
evident that it was his design to maintain the supremacy of the general
government at all hazards, that there was another overture made from
Jackson, the governor of the State, through General Price, and both of them,
at the request of their friends, came down under a safeguard from General
Lyon to make another attempt at negotiation with him, having been so suc
cessful with General Harney. I was present on the occasion. General Lyon
told them they need not be apprehensive of any man being molested in any
way so long as he made no effort against the government and the country.
He told them that he believed in the supremacy of the general government,
and that it was his duty to maintain that supremacy, and he would do it,
and would allow nothing to stand in his way of doing it. They broke off
upon that, and said that unless he would agree that the federal troops should
not be moved through the State without their consent, and many other
things of that kind, they would have to prepare to defend themselves. He
told them that if they had any designs against the government they had
better prepare. They left, burning down the railroad bridges again to pre
vent his following them.
The day afterwards General Lyon embarked his troops on boats and fol
lowed them to Jefferson City, where they had a considerable force. They,
dispersed, however, before we reached there, and went to Boonville,
some fifty-odd miles further up the river. There they collected troops, and
gave put that they were going to make a stand. General Lyon pursued
them immediately, as soon as he could make disposition of his troops to hold
Jefferson City, leaving a portion of his troops there, and reached Boonville
with about 1,700 men on the 17th of June, having left St. Louis on the 12th.
We found the enemy drawn up a few miles below Boonville. We landed,
160 TESTIMONY.
pitched into them, and cleaned them out in about two and a half hours.
There were three thousand of them. We killed a great many of them, took
a great many with their arms, and scattered them in every direction.
General Lyon's plan was this : Before he left St. Louis he had sent Gen
eral Sigel with about two regiments out by what is known as the south
western branch of the Pacific railroad. He intended that force to mov.e
down towards Springfield, to cut off re-enforcements and arms which we
knew were being sent into the State from Arkansas. Having failed to get
them sent in by way of St. Louis, they sent them in in that way. While
this force under Sigel was to go down there, General Lyon intended to pur
sue with his force and strike the enemy in the rear.
At the same time he sent orders to our troops at Fort Leavenworth. I do
not know exactly who was the commanding officer at Fort Leavenworth at
that time ; but I know that subsequently Major Sturgis — now General
Sturgis — was in command, and led the troops, under orders from Lyon, in
the first place, down to Kansas City to attack a body of men who were
known to have been collected irfJackson county, which is the count}7 in
which Kansas City is situated. A large force was also collected at Lexing
ton, which is in the county below. The force at Fort Leavenworth was
ordered to Kansas City to strike at these men ; but they never waited for
the attack, but fled towards the south, Jackson and his men having fled in
that direction.
The order was to pursue them. General Lyon made as rapid prepara
tions as possible to pursue with his own body of men, to unite with the rest
at or near Springfield. I believe that the committee all know that in the
flight of this body of men, Sigel, who had penetrated the southwestern part of
the State, fought a battle with them at Carthage, but they were too large in
number for his force; in fact they were in overwhelming numbers; they
joined all their commands there; they had those there that had been beaten
by General Lyon at Boonville, those who had fled from Lexington and from
Jackson county, and parties which had fled from the north side of the river,
which had been occupied about that time, under orders from General Lyon,
by some Iowa regiments. Colonel Curtis, now General Curtis, of the 2d
Iowa regiment, Colonel Bates, and I think a portion of the Illinois regiments,
occupied the northern part of the State. The whole of the rebels who had
been gathered in these camps of instruction fled off towards the south; they
were met there at Carthage by Sigel, and he had an engagement which
lasted the greater portion of the day. He killed a great number of them,
and succeeded in drawing off his force, with a loss of not more than two or
three men, in the face of a very overwhelming force of the enemy. Even
as early as at that time McCulloch had penetrated into Missouri, and had
captured one company of SigePs men who were posted at a small town
below Carthage, near Arkansas.
General Lyon in making this movement talked it all over with me before
he made the plan of the campaign. He expected to strike a decisive blow
before these men could mass themselves together anywhere, or overrun the
State "while they were in scattered bodies. He expected that even with the
small force that he had and was able to spare he could drive them out of
the State; and he had no doubt but what he should succeed, because the
President having called for a large body of troops, and having the whole
northwest to draw upon, he had very little doubt of being sufficiently re-
enforced so as to be enabled to hold his position in the southwest. After
having cleared the State of secessionists, before they could raise any great
army in the southwest to attack him there, he had no doubt of being re-
enforced in overwhelming numbers from the northwestern States. He calcu
lated with confidence upon being supported. That was his plan, and so far
TESTIMONY. 161
as he was concerned, I believe everybody knows his plan was executed with
vigor, promptitude, and success. That he was not supported was not his
fault, for he ceased to be the commander of the department, even before the
appointment of Frdmont. There was, among a class of our Union people,
great distrust and great apprehension felt of him, on account of his vigor
and earnestness, and they protested against his having the command of the
department.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. The Union people had a distrust of General Lyon ?
Answer. Yes, sir; it comes from a class of people, of men who liked the
Union very much, but did not see the necessity of fighting for it, who
thought the best way to put down the rebellion was to make a show of force,
but not to use it at all.
s By Mr. Johnson.
Question. Carrying on war without fighting ?
Answer. There were a great many who fell into that error, who were as
good Union men as anybody. I do not make any charges against them.
But that was not General Lyon's plan, and he was obnoxious to that kind
of criticism. Many said he was alienating the people, making enemies to
the nation, by the rigor of his movement, and the promptitude with which
he drove these people before him. The State of Missouri was, by an order
from the War Department, attached to General McClellan's command, he
being at that time in Cincinnati, and soon afterwards he took the field in
person in the mountains of Western Virginia. It was impossible for General
Lyon to communicate with him. It was impossible for General McClellan
to know what General Lyon wanted, and to give him a proper support. My
brother and myself had conceived a very different opinion of General Lyon
from that which was held by the persons of whom I have spoken. We
thought he was the right man in the right place. We had very strongly
urged upon the President his appointment as brigadier general. We thought
he was the best man to command that department, and insisted upon his
being allowed to command it. But when we were overborne by representa
tions made by others to the President, and it was determined that he should
not command it, we thought it best to have some one appointed to the com
mand who would carry out the same policy, and who would take the field
in person. Hence, we both urged the appointment of General Frdmout. I
do not know whether anything we said had any influence at all upon that
appointment. I am inclined, however, to think that it did. We not only
wanted him appointed, but we wanted him there. He went to New York,
however, and remained there for some time. I had left Boonville; had left
the column under General Lyon to come here to Congress. I received a
despatch from General Lyon, dated either the 17th or 19th of July. I am
inclined to think it was the 17th. The despatch stated that he was threat
ened by a force of 30,000 men, and he must be overwhelmed unless he was
supported. I got my brother — who was a member of the cabinet, and I
thought would speak with more authority — to send that despatch verbatim
to General Fremont in New York, with an additional message, urging him
to go to Missouri. I believe he started almost immediately after receiving
that despatch. At any rate he reached St. Louis on the 26th of July. There
were rumors then of an attack to be made upon Cairo by General Pillow;
and it was also rumored that General Hardee, in the southeastern part of
the State, would make an attack upon Pilot Knob, where we had a military
station and a small force. But General Fremont was met by messengers
from General Lyon, reiterating exactly what he had stated in his despatch
Part iii 11
162 TESTIMONY.
to me. There were several messengers from General Lyon to General Fre
mont, urging the sending him re-enforcements and sustaining him at Spring
field, predicting that if he was not supported he could not hold his ground
there successfully against such odds.
By Mr. Julian:
Question. What date was that ?
Answer. The '26th of July.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Was Fremont there then ?
Answer. He was there then; he got there on that day, I think. As a
matter of course, I state now what I have heard of other men. I can give
their names: Captain Cavender, who was a captain in my regiment, which
was at Boonville, had accompanied Lyon down to Springfield. He came up
and was in St. Louis at the time General Frdmont reached there. He bore
a message to Frdmont, as he himself told me, stating the condition of affairs
at Springfield; that General Lyon had but 6,000 effective men with him, and
that the enemy had over 20,000 men, as there was no doubt about it, the
fact having been well ascertained. Colonel Farrar, who was then on Gen
eral Lyon's staff, as an aide-de-camp, was also in St. Louis, having started
from Springfield a few days later than Captain Cavender. He was charged
by General Lyon to state his condition to General Fremont, and he told the
same story, and urged the same state of facts. Hon. John S. Phelps, a
member of the House of Representatives, whose home was at Springfield,
and who had taken up arms for the government, and was the colonel of a
regiment — he came up to St. Louis, on his way to Jefferson city, to attend
a meeting of the convention which met there early in August, and also
coming on to Washington to take his seat here, which he afterwards did.
He came from General Lyon's camp and went to General Fremont and told
the same story. And there were other persons, not, I believe, directly from
General Lyon, but men who, living in the city of St. Louis, some of them
were greatly interested in our affairs there, and having heard the statement
of facts as they existed in the southwest, thought it their duty to call upon
General Fremont and tell him of it. I understood from Captain Cavender
that General Fremont promised to support General Lyon. But he seems to
have thought that the greatest peril to his command was in the direction of
the southeast, at Cairo. And he went down to Cairo himself, taking with
him, I think, four regiments of infantry; and he sent another regiment, Col
onel Baylies's regiment, to Cape Girardeau, which is sixty miles above Cairo.
He had abundant force under his command to have relieved General Lyon.
There were nine regiments at that time in northern Missouri, where there
were no secessionists embodied in the northern part of the State on the line
of the railroads.
Question. What do you mean by northern Missouri ?
Answer. I mean that part of the State north of the Missouri river. There
were no forces of the secessionists embodied at that time in any of that part
of the State. Or if there was, they were too insignificant to attract any at
tention or do any harm.
By Mr. Johnson:
Question. Were there regiments where they could be ordered to General
Lyon's relief ?
Answer. Yes, sir; there were nine of them there. And there was also one
regiment, at the time he arrived in St. Louis, at Rblla, which is 120 miles
from Springfield, on the direct road to Springfield.
TESTIMONY 163
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Who was in command of that regiment ?
Answer. Colonel Wyman. I think it was the 12th or 13th Illinois regi
ment. At the time General Fre'mont reached St. Louis that regiment was
then at Rolla. Another regiment, the 7th Missouri, Colonel Stevenson, was
subsequently sent to Rolla. It was stationed at Boonville when General
Fremont reached St. Louis, and he ordered it to Rolla, with a view, it is
supposed, of ordering it down to support Lyon. It would have gone from
Boonville direct, and reached Springfield just as soon as from Rolla. And
there was no enemy intervening between Boonville and Springfield. And
there was a great deal better road there, a little further from Springfield
than Rolla was. I have heard it stated that he gave an order to Stevenson
to repair to Rolla from Boonville Stevenson said that he was a great deal
delayed in getting there by not having transportation; and when he got to
Rolla there was no transportation to take him on. He got there on the 6th
of August, as I have understood from Colonel Stevenson. There was trans
portation which came into Rolla from the southwest. Wagons had been
hired by the quartermaster's department to take provisions down to Spring
field, as I have understood, and as I have no doubt is the fact, having seen
the paper discharging one of these wagons from service. The quartermaster
discharged the wagon from service after it came in. There were thirty or
forty wagons came into Rolla on or about the 4th of August, and they were
discharged from service and sent down to St. Louis — transportation enough
to have taken both regiments off.
Question. Were they discharged after General Fre'mont had given orders
to those regiments to go to the relief of General Lyori ?
Answer. I do not know that he ever gave any such order. Colonel Ste-
renson told me that he never got such an order, and I never heard it
alleged that Colonel Wyman was so ordered. Colonel Stevenson was
ordered to Rolla, as he said, he supposed with a view of being ordered on
to Springfield. But I have never heard that he was ordered to Springfield;
but, on the contrary, I heard from Stevenson that he was not ordered on to
Springfield after he reached Rolla, and he had no transportation of any kind
to take him forward.
Question. You say that Stevenson said he had no transportation to take him
forward ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Who ordered the transportation back to St. Louis from Rolla ?
Atiswer. The quartermaster. I know the fact to be that that transporta
tion was discharged from service. It was transportation that, under Gen
eral Lyon's orders, was hired. He was not able to avail himself of the
purchase of wagons to obtain transportation, and in the great hurry in
which he sent Sigel and the rest of that command oat to the southwest he
ordered wagons to be hired in the city by Quartermaster Saxton and Quar
termaster Carey Gratz. He ordered, in my hearing, that they should employ
this transportation for that purpose, and it was employed. And I knew the
fact to be that some 30 or 40 wagons reached Rolla, returning from Spring
field, on the 4th of August, and they were discharged and sent down to
St. Louis, although the owners of the transportation were very anxious
that it should be kept in the service.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Had General Fremont any knowledge of the fact that that
transportation was there and had been discharged ?
Answer. I do not know. I do not think he knew anything about it. My
impression is, that he does not know anything about it, and did not know
anything about it.
164 TESTIMONY.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Who was responsible for that discharge ?
Answer. I think he ought to have known it, and ought to have seen not
only that troops were sent down to re-enforce General Lyon, but that they
should have the means of doing it. I think that he had ample notice of Lyon's
danger, enough troops to have relieved him, and plenty of time to do it in.
But he failed to do it by not ordering the troops there, for if he did order
any troops at all, I have never heard it alleged that he ordered more than
one regiment, and that was Stevenson's.
By Mr. Johnson:
Question. And this transportation which was discharged there could have
been used to take these regiments on ?
Answer. Undoubtedly. They got there on the 4th of August, and there
were six days between that and the 10th when the battle was fought. It
could have been used for that purpose.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. The distance from Rolla to Springfield was 120 miles ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Any railroad ?
Answer. No, sir; it was a bad road. The battle need not have been
fought on the 10th, and it wculd not have been fought on the 10th if they
had had any assurance of re-enforcements. It was fought in utter despe
ration of any relief from any quarter, and in order to save himself and save
his army. I have understood from surviving officers, who were present
there, that he made his determination to strike a blow so desperate that,
if he failed to drive them before him, they could not follow his army if he
was obliged to retreat.
Question. I asked you the distance with reference to whether there was
sufficient time, after General Frdmont knew of General Lyon's condition, for
those regiments to have reached him ?
Answer. I have a letter here from John M" . Palmer. I will state, before I
read this letter, that after reaching St. Louis General Fremont drew off one
of these regiments from North Missouri, as I understand, to go down with
him to Cairo. I think one of those regiments were a portion of the force
under General Pope's command in North Missouri. I do not know whether
all of them were; and I "do not know exactly what regiment they were; I
cannot recall them. But my opinion is — I think I have heard it so stated, cer
tainly that has been my impression about it — that one of those nine regi
ments were taken by Fre'mont to Cairo. He drew them from Pope's com
mand, and shipped them on eight steamboats, and took them down to Cairo.
They were infantry regiments.
By the chairman:
Question. Then he left five regiments. Where were they ?
Answer. They were stationed on the railroads up there; all communi
cating by river and railroad with St. Louis. They could all have been
brought to St. Louis in 24 hours. There was, in addition to that, Colonel
Mulligan's regiment at Jefferson City. There were, also, in St. Louis or near
St. Louis, five regiments that were called Home Guards, men who had been
mustered into service by General Lyon under the order of which I have
previously spoken.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Were they disposable to be sent out of St. Louis ?
Answer. Yes, sir; they had been sent out of St. Louis frequently by Gene
TESTIMONY. 165
ral Lyon to occupy different points in the State, and could have been made
use of for that purpose. If it had been intended to send Stevenson's regi
ment to Springfield it need not have been brought to Roll a, but could have
been sent more expeditiously and securely from Boonville, where it was
stationed. The road from there was much better than from Rolla to
Springfield, and the distance was not much greater. Instead of that it
was carried down the river by steamboat. There were a great many de
lays in getting steamboat transportation, and then it was taken by railroad
to Rolla, where it got on the 6th of August.
Question. Were there any means of transportation at Boonville, to have
taken the regiment from Boonville to Springfield ?
Answer. The country is of such a character, it being a wealthy country
and highly improved, that there would have been no difficulty in an emer
gency in impressing teams enough or in marching through the country with
out any teams, because you could always calculate upon getting sub-
'feistence through that country, which is one of the best cultivated portions
of Missouri. In fact, Lyon got all his transportation there, I think, with
which he marched south. The country surrounding Boouville is about the
wealthiest and best cultivated in the State. I have already mentioned
that there was a regiment in St. Louis, Colonel Baylies's regiment of rifles,
which was sent down on the 6th of August to Cape Girardeau; that regi
ment was available to have been sent to Rolla and to Springfield; and
what makes the thing perfectly conclusive is that, as soon as the news of
the battle reached St. Louis, four regiments from Illinois that were in North
Missouri were instantly sent to Rolla. They could just as well have been
sent before and better; because, after that battle, the secession element in
the State — throughout the State — was in a perfect ferment, and the troops
could better have been spared before the battle than after it. The seces
sionists commenced organizing in every part of the State as soon as the
result of the battle was known.
By the chairman:
Question. What necessity was there for General Lyon to fight the battle
there against such odds, and what objection, under the circumstances, to
his retreating; what obstacle in the way of his retreat?
Answer. This is the state of facts: He had no cavalry at all, except a
few companies of regular cavalry, while the enemy had 5,000 cavalry, and
the rest infantry. A very large proportion of their force was mounted. It
would have been impossible for him to have retreated before such a force.
They could have cut him off and destroyed him on the retreat by the nature
of the country through which he had to pass. It is a broken country, cut
up by streams, some rapid and large streams, such as the Gasconade river.
The country is very broken, hilly, and wooded; and General Hardee was to
have cut him off at the Gasconade, and would have done so if Price had
been able to pursue.
Question. I should have supposed that would have made against their
cavalry.
Answer. Yes, sir; but it would have compelled Lyon to have marched his
troops in a long line extending over seven miles. It would have been easy
enough for their cavalry to have come up with them and held them in that
disordered condition until the balance of the infantry regiments could have
pursued and engaged them whenever they saw proper to engage them, on
any spot of ground they chose. They would have been encumbered, also,
with the women and children of the Union people of Springfield and the
southwest, and their baggage, as they were in their march encumbered with
these people. Thousands of them fled, while the secessionists remained
166 TESTIMONY.
there. That was General* Lyon's judgment about it, and I adduce these
facts in justification of his judgment. And there is another thing to be said
about it: he had a great reluctance to do any retreating at all.
The chairman: I like him for that, certainly.
The witness: And he believed, I expect, (in fact, I have no doubt about
it,) that he could vanquish them on that field; and if he had lived I do not
believe our army would ever have moved from the field, which was fairly
won. One or two more regiments would have been all that he would have
asked.
The chairman: I guess he would have whipped them as it was if he had
lived.
The witness: He did whip them; they were driven from the field; our
army remained masters of the field. As much as I have read about battles
in this country, from the accounts I have received of that fight at Spring
field, I do not believe there ever was such another fight on the continent of
America. There were 23,000 men of the enemy. Our men attacked them
about daylight, and they fought until 11 o'clock. At 11 o'clock there was
not an enemy to be seen. They were repulsed by our troops three several
times. When they had brought up fresh troops, they were repulsed and
driven out of sight each time; and on the third and last assault, which was
a desperate one, and almost a hand-to-hand encounter, our men succeeded
in driving them out of sight, until they could not see where they were; and
the victory was ours, and belongs to our army. There was lost in killed
and wounded pretty nearly one-third of our forces. My regiment, the first
Missouri regiment, went into the battle with about 700 men, and there
were 315 of them killed and wounded. One of the Kansas regiments
suffered about an equal loss. The killed and wounded of the enemy is only
conjectural, because the reports which they have made about it are abso
lutely false. They must have lost 4,000 or 5,000 men in killed and wounded.
I have since seen published in the newspapers a string of their officers
killed and wounded at that fight. I saw it published in the New York
Herald ; and there were over fifty officers that were killed and wounded
that were named in that list, a great many of whom I knew well. I know
the fact to be that they were killed. It was a very destructive fight to
them, and also to our own people, who had to withstand attack after attack
from fresh troops.
; By Mr. Odell :
Question. What do you make our force to have been ?
Answer. The force we had then in the field and in the fight was, I think,
about 5,000 men. There were, I think, about 1,200 or 1,400 men under
Sigel, and about 3,800 men under Lyon. They attacked in two columns.
The enemy succeeded in defeating Sigel's column.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Do you know whether Sigel's column ever rallied and came into
action again ?
Answer. No, sir; it was scattered and driven off. The camp which the
enemy occupied on Wilson's creek extended, they tell me, from four to five
miles in length; and the attack was made at the two opposite ends of the
camp; Lyon at one end and Sigel at the other. At first Sigel's attack was
successful; he drove off the enemy and occupied their camp, which he set on
fire. The enemy rallied and scattered him with overwhelming numbers, and
his men were considerably scattered, I am told. The enemy succeeded in
capturing five of his six cannon, scattered his men and drove them off, taking
a great many prisoners; I think twf hundred or three hundred prisoners;
TESTIMONY 167
and then the whole fight was maintained by the column under Lyon. I
am told that Lyon was killed about 9 o'clock in the day. He had been
wounded twice before, once in the head and once in the leg, a ball cutting
him through the scalp, and one passing through his leg. He was shot
down at the head, I think, of one of the Iowa regiments, or one of the
Kansas regiments, I am not certain which, leading an attack; he was
shot through the breast. His death was not known for some time, except to
a few officers. Finally, when the enemy were driven clear off the field,
Major Sturgis was the senior officer in command, the lieutenant colonel of
my regiment having been wounded, and the colonel and lieutenant colonel
of each of the Kansas regiments having been wounded and shot down. The
colonel of the Iowa regiment never went into the field; I think he was sick.
Major Sturgis was the commanding officer. A council of war was called,
and it was determined, as the ammunition of the men was pretty nearly ex
hausted, there being left not more than two or three rounds to a man, that
,they should at least fall back until they ascertained what had become of
SigePs column. They fell back upon a more commanding position, from
which, after looking over the whole ground, ascertaining that SigePs men
were really driven back entirely, and that they could expect no support
from him, they determined to fall back upon Springfield, which they reached
about midnight, having left it a little after dusk the night before. The
distance was twelve miles. The enemy never made the least attempt
to follow them. The officers say that if they had been re-enforced upon
their return from Springfield — the transportation of Ben McCulloch's and
Price's army having been destroyed in the battle and their army being so cut
up — it was their determination to have turned back and renewed the fight.
But they reached Rolla without being re-enforced by a single man. They
found six regiments at Holla, four of which had been sent there after the
battle, and two of which, Wyrnari's and Stevenson's, were there before the
battle; Wyman's having been there probably a month; a great while at any
rate. It is my opinion, formed from conversation with many persons in the
service out there, that no effort of any kind was made to re-enforce Lyon;
certainly none which deserved to be called an effort. Yet the means were
ample, the time was sufficient, and the notice was ample. I doub^ very
much whether the general commanding there had any appreciation of the
importance of the matter, even after he had all the information that every
body else had upon the subject. Cairo was fortified, -had heavy artillery,
heavy ordnance — the kind of ordnance mounted usually in such works — and
was defended by six or eight regiments. It was within reach by railroad
and river of re-enforcements from the entire northwest, and could have been
re-enforced from Philadelphia before Pillow could have moved up from New
Madrid against it, and before he could have waded the Mississippi or the Ohio
to have attacked those fortifications there. It was a simple absurdity to have
considered that the point of danger. If those four regiments had been all
that he had the disposition of, it was a simple absurdity to relieve Cairo,
fortified and defended as it was, by its natural position at the junction of
the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, with the immense armament it had there,
sufficient to have defended it 'against all the river craft the rebels had on the
river and on the ocean. It was a simple piece of absurdity to send four
regiments of infantry down there, if they had been all that we had in the
city, or in his department, instead of sending them to Lyon.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. You stated that he went himself with these four regiments to
Cairo ?
Answer. He did go with them.
Question. Do you know what time be went
168 TESTIMONY
Answer. I think he started on the 1st of August; that is my impression.
Question. And he was notified of Lyon's condition on the 26th of July ?
Answer. Yes, sir; previous to that. He was notified of it before he left
New York. He was notified by a despatch from Lyon to me, which my
brother sent to him. He had full notice of that before he left New York.
And what shows that he had the regiments to send to him was that these
same regiments, which were in North Missouri before the battle, he sent to
Eolla after the news of the battle reached him, and they reached Rolla a
week afterwards. They could have been just as well sent before, and better
spared.
Question. As a military man, it is clearly your opinion that the regiments
he himself took to Cairo should have been sent to Lyon's relief?
Answer. Undoubtedly; that is my opinion. I do not know whether it is
worth anything or not, but I give my reasons for it.
By the chairman:
Question. This idea occurs to me. The enemy were over 20,000 strong,
and Lyon had only 5,000 men. Now, all the re-enforcements General Frd-
niont could have sent to him would have still left Lyon vastly inferior to
the enemy ?
Answer. There is a doubt about that. It would have left him inferior in
numbers, perhaps, and yet he might have been very superior, for he man
aged to beat them with 5,000.
Question. Would not that be a difficulty with military men; would it not
be considered rash to re-enforce him with an amount of men that would
leave him still weaker than the enemy ?
By Mr. Johnson:
Question. If that had been the determination upon the part of the com-
mander-in-chief, should he not have notified General Lyon of that ?
Answer. He said he would re-enforce him.
By the chairman:
Question. I should say that a military man should have said, " I cannot
re-enforce you ; you must retreat." That is what I think. I do not know
anything about that, however.
Answer. In reply to that, I would say this, that if he had four regiments
that were disposable they should have been sent where they were wanted
rather than where they were not wanted. Now, it must be a pretty clear
case, I think, that those four regiments of infantry could not have been any
great addition to the fortifications at Cairo, where they had mounted such
heavy ordnance, and where they had such strong works, and where the
natural position was so strong that it was almost impossible to take it.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. Do you know what the force was there at Cairo at that time ?
Answer. My general idea about it is that there were six or eight regi
ments there at Cairo. I have a letter here from General Palmer, to which I
have already referred. I will read it:
" ST. Louis, MISSOURI, November 22, 1861.
"DEAR SIR: On the 5th July, 1861, the 14th regiment of Illinois volun
teers (900 strong) crossed the Mississippi river, and on the 13th moved
from Hannibal to Macon City, and remained there and at Eevick and Stur
geon, on the North Missouri railroad, until the 9th of August, and on the
10th reached Jefferson barracks. When this regiment left Hannibal, the
TESTIMONY 169
3d Iowa and the 16th Illinois were on the line of the Hannibal and St.
Joseph railroad. On the 13th July Colonel Turchin's Illinois regiment came
into the State of Missouri. On the 14th Colonel Grove's 21st Illinois was
at Palmyra, at which place Colonel Turchin was stationed. On the 31st of
July I found at Mexico Colonel Marshall's 1st Illinois cavalry, and one
battalion of the 15th Illinois, Colonel Becker's regiment having left the
same place a few days before. During the month of July the following
regiments were in North Missouri, and within twenty-four hours of St. Louis:
' " 14th Illinois volunteers, Palmer 900 strong.
" 16th Illinois volunteers, Smith 800
" 19th Illinois volunteers, Turchin 800 "
" 15th Illinois volunteers, Turner 800 "
" 21st Illinois volunteers, Grant 800 "
" 1st Illinois cavalry, Marshall 600
> " 24th Illinois, Hecker 900 "
" 3d Iowa, Williams 100 "
" Total 6,300 men.
"All these regiments were then full, and the estimate of their actual
strength is low.
" Very truly, yours,
"J. M. PALMER.
Colonel F. P. BLAIR.
" P. S. — If it be inquired what all these regiments were doing, the answer
is, eating their rations and holding railroads.
"J. M. PALMER."
There was, in addition to these regiments, a battalion under Major Hunt,
at Hannibal, of three companies. There was a battalion of four companies
at St. Joseph's, under Colonel Peabody, and all available at that time. If
we had succeeded in completely driving and routing the enemy under Price
at Springfield, I do not believe there would have been any occasion for
another regiment in North Missouri.
Question. Do you know which of these regiments went to Cairo ?
Answer. I know that some of them went, but I do not now know which
they were. This force was in North Missouri, that I know of. Then there were
Baylies's regiment in St. Louis ; Stevenson's regiment at Boonville ; Wy-
man's regiment at Rolla ; Mulligan's regiment at Jefferson City ; and five
regiments of Home Guards in St. Louis, or about St. Louis. Some of them
might have been a little distance off. Those regiments were available without
weakening the force either at Pilob Knob, Cape Girardeau, Bird's Point, or
Cairo ; and I think, if he had been disposed to help Lyon, to re-enforce him,
and had told the governors of Illinois and Indiana of the fact, he c6uld have
got twenty regiments in time. I know very well that in a week or two
afterwards — a week, I think — certainly not more than ten days after this
battle was fought — they sent eight regiments and two batteries from In
diana to him. If the condition of Lyon had been made known to the gov
ernor of Illinois and the governor of Indiana, and a demand made for troops,
either to go to Cairo, so that he could have gone with what he had in Mis
souri to the aid of Lyon, or to have sent them directly from those States to
the aid of Lyon, I believe he could have got anywhere from twenty to thirty
regiments from those two States in time.
170 TESTIMONY.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Were these regiments you "have referred to as being at these
different localities armed at that time ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I heard of this disaster to our arms on my way to St.
Louis ; and I think it will be easily understood by those who know my re
lations to General Fremont previously, that I was very loth to attribute any
blame to him ; and it was not until I had ascertained to my own satisfac
tion, from information which came to me, in many instances unsolicited, that
he had troops at his disposal, that the truth forced itself upon my mind that
he was responsible for that ; that my opinions of him, which were favorable
previously, were shaken and changed ; and then I confess that what I ob
served of General Fremont in the after conduct of the war was anything
but reassuring.
He surrounded himself by the worst men that probably any man ever had
the misfortune to be surrounded by — men whose whole history, I believe,
as far as I have heard anything said about them, go to show that they did
not have the public interest at heart at all, but were seeking their private
ends at the expense of the government ; and a very singular circumstance
occurred there, which probably is worthy of mention ; I do not recollect
when it was, but it was some time after the disaster at Springfield. It was
rumored that Jeff. Thompson was cutting up some of his antics down in the
southeastern part of the State. General Fremont ordered a concerted move
ment from Cairo, under General Grant, and from Pilot Knob, under General
Prentiss, to go down and catch him. The order to General Prentiss was
sent down, as a matter of course, by the Iron Mountain railroad, and the
order to General Grant was sent down by his chief of staff, in the same
way; and these orders would necessarily have been compelled to go through
the enemy's lines to have reached General Grant, instead of sending the
order around by the Illinois railroad, or down the river, so as to insure Gen
eral Grant getting his orders about as early as General Prentiss got his
orders at Pilot Knob. As a matter of course, General Grant did not get his
order, and the movement was not executed, growing out of the ignorance of
the chief of staff of the mere geography of the country.
It was very well understood in Missouri, after this fight at Springfield,
that the secessionists had taken heart, were encouraged, and were rising up
in every part of the State. In fact, they were so emboldened that very soon
afterwards they began to attack our people at the different positions that
had been assigned them, where they had been perfectly secure before. There
was an attempt made upon the force at Boonville, or in the intrenchments
near there, which was beaten off by the Home Guards. There was an attack
made at Lexington that was beaten off by the three or four companies then
inside the intrenchments there, and Colonel Marshall, with his Illinois cavalry
regiment, was sent up to the relief of Lexington. Mulligan's regiment was
sent up there, Mulligan commanding the post; and, as I have understood —
and I believe such was the case — Mulligan was instructed to hold Lexing
ton. It was then understood that Lexington was to be invested by Price.
Mulligan went there and took possession, probably a week or so — I do not
recollect the dates, nor is it material — before Price appeared before Lexing
ton. It was understood that he was working his way around there by the
head of the Osage, to get into that country which was so rich, and in which
supplies were so abundant. Mulligan was instructed, as I have understood,
and as I believe, to hold Lexington until he was relieved. He had ample
means of escape, even when Price was within ten miles of the place. He
had steamboats at his command, and could have moved across the river and
saved his whole command, if he had not obeyed orders; but instead of that
he obeyed orders, and remained there. Price's army was so large that he
TESTIMONY. 171
soon succeeded in getting between Mulligan and the river, and destroying
the boats. Mulligan was then regularly invested and cut off from water,
and remained there so invested and fighting for nine days, when he surren
dered, from sheer starvation and exhaustion.
General Fremont had troops enough in St. Louis, at Rolla, at Jefferson
City, and all along the line of road, and in North Missouri, to ha.ve relieved
him. In fact, he either intended to relieve him when he ordered him to hold*
Lexington until he was relieved, and believed that he was strong enough to
do it, or he did not intend to relieve him, but intended that he should be
taken One or the other horn of the dilemma he must take. I understand
that General Fremont says that about the time he was going to move to re
lieve him, five regiments were ordered here. But it is a matter of history
that he did not move a single regiment out of Missouri to fill that order;
and the order was not received by Fremont till three or four days after Price
had invested Lexington.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. The order that came from here to send on five regiments ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; he sent two regiments from Cairo or Paducah, I think,
arid the other three were regiments which had just then completed their
organization at or near Chicago, or somewhere in the interior of Illinois, but
he did not weaken his command in Missouri one man — not one. That is a
matter of history, and clears up that excuse. The order was soon counter
manded, and only two regiments left the department, those from Paducah
and Cairo, and those only got to Cincinnati and were sent to BuelPs depart
ment in Kentucky.
I do not know the number of men Fremont had in Missouri at that time.
I simply know that he had a large force there. I think he had 5,000 or
6,000 men at least at Holla, which was on the railroad, and who could have
been sent up to Jefferson City and above that by railroad. I know there
must have been at least 8,000 or 10,000 in St. Louis, because he inaugurated
Benton barracks the Wednesday before the Friday on which Mulligan sur
rendered. That inauguration was to have taken place on Monday, but it
rained on Monday and the ceremonies were postponed. It rained on Tues
day, and the pageant was again put off ; but on Wednesday the ceremony
came off. General Fremont was there and reviewed what the newspapers
stated were from 8,000 to 10,000 men ; arid there were several regiments
in the city which were not included — that were not there at all. My
regiment, what was left of it, was within two miles of this ceremony, and
although they were willing to have participated in it, they were not there.
I mention this simply to show that the whole force was not at this ceremony.
Question. You say that this took place on the Wednesday before Mulli
gan's surrender, on Friday ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; and the fight went on for nine days before he sur
rendered. I know it lasted that long, and no troops were moved, as far as
I know or have ever been able to ascertain, until the surrender was made,
unless they were troops on the north side of the river which came down
under Sturgis and found no means of crossing. I have been informed by a
gentleman, whose name is Shaffer, now on General Hunter's staff, that after
the surrender occurred he left Rolla with General Hunter and went to Jef
ferson City, and there had to wait a few hours to get Colonel Jeff. C. Davis's
quarters, who was reported by General Fremont on the same day to have
moved, and to have with Lane 11,000 men south of the river and below
Price's army. Yet Price remained in Lexington ten days and moved off un
molested by anybody, and St. Louis by river and railroad is not four days
from Lexington ; a swift boat could make it in two days.
172 TESTIMONY.
Question. You can get from St. Louis to Lexington in two days ?
Answer. You can go within sixty miles of it by railroad, and then be so
far south of it that an army there would have to make very good time to
get south of you ; or you can go directly to Lexington by steamboat. The
very slowest boats go there in four days from St. Louis. The reviewing of
the troops at Benton barracks was intended for Monday, but postponed until
Wednesday on account of the rain. Now, if he had started troops from St.
Louis on Monday they could have got there in time.
Question. Did General Fremont know anything about General Mulligan's
condition ?
Answer. He knew a great deal about it, and could have known more if he
had not refused to see peopl^ who did know. I have a paper in my pocket
which is a curiosity. A man, commanding the steamboat Sunshine, a gov
ernment transport, came down with despatches from Mulligan to Jefferson
C. Davis, at Jefferson City, giving a statement of his condition. He had a
guard of ten or twelve men with him. The boat was seized at Glasgow by
a party of secessionists under Martin Green, brother of ex-senator Green,
and another fellow, who made a great deal of noise there, whose name I have
forgotten. They had some 5,000 men, and seized the boat and made it ferry
them across the river to Glasgow. They were going to re-enforce Price's
army. They kept the boat, but the captain made his escape and came down
to St. Louis. He sent up this paper to General Fre'inont when he got to
St. Louis :
"Captain George W. Willard, of steamboat Sunshine, taken by State troops
at Glasgow, has despatches from Colonel Mulligan to Colonel Jefferson C.
Davis, at Jefferson City, sent by his guard, and secreted by me when the
guard were taken prisoners."
The reply on the same piece of paper is : " Captain, a train leaves to-mor
row for Jefferson City, by which you can forward the despatches or go. If
you are not of the army you can leave the despatches here. Should be
pleased to see you to-morrow."
This is signed by the secretary. He refused to see him then, but said he
would see him to-morrow.
Question. This Jefferson Davis is one of our men ?
Answer. Yes, sir. This is Jefferson C. Davis, of Indiana, colonel com
manding at Jefferson City. I will state this further : that if General Fre"-
moiit did not know the condition of Colonel Mulligan, he was ignorant of
what every man in St. Louis knew, and what the newspapers published
every morning about the condition of that command. It was well known
there. It was known two weeks previous that Price's army was advancing.
It was known exactly when he reached Warrensburg ; it was known exactly
when he invested the town of Lexington ; it was known that they had large
numbers, &c. All this was well understood in St. Louis, and known to
everybody, if it was not known to the general commanding.
There is one thing very certain upon this point, without being any mili
tary authority myself, or pretending to any military knowledge. Mulligan
and Marshall and others were in the trenches at Lexington with 2,300 men,
and they had orders to hold it until they were re-enforced or relieved, and
the general who gave that order without knowing that he could relieve them
is responsible for what occurred, because Mulligan could have gone across
the river and escaped with his whole command, and with his entire property
that he had there, even after the advance guard of Price appeared in town.
Nothing could have stopped him. He had the boats at his command, and
could have taken off his troops without difficulty, had he not obeyed orders
to hold the place until re-enforced or relieved.
General Fremont despatched to the President — that is, I saw the despatch
TESTIMONY 173
published — as soon as the news of the surrender of Lexington reached the
city, that he had 4,000 men on the north side of the river moving down on
Price, and 11,000 under Lane and Davis south of the river, and he was about
taking the field himself, and hoped to cut Price off. Yet Price actually re
mained in Lexington ten days after the surrender, arid was not cut off.
Now, the fact is that Davis had not moved; the fact is that Lane had not
moved, and they were not south of Price at all with 11,000 men. The fact
is that Sturgis had only 1,200 men, and no means of crossing the river. It
might have occurred to anybody that such would have been the case; that it
was impossible to cross such a river as the Missouri in the face of a supe
rior enemy. And instead of taking the field, as he said when he sent that
despatch, General Fremont remained in St. Louis several days afterwards.
He then went to Jefferson City, and stayed there over a week. He went to
Tipton, and stopped there another week. And he remained some time at
Warsaw, building a bridge, and finally got down to Springfield, I think, in
about a month from the time that he left St. Louis.
By Mr. Johnson:
Question. Where was Price then, when he got to Springfield ?
Answer. Price was between seventy and eighty miles south and west of
him. He never gained a foot on him.
Question. As the two armies marched, Price rather increased the distance
between them, did he ? How is that ?
Answer. I do not know whether he did or not. He increased it when he
wanted to increase it; he stopped whenever he had occasion to stop any
where for anything; he did not seem to be in much of a hurry. Yet when
Fremont got down to Springfield he seemed to think, he imagined, he had
the hallucination, that the enemy were about to attack him, and he sent
messenger after messenger back to Hunter to come up, and Hunter did
make forced marches and came up and found Fremont in a perfect panic
about fighting a battle with Price, who was seventy miles off from him.
The most remarkable characteristic of the man seeming to be an insensi
bility to fear when others were in danger; he seemed to have no apprecia
tion of the danger in which Lyon was and Mulligan was; when others were
exposed to great and imminent danger, he thought they could do well
enough; but was in a perfect panic of fear when he himself was in the field,
and the enemy seventy miles off, and he himself surrounded by 35,000 or
40,000 men, well armed and equipped, and with eighty cannon. I don't mean
by this that he was in " bodily fear," but that he was paralyzed by his in
capacity to deal with great affairs, overwhelmed by a responsibility to
which he was unequal.
As a matter of course, I state these things upon what I have heard from
officers who were there. So far as the report or rumor about his expecting
a battle the next day is concerned — which rumor is a matter of history and
perfectly notorious in Missouri — it is a fact just as well known that the
enemy were nowhere within three days' march of him. I have heard, and
I think it can be substantiated, that he was very reluctant to give up his
command. He knew the President had given that order, yet he was present
at a mutinous meeting of his officers, in which those officers, those personally
attached to him and around him, were shouting "Hurra for Fremont, and
down with Hunter;" and he was bowing to them with approbation while
these expressions of mutiny were going on; and the newspapers in his
interest in Missouri, German and English, were every day fulminating
threats that the army would resist and would not accept any other general;
whereas he had suppressed several newspapers, one at least, that had been
a stanch supporter of the Union ; suppressed it for a mild criticism upon
174 TESTIMONY.
the fall of Lexington ; stopped its publication and imprisoned its editors.
He allowed those newspapers in his own interest to threaten the govern
ment that the army would revolt and mutiny if he was superseded ; per
mitted it to be done, and is responsible for it, because he did not prevent it.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. What paper do you refer to ?
Answer. The St. Louis Republican, the St. Louis Democrat and the An-
zieger des Westers, &c. »
Question. I mean the paper suppressed because it criticised the matter of
Lexington.
Answer. The Evening News, a stanch Union paper in the very darkest
hours of our trouble. He suppressed it and imprisoned its editor for a
respectful criticism upon his military ability.
Question. When did he receive the order to give up his command ?
Answer. That was about the first of November ; I think about that time.
Question. Just at that time how far was the enemy from his position ?
Answer. Well, sir, it was from sixty to seventy miles ; that is as well
known as it was known that he was at Springfield at the head of our army.
Question. At what point was the enemy ?
Answer. Somewhere near Carsville, in one of those southwestern counties.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Was there any considerable portion of the enemy's forces in his
immediate vicinity ?
Answer. No, sir ; there is no pretence that there was by anybody that I
have ever heard of, and I have conversed with a great many officers that
was there at the time. I have seen large numbers of them, some of the
most intelligent and the best informed. His paroxysms there were the
subject of universal ridicule among intelligent men. A great many thought
he wanted to retain the command, and as it was published in the newspapers
that he was not to be relieved if he was in the presence of the enemy, he
made this pretence. My own opinion is that he did not know any better.
General Hunter told me that on the night he arrived there, after getting in
formation of his appointment to the command, he reached the town and
asked for General Fremont, and found him at his headquarters surrounded
by his brigadier generals and generals of divisions, with a plan all marked
out for a battle to occur the next day at Wilson's creek. It was a beautiful
plan of battle, and he says he had no doubt if he had not arrived there that
night and taken the command the army would have marched the nexfe
morning to Wilson's creek to battle, the only enemies there being the dead
bodies of the secessionists left there by Lyon.
By Mr. Johnson:
Question. Was it in the direction of the enemy ?
Answer. Yes, sir; it was in the direction, I think.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. How far was it from where they were to Wilson's creek ?
Answer. Well, sir, I suppose it was twelve miles from Springfield.
By Mr. Johnson:
Question. And in the direction of the enemy, who were some sixty or sev
enty miles off?
Answer. Yes, sir, according to my understanding of it. I made a. remark
about General Fremont now that may be considered rather harsh and un-
TESTIMONY. 1 75
j ustifiable. I do not mean to impute to him any personal apprehension by
what I have saicl. I do not want it taken in that sense. I said that he
showed great insensibilit3T to fear when other people were exposed to dan
ger, as in the ease of Lyon and in the case of Mulligan, and made no effort
to relieve them; but that he was in a perfect paroxysm of apprehension at
being threatened with his own command; urging Hunter to come up by
forced marches, when in fact he was in no danger. He had an army there
capable of coping with all the secessionists on the west bank of the Missis
sippi. What I mean is that he was conscious of his own incapacity, and
overwhelmed by apprehension growing out of this consciousness.
His disregard of danger threatening others is illustrated by what occurred
at Fredericktown. He was then some 25 miles south of Tipton, off the
railroad line and off the telegraph line, when, on the 15th of October, news
was received in St. Louis that Jeff. Thompson had burned the Big River
bridge on the Iron Mountain railroad, the largest bridge on that road, cut
ting off a detachment of our troops, some 1,500, then at Pilot Knob. Imme
diately Captain McKeever, who was his adjutant general, sent a despatch
on the same day to Grant to send troops up from Cape Girardeau to cut off
Thompson. Colonel Carlin, who was in command at Pilot Knob, telegraphed
for re-enforcements. General Curtis and McKeever, together, made great
efforts, and got off the 8th Wisconsin and Boyd's Missouri regiment, and a
battery from my regiment under Major Schofield, to go down this road and
pass around this burned bridge, and thus proceed to Pilot Knob to the aid
of Colonel Carlin.
In the House, the other day, two columns of despatches, purporting to
give an account of that affair, were read by Colonel Shanks, or caused to be
read by him. But there was a singular omission. They purported to be
extracted from General Fremont's register of despatches, and to give a full
and complete account of the affair. There was an omission of one despatch
which General Curtis received from General Fremont on the 21st of October,
as soon as he could reasonably be expected to hear of this affair of the
burning of this bridge and the threatening attack of Jeff. Thompson on
Colonel Carlin, and of the movement of troops under the orders of McKeever
for their relief, given without Fremont's knowledge. That despatch ordered
back the re-enforcements and upbraided Carlin for not himself having taken
care of all the bridges between St. Louis and Pilot Knob, some ninety miles to
be guarded by 1,500 men, and at the same time cope with Jeff. Thompson, who
had some 3,000 or 4,000 men. Re- enforcements were sent by McKeever,
Grant, and Curtis ; but the order to withdraw the re-enforcements came from
Fremont, and that order was omitted from the list of despatches. General
Curtis gave me the despatch which is so singularly omitted from General
Fremont's narrative of events. I have the despatches here. One is a de
spatch from Carlin asking for re-enforcements; the second is a despatch from
Brigadier General McKinstry to Captain McKeever, by which it appears
that General Fremont was not in a position on the 15th of October to hear
of the occurrence, there being no telegraph from Syracuse, or from any part
of this railroad line south to where Fremont had gone, 25 miles south. As
will be seen by these despatches, McKeever and Curtis co-operated in send
ing down the troops from St. Louis to the assistance of Carlin. McKeever
on that day, when Fremont was 25 miles south of Syracuse, ordered Grant to
send up re-enforcements from Cape Girardeau, and they did go under Colonel
Plummer and cut off Jeff. Thompson.
176 TESTIMONY.
By the chairman:
Question. Where were you during this period ?
Answer. I was in St. Louis. On the 21st this order came from Frdmont:
" Order all the troops you have sent on the Iron Mountain road back to
Bentqn barracks. The whole affair has been grossly exaggerated. Colonel
Carlin should have kept the road open without any additional force.
"By order of —
"GENERAL FREMONT."
And signed by Captain McKeever, as assistant adjutant general. This
despatch was not sent by McKeever and could not have been because he had
co-operated in sending down these very troops.
The battle was fought the next day at Fredericktown, against at least
3,000 of Jeff. Thompson's men, and he was completely routed by an equal
force of our people; and it was then convenient for General Fremont to
claim that victory, which happened to be the only one for the federal troops
during his time there.
I had made up my mind before the fall of Lexington that the command
was too large for General Frdmont, and I communicated that fact to my
brother, expressing the hope that he would communicate the fact to the
government, so that they could act upon it. I did not have any unkind
feelings to General Fremont; I did not make the communication in that
sense. But I had some interest in my own State, and some in the govern
ment. And I had come to that conclusion from my observation of things, •
and facts that had come to my knowledge, some of which are named in the
letter, and some of which I did not name in the letter at all. I came to the
conclusion that he was unfit for that command, and I stated that fact to my
brother, and Mrs. Fremont came on here and went to see the President, and
subsequently went to see my father and asked him about it. And he com
municated the fact to Mrs. Fremont that I had written such a letter, and im
mediately upon her return to St. Louis I was arrested. That, as well as I
can recollect, was about the middle of September. The charges were not
preferred for some time afterwards. The charges he preferred were that I
had written this letter and had communicated with the President and had
shaken the confidence of the President in the general commanding out there;
I was charged with insubordination. Upon the charges being sent forward
here, General Scott dismissed them as being frivolous and untenable. Prior
to that, however, General Fremont wrote me a letter, stating that I had
made unfounded accusations against him to the government, but he released
me from arrest at the request of my brother.
I then wrote to the adjutant general and sent the communication through
him, stating that I felt myself called upon to make good these accusations,
which General Fremont pronounced unfounded. I wrote that I would pre
fer charges as soon as I could get them in form. Whereupon I was re-
arrested for doing what every well informed person knows I had a perfect
right to do, to prefer charges against him or anybody else in the army.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Did you prefer charges against him ?
Answer. I did.
Question. What became of them ?
Answer. They are on file in the War Department. I have held myself ready
to make them good whenever General Fremont asks for a trial, or the govern
ment chooses to order one, whenever the government is in condition to supply
officers high enough in rank to be ordered on the trial. If the charges are ever
brought to trial I hold myself in readiness to make them good. I will simply
TESTIMONY. 177
state here at this point that I did not make any charges in the letter which I
wrote, and which has been published, affecting General Fremont's private
character at all. I said nothing that could have been construed as growing
out of any unkind spirit towards him, which I did not have at that time. I
have not sought to make this controversy — never given a turn to this matter
to make it a personal affair between General Fremont and myself. The whole
of that grew out of his arrest of me, which was converted into, or had the
aspect of, a personal affair between himself and myself, by reason of the arrest
and the subsequent proceedings under that arrest, upon charges which,
when preferred, were pronounced frivolous by the general-in-chief. I had on
disposition to quarrel with him. Certainly it was a very great humiliation
to me to have come to the conclusions which I did about it. It could not
have been a matter of any congratulation to me to make a breach with a
man whose friend I had been, and although I am under no obligations of
any kind to him, and never was, yet, with whose family — Colonel Benton's
family — I had, ever since I can recollect, maintained the warmest relations.
Both of the families, not only myself, but my own family and my father's
family, all of us maintained the warmest and kindest relations, personally
and politically, with General Fremont's and Colonel Benton's families.
Question. Do you remember the date of that letter which you sent here ?
Answer. I think it was dated the 1st of September — about that time.
The letter has been published, arid it states what I thought proper to lay
before the government. There was a great deal said about the frauds in
contracts at that time, by those people who were surrounding him there.
Those Californians had come and settled down there like obscene birds of
prey. It was notorious that they enjoyed his special confidence and favor;
that is, they had them at his instance; that was well known. But I did
not at that time wish to disparage him in any way that affected him
personally, because I did not wish to speak about anything from which any
unkind or personal feeling can be argued. The grounds I alleged as to
his incompetency were public grounds, and all the rancor and all the
littleness that has grown out of this controversy, has arisen by his own
act. in treating charges of a public nature as a private feud, and acting upon
it in that way. I never had any private grief against General Fremont up
to that time.
Question. Had you any difference with him ?
Answer. None.
Question. Not upon any subject ?
Answer. None.
Question. Business relations ?
Answer. Not upon any earthly subject. At the time I wrote that letter,
and for long afterwards — many days, weeks afterwards — I never had asked
him a favor that he hesitated to grunt for one instant. I was compelled, as
the representative of the district, and as a citizen, and from the supposed
relations between us — I was applied to again and again by persons to re
commend them to him for contracts. I never asked him to give anybody a
contract that he did not give it without the slightest hesitation — never. I
did not ask him for many. I asked him for some when I understood that he
was disposing of them ; when I understood that they were not going through
the quartermaster's department; that, as a matter of favor, he was giving
them to the men from California, men from New York, and from those dis
tant cities, where the people had not felt the slightest effect in their busi
ness, or very little, from the devastations of the war. And when 'people
whom I represented 'in Congress had lost nearly everything, whose business
had been all destroyed and they were reduced to poverty; when these men
Part iii 12
178 TESTIMONY.
came to me and asked me to represent the facts of what they were, what
they had suffered, what they had done for the Union cause, and that
they had as good right to have these government contracts if they were
given out of favor, or a right to compete for them if given out in the usual
way, then I could not refuse to ask for them. And those were the only
grounds upon which I did ask for them. And I take occasion to say again
that he never refused them. I never asked him to appoint anybody to office
that he did not appoint him.
Question. Do you speak now of all the time ?
Answer. I mean up to the time of my arrest. I never asked him for any
thing subsequent to that. I of course never had any communication with
him other than official communication subsequent to that.
Question. I do not mean, of course, by my question that you askeA him
for contracts personally, but in behalf of friends.
Answer. I understand that. I went to him and made these representa
tions to him, and recommended persons to him as officers that I knew would
be serviceable to the country and to him, most of which recommendations lie
adopted. If he did refuse any, it was such a small affair that it has left no
trace upon my memory. After this breach occurred, these newspapers in
the city attacked me, imputed personal motives to me for my conduct, said
that I was disappointed in not controlling everything — asserted it over and
over again. And I knew perfectly well that these accusations had his
sanction. And I knew at the same time that if he did not absolutely dictate
those things — 1 knew from the style of the articles in the newspapers, with
which style I was perfectly familiar; I knew from the nature of the accusa
tions themselves, and from other circumstances — that he or some of his im
mediate staff or surroundings were instigating those attacks upon me. I
knew at the same time that they were all false, and that he knew it. One
of those accusations was that I wanted to be a brigadier general, or wanted
to be a general in his place. Well, I had in the first place been offered it by
the government — by those who had a right to confer such a place. I had
been offered the position of general, and declined it. It was when General
Lyori was made a general. They offered to make me a general instead of
him. I knew he could do more service to the country and was better fitted
for it, and I recommended him. And General Fremont wrote a letter to my
brother — I think it was dated on the 8th of September, long after the letter
that I wrote here to Washington — in which he stated to my brother that he
had frequently urged me to receive high position in the army, and that I
had declined it. So that he knew the accusation was not true.
Question. Do you remember any application of yours, in behalf of friends,
for a large contract of clothing, &c., which was not granted ?
Answer. I recollect the only large contract that I ever asked him for for
clothing. It must have been that one, for I never asked him for any other.
I recollect that so far from not granting it, he approved it. And I can refer you
now to the very application in the report of the committee of the other house,
with " I approve " indorsed on it. It was refused by McKinstry. You will
find in that report the only contract I ever asked for. I went to him subse
quently, after McKinstry refused to give this contract, and there was some
modification of it. The contract was at the prices paid others at the eastern
cities here. I asked him for that. I went and saw him; and so far from
refusing it, he indorsed his approval upon it instantly. And I gave it to my
friend, John Howe, who went up and gave it to McKinstry. Mr. Howe had
had a quarrel with McKinstry — he thought McKinstry was not loyal — and
McKinstry would not then give him anything. I then went to General
Fremont about it. McKinstry then made a publication about it — made a
blow over it in all the telegraphic despatches to the east, to get a little
TESTIMONY. 179
reputation as being a man who had stipulated for only the prices given at
the eastern depots.
Question. Do you recollect how many suits of clothing it was for ?
Answer. I do not. It was for a large amount. The application was
made on behalf of one gentleman residing in St. Louis and another gentlo-
man residing in Chicago; and it was thought that it was but reasonable
that those two cities should have a lot of clothing to be made up, and thus
furnish employment for the families of our absent soldiers who were in the
field against the enemy.
By Mr. Julian:
Question. Did General Frdmont give you all that you asked ?
Answer. Everything.
Question. Without any hesitation ?
Answer. Without any hesitation, not only in the matter of this contract,
>but in every other.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Did these parties get this contract?
Answer. They did not. It was modified, and only a portion of it was
given to Mr. Howe.
Question A portion was given to Mr. Howe ?
Answer. Yes, sir; he was satisfied with it. I insisted upon it after Mc-
Kinstry's refusal and publication. I was determined he should have it.
He did modify it in this shape and give it.
Question. Modified it as to quantity or as to price ?
Answer. As to quantity.
Question. Was that before or after you had written your letter to your
brother ?
Answer. It was before.
Question. In the first place, it was granted for the whole ?
Answer. Yes, sir; and subsequently granted as to a part to Mr. Howe.
Question. And Mr. Howe executed the contract ?
Answer. Yes, sir; and I believe got paid for it.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. The limitation of the amount was made by McKinstry and not
by Fremont ?
Answer. Made by McKinstry. The whole resistance to the contract, to
their obtaining it to the full amount, was made by McKinstry. Fremont
signed the original contract as originally asked for; approved it without
any sort of hesitation.
By Mr. Johnson:
Question. Which was granting all that you asked in the aggregate ?
Answer. Yes, sir; and the contract, I expect, can be shown with his sig
nature upon it, in his own handwriting, because I saw him put it there
myself
By Mr. Odell:
Question. What do you know about the difficulty of access to General
Fremont ?
Answer. I never had any myself. He gave a special order that I should
be admitted to see him whenever I came. But I know that it was almost
impossible for any one to see him who was not so accredited; and the sort of
people that did have access to him were of such a class that I was very
much ashamed after a while to exercise the privilege that was accorded to
me in their company. The first day that I went to see him after I arrived
180 TESTIMONY
there he gave orders to his guard to admit me whenever I called. It was
a very onerous duty for me. Almost everybody would come to me and say
they could not get access to him, and that they knew I could. Many of the
best men in the country would go there and be denied admittance — be de
nied an interview. Men came there proffering to raise regiments — men
that I know were fully able to do it, and were good men, and they could
not get to see him. Governors of States, congressmen, colonels of regi
ments, men bearing information from the disturbed portions of the State,
• right from the hostile part of our State, would come with information to
him, and could not get a glimpse of him. I know several instances of that
kind.
Question. Was not the pressure upon him, natural to his official position,
such as to justify the difficulty in getting to see him ?
• Answer. I do not know. He assumed to do duties that he had no business
to do; that he was not charged to do by the government. He assumed to
do all the contracting — to give out all the contracts. He assumed the
duties of the commissary, quartermaster, and all the other departments,
and, of course, was occupied by these contractors, when they ought to have
been turned over to other officers.
Question. Was that the general course of his business, or only occasional?
Answer. He seemed to be chiefly so engaged.
Question. Do you mean to say that as a general thing the men who ob
tained contracts for supplies for the army of any description would have to
go to him rather than to the quartermaster or the commissary ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I mean to say so; that that was the general fact. I
know I was urged again and again, by men that I refused to do it for, to
go to him for those matters. In some cases I would write to the quarter
master and ask him to give them a contract, if he could do so, to the advan
tage of the public service. There is a fact that I want to place upon record
in my testimony. I want to state this for the information of the committee.
I have seen a statement of the receipts and disbursements made in St. Louis
from January, 1861, to January, 1862, an authenticated statement of that
kind, and up to August the disbursements of this year were less than of the
year previous. I make this statement in this shape as affecting General
Lyon. Whilst he may have been said to run in debt, and did run in debt,
(because the troops were not paid at all; my regiment was not paid until
October; never got a cent; never got any clothes from the government;
never got anything from the government,) this only goes to show how a
man who was in earnest to work for the government could work and did
work for the government. Whilst General Lyon was there the expenditures
made by the government were less than in the year previous. Since that
time the expenditures have amounted up enormously!
Question. Do you know the aggregate amount of that statement ?
Answer. I do not.
Question. You said you had seen the statement, and I did not know but
what you remembered the figures.
Answer. I know that in the years 1860-61, the expenditures were
$7,000,000, and this year they are over $25,000,000, and the greater portion
of it has been expended there since August — the great bulk of it;' that is,
up to August it was not so large as it was in the year previous. It only
goes to. show this : I know that General Fremont's friends had made the
complaint that he had no money and could not do anything, and could not
be expected to do anything; that the government had neglected him. I
understand that he has shown a letter in his statement — I do not get this
frofoi any member of the committee — written by Lyon, heaping coals of fire
on General Scott's head for not supporting him, throwing the blame on
TESTIMONY. 181
Scott for his overthrow there, and saying that Scott did nothing to support
him; and it is argued from this that Fremont would have supported him if
he had had the means. Now the fact is that Fremont had large means to
supply him, and of his large means in men and money, JBO far from doing
anything to compare in brilliancy with what was done by Lyon, he undid
everything that was done by Lyon; had even to exchange the prisoners
that Lyon had taken at Camp Jackson for the men taken prisoners at Lex
ington under his command. He undid all that was done by Lyon; at the
same time Lyon had no sort of aid in money rendered him by the govern
ment, while the other man had an abundance of everything, so much so that
he used it very profligately in dispensing it to unworthy people; that con
tract which he made with Beard, dated on the 25th day of September, for
building fortifications around St. Louis which were nearly completed, one-
half of which had been built by the officers, under their superintendance,
and upon which Beard had never hired a man to strike a lick; it was all
covered by his contract, and charged for at prices four times what it cost to
build them. That has been testified to by those who know the facts in the
case — that this contract was made by McKinstry, under the special orders
of General Fremont; the prices paid for the different species of work having
been fixed by Frdmont himself, and incorporated by McKinstry under his
orders. The work done by officers of the army, and to some extent by the
soldiers, or which had been completed by them, this man's contract covered,
and he charged at least four times the prices paid for it.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Do you mean to say that General Fremont himself fixed the
prices ?
Answer. I mean to say that the testimony shows that. I do not know the
fact myself from my own knowledge.
Question. You mean that the prices fixed were fixed by General Fremont,
and not by the quartermaster — that that is the testimony generally 1
Answer. I mean to say that.
By the chairman :
Question. You do not mean to say that from your own knowledge ?
Answer. I mean to say it from the knowledge of those who have testified
to it, and who know the facts.
The chairman: That testimony we must get otherwhere.
The witness : I can get the testimony for you here if you want it.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. All my question implied was simply this: I understand you to
say that McKinstry was furnished by Fremont with the figures at which this
was paid ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. I wanted to know if you did mean to say that ?
Answer. I meant to say that; and if you want the parties who can testify
to that fact, of their own knowledge, I will give you the names of the men.
The chairman: Give us the names of the men.
The witness: I will send their names to you. Mr. Clements, the clerk of
McKinstry, has stated the fact on oath before the Van Wyck committee.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question Do you know whether there was any necessity for building the
last five forts in a very short time, such as would justify the building them
at the prices paid ]
Answer. I know there was no necessity for building the forts there at any
182 TESTIMONY.
time. St. Louis never was threatened by anybody after General Lyon caged
all those fellows at Camp Jackson. There is one point about that testimony.
I have understood that it has been alleged that General Lyon would, if he
had had the means, have fortified the city, and that he selected those sites
for fortifications. I do not know the fact to be that he would not have done
it; but I will state what I believe is pretty well known: that I was as con
stantly arid as confidentially with General Lyon as any other man throughout
the whole period covering his command there, and 1 never heard him once
utter a single, solitary word about fortifying the city of St. Louis. He did
talk about fortifying the hill immediately above the arsenal, for the protec
tion of the arsenal. The arsenal was in very low ground, and commanded
by these elevations. He intended to seize those elevations, which was the
key to the possession of the arsenal, and hold them. I know that to be true.
But as for fortifying any other part of the city, I do not believe it to be true;
for I think it very improbable that he would contemplate anything of the sort
without speaking to me about it. And the only time the city, was ever in
danger from anybody, as far as rny judgment is worth anything*, was when
General Lyon was there. The whole expenditure was useless — a mere job,
and intended for that.
By Mr. Johnson :
Question. What has been the amount expended in that way, estimated at ?
Answer. $360,000.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Who were these bad men that General Fremont surrounded
himself by ?
Answer. There were five or six from California — I do not remember the
number exactly — men who are in the worst possible repute in California, and
whose names figure pretty largely in the public prints: Palmer, Beard, Has-
kell, and others who were on his staff, some of whom were connected with
him officially, and at the same time had contracts under him — men of no re
pute, or very bad repute, in California, for their peculations.
By the chairman :
Question. On his staff and had contracts ? Name them.
Answer. Haskell was on his staff ; he was director of police, when he
ought to have been in the hands of the police, instead of being director of
the police. Leonidas Haskell, he was captain on his staff, in an office crea-
ted for him, that did not exist in the military service at all.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Any others that you think of?
Answer. There were a number of men from eastern cities who were on
his staff, connected with him, and had contracts.
Question. Was Woods one of them ?
Answer. Yes, sir; Isaac Woods. He was on his staff. I never heard of
his having any contracts.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Was he on his staff ?
Answer. Yes, sir; he was on his staff. He is said to have been recommended
by my brother. I was present when my brother recommended him to Fremont
verbally. I heard him talk about him. He told Fremont that Woods had proved
very serviceable to him in the post office department as a sort of spy, or rather
as an agent for organizing a spy corps; and by his energy in getting the mails
TESTIMONY. 183
through Baltimore at the time of the interruption; and also in putting the
cus torn-house and post office officers into their places from which they had
been excluded by fear of the mob; he showed courage and tact in this
service. He thought he would be serviceable to Fremont in the same ca
pacity. He never recommended him for anything else than*his qualifications
in that respect. He did not at that interview; I do not know about any
other time; I would not speak of anything more than I know. He recom
mended him for the qualities he had exhibited in that way. Fremont said
he knew Woods well, in Calforma, and coincided in my brother's judgment
of his activity and sagacity; and I should suppose he would be very useful
to him in that capacity myself. The capacity in which he was placed by
Fremont was a sort of principal man. He regulated all the admissions of
persons to Fremont's presence; he had the general superintendence of that
sort of thing. I never discovered that he was very serviceable in that par
ticular. I will say here that in all the testimony I have seen and heard in
regard to Woods, although I know he had a very bad name, and have heard
since that his name in California was not very good, I have never heard of
anything that has been brought home to him of a criminal character in re
gard to contracts.
By Mr. Julian:
Question. Is General McKinstry one of the men you would classify with
these others ?
Answer. General McKinstry was a regular army officer, the quartermaster
at that post. In regard to General McKinstry, I think he was about the
worst man at that post. I am very sorry to say that I was somewhat instru
mental myself in having him there. I will state this: that there were such
representations made to me about McKinstry that I interfered to have him
restored to that position after he had been relieved from it. I never had
seen the man myself, then; but relying upon the statements made by Union
men, whom I knew to be such, I interfered in his behalf at their solicita
tion. But I think after surveying the whole field that he was the worst man
that Fremont had about him; worse in morals and every other way. I think
that he, by his flattery and by pandering to Fremont's love of show and
parade, and obtained an ascendency over his weak mind that was very con
trolling, and that was exercised for the very worst purposes possible.
Exhibits to accompany the testimony of Frank P. Blair, Jr.
Since delivering my testimony I have found among my papers several
letters bearing upon portions of it which I desire to incorporate in my testi
mony.
First. A copy of a letter from honorable Montgomery Blair to honorable
Edward Bates.
Second. A copy of extract from letter from General Fremont to honorable
M. Blair, dated Astor House, July 13, 1861.
Third. A copy of extract from letter from General Fremont to honorable
M. Blair, dated September 8, 1861, and a copy of a proposal for contract
from John How and W. S. Gurnee to General Fremont, dated August 19,
1861, indorsed and recommended to Quartermaster McKinstry, by General
Fremont, which will be found in the testimony of H. W. G. Clements, clerk
to Quartermaster McKinstry, at page 977 of the report of the House com
mittee on contracts, of which Mr. Van Wyck is chairman. This is the only
contract for clothing that I ever asked General Fremont to give to any one,
and it is the same that, I understand, he says he refused to give. His own
184 TESTIMONY.
indorsement on the paper shows the contrary, and proves that I could have
hac[ no dissatisfaction with him on that account. McKinstry did refuse to
give the contract, and published his refusal in a flaming letter, intended to
affect a virtue he did not possess. Subsequently, he gave a contract to Mr.
How, at my instance, for about one-half the amount.
WASHINGTON, June 19, 1861.
DEAR SIR: At my solicitation Governor Chase yesterday called on General
Scott in reference to relieving our friends in Missouri from the annoyance
of being subjected to an officer whose attention must necessarily be, to a
great extent, directed to another field of operations; showing him General
McClellan's letter, in which he confesses that he does not understand the
course of policy proper to be pursued in Missouri, and says that he is em
barrassed in the matters in his more immediate charge by having Missouri
added to his division.
General Scott declined to detach Missouri from McClellan's division on the
ground of your objection to it.
I conjure you to withdraw that objection. Lyon is an older officer than
McClellan. He has seen much more service in the field, and has in his con
duct of affairs in Missouri exhibited good judgment as a commanding officer.
There is, indeed, so far as I can discover, no sufficient reason for subjecting
his operations in Missouri to any intermediate supervision. When the dif
ferences in Missouri shall have been disposed of, and it becomes necessary
to combine the movement of the forces of the west upon the south — for
which purpose alone I understood you to desire to have Missouri added to
the Ohio division — it may then be restored to it. But while the operations
are so distinct as at present, McClellan's attention being limited almost
exclusively to one field, and Lyon's entirely to another, it is surely unneces
sary to place the older officer under the younger.
Hoping that you will concede this to men who are your tried friends, and
that you will not co-operate with those whose evident design is to embarrass
them, to deprive them of the credit of their success, whilst subjecting them
to all the discredit of defeat, if they meet it.
I remain yours, truly,
M. BLAIR.
Hon. EDWARD BATES.
Proposition of J. How and W. S. Gurnee for furmshing clothing, &c.
ST. Louis, August 19, 1861.
SIR: Referring to the conversation had with you some three weeks ago,
by one of the undersigned, (Mr. Gurnee,) in relation to army supplies, and
to what extent such supplies could be furnished at Chicago with the prompti
tude required for the fitting out of an army, we have to say that Mr. Gurnee,
having conferred with the principal manufacturers of Chicago, returned to
this city prepared to give satisfactory answers, but learning here that St.
Louis claimed a portion of the work, he proposed to her associate in these
communications, (Mr. John How,) to unite in this proposition with the un
derstanding that the goods, as far as practicable, be manufactured in Chi
cago and St. Louis and in equal proportions.
They now make out and submit to the commanding general the following
propositions:
First. They will furnish and deliver at any depot or office in Chicago or
St. Louis, the goods manufactured in the respective cities, as follows:
20,000 coats or jackets, at rate of 1,500 per week.
20,000 pairs of pants, at rate of 1,500 per week.
TESTIMONY. 185
20,000 pairs of drawers, at rate of 1,500 per week.
40,000 flannel shirts, at rate of 3,000 per week.
70,000 pairs of socks, at rate of 5,000 per week.
15,000 overcoats, at rate of 1,000 per week.
35,000 boots or shoes for infantry, at rate of 1,000 per week.
5,000 cavalry boots, at rate of 400 per week.
17,000 caps or felt hats, at rate of 2,000 per week.
15,000 knapsacks, at rate of 2,000 per week.
15,000 haversacks, at rate of 2,000 per week.
15,000 canteens, at rate of 2,000 per week.
2,000 horse equipments, at rate of 200 per week.
All the supplies furnished shall correspond to the patterns and samples
now being made for government service, unless changed by your order;
and the price to be the same at which contracts are now being filled in the
principal of the quartermaster's departments for the United States, with
allowance to .us when superior articles are required, and deduction if infe
rior are delivered, we to be notified at the time if deductions are claimed.
We will commence the delivery of the goods within twenty days after the
signing of the contract, and will, as far as practicable, increase the deliv
eries, and even the amount of goods when required by your department.
An early answer is respectfully requested, as the time is short within
which to supply the army of the West, and have them prepared for the
HOW.
W. S. GURNEE.
Major General JOHN C. FREMONT,
Commanding Department of the West.
I recommend this proposal for contract to Major McKinstry.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
A true copy.
H. W. G. CLEMENTS.
•
Extract from a letter from General Fremont to Hon. M. Blair.
ASTOR HOUSE, July 13, 1861.
*********
My idea is to have as much as possible the advantage of the particular
abilities which Woods and Davis can bring to the service. I. C. Woods in
the quartermaster's department, and Ed. M. Davis in the commissary de
partment — both, of course, under the regular army. I wish to have both of
these near me, and will consider them part of my staff. Pray have the ap
pointments made out for them immediately — their brigade duties won't
interfere with greater usefulness. *****
Yours, truly,
J. C. FREMONT.
Hon. M. BLAIR, fyc., fyc., !fc.t Washington.
Extract from a private letter from Major General Fremont to Hon. Montgomery
Blair, dated September 8, 1861.
* * •* * * * # *
"Frank's regiment will be a brigade, and a fit command for a general of
artillery. I urged him several times to accept high rank and* go into the
war, but he does not like to lose his position in Congress. I think he is
wrong, but we all set different values on the same thing."
* * *****
186 TESTIMONY.
Upon this extract I make this remark : that General Fremont does not ap
pear to have understood the motive which led me to decline " high rank."
It was from no indisposition to " go into the war," but because I thought
others more competent to render service to the country. I had gone into
the war long before he entered the service, and under circumstances far
more trying than any that surrounded him. The extract, and the contract
to which his recommendation is attached, and which is set out in this testi
mony, are quoted for the purpose of disposing of the charges made by him
and his hangers-on to impugn my motives in asking for his removal from
the western department. It is a curious coincidence that every imputation
of this kind against me is shown to be untrue by his own handwriting
and signature.
WASHINGTON, February 24, 1862.
Major CHARLES ZAGONYI sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What rank did you hold in the army of the northwest under Gen"
eral Fremont ?
Answer. I first entered the army as a captain ; later I was appointed major.
Question. How long were you with General Fremont ?
Answer. From the 12th of July till the 6th of November, when we came
back from Springfield.
Question. You accompanied him on his expedition down to Springfield 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I did.
Question. In what capacity ?
Answer. As major, commanding my command of cavalry, three companies.
A fourth company remained behind.
Question. What was your command called ?
Answer. The body-guard.
Question. Proceed in your own way to give an account of what you observed
about the army in its progress to Springfield.
Answer. I think it would be well for me to state how this command was
formed, and for what purpose.
Question. Very well ; please do that.
Answer. On the 2d of August, as we were returning to St. Louis from Cairo,
I had a conversation with General Fremont, and suggested to him that it would
be well for him to have a separate company of infantry or cavalry — I advised
him to have cavalry — for a body-guard. It is customary in Europe, and also
here, as I saw in the newspapers before we left, for the different generals to have
body guards. In Europe a body guard for the general is used in this way :
whenever a guard is wanted at headquarters, instead of detailing them from the
different companies of soldiers, they are taken from this body guard ; and when
the general goes into the field he has a company of cavalry upon which he can
rely in case of necessity. I told General Fremont that if he would allow me
to form such a company, I would make every man in it fit to be an officer in a
cavalry regiment, of which we were then in great need in the west. The gen
eral agreed to the proposition, and I commenced to raise the company ; but be
fore I had completed organizing one company I had men enough for three com
panies. I reported that fact to him, and at last he agreed that I should take ^11
that came, with the idea that eventually they should be formed into a regiment.
During this time this cavalry, as far as it was raised, did every kind of duty in
TESTIMONY. 187
St. Louis. I have been ordered out many times in the middle of the night,
when any trouble was apprehended by the provost marshal, or if there was any
confusion or disobedience anywhere. We did regular duty ; and when we
started to enter the field, I can say that all the rest of the cavalry there did not
do as much duty as the three companies under my command. We were every
where scouting, reconnoitring, performing night-guard duty. Everything of
that kind was done by my three companies, so that we never had twelve
hours' rest at any time — no man of us.
Question. How were they dressed and equipped 1
Answer. Just the same as other cavalry, only more simply, because there
was not a bit of cord on their uniforms, which was the plain cloth of the uni
forms, with the buttons.
Question. Just like other cavalry, only the uniform was more simple ?
Answer. -Yes, sir. The uniform was made by the order of the quartermaster,
General McKinstry. No one had anything to do with it but him ; he equipped
the whole force.
Question. How were you armed ]
Answer. Each man had a revolver, and generally a sabre, and about two-
thirds had carbines.
Question. I have heard it said that that body-guard was equipped and dressed
very extravagantly and expensively. How was that ?
Answer. I cannot account in any way why that should be said. I knew that,
before we started, we had been abused in everyway by everybody; so 1 heard.
When I was trying to equip my troops, I was refused, and troubled, and kept
back in everything I undertook to do.
Question. You have stated all you know about their dress ?
Answer. Yes, sir; just as it was.
Question. You accompanied the expedition to Springfield?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was the particular duty of this body-guard on the march ?
Answer. Just as the rest, we marched ahead; except that it was my duty
generally to keep a guard at the general's headquarters, to send out pickets and
patrols, and do every duty like that. There was no particular duty. I went
out several times on expeditions. At Warsaw a rumor came that the enemy
had a force lately recruited of about 150 men. I was sent out to see about it.
We went out in the night, going about twenty miles between 7 o'clock and 10
o'clock ; but the enemy had fled. However, I was fortunate enough to capture
about 40 mules and horses, and 170 bushels of wheat, which we found in a mill,
belonging to Price's army.
Question. Had you seen military service in Europe 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I was in active service in 1848 and 1849 in the Hungarian
war against the Austrian and Russian army.
Question. What do you say in regard to General Fremont's skill in handling
the army on this expedition1?
Answer. I had only the rank of major ; but I had experience. I served in
1848 and 1849 under the best of generals, (General Bern,) and I never had a
warmer attachment or higher esteem for any man than for General Fremont as
a military man, as a commander, and as a general.
Question. Will you tell us about your charge at Springfield 1
Answer. On the 24th of October news came that some 300 or 400 men of the
rebel army from Price's command were in Springfield. The man who brought
the news told it to me, and I immediately reported it to General Fremont, and
asked his permission to go and attack them. The general answered that he
would let me go the next day, but not that day. After some further remon
strances that it would probably be too late the next day, he consented to let me
go that evening. I had intended to go with my own force alone ; but the general
188 TESTIMONY.
did not wish to risk my force alone, and gave me an order for 1'50 men from
another command.
From that evening till the next morning about 11 o'clock I made fifty miles,
stopping only one single hour on the road to rest. I had a scout with me that
I sent forward to learn about the enemy's strength, and I found that the enemy,
instead of having only 300 or 400, had 1,800 or 1,900. I inquired how they
were armed, and what kind of soldiers they were. I asked if they were 'well
drilled, and the scout said they were. I thought it over in my mind as to what
I should do. It was a little risky for me to try the experiment, but we had
been so shamefully abused I could not do anything else, and I thank God we
did not turn back, but went forward. If I had not gone forward and won that
battle, I think I should have left this country for shame. I made up my mind
I would go forward and see the enemy, and then do what I should think best.
I did not know whether I would attack them. Before I started I sent a des
patch to the general, which was worded something like this :
" GENERAL : From reliable assurances I report that the enemy is 1,800 or
1,900 strong. I would ask you, general, to send me a re-enforcement, that in
case I am defeated I may fa'll back upon them, or if I am successful I may be
able to hold the place."
From that the general could see my mind was made up to attack the enemy.
I went forward. In a short time I met a Union man, who told me the enemy
would hardly stop to receive me, but would retreat. I inquired about the place,
how it lay, for I did not know anything about it, and what way they would be
likely to retreat. I made a detour around of about seven miles on the prairie,
so that, in case they should retreat, I should be able to catch them. That
brought me, about half-past 4 o'clock, near Springfield. I learned, upon inquir
ing from Union people and from foreigners, that it was true that there were
1,800 or 1,900 of the enemy, and one man told me there was not less than
2,200 ; and after the battle was over I found out there was indeed 2,200. I
thought the enemy were on the other side of Springfield, which would give me
about two miles ride yet. I ordered my command forward ; and on coming from
a little wooded space out in front of my command about twenty or twenty-five
yards, all at once the bullets were whistling around me. I looked around and
saw the enemy drawn up in line of battle. I heard another round of firing,
and saw another force of about 300 men. The bullets, by fifties and sixties,
were whistling around me. I had nothing to do but to retreat or go forward.
A look showed me there was hardly any place to get at them but down
a lane. I ordered my cavalry forward in quick trot down the lane. Before I
had got 200 yards down the lane, I had lost about forty men, not killed or
wounded, but mostly disabled by their horses being shot down. I then stopped
my command, opened a fence, and went into a field about 150 yards from the
enemy's camp. I formed my command, which at the time was hardly more
than a hundred men, and with them I attacked the enemy, and in less
than five seconds the enemy were completely broken to pieces and running in
every direction. My men were so much excited that ten or fifteen of them
would attack hundreds of the enemy ; and in that single attack I lost fifteen
men killed — that was all I lost in dead ; and the enemy's dead men on the
ground were 106.
Question. How did you fcill them — with sabres or with revolvers ?
Answer. Mostly with the sabre. We Hungarian cavalrymen teach our sol
diers never to use the revolver, as they are of very little use. The sabre is the
only arm the cavalry need if they are well drilled. There were no swords of
my men that were not bloody ; and I saw swords from which the blood was
running down on the hand. The men were drilled very well. I had only six
weeks from the time I had the first man sworn in the service to the time we
TESTIMONY. 189
started for th# field ; but in those six weeks I brought them forward so far as I
ever thought I should be able to do. They were mostly Americans — about
one-fourth Germans.
Question. Were they raw men when you took them?
Answer. Not a single* one ever served before.
Question. Can you teach men the use of the sabre in that time?
Answer. Yes, sir; but we worked from the time the sun was up till the sun
went down ; and in the evening I gave extra hours to my officers and non-com
missioned officers, so that I had hardly four or five hours to myself nights ; and
I never saw that the general slept more. He beat me in work every day.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. How many did you have wounded besides the fifteen killed ?
Answer. I had twenty-eight wounded, but only two dangerously; that is,
neither of them died, but they were badly wounded. One was an officer, and
•another a non-commissioned officer.
Question. This battle was outside of Springfield ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did your force charge into the town of Springfield ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; through every street, and all around wherever we could
see an enemy, until night came upon us.
Question. Do you know the number of wounded of the enemy ?
Answer. No, sir ; I do not, but I heard that it was a great many ; and that
a great many of them would die, because they had mostly received heavy cuts
on the head. All the dead were cut in the head. Some of the enemy behaved
themselves very bravely indeed, but they were not able to hold up against this
tremendous charge. To show the spirit of my men, about half an hour before
I made the charge I halted my command, as my men had made twenty hours'
ride without eating anything or feeding their horses ; I thought that, being young
men, they would be worn out ; I asked if any of them were broken down, or
sick, or tired out, to step forward from the command, and I would leave them
behind, and employ them on extra duty. I stated to them that when I started
I expected to find about 300 or 400 of the enemy ; but, instead of that, the
probability was that there were 1,900 of the enemy. I told them I had made
up my mind to attack the enemy, and I promised victory ; but, I said, that I
did not want to throw away any lives; and I asked those who felt tired to step
forward two steps, and I would put them on extra duty; but not one single man
showed any tired or sickness ; and every one of them, I saw their eyes grow
big like your fist — every one.
By the chairman :
Question. What have become of your men ?
Answer. They have been discharged; dismissed with disgrace, really, not
discharged. They were dismissed with disgrace. I saw a telegraphic despatch
from Washington, which stated that we used some expressions at Springfield for
which our further service in the United States army is of doubtful expediency.
So there was a reason why we should be dismissed from the service of the
United States.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. What were those expressions ?
Answer. I did not know. I have been brought up a soldier, and have been
an officer for years long, and understand my duty. I did my duty towards
every superior officer, and to every officer, and I taught my men to do their duty.
There never came to me a single complaint from the beginning to the last hour
against my men that they were disrespectful in any way. But I know one
190 TESTIMONY.
thing — I found out later what was that expression — it was nothing* more than
this : When I was leading my men on to that charge, to excite them a little, I
said that our war-cry would be, "the Union," and " Fremont" our general. It
is customary in Europe, when attacking the enemy, to have a war-cry — "Liberty !"
"the Union!" And, as a general thing, if we like and respect the general, it
is customary to use the name of the general in the war-cry. In Hungary, where
we were fighting for liberty, my government and the ministers did not feel
offended because when we charged the enemy, we used the name of General
Bern.
By the chairman :
Question. That had been your custom in Europe, and you thought it right to
do so here?
Answer. Yes, sir. That must be the only crime that we have committed
against the country, or against our superior officers.
Question. Was there in your command, or in any other part of General
Fremont's army, any intention to set General Fremont up above other officers,
or against the government?
Answer. No, sir. I never heard anything of the kind, except one time one
of my officers received a letter from Iowa. He was a countryman of mine — the
only countryman I had in the body-guard. He was a finely educated man; his
father was a count at home, but, at present, is a farmer in Iowa. His father
wrote him a letter in which there was something said of a public meeting in
Davenport, Iowa, to set up a western republic, or something of the kind. I
ridiculed the idea. I told him I did not believe General Fremont, as a citizen,
a patriot, a soldier, ever would think of such a thing ; and as a soldier in the
United States army, I told him I would not even follow General Fremont, or
any general, no matter how much I liked him.
Question. Was that ever communicated to General Fremont ?
Answer. No, sir.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Was there any manifestation of such feeling at any time among the
body-guard 1
Answer. No, sir; no, sir. I took service in the United States army only for
the reason that I wanted to see this great country united again, and put down
the rebellion, and not to divide it more and more. I am not a fortune hunter.
I had no idea of begging anything. I had made up my mind that I would fight
for no country but iny own. But later, being called to serve under General
Fremont whom I had never seen in my life, but for whom I had high esteem, I
offered my services, and was accepted.
By the chairman:
Question. Were you present with the army at the time General Fremont was
superseded ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I was present.
Question. Will you tell us what was the situation of General Fremont's army
and that of the enemy at that time; where were they1?
Answer. Just the day the order came to supersede him, we got information
of the enemy in this way. The scout which the general gave me when I went
forward to Springfield, I had kept in my own employment until that time. On
the first day of November I asked him to go forward towards Wilson's creek,
&c., until he could see the enemy and find out where was his advance-guard,
which I expected would be cavalry, and how strong they were, and bring me
the news. I told him if he did not bring me the truth his life would be in peril,
for I should take him along with me. He came back on the 2d of November,
TESTIMONY. 191
and informed me that at Wilson's creek were six hundred picked men, of the
very best cavalry of the enemy, and about nine or ten miles beyond were the
rest of the army at two or three different places, the names of which I cannot
remember. I at once gave orders to my officers to call their companies together,
and inspect their arms, and to pick out the best men and the best horses, and
have about one hundred and fifty men ready to start in the evening ; to put them
perfectly in order in arms, equipment, and everything. 1 intended to go up to
the general and ask for permission to capture the enemy. I did not mean to
drive them off. but I was going to surround them, get behind on the left and
right, and capture or annihilate them, if possible. Before I was ready to go to
the general niy adjutant came to me and said that there was some news circu
lating around the camp and at headquarters that the general was superseded.
I found out in a short time that that was true. I was myself so disheartened
that I gave up every idea of going forward ; and it was not only I, but the whole
army felt so. I can say, without exception, that I do not believe that a single
j*egiment in that whole army was not disheartened.
Question. What number of troops had General Fremont at that time?
Answer. Indeed I cannot tell; may be 22,000 or 23,000. I think over
20,000 at any rate.
Question. Did you go far enough to ascertain the position of the enemy on
that occasion?
Answer. Yes, sir; I did from my scout perfectly. He could not tell me what
was the whole force, but he mentioned one or two places where the army was
standing — I do not remember the places — and told me there were not less than
25,000 'or 30,000 men.
Question. Where were they about that time ?
Answer. About nine or ten miles beyond Wilson's creek. The advance
guard of the enemy was at Wilson's creek, but the main body about nine or
ten miles beyond, or about twenty miles from Springfield. My scout could go
no further than where the advance-guard was ; he could not penetrate beyond
with safety- But he ascertained from citizens who were fleeing from their homes
where the enemy was. On that same day I met General Asboth for the first
time since he had got to Springfield. He congratulated me that I was so suc
cessful at Springfield, but at the same time told me that may be it would bring
the greatest trouble on the whole army, because the enemy would find out that
our whole army had not arrived at Springfield. General McKinstry was not
up there yet. General Hunter we could not hear from, and General Asboth
was very much afraid they would attack us, and that we would be obliged to
retreat. He told me, indeed, that there was nothing left but to retreat. I an
swered to him that I would make sure about it, and I would start and bring
him news.
Question. Who were the scouts that had gone out and seen the enemy ?
Answer. They were sent out from different divisions of cavalry. They in
tended to send me out that day, but 1 asked permission to rest my men and
horses, because they were very much tired. I did not tell my reason for not
wanting to go out, but it was that I wanted to go out in the night. There is no
doubt about the enemy. The men were very enthusiastic to go forward, and I
am perfectly confident that, if Price had had 50,000 men, we would have been
victorious ; we would have driven him completely away, and perfectly anni
hilated his army.
Question. There has been some doubt expressed that the enemy were so near
as you seem to apprehend they were at that time.
Answer. There was no doubt about it; we could not doubt it. We had been
out with the general, too, and had met, I cannot tell how many, .twenty or thirty
families who brought news besides our own scouts. There were General Sigel's
scouts, and General Asboth's scouts, and scouts from various quarters and from
192 TESTIMONY.
if
different regiments, and every one of them told the same story. And these
Union families running away told us the same story, and that they were hardly
able to escape. And I perfectly know it from my own scout, upon whom I felt
assured to rely, because he had brought me the best news from Springfield be
fore — that the advance guard of the enemy was at Wilson's creek.
Question. How long, in your judgment, would it have taken General Fremont
to have overtaken the army of Price, if he had not been superseded ?
Answer. Had not the enemy attacked us, we would have overtaken him be
fore forty-eight hours, certain. I do not know as I could tell exactly, for I
never heard about it much, but I know an arrangement was made already, or
talked over with the generals. One or two persons knew it besides the generals.
The intention was to send out most all the cavalry force, which was about 3,000,
and a couple of batteries of artillery, have them go forward in double quick
time and overtake the enemy, and keep them from retreating, so that there was
no possibility that they would be able to run away from us ; and in using this
cavalry to go forward, and hold the enemy until the main body of the army
could come up, the design was to go to the right and left and encircle the enemy,
and in case of retreat or disorder to annihilate the whole army.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. At the time General Fremont was superseded, were there any signs
of mutiny in his army, and did he countenance any insubordination1?
Answer. Mutiny I did not see. There was great attachment to General Fre
mont; there was a disappointment of nearly all the army at his removal. Only
one general in my life have I seen before, to whom his army was so much at
tached as to General Fremont, and that was General Bern, under whom I served
in Hungary; and he was loved so much by his army that every soldier called
him his father. The second instance was that of General Fremont. They were
so much disappointed after he was superseded that I believe, and I express it
perfectly confident that, had not the enemy been so near, one-half of the army
would have laid down their arms.
Question. What did General Frdmont say to that ? Did he encourage it ?
Answer. No, sir; he quieted them in the very best way. I spoke with the
generals ; I was upon good terms with them, as my position was ; they were
kind towards me. General McKinstry, General Pope, General Asboth, Gene
ral Sigel — I conversed with them, but mostly with General McKinstry and
General Sigel — I conversed with them a long time, and I heard their ideas.
They told me the general's wishes, which I heard from the general also, that
he obeyed orders, and he advised them all to do their duty as soldiers and citi
zens. Nothing of encouragement at all, but there was a feeling of disappoint
ment there. There came up a body of officers, from 100 to 150, all the colo
nels came up, and asked J&eneral Fremont to retain his command and lead them
against the enemy. He spoke to them a few kind words, and told them he must
obey his superiors and they must obey theirs, and that they must go forward
and beat the enemy. They cheered him then. And in the evening before he
left he told them that if General Hunter did not come up and the enemy showed
signs of coming forward, he would lead them against the enemy, and they
should tell all the soldiers the same. Well, in the evening in every camp the
fires were blazing, bon-fires, and cheering and cheering until midnight, from
regiment to regiment all around Springfield in every camp. The general was
serenaded by different bands that evening ; there were fifty or sixty musicians
playing at once, all together, feeling happy that he would lead them against the
enemy.
Question. When General Hunter came up was he resolved to fight 1
Answer. I did not see General Hunter ; he came up towards midnight. I
heard that he had come up, and hearing that, I was perfectly assured that all
TESTIMONY. 193
was over with us, and that General Fremont would go home the next morning.
So I felt no more interest about it. I was only afraid that in case the eneiny
should attack them very quickly, the soldiers were so disheartened that it was a
critical affair. That was the only thing that troubled me — nothing more.
Question. You' did not know anything about General Hunter holding a
council ?
Answer. Xo, sir; I heard it later; but I did not know it personally at the
time.
Bv the chairman :
"
Question. Do you think of anything more that you would like to state ?
Answer. Nothing more ; except that I would like to say a few words about
our being disbanded. When we got to St. Louis I was refused rations for my
men and forage for my horses. My horses for thirty-six hours had not anything.
I \vent to the quartermaster and asked him why he refused ; he told me he had
^he order. He said we were not regularly in the service. I asked him how he
could say that ? I asked him if he had not before given me everything I needed,
as he had to every one else ? I asked him if he did not know that my men were
sworn in for three years, or as long as the war lasts ? I told him I would turn
the horses loose, because I could not see them starve. At last he consented to
give us forage, with the condition that he wrote on my requisition that no mat
ter what was done with the body-guard the horses must be supplied, because
they belonged to the government. I asked him why he put that in ; I told him
that it was an insult to my command. I told him he was an old United States
officer, and I would like to have him show me as good a command, so well trained,
so well drilled as my young soldiers. But he said nothing.
Question. Have you received your pay ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I received it after much trouble ; but we have been hunted
down.
Question. Who was this quartermaster?
Answer. Captain Turnley. I was refused rations for my men; but after
General Halleck came up he ordered that I should have everything. But with
him we had a great deal of trouble in the last days ; we could not get any pay
for the men. My" men were ragged, had no overcoats, the weather was bad,
and the snow falling; they had no accommodations at all ; they had been promised
tiieir pay from day to day, and were put off day after day, and then they said
they could not pay us because we did not give up everything. We did give
up everything, and I went to the paymaster, and he said that he had received
a letter from the commanding general that the quartermaster said I had not
returned everything. I wont to the quartermaster and asked him if he con
sidered that there was so much as a pin from the government that I had not re
turned. He looked over the accounts and found everything complete and
perfect, and our pay was ordered. But there was taken from the men's pay all
the clothing to the last penny that the government had given us ; I protested
against it; I said that at least one suit of the clothes should be allowed for this
four months' service. But it was all taken out; we paid for everything the
government had given us. My men were ragged ; their pants and boots were
torn to pieces ; in the whole army was no such ragged command as mine.
After my command was paid off I reported myself to the commanding gen
eral, and requested him to do something with my officers. I recommended them
in the highest terms, that they were young men, that I had drilled them, that
they were good for service, and the whole western department had not such
good officers as they were. He paid no attention to it ; said he could do nothing
with them. I made as a complaint that they did not make one half with all
their pay, as what they had spent for their uniforms and horses if they were
Part iii 13
194 TESTIMONY.
turned off now. But that did not ' matter ; their services were not needed, and
they were dismissed.
Even here, in Washington, I was hunted. I went to the paymaster general
to get travelling expenses for three of my officers and myself — two of us from
Philadelphia, and two from New York ; they would not pay me, and really
insulted me, hy telling me that General Fremont had no right to appoint officers
all over the country. I showed him.an extract I had cut from one of the New
York papers, which showed that General Fremont had the right to appoint me ;
then they said that he had no right to write for his California friends and
appoint them to office. Then seeing that we were hunted and insulted, I could
not longer bear it, I just told him in plain words, right out before his secretary,
that it was a lie. After that, he picked up the papers and ordered me to be
paid off. It showed that if 1 had not taken the hard step against him he had
the feeling to keep it back from us.
WASHINGTOIV, February 24, 1862.
Major JAMES M. SAVAGE sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. Were you with General Fremont in the western department 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was your rank and position 1
Answer. At first I was captain ; after the 20th of September last I was a
major on his staff.
Question. Go on and state what appears to you material touching the con
duct of the war in that department.
Answer. During the whole of the time I was in St. Louis, and a portion of
the time we were in the field, I was assigned by General Fremont to General
Asboth, who was his chief of staff, and I did duty under him. My duties under
General Ashboth, in St. Louis, were confined to the reducing to writing of
the orders and the dispositions and reports which General Asboth made.
Although he was an accomplished scholar he found it difficult to write the
English language. Besides that, I had to examine a great many little matters
which came up in the course of the administration of such a department. I
knew nothing of contracts, with the exception of one that I desire to speak
about. That was a contract made with Mr. Sacchi, for horses, and known as
the " Sacchi contract." I have known Mr. Sacchi, in New York city, for twelve
years. During the whole of that time he has occupied an office in William
street, and during a portion of that time, and at present, he resides in Twenty-
sixth street, near Fifth avenue. He is a man of family, and generally reputed
to be a man of property. His knowledge of the English language is as per
fectly good as I have ever known a foreigner to acquire. I wish to say, also,
that he enjoys a perfectly good reputation among those who know him in tin;
city of New York. Mr. Sacchi visited St. Louis on the application and at the
invitation of General Asboth, and was induced by him to make an offer for a
contract to purchase and supply horses. He never, to my knowledge, had more
than one or two interviews with General Fremont, and never held any position
on his staff, or any office whatever under him. And it may be proper for me to
say, as certain charges have been made in the papers, very freely, with regard
to the ostentation shown by General Fremont, and his inaccessibility, that
during the whole of the time I was there in St. Louis I was at the headquarters
every day, and all day, and usually until ten and eleven o'clock at night, and
sometimes until midnight, and during the whole of that time I never saw Gen-
TESTIMONY. 195
eral Fremont in n carriage but twice ; and I believe he could hardly have been
in a carriage daring that time without my knowing it.
The only sign of ostentation or display I ever saw was when the re-enforce
ments left St. Louis for Cairo. I then understood, and it was generally under
stood by the staff, that a certain degree of display was then used; that more
steamers were taken than were absolutely necessary to carry the troops to Cairo,
in order to give the enemy the* idea that the re-enforcements were larger than
they in fact were. I know also that during the passage down the Mississippi
to Cairo, whenever the faster steamers got ahead of the others, we were obliged
to tie up to the bank until the others came up, with the intention of going into
Cairo with a very full show of force, and as large a display as was possible.
There never was any difficulty in the way of any person who had any mili
tary business with General Fremont, which was of the slightest importance to
the army, procuring an interview with him. Delays of hours and possibly days
might occur in some instances. But where persons came with pressing business,
and disclosed it specifically, either to me or to General Asboth, they were always
sent up to General Fremont, and had an interview with him. I never heard
any specific instance of a person being refused admission, except in the case of
one man, who, I am told, stated that he waited three days for admission to
General Fremont, and that it was five hours before he could get into the ante
room. By the ante-room he undoubtedly meant the room in which I was sta
tioned. I did not credit the report at all, from the fact that I know the last
portion of it could not be true. No person ever had the slightest difficulty ia
getting into the room in which I was stationed and making known his business
to the officers there.
Question. Who was this man ?
Answer. I was told by a captain in Colonel Mulligan's regiment that he was
a. man who came with information of the state of the force at Lexington. Now,
if he disclosed the nature of his business, or represented that it related to the
armies in the field, I know that he could have met with no delay or difficulty.
Question. Did you accompany General Fromont on his expedition to Spring
field?
Answer. Yes, sir. I was assigned to duty at Springfield with General Asboth,
vfind was encamped about a half a mile from General Fremont's headquarters.
On the 2d of November, I flunk, I received reports from Major Clark Wright,
an accomplished officer then in command of a battalion there, who had fought
at Wilson's Creek on the 10th of August, and who was thoroughly familiar
with the country about there, that the enemy had appeared at Wilson's Creek
in considerable numbers — I do not now recollect the numbers — and that a much
larger force, and, as he concluded from the reports of his scouts, the whole force
of General Price-- was within a few miles of Wilson's Creek. This report was
confirmed by other officers of his; by scouts sent out by Major Waring, com
manding a regiment of cavalry called the Fremont Hussars; and by several
other officers and privates in the regiments of Colonel Rombaner and Colonel
Kalmann, and others whose names I do not now recollect. I prepared a report
from the statement of Major Wright, which was signed by General Asboth, and
transmitted to General Fremont. On the 3d of November I rode out with Gen
eral Fremont and visited the outposts about Springfield. At several of the
outposts we found long trains of wagons drawn by oxen, containing Union
families, or families who represented themselves to be such, coming in from
Wilson's Creek and vicinity, as they stated, all terrified at the near approach of
the enemy, representing in many instances that the men belonging to the family
had waited behind until the enemy appeared in sight, and had only escaped by
having a few minutes the start.
Question. Were you with the army at the time General Fremont was super
seded by General Hunter?
196 TESTIMONY.
Answer. I was ; yes, sir.
Question. Were there any signs of mutiny at the time the troops became
aware that General Fremont was superseded ?
Answer. The men were very much excited, and I think they could easily
have been started up to a mutiny by careless or wicked officers. But I saw
nothing on the part of any man that approached a mutiny. The officers them
selves, the C4ermans particularly, were very muc*h excited, and very loud in the
expression of their disappointment ; one or two of them, in particular, in their
denunciation of the conduct of the government in thus acting towards General
Fremont. But during the course of the day they seemed to become reconciled
to the order, and to make up their minds to obey whatever commander should
be placed over them.
Question. What was the bearing and conduct of General Fremont on the oc
casion when they manifested this dissatisfaction? Was it calculated to increase
the dissatisfaction, or to allay it ?
Answer. One officer called upon General Fremont and made him a short
address, in the presence of several other officers, and in the hearing of many out
side of his headquarters, to the effect that his men would fight for General Fre
mont and under General Fremont, and for nobody else. The reply of General
Fremont was less loud, and more difficult for those outside to hear. But I
heard enough to show me that General Fremont reproved him for his remarks,
and repeated, in substance, the recommendations of his farewell address to the
soldiers, to the effect that every man must do his duty, notwithstanding the
action of the authorities. I am confident that he did not, in a single instance,
countenance or advise a single man leaving the army, but that he would have
put down by force, if necessary, any attempt at mutiny.
Question. Do you know anything about his ability to have relieved General
Lyon 1 Were you in a condition to know that ?
Answer. No, sir; neither in relation to the Springfield matter, nor the Lex
ington matter. My mind has been made up from the orders sent and the re
ports made, and those, I understand, have been furnished to this committee.
Question. Did you accompany General Fremont to Cairo when he re-enforced
that place 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was the condition of things there ? What was the amount
of force there ?
Answer. The force at Cairo, when we reached there, was represented to be 1,200
men, besides a large number of men — whether one, or two, or three regiments,
I do not know — whose time had expired, and who were demoralized and disor
ganized to such a degree that they were without arms, and were waiting there
only for their pay.
Question. How many effective, reliable men were there at that time ?
Answer. I can only answer from hearsay, that at the time there were only
1,200.
Question. Was the place threatened ?
Answer. A large force of the enemy were threatening it, as we learned from
all the scouts and spies sent out, at New Madidd ; a force, I believe, amounting
to about 20,000 men, and an attack was daily and almost hourly anticipated.
Question. So that the place was under the greatest necessity for succor ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; and the re-enforcements were received with the greatest
outbursts of joy and satisfaction, both on the part of the soldiers and officers at
Cairo and at Bird's Point ; and I would state here that one of the regiments
taken by General Fremont to Cairo, at that time, was composed from two regi
ments whose time was just expiring, and who had been appealed to by General
Fremont to serve for the few days that it was supposed would be necessary be-
TESTIMONY. 197
fore they could be replaced by another regiment. They did, in fact, serve for
several weeks from the time when they should have been discharged.
Question. What amount of re-enforcement did he take down there at that
time ?
Answer. About 4,000.
Question. Do you know how it was at Pilot Knob 1
Answer. I do not know how it was at Pilot Knob. I know that Cape Girar-
deau was threatened both at that time and subsequently ; and it was regarded
generally by officers, and is an undoubted fact, that Cape Girardeau was one of
the most important points along the line of the river.
Question. You are acquainted with the condition of General Fremont's forces
at that time. Do you think, as a military man, that it was proper under the
circumstances, or that he could have relieved General Lyon at that time ?
Answer. I think it absolutely impossible for the general to have done more
than he did at the time. I never heard, either from General Sigel, or any of
the other officers who were present at Wilson's Creek when that battle was
fought, with many of whom I have conversed, the slightest hint that General
Fremont could, or should, have re-enforced them.
Question. Do you know how it was about Colonel Mulligan1?
Answer. I know hardly anything about that Lexington matter?
Question. Is there anything else you know in regard to that department that
you deem useful or important for the government to know?
Answer. There is only this one thing that occurs to me at this moment. In
a letter of Mr. Thurlow Weed to the Albany Evening Journal, there is this
charge made, that the army of General Fremont was guilty, in many cases, of
depredations upon the property of Union men; that the divisions of General
Sigel and General Asboth, on their march from Tipton to Warsaw, utterly
despoiled a Union man by taking his corn, grain, cattle, and everything from
his farm. Now, I was with the division of General Asboth on that march, and
know, in the first place, that nothing of the kind could have taken place ; and
in the second place, the division of General Sigel never marched over that line
of road from Tipton to Warsaw ; but it marched from Sedalia, a point some
30 or 40 miles further up the railroad.
Question. What were General Fremont's orders about that 1
Answer. They were very strict upon the officers to restrain their men from
any plundering, and I think the army passed through the whole march with as
little theft as possible. You cannot always keep soldiers from stealing apples,
and chickens, too.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Did you understand what was the immediate cause of difficulty
between General Fremont and Mr. Blair ?
Answer. I have never understood it. All that I know is, that Colonel Blair,
from being a frequent, almost daily visitor at headquarters, ceased entirely to
show himself there ; and I knew and heard nothing about the matter, except
certain charges that appeared in the newspapers.
By the chairman :
Question. Do you know anything about the contracts about which so much
has been said 1
Answer. No, sir ; except the Sacchi contract, of which I have spoken.
198 TESTIMONY.
WASHINGTON, February 24, 1862.
Colonel I. C. WOODS sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. Were you in the army of the west, tinder General Fremont ?
Answer. I was.
Question. What was your rank and position there 1
Answer. I was, in the first place, a major upon the general's staff. I then
held a commission as captain in the commissary department from the Secretary
of War, the duties of which I never performed, as I was ordered by General
Fremont to remain upon his staff. I was promoted by him to a colonelcy, and
placed in charge of the transportation.
Q.uestion. Did you accompany the army on its way to Springfield ?
Answer. I did.
Question. Will you state, in your own way, what you think it material to
state in relation to the army there, the administration of the department, any
thing about contracts, contractors, any misconduct or frauds upon the part of
anybody, or anything else you know which you think the public should know ?
Answer. I have made a memorandum of a few things, about which there has
been some talk, with a few notes in the margin to assist my memory in stating
what I have myself observed.
Question. You can use your notes to refresh your memory. The rule of
law is, that notes may be used to refresh the memory ; but you must state what
you know outside of your notes.
Answer. The first memorandum I have is about some Austrian muskets,
about which a great deal has been said officially and unofficially. I know those
muskets were a kind that had been used for a long time in the Austrian army.
That information I obtained from Colonel Albert, who was upon General Fre
mont's staff. When he first saw the muskets in St. Louis he remarked that
they were an old friend of his. I know when the muskets were first offered to
General Fremont in New York, at which place I joined him. they were refused
upon the ground that the primer, which was used in place of the percussion cap,
was not to be had in this country. The battle of Bull Run had not been fought
then, and it was supposed that there were a plenty of other arms in the country.
After General Fremont had arrived in St. Louis, and the government had
issued orders to have all the arms procurable forwarded from New York to
Washington, it became impossible to get other arms. These Austrian arms
were then bought ; but upon the condition that the importers should manufac
ture, in New York, this percussion primer (which was used on them instead of
a percussion cap.) in sufficient quantities to answer the purpose for these arms.
And as quite a large portion of the army of the west were foreign soldiers, and
a great many of the officers were familiar with the arm. and a great many of
the soldiers had before used it, although it took one more motion to prime it
than it did to put the cap on our muskets, still as it took the same bullet — the-
Minnie bullet — that our muskets did, it was decided that it was absolutely
necessary to have them.
There were at that time many companies of home guards who were wanting
arms to guard railroad bridges, &c., audit was considered that these arms would,
answer their purpose.
The facts in relation to the character of these arms have been very carefully
and particularly set forth by Captain Callender on another occasion. He is an
ordnance officer, and had charge of the St. Louis arsenal for some time. I know
that after the arms arrived in St. Louis, Captain Callender took two of them,
took out the breech-pin and rifled them, and brought them to headquarters to
show how well they rifled. He stated to me then that the breech of these arms
TESTIMONY. 199
was a little thicker in metal than our own muskets, and rifled better than our
own muskets did.
One of them was sent to Cincinnati and one to Philadelphia as a sample to
be altered by way of experiment. When they were altered they were returned
and examined; and Captain Callender made an official report, recommending
that they should be altered, and I am pretty sure that he recommended that
they should be altered by the Cincinnati manufacturer, as being cheaper than
the other, and at the same time answering the purpose.
The reason he did not alter them himself, which he was as competent to do
as the person in Cincinnati, and which he has been doing since — for from the
time that General Fremont left, up to the middle or last of December, no other
arms wc-re sent to the west, but Captain Callender was engaged in rifling these
very arms — the reason he did not do it when they were received by General
Fremont, and while General Fremont was there, was, that he was engaged in
rifling Springfield muskets, of which there were several thousands to be rifled.
He had but one rifling machine, which would rifle about 60 a day ; and by com
putation lie found that he could not rifle more than enough for two regiments in
a mouth. These Austrian muskets, therefore, were sent to Cincinnati.
Previous to that quite a number of regiments of home guards were supplied
with them. I remember that one regiment, which was about ] 5 miles out from
Sedalia on the road to Springfield, learning that a car-load of these altered arms
had arrived, marched in to get these arms, and marched back again the same
day. Other regiments had them unaltered, all with the understanding that they
were to be exchanged for the altered ones when they should be received.
At headquarters in St. Louis, taking into consideration that we had a great
many foreign soldiers who were used to these arms, we looked upon that pur
chase even at first as being a very excellent one ; and when it was found that
they could be altered and made a very good weapon, it was looked upon as a
very economical purchase in every point of view. As they cost but about $11 50
each when. ready to be put finally into the hands of our soldiers, it was looked
upon as a better and far more economical arm than we could otherwise get.
Now, with reference to the Hall carbines, about which so much has been said.
I know nothing about their purchase, but I know a great deal about their issue. 1
know that when they came there we had no other arms for our cavalry. The
2d Illinois cavalry regiment were supplied entirely with Hall's carbines; four
companies of Kansas cavalry were supplied with them, as were other regiments ;
and 500 of them were sent to General Pope, in North Missouri, to be issued to
home guards there. They were issued very quickly after their receipt, and
we had no other arms for cavalry to take their place.
There has been something said in regard to a matter of $'200 which was wanted
by Captain Schwartz, who was recruiting a battery, for recruiting purposes. He
came to me for it, and I told him we had no money at headquarters. I sent
him, with either a verbal message or a note, to the proper officer who was the
mustering officer at the arsenal. He, by the regulations of the department, was
the recipient and distributor of the funds for recruiting purposes appropriated by
Congress. But he had no funds. In the absence of funds in the hands of the
mustering officer it was the business of the quartermaster's department to ad
vance the money. But the quartermaster had no funds, and there were no funds
in the department except the funds in the hands of the paymaster.
Captain Schwartz was an educated artillery officer from Baden ; had served all
through the revolution there, and had served all through the Avar in Nicaragua.
His first officer was a Swede, his second officer a Dane, both of whom had been
decorated for gallantry in the Schlesswig-Holstein war ; and the battery they
were raising promised to be a very efficient one. This was early in August —
about the 13th, I think — and the general was very anxious to have the battery-
perfected, and the only way was to order the paymaster to advance the $200.
200 TESTIMONY.
I am told by officers who were in the Mexican war that it was a very common
thing' there, in the exigencies of the war, for one department to turn over funds
to another department, to be replaced afterwards when the other department
should be in funds again, although it was contrary to regulations. The exigen
cies of the service in Missouri were, I presume, what induced the general to
make that order.
In relation to contracts, I know a great deal about them. We found a beef
contract in the Missouri department which had been made with some parties
there, which the government had a right to discontinue at any time. General
Fremont directed the captain who had charge of the commissary department to
advertise the ordinary time for proposals, and then to make a new contract with
the lowest bidder, with certain stringent provisions, among which was one for
driving beef-cattle along with the army, so that we might have less weight to
transport in our wagons. The contract was advertised and let, and it was done
wholly and entirely by the officer in charge of the commissary department. Of
course the general directed him as to the fact that he should advertise, and it
was let regularly to the lowest bidder. Captain Hague said it was a very good
contract. Bo far as that department was concerned, this was the only transac
tion in the way of contracts that was ever executed in the department, I think,
while General Fremont was there.
I think that in the ordnance department there were no contracts whatever
issued during the time the general was there, either by his order or by Captain
Callender. There were a great many propositions for contracts for furnishing
shot and shell.. I remember very distinctly that quite a number were placed in
my hands for presentation ; but the general gave orders after the first was re
ceived to send them all to Captain Callender, which was done.
In the matter of guns, field artillery, of which the department had very little,
it became necessary to order some made. There was no contract, but Green
wood, of Cincinnati, had made guns for the State of Indiana, and the general
ordered him to make some guns for him. He appointed an officer to examine
them, to see that they were well bored, &c. The pi-ices were to be the same as
charged to the State of Indiana, of which no complaint had been made. Then
some parties in St. Louis offered to cast some bronze guns. Their propositions
were all referred to Captain Callender. I do not think he made a contract with
them, but he gave them an order to furnish some bronze guns.
In the matter of small arms, pistols, sabres^ muskets, carbines, and those
smaller weapons that come under the supervision of the ordnance department,
there was no contract made for them, because, of course, it could not be filled :
but orders were made direct to parties in New York and Philadelphia to purchase
them. This was to save time, for to have made requisitions would have necessi^
tated the going around by way of Washington, and would have taken a long
time. They were, accordingly, ordered direct from the parties by telegraph.
That I believe is about the state of facts in reference to the ordnance department.
In reference to the quartermaster's department, I know positively that there
never was but one contract made at headquarters, and that was made by Captain
Turnley, who had been assigned to the general as quartermaster upon his staff.
We were overrun with proposals to buy horses ; every one seemed to want us
to buy horses. We made a computation one day and found that we had had
offers in a very short time for 50,000 horses. There was a proposition came to
General Fremont, through General Asboth, for some parties to furnish a thousand
horses from Canada. The proposition was first made .in New York, as I sub
sequently learned. But I first heard of it in St. Louis when General Asboth
introduced Mr. Sacchi to me. He had previously introduced him to the general.
Mr. Sacchi's proposition was to furnish 3,000 horses from Canada. It was very
clear that he could not furnish Canadian horses up to the government standard
of height. His proposition was to furnish them at $150 each. Finally, as
General Asboth was very anxious to have some Canadian horses, the general
TESTIMONY. 201
directed that Mr. Sacchi should be allowed to furnish 1,000 horses, at $130
each, at the government standard. It was very evident to General Asboth and
myself, who discussed this matter the very day the contract was executed, that
Mr. Sacchi never could execute that contract ; that the price was too low, the
standard too high, and the time was too short. Subsequently he asked for an
extension of time, which General Fremont, upon my recommendation, refused.
He then asked permission to furnish the horses from somewhere else, which the
general refused. Finally, Mr. Burling, or Betting, the purchaser of the contract,
from New York, brought fifty horses there. Captain Turnley requested Mr.
Eeeside to inspect them,, and he passed two only. It is fair to say that only
two horses were delivered under contract. The fifty horses were taken by
Captain Turnley, there being no horses in St. Louis, and General Smith, at
Paducah, being in want of horses ; but the other 48 were purchased in open
market after being rejected under the contract. That was the only contract for
horses executed by the direct order of General Fremont.
There were several memoranda for horses made by Captain Turnley, but they
were not made into contracts. The government was at liberty to take five, fifty,
or one hundred horses, as it pleased. The Fremont Hussars were buying horses
under the command of Major Waring. Their officers were all foreign officers.
Two were Austrian cavalry officers, and had served at Solferino. The captains
and nearly all the lieutenants were foreign officers. They recruited their ranks
very quickly, principally from the foreign population of St. Louis. They were
very anxious for horses — good horses. They came to General Asboth and made
strong representations for good horses, which they could not get at the quarter
master's department. They brought there two or three horse contractors, and
by direction of General Fremont, through General Fremont and the officers of
the hussars, Captain Turnley made a few memoranda for horses, the horses to
be inspected by Colonel Morrill, an officer of the United States army. These
memoranda were the only memoranda of horses made at headquarters, and I
think that perhaps 500 or 600 horses were delivered under these memoranda.
The great bulk of the horses bought in the western department were bought in
open market. According to a report that has been made of the number of
horses bought by General McKinstry, made by his chief clerk, a few of which
were bought before General Fremont went there, there were some 6,000 horses
bought, of which only some 200 or 300 were bought under contract. The rest
were all bought in open market. Of these 6,000 horses we never heard any
thing connected with them at headquarters. Major McKinstry bought them in
open market as he pleased, and two-thirds of them he bought from persons
recommended by Colonel Blair. And I will state in this connexion that we
were very careful in St. Louis always. We found the city full of secessionists,
and it was with great difficulty that we could get our baggage carried through
the streets up to headquarters, the secession feeling was so strong. We exer
cised a great deal of caution in order to learn who to deal with. We required
some sort of certificate about every man we dealt with. And that was the case
in regard to the 6,000 horses bought by Major McKinstry. But those were not
all the horses bought there. When Captain Turnley first came there he made
an estimate of the number of horses and mules wanted. As I had had some
thing to do with horses and mules for several years, and expected to have some
thing to do with the transportation there, I submitted to the general a written
statement, objecting to the use of horses for transportation purposes, and urging
the use of mules. . I objected to horses being bought in St. Louis, for, though
St. Louis is a good mule mart, government had stripped Missouri of all good
horses. Captain Turnley made an estimate for some three-quarters of a million
of dollars, sent it on here, and it was approved and the money placed to his
credit in New York.
At the time we went down to Cairo I talked with the general about buying
stock, and made some representations to him about the difficulty of getting good
202 TESTIMONY.
stock, the possibility of getting it good if he dealt promiscuously with any and
every inan who had stock to sell, and the total folly of endeavoring to get good
horses by contract. I urged the general to select some person, as an inspector
of horses, to inspect all that Avere wanted for the western department. I recom
mended Mr. John E. Reeside, of this city, for that purpose. I had had a great
deal to do with stock, and I had found Mr. Reeside the best judge of horses I
ever saw ; and, as I wanted to favor the interests of the western department,
I recommended this man, though he was no friend of mine. The general sent
for him, and gave him a commission to inspect horses. I also urged the general
to buy all his horses in Ohio and not in St. Louis. Mr. Reeside went to Ohio,
where I knew he could get good horses, and from there shipped horses to St.
Louis, and all the best horses we had in St. Louis came from Ohio. Two-thirds
of the horses used by the body-guard were Ohio horses, and they performed re
markably well. Their march from the time they left camp in the morning, on
one occasion, fought their battle, and returned to camp, was ninety-two miles,
without hardly loosing a girth, and not a horse was hurt. The battle of Fred-
ericktown was an artillery battle, and the horses there were Ohio horses, and
so on through the department ; wherever you found good cavalry horses per
form good service they were almost generally Ohio horses. The State of Mas
sachusetts bought all her horses, as we bought Ohio horses. In reference to
other contracts in the quartermaster's department, General Fremont stated he
would have as little to do with contracts as possible ; and when people sent in
propositions they were almost universally sent to the quartermaster's depart
ment without their being shown to General Fremont, unless there was some
thing special about them. There were a great many propositions for all sorts
of articles. There was one particular proposition that was presented at head
quarters for a long time. Mr. Gurney, of Chicago, recommended by a great
many of the first men of Chicago and Illinois, and Mr. How, an ex-mayor of
St. Louis, made a proposition to furnish a large quantity of supplies for the
army, amounting in the aggregate to three-quarters of a million of dollars.
They were around the headquarters for three or four weeks. That was about
the only one that was pressed there. The rest Avere generally satisfied when
they Avere refused, and Avent aAvay. I think this one was pressed for two or
three Aveeks. Mr. Gurney saw the general tAvo or three times about it ; and it
was urged by Colonel Blair that this contract should be made, so as to giA^e
employment to the Union citizens of St. Louis. The proposition Avas sent to
me after the general had first approved it, and I indorsed upon the proposition
a recommendation to General McKinstry to make the contract if the prices and
quality were equal to those he generally made. General McKinstry refused to
make the contract, stating that so large a contract for so much money should
not be made without advertisement ; but it is a significant fact that some six or
seven days General McKinstry did giAre an order to Mr. How for about one-
third of this very order, amounting to about $225,000. I doubt if there Avas
anything Avrong about it. General McKinstry had a memorandum from the
general to furnish supplies for fifteen or twenty regiments ; he could not get
any supplies from Washington, and this Avas among various orders that he gave
to get these supplies. I believe that is about all the details I haA^e to state in
regard to contracts, except that it AAras not the policy of General Fremont at
headquarters to have anything to do with contracts.
There was a contract made for the manufacture of cars ; that was made by
General McKiustry, General Fremont directing him to make it. Then there
was a contract made by General McKinstry with Mr. Beard for fortifications ;
but the prices and eA'erything connected Avith that contract Avere regulated by
General McKinstry. I recollect very distinctly having written a letter in which
General McKinstry was directed to make the contract, the prices being left to
him. The reason for making that contract Avith Mr. Beard Avas that the officers
in charge of the fortifications were getting along very slowly, and it was neces-
TESTIMONY. 203
sary to get some one else who would carry the work along night and day, as
the city was then rery disturbed, and it was deemed necessary to have some
fortifications and mount them with guns to control the city. I believe I have
now referred to all the material contracts.
By the chairman :
Question. It has been said that the prices paid for these fortifications were
very extravagant. What do you know about that ?
Answer. 1 know nothing about that; I only know that General Fremont also
knew nothing about tli£ prices. I do know that in the order which I wrote
myself, and which I took a great deal of pains with, because I wanted to be
sure and protect the general in every possible way, I threw upon General Mc-
Kinstry the responsibility of fixing the prices. But as to the prices themselves,
whether they were high or low, I am no judge.
Question. What else do you know, connected with that department, that
would be of interest 1
Answer. I would like to mention one fact here which came to my knowledge
while 1 was in St. Louis. During the time the St. Louis arsenal was being
threatened by the secessionists, when there were 30,000 of the best Springfield
muskets stored there, which the secessionists were determined to get, at that
very time this arsenal was busily engaged, under the contract of Major Ilagner,
in rifling muskets for General Buekner, of Kentucky, for the Kentucky State
guards ; and those arms, after being altered, were sent to Kentucky and sup
plied to the State guard. That information I received from Captain Tracy,
10th infantry, who was on the general's staff in Missouri.
When we went to St. Louis the government had no credit, and it was with
some little difficulty that anybody could be found willing to trust them. The
merchants had expected that the secessionists would take the city, and they
were timid and afraid to trust the government. That will account, perhaps,
for large orders given by General McKinstiy on particular firms he may have
dealt with. 1 know that was the fact, so much so that officers of the army were
unwilling to appear alone in the streets with their uniforms on.
In reference to Cairo, I would say that the question was agitated at head
quarters whether the general would go himself with the force he coulo\ muster,
and try to protect the place, or whether he would send out all the force he had
on the road to Springfield. He could not do both ; that was the opinion at head
quarters. Jeff. Thompson, the rebel, was in below Cape Girardeau, in the
swamps ; and Hardee had come up to Pocahontas, in Arkansas, with quite a
force and well armed. General Pillow had landed at New Madrid with a large
"force, estimated at from 12,000 to 15,000 men. And the three were threatening
Cairo. We received information that they intended to cross the river at Com
merce, burn the bridges on the Illinois Central railroad, and then attack Bird's
Point, and so go on and attack Cairo. General Fremont persuaded some of the
German troops whose time had expired — one regiment of them — to embark in
these steamers for Cairo. When we got down there we found that there was
only one regiment at Cairo, and those were three months men, whose times were
expiring, and they were about being paid off. Other three months regiments
were paid off, and were about reorganizing. I was informed by Colonel Wagner,
at Cairo, at the time we landed there, that there were only some 600 men under
anus there. Others had Been allowed a parole to go home before join ing for the
war. I doubt if it is known to the public at all, the fact I have stated about
there being but 600 men under arms at Cairo then. Of course we did not allow
that to get out at that time.
Question. What was the force of the enemy then threatening the points along
there ?
I
204 TESTIMONY.
Answer. We never could ascertain exactly. Jeff. Thompson, as near as we
could understand, had about 3,500 men. He was in a secession portion of the
country, and there was a railroad from Bird's Point out to where he was. Then
Hardee's force we could never fully ascertain; as near as we could learn he had
some 6,000 or 7,000 men, and was moving up from Arkansas; and we could
never fairly determine where he intended to operate. But if he and Jeff. Thomp
son had united their forces upon Bird's Point they could have captured that
place and Cairo when General Fremont went down there. Then at the same
time that General Fremont took this force to Cairo, on the very day he re-
turned to St. Louis, he had ordered three regiments to re-enforce General Lyon,
one from Rolla, one from Jefferson City, and one from some other place. They
would not have reached him in season, as the result showed. But there were
three regiments ordered to his assistance.
Question. It has been stated that there were seven thousand or eight thou
sand men in North Missouri at that time which could have been disposed of
for the assistance of General Lyon.
Answer. I think there were four regiments in North Missouri, a portion of
them guarding the North Missouri railroad, and a portion guarding the Hanni
bal and St. Joseph railroad, under command of General Pope. General Pope
telegraphed from Quincy to General Fremont as early as the ISth of July for
permission to take these regiments in Illinois and go up the North Missouri
railroad and take possession of that and the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad.
He did -go there and fight one or two small battles. The rebels had burned one
or two bridges of the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad. It was deemed of
great consequence to keep open that road, as it was the only reliable means of
communication with Fort Leavenworth and Kansas. General Fremont could
have withdrawn those troops from North Missouri, but it was believed that if
he did so the whole country there would have risen in arms at once.
Question. How many troops could have been withdrawn from there at the
sacrifice of that portion of the State ?
Answer. I suppose he could have withdrawn three regiments. I think he
did withdraw three regiments after the battle of Springfield, and send one or
two of them to Rolla. But he would have left these roads unguarded and per
mitted the enemy to rise there.
Question. If he had sent those regiments to the aid of General Lyon, would
they have increased his force so as to have made him strong enough to stand
against Price?
Answer. It was not supposed at headquarters that General Lyon, with the
force he had, the time of three or four of his regiments having nearly expired,
would fight the enemy at all, but. that he would retire, in front of the enemy
and let Sigel take command of the rear guard and retire as Sigel did from Car
thage. The so-called battle of Carthage was but a retreat, the enemy having
been kept at bay with artillery. General Lyon had all the transportation at
his end of the line — one hundred and seventy-five six-mule teams, and, I think,
one hundred and twenty -five two-horse teams. His force was small, and he
could not spare any of his troops to escort this transportation back again. He
kept them all there, and that prevented the other regiments from having the
transportation they required, and which they would have otherwise had if he
could have spared an escort to take it back. Knowing these facts, it was sup
posed at headquarters that he would retire before Price until General Fremont
could have the opportunity of sending him re-enforcements, and then take the
field offensively again as soon as the re-enforcements reached him.
Question. What have you to say about General Fremont's dstentatious dis
play and exclusiveness ?
Answer. So far as the matter of exclusiveness is concerned, I suppose I know
more about it than anybody else. When he went there he had not a thorough and
TESTIMONY. 205
efficient staff, and he was obliged to attend to everything that came up with
such materials as l^e had. The three months men going out and the three
years men coming in made an enormous amount of work at headquarters. For
a period of several weeks I was the channel of communication between outsiders
and General Fremont. The guard were stationed below at the stairs leading up
to his office. We were in the habit of rising about daylight and breakfasting
after we had done considerable work. I remember one day in particular I came
down about half past ten o'clock, after getting my breakfast. My office was
about twenty feet off. I did not reach it until half past two in the afternoon ; there
were so many there who had to be disposed of. So far as the charge of exclusive-
ness is concerned, it was absolutely necessary and essential that he should put
some guard between himself and the public, to discriminate what business should
go to him and what should go to the other officers. Nine-tenths of all the busi
ness went to other officers. But volunteers and others, not understanding where
they were to go, assumed that everything was done at headquarters. Soldiers
who wanted passes over railroads, or who wanted to get into the hospital — in
fact, every form of business came to headquarters.
Question. Was he unreasonably exclusive for a commanding general having
such a department under him ?
Answer. My opinion is that he was not exclusive enough. That was my
opinion at the time, and I have never changed it. I considered that he was too
anxious to accommodate those who called to see him. So far as ostentation was
concerned, I was a member of his family during the entire time he was in St.
Louis. We occupied a very fine residence in St. Louis, but it was simply be
cause a relative of his wife offered it to him for his occupation ; and doing the
business he did, it was absolutely necessary that he should eat, and sleep,. and do
his work all under one roof, and that necessitated the taking a large house,
where he could have all his officers at work together. For a period of five weeks,
while I was there, he never went further from his door than on to the sidewalk,
where he went to review some troops that had arrived and wished to be reviewed
there in front of the house. The house was a very fine house, and he took some
pains to take care of it. Zagoni's horse, which was intended as a school for offi
cers, and given out as such, in which were a great many gentlemen of education
and fine attainments who had enlisted in the ranks, ten or eleven physicians,
graduates, or many of them — a portion of their duties was to attend about head
quarters. That was as much for the good of the men as to take care of the
property. At the same time, when we first went there, it was necessary to have
some secure and safe place for the arms of the guard, for we were afraid the city
would rise and break out in rebellion. Indeed, General McKinstry, the provost
marshal, reported once or twice that they intended to rise. Tile arms of the guard
were put in a room in the basement that had iron shutters, and it was necessary
they should be there to guard that. I never saw anything in the way of osten
tation.
Question. Do you know any reason why he was superseded at the time he
was?
Answer. I think I do. We all had a conviction on that subject at head
quarters. Not that I ever talked with the general about it ; but we on the
staff all had the conviction that the primary cause of his being recalled was his
proclamation.
Question. Were you present at the time he was superseded at Springfield ?
Answer. In one sense I was present, and in one I was not. My tent was
near that of the general, and when the civilian came with this letter from Gen
eral Curtis I was in the yard, but not in the room where the general was.
Question. What do you know about the situation of the enemy at that time,
whether there was any enemy there, arrd how near the enemy was ?
Answer. We had no doubt in our minds that the enemy were near, and we
206 TESTIMONY.
subsequently had positive testimony that the enemy was near us. The day the
general was superseded — I think it was Saturday, the 2d of November — I rode
out with the general to the outer pickets, and we there found on one of the
roads a refugee family that had come in. from Wilson's Creek. We talked with
one of them, a very intelligent man, who stated that he had left home in conse
quence of the Texas ranger cavalry coming there. Four or five of them came
to his house, and there were some 400 of them close by. Colonel Richardson,
who had charge of the recruits, told me positively, several times over, that he
was satisfied, from what his scouts and spies represented to him, that the enemy
were marching from Cassville to Springfield towards iis —his spies had seen
them.
Question. How far is Cassville from Springfield ?
Answer. I do not now remember ; I have forgotten. The day that he was su
perseded, Lieutenant Max Tosk and Mr. Thompson went to Price's army with the
convention between General Fremont and General Price for the pacification of
the State. We looked upon that as one of the most important measures that
had come up during the war. General Price had offered to confine the war to
the regular armies in the field, and do away with the guerilla fighting entirely, and
that no man should be disturbed for any opinion he entertained, if he did not
express them and force them upon the public. Documents were drawn up, and
Mr. Thompson and Lieutenant Tosk went with them to Price's army ; and
when they came back they stated emphatically that it was the intention of the
enemy to fight us. Lieutenant Tosk said he overheard conversations between
staff-officers of General McCulloch, in which they expressed their intention to
give us battle, and that they were on their way to do so ; and when they heard
that General Fremont was superseded, they received it as very gratifying intel
ligence. They represented their army as being very large — -from 40.000 to
50,000 strong. There was no doubt upon the mind of any member of General
Fremont's staff, or of any officer in the army that I conversed with, that the
enemy were close at hand and intended to give us battle.
Question. Had General Fremont made any disposition for a battle 1
Answer. When General Fremont was superseded he was waiting for General
Pope to come up with his troops, the most pressing orders having been sent
back to them to hurry forward, in order that we could go forward and meet the
enemy. The most pressing orders were sent to General Hunter to come up
with his division. But General Fremont would not wait for him after General
Pope came up. When he was superseded on Saturday his first intention was
to leave on Sunday morning, and go back to St. Louis, but he was persuaded
by his officers to remain. There was a written request presented to him, signed
by the principal generals, requesting him to remain until General Hunter came
up, and, I believe, involved in that request was one that he should give battle
to the enemy. He decided to remain until General Hunter came up. On Sun
day, when it was supposed the enemy was close at hand, he called a conference
of the leading officers in his command, and in that conference all the dispositions
in reference to a battle the ensuing morning were made. General Hunter came
up while the conference was in session, and the plan agreed upon was submitted
to him, and, upon the supposition that the enemy were close at hand, it was
believed that a battle would ensue the next morning. General Fremont had
insisted to lead the army if General Hunter had not come up.
Question. Did the army show any mutinous disposition when it was ascer
tained that General Fremont had been superseded ?
Answer. There was no mutinous manifestation on the part of the soldiers at
all. A great many of the German officers, who were very much attached to
General Fremont, came to headquarters and expressed their sympathy for him,
and stated that they were very sorry to part with him, aud one or two made
TESTIMONY. ^ \ 207
speeches, and there were cheers for the general. But I saw nothing on the
part of the officers or men of what I would call a mutinous disposition.
Question. What was the bearing of General. Fremont in regard to any
demonstrations that were made] What was hia course of conduct on being
superseded ?
Answer. He seemed very much relieved ; was much more pleasant and cheer
ful than he had been for weeks before. He issued an order, through Colonel
Eaton, relinquishing the command of the army to General Hunter. He then
wrote his farewell address to the army, and both of them were printed. We
had taken a little printing press along with us, and had got a detail of printers
from the various regiments to work it, and had found some type and printing
paper in Springfield, and were doing the printing for the army. That order
relinquishing the command and the farewell address were printed and circulated.
General Fremont was much more cheerful than I had seen him for weeks before.
Question. It has been said that they cheered him, and made very strong de-
'anonstrations in his favor, and perhaps against the government, and he bowed
assent to it.
Answer. There was no demonstration of soldiers made at all until we started
out of Springfield on Monday morning. I rode out with the general then, riding
just in rear of him. The only military demonstration was made by the Benton
Cadets, an infantry corps he had raised, intending to make it a school for infan
try officers, as the body-guard was for cavalry officers. The Benton Cadets
were drawn up in the road and presented arms as the general passed. That
was the only military demonstration that was made. We did not pass through
the different camps, but as we passed the cadets and through the town the
soldiers would run out from their camps, come up to the fence, and those who
knew the general would cheer him. So far as regards any mutinous conduct on
the part of the army, I never saw anything at all of it. There .were some few
of the officers who felt very much aggrieved, who felt they had lost everything,
and who, in a private way, may have felt for the moment that they would be
willing to do almost anything. But it was one of those momentary feelings
which they did net. give expression to as a general thing, and I doubt if any of
that came to the ears of General Fremont. If it did, I am perfectly certain that
he did not listen to it for an instant, but promptly rebuked it.
Question. Are there any other matters of importance you desire to mention 1
Answer. Our great want in the western department was the want of money,
There was very little money ever sent there. A great many things could have
been bought cheaper than they were if the government had furnished us money
to pay for them. The quartermaster's department particularly eould have dealt
to much better advantage if they had had money. But not having it, they were
under the necessity of dealing with those who had money or credit. In regard
to extravagance, I am of opinion, and I have not hesitated to express that
opinion publicly, that the western department during General Fremont's admin
istration will be found to have been more cheaply administered, so far as regards
dollars and cents, than any other department of the army. Our provisions cost
less than anywhere else ; our horses cost no more ; the transportation of the men
cost no more ; the arms for the department cost no more than they did any
where else ; our purchase of Austrian muskets was a very economical one.
the clothing and equipments for the men only cost the additional freight from
the east ; our army did not cost half as much as any other army of the same
size in the country, for the reason that they did not have the clothing — they
never were properly clothed. I have here copies of requisitions made from every
division in October for overcoats and blankets. Not one-half of our army had
overcoats, but used blankets instead. The Benton Cadets went all the way to
Springfield without overcoats, and so did the body-guard ; the army did not have
them.
208 TESTIMONY.
The provisions that we consumed between the terminus of the railroad and
Springfield, the forage and hay for the horses, cost next to nothing. When we
got it from secessionists we paid nothing for it. When we got it from Union
men we gave them printed certificates of the market prices, with the statement
that they would be paid if they proved their continued loyalty. The army
lived on about half rations during the entire march from Sedalia to Springfield.
Every mill anywhere near the line of our march we took possession of. We
gathered the wheat in wagons. We had millers with us who ground the wheat,
and the army was fed in that way. In Springfield General Asboth's division
was fed almost entirely on corn-meal and beef. The rations were reduced from
2,200 and odd pounds to the thousand rations down to 800 and odd pounds, so
that feeding the army with beef at 3J cents per pound, and corn at 25 cents a
bushel, made it very cheap supporting the army.
In the matter of transportation we had the most motley assemblage of wag
ons that ever any army had. We had ox wagons, two, four, and six yokes,
horse and mule wagons of every kind. We had government transportation, our
own transportation, and pressed transportation. However, that relates rather
to the question of speed in getting over the road, than to economy.
A great deal has been said about musical directors, adlatus, &c. General
Fremont had no staff of any kind allowed him by the government. As is well
known, previous to this rebellion there never was much necessity for a staff.
A major general by the law of July, 1829, was allowed three aids, to be selected
from the army. The War Department construed that "army" meant line of
the army, and they would not give him aids out of the various departments
that had been charged with staff duties. I was a captain in the commissary
department : they would not allow General Fremont to select me as one of his
aids. When General Fremont ordered me to leave St. Louis to accompany
him, General Halleck threatened me with arrest if I went, and I had to re
main. The law of August 5, 1861, allowing major generals to nominate to the
President for appointment, gave as many aids as a major general wanted. Un
der that law General Fremont appointed a great many people to assist him ; but
he did not appoint them in the sense understood by the public. His appoint
ments were especially and particularly contingent upon the confirmation of the
President. He complied strictly with the law. And having selected fifteen or
eighteen, whatever the number was that he had, it became necessary to assign
to them certain duties. He assigned Colonel Albert, who was an officer of four
teen years' experience in the Austrian army — who -had fought, I believe, in
twenty-eight pitched battles — he assigned him to General Asboth, who called
him an adlatus, which means an aid to the chief of staff. Of course General Fre
mont let him call him whatever he pleased. Colonel Albert was thoroughly famil
iar with all the routine of a soldier's duty. Major Darsheimer was assigned to
postal duties. Captain Tracy was assigned to commissary's duties. He did no,t
receive any commissary stores ; he made no contracts ; but he carried the orders
to those who did provide those stores. I never held a dollar's worth of public
property in my hands while there. As a staff-officer I avoided that, although a
captain in the commissary department. I was simply a channel of communica
tion for the general's orders to those who provided the articles wanted. I never
made any contracts ; I never was ordered to do so. Captain Waldaner, on the
staff, was called the musical director. Congress had provided for the enlist
ment of twenty-four musicians for each infantry regiment, and sixteen musicians
for each cavalry regiment. But Congress had provided no way to obtain the
instruments for these musicians, and there were continued applications for them.
Captain Waldaner was directed to arrange for the ordering of these instruments,
and to arrange with the adjutants of the regiments to take charge of the matter.
And so on with the different officers throughout the staff. They were appointed
under the act of August 5, and were assigned to this, that, or the other duty,
TESTIMONY. 209
so as to subdivide the duty, and thus give greater efficiency to the staff. It is
stated in General Thomas's report, and elsewhere, that members of General
Fremont's staff were interested as speculators. As I was with the general from
the time he started from New York to the time he left St. Louis to return east,
and as I knew every staff officer he had, I am as conversant with the facts con
nected with them as any one can be. And I state, confidently, that, in my
opinion, no member of his staff ever had a dollar's interest in any contract, pur
chase, or sale ; no interest, directly or indirectly, in anything connected with the
furnishing of supplies. Captain Haskell was not a contractor, but a seller of
mules to the government before he went on the staff. I know he did not want
to go upon the staff, and did not know lie had been appointed until he saw it
announced publicly. And he then immediately assigned away all interest he
had in those matters. I saw him every day, as he was on the staff, and I know
he tried to do his duty to the general and to the country, as far as he was able.
I had no interest in contracts at all. On the contrary, I probably sacrifice^ as
*much as any man ever did sacrifice who ever went upon any general's staff in
this country, for I had a large interest in Texas before the war commenced, and
there was a great deal of that still left ; and I sacrificed the whole of it that I
might have something to do with putting down this rebellion — not particularly
in going upon General Fremont's staff. No one knows, perhaps, as well as my
self, except General Fremont himself, of the economy and management of that
department. Let me refer here to one 'matter I think of in relation to the Lex
ington affair. It has been said that General Fremont did not receive a man who
brought news that Colonel Mulligan was in great stress and danger, I know more
about that than any one else. When General Fremont retired at night we were
very careful to allow no one to disturb him. If anything special came it was
brought to me. About twelve or Qiie o'clock at night the guard came up and awoke
me, and said there was a communication from captain so-and-so. I looked it
over and saw that it was something in reference to Lexington, and that we had
received the same information that day by telegraph I said, " Tell him to call
in the morning." He was very pertinacious to see General Fremont ; but I
sent him away, as we had already received the same information. Now, in refer
ence to sending succor to Lexington, I had the copies of the orders in my
hand ; I wrote a great many of the telegraphic despatches. I know that Colonel
Jefferson C. Davis was ordered to take his troops, with three days' rations in
their knapsacks, and break through the enemy's lines and relieve Colonel Mul
ligan. Orders were sent to Sturgis, and Lane, and Davis to make a combined
movement for the relief of Lexington. The reason why those orders did not
succeed was because Colonel Mulligan, according to our views at headquarters,
had no business on that side of the river. He ought to have put the river
between him and the enemy before they took his steamers. While he had the
control of the steamers he should have put his men upon them and have taken
them to the other side of the river, where he could have united with Sturgis,
and then with him he could have again crossed the river and joined General
Lane. General Sturgis arrived upon the river bank, but had no means of cross
ing, and had to leave-
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Did Colonel Mulligan's orders permit him to do that, or were they
peremptory — in such terms as to exclude him from doing that ?
Answer. No, sir; he had no orders in reference to those matters at all. The
movement across the river is one of those things about which an officer must
exercise his own judgment. That is never provided for, except when an officer
is ordered to hold a post at all hazards. Colonel Mulligan was never so ordered.
Question. Do you know the order to Colonel Mulligan about Lexington ?
Part iii 14
210 TESTIMONY.
Answer. Yes, sir, because I was familiar with the order that directed him to
occupy Lexington. He was simply directed to move to Lexington and occupy
it. It was one of those points which it was not considered necessary to hold
at all hazards. I did not see that order, but I understood it.
Question. Do you know that, by the terms of the order, he was authorized
to cross the river if he had thought best ?
Answer. I know that as well as any man can know it who has never seen
the order. I know that, according to his instructions, he should have crossed
the river. He had general instructions to occupy Lexington.
Question. Had he any orders, do you know, to hold Lexington at all
hazards ?
Answer. Xo, sir.
Question. His instructions were general, and in your judgment it was his duty
to have taken the other side of the river 1
Answer. I do not put' it upon my judgment, because I am not a military
man. But my own judgment corroborates the judgment of military men on
the staff, that in the absence of positive instructions to hold the place at all
hazards, it was his duty to put the river between the enemy and himself. For
instance, Fort Leavenworth was to be held at all hazards and at all costs, as
essential for the protection of that section of country there. But Lexington
was not a place of that importance. There is no dispute about the bravery
with -which the the troops fought at Lexington. But Colonel Mulligan had
within his intrenchments a regiment of cavalry, and no ^officer in defence of a
post wants any cavalry inside intrenchments for they are positively an incum-
brance and not a benefit.
Bv Mr. Covode :
Question. I discover that you are familiar with all the transactions there ; can
you tell at what time the first difficulties took place between General Fremont
and the administration here, or the parties representing it ?
Answer. I think I can pretty closely. As I remarked before, the general
issued his proclamation ; then the President requested him to modify it. He
telegraphed word back to the President that he would modify it if ordered to
do so. The President ordered the modification. Then about that time came
this difficulty about the Howe & Gurney contract. There was a great pressure
made at headquarters to have that contract executed.
Question. Did Colonel Blair want this contract for these men ?
Answer. They were indorsed by Colonel Blair. He introduced them to
General Fremont. He was their channel of communication.
Question. Do you know the date of that contract ? As far as I can ascertain
the relations between General Fremont and Colonel Blair were 'good up to the
24th of August, judging from letters. Now, I want to see how soon after that
contract was refused 1
Answer. The contract was not refused by General Fremont ; but General
McKinstry was recommended to make it if the prices and qualities were
the same as under other contracts. But General McKinstry refused to make
that contract.
Question. What time was the contract refused by General McKinstry?
Answer. I think it was the 25th of August that General McKinstry refused
to make the contract : and then, singularly enough, on the 6th of September,
General McKinstry gave this Mr. Howe a memorandum to furnish 10,000
infantry overcoats; 25,000 pairs army sewed shoes; 5,000 uniform coats;
10,000 trousers; 15,000 drawers; 15,000 flannel shirts; 20,000 pairs stock
ings ; 5,000 blankets ; 5,000 haversacks ; 5,000 canteens, cork and strap ; 50
sergeant's sabres ; 5,000 fatigue overalls ; 5,000 infantry hats, trimmed ; and
5,000 blue flannel sackcoats. After he had refused to make the contract with
TESTIMONY. . 211
Howe & Gurney, lie then gave Howe tins memorandum. You could not say
that it was for any particular number of men. But the value of the contract
asked for was about three-quarters of a million of dollars.
Question. Were the relations between General Fremont and Colonel Blair
good up to the time that contract was refused 1 •
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Did Blair himself apply in person to General Fremont for the
whole of this contract ?
Answer. Yes, sir. Colonel Blair was one of the very few men who was al
lowed access to General Fremont at all hours. The sentinel on the stairs below
had a list of persons who could pass up at all times. Colonel Blair could walk
up at any time to see General Fremont, or any of the family, and he could take
others up with him. I never at any time introduced either Mr. Gurney or Mr.
-Howe. They came there by direction of Colonel Blair.
Question. The relations between General Fro'mont and Colonel Blair were
good up to the time that large contract was rejected ?
Answer. That is what we understood at headquarters.
Question. Did you discover any immediate change after that was rejected ?
Answer. Yes, sir. The first we heard were rumors from outside that Mr.
Blair was speaking against General Fremont among the citizens and people
there.
Question. Did you hear anything of that before this claim was rejected ?
Answer. I cannot fix the exact date in my mind. But Mr. Blair did not
come to General Fremont from about that time. I think he was getting dis
satisfied previous to that time, but it culminated in that.
Question. In what way did General Fremont indicate his refusal of two-thirds
of the contract 1 Did he do it by enclosing in brackets a portion of the offer 1
Answer. The offer was an offer to furnish so and so. General Fremont had
made some lines, or scores, or marks upon it, and passed it over to me, and told
me to send that to General McKinstry. I wrote across the back of it an
indorsement in my own handwriting, and wrote it as I -did all other indorse
ments. I was opposed to contracts coming to headquarters ; I was opposed to
people speculating and making money out of the government. I wrote on it
that General McKinstry was recommended to make the within contract, and
then named the qualifications.
Question. Did you sign General Fremont's name to it ?
Answer. No, sir. I carried it to General Fremont and he wrote his name
on it.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. That was an offer to furnish so many goods ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do I understand you that it was to be accepted with General Mc
Kinstry 's approval for a portion of it 1
Answer. For one-third.
Question. It was not approved generally by General Fremont for the whole
amount ?
Answer. No, sir ; not all for the whole amount, but recommended for about
one-third.
Question. How was the one-third indicated ?
Answer. He made some marks upon it. He made some marks upon the
margin, and indicated that one-third of that was the amount that he would re
commend ; except some articles which he erased. I think the proposition con
tained wagons ; I know it contained harness. General McKinstry had ordered
212 TESTIMONY.
all the wagons that were wanted j or if it did not contain wagons it was some
article that General McKinstry had enough of before. General Fremont then
indicated upon the margin one-third of what was left. And the recommenda
tion which I wrote and which he signed was for what he had indicated.
Question. What did General Fremont put upon that document to indicate
that he was willing to give one-third of it ?
Answer. They wrote a proposition to do so and so. I think it was written
upon foolscap paper, and it came to General Fremont folded so that it would go
into a large envelope. He drew his pen through certain articles which he had
enough of already. He then indicated one-third upon the margin of the rest of
the articles. I do not now remember the exact form in which he indicated that.
Question. The writing which he put upon the paper conveyed to General
McKinslry the intelligence that he was willing a contract should be made for
one-third, but not for the whole 1
Answer. That is my recollection. Then the indorsement I wrote upon the
paper covered it as it then existed.
Question. With the limitations General Fremont had then put upon it 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. You do not remember whether General Fremont indicated the one-
third on the inside by writing on the margin or by marks around the articles ?
Answer. My impression is that he drew a line around the articles and then
wrote upon the side some words to indicate that he was willing to let a contract
for one-third be made. Mr. Blair was near run down with applications ; every
body wanted his recommendation. And for the first three weeks when Mr.
Blair was friendly to General Fremont I sent to him a dozen times to know
whether such and such a man were good men. For example, a refugee by the
name of Morse came there and wanted to be a government inspector, and wanted
government to buy horses of refugees from southwestern Missouri. I required
him to get a recommendation from Colonel Blair, which he did. And General
Fremont decided that he would discriminate in favor of refugees who were
driven from their homes and had horses and mules to sell. He did that as a
matter of policy to create good feeling in the State.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. Did Blair continue to recommend anything after the failure to get
this large contract 1
Answer. I cannot fix the exact date, but about that time friendly relations
between them were broken off.
Question. Who recommended you to General Fremont ?
Answer. Montgomery Blair, I had been doing business for his department
for three years.
By Mr. Julian ::
Question. He knew you well ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I was in Charleston on my way to Texas when Fort
Sumter was bombarded. I immediately came north and volunteered to Judge
Blair to do anything he wanted me to do. I went over to Baltimore, when
communication was interrupted, and did what he wanted done there, and then I
looked around for further opportunity of doing something, and he recommended
me to General Fremont, who did not know me at that time. The following
from my official report as directior of transportation, made to General Fremont
in November last, gives the facts in reference to many important matters con
nected with the western department :
TESTIMONY. 213
CONNEXION OF PACIFIC AND IRON MOUNTAIN RAILROADS, AND ITS ADVANTAGES
AS A MILITARY MEASURE.
Some time prior to the date of my appointment, the rails had, by your order,
been laid down, which joined the Pacific and Iron Mountain railroads, and this
connexion being made to pass along the city levee, both roads had, in common,
an excellent landing on the Mississippi river.
The connexion of these two roads, completed September 12th, placed at your
control, for use upon either, the entire rolling stock of both.
ITor moving troops up the Pacific road, which is the longer of the two, only a
limited number of cars or engines could be borrowed for any length of time from
the Iron Mountain road ; but if, on the other hand, there had arisen a necessity
for concentrating troops upon Ironton, it could have been done with great rapidity.
You could have placed several regiments upon cars at Holla, at Syracuse, or
Jeffers%i City, (points on the Pacific road,) taking upon the same train troops
from Benton barracks, and the arsenal in the city ; while steamers from points
up the Mississippi could have landed their forces at the railroad junction on the
levee, and the whole have been moved over the Iron Mountain railroad to their
destination, without change of cars, even to those regiments passing through
the streets of this city. Trains have been taken by us from the arsenal, along
the levee, through the streets, and thence over the Pacific road to Jefferson City.
On the 24th of September two Illinois regiments were disembarked from
steamers at the levee, placed on board the cars at the railroad junction, with all
their equipage, and without delay from the want of wagon transportation, were
taken by rail to their destination at Ironton. From Ironton, the 1st Nebraska
regiment, Colonel Thayer, with all its camp and garrison equipage, was placed
upon the same trains, and taken to Syracuse, on the Pacific railroad, halting, as
it passed through the streets of St. Louis, only long enough for the citizens and
soldiers to exchange congratulations. Syracuse was the rendezvous for General
Mclvinstry's division, to which Colonel Thayer' s regiment belonged, and it
was, at the date I refer to, the western terminus of the Pacific railroad, as Colo
nel Bissell had not, at that time, finished repairing the railroad bridge over the
Lamine river — destroyed by order of Governor Jackson.
TELEGRAPH LINES.
At the time of your arrival in St. Louis there was no telegraphic communica
tion between St. Louis and Ironton, or along the line of the Iron Mountain
railroad ; none from St. Louis along the line of the North Missouri railroad
to the Hannibal & St. Joseph railroad ; none along the line of the southwest
branch of the Pacific railroad to Holla, and none west of Jefferson City on the
main stem of the Pacific road. The telegraphic corps, organized under your
orders, consisting of two companies, completed the telegraph line to Ironton,
which included an office established at Jefferson Barracks ; they also completed
the line to Holla. Two days after your arrival in Jefferson City, the telegraph
corps reached headquarters by steamer : and when you camped at " Camp Lily"
they opened telegraphic communication with St. Louis in two hours from the
time Captain Smith received your orders to connect the camp by telegraph with
the railroad depot. The communication was made by means of an insulated
copper wire, carried upon a reel, the reel mounted on two* wheels, and drawn by
one horse. The wire was attached to the line at the depot, and uncoiled upon
the ground as the horse was driven toward camp, a distance of nearly two miles
from the main telegraph line. At first the wire was allowed to remain upon the
top of the ground ; afterward a trench was dug and the wire buried. Iinme--
diately upon your leaving Jefferson City the telegraphic company, by your
214 TESTIMONY,
orders, commenced repairing the line between Jefferson City and Syracuse;
they also erected so much new line as was necessary to complete telegraphic
connexion Mrith Sedalia. Then, by your order, they commenced repairing the
old telegraph line from Syracuse to Fort Smith, Arkansas, which had been
partially destroyed by the rebels. This line passes through Warsaw, Bolivar,
and Springfield. Upon your return from Springfield we met the telegraph
corps at the town of Warsaw, which place was then in telegraphic communica
tion with the headquarters of the army at Washington. As the poles were all
standing, and but little of the wire removed between Warsaw and Springfield,
the captain of the telegraph corps informed us that he expected to place Spring
field in telegraphic communication with St. Louis in the course of the following
week or ten days.
POST OFFICES AND COMMUNICATION BY LINE OF STAGES.
Immediately upon our occupation of Warsaw, the post office in that t<>wn was
reopened by your orders, and a loyal citizen selected to take charge of it as
postmaster, under the general supervision of Major William Dorsheimer, of
your staff, postal director. Under your specific instructions, I re-established,
in wagons, the semi-weekly mail line between Warsaw and the Pacific railroad
at Tipton, which line, after a few days, was found to be so useful to every de
partment of the army that you ordered it increased to a daily. As a mode of
rapid, regular, and frequent communication between an army in the field and
the base of its operations, the advantage of a daily line of wagons are so self-
evident that I need not comment upon the establishment of this line. Under
your instructions this mail communication in wagons was extended southward
as the army progressed. On our arrival in Springfield we reopened the post
office there, as had been done in Warsaw, and we carried to the people in that
town the first mail they had received for four months. During your stay in
Springfield the mail communication with Tipton, by way of Warsaw, and over the
line herein referred to was regular and frequent.
All the facts connected with the reopening of the post offices, the selection
of postmasters,' and re-establishment of the mail line, were communicated from
time to time to the Post Office Department in Washington as they occurred.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, IN THE FIELD,
Office of Director of Transportation, Warsaw, October 20, 1861.
The prescribed blank forms (H) are now ready for delivery, to be given in
every case to the people of the country for property impressed for the uses of
the army. Officers in charge of parties impressing are directed to take only
wagons, horses, animals, and forage. When necessary, they will impress either
horse, mule, or cattle teams, as the emergency demands; but will not take loose
animals for the purpose of mounting men not entitled by the regulations of the
service to ride. They will prevent all depredations upon private property by
the men while in the execution of their duty. They will avoid stripping a
family entirely of their wagons or animals, unless there exists imperative neces
sity for so doing. They will have all property carefully examined, in order to
take none but what is in good order and suited to the uses of the army, and
everything must be carefully appraised at its lowest cash value by two compe
tent commissioned or non-commissioned officers, experts, if possible, whose
names shall be entered in the body of the receipt. The owner will sign the
prescribed form of oath of allegiance on the back of the receipt before its issue.
Every officer will keep correct memoranda of the name and address of the par
ities from whom he takes property, its description, value, and to whom each re-
• ceipt was issued, reporting the details to the director of transportation. Any
TESTIMONY. . 215
officer or soldier of the array having in his possession any animal or property
belonging to the people of the country will report the same to the quartermaster
of the regiment, who will report to the brigade quartermaster, for the action of
the proper officers.
I. C. WOODS, Colonel and D. O. T.
Official. J. H. EATON,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General.
(H)
No. .]
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Office of Director of Transportation, Camp near , , 186 .
Received this day , for which the government agrees to pay .
•Total to be paid by the United States to Mr. .
Property valued by , appraisers.
This appraised value to be paid to the owner of the above property by the
government of the United States, subject to the conditions indorsed on the back
of this receipt.
Indorsement. — This receipt is only intended to be binding upon the govern
ment when given to true and loyal citizens of the United States, whose property
we have been compelled to take by the exigences of the service.
The property of all those who have in any way aided or abetted the rebels
is forfeited to the use of the government by the act of Congress ; and before
this claim can be paid satisfactory evidence must be produced of a continued
obedience of Mr. to the Constitution and laws.
(Signed) .
WAGONS AND HARNESSES.
Late in the month of August General McKinstry ordered quite a large
number of wagons and harnesses; 200 from manufacturers in St. Louis; 200
from manufacturers in Cincinnati; 450 from D. G. Wilson, J. Childs & Co.,
Philadelphia; 200 from J. S. & A. Abbott, Concord, New Hampshire, and the
governor of Massachuseits was requested to send 200 of the same pattern as
furnished to the Massachusetts troops.
The wagons from Philadelphia commenced arriving about the middle Of Sep
tember, as they were on hand at the manufactory when ordered ; but the wagons
and harnesses to fill the other orders had to be made after receipt of the telegrams
from General McKinstry, and, with every desire on the part of the manufacturers
to urge them forward, could not, with a few exceptions, commence arriving at St.
Louis until after your departure from the city. The greatest difficulty encoun
tered in providing transportation was to procure the requisite number of har
nesses. The shops at St. Louis were engaged in making cavalry equipment
and artillery harness as well as team harness, but their capacity is comparatively
limited. The facilities in Chicago and Cincinnati were also limited, and, besides,
both cities had large orders to fill for infantry equipments for their State troops.
New York and Philadelphia have been the only places where we could procure
any large amount of team harness. In those cities we were fortunate enough to
arrange with Betts, Nichols & Co., of New York, and Lacy & Phillips, of Phila
delphia, large army contractors, to execute orders for this department upon the
same terms as executed for the department at Washington.
These orders have been filled as to time of delivery, and very faithfully as to
the quality of work.
The first army wagons received here for the use of this department were
216 TESTIMONY.
manufactured in Indiana, and contracted for by the authorities in Washington.
These wagons proved to be made of inferior material ; the poles, perches, and
hounds were easily broken on the road; none of which complaints, I would
state, can be made against any other wagons sent to this department. Those
made in St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Philadelphia were good; while those from
Boston and Concord, New Hampshire, were very superior in every respect. No
harnesses were ordered to be made to accompany the wagons from Indiana, a
very serious omission, which left the quartermaster's department in St. Louis so
short of transportation, though having a plenty of wagons, that up to the time of
your departure from St. Louis for Jefferson City, September 27, the post duty
connected with moving the baggage of new regiments arriving here was nearly
all performed by hired teams, because the quartermaster had not the organized
transportation at his command.
/
AMBULANCES.
Doctor Buell, of the sanitary commission, reported to you in September that
he was unable to find more than one ambulance in this department. A requisi
tion was made upon the quartermaster's department in Washington for quite a
number of both two and four horse ambulances, with harnesses complete, but
none ever came forward. All that were procurable in St. Louis were purchased,
but as a whole, the entire army under your command, which moved from Jeffer
son City to Springfield, was never furnished with an average of one ambulance
to two regiments, because they could not be had. In returning from Spring
field we had only a few sick, nearly all who were ill from fever and ague, con
tracted along the line of the Pacific railroad, having recovered in the clear
mountain air of the Ozark ranges, in which you campaigned. We made an ex
cellent substitute for an ambulance, putting a frame of light plank upon four
buggy springs in a common wagon, the springs were floored over, and then two
inclined planes were raised upon this floor at an angle of about thirty degrees
each, which enabled six persons to ride comfortably in the wagon. This sub
stitute worked extremely well on the return road from Springfield to Sedalia.
OX TEAMS FOR SUPPLY TRAINS.
During our stay at Warsaw I was enabled, under your orders, to make an
arrangement with Jones & Cartwright, of Fort Lcavenworth, to sell to the
quartermaster's department two hundred wagons, one thousand or more yoke
of cattle, who were to be broken to draught, with yokes, bows, chains, and wagon
fixtures complete, being the same transportation they had used in the Pike's
Peak trade. I also secured the services and experience of that firm to superin
tend the hiring of competent wagonmasters and teamsters, while all the details
of this purchase of ox teams, the prices, the terms, &c., were left to be arranged
by Major Robert Allen, quartermaster, St. Louis. In view of the approach of
winter and bad roads, the want of enough organized mule teams in your depart
ment, and the fact that ox teams can haul heavier loads at much less expense,
both of original outlay and cost of maintenance, I considered this arrangement
with Jones & Cartwright to have been of great value to the public service in
this department.
FORWARDING SHARPSHOOTERS IN WAGONS FROM BOLIVAR TO SPRINGFIELD.
At Bolivar, on the evening of the 26th of October, you directed me to prepare
a number of wagons immediately, and to have the sharpshooters, under com
mand of Major Holman, sent forward in them to Springfield with every possible
despatch.
TESTIMONY. 217
Tn Compliance with this order I prepared nine of the regular army wagons,
by placing narrow seats for the men between the bows of the wagons, the latter
being left standing to hold on by. The wagon covers were removed. Knap
sacks and haversacks were packed in the bottom of the wagon.
One hundred and fifty men were thus placed in the nine wagons, being the
whole number of Major Holman's command.
The little party started from Bolivar at 7 p. m. of the 26th, and reached
Springfield, a distance of thirty miles, at daylight the next morning, Sunday
where they found and relieved the garrison of twenty-six men.
PURCHASE OF WAGON KEGS FROM WARDEN OF STATE PRISON.
The warden of the State Prison at Jeffcrsox City manufactures barrels, half
barrels, and kegs for the St. Louis market. .
I directed the post quartermaster to accept an offer he made, to furnish for
the use of the army five hundred of the five, ten, or fifteen gallon kegs, which
we needed for the teamsters, one to each wagon. These kegs were to be paid
for by our transporting to St. Louis a quantity of empty barrels and half bar
rels, which we could and did easily carry in the hold of any of the chartered
steamers. This contract gave the kegs to the government free of cost.
SUPPLIES OF HAY AND GRAIN AT JEFFERSON CITY AND TIPTON.
As a consequence of the large number of animals which had been collected
at Jefferson City, amounting to several hundreds, the surrounding country not
being well stocked with oats and hay, and the fodder being yet unfit for food,
the forage had become well nigh exhausted even before our arrival. A few days
after we reached there, the forage contractor at the post was unable to fill the in
creased requisitions upon him. The new crop of corn at that date, October 1st,
was too green to be fed to our animals, and the cavalry horses were, as a con
sequence, put upon half or quarter rations. In view of these facts, and after
numerous complaints from the officers of the different regiments, Brigadier Gen
eral McKinstry gave a large order, October 1st, for oats and hay, to be for
warded at ouce from St. Louis to Jefferson City. Under his directions I sent
the following telegram:
CAMP LILY, JEFFERSON CITY,
October I, 1861.
Brigadier General McKinstry directs me to order you to send at once one
hundred thousand (100,000) bushels of oats, with a proportional amount of hay,
some part of both to come to-night by railroad, the other by boat.
You will call on E. H. Castle for railroad transportation, and on B. Able for
steam transportation.
I. C. WOODS, Colonel and D. O. T.
E. L. BEARD, St. Louis, 223 Main street.
The railroad trains of October 3 brought a little oats and hay, shipped in
compliance with the telegram, and it continued to arrive there daily until the
10 tli of October, at which date, being then in Tipton myself, I ordered further
shipments discontinued.
The army commenced leaving Jefferson City on the 4th of October. Your
headquarters were moved forward on the 7th of October, and reached Tipton
on the 9th, by a three days' march. On our arrival, I ordered the surrounding
country to be thoroughly examined by our forage master and his assistants, in
order to ascertain what was the supply of oats and hay among the farmers.
The quantity of oats and of old corn proved to be inadequate to the feeding of our
218 TESTIMONY.
stock, as was the case in Jefferson City; but in the elapsed time between Octo
ber 1, the date of General McKinstry's order for oats, and the 9th of October,
the date of our arrival at Tiptou, and owing to the change of locality, we found
the new crop of corn was fit to be fed to our animals. Upon the 10th of Octo
ber, the day following our arrival at Tipton, by your order, I telegraphed as
follows to Major Allen, quartermaster at Saint Louis :
No. 13.
TIPTON, October 10, 1861.
We are able at present to supply ourselves with hay here ; no more should
be sent to Jefferson City until their stock is reduced, as they lack storage for it.
I. C. WOODS, Colonel and D. O. T.
Major ROBERT ALLEN, Quartermaster) St. Louis.
No oats or hay were ordered from St. Louis to Tipton, or from St. Louis to
points beyond Tipton. The following telegram shows why a limited amount
of forage was ordered from Jefferson City to Tipton.
No. 160.
TIPTON, October 16, 1861.
Your surplus mules and horses will come forward here. I have ordered the
shipment of forage from St. Louis to be discontinued. The animals will be col
lected here. You can send us any surplus oats or corn you may have.
I. C. WOODS, Colonel and D. O. T.
J. G. KLINCK, Quartermaster, Jefferson City.
The horses and mules were ordered moved from Jefferson City to Tipton,
because the latter place had been made the depot for all army supplies. The
shipment of forage from St. Louis west had been ordered discontinued on the
10th of October, but the surplus which had accumulated at Jefferson City had
to be ordered away from there, or it would have been spoiled by the weather.
By this time, October 16, a fortnight having elapsed, the new corn at Jefferson
City had also become fit for feeding to animals, if used sparingly.
USE OF THE PRISON MECHANICS AT JEFFERSON CITY.
At Jefferson City we were unable to procure citizen mechanics for the needed
repairs of wagons and harnesses, or for the shoeing of our animals.
There were few public shops, fewer workmen, and a large amount of work
had to be done before the army could move' forward.
In this condition of things, by your order, I directed that a contract be made
between J. J. Neville, post quartermaster, Jefferson City, and the warden of the
State prison, by which contract the army were enabled to have the benefit at
once of shops and mechanics. Blacksmiths, horseshoers, carpenters, wheel
wrights, and harness makers were provided by the contract from among the
convicts at the prison.
The work done at the prison was placed under the superintendence of Mr. E.
Morgan Davis, of Indiana, whose report I have annexed, (Exhibit K.)
After the departure of the army from Tipton, and the removal of the stock
from Jefferson City, the post quartermaster, Captain Kliuck, by proper notice,
as provided in the contract, discontinued the use of the prison labor.
TESTIMONY. 219
ST. Louis, November 12, 1861.
COLONEL : Under orders from you I went to Jefferson City and established
workshops for the use of government. These consisted of blacksmith, wagon-
makers', and harness shops, in which were employed 24 blacksmiths, 10 wagon-
makers, and 5 saddlers, all of whom were convicts from the State penitentiary
at Jefferson City.
These workshops were constantly employed from the time they were started
(October 2) until Friday, November 8, 1861.
The contract for the labor was made by Quartermaster Neville, under your
orders, at the following rates per diem: Blacksmiths, SI 50; wagon-makers,
$1 25; saddlers, $1; and there was of their time consumed in government
service the following: 24 blacksmiths, 717 days in all; 10 wagon-makers, 312
days in all ; 5 or 6 saddlers, 161 days in all.
From the above is to be deducted for short hours worked the following : 24
blacksmiths, 1 hour each day from October 9 to November 8, 79 J days ; 10
wagon-makers, 1 hour each day from October 9 to November 8, 29 days ; 5
saddlers, 1 hour each day from October 9 to November 8, 14J days.
The property remaining on hand I have turned over to the post quarter
master at Jefferson City, Captain J. G. Klinck, to whom a complete inventory
was given, but who refuses to receipt to me for the reason that 1 have hitherto
acted without any recognized order from the government.
During the few clays preceding the closing up of the works the labor was
employed upon the manufacture of the parts of wagons, harnesses, &c., which
could be sent forward to any train in motion, and would be sufficient, in every
case of merely partial injury, to completely repair and set right whatever may
have been damaged.
Most of the portions prepared for repairs of wagons, &c., have been handed
over to trains, and have been consumed in the service of the army.
All which is respectfully submitted.
Your obedient servant,
E. MORGAN DAVIS,
Superintendent at Government Workshops.
Colonel I. C. WOODS.
In Warsaw, October 18, I had the honor of reporting the condition of the
army transportation to be as follows :
First division — Major General Hunter.
13th Illinois, Colonel Wyman 26 government teams.
14th Illinois, Colonel Palmer 15 do.
15th Illinois, Colonel Turner 19 do.
24th Indiana, Colonel Hovey 11 do.
26th Indiana, Colonel Wheatley 16 do.
6th Missouri, Colonel Bland 7 do.
Staff teams 8 do.
1st Missouri cavalry, Colonel Ellis 18 do.
At Tipton, from Holla 35 do.
En route from Rolla, subsistence trains with General
Wyman 50 do.
205
Prior to the 17th October, the day of my leaving Tipton for Warsaw, the
old mules came by railroad from Holla to supply thirty-five wagons referred to
220 TESTIMONY
in my report as "at Tipton from Holla," belonging to General Hunter's division.
Subsequent to that date, and prior to trie 23d, the Douglas brigade regiment
arrived at Tipton, having, in addition to their own wagons, twenty-live for
General Asboth, to whose division they belonged. They joined General Hun
ter's column, en route, and I lost sight of them after that date.
General Hunter also procured quite a number of wagons, harness,- and mules
from the quartermaster at Tipton, prior to 23d October, the account of which
was never forwarded to me, but which, in my opinion, must have increased his
means of transportation enough to compensate for the fifty wagons which Colo
nel Wyman was to have brought by land from Holla, and which never reached
General Hunter's division. The division of General Asboth, as shown by the
statement enclosed, was not supplied with enough transportation for both regi
mental purposes and field train ; but this deficiency was compensated for in the
facilities offered by the country through which we^passed.
FORAGE FOR THE ARMY WHILE EN ROUTE FROM TIPTON TO SPRINGFIELD.
During the march of the army from Jefferson City to Springfield, the animals
were fed with oats, corn, or hay obtained from the tanners along the line of our
march. When this forage was taken from active secessionists, who had aban
doned their property either to join Price's army or upon our approach, no receipt
or form of acknowledgment was given them for the property, but when taken
from Union men, or from citizens who claimed to be law abiding, then a printed
form of receipt was given to each person, after an appraisement of the property,
and an agreement of allegiance signed upon the reverse side, that being the form
instituted at Tipton, for issue to loyal owners of property, impressed into the
service for hire or for permanent use.
WANT OF TRANSPORTATION AS AFFECTING THE RATIONS OF THE ARMY.
In consequence of the scarcity of transportation, the advance divisions of the
army were very short of flour, bread, coffee, sugar, and some minor articles. I
was unable to respond to the requisitions of the acting chief commissary, Colo
nel Tracy, for means of transportation for the rations which were in abundance
at the depots in Tipton, Jefferson City, and Sedalia.
To remedy this want as far as possible, I aided him at Warsaw and at Yost's
Station in his endeavor to procure mechanics to work the various mills he found
near the line of our march. I furnished also means of transportation to gather
in the wheat and old corn procured by thoroughly examining the farm houses
and out-buildings as we passed along.
At Springfield, for the first time, the new corn was considered in a fit state to
be ground into meal for the use of the troops. Large quantities were gathered
and so ground at the steam mill in the town, which, with fresh beef and salt
found in Warsaw and Springfield, formed the principal food of the soldiers.
At Warsaw the regiment of Colonel Carr was supplied with flour and corn-
meal by the colonel using a small donkey mill near their camp. Salt was found
in Warsaw in quite large quantities, and taken possession of by Colonel Tracy,
acting chief commissary of subsistence on your staff, and some considerable
molasses was also found at the same place, and taken. The steam mill in the
town of vVarsaw was worked by order of Colonel Tracy, with millers and engi
neers taken frem the regiments. Post bread, of unbolted flour, was baked in an
oven made or found in the town, and supplied to the troops.
By a concert of action with Colonel Tracy, acting commissary of subsistence
of your staff, I succeeded in getting the weight of our rations very much re
duced. By your approval he changed the proportion, making them much better
TESTIMONY. 221
adapted to otyr wants. By the new army regulations, 1861, the 1,000 rations
are in weight as follows :
Bacon 750.00 pounds.
Bread 1,000.00 pounds.
Beans 155.00 pounds.
Rice 100.00 pounds.
Coffee 100.00 pounds.
guo-ar 150.00 pounds.
Vinegar 92.50 pounds.
Candles 15.00 pounds.
Soap 40.00 pounds.
Salt 33.75 pounds.
2,436J ' pounds to 1,000 rations.
In the last requisitions from Colonel Tracy, made upon me at Springfield,
and which I transmitted to my agents in Sedalia, this ration was, as to number,
reduced and altered to the following proportions :
Bacon, 2-7 214 2-7 pounds to 1,000 rations.
Bread, 2-7 285 5-7
Coffee, 10-7 142 6-7
Sugar, 10-7 214 2-7
Candles, 7-7 17.50
Soap, 3-7 17 1-7
891 5J-7
Regulation allowance 2, 436 J
Reduced as above 891 5J-7
A reduction of nearly two-thirds ; an immense saving in transportation, and,
in the same proportion, an addition to the mobility of your army.
I ceased to act officially after the publication of your farewell address of
Saturday, November 2, and since that date have taken no cognizance of the
army transportation.
In conclusion, I beg leave to express tie opinion that the army you left at
Springfield was capable of great efforts in celerity of movement. The divisions
of General Sigel and General Asboth have earned particular distinction in this
respect. They had become habituated to marching with little baggage, scanty
transportation, and short rations ; they were getting familiar with camp life
generally ; rain and bad roads were no strangers to them. The division of
General Asboth, more> particularly, had learned to live on fresh beef, salt, and
corn meal.
SOME CAUSES OF WANT tyF TRANSPORTATION.
There were great and serious delays in our transportation getting forward
from the railroad.
When once the wagons, animals, and harness were at Tipton there was but
little energy or knowledge of the business shown by the quartermaster's de
partment there in organizing teams and sending them forward to the army. My
orders to the quartermaster were frequent and urgent, but yet the delay con
tinued. A train of pack-mules, for one item, was delayed at Tipton a fortnight,
waiting for some trilling article from Saint Louis. These pack animals were
intended to accompany the advance of the army, as a means of transportation
222 TESTIMONY.
for tlie baggage of any cavalry scouting party moving across the country where
no roads existed.
This comparatively small matter of the pack animals is referred to hy me as
an illustration. The, packs were furnished in Saint Louis before you left ; the
packers and mules reached Tipton the day after I left that place for Warsaw,
on the 17th of October ; yet the train "was met by us at the Osage river on the
6th of November, on our return from Springfield.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 24, 1861.
Allow me respectfully to recommend to the attention of the general com
manding that the quartermaster here should be ordered to buy no more horses
in Missouri. The nunjber or*-hand is large and embarrassing, and, besides, they
can be bought at any tinte when wanted, I would state that I believe nearly gr
quite enough horses have already been bought and contracted for in Ohio, to
mount the cavalry and supply the artillery, while for transportation purposes
mules are preferable.
I would also respectfully recommend that the quartermaster adopt the system
of advertising, the quartermaster reserving to himself the right of rejecting any
or all bids offered. Wagons, harness, and all articles needed in the transport
ation department should be bought at the discretion of the quartermaster,
whether to be purchased in open market of responsible men, or from the manu
factories at regular prices, or obtained by advertising in the same manner as
proposed to be done in the purchase of mules. The system, as adopted by
General Meigs, is to open the bids when a day is fixed. On that day he buys
from the lowest bidder, takes any number he pleases ; on the following day the
same way from other bids, and so on, thus securing his animals at reasonable
prices and keeping entire control of the market.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
I. C. WOODS, Colonel and D. of T.
Major General J. C. FREMONT.
Indorsed as follows :
Approved and Quartermaster P. T. Turnly ordered to comply.
By order of Major General Fremont,
J. H. EATON,
Colonel, A. D. C., and Military Secretary.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, September 25, 1861.
Requisition signed acting regimental quartermaster twelfth Missouri volun
teers, was approved by you, and Captain Bradshaw or 'ered to issue it.
Other requisitions have passed through my hands, and been approved by me,
and ordered to be issued. Other requisitions have been sent direct from com
manding officer to Captain Bradshaw to issue. The complications which must
necessarily result from a divided responsibility, I would respectfully suggest
that the good of the public service requires that all requisitions for transporta
tion should pass through my hands before being ordered to be issued by Cap
tain Bradshaw. Some system must be arranged between us.
Respectfully,
I. C. WOODS, Colonel and D. of T.
Captain P. T. TURNLY,
Assistant Quartermaster, United States Army.
TESTIMONY. 223
SEPTEMBER 26, 1861.
Tbis arrangement is right.
Colonel Woods will control the issue or management of all transportation
wagons, ambulances, steamers, cars, &c., and pack mules. Captain Bradshaw
will take note hereof.
P. T. TURNLY, Assistant (Quartermaster.
LOSS IN PURCHASES FROM WANT OF FUNDS.
It may not be inappropriate here to state that, in my opinion, based upon
observation and experience, where the cost to the government for any supplies
furnished to the army of the western department has been increased one dollar
by the combination of parties in interest wishing to obtain contracts, it has been
increased ten dollars by the want of funds with which to make the purchases.
In the department of transportation this want of funds has been a heavy draw
back. Losses have arisen from a want of proper corrals, from improper feeding,
and from incompetent attendance upon the draught animals in St. Louis. There
has been a want felt of proper shops in St. Louis for shoeing and wagon work.
The public property, in many cases, has been exposed to damage from the
elements ; with the inefficient guard maintained, stampedes of the animals, and
losses therefrom, were not uncommon.
In my opinion, too much stress cannot be laid upon the evils which the with
holding of money from your department has caused you. Money lies at the
basis of the most simple wants of the soldier, and withholding that money from
the executive officers here, who had charge of supplying those wants, has com
pelled them, as a first step, to use the credit of the government or to do without
them. Instantly, when they attempt to use credit, the control over all supplies
passes from the government into the hands of those who do have money, or into
the hands of merchants, speculators, banks and capitalists, who form the inter
mediate link between the producer and the government. Money must be used
to procure goods or products from first hands, and when any department of the
government ceases to have money, it must lose connexion with the producers,
must make use of the middle men as a substitute, and must pay dearly for its
want of money and for its experience. In any department without money,
there is no course left to choose between high prices or ceasing to move the
machinery of the department.
WASHINGTON, February 14, 1862.
GENERAL: Since my official report to you, on the 20th of November last, I
have seen the report of the Van Wyck investigating committee of the House
of Representatives, in which the members of that committee, 0. H. Van Wyck,
E. B. Washburne, W. S. Holman, R. E. Fenton, H. L. Dawes, and W. G.
Steele, have put their names to the following statement, on page 96 of their re
port : " That I was one of the gang of California patriots who hovered like
sharks about the headquarters of the commanding general ; " and on page 93,
referring to a horse contract, they say : " Your committee believe, from the tes
timony of Captain Turnly, that this was a scheme by which the said Colonel
Woods (who was denominated on the staff of General Fremont 'director of
transportation,') intended to defraud the government, and that he found in
this man Sacchi, in the language of Captain Turnly, ' a good person through
whom to work.' "
The facts are, general, that I never had any interest, presently or remotely,
pecuniarily, politically, or otherwise, in any purchase or sale, made to or for
your " department," whether made by contract or otherwise ; never from any
224 TESTIMONY.
of these personal considerations did I recommend any man or men to you for
any place or position, civil or military, during my connexion with the " depart
ment of the west," which connexion, I am proud to say, commenced with its
existence and continued to its close.
I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
I. C. WOODS.
Major General J. C. FREMONT, United States Army.
WASHINGTON, February 27, 1862.
General S. D. STURGIS sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. What is your rank and position in the army 1
Answer. I am a major of the 4th regular cavalry, and a brigadier general of
volunteers.
Question. Did you serve in the western army under General Fremont ; and if
so, in what capacity?
Answer. I served under him last summer as a major of cavalry, and subse
quently, from the early part of September until his recall, as a brigadier general.
Question. Will you state in your own way your connexion with that army,
about what time you joined it, how long you were with it, and whatever you
deem material relating to it ?
Answer. I served under General Fremont from the time he took command of
that department until he was relieved from it. I went from Kansas City, in
June, with a force of about two thousand three hundred men, and marched to
Springfield, and joined General Lyon there. After General Lyon was killed I
took command of the army and marched it to Rolla. From there I went to St.
Louis to look after the interest of the command, and was put in command of the
St. Louis arsenal.
Question. You were at the battle of Wilson's creek, at the time General
Lyon was killed.
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What amount of force did General Lyon have there 1
Answer. He had about five thousand men, including Colonel Sigel's column.
That column, however, took but a small part in the fight. The fight really was
conducted with about three thousand seven hundred men.
Question. What was the strength of the -enemy at that time?
Answer. The estimate I gave in my report was twenty-three thousand men.
I took the lowest estimate that was made of their force, but found a consolidated
morning report placing it at that number.
Question. Do you know what was the condition of General Fremont's com
mand at that time in regard to his ability to re-enforce General Lyon?
Answer. No, sir, I cannot say. I know there were two fine regiments at
Rolla, because I saw them there as I returned from Springfield. Without
attempting to go into the whole analysis of the matter, I should think that for
that emergency they might have gone to Springfield. And I think if they had
been there the tables would have been turned against the enemy, because,
although we held the field, we were unable only from weakness, want of ammu
nition, and a general want of numbers, to pursue Price and his army.
Question. Do you know of any other force that could have been sent to the
relief of General Lyon ?
Answer. No, sir, I cannot say that I do.
Question. Do you know what disposition General Fremont did make of thoae
two regiments at Rolla 1
TESTIMONY. 225
Answer. They remained at Rolla, and, as far as I know, they are at Rolla
yet. I found them there after the battle, and I know they remained there a
long time.
Question. How for is Rolla from Springfield1?
Answer. We were some six days marching from Springfield to Rolla. It
must be some ninety or one hundred miles.
Question. Now, in your opinion as a military man, considering that the dis
parity of forces was so great, would it have been good generalship for General
Fremont to have sent those two regiments on from Rolla, or should General Lyon
have retreated before so immensely superior a force ?
Answer. I think General Lyon should have retreated without a fight. I said
so myself repeatedly. T voted for that. I told General Lyon that we were too
weak to pretend to cope with the enemy. I told him that even if we encoun
tered them and whipped them, it would lead us to ruin merely, for every time we
encountered them we would become more and more weakened, and at last we
would have to surrender. I told him that we were too weak to hold the country,
and I held that we should retreat.
Question. Is it your opinion that it was the duty of General Fremont to have
endeavored to re-enforce General Lyon 1
Answer. I think so, as long as he did not withdraw him.
Question. Had General Lyon any orders that compelled him to remain there
and fight ?
Answer. I think not. He never showed any.
Question. You still adhere to your opinion, as a military man, that it was
General Lyon's duty to have retreated, and not to have fought 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know what was the condition of things at that time at
Cairo and Pilot Knob ?
Answer. No, sir. 1 had come up from Texas to Missouri, and had never
been at St. Louis.
Question. Did you accompany the army afterwards to Springfield under Gen
eral Fremont ?
Answer. Yes, sir; that is, I marched by one road converging towards his line,
and joined him at Springfield.
Question. What was the condition of his army when you joined him at Spring
field, and before he was superseded?
Answer. I went over myself to visit him before we arrived at Springfield,
and, so far as I could judge of the army as it marched, I should judge it was
in good condition.
Question. While he was there at Springfield, and before he was superseded,
what was the position of the enemy ?
Answer. That is very difficult to say. For fear I might be asked that ques
tion I have brought with me here my order-book, which I brought to this city
with me for another purpose. I will read a letter which I wrote to General
Fremont on the same day that I joined him at Springfield. On the 30th of Oc
tober I was stationed at Greenfield, some 35 miles from Springfield. On the
evening of the 30th I received an order from General Fremont to repair to
Springfield with as great haste as possible, and not to regard provisions ; thaJ^f
I expected to be in the battle at all, I must make haste. I marched all niJBfc,
and got to Springfield the next day. This is the letter that I wrote that morn
ing to General Fremont :
" HEADQUARTERS,
" Greenfield, Missouri, October 30, 1861.
" SIR: I have the honor to report the arrival of my command at this place
yesterday at half past 2 o'clock p. m. We found a rebel flag flying near the
Part iii 15
226 TESTIMONY.
court-house, and took it down to-day. It will be replaced by a United States
flag presented by the ladies of Greenfield.
" I have read General Lane's despatch to General Fremont, and have to say
that all the information I receive goes to confirm what he says in regard to the
rebel army (combined) being prepared to receive us at or near Neosho.
" I remain at this place until further orders."
This letter I addressed to Colonel J. H. Eaton, General Fremont's assistant
adjutant general.
Question. How far is Neosho from Springfield 1
Answer. I take it to be 80 or 100 miles.
Question. That is where you supposed they would make their stand 1
Answer. Yes, sir. We got to Springfield late in the afternoon of the next day,
the 31st of October, a distance of 35 miles ; we marched pretty nearly all night.
The next day after I got there, I think, (though I may not be accurate as to
dates, and may mistake as to a day or so,) General Fremont called us together —
on the 2d November, I think. He stated in council that the enemy was at
Wilson's Creek, at the old battle-ground, and proposed his plan of battle. After
we got through, General Hunter, who was to replace General Fremont, arrived
there. General Fremont stated to General Hunter his plans. General Hunter,
without saying much — I do not know as he said anything — walked out, and in
the morning he countermanded the orders to move. And the next day after
that he took an escort and went down to Wilson's Creek, as a matter of curiosity,
to see the battle-field. I did not go myself, but the general impression created
upon my mind, and the minds of all of us, by the officers who did go along, was
that the enemy had not been there at Wilson's Creek. If that impression was
correct, then the scouts must have imposed upon General Fremont.
Question. Did you understand that General Fremont had sent out scouts
there who had ascertained the position of the enemy ?
Answer. No, sir ; but I took it for granted, as we always had our scouts out.
Question. Who did you say went down to Wilson's Creek the next day but
one after General Fremont was superseded ?
Answer. General Hunter, with an escort, and many officers who had been in
the battle there under General Lyou, and wanted to go out there as a matter of
curiosity.
Question. What day of the month did they go out there ?
Answer. About the 4th or 5th of November ; somewhere about that date.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. What day was General Fremont superseded ?
Answer. He was superseded on the night of the 2d or 3d of November. Gen
eral Hunter lay over one day, and then went down to the old battle-field.
By the chairman :
Question. How long was it after General Hunter commenced his retreat be
fore Price commenced to advance 1
Answer. That would be difficult for me to say. I am not sure, from anything
I know, that he ever did advance.
stion. You do not know that he ever advanced at all ?
Answer. No, sir ; because I withdrew with the army to Sedalia, and was then
gjordered to St. Louis.
Question. Is there any other fact that is connected with General Fremont's
administration of that department that you desire to make any statement about?
Answer. No, sir ; not that I know of. I am not as well posted in regard to
matters as one might think I ought to be, coming from Missouri, for I was all
the time in the field ; and people not there might very likely obtain from news-
TESTIMONY. 227
paper reports more actual knowledge than we in the field had. I am very
badly posted, indeed, in regard to matters there.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Could General Lyon have retreated from Springfield without great
danger of being cut off by the enemy ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; without any danger whatever ; that is, if he had retreated
in time. At the time he had his council at Dug Spring, he could have retreated
without danger, if he had kept right on in his retreat from Dug Spring.
Question. How l©ng after he left Dug Spring before the battle of Wilson's
Creek?
Answer. The battle was on the 10th of August. He left Dug Spring, I
think, some two weeks before. He had gone beyond Springfield in pursuit of the
enemy, and had pursued them as far as Dug Spring, where we became satisfied
that they were too strong for us to attack them. That was some 30 or 40 miles
from Springfield. We there determined to retreat until we fell in with re-en
forcements. I told General Lyon that we could not hold the country, and that
we should retreat as soon as we could. He said that there was no hope of re-
enforcements, because there were no re-enforcements to send. I told him that
we should then retreat as soon as we could. We then started for Springfield,
and could have kept right on to Holla, But after sitting on our horses for three
or four hours, something, I do not know what, seemed to change the opinion of
the general, and he ordered us to encamp there. And after a day or two had
passed the enemy came up in strong numbers to Wilson's Creek and near to
Springfield, and then it was too late to retreat.
Question. It then became necessary to fight ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I do not think that General Fremont should be held re
sponsible for General Lyon not retreating ; I think that was optional with
General Lyon. In his council of advisers General Lyon laid before us the sub
stance of every document he had in regard to his re-enforcements. And I think
it was altogether optional with him whether he should retreat or not.
Question. Then, if I understand you, you give it as your opinion that Gene
ral Fremont had a right to suppose that General Lyon would retreat if he found
himself unable to meet the enemy?
Answer. Yes, sir; I think so. Without knowing anything more of the facts
in the case, I should take that for granted. If I had been in General Lyon's
place, from all that I know of his instructions, I should have considered that it
was discretionary with me to remain or not. I might say, in pursuance of the
same idea, that General Lyon said he had called again and again for re-enforce
ments, had stated that the enemy were collecting in large numbers, and that
re-enforcements were necessary ; and I think that if General Fremont did not
recall him under these circumstances, when he could not re-enforce him, it then
must be considered that it was discretionary with him to withdraw or not as he
thought best. General Lyon said that he had been informed from headquarters
that re-enforcements that had been intended for him had, of necessity, been di
verted to other points, and therefore General Lyon said he had now no hope of
re-enforcements.
Question. When did General Lyon have that information ?
Answer. That I cannot exactly say.
Question. Was it before he came back to Springfield from Dug Spring ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. While he had it in his power to retreat?
Answer. Yes, sir. This information he gave us in council at Dug Spring.
228 TESTIMONY.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Did General Lyon send to General Fremont for re-enforcements in
time for them to have been sent to him before the battle of Wilson's Creek.
Answer. Yes, sir; I take it so. From having heard so often of his having
asked for re-enforcements, I take it that they were asked for in time for them to
have been sent, if there had been any to send.
Question. Do you know whether General Lyon had sent to General Fremont
an account of his exposed condition, his danger, and his necessities 1
Answer. General Lyon stated that he had done so repeatedly.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Do you know whether General Fremont had any re-enforcements
to spare?
Answer. No, sir. I do not know. I had not been in that part of the State
since the war broke out.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. How many composed the council at Dug Spring 1
Answer. I should think about fifteen officers.
Question. What was the general opinion there ? Were there any others than
yourself that advised a retreat1?
Answer. Yes, sir ; it was unanimous. The only question of difference was
as to which way we should retreat. Some wanted to fall back towards Kansas —
Fort Scott ; and others wanted to fall back to Holla. Colonel Sigel said (and
many agreed with him afterwards) that we should fall back to Holla, or until
we should meet with re-enforcements.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Were you ordered to relieve Colonel Mulligan, or to re-enforce
him while he was at Lexington ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. From whom did you receive that order, and what did you do in
pursuance of it ?
Answer. I was ordered by General Fremont, while I was at Hudson, on the
Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad, to repair to Lexington by way of Utica, with
all the infantry and artillery I had. He ordered me to send back all the cavalry
I had, and to advance with my infantry and artillery. I had no artillery, for it
had been ordered away by General Pope, under whose immediate command I
was. I started at once with all the infantry I could get together — some 1,100
men. We left the railroad when we got to Utica, and we marched night and
day, I think, until we got to the river bottom. We had heard firing the day
before, but having no cavalry, I was unable to cut off the enemy's scouts, who
ran ahead with information of our approach. The consequence was that before
we arrived there, the enemy made a desperate effort, and got possession of the
boats, and threw a large force of infantry, 3,000 strong, over into the timber
before I got there. I saw then that I could not get across the river, and I
accordingly diverged from there towards Kansas City.
Question. Why were you instructed to march without your cavalry ?
Answer. That I do not know.
Question. Would your force have been more efficient for the purpose for
which you were sent if you had taken your cavalry along with you ?
Answer. If I had had a little cavalry — enough to have cut off these scouts
TESTIMONY. 229
that we saw going ahead with the news — ten or fifteen men would probably
have changed the whole matter.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. How much cavalry had you when you received your orders?
Answer. I had had three companies, but my cavalry had been reduced to
half a company by orders from General Pope. But General Fremont did not
know that; his order was to send back the three companies.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. It would have been of no service to you to have taken a large
body of cavalry — say three companies 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Bflt a small squad of cavalry might have been of great service to
you?
Answer. Yes, sir. I do not think General Fremont knew the exact condi
tion of my command at that time. General Pope, under whose immediate com
mand I was, had taken away a part of my force before, and had taken away the
last piece of artillery I had. General Fremont was not aware of that, and could
not have been expected to be aware of it.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Where were you at that time ?
Answer. I was at Hudson, on the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad. I went
by railroad to Utica, and then marched to Lexington, which, I think, took us
two days and two nights.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Were there any signs of mutiny in the army at Springfield, imme
diately after General Fremont was superseded ?
Answer. No, sir; not at all; not the slightest.
Question. Were there any indications of a disposition to refuse any longer to
serve the country 1
Answer. Not that I saw ; there was none in my division. I heard of nothing
of the kind, except that I did hear that one officer (a German) broke his sword.
Question. Do you know the conduct of General Fremont in relation to that
demonstration you have mentioned 1
Answer. No, sir; I do not; I do not even know that the demonstration took
place.
Question. You merely heard of it ?
Answer. I heard of it. If it was done it was done so quietly that I knew
nothing of it. I saw it stated in the papers, but I saw nothing in the camp.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. At the night of the council — the night that General Hunter arrived,
when the battle for the next day was being planned — did you suppose the enemy
to be at Wilson's Creek, or in that vicinity ?
Answer. At that time I supposed the enemy to be at Wilson's Creek; I had
no doubt of it all, upon the simple principle that I supposed the commanding
officer knew. I had just arrived, but my letter from Greenfield to General
Fremont showed what my opinion then was, based upon my information from
my scouts, and what I could gather up.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Do you know what was the belief of other generals and officers at
that time 1
Answer. I do not know that the matter was discussed at the council. I am
pretty sure that it was not discussed. But I know what the officers said the
230 TESTIMONY.
next day ; they were divided in opinion : Some said the enemy were there, and
some said they were not there at all.
Question. But at the time of the council ?
Answer. I took it for granted that the enemy were there. I did not doubt
that at all.
Question. Was that the conviction of the other officers ?
Answer. I had no conversation with them upon the subject, but I took it, from
the tone of the council, that the most of them thought as I did in that respect.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Would not that follow from the statement made by the general
calling the council of the necessity for it? Would he not give a reason for calling
a council of war ?
Answer. I do not recollect his explanation exactly ; but it was to the effect
that he had information that the enemy was there. I had no reason to doubt
it, and whether he was there or not it would be very difficult for me to say even
now, but I think the sequel showed that he was not there. But that is a mere
matter of opinion.
Question. What force would have been sufficient to have saved you at Wilson's
Creek?
Answer. I think if General Lyon could have had 2,500 or 3,000 fresh re-en
forcements, we could have driven the enemy out of the country entirely. They
were staggered when we left them, and when we withdrew from the field there
was not a gun fired at all. But we had no means of advancing. The artillery
horses wer6 scattered or killed and wounded. There were large ravines in front
of us, and our ammunition was exhausted. If we had advanced, and the enemy
had found that our ammunition was exhausted, they could have rallied and de
stroyed us.
Question. Do you know of any force that could have been sent to you ?
Answer. There was no force, except the two regiments of Colonel Wyman
and Colonel Stephenson at Holla, that could have been sent to us.
Question. Was there anything in the way of those regiments having been
sent to you ?
Answer. No, sir, not that I know of; but I am not posted in regard to that
matter. If they had been sent, I think, myself, it would have changed the fate
of the day.
Question. Do you not think, as a military man, that they should have been
sent to you, as you were situated ?
Answer. I think either the whole army of General Lyon should have been
withdrawn or he should have been re-enforced, even with the two regiments at
Rolla. I know of no reason for their being at Rolla, except their being on
their way to Springfield. But there may have been other reasons.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Were there many rebels in your rear — between you and Rolla — at
the time you fought at Wilson's Creek ?
Answer. No armed bodies.
Question. Had you not, in your opinion, advanced too far without knowing
whether you would have re-enforceinents or support ?
Answer. That I have already answered. My opinion for a long time before
the fight was, that, unless we were re-enforced, we were too weak to hold that
country.
TESTIMONY. 231
WASHINGTON, March 3, 1862.
General S. D. STURGFS recalled.
The witness said : I forgot to state when I testified before, that the day after
General Hunter assumed command at Springfield he sent a reconnoitring party
out to Wilson's Creek, under Colonel Merrill, which established the fact that
there was no enemy there ; neither had there been any nearer than Cassville for
a long time.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. How far is Cassville from Springfield ?
Answer. Some 60 or 80 miles. I desire to state that I received the order
from General Fremont to join him at Springfield, on the 31st of October, the
day after I wrote the letter which I have read in evidence here.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Where did you first meet General Sigel after the fight at Wilson's
Creek was over ?
Answer. At Springfield, where I called a council of war after dark that same
evening.
Question. Was his force so utterly demoralized after their repulse as not to
be able to render you any assistance?
Answer. Yes, sir ; we never saw his force until we got within three miles of
Springfield, when we met a part of it coming in from the west, under Lieutenant
Farrand, of the regular service.
Question. Were Sigel's guns, after being captured by the enemy, brought to
bear upon your force during the battle J
Answer. Yes, sir ; they were. We recognized them the moment they were
fired, by their ammunition.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. How many men had General Sigel under his command that day,
and what did they do on the field ?
Answer. He had of all arms from 1,200 to 1,300. That included three
companies of cavalry and a battery of artillery of six pieces. All I know in
regard to their operations is what I gathered from the officers and men of the
expedition afterwards. We surprised the enemy, according to programme, and
drove them from their camp. Then, supposing that the enemy were routed,
General Sigel's men went to the camp and took to pillaging, and to eating the
half-cooked victuals on the fires, and some even went in bathing in the stream.
And while they were disorganized in this manner, the enemy rallied and took
their battery Ifrom, them and routed them.
Question. How did they get to Springfield ?
Answer. All that I know about that matter is that General Sigel told me that
he himself got into Springfield with ten men, and that his men had retreated by
all the roads they could find — meaning by that that they had got scattered.
WASHINGTON, March 1, 1862.
HORACE A. CONANT sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What has been your rank in the army ?
Answer. I have never been, legally speaking, in the army. I had an informal
appointment, or an appointment from General Lyon, last May, on his staff.
232 TESTIMONY.
Question. In the western army ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Were you with the force under General Fremont at Springfield ?
Answer. I was.
Question. At the time he was superseded by General Hunter?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was his proximity to General Price's army at that time, as
you understood it ?
Answer. As I understood it, we were near them. 1 have a little memoran
dum-book or journal here, which I made at that time during our trip. I went
down from Kolla; the general went down from Sedalia. Some two or three
days before General Fremont was relieved, [looking at his memorandum-book,]
on October 30, I was at Wilson's Creek myself, and there were reported at that
time to be some 2,000 rebels at Flat Creek, some 45 or 50 miles below Spring
field.
Question. When was General Fremont superseded ?
Answer. He received notice on the 2d of November ; but General Hunter did
not arrive until the evening of the 3d, after dark.
Question. Were you sent out with any scouts to ascertain the position of the
enemy 1
Answer. I was not. After General Hunter took command, Colonel Wyman,
of the 13th Illinois regiment, was made provost marshal, and I acted as his dep
uty. I was actually provost marshal, for the colonel was sick, and I was obliged
to act for him. The day that General Hunter took command he let Major
Wright make a reconnoissance, and he scouted around some 24 hours, from 5 to
25 and 30 miles about Springfield. He found none of the enemy whatever, but
heard of their being within 10, 15, or 20 miles of Springfield, burning haystacks,
mills, &c., in numbers of from 100 to 300; those were the largest numbers we
could hear of.
Question. Where was the main body of Price's army at that time ?
Answer. We understood that it was at Cassville, and it was reported to Major
Wright, by the parties with whom he came in contact in his scouting, that they
were retreating from there.
Question. Do you know what the scouts reported whom General Fremont
sent out?
Answer. I do not, from my own knowledge. But the general impression be
fore General Fremont was relieved was that the enemy was in force in large
numbers near Springfield. That, I think, was the general impression of the
whole army.
Question. Was it the general impression that there was to be a fight there ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. But, in your judgment, that impression was erroneous ?
Answer. I could form no judgment of it until after General Fremont was
relieved, because none but scouts were allowed to leave the camp, and we were
under orders to be ready to march at a moment's notice.
Question. Was it your opinion, up to that time, that a battle was imminent ?
Answer. Having been in the battle before under General Lyon, I did not
think that Price would give us battle where the forces were anything like equal ;
but at that time I had a belief, based upon the judgment of officers in command,
that we were to have a battle. General McKinstry made an armed reconnois
sance, or started to do it, on the first day of November, I think, with a brigade
of 5,000 or 6,000 men, but he was ordered back ; and I remember hearing, at
the time, Colonel Eaton, the adjutant general of General Fremont, rather repri
mand him for taking so large a force.
Question. Is there anything else connected with the administration of that
TESTIMONY 233
department that you deem it material to state ! I do not know anything of
what you do know, so that I am unable to direct you at all.
Answer. There are a great many things a man might give as matters of
opinion, having been associated thoroughly with the campaign ; but not having
had access to the documents and orders, I should not be able to state them from
positive knowledge. I could give my ideas from what was the general impres
sion, from the time we left'our posts at Holla and Sedalia, until General Fre
mont was relieved.
Question. Are you a military man ? Have you had a military education 1
Answer. I never was in a military school. I have been in the volunteer
militia of the State of Missouri for eight or nine years. I was unfortunately
connected with the expedition under General Cross that went out after Mont
gomery some fifteen or eighteen months ago. That was my first active service.
Question. You do not pretend to have a knowledge of military science ?
Answer. No, sir ; I do not feel that I have any great military abilities. Still,
I think there are a great many men outside of military schools whose good
common sense teaches them what to do, as well as a West Point education.
Question. I do not think you are so far wrong in that opinion. Do you know
anything about the force that General Lyon had at the battle of Wilson's Creek ?
Answer. It was within a few hundred of 5,000. There were, I should judge,
about 4,800 in the battle.
Question. What was the force of the enemy that he had to encounter there ?
Answer. We know them to have been 19,000 a day or two before the battle,
and we had every reason to believe that they were re-enforced by 3,000 or
4,000 that night, making their force something like 23,000.
Question. General Fremont was at St. Louis then ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How long had he been there previous to the battle ?
Answer. I do not know positively ; I should judge about two weeks.
Question. What was the number and condition of his forces, at that time so
far as you know ?
Answer. I suppose he had something near 10,000 men, in and around St.
Louis, that could have been ordered off. There were no troops in the State at
that time that were what we would call, in military parlance, thoroughly
equipped and ready for the field. A great many might have had equipments,
but they had no transportation. There was one regiment (Colonel Stephen-
son's) which General Fremont ordered to join us, but they disobeyed orders,
and plead, as a reason for doing so, that they did not have transportation.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Colonel Stephenson disobeyed orders ?
Answer. I said he disobeyed orders. I know we got a copy of the order
from General Fremont, after General Lyon's death, in which he ordered Colonel
Stephenson to move his regiment to join us, and Colonel Stephenson was put
under arrest for disobedience of orders ; but he was afterwards released.
By the chairman :
Question. Was there a necessity for General Lyon making a stand there at
Springfield and fighting a battle at that time ?
Answer. It was so decided, after a thorough consultation of all the officers
having any command, however small, from a battalion to a regiment. The reason
of that was this : we had gone down there and were out of provisions almost,
and after the battle of Dug Spring we fell back upon Springfield, and were in
no condition to retreat. There were narrow defiles in the Ozark mountains
where it was almost impossible for one wagon to pass another. We could not
234 TESTIMONY.
withstand an attack there by their forces, and, in the judgment of the officers
the only course left was to attack the enemy.
Question. You say you were out of provisions ?
Answer. We had but few provisions. We had sent a train to Holla for pro
visions, and were grinding corn in the mills in the neighborhood to sustain the
army.
Question. Could you have sustained many re-enforcements there ? How would
you have got provisions for re-enforcements if they had come 1
Answer. We had a train of over one hundred wagons at Rolla, which was
detained there by negligence, I might say.
Question. By whose negligence 1
Answer. It is hard for me to say. But we then supposed it was through the
negligence of Major McKiristry; and I have seen no reason to change my
opinion on that point since.
Question. In what capacity was he then acting?
Answer. He was quartermaster of the department of the west. I was acting
as quartermaster there at Springfield, and my wagonmasters were to have been
gone nine days, and they were gone twenty-two days. Wagons that had been
hired were ordered to St. Louis and paid off, and in the place of them new
wagons were ordered up, and fresh mules without shoes ; but they could not
travel over the rough roads of the mountains, and shoes were afterwards sent
up to them, and eventually blacksmiths were sent to put them on. And finally,
but sixty-five wagons came instead of nearly one hundred that were sent for
provisions.
Question. What was the condition of Cairo at that time, in regard to the
number of men there ? Do you know 1
Answer. I do not know positively. General Prentiss was in command there,
and we were in communication with him ; but there were no official reports that
came to General Lyon in reference to the number of troops there.
WASHINGTON, March 5, 1862.
General DAVID HUNTER sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am colonel of the 6th cavalry, and a major general of volunteers.
Question. Where is your station now?
Answer. I am commanding the department of Kansas at present.
Question. Were you in the army under General Fremont at any time ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Please give us a narrative, in your own way, of all that you deein
material, without questioning.
Answer. Unless you would question me I would hardly know what points
you desire to arrive at.
Question. We want to know how that western department was administered;
if there were any defects that came under your notice or observation, or any
thing that would require a military man to take notice of it. We desire to
know all about it.
Answer. It struck me that there were a great many defects in the department as
soon as I went into it. In the first place, the whole property of the government
was in the hands of irresponsible agents, who had given no bonds and knew
nothing about the administration of the different branches of the service.
Question. Give us a narrative of when you went into the army there, what
TESTIMONY. 235
you fotmd, what was the condition of the department, the important events that
took place, &c.
Answer. I was ordered by General Scott to go to Illinois.
Question. About what time ?
Answer. The last of August. I arrived at Chicago about the first of Sep
tember, and had orders to report to General Fremont, at St. Louis. I did so
by letter from Chicago. A short time afterwards I received a telegram from
St. Louis from General Fremont, stating that he wished me to go to St. Louis ;
that he had something for me to do as soon as I was well enough. I thought
I was well enough to go down there at any rate, and I went down the next
day and reported to General Fremont. A short time after I had been in his
office General Asboth brought in a programme of what it was expected I would
do. General Fremont handed it to me, and requested me to examine it care
fully, and look at the maps, and tell him what I thought of it. It commenced
by stating that Springfield was a great strategic point, in the midst of a large
plateau of fertile country, &c., and stated that he wanted me to go to Holla and
advance with all the disposable force from there on Springfield. At the same
time Colonel Jeff. C. Davis was to leave Jefferson City with all the force he
had there, cross the Osage at Tuscumbia, join me near Springfield, and advance
and take possession of Springfield. After looking it over I was very much
surprised, because I knew, at the same time, that General Price was at War-
rensburg, thirty-five miles south of Lexington, advancing on Lexington. I
asked General Fremont why I should go and take possession of Springfield,
where there was no enemy, and leave Price at Warrensburg, advancing on
Lexington. I proposed to him to give me the command of all the available
force at Holla and St. Louis, and let me go out at once to Sedalia and attack
Price before he could get to Lexington. Fortunately for me, Mr. Montgomery
Blair was present during the whole of this interview. Mr. Blair said, " Cer
tainly ; why should you go to Springfield, where there is no enemy, and leave
Price marching on Lexington ?" General Fremont shrugged his shoulders, but
made no reply about that, and some time afterwards Mr. Blair and myself left.
I heard nothing more for three or four days, when I received orders to go to
Rolla, but with no orders what to do there. I went there and remained a week,
when I was ordered back to Jefferson City to join General Fremont in his ad
vance to the south.
Question. What amount of troops did you have at Rolla and under your
command in the expedition to Springfield ?
Answer. I had about 3,700 men at Rolla. There was a large division as
signed me on paper, but it was scattered all over the face of the earth.
Question. What amount had Price under him when he was going to Lexing
ton?
Answer. He had about 21,000 men, and others joining him. Harris and
Green were crossing the Missouri, at Glasgow and at Arrow Rock, for the
purpose of forming a junction with him. I went to Jefferson City, where I
remained some time. General Fremont finally came up.
Question. Did you propose to go and intercept Price's advance on Lexington
with that amount of force ?
Answer. No, sir; not at all. I proposed this: there were some 15,000 or
20,000 troops at St. Louis at the time, and there were those troops at Rolla, and
those with Colonel Davis, which would have given me a column equal to Price's,
or very nearly equal to it. I could give you a pretty good idea of what I
thought of the state of affairs by reading you some of my telegrams and letters
to General Fremont, which I have copied here in this book. And I can give
you some letters from General Pope, which will show you what he thought of
the state of affairs.
Question. Your telegrams and letters to General Fremont would be proper.
236 TESTIMONY.
Answer. In the first place, I received notice of what my division was to be
composed of. They were scattered in every direction, and I did not know
where or when they would report. My first telegram to General Fremont,
through his adjutant general, is from Jefferson City, dated September 26, 1861,
and is as follows :
" I have just received your letter of the 22d instant, designating the regiments
of my division. Have all these regiments been ordered to report to me, and at
what place? Please send me six of the largest maps of Missouri."
Here is another of the same date :
"I have ordered, agreeably to the general's order of the 24th instant, Colonel
Stephenson, 7th Missouri, to move, with his regiment and 4th Iowa, directly
from Holla to Linn Creek; after which to send the 4th Iowa to Tuscumbia.
Please telegraph if this order meets with the approbation of General Fremont,
that I may countermand it if necessary."
Still another telegram to General Fremont from the same place and of the
same date :
"I believe McCulloch is near Mount Vernon, in Lawrence county. A force
of 4,000 men is reported at Linn Creek. Colonel Wyman, in consequence of a
railroad accident, has not yet left Holla. If the general wishes, he could move
on Linn Creek immediately with the four regiments of my division now at Holla."
Here is a letter from Jefferson City to Colonel Eaton, the adjutant general of
General Fremont, dated October 4, 1861:
" COLONEL: Your letter of yesterday, ordering me to march this morning,
was only ^received this morning at ten minutes after two. You will see by my
report of transportation sent you on the second instant that for the forty-one
wagons in possession of my quartermaster he has only forty mules. It will
therefore be impossible for him to take the forty or more wagons agreeably to
your order. Colonel Stephenson, of the 7th Missouri regiment, informs me that
he is attached to Colonel Totten's brigade, of the 5th division. I must protest
in the strongest terms against this very unmilitary proceeding of depriving me
of the most important part of my command, when under marching orders, with
out giving me official notice of the change. Detaching Colonel Stephenson
from my division will leave me but one regiment here fit to take the field."
We marched in obedience to that order, and my next communication is from
California, Missouri, on the 6th of October:
" COLONEL: I informed you yesterday, by telegram, that the command had
been without rations for more than twenty-four hours, and the supply here is so
small that we should be without to-day had it not been for this fast. The
baggage is not yet all up, and our men were exposed the night before last to
one of the violent storms of the season without shelter. I fear much all the
ammunition is injured, particularly in Ellis's regiment, where they have neither
greatcoats nor cartridge-boxes, and have been obliged to carry their ammunition
in their pockets. Should these men remain without greatcoats at this season
of the year, I fear great sickness and mortality among them. Colonel Ellis is
in want of swords, pistols, cartridge-boxes, gun-slings, greatcoats, ammunition,
and wagons and mules for transportation. Colonel Stephenson is also without
wagons or mules for transportation. Colonel Marshall is also destitute of trans
portation, and so is Captain Stanley. Colonel Turner has but seven teams, and
Colonel Bland but nine four-mule teams. Please send us transportation at once,
and the supply of provisions. The fresh beef sent from Jefferson City was
spoiled on the way up and thrown away."
Here is also a telegram of the 6th of October :
"I have received your telegram to Lieutenant H. W. Greiner, directing him
to notify General Hunter to halt with his own division, until further orders, at
TESTIMONY. 237
Tipton. We have not transportation sufficient to. move the command as I re
ported this morning, and have no provisions. We cannot depend upon the
railroad, as they are only now delivering the baggage due the day before yes-
terdav. Some of it has not yet arrived. Volunteers without provisions, tents,
greatcoats, or blankets, become perfectly demoralized. Shall I move to Tipton
in the morning, leaving what baggage I cannot transport, and without
provisions?"
From Tipton I telegraphed, on the 7th, as follows:
" I did not receive your telegram ordering me to move with all the troops
from California to Tipton till after my arrival here. Consequently, I brought
only my own division, agreeably to previous orders."
On the 12th I wrote as follows :
" I have received the general's orders directing my division to move in the
morning. Not one-half of my division has yet reported. Colonel Ellis's cav-
,alry are without ammunition, cartridge-boxes, swords, pistols, and greatcoats,
and many of them are greatly in want of clothing. The men of the Indiana
batteries are in want of greatcoats, clothing, and ammunition. Requisitions
have been sent in for ambulances, but they have not been furnished. Some of
our mules are unshod, and we shall have them lame and unserviceable unless
we can be furnished with portable forges and blacksmiths' tools. About fifty
tents are needed for the division. As we shall have to send our teams back for
provisions after four days' march, we should not leave here with less than 60,000
rations, as we cannot calculate on their return in less than fifteen days to our
camp, even if we should remain stationary at the end of our four days' march.
The cavalry regiment has not a wagon, and Colonel Palmer's and Colonel
Eland's have, neither of them, sufficient for their baggage. To enable them to
move efficiently we need at least 100 wagons and the ambulances already or
dered to be supplied to the division by the general commanding."
Here is a letter to Adjutant General Thomas in relation to the same affair :
" CAMP NEAR TIPTON, October 15.
"GENERAL: When I parted, day before yesterday, from General Cameron,
he remarked to me : ' On you, sir, I place great dependence.' I hope you will
consider it due to me to explain fully to the honorable Secretary of War how
completely I have been ignored in the department of the west. On the 13th
of September I reported to General Fremont, in St. Louis, and did not see him
again while I remained in that city. Instead of being permitted to attack Gen
eral Price, who was then at Warrensburg marching to attack Lexington, I was,
on the 16th, ordered to Rolla. After remaining a week at Holla I was ordered
to Jefferson City. You will see by my letter of the 4th instant that instead of
a division, I informed General Fremont that I marched from Jefferson with
only one regiment fit to take the field, and this regiment was without the neces
sary transportation. This morning I have for duty only 2,684 men, the cavalry
portion of the command being without swords, pistols, cartridge-boxes, and ammu
nition for their guns. We are here by order of General Fremont, waiting trans
portation. You can see plainly, by this simple state of facts, that no blame or
praise can attach to me on account of any of the operations in this department."
On the 18th of October I wrote to General Fremont from Tipton a letter,
from which I read the following :
" I have made every effort to obtain the necessary supplies, but without suc
cess. I shall move to Versailles to-morrow, but without the means to transport
supplies. The division will soon be in a destitute condition. Please inform
me at Versailles if the general commanding wishes me, under the circumstances
in which we are placed, still to advance."
238 TESTIMONY.
Dr. Barnes, my medical director, was ordered to report to General Fremont.
In my reply to the order, I state to Colonel Eaton :
" I am very sorry to have received, this evening, the order detaching Surgeon
Barnes from my command, as he was assigned to me by the President at my
particular request. I, however, fully appreciate the necessity of Dr. Barnes
being at headquarters, as I found the hospital at Warsaw with 300 sick in it,
who had been absolutely without anything to eat for two days. I shall be at
Mountview to-morrow with a part of my command, but without provisions, and
with my transportation in a very crippled state, from the want of mules and
horses."
[See letter of General Pope to General Hunter, hereto attached.]
That comprises pretty much all the information up to that time. I arrived at
Springfield on the 3d day of November, just as tattoo 'was beating, about 9
o'clock. I was under the impression, from what I had heard on the way, that
General Fremont had left for the east. I inquired where the quarters were that
he had vacated, intending to take possession of them myself, and learned that
he was still there. I found him, with all the generals of his command assem
bled, discussing a plan for attacking the enemy the next morning at Wilson's
Creek — everything arranged for the attack. I said nothing on the subject at
all ; but I was fully convinced, from what I had heard, that there was no
enemy at all. It is said that I countermanded General Fremont's order for the
battle the next day. It is not so. I gave no order in the case whatever.
General Fremont left the next morning for the east, and I assumed the command.
I spent the day in examining the positions around Springfield and the different
camps there. I sent out a couple of regiments of cavalry to reconnoitre and
examine the ground about Wilson's Creek. They returned in the evening, and
reported that no enemy had been there, and that they were sixty or seventy
miles off, at Cassville. The next day after that I went out myself to Wilson's
Creek, with a party to bury some dead that were said to have been left on the
battle-field there. We found five bodies, and buried them.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. This was the 5th of November that you went out there ?
Answer. I think it was the 5th, but I am not confident about that; it may
have been the 6th. But that General Price was at Cassville at that time will
appear from a letter of his own, (that is, one from his adjutant general,) enclosing
a treaty that had been made by General Fremont with General Price. Here is
a copy of that letter :
" HEADQUARTERS MISSOURI STATE GUARDS,
" Cassville, Missouri, November 5, 1861.
"GENERAL: I am instructed by Major General Price to acknowledge the
receipt of Assistant Adjutant General Eaton's letter of November 2, enclosing
a proclamation drawn up in accordance with the propositions submitted in
my letter of the 26th of October. Major General Price directs me to say that
he receives your assent to his propositions with much satisfaction, and the
agreements and provisions set forth in the proposed mutual proclamation fully
meet his approbation. He has filled up and signed both copies of said procla
mation received from Assistant Adjutant General Eaton, one of which is retained
for publication and distribution, and the other herewith enclosed to you for a
like purpose. Major General Price also approves of the agreement entered into
TESTIMONY. 239
on his part by Messrs. Williams and Barclay, and herewith returns the original
statement, retaining a copy of the same.
" I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"HENRY LITTLE, Adjutant General.
"Major General J. C. FREMONT,
" Commanding United States Forces, Sjwingfield, Missouri."
That is a letter from General Price's command at Cassville, of the 5th, the
day after I took command.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. When was this battle to have been fought ?
Answer. On the morning of the 4th, the morning I took command.
By Mr. Gooch :
.Question. On what information did you come to the conclusion that there was
no enemy at Wilson's Creek, or in that vicinity ?
Answer. I came to that conclusion from conversations with various officers of
my acquaintance there, who, notwithstanding the reports, did not believe any
thing of the kind.
Question. How did you find the belief of the officers generally on that point 1
Answer. I asked them about what they thought of it, and I found that they
did not believe it at all.
Question. Was that the general belief of the officers ]
Answer. It was among those I met with.
Question. You saw and conversed with a great many of the officers ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. When you made the reconnoissance out in the vicinity of Wilson's
Creek, were there any traces of the enemy having been there1?
Answer. Not the least. I questioned people who lived there — a man who
had a mill-right on the creek where the battle had been fought, and he said
there had been no enemy there at all. There might have been a few scouts,
but not any force at all.
Question. Were they Union people living out in that vicinity?
Answer. One man that we found at the mill professed to be a Union man.
There were a great many Union people through that part of Missouri, about
Springfield. I think Mrs. Phelps, who appeared to be better posted than
anybody else there, told me that there was no enemy in the neighborhood there
at all. She is the wife of Colonel Phelps, member of Congress from Mis
souri.
By the chairman :
Question. Did you continue the arrangement made by General Fremont with
General Price]
Answer. No, sir ; I annulled it at once. Here is the letter I wrote to head
quarters :
"HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
" Springfield, Missouri, Nove?nber 1, 1861.
" GENERAL : Enclosed you will find copies of certain negotiations earned on
between Major General J. C. Fremont, of the first part, and Major General
Sterling Price, of the second part, having for objects, first, to make arrangements
for the exchange of prisoners ; second, to prevent arrests or forcible interference
in the future 'for the mere entertainment or expression of political opinions;'
third, to insure that 'the war now progressing shall be confined exclusively to
240 TESTIMONY.
armie«rin the field;' and, fourth, the immediate disbandinent of 'all bodies of
armed men acting without the authority or recognition of the major general
commanding, and not legitimately connected with the armies in the iield.'
"You will also find enclosed a copy of my letter of this date, despatched un
der a flag of truce, to General Price, stating that 'I can in no manner recognize
the agreement aforesaid, or any of its provisions, whether implied or direct, and
I can neither issue nor allow to be issued the joint proclamation purporting to
have been signed by Generals Price and Fremont on the 1st day of November,
A. D. 1861.' It would be, in my judgment, impolitic in the highest degree to
have ratified General Fremont's negotiations, for the following, amongst many
other, obvious reasons : The second stipulation, if acceded to, would render the
enforcement of martial law in Missouri, or any part of it, impossible, and would
give absolute liberty to the propagandists of treason throughout the length and
breadth of the State. The third stipulation, confining operations exclusively
to armies in the field, would practically annul the confiscation act passed during
the last session of Congress, and would furnish perfect immunity to those dis
banded soldiers of Price's command who have now returned to their homes,
but with the intention and under the pledge of rejoining the rebel forces when
ever called upon ; and, lastly, because the fourth stipulation would blot out the
existence of loyal men of the Missouri home guards, who have not, it is al
leged, been recognized by act of Congress, and who, it would be claimed, are
therefore 'not legitimately connected with the armies in the field.'
"There are many other objections quite as powerful and obvious, which might
be urged against ratifying this agreement. It is addressed ' to the peaceably
disposed citizens of the State of Missouri,' fairly allowing the inference to be
drawn that citizens of the United States (the loyal and true men of Missouri)
are not included within its benefits. In fact, the agreement would seem to me,
if ratified, a concession of all the principles for which the rebel leaders are con
tending, and a practical liberation for use in other and more immediately im
portant localities of all their forces now kept employed in this portion of the
State.
" I have the honor to be, general, most respectfully, your most obedient servant,
«D. HUNTER,
" Major General Commanding.
"Brigadier General THOMAS, Adjutant General U. S. A."
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Did you hold a council of war after arriving at Springfield ?
Answer. I did.
Question. At that council did you determine to retreat, fall back, or to ad
vance ? What was the decision of that council ?
Answer. There was a difference of opinion in regard to what should be done.
I had read to them a letter which I had received from the President on the sub
ject of returning, and asked their opinion on it. General McKinstry recom
mended that we should go forward, not that he expected to meet Price at all.
None of us believed he would allow us to overtake him, but he thought a de
monstration should be made ; that we should go forward. General Pope, I be
lieve, did not at that time express any very decided opinion one way or the
other ; but he stated afterwards that he thought I was right in not going for
ward. The two Germans — Asboth and Sigel — chimed in with McKinstry.
Question. They wanted to go forward ?
Answer. They thought a demonstration would have a better effect. None of
them pretended that they thought we could catch Price at all. But they
thought it would have a better effect on the country to make a move forward.
General Turner was the other general of division, and he thought differently.
TESTIMONY. 241
By the chairman :
Question. What were your orders from the President ?
Answer. I have a copy of them here :
" WASHINGTON October 24, 1861
" SIR : The command of the department of the west having devolved upon
you, I propose to offer you a few suggestions, knowing how hazardous it is to
hind down a distant commander in the field to specific lines of operations, as so
much always depends on the knowledge of localities and passing events. It is
intended, therefore, to leave considerable margin for the exercise of your
judgment and discretion.
" The main rebel army (Prices) west of the Mississippi is believed to have
passed Dade county in full retreat upon northwestern Arkansas, leaving Mis
souri almost free from the enemy, excepting in the southeast part of the State.
Assuming this basis of fact, it seems desirable — as you are not likely to over-
•take Price, and are in danger of making too long a line from your own base of
supplies and re-enforcements — that you should give up the pursuit, halt your
main army, divide it into two corps of observation, one occupying Sedalia and
the other Holla, the present termini of railroads, then recruit the condition of
both corps by re-establishing and improving their discipline and instruction,
perfecting their clothing and equipments, and providing less uncomfortable
quarters. Of course both railroads must be guarded and kept open, judiciously
employing just so much force as is necessary for this. From these two points,
Sedalia and Rolla, and especially in judicious co-operation with Lane on the
Kansas border, it would be very easy to concentrate and repel any army of the
enemy returning on Missouri on the southwest. As it is not probable any such
attempt to return will be made before or during the approaching cold weather,
before spring the people of Missouri will be in no favorable mood for renewing,
for next year, the troubles which have so much afflicted and impoverished them
during this.
" If you take this line of policy, and if as I anticipate you will see no enemy
in great force approaching, you will have a surplus force which you can with
draw from those points and direct to others, as may be needed — the railroads
furnishing ready means of re-enforcing those main points, if occasion requires.
" Doubtless local uprisings, for a time, will continue to occur, but those can be
met by detachments, and local forces of our own, and will, ere long, tire out
of themselves.
" While, as stated at the beginning of this letter, a large discretion must be,
and is left with yourself, I feel sure that an indefinite pursuit of Price, or an
attempt, by this long and circuitous route, to reach Memphis, will be exhaust-
ive beyond endurance, and will end in the loss of the whole force engaged in it.
" Your obedient servant,
"A. LINCOLN.
" The COMMANDER of the department of the west."
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Did your own judgment correspond with the instructions from the
President ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. What time did you receive that letter 1 Before the council ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I submitted it to the council.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. On what day did you call your council ?
Part iii 16
242 TESTIMONY.
Answer. My impression is that it was on the 7th of November.
Question. Composed of the same officers that General Fremont had in his
council ?
Answer. No, sir ; I only called the generals commanding divisions — five of
them.
Question. Those generals were also in General Fremont's council 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. There were others in his council ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; he had the brigade generals in his council.
Question. The same men you had in your council were also in his council ?
Answer. Yes, sir; with the exception of General Turner, who took com
mand of my division when I left it.
Question. Was there any question in your council as to where the enemy was ?
Answer. I think not.
Question. Where did you believe him to be at that time ?
Answer. At Cassville.
Question. Did the generals composing your council concur in that belief?
Answer. I think they did.
Question. Have you any doubt now that he was then at Cassville ?
Answer. None whatever.
Question. Was there any considerable portion of his force at a nearer point —
at Wilson's creek, or in its vicinity ?
Answer. I do not believe there was any force at all at Wilson's creek. He
had a guard in advance of Cassville, of course, and McCulloch was said to be
about fifteen miles south of Cassville, with his command, still nearer the Arkan
sas line.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. You say that McKinstry, Asboth and Sigel, all believed there was
no enemy near ?
Answer. Yes, sir, that is my impression. In fact I have reports now from
Sigel, whom I sent out to Wilson's creek, that there was no enemy in that
neighborhood at all. I had reports every day from men in Price's camp.
There was a certain Major Wright there, who had a battalion of spies — very
efficient men, indeed — all young men from that portion of the country in south
western Missouri. They would go off in their farmer clothes and stay two or
three days in Price's camp ; and every day, almost, Major Wright would re
ceive a report from some of those men.
Question. Those generals were still for making an advance ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was General Fremont's opinion about the locality of Price's
army at the time you took the command ?
Answer. He notified me several times during the day I arrived there that
Price was immediately on him ; that an attack would take place the next day.
He appeared to think, of course, that they were at Wilson's creek, or he would
not have made dispositions to attack him the next morning.
By Mr. Gooeh:
Question. Do you know on what information General Fremont came to the
conclusion that the enemy was at Wilson's creek ?
Answer. No, sir, I do not.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Do you know whether he had sent out scouts to determine that
fact1?
Answer. I presumed he had, of course.
TESTIMONY. 243
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Is it not a remarkable fact that there should have been so much
doubt in relation to that matter ; that General Fremont, being there in com
mand, should be under the impression that he was to attack the enemy the next
morning, and you, upon assuming command, should be convinced that there was
no enemy there ?
Answer. Yes, sir, I think it is very remarkable indeed.
Question. Did you convey to General Fremont the order to supersede him ?
Answer. No, sir ; he had it two or three days before ; he sent it to me.
Question. His relinquishing the command and your taking it was contingent
upon your coming up and reaching that point at Springfield ?
Answer. Yes, sir. He was to have left for St. Louis before I arrived, but he
concluded to remain until I arrived. He had made all preparations to leave for
St. Louis before I arrived. Here is an order I sent to the colonel commanding
the Indiana brigade, on the first of November. I had left him behind, on ac
count of not having transportation sufficient to come up :
" MOUNT VIEW, November I, 1861.
" COLONEL HOREY : General Fremont informs me the enemy is marching on
him at Spraigneld. You will join me with the least delay with your command,
leaving all your tents, and bringing with you only your mess-pans and camp
kettles. I march at daylight in the morning, and hope you will join me during
the night."
He was some ten or twelve miles in my rear. He did join me during the
night, and we marched at daylight in the morning.
Question. Was the movement of General Fremont to Springfield from St.
Louis, at the time it was made, a judicious movement, in a military point of
view, considering the condition of the enemy and the position of Missouri at
the time ?
Answer. I did not so consider it. Price had gone up to Lexington and done
all the damage he could there, and he retreated from Lexington when we had
only about a couple of thousand of men at Sedalia, making seventy miles in
two days. And when he was going at the rate of seventy miles in two days
from a force of two thousand men at Sedalia, I had no idea he was going to al
low General Fremont to catch him ; and I thought those troops might be used
to much greater advantage on the Mississippi and in Kentucky than to be fol
lowing after General Price down to Arkansas.
Question. Was not the movement of General Fremont necessary to compel
or induce Price to leave Missouri ?
Answer. Certainly; I have no idea he would have gone out without that
movement, but what was the object of making him go out compared with the
using these thirty odd thoi/rsand troops in another direction ?
Question. You think that object was accomplished, but more might have been
accomplished by using the troops in another direction ?
Answer. Yes, sir; no doubt that object was accomplished, because I had
positive notice before I left Springfield that Price was in Arkansas. There
had been so much talk about a battle there that I delayed marching for several
days to see if there was any possibility of his coming to attack us, or any prob
ability of his allowing us to attack him.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. What was the effect upon the country of your falliag back at that
time ; was there not a considerable amount of mischief done ?
Answer. Yes, sir; there always is.
244 TESTIMONY.
Question. Had you remained at Springfield would it have been in your power
to have prevented that?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Had you advanced would the enemy have fled from you?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Then it would have saved a great deal of Western Missouri from
desolation if you had advanced from Springfield.
Answer. I do not know that we would have saved much. They had ravaged
the whole country twice — in going up and coming down.
Question. Did you fall back without any other council of war ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. So that there was no council that determined to fall back?
Answer. No, sir; I called a council merely to get their views. In regard to
General McKinstry, I had no confidence in him whatever. I considered him a
traitor. And with respect to the two German generals, they are very good sol
diers, Sigel is a very good soldier. They merely said, with General McKinstry,
that we better make a demonstration — not that they believed we would catch
Price at all, but they thought it would have a great deal better effect on the
country to march out two or three days and come back again. An hour after
the council was over my adjutant general came to me and said I had been be
trayed ; that he had heard the whole proceeding of this council repeated by
a newspaper reporter. He told me what he had heard and asked me if such
and such things had taken place in the council. I told him that was precisely
what had taken place. He said "Somebody has betrayed you." I said "It is
General McKiustry ; you order him to leave here to-morrow morning and report
at St. Louis." So I disposed of him at once. The day after I had a telegram
from Washington ordering me to put him in close confinement, to be sent down
to St. Louis. I forwarded that on to St. Louis and had it done.
Question. Do you know where that order originated?
Answer. I do not know about that; I assumed my command on the 4th, and
had no communication with the government here before that.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. You think he disclosed the proceedings of that council ?
Answer. I have no doubt about it at all. In regard to the opinion of those
German generals, I think they just chimed in with McKinstry, because he stated
his opinion in a very positive, dogmatical manner, and they had been so accus
tomed to defer to him that they simply assented to what he said. I took the
.whole responsibility of the retrograde movement on myself; that is, I had the
approval of General Pope and General Turner.
Question. What was the condition of the troops when you took command ?
Answer. They were in pretty good condition. We have heard a great deal
of talk about their being in a state of mutiny, and very insubordinate, &c., but
I noticed nothing of the kind. I did not notice the first act of insubordination.
Question. I mean their physical condition ?
Answer. They were in pretty good physical condition. We fortunately had
very fine weather, indeed, and the stopping at Springfield enabled the trains to
come up.
Question. They were in good spirits ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. When did this mutinous spirit show itself?
Answer. I saw nothing of it at all.
TESTIMONY. 245
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Was there, as far as you could judge, any desire on the part of the
troops to push forward ?
Answer. I do not know that there was ; 1 do not think that there was ; I
never knew them to express any feeling one way or the other.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Was there any dissatisfaction manifested by the troops upon your
taking command ?
Answer. Not that I know of.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Was there any feeling manifested by the officers or men on account
of General Fremont being superseded?
Answer. No, sir ; not so far as I witnessed. I was told that the German
officers had called upon General Fremont, and he had made them speeches, and
they had made him speeches, and some of the speeches made in the presence of
General Fremont were insubordinate ; but I saw nothing of the kind when I
assumed command.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. What course did General Fremont take in regard to the insubordi
nate speeches ?
Answer. He took no course whatever, according to the statement I heard.
He did not reprove them at all for it, but I believe rather encouraged it.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Did you see any act of insubordination ?
Answer. No, sir ; none at all.
Question. You do not know anything about it ?
Answer. No, sir.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. So that, of your own knowledge, you do not know that any insubor
dinate speeches were made ?
Answer. No, sir.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. How did you learn that he rather encouraged them 1
Answer. From the officers there.
Question. From whom ?
Answer. I could not name any particular individual.
Question. We think it is important.
Answer. If the committee want a statement of that kind I can get a hundred
officers who will make the statement.
Question. We only want one or two names.
Answer. My impression is that General Pope was one of them. I do not
remember any other name now.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Are there any other facts connected with this western department
that you deem it important or essential to state 1
Answer. I do not think of anything at present.
246 TESTIMONY.
The following letters from General Pope to General Hunter were read :
HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION,
Syracuse, October 12, 1861.
DEAR GENERAL : I received, at one o'clock last night, the extraordinary
order of General Fremont for a forward movement of his whole force.
The wonderful manner in which the actual facts and condition of things here
are ignored stupefies me. One would suppose from this order that divisions and
brigades are organized, and are under immediate command of their officers ; that
transportation is in possession of all ; that every arrangement of supply trains to
follow the army has been made ; in fact, that we are in a perfect state of pre
paration for a move.
You know, as well as I do, that the exact reverse is the fact ; that neither
brigades nor divisions have been brought together, and that if they were there
is not transportation enough to move this army one hundred yards ; that, in truth,
not one solitary preparation of any kind has been made to enable this advance
movement to be executed. I have never seen my division, nor do I suppose you
have seen yours. 1 have no cavalry even for a personal escort, and yet this
order requires me to send forward companies of pioneers protected by cavalry.
Is it intended that this order be obeyed, or, rather, that we try to obey it, or is
the order only designed for Washington aiid the papers ? If such a movement
is made without provision or camp equipage of any kind, of necessity the whole
force must return ignominiously, the next day, to the railroad. Please explain
to me all this, and let me know what you design doing.
I am here without a command. Only the other day I was ordered here with
the force from Boonville. Now I am ordered to go back in the direction of
Sedalia. I am here myself, as I happened to be in Georgetown when the order
reached me ; but Kelton has no transportation for his brigade at Boonville, and
has for ten days been trying to press wagons for thirty miles in every direction
around him. I suppose that he has met with little success, as that whole re
gion has been stripped before he reached there.
I went to Jefferson City, the last time I saw you, for the express purpose of
getting transportation for my division, and explained to General Fremont pre
cisely what I have said above.
Now, in the face of the fact that he knew no transportation was furnished,
and that Kelton has none, he should coolly order such a movement, and exspect
it to be made, I cannot understand on any reasonable or common-sense hypoth
esis. Please enlighten me, if you can, and at all events let me know what you
intend to do, as I presume you to be in the same situation that I am.
I will be obliged to you for any late paper or news.
Very truly, yours,
JNO. POPE.
Major General HUNTER, Tipton.
CAMP THREE MILES WEST OF OTTERVILLE,
October 18, 1861.
DEAR GENERAL: I received your note yesterday morning, and I am really
sorry I could not come down to see you before I left Syracuse. I am anxious
to know the result of the Secretary's visit and its object. Upon his action on
the subject, in my judgment, rests the safety of this command from great suffer
ing. If we attempt to go south of the Osage without supplies for at least a
month, and without much better preparation for everything than exists now, I
do not believe one-half of these troops will ever return alive. The winter is
coming on us. The men of this division are without overcoats, their clothes in
TESTIMONY. 247
rags,and only one blanket apiece ; 110 provision trains or depots organized, and,
so far as I can see, no object in view.
I shall, however, move from here and occupy the point designated with five
regiments, being all I can get anything like transportation for. I can, perhaps,
carry eight or ten days' rations for the five regiments by making very short
marches. I have nearly a thousand sick men in the division — of course there
u no sort of arrangement to take care of them. I have had buildings hired in
Otterville, and shall establish a hospital there for the division, as far as I can
do so, without hospital supplies of any kind.
Each division commander is left to himself. I don't know where to look for
provisions short of St. Louis, or where for quartermaster or any other stores
short of the same place, neither do I know to whom I can apply for anything
this side of St. Louis. I have written and telegraphed for 300,000 rations, as
1 intend to establish at Otterville a depot of provisions and of such stores as I can
get for my own command.
Altogether this is the most remarkable campaign I ever saw, heard of, or
read of.
Do let me know all about the Secretary's visit and its results. Write me, if
you have time, about your own movements and plans, what steps you have
taken to get the means to move, and how soon you expect to go.
Give my regards to Shaffer, and believe me truly yours,
JNO. POPE.
Major General HUNTER,
Camp near Tipton.
I bave not a single ambulance in the whole division.
CAMP NEAR QUINCY, October 26.
DEAR GENERAL : I reached here last evening, and intend to remain until my
trains come up. I found that by going direct to Hazle creek I merely got into
a pocket, to get out of which I would be compelled to return to the forks of the
road. I am on the main road to Stockton, about eighteen miles from Warsaw.
Fremont left a point twelve miles beyond this yesterday, intending to
be at Bolivar last night. Why he has gone so much further east I don't know,
unless (as I suspect) he intends to return to St. Louis by way of Rolla, leaving
us to get back as we best can.
I have no orders for any further movement ; have you 1 I saw the express
man from Fremont with despatches for you, is my reason for asking.
I have a good camp, open prairie near the timber, good water, and forage
enough for a few days.
I shall anxiously await orders from you.
Very truly, yours,
JNO. POPE.
Major General D. HUNTER, Warsaw.
CAMP OF SECOND DIVISION,
Near Quincy, October 26, 1861.
DEAR GENERAL: I received an hour ago, by the hands of Dr. Mack, "beef
contractor," the order for a further movement to the south. Dr. Mack has the
same order for you, but for fear of accident I send you a copy of mine.
Dr. Mack states that the troops in advance of us are living on quarter rations,
and are pushing forward to " Neosho " at the rate of twenty miles a day. Within
a few days they will be out of subsistence entirely. He says they talk of sup?
ply trains behind to be coming up, but none have passed me, nor do I know of
any between here and Rolla. Even, however, if there were such trains they
248 TESTIMONY.
could not possibly overtake a command travelling at such a rate. The troops
in advance seem to me doomed to destruction, or to such suffering as would make
death grateful. I have few days' rations and cannot move until my trains
reach here, which, I trust, will be in a couple of days. Of course, following ia
the rear of the armies of Fremont and Price no supplies can be expected from
the country.
Price is doubtless in Arkansas, as he was at Neosho five days ago still mov
ing south. When our forces have succeeded in reaching Neosho, or Arkansas
itself, what is to be accomplished, or rather what does any sane man suppose
will be the result 1 The prospect before us is appalling, and we seem to be led
by mad men. Of course, General Fremont and the men around him, whose
official existence depends upon his not being superseded, are desperate. But
should they be permitted to drag to destruction, or at least to great and unne
cessary suffering, the 30,000 men of this army, for no other purpose than to save,
if possible, their own official lives 1 I shall obey the order and go on as soon as
my supplies arrive here, but it will be with a heavy heart and grievous forbod-
ings. If anything were to be accomplished it would, perhaps, be endurable,
But no possible result will be or can be attained, except to allow Price to deprive
the country of 30,000 troops for the entire winter. Let what will come these
troops cannot be again put into the field before spring.
Please write me what you propose to do, that we may act in concert and save
the force in advance of us from starvation, although we suffer great hardships
ourselves in the attempt.
As soon as I receive my supply trains I will push on and share my rations
with those who will be in the most need of them. My supplies, even under the
most favorable circumstances, will go but a little way with so large a force as is
in advance, but I will do the best I can.
I think Fremont crazy or worse.
Very truly your friend,
JNO. POPE.
Major General D. HUNTER, in camp.
Please send me any late papers you may have.
WASHINGTON, March 8, 1862.
Captain CHAUNCEY McKEEVER sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am a captain of the regular service in the adjutant general's de
partment.
Question. Were you with General Fremont while in command of the western
department 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Please state in your own way what you deem material concerning
the administration of that department.
Answer. I arrived at St. Louis the latter part of August — about the 30th of
August — and remained on duty there until General Fremont was relieved.
When I arrived there I found not a very large number of troops in the depart
ment that were organized ; and the most of them appeared to be wanting either
in instruction or in arms or clothing, for they were very badly armed and very
poorly clothed. There Avas a great scarcity of everything. There seemed to
be very little transportation ; a great scarcity of wagons and animals. There
seemed to be a great deficiency particularly of wagons arid harness. There was
TESTIMONY. 249
a very small amount of money in the quartermaster's department. The con
stant complaint was that there was not money to buy anything with.
Question. What effective force do you suppose General Fremont had when
you went there — what force well appointed and ready for the field ?
Answer. There was a large number on the rolls, but I doubt whether he had
an effective army of over 20,000 men at that time. There were a great 'many
came in afterwards, but the most of them, as they arrived in St. Louis, received
arms there, so they ctuld not have had any before at all — had been in camp
without arms. I saw very few regiments during the whole time I was there
that I considered well armed. Their arms generally were of an inferior char
acter.
Question. What was the condition of the department when you arrived there
as regards the position and strength of the enemy, and what was necessary to
be done ?
Answer. At the time I arrived there very little seemed to be known at all
about the position of Price and his army. I do not think it was known that he
was so near Lexington, or that it was expected he would attack Lexington at all ;
and there were occasional reports that the enemy were advancing up along the
Mississippi river in the direction of Ironton, Pilot Knob, and Cape Girardeau.
The first I knew at all of Price's army being in so large a force was after we
heard he had attacked Lexington. But I had then been but a very short time
in the department, and had very little to do except with the rolls. I was not
the senior adjutant general then. Captain Kelton was the senior adjutant gen
eral. I therefore knew very little of what was going on, or what were the plans.
I knew very little about the military disposition of the enemy, or of our own
force. I think Price's attack on Lexington was rather unexpected. I supposed
at the time an effort would be made to relieve Lexington, and made from the
northern side of the river, from General Pope's command ; and my impression
always was that the proper plan for Colonel Mulligan to pursue would have
been to vacate his position in Lexington, because it was not a defensible one. I
do not see how he could very well expect to get re-enforcements when he allowed
the passage of the river to be obstructed by the enemy's seizing his steamers.
He certainly knew the strength of the enemy for some days, and if they were
as strong as he represents I do not think he should have remained there. I do
not think that either courage or prudence required him to remain there. His
position, if chosen in a military point of view, was certainly an indefensible one,
for if he was cut off from water he certainly could not expect to hold out long.
The river at that time of the year is low, and large steamboats cannot go up
there. The railroad did not go near Lexington, and it was almost impossible
for an army to march from the terminus of the railroad to Lexington for want
of transportation ; and at the time we heard of the attack upon Lexington there
were very few troops in the city of St. Louis.
Question. What was the distance from the end of the railroad to Lexington ?
Answer. I do not recollect exactly how far it was ; I should suppose it was
fifty or sixty miles. They had burned the Lamine River bridge, so that the road
was not passable much beyond California. They had to repair the bridge after
wards.
Question. Were you with General Fremont when he was superseded by
General Hunter ?
Answer. No, sir ; I was in St. Louis in charge of his headquarters there.
All the papers and records were kept, and all the office duty was performed in
St. Louis, under direction of General Fremont, in pursuance of special orders.
Question. What do you know about the construction of the fortifications
about St. Louis, of which so much has been said ?
Answer. My impression is that they were constructed on what is called the
German plan, which the engineers in our army were not inclined to think was
250 TESTIMONY.
the best system by any means. I do not know that they cost any more ; but I
believe our engineers think that is not the best system. The German system
is rather an old system, upon which a great many improvements have now been
made.
Question. Under whose direction were they built ?
Answer. Under the direction of Major Kappner and Colonel Hessendenbet.
Major Kappner, who, I have understood, is an old Austrian officer, is rather an
elderly man ; I should think he is over sixty years of age. Sp far as my inter
course with him is concerned, I should think him a very honorable, upright
man. I believe he built five forts at day labor. Those that I saw appeared to
be thoroughly built, and capable of a pretty strong defence.
Question. Do you know whether they were economically built or otherwise?
Answer. The five built by Major Kappner were built as cheaply as they well
could be built under the circumstances. The labor and the material used were
paid for at a higher rate probably than otherwise would have been the case,
because they did not know when they could get their money. The quarter
master's department, as they knew, was out of funds, and then, too, there were
rumors afloat that General Fremont would be superseded, and they supposed
his accounts would be suspended, and they might not get their pay at all. The
five forts that were built by Major Kappner cost perhaps $60,000, as I have
understood. That seemed to me to be a very reasonable sum to pay for them.
Question. What do you know about the other forts built there ?
Answer. I have never read the whole of the contract ; but I have seen either
the original or a certified copy of it, which was in the hands of the congressional
contract committee that went out there. It appeared to me that the prices were
very high indeed. I think there were five other forts, or six at the outside ; and
if they were paid for entirely according to the terms of that contract, I think
the contractor must have received $250,000 or $300,000, and must have made
a good thing out of it if he was anything of a business man. I have never
examined the forts, but I have heard the engineers who examined them say
they were about the size of the others. The only ground I ever heard for pay
ing so much more for these forts than the others was, that the contractor said
that he worked on them day and night. But that does not seem to me to justify
the difference between $60,000 and $250,000, unless the forts were very much
larger ; and Major Kappner says the plan and material used were about the
same for all. And he is one who should know that, as I understand he laid
them out, staked them off and all that, and was to inspect the work from time
to time, as the building of the forts progressed, upon which money was to be
advanced to the contractor. If the estimates were handed in, they never came
to the office, but the money was paicT over on the positive orders of General
Fremont on the quartermaster's department. I should say if the contractor was
paid at that rate, he must have made a very handsome sum of money if he
understood his business at all.
Question. Did you observe, during your service there, any maladministration
in that department ; if so, who was to blame for it ?
Answer. I never thought the quartermaster's department was well managed.
The person who was acting as quartermaster when I arrived there, Major Mc-
Kinstry, seemed to me to have too many duties to perform. He was quartermas
ter of the city, acting quartermaster general on General Fremont's staff, provost
marshal of the city, and, afterwards, acting general of division. It seemed to
me that those were more duties than any one man could well and promptly per
form. And it struck me that there was not sufficient preparation made to take
the field in the way of transportation. The quartermaster had not provided
wagons or harness, and they had but just commenced purchasing animals when I
arrived there. When General Fremont left St. Louis to take the iield, about the
27th of September, I do not think there was transportation enough to have
TESTIMONY. 251
moved one division of his army as it should be moved, or, at any rate, not more
than enough for one division. They were purchasing wagons and harness as
late as the 25th of October or the 1st of November. Even at that time his
army was not sufficiently supplied with transportation. They were all com
plaining of want of transportation.
Question. Was General Fremont deficient in exertions to get transportation ?
Answer. No, sir ; as soon as he made up his mind to take the field after
Price, he made every exertion to get transportation. He ordered the quarter
master to purchase wherever he could get it without limiting the price or any
thing. I received orders several times to direct the quartermaster to purchase,
mules, wagons, harness, &c. Whether he knew before he started that the
quartermaster had not then purchased the transportation I do not know. There
was a great scarcity of transportation at the time. The fact is, at the time Lex
ington was attacked, there was scarcely any troops prepared to take the field.
They were waiting for arms. I think some 10,000 Austrian muskets had been
>scnt to Cincinnati to be altered and rifled. But I did not consider they were a
good weapon even when improved. They did not seem to give satisfaction at
all. Complaints were made that the locks were not good ; that the guns would
go off at half-cock ; that the locks would break ; that the hammers would break
off. General Fremont had considerable cavalry there. The most of them had
horses, but they did not have sabres, carbines, or pistols ; and as late as the
1st of November there were several regiments there that had not arms at
all. After General Fremont started he was continually urging me to
send forward the 1st Iowa cavalry to join him; but I was unable to do
so because they could not be supplied with arms. It was a regiment
a thousand strong, and they had had horses for some mouths ; but they had no
arms, nor had General Fremont a sufficient number of field pieces to supply his
artillery. There were companies in St. Louis when I left that had not been
supplied with guns, and several others were down at Jefferson Barracks waiting
for guns to come on from the east. There was a great deficiency in arms of
all kinds there. I think General Fremont tried in all directions to get them.
The reply from Washington was that they had no arms to give him ; that the
ordnance department could not 'supply them. The impression here seemed to
be that there were more arms in Missouri than there really were. When the
Secretary of War came out there, he asked what had become of some 10,000
arms sent out to General Lyon, but no one seemed to know anything about
them. It was supposed that they had been distributed to the home guards, and
not turned im. What arms were there were rusty, out of order, and not in con
dition to be used at all. Captain Callender, the ordnance officer there, certainly
exerted himself to the utmost, and purchased wherever he could find weapons,
and whenever he could get authority to do so. He seemed to make all the exer
tions in his power. And I think that the fact that so many reports came out to
St. Louis, and the west, that General Fremont was to be removed interfered a
great deal with the efficiency of his command. I do not think all his orders
were as promptly obeyed, or that the same exertions were made by a great
many of the officers, because they thought he was to be removed, and they
could act as they pleased with impunity.
Question. They thought that General Fremont was in disfavor with the ad
ministration?
Answer. Yes, sir; I think so. General Curtis, I think, acted under that
supposition. He undertook to take powers up.on himself that certainly were
not delegated to him by the army regulations, or any orders from Washington,
that I am aware of. He undertook to send a flag of truce through our lines
to Price, at Springfield, for an exchange of prisoners, for which he was repri
manded by General Fremont, and informed that if he, or any other officer, un
dertook to do a like act again he should be arrested. He seemed to think he
252 TESTIMONY.
had a right to send troops out of the city when and where he pleased, just be
cause General Fremont was absent; that I could not act in General Fremont's
name because he was not there, although I had written instructions from Gen
eral Fremont what to do, and special instructions for special cases.
There were certain reports came to St. Louis that Jeff. Thompson, whom 1
was instructed to keep an eye upon, was advancing. I was instructed to watch
Cape Girardeau and fronton, and see that they were re-enforced in case of at
tack. On learning that Jeff. Thompson, or a part of his force, had burned the
Big River bridge, I ordered General Grant, in the name of General Fremont, to
send re-enforcements to Cape Girardeau, and ordered the command to start
from there to intercept Thompson's retreat. I also re-enforced Irontou and
Pilot Knob. I also sent a battery of the 1st Missouri light artillery, under the
command of Major Schoneld. I sent him in charge because I knew he was an
officer of experience, and I felt a little solicitous about the place. He went at
my special request. Of course I consulted him about it, and he agreed to go.
All the orders were issued, of course, in the name of General Fremont, accord
ing to instructions. Major Schofield had been assistant adjutant general for
General Lyon, and I knew he was thoroughly posted there. We agreed that
that was all the re-enforcements that were necessary; that Colonel Carlin, with
his own force and the additional force I had sent him, ought to be able to drive
Jeff. Thompson back ; and with Colonel Plummer coming up from Cape Girar
deau, I was in hopes to cut off Thompson entirely. A despatch that was sent
from Colonel Plummer to Colonel Carlin informing him what he was going to
do, was intercepted by the enemy, and he immediately fell back off the main
road to Fredericktown. Colonel Carlin and Colonel Plummer joined their forces,
and attacked the enemy there, and whipped him. There was telegraphic com
munication opened between Pilot Knob and St. Louis, and I was kept fully in
formed of the condition of things there. General Curtis also received some
telegrams from some parties who gave him wrong information, exaggerated Jeff.
Thompson's forces, said that he had 10,000 or 15, 000 men, and was advancing on St.
Louis. And G eneral Curtis acted as though he thought it was all true. He went
out and inspected all the fortifications, and ordered the 1st Iowa cavalry down
to Jefferson Barracks to scout out from there. Now, I had positive information
that there was no enemy there. This Iowa cavalry had been under orders for
some time to join General Fremont as soon as they were equipped. One squadron
had been equipped the day previous, but, owing to pressing business and the
re-enforcing Pilot Knob, I had not sent them off. And I then ordered this
cavalry to proceed and join General Fremont at Tipton. General Curtis ordered
also a part of one of the Missouri regiments down. I directed him, in the name
of General Fremont, to withdraw those troops, as they were not needed down
there. The battle was fought as I had expected, and as I had ordered. I
ordered Colonel Carlin distinctly to attack Jeff. Thompson. He did so and
defeated him. They pursued them but a short distance. I do not know why
they did not pursue them further. They were successful, had an ample force,
and there was no need of any more troops. To have sent more troops down
there would have been an expense to the government that was not necessary.
I think there was no necessity for General Curtis interfering in the matter at
all. I reported to General Fremont, and he approved of what I had done.
Question. What is your opinion in regard to the failure to re-enforce Colonel
Mulligan at Lexington ?
Answer. I had been so short a time in the office that I knew but little of the
general affairs of the department at that time. It was only after the surrender
of Colonel Mulligan that I was appointed the principal adjutant general. I
therefore knew very little about what could be done. I did not know exactly
how General Fremont's troops were posted, or how many he had. I think he
had only some 2,000 or 3,000 in the city. Regiments were arriving there every
TESTIMONY. 253
tl.iy, but they had no arms, and no baggage wagons, and no tents. There vri.s
a great scarcity of tents in the department. It appeared to me almost impossi
ble for General Fremont to have sent troops to Lexington in sufficient numbers
to save it before it fell. Of course, however, having arrived there so lately, I
could not tell what might have been done to strengthen Lexington if it had
been understood that Price was going there, After it was attacked it appeared
to me too late to do anything to save it. I do not know what information
General Fremont had in reference to Price's movements ; whether he could
have anticipated the attack on Lexington or not ; and I did not know what
orders Colonel Mulligan had. I know that General Fremont ordered troops
from the northern part of Missouri to go to the relief of Lexington ; but when
they arrived at the river, they were scarcely in sufficient numbers to have been
of much service, and they had no means to cross the river, the boats having all
been seized by Price's army before they got there. I have no means of esti
mating the number of Price's force. I have always supposed it was very much
exaggerated, because I do not think he could have brought that number there
and subsisted them without more having been known about it. He had enough
to take the place, and I suppose that was all that was necessary.
Question. How was General Fremont about being accessible to those who
had important business with him 1
Answer. It was very frequently difficult to get to see him ; but I think that
was because he had so much to do— because he was so busy. I think he de
voted his whole time to business. He was in his office from very early in the
morning until late at night.
Question. Had he any system by which persons having important business
with him could be admitted to see him 1
Answer. I think a great deal depended upon certain members of his staff'. I
think that they frequently did not tell the general that persons were there in
waiting ; that they took upon themselves to decide whether their business was
of importance or not. There were a great many persons came there With what
they considered important information, when they really had no information at
all, as the general knew all about it beforehand. But they seemed to think
that because they had just come from the country they had information of im
portance.
Question. I refer to those who came upon important business, or with in
formation that it was necessary for the general to have.
Answer. I have heard persons talk about their not being able to see him ;
but I never knew of an instance where it was very necessary for a person to
see the general that he did not see him. If he knew that they were there and
had important business with him, they could generally see him. I heard the
honorable Mr. Gurley say once that he had to wait two days to see him. I do
not know that the general knew he was there, or, if he did, that there was any
thing particular the general had to say to him. Mr. Gurley went there as a
member of General Fremont's staff some time before he took the field, and I
suppose he had no particular orders to give him.
Question. Was there anything unusual about his accessibility as a person en
gaged in the business he was engaged in ?
Answer. No, sir ; I think not. It is always more or less difficult to see a
commander of a department. General Halleck was so overrun with visitors he
had a staff officer there who would sometimes take your card up, and sometimes
not. General Fremont's officers were all at his headquarters, and he was always
there, and it seemed to me that somebody was with him all the time. After I
was the chief adjutant general I always walked into his room whenever I had
matters of importance to communicate to him, and got through with the business
as rapidly as possible, because the general always seemed to be busy.
254 TESTIMONY.
WASHINGTON, March 14, 1862
Colonel CHESTER HARDING, Jr., sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. Please state to us yoiu' rank and position in the army.
Answer. I am at present adjutant general of the State of Missouri.
Question. Were you there under the administration of the western depart
ment by General Fremont 1
Answer. Yes, sir; during the whole time.
Question. Please give us a statement of all that you deem material in that
administration that came under your notice.
Answer. On the 26th of July, when General Fremont arrived, I was sta
tioned at the arsenal. I had been acting for General Lyon, under his orders,
from the time of his departure. Here is that order :
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT WEST,
Special order.] St. Louis Arsenal, June 13, 1861.
1. In the absence of the department commander, Lieutenant Colonel Chester
Harding, jr., will give the necessary directions for carrying out the proper policy
of the government as has been verbally expressed by the undersigned, and all
orders given by him will be regarded as bv authority.
N. LYON,
Brigadier General United States Volunteers, Commanding.
When General Fremont arrived, he ordered me to report to him for duty as
assistant adjutant general upon his staff. I went with General Fremont to
Cairo, as his adjutant general in the field, and returned with him.
Question. State what force you took there.
Answer. We took 3,800 men. That is not the exact number, but it was in
the neighborhood of 3,800.
Question. How did you go there ?
Answer. In seven steamboats, besides the one which General Fremont had
himself — seven transports for troops.
Question. For what purpose did he charter a boat for himself to go there ;
what was the object of it ?
Answer. He had considerable business to do, and I suppose it was for the
purpose of being more private than he could have been had he been on the
same boat with the troops.
Question. How was that boat furnished ; was there anything extraordinary
expensive, or ostentatious about it ? Please state how that was.
Answer. The boat was always a very fine boat and magnificently furnished,
and had been furnished by the Alton Packet Company. There were very few
state-rooms in her. The saloon and cabin were supplied with sofas.
Question. Did General Fremont add anything to it ?
Answer. I do not know of any change being made in and about her in con
sequence of General Fremont taking her — either extra furniture or any
change at all.
Question. Please state whether there was on that expedition anything showy
or ostentatious above the ordinary movement of armies.
Answer. Nothing that I discovered. I heard some talk about General
Fremont coming down to the boat in a carriage drawn by four horses, but I did
not see the carriage myself. I went on board the boat early in the morning
before he arrived. She was lying in the stream then.
TESTIMONY. 255
Question. Was he ostentatious in his bearing and deportment about St.
Louis ?
Answer. It never struck me so. He had a fine house, and he had plenty of
orderlies around stationed at different passages. They were generally in the
basement of the house, and they had plenty to do to keep people from rushing
up stairs ; but I never saw anything indicating a desire to be very magnificent.
Question. What do you say of his inaccessibility 1 It has been sometimes a
matter of complaint that even a man of business could not get at him.
Answer. 1 presume it was very difficult for citizens who went there not upon
business to see him ; and. perhaps it was difficult for those who went upon busi
ness and he was engaged and occupied with other matters. I have myself had
to wait a day or two even after I had been ordered there, and get in the room.
He would tell me he could not attend to me then and ask me to call again at
such a time.
Question. Was he attentive to business there 1
Answer. He was occupied all the time. I never saw him idle one moment.
Question. Was he unnecessarily exclusive in your judgment I
Answer. In my judgment he was not. If he had received all the visitors
who wished to see him he never would have done any business at all.
Question. You have spoken of the visit to Cairo. What was the condition of
affairs when you got there ; what amount of troops were there ?
Answer. General Prentiss made to me a brigade return when we arrived
there, showing the forces which he had in Cairo and opposite to Bird's Point.
My impression is, that, including the three months men, that report showed
something like 5,600 men.
Question. Does that report include those that Fremont took along or not ?
Answer. No, sir ; exclusive of the re-enforcements.
Question. How were they armed and equipped 1
Answer. I made no inspection, and saw none of the troops excepting two or
three regiments that were on the west bank of the river at Bird's Point.
These were very weil armed ; but I do not think that any regiment in the ser
vice in the western States at that time could be said to be well equipped with
everything.
Question. Were those positions, Cairo and Bird's Point, or either of them,
threatened in any way by the enemy 1
Answer. Yes, sir; all the southeastern part of Missouri and the different
points there were threatened.
Question. By what force, as near as you could ascertain ?
Answer. We supposed frojn all the reports that we could gather, and from
intelligence that General McClellan, General Prentiss, and General Pope re
ceived, that they could collect, including Missouri irregulars, something like
20,000 troops at Pocahontas and Pitman's Ferry, and would be joined by
Watkins with his men from New Madrid, and by McBride, who was collecting
forces, and had at one time 2,500 men in Oregon and Texas counties, on the
borders.
Question. State the condition of things in the western department when
General Fremont arrived there. What was the amount of the forces, and how
were they armed, equipped, &c., when he took command ?
Answer. On the 26th day of July, 1861, there were in St. Louis, four regi
ments of the United States reserve corps, who could not be ordered from the
county of St. Louis without their own consent. They numbered very nearly four
thousand men. The term of service of the first and second regiments was to
expire on the 7th day of August, and of the 3d and 4th, on the 8th day of Au
gust. The 5th regiment of the United States reserve corps, whose time was to
expire on the llth of August, was part of it in Lexingtion and part of it in St.
Louis. The 4th regiment of Missouri volunteers, Colonel Schittner, the 2d regi-
"256 TESTIMONY.
nient, Oolouel Boernstine, with the exception of two companies under (now)
Colonel Austerhaus, and a portion of the 3d and 5th Missouri were in the arsenal
or near it, their term of service having expired. They remained together simply
to obtain their pay and to be re-organized. The 8th Missouri volunteers was
not quite complete in its organization, but still could have taken the field, and
was sent to Cape Girardeau in the course of a few days. They had no trans
portation. They numbered about 800 men at that time, or very nearly up to
the minimum. A portion of Backhof 's artillery battalion was in the arsenal for
the purpose of being mustered out and paid off. Those were all the troops in
or neat the city, with the exception of skeleton companies of the 9th and 10th
regiments of Missouri volunteers, which were then forming.
Question. Can you give in general terms the number of the troops available
in his department at that time 1
Answer. Here is a statement which shows the position of all our Missouri
troops at the time when General Fremont arrived. The 1st regiment, Colonel
Blair, was at Springfield. The 2d regiment was in the arsenal for mustering
out and reorganization. The 3d regiment was in the field at Springfield, Mis
souri, with the exception of the three months' men, who had returned to be
mustered out. The 4th regiment was in the arsenal to be mustered out and re
organized. The 5th regiment was in the field at Springfield, Missouri, with the
exception of the three months' men, who had returned to be mustered out. .The
6th regiment, Colonel Bland, was at Pilot Knob and Ironton. Of the 7th regi
ment, two companies were in Jefferson City and eight in Boonville. The 8th
regiment was then at the Abbey Park, in St. Louis. The 9th regiment had but
226 men, distributed around among skeleton companies, and they were at the
arsenal, not clothed or equipped. The 10th regiment was in the same condition,
and with about the same number of troops. What afterwards became the en
gineer regiment of the west was then just started, and there were 76 mechanics
in the arsenal. Bud's battery, 154 men, were in the arsenal, and we had just
received authority to keep them and get them their guns and artillery accoutre
ments. There were 554 of Bayle's rifle battalion at Holla. There were 307,
that is, three companies, of the 23d Illinois in the arsenal, but under orders to
go to Jefferson City, where the remaining seven companies were stationed.
There were two companies of Backhof 's artillery battalion in the field at Spring
field ; a portion of one company was at Jefferson City and another portion at Boon
ville. Of the pioneer company, 120 men, half of it was at Springfield ; a section
was in St. Charles, and a section at Pilot Knob. The first four regiments of the
United States reserve corps were in St. Louis ; and of the 5th, a part was at
Lexington and a part at St. Louis. Besides these, there were 23 companies of
home guards, who were guarding the railroad bridges and tracks in different
parts of the State ; making a total of 15,943 troops.
Question. How were they armed and equipped ?
Answer. The regiments in the field were tolerably well armed and equipped.
There had been great difficulty in procuring cartridge-boxes, knapsacks, &c.,
and the other accoutrements for the field when General Lyon started for
Boonville, and Sigel's command went to the field insufficiently supplied with
these. Subsequently, from the accoutrements which the government sent with
ten thousand arms for distribution among the loyal inhabitants of the State of
Missouri, we took enough to supply the troops in the field. None of the regi
ments had a proper supply of army wagons.
Question. Were you there at the time that General Lyon fought the battle of
Springfield?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. It has been said that General Fremont was culpable for not granting
aid or sending him re-enforcements. How was that ?
Answer. My own opinion is that General Fremont had the choice of one of
TESTIMONY. 257
two things to do ; to re-enforce General Lyon, which he might have done by
neglecting the southeast, or let Lyon get along the best way he could with what
force he had, and keep the southeast. He had not force enough in a condition
to move to accomplish both purposes at that time.
Question. What do you mean by the southeast ?
Answer. That whole country from Pocahontas up by Pitman's Ferry, includ
ing Ironton, Holla, and Cairo.
Question. You have stated how that part was threatened at the time ?
Answer. Yes, sir. General Fremont's plan of operations there was not the
plan that I would have followed if I had been in command.
Question. In what particular, in your judgment, did he err ?
Answer. I thought all along, and so advised General McClellan and the other
generals, that the proper way to prevent troops from coming up from Pocahontas
was to occupy the heads of the only roads by which they could move, and to
push down our forces by the way of Greenville towards the Arkansas line. In
fact, that plan was agreed to at one time, and the forces were ordered over to
me at the arsenal for the purpose of making a movement ; but subsequently
General McClellan countermanded the movement of some regiments that were
intended to go in that direction.
Question. Where did he order them to when he countermanded the movement 1
Answer. They were held in reserve in case Cairo should be attacked. It
was upon the representations of General Prentiss and General Pope that the
order was countermanded. That was all the force we wanted to keep the south
east, and if we could have had the five regiments General Lyon could have
been re-enforced easy enough.
Question. And that, you say, was prevented by General McClellan's orders ?
Answer. He countermanded the order which had been given in the first place
for Grant's and some other regiments.
Question. So that five regiments had to be held in reserve instead of going on
that expedition ?
Answer. No, sir ; not the five. Wyman's regiment was one of the regiments
that was ordered off, and Marsh's 20th Illinois was another. Our stores at Holla
had accumulated so that there was a vast amount of government property there
at risk, and McBride was not far off with forces varying from day to day, never
having any permanent force, but varying from 1,500 to 2,500 men. Farmers
would come out and join him and stay two or three days and go home again ;
but, at any time, he could collect a large force to make a dash upon an exposed
point. It was necessary to protect that place, and I sent Wyman there. I
sent Marsh to Cape Girardeau, because it was a very good base for operations
through the southeastern portion of the State, with a good road back from there
to Bloomfield and Greenville, and communication could be kept up with Irontou
very easily ; and because, also, there was so much talk about Cairo, and so
much apprehension felt that it was in danger, I wanted him to be where General
Prentiss could feel that, in case of an attack, he could call on Marsh to re-enforce
him. Cape Girardeau is only fifty miles from Cairo.
Question. It has been thought that re-enforcements might have been spared
from Rolla to go down and help Lyon 1
Answer. It was through some of General Lyon's orders that the troops were
not moved forward from Rolla. As I stated before, Wyman was at Rolla. I
had been organizing, as fast as I could, the men for Bayles's rifle regiment,
and had some 500 of them sent down and stationed at Rolla, with a design to
move Wyman forward as soon as Bayles was strong enough to hold the place.
Before the battle of Springfield, and after the three months' men began to be
anxious about their pay, General Lyon sent some of them back. He sent back,
among others, the 4th regiment United States reserve corps, which was at
Part iii 17
258 TESTIMONY.
Springfield with him ; and he gave authority to the officers who were going to
reorganize some of the three months regiments to pick up everybody they could
find and bring them to the arsenal for reorganization. In that way nearly the
whole of Bayles's command came up to the arsenal just about the time General
Fremont arrived, and left nobody at Rolla but Wy man's force.
Question. Then, in your opinion, General Lyon could not be spared any
troops from Rolla, for the reasons you have given ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Was there any military necessity for Lyon fighting the battle there,
or could he have retreated ?
Answer. Of that I can only speak from what the regular officers and others
have said since their return. There have been various opinions about it. Some
think that the battle was fought in the best place ; that it was necessary to fight
it there. Others think there was another stronger place nearer Springfield
which might have been held, and that our troops should have awaited the attack
of Price there; it was known Price was about to attack us; but how much
weight their opinion is entitled to I have no means of judging.
Question. It is a debatable question among military gentlemen 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. You know the amount of troops under Fremont; you know the
condition of Cairo and other exposed parts of his department; and taking it all
into consideration, under all the circumstances, what do you say as a military
man of Fremont not re-enforcing Lyon]
Answer. I would think that, according to his own views about the neces
sities of the case, he acted in a proper manner; but the view which he took,
and which the other generals took, of affairs in Missouri, was one that I never
did agree to, and am not convinced yet.
Question. I am not now speaking of the original plan of the campaign ; but,
under the circumstances that he had planned it, was it in his power and ought
he to have really re-enforced Lyon?
Answer. I do not think he could have done it and carried out his plans.
The troops were not there to do it with; that is, to do it immediately. He or
dered them as he came along, and they commenced coming rapidly to the State,
and we were hard at work furnishing them after they arrived as rapidly as
possible, trying to get them ready to take the field.
Question. Did you accompany Fremont to Springfield and were you present
when he was superseded?
Answer. No, sir. On the 15th of August I left General Fremont's staff and
took command of a regiment. He assigned me to the command of a district
embracing the lines of the Pacific railroad and Southwest Branch ; and from
that time until he was removed I wras in charge of that department, a brigade
command.
Question. His commissary department and his contracts have been criticised ;
do you know anything about those things'?
Answer. Nothing in the world. I was never in General Fremont's confi
dence in respect to his campaign or his operations in the city for supplying his
troops.
Question. Do you know anything about the building of those fortifications in
St. Louis?
Answer. Nothing at all, further than that I have seen them and been in
them.
Question. But you do not know whether the prices for them were exorbitant
or moderate?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Now let me ask you as to the necessity of building those fortifica
tions, or the military expediency of them ?
TESTIMONY. 259
Answer. I do not think they were necessary myself; but a great many per
sons, who ought to know better than I, did think so.
Question. Would they not enable our forces to defend the city with less force
than to attempt it without fortifications ?
Answer. I think that the battle that will defend St. Louis will have to be
fought a good many miles away from it. They would not have assisted us in
case of an attack by the river.
Question. What would be the difference, as to the propriety of it, between
fortifying that city and this? Was it necessary that this city should have been
defended by fortifications'?
Answer. I certainly think so, with the enemy right at the door. They came
as near as Arlington Heights, as I understand.
Question. Suppose then that they had come that near St. Louis, as they did
approach pretty near sometimes1?
Answer. If they ever got as far as St. Louis they would be in strength
enough to pay very little attention to the forts.
Question. You do not believe much in fortifications ?
Answer. Oh! yes, sir; but I think that our fight for St. Louis must neces
sarily have taken place at a long distance from the city.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. I see that you differ greatly from General Fremont in regard to the
amount of forces at Cairo at the time of your visit ?
Answer. I saw in General Fremont's publication a statement that General
Prentiss had about 1,200 men. That led me to reflect, and I think that that is
a mistake. I think that among his adjutant general's papers in St. Louis
will be found General Prentiss's report of the 3d of August.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. May not the discharge of the three months men about that time
explain it ?
Answer. In making the statement I did of 5,500 men I included the three
months men.
By Mr. Wade:
Question. The time of their enlistment was about expiring at that time 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Might not that reconcile the discrepancy 1
Answer. That will reconcile it. I do not think there were over 1,200 three
years men.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Can you give us the whole force of the western department at the
time General Fremont took command ]
Answer. In addition to what I have already mentioned, there were two
regiments of Illinois troops, and one of Iowa troops, the second Iowa, Colonel,
now General, Curtis upon the line of the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad.
General Pope was in northeast Missouri with a portion of his division. I do
not know what troops or regiments constituted his force. Colonel Mulligan was
at Jefferson City. General Lyon's column consisted of the 1st Missouri rifle
battalion, of the 2d Missouri, two companies, the 3d Missouri and the 5th Mis
souri, these last two regiments having been weakened by the loss of their three
months men, the 1st Iowa, the 1st and 2d Kansas, five companies of regular
infantry, and five companies, I think, of regular cavalry ; I believe there were
five. I have a post return at my room. He also had Totten's battery, regu
lars, two volunteer batteries, and Dubois's regular battery.
260 TESTIMONY.
Question. Can you give us a statement of the whole force in the western
department at the time General Fremont took command1?
Answer. I can, with the exception of giving the numbers of General Pope's
command in northwestern Missouri.
Question. Have you stated the aggregate amount, with the exception of the
forces under General Pope1?
Answer. No. I did not include General Lyon's column, nor did I include
the three regiments that were stationed on the Hannibal and St. Joseph road
in the statement which I gave.
Question. Adding those to those you have already referred to, and excepting
the forces under General Pope, how many were there in all ?
Answer. Besides the 15,000 I have spoken of, there were in the State when
General Fremont arrived: Marsh's 20th Illinois regiment, about 900 strong, at
Cape Girardeau ; Wyman's regiment, about a thousand strong, at Holla ; the
2d Iowa, about 950 strong, at St. Joseph and along the line of the Hannibal
and St. Joseph railroad ; the 16th Illinois, Colonel Smith, about 900 strong,
also guarding the line of that road ; and another Illinois regiment, the number
of which I have forgotten, about 900 strong. With General Lyon, besides the
1st, 2d, 3d, and 5th Missouri and an artillery battalion, which I have included
in the list before given, there were two Kansas regiments and one Iowa regi
ment, making an aggregate of about 2,400 men, and the regular infantry and
cavalry of which I have spoken. Besides these, 'General Pope had moved into
northeast Missouri with a portion of his troops from Illinois. I do not know
the strength of his command. I believe those were all the troops that were in
Missouri on the 26th of July.
Question. What other troops were there in the western department, aside
from those in Missouri ?
Answer. I have no means of knowing what troops there were in the western
department outside of Missouri.
Question. State what changes were made in the department, including the
State of Missouri, from the 4th of March to the time when General Fremont
took command 1
Answer. On the 4th of March General Harney was in command of the de
partment of the west. This department included the territory between the
Mississippi river and the department of New Mexico. Captain Lyon, the
senior line officer of the United States army, was subsequently placed in com
mand of the troops, and General Harney, to that extent, relieved. General
Harney was afterwards reinstated, and again relieved. Captain Lyon had been,
in the meantime, promoted to a brigadier generalship and the command of the
department devolved upon him by reason of seniority. While General Lyon
was at Boonville, in June, an order was issued detaching Missouri from the
department of the west and attaching it to the department of the Ohio, then
commanded by General McClellan. This organization continued until the
western department was created, and General Fremont assigned to the com
mand of it.
Question. Will you state the effect which was produced upon Missouri by
those changes ?
Answer. The effect of attaching Missouri to a command already as large as
that of the department of the Ohio was to deprive us of the supervision and
action of a commanding general upon the spot. General McClellan was busy
with his column in Western Virginia, and it was very difficult to advise with
him, or apprise him of occurrences in the State, and he could not give us the
attention which our situation required. I attribute our troubles, to a great
extent, to the change in the department. There never was a time when we did
not need the personal presence of the general who had the power to order what
circumstances required.
TESTIMONY. 26 L
Question. Do you know the instructions given to Colonel Mulligan in relation
to holding Lexington, and the reasons why he was not re-enforced?
Answer. I have no knowledge on the subject.
Question. What force, in your judgment, should have heen kept at Cairo?
Answer. Enough to garrison the forts and man the batteries. If a land at
tack was threatened it must necessarily come by the way of the roads through
the swamp region in the southeast, and those roads would be easily held by a
small number of troops.
Question. What is your estimate in numbers of the troops necessary to man
the fortifications and hold the roads to which you have alluded ?
Answer. I should suppose four thousand men plenty. If re-enforcements
were required at any time they could very easily be sent by the Illinois Central
railroad and by the river in time to meet any attack. I have made a concise
statement of matters in Missouri, and I also have certain letters and telegraphic
despatches which I offer to the committee as a part of my testimony.
PACIFIC, October 5, 1861.
On the 14th June, 1861, Brigadier General Lyon moved up the Missouri
river, taking with him the 1st and 2d regiments Missouri volunteers, three
small companies of regular infantry, Totten's battery, (four pieces,) and an
eight-inch howitzer, with a few artillerists. On the day before a battalion of
the 3d Missouri had been sent to the southwest, and was speedily followed by
the remainder of that regiment, the 5th Missouri, two batteries (four pieces each)
of light artillery, and a battalion of rifles. The last-named corps was to occupy
the railroad to Rolla, until relieved by the Home Guard, and afterwards to garri
son that place. Such of the troops as could be spared from Fort Leavenworth
and two regiments of Kansas volunteers had been ordered to make their way to
Springfield, where it was designed that the three columns should effect a junc
tion. At the same time, the fourth Missouri occupied Bird's point, one Illinois
and two Iowa regiments held the line of the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad;
the arsenal was garrisoned by the skeleton companies of the then unformed 6th,
7th, and 8th Missouri, numbering about eight hundred bayonets, all told; the
powder magazine was held by Captain Tracy, with a half company of recruits,
and St. Loftis was left in charge of a small company of United States general
service recruits and the United States reserve corps, who could not be moved
from there without their consent. Excepting a few small outposts in Kansas
arid Nebraska there were no other troops subject to General Lyon's orders.
The Home Guarc^, which afterwards did good service in protecting the railroads,
had not been armed or equipped by the United States.
At Boonville General Lyon was joined by the 1st Iowa, and troops from
Illinois were sent to fill their places on the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad,
the country along the line being in such a disturbed condition that a large force
had to be maintained in that region.
While General Lyon was lying at Boonville, he received the official informa
tion that Missouri had been detached from the department of the west and at
tached to the department of the Ohio, under command of Major General Mc-
Clcllan. During the same interval, the 5th regiment United States reserve
corps was sent up the river, and eventually became the garrison of Lexington ;
the 4th regiment of the same corps, with three companies of the 3d, and the
small company of general service recruits above mentioned, were ordered to the
southwest, to strengthen Sigel's column ; a part, and, at a later period, the
whole, of the 7th Missouri, were stationed at Boonville, which place they held
on the 26th July, 1861, the date of Major General Fremont's arrival at St.
Louis.
There now came intelligence of the gathering of a formidable army in the
262 TESTIMONY.
unprotected southeast. Tennessee and Arkansas troops were concentrating
at Pocahontas and Pitman's Ferry; Missouri rebels were assembling under
Watkins and McBride. There seemed little reason to doubt that the enemy
could advance, threatening Bird's Point, Cairo, Ironton, Holla, and even St.
L/ouis, with a force exceeding twenty thousand men. So great appeared the
danger that General Lyon hesitated for a time whether he would not give up
his projected expedition to Springfield, and take the field in the southeast.
Leaving that region, however, to the care of the then commanding general, he
finally carried out his original plan, and took up his line of march from Boon-
ville, starting about July 4. In the face of the information received, it would
have been criminal neglect to leave Holla or Irouton unprotected. The 13th
Illinois was brought from Casey ville and sent to the former place ; the 6th
Missouri, still incomplete, went to the latter. The 20th Illinois embarked for
Cape Girardeau, it being the intention that other Illinois troops should occupy
the intervening country and points further south. They could not be obtained,
however, and from the 7th July, until General Fremont's expedition down the
Mississippi had reached Bird's Point, there never was a day when the rebels
could not hav€>ovemm the southeast.
By the middle of July every bayonet that could be spared from the city had
been sent into the field. The remaining seven companies of the 3d United
States reserve corps, all the organized companies of the 8th Missouri, Lieutenant
Colonel Schaeffer's battalion of the 2d, the 4th Missouri, then just returned from
Bird's Point, were all actively employed in northeast Missouri in meeting the
movement of Harris and others, supposed to be an advance upon the capital,
while a similar advance was to take place from the southwest, thus dispersing
or capturing the convention then about to meet. In fact, there remained scarcely
enough men in the arsenal to perform the ordinary guard duty, and in the city
proper so few of the reserve corps that daily visits were paid to headquarters
by prominent citizens remonstrating against leaving the city defenceless.
This state of affairs lasted only a few days. The expedition into northeast
Missouri returned in about a week. The 4th regiment United States reserve
corps and the detachment of the 3d before mentioned returned to the city from
the southwest. The rifle battalion, theretofore stationed at Holla, and most of
the three months men of the 3d and 5th Missouri, came back at about the same
time. The battalion of the 2d, which had been stationed at Jefferson City, was
relieved by Mulligan's Irish brigade, so that on the 26th July, 1861, General
Fremont found, in the city and arsenal, the 1st and 2d regiments United States
reserve corps, whose term of service would expire on the 7th August ; the 3d
and 4th regiments United States reserve corps, whose term woukj, expire on the
8th August ; the 2d Missouri, a part of the 3d and 5th, and the whole of the
4th and of the rifle battalion, together with a part of Backhof 's artillery bat
talion, all of whose terms of service had then expired, and who kept together
merely to be mustered out of service and paid. In other words, there were no
troops except the 8th Missouri in or near the city at the time of General Fre
mont's arrival, who could be ordered upon any distant service. About the 20th
of July General Pope, with a part of his brigade, took the field in northeast
Missouri, in pursuance of orders from General Fremont. His force was the only
increase that had been made in the number of troops on duty in this State, and
he had enough work on his hands to give it employment in the region to which
it was assigned.
Looking, then, to the position of affairs in this State on the 26th of July,
1861, it will be found that General Lyon was in the southwest, in need of re-
enforcernents. There was trouble in the northwest, requiring more troops than
were there. In the northeast there were no more troops than were required to
perform the task allotted to them ; while in the south and southeast there was a
TESTIMONY. 263
rebel array of sufficient force to endanger Bird's Point, Cape Girardeau, Ironton,
Rolla, and St. Louis, and no adequate preparation was made to meet it.
General Fremont sent the eighth Missouri to Cape Girardeau and the fourth
United States reserve corps (whose term of service was to expire on the 8th of
August) to re-enforce Bland at Ironton. He took some of General Pope's force
from him, added to it two battalions of the first and second United States re
serve corps, (whose term of service was to expire on the 7th of August,) equipped
BuePs light battery, and started about the first of August for Bird's Point with
the troops thus collected, being something less than 3,800 men, and being also
all the available troops in this region, expecting to find an enemy not less than
20,000 strong. Subsequent events showed that the rebel force was not over
estimated, and nothing but the re-enforcements sent to the points above named,
and the expedition down the river, prevented its advance upon them. Common
report greatly magnified these re-enforcements, and it was generally believed in
the city, and no doubt so reported to the rebel leaders, that Fremont had moved
some ten or twelve thousand troops to the southeast ; while, in fact, he did not
have over fifty-five hundred to move, and was not strong enough at any point
to take the field and commence offensive operations. General Fremont was not
inattentive to the situation of General Lyon's column, and went so far as to re
move the garrison of Boonville, in order to send him aid. During the first days
of August troops arrived in the city in large numbers ; nearly all of them were
unarmed — all were without transportation ; regiment after regiment laid for
days in the city without any equipments, for the reason that the arsenal was
exhausted, and arms and accoutrements had to be brought from the east. From
these men General Lyon would have had re-enforcements, although they were
wholly unpracticed in the use of the musket and knew nothing of movements
in the field; but, in the meantime, the battle of the 10th of August was fought.
CHESTER HARDING, JR.,
Late Ass't Adj't Gen'l upon the Staff of Brig. Gen. Lyon.
WASHINGTON, March 17, 1862.
Colonel ANSELM ALBERT sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am a colonel, but not of any regiment. I was appointed by
General Fremont on his staff, and so missed the opportunity to enter a regi
ment. I then commanded the second brigade in the fourth division as act
ing brigadier general, but have never been confirmed as colonel or general,
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Are you now in the army ?
Answer. I am "now on General Sigel's staff.
By the chairman :
Question. At whose instance have you appeared before the committee ?
Answer. I understood I was to be summoned, and hurried up and came
on and found the summons here.
Question. Were you with General Fremont during his command of the
western department ?
Answer. I was, from a little before he started from St. Louis for Spring
field.
Question. About what time was that ?
Answer. I was appointed on his staff on the 23d of August, but I did not
264 TESTIMONY.
enter upon active service until about the 23d of September. When General
Frdmont first came to St. Louis I was with the army at Springfield under
General Lyon. I was wounded and made prisoner at the battle of Wilson's
creek, when I was exchanged and came back. I was still unwell and
could not enter immediately upon active service.
Question. What amount of force had General Fremont when he first took
command of that department ?
Answer. I think he had but a small force. I was in the field, and know
that we had under General Lyon only some four thousand and some few
hundred effective men. The most of them were three months men who had
served out their time, and were only kept by the efforts of their officers, who
told them it was absolutely necessary for them to remain until other troops
could come and relieve them.
Question. Do you know anything about General Fremont fortifying St.
Louis ?
Answer. I found the city fortified when my health was re-established and
I entered upon service again ; the fortifications were nearly completed then.
Question. You know nothing about the cost of those fortifications ?
Answer. No, sir j my opinion is that the fortifications were absolutely
necessary and that they helped a great deal.
Question. You were with General Lyon at the time he fought the battle
at Wilson's creek ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; and I was wounded and captured there. At that time
I was lieutenant colonel of the 3d Missouri three months volunteers.
Question. What induced General Lyon to fight that battle instead of re
treating before so large an army ?
Answer. There was a difference of opinion whether to retreat or to fight.
It was thought that it might be more dangerous to retreat without fighting
them than it was to fight them. We underrated the enemy and the enemy
overrated us. I know General Lyori's views about it very well, because on
a former occasion, about the first of August, we had advanced against the
enemy as far as Dug Spring, and there General Lyon was not sure whether
he should continue to advance and attack the enemy, or whether he should
fall back to Springfield or still further back. He called a council of war
there, at which I was present. His spies at the time reported that there
were about 25,000 or 30,000 in the enemy's army. Still he thought we
might be able to beat the enemy. But in case we were beaten we would
be entirely lost. He asked the opinion of everybody there in the council of
w.ar, and, if I recollect rightly, there was nobody there but General Sigel
who at all expressed the opinion that we should attack the enemy. General
Lyon complained very bitterly at the time of how much his command had
been neglected.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. What did he mean by being neglected ?
Answer. It was neglected in every way. He was not re-enforced • the
men had hardly any clothes to wear, and had not been paid.
By the chairman :
Question. Were the council, all but General Sigel, for retreating ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was the final decision of that council ?
Answer. The decision of the council of war would very likely have been
to retreat further than Springfield. But it was broken up by the report that
our outposts had been attacked by the enemy, and as we had merely agreed
TESTIMONY. 265
to retreat, we left the council undecided how far we should retreat. We
retreated only to Springfield.
Question. You say that General Lyon made great complaint of being
neglected. Did he say who was to blame?
Answer. He said that instead of re-enforcing him they had at one time
gone so far as to order him to send one of his regiments to the east.
Question. Who made that order ?
Answer. The order must have been issued by the War Department, or by
General Scott.
Question. What regiment was that ?
Answer. The first Missouri, Colonel Blair.
Question. Where was it ?
Answer. It was with us.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Was it removed ?
Answer. No, sir ; the order was countermanded. General Lyon said the
neglect towards him had gone so far that they had actually ordered away
one of his regiments.
By the chairman:
Question. Do you know enough about the necessities of General Fremont's
command at that time to give an opinion as to whether he could and ought
to have re-enforced General Lyon ?
Answer. I do not think that at the time he had any troops to spare in St.
Louis, and every place in Missouri was threatened by attack of the enemy;
and it was quite natural that some misfortune should happen at some one
place. I think Bird's Point and Cairo were very important places to be
taken care of.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Did you not get re-enforcements after the battle ?
Answer. After the battle I only know what I was told, for I was a prisoner.
Question. Were you not told that there were re-enforcements sent to
Lyon's division after the battle ?
Answer. I understood that Colonel Wyman, at Rolla, had orders to goto
him, but he disobeyed them. I do not know whether for good reasons or for
bad ones.
Question. Was not Colonel Stephenson also ordered to go to General
Lyoivs relief?
Answer. That I do not know.
Question. Was not your division re-enforced after the battle ?
Answer. After the battle the whole force retreated to Rolla, and several
regiments came there.
Question. How many ?
Answer. I do not know, I was a prisoner for three or four weeks after the
battle and was sick and did not know what was going on.
Question. Did not General Fremont send several regiments to re-enforoe
General Lyon's division after the battle of Springfield ?
Answer. I do not know.
Question. You have an opinion about it, have you not ?
Answer. I suppose several regiments were sent, because when I went
through Rolla afterwards I saw several regiments there that I did not see
before.
Question. Could not they have been sent to Springfield as well as to Rolla ?
266 TESTIMONY.
Answer. There is a railroad all the way to Rolla, but between Holla and
Springfield is about one hundred and twenty miles, and no railroad at all,
arid it would have been difficult to get the troops on.
Question. Armies should not stop for bad roads, should they ?
Answer. We always marched, whether the roads were good or bad. But
those troops could not have got to Springfield in time. Our regiment oiice
inarched three days to gain about eleven miles; still they marched.
Question. Did General Lyon make any complaint about not being re-en
forced ?
Answer. He made those complaints I have said.
Question. When ?
Answer. Before the battle.
Question. How long before ?
Answer. About nine days, at the council of war at Dug Spring. He
never made any allusion to General Frdmont. He made one allusion against
Colonel Blair.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. What was that ?
Answer. Because the 1st Missouri regiment of volunteers had been
ordered east, and if it had been so ordered, it was through the influence of
its commander, Colonel Blair.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Do you know anything about the surrender of Lexington ?
Answer. I can say very little about that. I know the general state of
affairs, and that it was very difficult to move the army, because there was
hardly any transportation or troops to move. And the cavalry had no arms;
one regiment I know had to drill with stick swords, just the same principle
as wooden cannon. A day or two before Colonel Mulligan surrendered, I went
to the office, though I was hardly able to do any work; I recollect hearing
some telegraphic correspondence with Colonel Jefferson C. Davis at Jefferson
City. He was asked whether he thought he was strong enough to break
through the enemy's lines and take some provisions to our troops. He said
he was strong enough to break through the lines, but he had no transporta
tion to take provisions. Of course it would be of no use to get through
without they could take provisions with them.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Did you go with General Frdrnout on his march to Springfield ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Were you present with General Fre'mont at Springfield the
night before he was superseded ?
Answer. I was.
Question. Were you* present at his council of war ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What can you tell us about the position of the enemy at that
time?
Answer. The enemy were at different places on the road from Springfield
to Cassville. The nearest part of their forces were at Wilson's creek, which
is about ten miles from SpringfieM, and then they were at all the good
camping places along the road, at Dug Spring and Crane creek. The re
serves were at Springfield, where General Price had his headquarters.
Question. How many of the enemy were at Wilson's creek ?
Answer. Only the advance guard, as you might call it, a couple of thou
sand of men, more or less.
TESTIMONY. 267
Question. How near to them were the nearest forces ?
Answer. Some five or six miles beyond Wilson's creek, and at different
places along the road.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. The main body of the army was at Cassville ?
Answer. The reserves; I did not say the main body.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Where was the main body?
Answer. It may have been at Dug Spring.
Question. How far is that from Springfield ?
Answer. Perhaps eighteen or twenty miles.
Question. How do you know that Price's forces were located as you have
represented ?
Answer. I know that because General Fremont had entered into an agree
ment with General Price about the war in Missouri, that no guerillas should
be employed, and he had sent Lieutenant Max Tosk with a flag of truce to
the headquarters of General Price to have the agreement signed. I saw
this officer going and when he came back, and as I was very much interested
at the time to know everything about the position of the enemy I questioned
him. The agreement was signed at Cassville, and the furthest troops we
had were there; there could hardly be any doubt about that.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. How far is Cassville from Springfield ?
Answer. It is sixty or severity miles, I should think.
Question. That was where General Price's headquarters were ?
Answer. Yes, sir. The agreement was signed there.
Question. Do you know the date of that agreement ?
Answer. I think it was the 2d of November.
Question. What day was General Fremont superseded ?
Answer. I think it was the 4th of November.
Question. Within two days of the time the agreement was signed ?
Answer. Yes,' sir.
Question. You say you questioned this officer ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What information did you get from him ?
Answer. Just as I have stated to you. He said he found the enemy's
troops at all these different places; he told me the names of several of the
officers whose acquaintance I had made when a prisoner — Lieutenant Tosk
had been made prisoner also at the battle of Wilson's creek, and knew those
men by sight, and personally, and so he knew when he saw them that cer
tain regiments were there.
Question. Was this messenger one of General Fremont's messengers ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Who had been to Cassville ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And he returned directly to General Fremont and told you this ?
Answer. He did not come back while General Fremont was there. He
came back after General Hunter had taken the command.
Question. You say he told you the forces were thus stationed ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How long after General Hunter had taken the command did he
come back?
Answer. I think the next day, say the 5th of November.
Question. Is that the only means you have of knowing what the position
of the enemy was ?
268 TESTIMONY
Answer. No, sir; I was asked how I know now that the enemy was at
those places, and I told what he said, but it was a part of my business then
to send out spies and scouting parties to get all the information I could,
and all the reports of the scouts and of the spies were to the effect that the
main body of the enemy were very near us, only a few miles beyond Wil
son's creek. But I regard the information got from Lieutenant Tosk as- more
valuable than any other, because he had a better chance to see the enemy,
and he had no interest to make himself important, and he told me all he
knew about it.
Question. You were present at that council of war ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you expect to engage the enemy the next day ?
Answer. We expected to inarch towards the enemy and engage him if we
found him at or near Wilson's creek; if we had not found him at that place
we would have found him somewhere else. On that march from Tipton
the enemy had all the advantage in retreating quickly through an open
country, while we lacked transportation, and our provisions were scarce;
still we gained forty miles on him in about ten days. After reaching Spring
field the enenvy had to retreat over a narrow road to Arkansas, through
timber and up the hills, while we could take the open road and gain twice
the time; I know we should have caught him at Cassville, or at least have
caught his main body there. It was calculated so that if we did not find
him at this place we should find him at the second or third place.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. From the information which your scouts brought to you at
that time, did you believe that the enemy was in considerable force within
twenty or thirty miles of Springfield ?
Answer. We had every reason to believe so. Major Clark Wright, who
had command of Missouri volunteers, made a report very nearly in these
words: " My scouts report that, not only every road, but every footpath is
alive with soldiers. They are swarming like bees in a hive, and advancing
towards Wilson's creek."
Question. You supposed that the enemy were coming back to give you
battle ?
Answer. I supposed they were going to make a show of doing so, and I
believe if we had not waited in Springfield afterwards, we should have had
an opportunity of beating them; and if we had not beaten them the results
would have been very important. At that time, if we had driven Price's
men into Arkansas, the most of his Missouri troops would have left him,
especially as the agreement between him and General Fremont would have
been in force, which agreement General Hunter revoked.
Question. Did you, after that council of war, go forward from Springfield
on any reconnoitering party ?
Answer. I myself did not.
Question. So you have no personal knowledge from anything which you
had seen before, or anything which you have seen since that council of war,
of the position of the enemy, but you judge wholly from the reports of
scouts and messengers sent out ?
Answer. I have some other reasons for believing that the enemy were
very near. While we were waiting there the enemy set fire to everything
to prevent our marching after them, and the fires were as near as ten miles
from Springfield. And I have been over that same country twice since,
and have seen what had been done there, and have heard what the few
people left there have told me. They said that the sun could not be seen
distinctly for two or three days on account of the smoke.
TESTIMONY. 269
By Mr. Odell:
Question. What force had the enemy ?
Answer. Perhaps 25,000 or 30,000 men.
Question. What was your force ?
Answer. About 32,000 effective men.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Did you retreat with the army under General Hunter ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. At what time did General Hunter take command ?
Answer. The 4th of November, I think.
Question. When he took command you were in council ?
Answer. We were in council when he arrived.
Question. Did you communicate to him that the enemy were advancing ?
Answer. He heard the proceedings of the council of war.
Question. Did you tell him about it ?
Answer. My functions on the staff ceased when General Hunter took com
mand.
Question. Did any of the other officers tell him ?
Answer. These reports to General Frdmont were made in the presence of
General Hunter. He did not say at the time that he would take command
immediately.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Have you any doubt now that the forces of the enemy were
stationed at the points you have indicated ?
Answer. I have not the least doubt about it. I have been over that road
twice since. I went to Arkansas on General SigePs staff, under General
Curtis, and have just returned from there. There are but few men left there
who can tell anything about it.
Question. Did the information which you obtained as you passed over the
road since that time satisfy you that Price's troops were there at that time ?
Answer. I am perfectly satisfied of it.
Question. You say there were 2,000 men at Wilson's creek?
Answer. I cannot tell the exact number, but there was a large number, a
large advance guard ; that is, it would be an advance guard, supposing their
army to be facing this way.
Question. Did you learn which way that force was moving at that time —
whether towards Springfield or towards Arkansas ?
Answer. They were just waiting there. They commenced their retreat
several days afterwards — in fact, they did not retreat far. The Arkansas
troops crossed over the line, and went into winter quarters about ten miles
beyond the line, and the Missouri troops came back into Missouri right
away after we left.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Did not a reconnoissance go out with General Hunter ?
Answer. I went with General Hunter one time, but we did not gp more
than a half a mile or a mile from town.
Question. Did not a reconnoissance go out the day after General Hunter
took command ?
Answer. I do not know.
270 TESTIMONY.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Did you at any time make a reconnoissance with General Hun
ter ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; but only a half a mile or a mile outside of town.
Question. Do you know whether he sent a recounoissance out as far as
Wilson's creek ?
Answer. I do not know.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Was there any difference of opinion in the council of war as
regards the position of the enemy ?
Answer. There was not the least doubt expressed by anybody.
Question. It was agreed on all hands that there would be a fight soon ?
Answer. Yes, sir. The most would have gone out with the expectation
to meet the enemy soon. My opinion was that the enemy would not have
given us battle until we had got to Crane creek, which was about the
centre of his lines, so that their forces, in advance, could fall back to that
place, and the reserves could come up and concentrate there.
Question. You think the fortifications at St. Louis were necessary ?
Answer. Yes, sir. •
Question. Why do you think so ?
Answer. The city of St. Louis, like most American cities, is built over a
very large space of ground, and if you want to defend such a city you want
an enormous number of men, and if you have not the necessary number of
men, you must make it up of fortifications or something else. The popula
tion of the city itself, at that time, was troublesome enough. One of the
most dangerous classes of population were the Irishmen. They were all
gained to our side by being employed to build those fortifications, and now
they flock to our regiments, though it was hardly possible to get one or two
regiments before that time.
Question. You are acquainted with the subject of fortifications ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Are the fortifications there well constructed ?
Answer. Yes, sir, I think so. They are very well laid out. The general
plan of the fortifications is very good. I only saw them when they were
nearly done.
Question. You do not know anything about the contracts for building
them?
Answer. No, sir.
WASHINGTON, March 17, 1862.
E. L. BEARD sworn and examined.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. At what time did you enter into the employ of the government
under General Fremont ?
Answer. About the last of August; I do not recollect the exact date.
Question. Where had you been residing previous to that time ?
Answer. For 13 years previous I had been residing in California.
Question. In what business was you engaged in California ?
Answer. In farming and in building mills for crushing quartz, but farming
was my principal business.
TESTIMONY. 271
Question. Are you acquainted with machinery?
Answer. Yes, sir, with the constructing of machinery, putting up
mills, &c.
Question. Prior to your going to California, where was your residence, and
what was your business ?
Answer. I resided at Lafayette, Indiana, for some 13 years. My business
was constructing the Wabash arid Erie canal from 1834 to 1842. After
that, I was engaged in milling, running freight boats on the canal, &c.
Question. How did you happen to come to St. Louis at the time you men
tioned ? At whose instance ?
Answer. At my own instance.
Question. General Fremont employed you ?
Answer. After my arrival there, yes, sir. He sent for me soon after my
arrival; a day or two after.
Question Go on and state about your contract, its terms, &c.
Answer. Soon after my arrival in St. Louis General Fremont sent for me,
and in an interview I had with him he said that the fortifications that were
then being built by the government forces were progressing very slowly,
and that he doubted whether they would be finished in six months at the
rate at which they were then being prosecuted. He wished to know from
me in what time I could build them, and for what amount. He requested
me to go with the engineer and see the ground, and the fortifications then
commenced, and report to him as soon as I could. I did so, and submitted
a proposition to finish the works in thirty days, for the sum of $315,000.
That proposition was made on the 4th of September, in writing, and it was
indorsed on the back by General Fremont, requesting the quartermaster to
make out a contract with me. It was not an order to make a contract as I
had proposed, but it was left to the quartermaster to decide how to make
it. I went to General McKinstry with the order, and he objected to making
a contract for a gross sum. He stated that I must make a bid for each
separate article, so much per yard for excavation and embankment, so much
for lumber, &c. For one reason or other, during the press of business there,
the signing of the contract was delayed until the 25th of September, and
at that time the work was nearly finished.
Question. What time did the work begin ?
Answer. About the first of September I commenced purchasing tools and
breaking ground; but I did not really commence work until the 4th of Sep
tember, about. I was collecting materials together, &c., but there was
some delay on the part of the engineers in laying off the work. There
were really some two or three errors in the first that were laid, in getting
under way. The work was substantially completed and ready for mounting
guns; the stock-houses completed about the 4th of October. I was at work
until the 20th or 21st of October, sodding the embankments, fixing up the
soldiers' quarters in the block-houses, and building drawbridges into the
forts. They could not be finished until the guns were moved inside. There
was some delay for the want of gun-carriages, I believe, and the guns were
not mounted, though they were on hand. In the meantime, by the 10th or
15th of October, when the work was finished, the exigency at that time
really to all appearance had vanished ; St. Louis was then considered safe.
But at the time I commenced the work the general impression was to the
effect that it was doubtful whether St. Louis could be held or not; it was
feared that Price would take it. After the fall of Lexington, there was
really quite a panic and a feeling of doubt that St. Louis would follow.
Question. Was the contract drawn up according to the suggestions you
mentioned, specifying the items, &c. ?
Answer. Yes, sir; General McKinstry and myself fixed the prices.
272 TESTIMONY.
Question. Was the contract made between you and General McKinstry ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. General Fremont left it to General McKinstry?
Answer. Yes, sir; altogether. The prices were arranged between General
McKinstry and myself.
Question. Whose names were signed to the contract ?
Answer. General McKinstry's and my own; no others. It was inserted by
the clerk in the body of the contract that it was by order of Major General
J. C. Fremont.
By Mr. Covode:
Answer. Did you not say that it was not made in accordance with the
proposition you submitted to General Fremont, but in accordance with the
suggestions of General McKinstry ?
Answer. I made my proposition to the general, who submitted it or referred
it to the quartermaster to make a contract; and the quartermaster and
myself settled upon the prices, and we were disputing about the prices for
some time before the contract was completed.
By Mr. Julian:
Question. General Fremont referred it all to General McKinstry ?
Answer. Yes, sir; he did not go into the details at all; that was for the
quartermaster to attend to.
Question. General Fremont was very busy, I suppose ?
Answer. Not only that; he did not interfere in such matters. General
McKinstry and I were discussing the prices for some time, but finally we
agreed upon them.
Question. What do you say about those prices ?
Answer. I say that if I had had sixty or ninety days to do the work in
those prices would be extravagantly high. But to do it in the time I was
compelled to do it in, they are not too high. The contract specifies that I
am to do each particular portion of the work in five days. It has been
stated that I was to do all the work in five days, which is not correct. The
contract specified that I was to do each portion of the work within five days
of the time when it should be laid off ; and I complied with the contract in
every instance in that particular; the block-houses, and all the work per
taining to the fortifications.
Question. In view of the limited time in which you were compelled to
complete the works, were the prices fair prices, or were they exorbitant?
Answer. They were very fair prices; they gave a good profit. The work
cost two or three times more, doing it in the time I did, than it would cost
if I had had three or four times as much time to do it in.
Question. In what respect was the cost so much increased by the limited
time?
Answer. I had to keep on hand a large number of men ready to cover the
work as fast as it was laid off. Then I had to work men night and day;
and the costs of lights for night work alone was over $3,000. The cost of
the lumber was very much enhanced. Nearly all the mills in St. Louis were
engaged in getting out lumber for mortarboats and gunboats then being
built. I had to bring my saw-logs by railroad some forty miles, and could
only get two or three mills to work for me.
Question. You say you made a good profit ?
Answer. I cannot tell. I do not know what the work amounts to. I have
been denied the measurement of the work. The work has been measured,
but I cannot obtain a certified copy of it. I have applied to General Halleck
for it, and to General Cullom, who is the chief of the topographical engineers
at St. Louis, and to the parties who made the measurement. But the order
TESTIMONY. 273
of General Cullom to the engineers who made the measurement was that
under no circumstances was I to be allowed any note or information by
which I could ascertain the measurement of the work. All means of arriving
at the cost of the work is denied me. I do not know anything about it. I
cannot tell whether I have made anything or not. But my supposition was
that I would make something. I have made application to the Secretary of
War for an order to General Halleck to furnish me a certified copy of the
measurement which he has in his office in St. Louis; but the Secretary of
War declined to do so, on the ground that it would be exercising arbitrary
•authority over General Halleck's department.
Question. You were required, I understand, to complete the work in a very
limited time ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I agreed to finish it in thirty days, but that stipulation
is not in the contract. The difficulty was in having the work laid off fast
enough. I found that was the great obstacle to having the work finished in
'thirty days; and when I came to have the contract made out I bound myself
to have each portion of the work finished within five days from the time it
was laid off. I did that in order to protect myself. I might be bound to do
everything in thirty days, and then, not having the work laid off, I would
not be able to do it in that time, but would be left too much at the mercy of
the engineers.
Question. You had the work completed within the time agreed upon ?
Answer. Yes, sir; the work was all substantially finished on the 4th of
October, ready for the guns to be mounted. The block-houses were com
pleted. There was a little work, such as sodding, to be done. That was
not all done until the 21st or the 22d of October.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. When General McKinstry told you that you would have to make
your proposition in detail for the work did you speak to General Fremont
about it ?
Answer. I told General Fremont that General McKinstry refused to give
a contract for the amount in gross, but required me to make it in detail.
The general told me that it was very proper that it should be so done, and
that General McKinstry and myself must arrange that between ourselves.
Question. He declined to interfere ?
Answer. He did not interfere for me at all.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. When were the rates agreed upon between you and McKinstry ?
Answer. They were finally settled on the 25th day of September.
Question. They were not agreed upon until that time ?
Answer. No, sir; there were some alterations made on that day.
Question. Then the larger part of the work was done before the rates
were agreed upon ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What more did it cost you to build those works in haste than
they would have cost if built within a reasonable time ?
Answer. I should say, perhaps, three times as much.
Question. What did you pay extra per day for your men ?
Answer. For carpenters 1 paid half a dollar per day extra.
Question. What was the ordinary price for carpenters ?
Answer. We paid a dollar and a half and a dollar and seventy-five cents
apiece for carpenters, and for boss carpenters five dollars to seven dollars
i a day.
Question. What percentage above ordinary prices ?
Part iii 18
274 TESTIMONY.
Answer. I did not pay over fifty per cent extra on the labor.
Question. Did you pay fifty per cent, extra.
Answer. Yes, sir; about that on the labor.
Question. What would be a fair price for excavation at St. Louis pei
cubic yard ?
Answer. In ordinary times, and to do it as it is ordinarily done, I woulc
take it for twenty to twenty-five cents a yard.
Question. Would not that be a very liberal price ?
Answer. Twenty-five cents would be; twenty cents would be a fair price
Question. What for earth embankments ?
Answer. About twenty-five or thirty cents in ordinary times.
Question. What would be a fair price for puddled earth ?
Answer. From forty-five to fifty cents.
Question. Would not that be a very liberal price ?
Answer. No, sir. On the Wabash and Erie canal I have had as high a;
sixty cents for puddled earth.
Question. What would ordinarily be a fair price for sodding ?
Answer. About fifty cents a yard.
Question. What would be a fair price for paving yards and walks ?
Answer. I think about a dollar a yard would be about right.
Question. You think you got about fairly paid for that ?
Answer. I think I did not get enough.
Question. What would be about a fair price per gallon for building cis
terns ?
Answer. I think six cents a gallon would be a fair price. There was ;
large profit on the cisterns, but I did not make anything on the earthworks
Question. What would be a fair price for lumber in St, Louis ?
Answer. I paid as high as $23, $27, and $32 per M. I bought some fo
$15 per M. The ordinary price is from $12 to $15 per M, but I had to pa;
as high as $23, $27, and $32 per M.
Question. And got $100 per M ?
Answer. Yes, sir; that is, measured in the work after it is all done.
Question. That includes the work and the lumber ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What percentage of loss is there upon the lumber in measuring
it in the work ?
Answer. That I could not tell. I did not keep an account of it.
Question. I do not mean exactly, but what would be the probabl
amount ?
Answer. I should think about fifteen per cent, of loss.
Question. What was the proportion of each kind of lumber used ?
Answer. I could not state that, except from memory. But the most of :
was squared timber that I had to pay big prices for.
Question. What is a fair price for roofing?
Answer. I think I paid $3 50 and I got $4 50 for it. I paid $3 50 or $-.
I forget which.
Question. So you commenced the work and worked some twenty or twenty
five days, and then agreed upon the prices ?
Answer. The prices were talked over all the time from the 4th of Septen
ber until the contract was made. But they were not finally agreed upo
until the 25th of September, when the contract was signed.
Question. Why did you go to work before you knew the rates at whic
you were to be paid for it ?
Answer. Just on the assurance of the general and the necessities of th
case. I trusted to the quartermaster for the prices. I thought we coul
make a bargain in some way.
TESTIMONY. 275
Question. What is the whole amount of your claim for building those for
tifications ?
Answer. I could not tell that for the reason that I have not been able to
settle all my bills yet; they are not all in. As soon as I can get the meas
urement of the work and a settlement with the quartermaster, I can tell.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. You have your own measurement ?
Answer. No, sir.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Can you not get a measurement?
Answer. No, sir; I cannot get it.
Question. Did you not make any measurement or cause any to be made ?
Answer. No, sir, only a rough guess at it. I am to settle with the quar
termaster at the prices stipulated in my contract on the certificate of the
engineer in charge of the work. But I cannot get that certificate.
Question. Were the moneys paid you all paid without a certificate ?
Answer. Yes, sir; paid on account of the contract, without a certificate
of the engineer of the amount of work done.
Question. When did you begin ?
Answer. I began breaking ground about the first of September; but I did
not get fairly at work before the 4th of September.
Question. When did you receive your first payment ?
Answer. The general ordered $10,000 to be paid to me somewhere along
the last of August; and then $15,000 more soon after.
Question. You received $25,000 before you had done anything ?
Answer. I had commenced, but had not done much.
Question. How many dollars worth of work had been done on the 2d day
of September ?
Answer. Scarcely anything had been done except purchasing tools, making
preparations, &c.
Question. You had $25,000 paid you in advance ?
Answer. Yes, sir.-
Question. How much work had been done on the 5th day of September?
Answer. I had some 3,000 or 4,000 men employed at work there.
Question. How much work had been done then ?
Answer. I could not tell you how much work had been done.
Question. They had been at work two days ?
Answer. Yes, sir; three or four days; but they had not done much until
the 4th day of September. I had made large demonstrations, but they had
not got at work.
Question. On September 5 yon received $60,000 ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. That made $85,000 in all that you had then received ?
Answer. Yes, sir. The difficulty was in getting money; the quartermas
ter was short. I had made an estimate of how much money I would require
to go on and finish the work. I made a requisition on the 4th, 5th or 6th of
September for $135,000. The quartermaster had only $60,000, and the order
was given for that. Then there was $66,000 in the hands of Mr. Turnley,
and an order was given me for that to make up my requisition for $130,000.
Question. Then you had been paid $151,000 when you had been at work
only two days ?
Answer. Six or eight days only. I did not receive the $66,000 then, I
think.
Question. You had $151,000 when you had been at work only two days ?
276 TESTIMONY.
Answer. Well, sir; when I had been at work, fairly at work, two days.
Question. Why was that ?
Answer. Because I required that amount of money on hand to enable m
to finish the work in time.
Question. Then you took your whole pay in advance ?
Answer. To that extent, yes, sir.
Question. You had no contract ?
Answer. I had merely made a proposition.
Question. You had been at work two days ?
Answer. I had broken ground on the 1st of September, but had not dor
much until the 4th.
Question. Then you had really been at work two days when you had pai
to 3rou $151,000, and that without any bond, contract or agreement?
Answer. There was no contract, bond or agreement, except the prop
sition I made.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Had your proposition been accepted ?
Answer. No, sir; it was not accepted the way I had made it. I made
proposition, and General Fremont indorsed on the back of it an order to tl
quartermaster to make out a contract.
Question. What was your proposition ?
Answer. To do all the earthwork and timberwork required by the en£
neers for the fortifications and defence of St. Louis from St. Malachi chun
to the bank of the Mississippi river, with all the fieldworks, block-house
&c., and have it all completed within thirty days, and to do each portic
within five days from the time it was laid off — to do all that was required
me for that purpose for the sum of $315,000.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. When did you receive the next payment, after having receiv<
this 8151,000?
Answer. I do not recollect.
.Question. I have seen it somewhere stated that on the 19th of Septemb
you received an order for another sum of $35,000.
Answer. Yes, sir; but I did not get any money on that order for a loi
time afterwards.
Question. How much money had you expended up to the 19th of Sc
tember ?
Answer. I could not tell ?
Question. Had you spent the half of what you had received ?
Answer. I should suppose I had spent about that much.
Question. Then having on hand at that time some $75,000 of the govei
merit's money, you received another order for $35,000 more ?
Answer. Yes, sir; $20,000 was paid on that order, that was all that w
paid. Altogether 1 received $171,000.
Question. All this money was paid to you before this contract was co
pleted ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you never had a survey made, but all the payments ma
to you were made without a survey ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I never could get a measurement. I have been tryii
a long time to get one, but so far have failed.
Question. Are you familiar with the forts built by Major Kappner ?
Answer. No, sir. I went in about the 1st of September to see the mi
TESTIMONY. 277
ner in which they were being built, the size of them, &c., and have never
seen them since except in passing by.
Question. Do you know how the forts you built compare as to size and
expense of building with those he built, provided the time of building was
the same for all of them ?
Answer. I think the forts I built are larger. But that is merely guess
work. I could not tell by merely passing them.
Question. Did you go to St. Louis for the purpose of taking this contract?
Answer. No, sir. I had no idea of taking any contract when I left Cali
fornia.
Question. Did you have any partner, or any one associated with you in
this contract ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. What representations did you make to General Fremont which
Induced him to advance money to you ?
Answer. That I should want the money to enable me to complete the work
in time; that was all.
Question. What did you mean by that ?
Answer. To finish the work.
Question. You do not mean that you wanted that much money to pay for
the work as it was progressing ?
Answer. No, sir; but to finish all that was to be done.
Question. Why did you get orders for the money in advance of the amounts
due you ?
Answer. The idea was this: It was very difficult to get money at St. Louis
then ; there was very great difficulty in getting it. I employed a very large
number of men, and I wanted the means on hand to be sure of paying them.
Question. If there was great difficulty in the government getting money
to carry on its business there at that time, and you were paid to this extent
in advance, must not other persons working for the government have been
very much embarrassed by it ?
Answer. Yes, sir; all persons were. Every man that furnished forage,
mules, or any credit to the government was very much embarrassed. The
gunboats, mortarboats and fortifications were considered by the general, I
suppose, a matter of primary necessity, and for that reason the means were
provided for prosecuting those works, and paying for the labor on them as
fast as it was done.
Question. Would it not have been more in accordance with custom to
have paid you the amounts due you as the work progressed ?
Answer. That is very likely. In most cases it would be so.
Question. Did you ever take any contract before where you had money
advanced to you ?
Answer. I have had money advanced to me before ?
Question. To the same extent ?
Answer. No, sir. I never did any work before in the same hurry.
Question. On the whole, it was a very unusual proceeding from beginning
to end, was it not ?
Answer. The whole war, and all matters connected with it, are very un
usual proceedings.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. What do you understand the price of labor to be there ?
Answer. Just what men are willing to work for, and men are willing to
give. You can hire laborers there for 40 to 50 cents a day, I suppose. I
believe they are paying 50 cents a day for city work there.
Question. How much did you pay a da}* ?
278 TESTIMONY.
Answer. I paid 80 cents and a dollar a day.
Question. Why did you pay some a dollar a day, and others only 80 cents
a day?
Answer. I paid some a dollar for night work, and others 80 cents for day
work.
Question. The city paid 50 cents, and yon paid 80 cents ?
Answer. I think the city was hiring1 some for 50 cents. I do not know
that it was so.
Question. What did you pay the night men of the same grade ?
Answer. At first 80 cents, and afterwards a dollar a night.
Question. What are the wages of carpenters there ?
Answer. I cannot tell you.
Question. What did you paj^?
Answer. From $1 50 to $1 75 a day.
Question. How much for night work ?
Answer. The same.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Did your carpenters do any night work?
Answer. Certainly.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. You spoke of overseers that you paid higher prices.
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How much did you pay them ?
Answer. From $3 to $3 50 a day.
Question. How many did you employ ?
Answer. From 80 to 100 altogether. I could not tell exactly without the
check roll. Perhaps more. It is all guess-work. But I should think about
one hundred.
Question. How were your gangs divided between day and night ?
Answer. About equally.
Question. Did you work your night gangs from the beginning to the
close of the work ?
Answer. Not all the time.
Question. What proportion of the time ?
Answer. I think about three-fourths of the time I worked nights.
Question. You speak of its costing $3,000 for lights. How was what?
Answer. For torch baskets, rosin, coal, kindling, men to attend the
fires, &c.
Question. What is your estimate of the indebtedness of the government
to you ?
Answer. I should think the work would amount to about $250,000 alto
gether; perhaps $2(>0,000, or $270,000; I cannot tell exactly. 1 should
think about $250,000 or $260,000. That is my own guess about it
Question. You would have had a pretty good thing of it if you had got
your proposition accepted in the lump ?
Answer. Yes, sir; it was made at a guess. The fieldworks outside of the
fortifications extended some six miles in length; the fortifications some
three or four miles.
Question: Have you paid the laborers and mechanics ?
Answer. I have paid all the day laborers. The boss mechanic, and the
man who hired the carpenters under him, are unpaid. A great deal of the
lumber is still not paid for.
Question. What amount is yet due the mechanics and those who furnished
the materials ?
Answer. 1 think somewhere between $22,000 and $28,000.
TESTIMONY. 279
The following1 is a copy of the proposal submitted by Mr. Beard, and re
ferred to iii the foregoing testimony:
ST. Louis, September 4, 1861.
The undersigned proposes to build all the fortifications, redoubts, bastions,
and all else required of timber and earthwork for the defence of the city of
St. Louis, from fortification No. 6, at St. Malachi church, to the northern
limit of the city, all to be done according to and under the direction of the
engineer or engineers in charge of the work, binding myself to complete
the work in five (5) days after the same is laid out, for the sum of ($315,000)
three hundred and fifteen thousand dollars.
E. L. BEARD.
J. C. FREMONT, Major General Commanding.
The following is a copy of the indorsement by General Fre'mont:
HEADQUARTERS, September 4, 1861.
In order to place this city immediately in a state of, at least, partial defence,
I recommend the execution of a contract with Mr. E. L. Beard, who makes
this proposition.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major General Commanding.
Brigadier General J. McKiNSTRY,
Quartermaster United States Army.
280 TESTIMONY.
MISCELLANEOUS.
The joint committee on the conduct of the war submit the testimony taken
upon the following subjects :
HATTERAS INLET EXPEDITION.
PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
BURNSIDE EXPEDITION.
FORT DONELSON, &c.
CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS.
INVASION OF NEW MEXICO.
ACCOM AC EXPEDITION.
BATTLE OF WINCHESTER, MARCH 23, 1862.
MONITOR AND MERRIMAC.
PROTECTING REBEL PROPERTY.
BEBEL BARBARITIES.
WOUNDED FROM FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA
CONVALESCENT CAMP, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA.
TRADE IN MILITARY DISTRICTS.
COMMUNICATING COUNTERSIGN.
PAYMASTERS, RETURNING SLAVES, &c.
B. F. WADE, Chairman.
HATTERAS INLET EXPEDITION.
WASHINGTON, January 15, 1S62.
General BENJ. F. BUTLER sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am a major general of volunteers ; appointed on the 16th day of
May last, and qualified, I think, on the 19th of May.
Question. In what department of the army have you been acting ?
Answer. Immediately upon my appointment I was ordered to the then de
partment of Virginia, headquarters at Fortress Monroe. I would like to say a
word or two about the Little Bethel affair. Some time about the 8th of June —
I speak from -memory as to dates — I learned that there was a detachment of the
enemy at a place known as Great Bethel, with an advanced guard at a place
known as Little Bethel — the one being a large church, and the other being the
headquarters of a camp-meeting — a grove. Each of them was used as a depot
from which to make excursions among the Union men around Fortress Monroe,
and carry off both the men and their negroes. I caused a reconnoissance to
TESTIMONY. 281
be made by means of two negro spies. They reported to me, as subsequent
events have proved, the exact state of the works and of the men there, except
the numbers. I directed two detachments to march; one to march from New
port News, consisting of about 700 men, and the other to march from Hampton,
consisting of about 600 men. I ordered them to surround the detachment of the
enemy at Little Bethel and capture them, and then, if they thought best, under
the cover of that capture, to go to Great Bethel, which was about two miles be
yond — Great Bethel being about eight miles from each starting place ; and I
ordered two regiments, with two pieces of cannon, to march two hours later, for
the purpose of supporting these detachments, if necessary, in case any re-
enforcements should be sent to the enemy. At daybreak, precisely, the two de
tachments first named were before Little Bethel, and were just at that moment
about to make an attack, when the two rear detachments, which were to meet
about three miles in the rear, met each other in the grey of the morning, and
one of the detachments fired upon the other. The two detachments in front imme
diately retrograded, and returned about two miles, when the mistake was found out.
General Pierce, then in command, acting upon his judgment, moved forward still
upon Great Bethel — Little Bethel having been taken and destroyed. He then
sent back word to me that he had so done, and that he thought he could
get on without any re-enforcements. He made an attack upon Great Bethel.
That attack was not successful principally from the reason that our men were
frightened by reports of the great number of the enemy said to be there present.
Word was sent back to me for re-enforcements, and I ordered up two further
detachments, so that there were 3,000 of our troops before Great Bethel. The
last detachment reached there at one o'clock in the day, having marched, at
most, but eight miles. But upon consultation — it being believed that there
were 4,000 men and twenty pieces of cannon behind the intrenchments, whereas
I had sent them out to meet but 600 men and four pieces of cannon — they con
cluded that they were overmatched, and that it was best to withdraw in good
order, which was not done, however, but in bad order; and when they got
home that night seventeen officers sent in their resignation. I had a report
from one of the colonels that he saw 1,200 men come out of the intrenchments,
with four pieces of artillery, and attempt to outflank him ; and that his regi
ment was fired upon by, at least, twenty pieces of artillery in position. That
report of Colonel Allen is to be found printed in the Rebellion Record. Now,
in truth and fact, the enemy never had more than 600 men engaged there. They
sent to Yorktown and got a part of a Louisiana regiment, which marched eighteen
miles on a pretty warm day, and when they reached Big Bethel they lay down
and gasped and panted for breath. And it appears by the reports of the enemy
that as soon as our troops let them alone they retreated immediately to York-
town. That night Great Bethel was without an inhabitant, and the intrench
ments were without a man there, except my two negro spies, whom I sent up there,
and who came back to me and reported that fact; and the enemy did not return
there for something like a week after. I attribute the defeat of Great Bethel,
first, to the unfortunate collision in the morning, and secondly, to the fact that
there was no vigorous attack made, owing to the fear of our people that they
were to meet 4,000 men and twenty pieces of artillery, instead of 600 men and
four pieces of artillery that I had supposed they would meet. I have never
been inclined to attribute much blaine to the officer in charge, because he was no
more frightened with these reports than the rest were. Every one of them
came back that night with reports variously estimating the enemy at 4,000 and
5,000 men, and that they were intrenched in a very strong position. Now the
truth, as subsequently ascertained, was that the intrenchments were but three
feet high, and they could not see exactly what there was there, because there
was nothing to be seen. They took the reports of the women and negroes
along the road as to the number of men there ; and my experience has been
282 TESTIMONY.
that they always overate from four to six times. If our men had remained fif
teen minutes longer they would have taken the works, for the enemy did not
stop there fifteen minutes after our troops left. Both parties retreated from each
other with equal celerity. It was a misfortune of which, if any share of the
blame attaches to me, I am quite willing to bear it ; but it was a misfortune that re
sulted from the use of raw troops.
Question. That is the second or third time in our investigation that we have
found that misfortunes have befallen us from mistaking our own men for the
enemy, or vice versa. How is that 1
Answer. That must necessarily happen when the uniforms on both sides are
exactly alike, the officers' uniforms especially being exactly alike, and the for
mation of the regiments and the drill are also exactly alike. There has been
devised no means of distinguishing the two. Indeed, to the naked eye, at 300
yards, a good rebel flag cannot be distinguished from the American flag. The
red and white blend together, and there is a blue field and stars on both.
Question. You were with the expedition to Hatteras, I believe?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Will you give us a little account of that 1
Answer. Some time in June I sent to the War Department a memorandum
stating that there were works being built at Hatteras, and that it was being
made a depot for the rebel privateers. I suggested that something should be
done to break it up, and I thought a small expedition might achieve that pur
pose. That memorandum, I suspect, was turned over to the Navy Depart
ment, because about the 8th or 9th of August I heard from it from that depart
ment. General Wool had been appointed to that department, but had not then
arrived. A memorandum came to me that the navy would take as much force
as they chose and could get together, and attempt a bombardment of the forts
at. Hatteras. I was to take as much land force as was thought proper and
could be spared, and co-operate with the navy, and when the rebels were driven
out of the forts at Hatteras, we were then to take certain schooners loaded with
stone and stop up by sinking them there. General Wool having in the mean
time come down, I made a requisition on him for as much force as he could
spare, and he spared me 860 men, to be joined by 100 marines from on board
the ships. We took the Wabash, the Minnesota, the Susquehanna, and the
Constellation frigates, and the troops on board three transports, and went down
to Hatteras. When we arrived there we found a very heavy sea running on
the beach. After a consultation we undertook to land, and did land 319 men
of the land force, including one company of marines, when the surf stove every
one of our boats. We then undertook to land with whale boats and ship boats,
and a very deserving officer, trying to do it, was thrown on shore with his men,
and the boat stove. In the meantime, leaving these men on shore, as it was
impossible to reach them, the fleet bombarded one of the forts, known as Fort
Clark — a strong square redoubt, mounting eight guns — and silenced it. But in
consequence of the threatening aspect of the weather we were obliged to get an
offing. The next morning we returned and commenced the bombardment of
Fort Hatteras. After two hours of heavy bombarding I went to work to land
the rest of the troops. In the meantime I had sent my aid on shore, with di
rections to the troops there to advance. While engaged in landing the rest a white
flag was run up, and the place was surrendered to us. There were surrendered
about 750 men, a thousand stand of arms, 25 cannon, and two strong forts.
Though my orders were distinctly to sink vessels there and abandon the
place, yet after learning the exact condition of things, upon consultation with
Commodore Stringham, it appeared to me to be a very important situation to be
held for our own purposes. It was the opening to a great inland sea, running
up 90 miles to Newbern, and so giving water communication up to Norfolk.
It seemed to me that if we ever intended to operate in North Carolina and
TESTIMONY. 283
southern Virginia, we should operate by way of that inland sea, and should not
stop ourselves out. But it would be much better for us to take possession
of the fort there and hold it. I had just about men enough with me for a
garrison for that purpose ; the enemy having had about 750 men and I having
about 860. I could not pursue the advantage gained, because the inner bar,
about two miles up from the opening, carried only about eight feet of water,
while I had no gunboat that carried less than ten feet. It was, therefore, im
possible for us to go inside. I had a canal boat there, the Fanny, which had
a couple of field pieces mounted upon her, and which afterwards went inside
and was captured. She was the only boat that could go inside, and she could
not carry more than 100 men. Having come to that conclusion I garrisoned
Fort Hatteras, and having disobeyed express and written orders, it was neces
sary for me to report in person here ; and I came to be court-martialed, or to
make such representations as I could to have my actions and doings sanctioned.
Upon representing the matter to the government, to the commanding general,
the War Department, and afterwards to the members of the cabinet, my action
was approved, and the forts are now garrisoned ; and I have reason to believe
that there is at present an expedition going into Fort Hatteras, which never
could have gone there had it been stopped up by this stone fleet which we took
there with us for that purpose.
Question. Would it be easy to destroy the navigation there ?
Answer. I do not believe it possible to destroy the navigation there, and for
this reason : If you will look upon the map you will perceive that there is a
sea there, or an arm of the ocean, 90 miles broad, and extending along for 400
miles of the coast ; and it is only separated from the main ocean by a narrow belt
of sand, about two miles wide at its widest, and in some narrow places not more
than a half a mile wide, averaging about a mile in width. When the south
eastern winds prevail the water inside is thrown up very high, so that for weeks
together, after the storm abates, no matter what is the state of the tide, the
water is continually running out into the ocean. Hatteras inlet is only about
12 years old. Ocracoke inlet, which is below, was the main inlet ; but it is now
filling up, and Hatteras inlet is widening. For that reason you cannot find
Hatteras inlet upon most of the maps ; it is a new creation. I have not be
lieved at all in blocking up any large inlet by means of any artificial structure.
You may change the channel, but the water going in there must come out some
where. You can stop up some particular channel ; but, in my judgment, you
simply destroy a channel that we know, and open another we do not know of.
Question. Unless there is a rocky bottom all along there ?
Answer. The whole coast is sand. This thing has been tried by the very
nation that now complains of its barbarity. The English, in the time of Napo
leon, tried to stop up the harbor of Boulogne by sinking ships in the same
way, but they found it wholly ineffectual ; and I think it will be found wholly
ineffectual now.
Question. You have answered, what has been frequently asked, why that
expedition did not pursue their advantages on the main land, perhaps as far as
Bead fort or Newbem.
Answer. I meant to have stated at first that I had but 860 men, which was
hardly enough to attack a large coast. I had to go into Pimlico Sound, and go
ninety miles to reach that place. I had but one boat which drew less than ten
feet of water, and the bar carried only eight feet. That boat had no armament,
and no capacity to carry more than 100 men. It was simply a canal propeller,
brought down from the Raritan canal, and was used simply as a tug and to run
around in shallow waters, and to carry supplies. She was taken down there
simply to act as a tender, if she could live down around the cape, which it was
difficult for her to do, though it was fine weather. She was intended to carry
supplies from the larger ships to the men on shore.
284 TESTIMONY.
Question. Do you know whether the late storm has injured the fortifications
there 1 I have seen some statement that it had.
Answer. I watched that matter with a great deal of interest. The storm has
not injured the fortification at all. The point at Hatteras Inlet is almost square,
like the corner of this table. The larger fort is on the point ; the smaller one is
above. What the storm has done has been to open a six-feet deep channel be
tween the two forts ; a channel six feet deep and something like sixty feet wide,
all around Fort Hatteras, making a ditch there, and rendering it perfectly im
pervious to any land attack. The rebels understood this matter as well as we
did, and a great deal better. The fort was made with a great deal of skill,
under the direction of Major Andrews, who, I believe, was educated at West
Point. The whole face of the fort had been sheathed by means of plank sheath
ing driven into the sand to prevent the washing of the surf from undermining it.
And the glacis had been entirely covered by heavy turf of marsh grass, brought
about three miles, to prevent the sand from washing out. The storm would not
injure the fort. The only danger there is the unhealthy location, on account of
the fog and damp there. Nothing is ever dry there, not even the powder. One
reason they made no better fight against us was, that the magazine had not
been properly aired, and the powder would hardly burn. After I took posses
sion of the fort, I took enough of their powder to fire a national salute at the
raising of our flag, and though the muzzles of the guns were from us, yet, stand
ing as far back as across this room, the wind blowing towards us when the guns
were fired, blew back upon us kernels of powder entirely unburned, until we
were almost covered with them.
Question. Have we done anything to strengthen those fortifications since you
captured them ?
Answer. Nothing but to mount some heavy guns of long range. The only
guns they had were 32-pounders, which came from Norfo'lk. One interesting
fact that we learned by the capture of that fort was the official declaration that
the 8, 9, and 10-inch guns which they had captured at Norfolk had given out,
that is, they had used them all up, and could not supply any more. That
statement was made in reply to a very urgent appeal for some heavy guns ; and
thereupon one l(Mnch gun had been sent down from the Tredegar works at
Richmond. The rebels, as usual, had got notice of our coming, and they had
got that gun down the day before; but being a little dilatory with the shell,
they did not get the shell down in season, and they had no gun that could reach
us to do any harm.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Was it in contemplation at that time that your expedition was to
be followed up by a military force to operate in the interior 1
Answer. No, sir. On the contrary, we were to stop up the channel and leave ;
and it was owing to my disobedience of orders, and acting upon counsel with
Commodore Stringham, who agreed with me in regard to the necessity of hav
ing a naval depot there, that it was not done. It will be seen by reference to
the map that Cape Hatteras extends out here and makes a perfect lee for all
northern winds. The winds that prevail all through the winter are the north
east and northwest winds, against which this cape affords a great shelter.
Fortress Monroe, two days' sail from Hatteras, was the nearest point where our
vessels could find a coal depot and get water and supplies, for all the harbors
below there were then in possession of the enemy or stopped up, and it was
that consideration which induced me to leave that there as a coaling station, or
a place of refuge for light vessels and all the small steamers for the blockade.
TESTIMONY. 285
By the chairman :
Question. What is your estimate of the enemy's forces across the river, now
at Centreville and Manassas, the rebel army, generally called their army of
the Potomac 1
Answer. That is a matter upon which I suppose I have no business to have
an opinion. I have never had anything to do with the army of the Potomac,
and I have no sources of information but what are open to all of you.
Question. But we are not all shrewd enough, perhaps, to make the calcu
lations.
Answer. Perhaps, if you will allow me, I will give the data upon which I
form my opinion, and then you can form opinions for yourselves. I have never
believed the strength of the rebel army to be anything like what it has been
represented to be. I may be wrong, and probably should defer my opinion to
others; but I will give you the grounds upon which I base my judgment. In
the first place, I know the tendency of the human mind to exaggerate, and I
know the certainty that there will be exaggeration in regard to numbers, and I
can give you no better illustration than this : when I put on board at Hampton
Roads, for the Hatteras expedition, the 860 men I had, I did so in four detach
ments, and a very respectable gentleman, a reporter, sent a despatch in good
faith to the New York papers, that I had started with 4,000 men — in fact, I had
but 860 all told. Now, I have known our strength, and I have known the efforts
we have made to get a given number of troops for the army of the Potomac,
and I have come to the conclusion that if, with the great expenditure of money
and means, offering men more than enough, with our railroads, canals, and other
means, we could only get so large an army, then the south, without that material,
without that means, without those facilities — although they might have men
enough — must have found it impossible to get so large an army as has been
attributed to them. "
I then look at another thing. I examined with some care the reports of the
battle of Bull Run ; and I believe that it is now agreed that Johnston brought
to the rebel forces re-enforcements to the extent only of about 10,000 men, and
I believe that it is now agreed that there was only about 25,000 on a side en
gaged there at first. It was said that there were 100,000 men in the rebel army
at Mauassas. Now, I cannot believe that the rebel general was so stupid as to
risk a flank movement — a flank march all the way from Winchester — with an
enemy on the rear if Patterson had followed him up, in order to re-enforce
25,000 men with 10,000 men, when he had at the same time 75,000 men lying
idle within four miles behind them. I cannot conceive that to have been done.
A flank movement is always one of the most dangerous movements that can be
made. And I cannot conceive he would risk a flank march, with an enemy on
his rear which they had no reason to believe, I trust, would not follow at once.
I cannot believe he would run all that risk to bring 10,000 men so far to re-
enforce 25,000 men, when he had 75,000 men lying idle, doing nothing, within
so short a distance. And Beauregard says in his report, if I remember the
words, that he was in despair until he was told that Johnston's re-enforcements
were coming up. Now, why should a general be in despair for the want of a
re-enforcement of 10,000 men, when he had 50,000, 60,000, or any other num
ber of men lying so much nearer which he could use ]
Again, it is well known among military men, and to everybody else, I sup
pose, that soldiers are very tenacious of the honor of being in a battle, and it
would be more than a general's life is worth for him to omit in his report the
names of regiments who took part in a battle, for that is a part of the history
of those regiments. Then, General Beauregard, among our southern friends, who
are considered especially tenacious about this matter, must have named every
regiment in that battle. And if any gentleman has ever read Beauregard's
report, he may number the regiments ; and then, taking 750 men as the fighting
286 TESTIMONY.
strength of a regiment 1,000 strong, lie can easily estimate the number of troops
in the rebel army in that battle.
But to go further than that. You all understand that regiments in both armies,
from any State, are numbered according to the number of regiments raised in
that State. Now, how many do you find — how high is the number ? You will
not find that Beauregard talks about the 40th Georgia, or the 50th South Caro
lina, or the 60th Louisiana; but he will tell you of the 6th Georgia, the 7th
South Carolina, or the 8th Louisiana, and so on. You will find that he seldom,
except when speaking of militia regiments, ever gets into the teens. Then add
to that the fact that on the 28th day of August I captured at Hatteras the last
regiment of North Carolina volunteers that had been raised up to that time, and
that was the 7th regiment, and the colonel had not been elected a week when
he was taken. Therefore North Carolina had only seven regular regiments in
the field on the 28th day of August, and it is hardly to be presumed that she
had more than that on the 21st of July.
You will find, too, that when southern papers speak of their troops marching
from place to place, they do not say that such a regiment has just marched
through Tallahassee, or Columbus, or any other place; but it is such a com
pany — the Lionine Braves, the Pula&ki Guards, or some other company.
Therefore I have put all these things together, and reckoned a little as to the
number of regiments they had. It was for my own amusement and edification,
for it was nothing to me, and I had no particular business to know it. It is
your business as much as mine, and probably more, for it is your business to
look after the conduct of the war, while I only have to look after a division. I
have no sources of information but what are open to anybody ; yet I do not
believe that their whole regular army has ever exceeded, or does to-day exceed,
one hundred and fifty thousand — that is, all their force. And I never have
believed, and I never shall believe, until it is made certain to me, that there has
ever been more than seventy thousand men at the outside in and about Manassas.
Now, I know I have no right to know about this matter, for I have no more
means of information than anybody else has. I have given the grounds for my
opinion. And I want to give another instance as bearing upon this question :
When I lay at the Relay House, out here, just before I went to Baltimore, I was
very much frightened about the number of the enemy at Harper's Ferry. I
was told that there was a very large force at Harper's Ferry. I got all manner
of reports, usually estimating the number at eight thousand or nine thousand,
and some going as high as twelve thousand- or fifteen thousand men there. I
had occasion to send a spy up there. Now, I knew he could not tell about
numbers any better than others could. I knew that no man, not accustomed to
tell the number of men by their appearance, could get at the right number.
Unless he knew about the organization, he would evidently think that a regiment
was at least three thousand or four thousand men. I told my spy, therefore, to
find out the number and shape of the tents, if they were in tents, and if they
were in buildings, to give me the size and the number of the buildings. He
brought me the number of tents, saying they were mostly encamped in tents.
And from calculation, allowing to each tent all that it could possibly accommo
date, I made out that there were from eighteen hundred to two thousand men
up there. So that I felt perfectly safe, leaving a thousand men at the Relay
House that I should not be troubled by those at Harper's Ferry if I went to
Baltimore with the rest of my force. So that which appeared very rash to
General Scott, who believed that there were eight thousand men at Harper's
Ferry, and who scolded me very roundly for going away from the Relay House
and leaving only a thousand men there, was not so very rash after all.
Take the case of Big Bethel. It is admitted now, on all hands, that there
were only six hundred men in the intrenchments there, and four pieces of cannon.
If you will send for the Rebellion Record I would like to have you read the
TESTIMONY. 287
report of the colonel, who says he himself saw twelve hundred men file out of
that intrenchment with four pieces of cannon. Now, what he did see was this :
in making the attack Colonel Tompkins got two companies of his men separated
from him by a ravine which was fringed with bushes. As they marched up to
the battery, these men who had become separated appeared, and he saw them.
Not knowing that they were his own men, and supposing that he was being
outflanked, he gave the order to retreat, and then these companies began to
retreat also; and marching back, Colonel Allen saw these men, and took them to
be twelve hundred men. It is a universal rule that no man can give the slightest
judgment of numbers of men at any time or anywhere.
And I will make another observation ; that is, that 5,000 men cannot stand,
shoulder to shoulder, so close that they will touch, in double rank in less
than a mile front. Each man will average at the least two feet width of space,
which will give 5,000 feet for double rank of 5,000 men, which in round num
bers may be called a mile. Now, battalions are drawn up with 22 paces — 66
feet — between each two battalions ; and more than that, artillery and cavalry
treble space of infantry, at least for their front ; so that, take a column of 5,000
men, with the proper proportion of the several arms of the service, and they
cannot stand in line of battle short of two miles at least. Now, when you get
100,000 men ready to be deployed in line of battle, it is a v-ery easy sum to cal
culate as to how much front there should be, provided there are no inequalities
of surface in the ground where they are standing. I am calculating now for a
perfectly level parade ground, like the Champs d'Elyses, or any other perfectly
level piece of ground.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. You put your men in two ranks only 1
Answer. That is our formation of a line of battle. It is a universal rule that
you must not march in column with one company nearer to the next company
than the front of the line in which that company should deploy into line of
battle. They must march " company distance," as it is called, so that whether
they are in line of battle, or in column, or encamped, it is all the same. The
rule of encampment is that you must make each camp just as wide as would be
required for the front of your division, brigade, or regiment, as the case may be,
in line of battle, so that whatever may be the formation, you must have so much
room. The formation of an army in attack is usually made in double rank and
double lines — that is, a front line and a line of reserve ; so that an army of
50,000 or 100,000 men should have a front of at least a mile, reckoning upon
double lines, for each five miles, and that is allowing nothing for inequalities.
Then there is another thing to be considered : human sight is finite. If any
gentleman, when travelling on a railroad, will step "upon the rear car and look
back over a level, straight piece of track, the perspective of the two lines of
rails will run together in less than three-quarters of a mile ; that is the end of
vision. Now, the space between the rails is four feet and six inches. Now, apply
the rules of perspective to a body of men drawn up in line and see how soon the
perspective will run out when looking down a line of men. It will run out as
soon in the one case as in the other, and at the distance of a mile on a level
you cannot see any soldiers ; so that, standing on the ground on a level, no
man ever yet saw 5,000 soldiers drawn up in line of battle.
I feel bound to give all the grounds upon which my judgment in this matter
is based. I put these views forth with very great deference to the opinions of
others, saying, simply, that it is only the result of reason, and that upon which
I form my opinion. And I wish simply to add this : that in every other de
partment of the great battle of life we have beaten these gentlemen of the south,
and I do not believe they can beat us so easily in raising armies.
288 TESTIMONY.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. You came to Washington to report your success at Hatteras and to
have your course sanctioned by the government. Did you then contemplate
another and a further movement in that direction, and did you ask for troops
for that purpose ?
Answer. I did, but the exigencies of the army of the Potomac and of other
branches of the service would not permit troops to be spared for me. I got back
here and made my report about the first of September. General Sherman's
command was expected to start on the seventh of September, and the exigencies
of his command required all the troops that could be then spared. He did not
start until the 28th of October, owing to various delays in getting troops, &c.
I obtained authority on the 10th of September to raise some regiments for the
service. I have now got those regiments, and hope to move soon.
Question. You state that you had 860 men upon your Hatteras expedition.
I would like to inquire whether if you had had 10,000 or 15,000 men and suffi
cient transportation at that time, it is your opinion that you could have taken
possession of the principal towns in North Carolina ?
Answer. If I had had 10,000 men — yes, if I had had 5,000, or even 3,000
men — and boats of three guns each that could have got across the bar, I could
have taken possession of all the principal towns of North Carolina then, or at
least have troubled them a great deal. That might have been done with 3,000
men, for they were thoroughly frightened — in as great panic as they were at
Charleston when Sherman's expedition landed at Port Royal. I captured the
engineer and the commandant of the port there. They had relied upon their
defences at Hatteras, and had expended their entire strength upon their prepa
rations there, and when those preparations and defences gave way, they thought
the whole thing was gone.
Question. And a panic seized them?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. So that with 10,000 men you could have captured Newbern itself?
Answer. I have no doubt we could have gone anywhere with 10,000 men —
to Newbern, Wilmington, Raleigh — anywhere up to Norfolk. There were
8,000 men in and around Norfolk.
Question. And probably about that number now ?
Answer. Not more than that, except it may be the militia. There never was
up to the first of September, and I have not heard that there has been any in
crease of force until very lately perhaps. There never was over 8,000 men at
Yorktown. And here I would like to say a word in regard to the number of
men I was always credited with having at Fortress Monroe. The number on
our side there has always been put at from 15,000 to 18,000 men, as I have no
doubt all the members of tliis committee have heard time and again. Now the
uttermost number of men at any one time, reckoning everything that was white
at Fortress Monroe, never came up to 10,000 men ; and 4,500 of those men,
more than one-half of the fighting force of the entire effective strength there,
was sent to Baltimore and Washington on the Wednesday after the disaster at
Bull Run. And that will afford an illustration of the matter at Yorktown.
The enemy was always credited with having 25,000 men there. Now, General
Magruder, when he marched down to attack Newport News, took with him the
whole available force at Yorktown, except two regiments. That I learned in
this way : I captured the messenger who had the letter bag of the enemy's
volunteers, and I examined the letters it contained. The soldiers were writing
home to Richmond and other places, just as our soldiers write home, telling all
the news of the camp, what was going to be done, who were to stay here, and
who were to go there. It was stated that all were going to march but two regi
ments, and the regiments that were going to march were all named. Thus, by
TESTIMONY. 289
averaging the strength of their regiments at 700, I found that they marched
down to Newport News with from 5,000 to 6,000 men, leaving about 1,500 men
in Yorktown. The letters named the two regiments that were to be left, and
those that were to go, and yet at that very time I observed a calculation in the
New York Herald which put their forces at Yorktown at 25,000 men.
Question. Have you not found that, in every instance where you have been
able to get accurate information, they have represented their forces at from three
to four times what they actually were 1
Answer. YTes, sir ; not only their own forces but ours. For instance, I have
seen three different paragraphs going the rounds of the southern papers, stating
that I am now at Ship island with from 5,000 to 7,000 men ; whereas General
Pliclps is there with 1,900 men all told, and of course I have not been there at
all. A pretty intelligent Virginian once passed through my camp when we
were drilling our men on each side of the road. He was saying something about
the number of men there, and I asked him how many he thought there were
there in camp. Said he, " You must have as many as 6,000 men, perhaps more."
Now there were less than 1,800 men there all told.
By the chairman :
Question. I wish to ask you whether intoxicating liquors are used in the army,
and to what extent, so far as it has come under your observation ]
Answer. I can state to you that intoxicating liquor is used in the army to a
most woful extent. There is nothing that a soldier will not do to get it, and
officers, too, in many instances. To give you an illustration: We used to send
a picket guard up a mile and a half from Fortress Monroe. The men would
leave perfectly sober, yet every night when they came back we would have
trouble with them on account of being drunk. Where they got their liquor we
could not tell. Night after night we instituted a vigorous examination, but it
was always the same. They were examined ; their canteens were inspected,
and yet we found nothing. At last it was observed that they seemed to hold the
guns up very straight, and upon examination every gun barrel was found to be
filled with whiskey. And it is not always the soldiers who do this. I ordered
a search of the premises of the Adams Express Company, and examined the pack
ages sent by friends to the soldiers; and in one day I have taken 150 different
packages of liquor from the trunks, boxes, and packages sent to the soldiers by
sympathizing friends at home. In one regiment I got hold of the pass-book of
the sutler, containing the men's names and the names of every one of the offi
cers, and every officer but four was down in the book for from $8 to -$60 worth
of liquor in the course of 22 days. Of course the officers would not drink that
much themselves — those who got the lowest amount might have done it, per
haps — but they sold it to their men; that is to say, it was charged to them on
orders they had given their men for it. One officer I had reason to believe
was in partnership with th§ sutler. I instantly called him in — the one I sup
posed to be in partnership with the sutler selling to his own men — I called
him in, made him resign, and sent him home;' sent the sutler home, and stove
in the heads of the liquor casks.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Is it not in the power of the principal officers to suppress this thing,
if they are so disposed 1
Answer. Entirely so. In the expedition I am getting up 1 have made it a
condition in every charter of my transports that the carrying of any spirituous
liquors outside of the surgeon's supplies shall w^ork a forfeiture of all the money
earned. When I have no men under me, when I am at home, I like my wines,
&c., and I use it. But I have become satisfied from my experience that
the moment that I or any officer goes into camp, we must not only not drink
Part iii 19
290 TESTIMONY.
any liquor ourselves, but we must insist that no one under us shall drink any ;
otherwise, neither the officer nor the army is safe. Just so long as an officer
takes his own wine, he must let his men have their whiskey. I have given very
stringent orders to the sutler I have appointed for my present expedition. I
said to him: ''The moment I catch you selling liquor, that day you go home.
I am going to deprive myself of anything like spirituous liquor, and you must
aid me in this matter. I shall find you out if you do not." He agreed to it,
and shortly afterwards brings to me a new trap. He brings to me a small flat
bottle, marked somebody's hair oil, put up in Dey street, New York. At first
sight it looked all right enough, but upon examination each one was found to
contain about half a pint of whiskey with a few drops of olive oil on top, which
probably did not harm the whiskey any. This was to be sold by the sutler at
25 cents a bottle. It could be put up for, say, about five cents a bottle, and
they wanted to sell it to any sutler for eight cents a bottle. These men said to
my sutler: '• You can conceal this when you start; they will not examine these
bottles at all." And one of them said : "I sold many thousands of these bottles
at Fortress Monroe."
To show you how difficult a matter it is to stop this thing, I appointed a
quartermaster for one of my regiments. The first thing I knew a man comes
to me and says : " There are a couple of casks of vinegar on here, marked 'hos
pital stores,' are they to go on board the Constitution 1 " "Not hospital stores,"
said I, "but commissary stores." "No," he said, " they are marked 'hospital
stores.'" I thought that a little singular, and concluded to examine into the
matter. I found the two casks of " vinegar " were, in fact, two casks of
whiskey. I traced them back to my quartermaster, and now there is another
quartermaster in that regiment. Now, to give you another story about the way
in which whiskey will get into camp. A woman will come in with her crino
line made, not of springs of steel, or whatever is generally used, but of gutta-
percha tubes filled with whiskey. In regard to suttlers, you would be doing a
good thing if you would prevent their selling anything to the soldiers that they
can eat or drink without first cooking it. Preserved meats, dessicated vegeta
bles, solidified milk ; those things are all well enough, for the soldiers will not
eat them without some preparation. They generally want something they can
take in their hands and eat standing. If you restrict your sutlers in that way,
they would be a good institution. It is true, a soldier may use tobacco to ex
cess, but he will not buy too much thread, needles, pins, tape, buttons, &c.
But if you let him, he will continue to buy too much to eat and drink. If
you impose that restriction you will not have your sutlers make too much
money out of the men. Take this matter of common whiskey, that is worth
from 25 to 30 cents a gallon, and is sold to the men for $2 and $3 a gallon ; in
deed the men will give almost anything for it when they have got their money
on pay-day.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. What has been your experience in regard to chaplains ?
Answer. Well, sir, a good chaplain is a very good thing, but a poor chaplain
is as much worse than none at all as you can well conceive. The chaplains, as
a rule, in the forces I commanded were not worth their pay by any manner of
means. I think there should not be more than one chaplain to a brigade, ex
cept in one particular case. I am bound to say that I have never seen a Roman
Catholic chaplain that did not do his duty, because he was responsible to another
power than that of the military. I would not ask for more than one chaplain
to a brigade, except in the case of Roman Catholic regiments. In that case I
think there should be a chaplain to a regiment, for they have a great many du
ties to perform, to write all the letters, &c. They have always been faithful, so
far as my experience goes. They are able men, appointed by the bishop, and
TESTIMONY. 291
are responsible to the bishop for the proper discharge of their duties. That is
not always the case with other chaplains. I remember running against one
young man in one of my regiments who, from his dress and uniform, I saw
must be a chaplain. I said to him: "You are the chaplain, are you?"
" Yes, sir," he replied ; yet the last time I had seen him before that he was a
journeyman printer. In my judgment, no chaplain should be appointed who is
under forty-five years of age. Young men may be very good men, but they
do not have the respect of the soldiers. I never appointed but one chaplain,
and he is a doctor of divinity — Dr. Cleveland. I appointed him because he was
a man of genial temperament and will obtain the confidence of the soldiers,^ind
I believe him to be a pious man.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. You think it better to diminish the number and to elevate the
character of chaplains ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I do. I would have a chaplain to a brigade, and he should
not be appointed unless there was some religious authority to which he would
be responsible, or some religious body who would recommend him after having
examined him. There was a chaplain who went out with the expedition to Big
Bethel. He remained about three miles in the rear, and spent his time in con
soling a secession widow in a house there. When he was called up, he gave as
an excuse that she was very much frightened. I sent him home ; he was not
a catholic. Colonel Duryee had one chaplain at Fortress Monroe — Rev. Mr.
Winslow — who had the respect of every man there, and did infinite good. One
such chaplain as that was worth all the rest put together.
Question. You would not think well of reducing the pay of chaplains, but you
would reduce the number?
Answer. My idea is that the better way is to reduce the number to one to a
brigade, except in case of .Roman Catholic regiments.
PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.
WASHINGTON, April 15, 1862.
General T. W. SHERMAN sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What is your rank and position in the array 1
Answer. I am a brigadier general of volunteers.
Question. Where have you served during the present war ]
Answer. I have recently been in command of the expeditionary corps to the
southern coast.
Question. Will you give to the committee as concisely as possible a history
of the object of your expedition, and what has been done in the department of
which you have had the command 1
Answer. If I had been aware of the object of the inquiry the committee de
sired to make of me, I could have prepared myself much better by an exam
ination of my papers upon the subject.
Question. Can you prepare yourself by to-morrow 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
[Examination suspended till to-morrow.]
292 TESTIMONY.
WASHINGTON, April 16, 1862.
General T. W. SHERMAN'S examination resumed.
By the chairman :
Question. Have you prepared yourself to make the statement asked of you
yesterday ?
Answer. I have.
Question. You will please proceed then to state, in your own way, what was
the object of the expedition of which you have had the command, and what has
bern done by it.
Answer. Near the close of July last I was sent for by the Secretary of War
who took me to a cabinet meeting in the President's House. I was there informed
that there was an expedition on foot to the southern coast/ The general object of
that expedition was stated in that meeting, and I was asked to take charge of the
land force to accompany it. The Secretary of War directed me to General Scott,
and informed me that I was to confer with him and receive all rny directions from
him; that is, that I was to have nothing more to do with the Secretary of War upon
the subject. General instructions were put into my hands, signed by the Secretary,
and approved by the President of the United States, which were all the instruc
tions I ever received from the Executive on the subject of this expedition, with
the exception of some secondary matters. I have not these instructions with
me, but I can repeat them almost word for word. They were as follows :
" You will organize an expedition, in connexion with Commodore DuPont, of
12,000 men, and will decide upon the points of assault after the expedition has
eailed," (or something to that effect.) " The expedition should start at the earliest
practicable moment."
These were all the written instructions I received. After having received
these instructions, I was to confer with General Scott. I did so. General
Scott assembled a council composed of himself, General Totten, Commodore
DuPont, General Meigs, General Wright, and myself. I think these were all
who were present. We had some four or five meetings on the subject of this
expedition. It appeared that this expedition was got up in consequence of two
reports made by a board of officers that had been assembled previously. These
reports were read to the meeting or conference assembled by General Scott.
One of the reports was dated July 5, 1861 ; the other was dated July 13, 1861.
That board was composed of the following officers : Commodore DuPont, of
the navy ; Major Barnard, of the engineers ; Professor Bache, superintendent
of the coast survey, and Captain Davis, of the navy. These reports were read
and discussed at these conferences. — [See Appendix.] This board recommended
that certain points on the coast should be seized and occupied, as rendevouz
for the blockading squadron. At that time there was not a single point on the
coast below Old Point that could be occupied by the navy. This plan was for
the purpose of rendering the blockade more efficient. Their report of July 5th
designated that Fernandina, Florida, should be occupied by the navy, in con
nexion with a land force of 3,000 men. The report of July 13th discusses the
propriety of holding three different points : one was Bull's bay, an important
harbor just north of Charleston, St. Helena sound, and Port Royal sound. The
board came to the conclusion that Bull's bay, of these three points, should be
one point occupied. They also discussed the merits of St. Helena sound and
Port Royal harbor, and gave strong reasons why Bull's bay should be the
point occupied. Then if any other point should be deemed necessary to occupy,
they thought St. Helena should be seized before Port Royal was. We took
these reports into consideration, and discussed the matter generally. The
council agreed that two points should be siezed. And although the command
ers of the expedition were not limited to the occupying of any two particular
TESTIMONY. 293
points, the council recommended, and the expedition was got under way with
the calculation that Bull's bay and Fernandina should be the two points seized
and occupied. By the President's instructions we were authorized, as a matter
of course, to go where we deemed it best. Still it was the decided under
standing that the two points I have named should be the points occupied. It
was also further agreed that 8,000 men should be sent to Bull's bay, and 4,000
men to Fernandina, in connexion with the fleet. I was directed to go to New
York to fit out the expedition. The transports were divided into two divisions,
one for Bull's bay, and the other for i'ernandina. The armaments, commissary
stores, and everything of the kind were distributed between the two divisions,
according to the number of men of which those divisions were to be composed.
In fact, it was the understanding then between Commodore DuPont and myself
that these were the two points to be occupied.
But while the expedition was being fitted out it was somewhat enlarged. I
had -been directed, in the first place, to take eleven or twelve regiments ; after
wards the force was increased to thirteen or fourteen regiments, with the addi
tion of a battery of light artillery. Commodore DuPont's squadron, I believe,
was somewhat extended ; I think he had an additional number of gunboats.
While engaged in fitting out this expedition, I found that the people of New
York were very generally impressed with the belief that it was intended for
something more than we were really going to do with it. Commodore DuPont
and myself were enjoined to keep our business to ourselves ; the object of the
expedition was not to be made known to any one. We therefore could not un
deceive the public in regard to the matter. I had a conversation on this very
subject with Commodore DuPont, in the city of New York. I told him that
the expedition would never come up to the public expectation, from what I
could perceive ; and I recommended that we should do something or other in
'the military line, in order to justify public opinion, or else endeavor to rectify
it — one or the other. Of course, we could not well do the latter, as we
were enjoined not to say a word about it. Nothing was done in that re
spect until we got to Old Point Comfort, where the expedition rendezvoused
before finally sailing. Just prior to sailing we had a meeting on board the flag
ship in reference to the object of the expedition. The council was composed
of Commodore DuPont ; Captain Davis, his flag captain ; General Stevens ;
General Wright ; General Viele and myself. After full discussion we came
to the conclusion that the capture of Bull's bay was rather too insignificant
an operation for a force of the dimensions that we were to take with us ; and
we came to the conclusion that Port Royal ought to be the first point struck
at, for the reason that Port Royal, although more strongly defended than Bull's
bay, was a harbor of magnificent proportions, with deep water — indeed, the
best harbor on the whole coast. We thought we had a sufficient force to carry
it; accordingly, it was agreed upon, before leaving Old Point, that Port Royal
should first be taken, and afterward we would take Fernandina.
I do not know as I have sufficiently explained the real object of the expedi
tion. The object was to obtain two good harbors, the selection to be left to the
discretion of Commodore DuPont and myself, that would give the naval block
ading squadron facilities for shelter. In the council called by General Scott, in
Washington, it was determined, after discussion, that no ulterior operations by
land were to be considered in getting up this expedition ; that is, any ulterior
operations that would probably be demanded by circumstances, were not toH5e
anticipated at that time ; and therefore no preparations were to be made for
anything of the sort. That was well understood. All the preparations to be
made were simply with reference to the seizure and occupation of those two
important harbors ; the expedition was fitted out with that object alone. No
land transportation was taken on this expedition, further than was necessary
294 TESTIMONY.
for provisioning the men, get them wood and water, &c., at certain localities ;
not to march into the interior at all.
Witk regard to light-water transportation, it was agreed upon between the
quartermaster general of the army, Commodore DuPont, and myself, that Com
modore DuPont would furnish all the means for debarking the land forces of
the expedition. I had no responsibility in that respect. He was to put me and
my force on shore ; that was all well understood. Consequently Commodore
DuPont had from forty to fifty surf-boats manufactured for the landing the
troops, and he obtained two light draught steamboats and two steam-tugs for
the same purpose. I think that is about the extent of the transportation that
we started with. The surf-boats all arrived safely with the expedition. The
small steamers did not arrive ; they encountered a violent gale, and I think they
all put back, and we did not get one of them.
I am particular to mention these circumstances ; the importance of it will be
seen hereafter. It will show how pinched we Avere for transportation of -that
sort, when I come to explain why we did not go into the interior.
It is not necessary for me to enlarge at all upon the manner in which Port
Royal was captured; it is well known. It was captured by the navy. Im
mense preparations were made to assist in the capture of Port Royal, or any
other place we should attack, by the army ; but the army had little or no hand
in the capture of Port Royal. We knew nothing about the place before we
went there. We had no idea of the distance which it would be necessary to
transport troops in boats ; and it had to be agreed upon between Commodore
DuPont and myself, that the land force of the expedition should remain quies
cent upon the steamboats, while he captured Port Royal.
When it was captured, we found ourselves greatly deceived in our expecta
tions. We had no idea, in preparing the expedition, of such immense success.
We found, to our surprise, that instead of having difficult work to get one har
bor, after one harbor was obtained we had a half a dozen important harbors at
once. Such a panic was created among the enemy by the fall of Port Royal,
that they deserted the whole coast from the North Edisto to Warsaw sound.
This threw into our possession not only the harbor of Port Royal, but the mag
nificent harbor of St. Helena, and the harbors of North Edisto, South Edisto,
Tybee roads, Warsaw sound, and Ossabaw sound. In fact, the real object of
the expedition was already accomplished, although Fernandina had not yet been
taken. To carry out the programme, of course, we should have gone immedi
ately to Fernandina, although we had already taken all these harbors, sufficient
for all the wants of the blockading squadron. The land force was all ready to
proceed to Fernandina; our transports, as I have before stated, having been di
vided into two divisions. Had we been able to proceed right on to Fernandina,
the troops of that division need not have been debarked at all. But that was
not the case, and we landed the troops, while the transports remained in the
harbor, ready to proceed the moment the navy was ready. It was necessary to
land the troops, as they had then been on the transports nearly three weeks.
Commodore DuPont informed me that he would be unable to proceed to Fer
nandina at once, for the reason that he had used the bulk of his ammunition in
capturing Port Royal. I think he said he had fired away three-fourths of it,
or something to that effect ; and he did not think it prudent or safe to go to
Fernandina or anywhere else with the amount of ammunition that he had on
hand. We were therefore compelled to wait while he sent north for a supply
of ammunition. Port Royal was captured 011 the 7th or 8th of November, and
Commodore DuPont received his new supply of ammunition about the last of
November. The expedition, however, did not proceed to Fernandina, for the
reason that the commodore in the meantime had received orders from the Navy
Department to take charge of and sink what was termed the " stone fleet " that
had been sent out there. This, of course, absorbed his gunboats, so as to make
TESTIMONY. 295
it entirely impossible to cany on both expeditions at the same time. The Fer-
nandina expedition was, therefore, still further postponed.
Our transports had all this time been retained there at high cost to the gov
ernment. Some of them were large steamers, costing the government an im
mense amount. Many of the provisions on board the transports were of a
perishable nature, and it was absolutely necessary to proceed to Fernandina at
once, or to unload them. I had an interview with Commodore DuPont upon
that subject, the result of which was the conclusion that the expedition to Fer-
nandina should be indefinitely postponed. It might be taken up again at some
future time, but we would then indefinitely postpone it, and unload our vessels
and send them back to New York. I am a little particular in stating this, be •
cause I consider it very important. It gave me a great deal of annoyance and
uneasiness to have so many vessels, at high prices, laying there idle for nearly
a month. I could not have anticipated that the commodore would have found
himself unable to proceed ; I do not see that he could have anticipated it him
self. This stone fleet was sent there, and he had his orders to take charge of it
and distribute and sink it where desired.
A month had elapsed, and in the meantime this country that had fallen into
our hands had to be taken care of. I had received no instructions in regard to
the internal operations of our expedition, but I had my own views upon the
subject. I therefore laid out a plan, after having landed, for the capture of
Savannah, Fort Pulaski, and the country in that vicinity. I could not see what
else we could do that would be profitable. In the meantime I went to work and
established a basis of operations at Hilton Head. Port Royal is the key of the
whole system there. In order to retain that coast, Port Royal must be main
tained because it was so well fortified, vessels of any size could ride safely in
the harbor there, and there is such an immense system of waters around it. It
is the key of the whole coast, and must be maintained. I therefore constructed
one immense fieldwork around Hilton Head island, nearly a mile in extent — a
pretty large work, mounted with heavy ordnance. The calculation was to have
a system of defences there, so that the key of our position — Port Royal Harbor —
could be held by 2,000 men, leaving the remainder available for other purposes.
I will state here that according to the reports of the commission which gave
rise to this expedition, it was held that it would require 12,000 men to hold
Port Royal. I suppose it would, if seriously attacked without defences. But
my object was to have as many of my troops available for interior operations as
possible ; and for that reason I constructed these works. And I do not hesi
tate to say that Port Royal bay can now be held by 2,000 men against any
force that can be brought against it.
St. Helena sound had also to be taken care of, and I had it thoroughly re
connoitred in connexion with the navy. It was found that the occupation of
Otter island in that sound would subserve every purpose of its defence, and
would prevent any communication by water between Savannah and Charleston.
There is a network of waters, an inland water communication, running all the
way from Charleston to Savannah, which had been used all the time by the
rebels until we obtained possession there. Of course, the important point was
to prevent the enemy from coming by water from Charleston and attacking us
on our flank. I erected a fort on Otter island which entirely prevents that.
No vessel can go through St. Helena sound in any direction without passing
Otter island, which is now held by only 600 men.
By reconnoissance of the navy, Tybee was found to be deserted, and we took
possession of it, and constructed a fort there for the purpose of covering Tybee
roads. Although Fort Pulaski is at the mouth of the Savannah river, still out
side of Pulaski is a fine harbor in which any vessel can ride. Not only that,
the enemy can run the blockade there while it is in their possession. We con
structed a fort there, and armed it with heavy cannon, to protect that channel.
206 TESTIMONY.
After tliis bad been done we felt ourselves secure from any attack from any
quarter.
While tbis work was going on, I was looking about for something else to do.
As early as the 15th of November, eight days after landing at Port Royal, I
wrote to the War Department as follows:
"I have the honor to report that in consequence of the difficulty and great
amount of labor in landing our stores, some delay must necessarily occur in
continuing operations. This delay is as distasteful to us as it must be to the
authorities at Washington.
"In the meanwhile a matter of the first importance is to erect proper defences
at Hilton Head, as well as to strengthen the land side of the fort, to the end of
securing these important points with the least number of men. This is being
done, and a plan of the same will be furnished as soon as it can be prepared.
" In conducting operations here two modes suggest themselves, first, to hold
Hilton Head and Phillip's island with a strong force, and proceed with a suffi
cient force, in connexion with the naval fleet, under Commodore DuPont, and
open another harbor. This would be carrying out the original and actual object
of the expedition, as I understand it, and for which object only our means have
been provided; second, to occupy the points first mentioned, as well as Beaufort,
as a base of operations, and act thence on a line of operations embracing Port
Royal island and the road to Pocotaligo — the nearest point of the Savannah
and Charleston railroad — into the southern counties of the State, threatening
Savannah, &c., or to operate from the base of Hilton Head through the interior
creeks and channels leading into the Savannah river below Savannah, near Fort
Jackson, thus laying siege to Savannah, &c., and cutting off Fort Pulaski.
" For these last operations, the first will require more land transportation than
we are provided with, and the last will require an outfit of boats that we are
also insufficiently provided with. The former will also require a small cavalry
force.
" The only course, therefore, at present'is, notwithstanding the apparent open
ing for more brilliant operations, the first and original plan."
This was a mere preliminary letter, suggesting what I had discovered to be
necessary for operations there. The whole country between Hilton Head and
Savannah was a marshy country, where you could operate only by boats. All
the transportation I was furnished with, was forty-six surf boats ; and in the oc
cupation of St. Helena sound and Tybee island nearly all the boats I had had
been absorbed. We had no wharves ; all our transports had to lay out at a
distance from the shore, and everything had to be landed by means of these surf-
boats. Our light-draught steamers, with the exception of one, had put back to
New York. There was one that we chartered ourselves that we had there.
Our surf-boats had to be distributed about among these different ports, and we
had nothing to operate with. I, therefore, informed the department of it in
time — on the 15th of November — so that I might be furnished some means of
transportation that would enable me to operate through those waters. At that
time there was no opportunity for any operations under heaven, except to go and
take Feraandina ; and as I have explained, that was soon rendered impossible
in consequence of the naval fleet being diverted to another purpose.
Two days afterwards, on the 17th of November, I again wrote to the War
Department as follows :
" I have the honor to report that the position of the forces here necessitate the
most active operations during the coming winter; the climate and localities of
these islands rendering it impracticable to carry on operations upon them after
April next.
" We have now possession of the valuable harbors of Port Royal and St. Helena ;
one more will probably be in our possession in a short time. A fort should be
TESTIMONY. 297
constructed on Hunting island to secure that important roadstead of St. Helena.
After well securing these important points and establishing a firm base from
which to operate inland, there will not be left a very large force disposable for
internal operations. I would therefore recommend that an additional force of
10,000 men be sent to this point as early as practicable.
" We shall require three or four steamers drawing not over seven feet and
capable of carrying 800 to 1,000 men each for operations in the rivers and
creeks ; and a couple of ferry-boats drawing not over five or six feet would be
of the greatest advantage. We will require, also, about 100 row-boats, capable
of carrying from forty to fifty men each, with kedges and oars. A few of them
should be large enough and so constructed as to transport pieces of artillery, with
their carriages, including siege guns."
I asked for that on the 17th of November. I did not intimate to the depart
ment the precise plan I desired to pursue, because at that time that affair of
Fernandiua was still in the way, and I did not know when it was to be carried
out.
On the 27th of November I again wrote to the department, asking to be
furnished with armament sufficient for the reduction of Fort Pulaski. I stated
in my letter that I had examined Tybee island, and had ascertained that it
would be practicable to bombard Fort Pulaski from that island. I had found
out that their casemate guns were not effective on the island ; that only their
barbette guns were effective. And although the distance from the island to the
fort gave a pretty long range artillery, still I had no doubt but what the fort
could be crushed by 13-inch mortar shells.
My recommendation was approved by General McClellan, and the armament
for the bombardment of Fort Pulaski was ordered to be furnished me. I be
lieve, however, it had all to be cast at Pittsburg. It was but recently that any
of it has arrived ; it did not all get there until the latter part of last month.
On the 28th of November I wrote to General Meigs, quartermaster general,
reiterating, to some extent, what I had written to the department in my letters
of the loth and 17th of November, stating my need of re-enforcements, increase
of transportation, &c., and stating my anxiety at that time to go ahead and do
something, knowing, as I did, that the season for operations in that region would
be a short one. The delay in getting off to Fernandina caused me to feel very
anxious, while at the same time I had no means to move anywhere else. After
thinking the matter over thoroughly, I laid down in my own mind a plan which
I thought could be carried out, and which I desired to pursu£ at once ; and I
accordingly wrote to the department, after having been at Port Royal a month
and three days, as follows, on the 10th of December :
" I have the honor to submit the following to the consideration of the gcneral-
in-chief and to the War Department. The object of this expedition was to
seize upon at least two important points of our southern coast, and hold the same
for the protection of our blockading squadron when compelled to seek a harbor,
as well as to create something of a diversion in favor of our armies in the field.
" After the taking of Port Eoyal it was intended to proceed to Fernandina
and get possession of that harbor, but in consequence of circumstances unneces
sary here to particularly relate, that part of the expedition has not yet been
accomplished; and although I have been for some time prepared for it, a still
further delay arises from the fact that the gunboats of the navy have first to be
occupied in the work of disposing of the stone fleet just arrived from the north.
" But our operations resulting from the capture of Port Royal have become so
developed as to lead to the occupation of St. Helena sound, the Tybee, and, in
short, to the full possession of the coast from South Edisto to Tybee, and to
which may be added Warsaw and Ossabaw sounds, which, if not yet occupied
by us, have been deserted by the enemy.
298 TESTIMONY.
" In the meantime there is a formidable strategic line formed and forming in
our front, its right resting on Green island, in Vernon river, passing by Thun
derbolt or Augustine creek, (at both of which places there are earthworks,
mounted with heavy guns,) Fort Jackson, Savannah, and thence along the line
of the Savannah and Charleston railroad, indefinitely, towards Charleston, the
line having its principal bodies of troops between Vernon river and Savannah,
at Savannah, Hardieville, Grahamville, Coosawatchie, Pocotaligo, Salt Ketchie,
&c., and its most advanced posts at Pulaski, New River Bridge, Bluffton, &c.
" The object of this line appears to be to resist an invasion of the main land,
and not to attack the occupied coast, which, from all that can be learned, the
enemy have concluded they cannot maintain, and have given up all hope of
doing so."
I now come to the point that I insisted so strongly upon, and I think it is a
great pity I had not been listened to and allowed to go on.
"It may hence be inferred that the main object of the expedition has been
already accomplished, and that the point of Fernandina is now of so secondary
a character as to render it not only almost insignificant, but the operation of
taking it actually prejudicial to the great work which the development of cir
cumstances appears to have set before us. I am aware of the good effect that
the capture of Fernandina would have upon the public mind, but the military is
the only point of view that should be taken of it. It is no point from which to
operate, and will probably fall of itself the moment Savannah is occupied by
our forces, and therefore the resources of the navy and army here should be
husbanded for a more important operation, viz, the attack of the enemy's line
the moment preparations can be made."
I maintain this, that if we could have got Savannah and Pulaski the mo
ment those places fell, that moment all these forts below St. Simon's, Bruns
wick, Fernandina, St. John's, St. Augustine — all those places below Savannah
would have fallen without firing a gun. That was what I maintained at the
time. Therefore, the great point was to occupy Savannah ; that inasmuch as we
had already delayed the attack upon Fernandina for more than a month, why
should we think of it again until we had accomplished the work at Savannah ?
I gave my reasons for it, and I shall even insist that I was right about it. In
deed, it has turned out that a serious threat alone against Savannah caused the
fall of all these places. To proceed with my letter :
" The precise point of the hostile line to be struck, and the mode of attack,
cannot now be specifically set out without first knowing the means to be placed
in our hands, and must therefore be left to time and circumstances.
"But in my judgment, with the necessary means, Savannah should be the
point, and to be accomplished somewhat in this way : Pulaski to be vigorously
shelled as already recommended in a former communication ; at the same time
the gunboats of the naval squadron to shell out the garrisons of the forts on
Vernon and Augustine rivers, to be closely followed up by the landing of the
land forces in the vicinity of Montgomery and Beaulieu, thus taking Augustine
river, Fort Jackson, and Savannah in reverse ; this operation to be connected at
the same time with one from this point on Bluffton, New River Bridge, and
Hardieville to get effectual possession of the railroad crossing the Savannah
river, and prevent re-enforcements arriving at Savannah from the centre and
left of their line. A small head of column shown at Port Royal ferry would have
its effect in aiding this demonstration.
" I am firmly convinced that an operation of this sort would not only give us
Savannah, but, if successful and strong enough to follow up the success, would
shake the so-called southern confederacy to its very centre.
" Not knowing precisely what forces the enemy may have available, it is diffi
cult to estimate for the men and means necessary to the success of the opera
tion^ But I must modify the terms of my letter of the 27th November, which
TESTIMONY. 299
did not look to this precise operation, and recommend that the ' one regiment of
cavalry, one regiment of regular artillery, ten regiments of infantry, and one
pontoon bridge,' be extended to one regiment of cavalry, one regiment of artil
lery, and twenty regiments of infantry, and as many pontoon bridges as can be
sent here.
"An addition to our armament will also be required to enable us to carry oil a
siege, if necessary, for which the ordnance officer will make requisition.
" I do not say that the thing cannot be done with less troops, but it would be
better to have too many than too few, particularly as any success should be
followed up rapidly and with sufficient force."
That is the plan I laid before the department, and I am sorry we were not
permitted to go on and carry it out.
I will state another plan by which Savannah might have been taken, without
involving all this time and expense that the other plan required — something I
iid not know when this letter was written. About the 1st of January I had
all this country reconnoitred — all these flats, marshes, creeks, &c. — with the ob
ject of ascertaining the best mode of getting into the Savannah river. I found
out that the passage from Wright river into the Savannah river was not so
deep as I had expected, and I therefore regarded it as rather impracticable to
take my position at the head of Elbow island, which had been my intention. I
sent a topographical engineer to reconnoitre the Savannah river further down ;
and in doing so he examined Wall's cut closely. He sounded the Savannah
river in the night, passing around Cumberland Point, the south end of Jones's
island. I was very agreeably disappointed in the result of his report. It was
that if Wall's cut could be opened, vessels drawing from twelve to fifteen feet
might be taken into the Savannah river at high water. That was about the 1st
of January. From that time I went to work to open Wall's cut, and succeeded
in finding a man who could invent a machine to saw off piles twenty feet under
water. He invented the machine, and went down there, and we made out to
get those piles sawed off, and to get an old hulk out of the way, so as to enable
us to get vessels through into the Savannah river.
On the 14th of January Wall's cut was opened. Wliilst being opened we
took some prisoners from Savannah, who informed me of the state of the de
fences round the city of Savannah, the first information of a reliable character
that I had been able to obtain from that quarter. I found that there were no
defences about Savannah, excepting Fort Jackson, which had eleven guns
mounted on its barbettes. They were building a fort on the south end of
Hudson's island ; and there was a little island, directly opposite Fort Jackson,
upon which they were building a fort. But there was not a single gun mounted
except at Fort Jackson ; and at that time I suppose there were not over
10,000 men in and around Savannah. That. I was sure of, because we had
taken several prisoners, and they all agreed upon that.
I immediately wrote a communication to Commodore DuPont stating the facts,
and recommending that we should both go to work, take advantage of Wall's cut
which I had opened, and proceed to take Savannah by a coup de main. He re
plied to rne that he thought it was an excellent thing, and that he would unite
with me and do all that he could, and that lie would set aside for what I pro
posed that which he was about going to do. He desired to have a conference
upon the subject, which we did have the next day, I think, on board the flag
ship ; at which was present.Commodore DuPont, Captain Davis, Captain C. R.
P. llodgers, General Wright, Captain Gilmore, and myself. This matter I had
proposed was discussed, and it Avas agreed upon as I understood it, and as all
my officers understood it ; it was agreed that we should by a combined army
and naval force go right into the Savannah river and go up and take Fort Jack
son and the city of Savannah. I think every officer present regarded the thing
as very feasible, indeed. I told them that after garrisoning all my forts I would
300 TESTIMONY.
have an available force of 9,000 men. I did not care at all about Fort Jackson;
all 1 wanted was to have my men landed there. I was so firmly convinced that
the matter was agreed upon that the last thing T said to Commodore DuPont
was, " the point is Savannah, and immediately ?" He replied, "Yes." The coun
cil was dissolved that afternoon with the thorough understanding that this mat
ter was to be carried out ; and I went to work immediately to make prepara
tions for it.
In one or two days I received a private note from Commodore DuPont in which
he stated that he had given this subject more serious consideration, and had
some suggestions to make to me that he thought would be satisfactory, and that
he would send Captain Davis over to me the next day to explain it. I did not wait
for Captain Davis to come, but jumped into a boat the next morning and went
over to the flag-ship myself to see about it. I was there informed that in con
sequence of a discussion of this matter between officers on board the flag-ship,
they had come to the conclusion that we could not take Fort Jackson. As I
understood them, they stated that not more than two gunboats could act upon
Fort Jackson at the same time, and that two gunboats could not take such a
work as that. And not only that, but they represented that five rafts were being
prepared by the enemy, which would make it difficult to take wooden vessels
into the Savannah river. And that, as the going into the Savannah river was a
new thing, they thought it was very hazardous. The commodore therefore came
to the conclusion that he could not attempt it. I told them that I did not ask
them to take Fort Jackson ; that all I wanted was to be landed at the mouth of
Augustine creek, and I would march on Fort Jackson- — on the rear of it. How
ever, that plan was given up. That was the reason why Savannah was not
taken by coup de main when it might have been taken. Of course, a week or
two afterwards the other forts for the protection of the river were completed.
The point with us then was, what was the next best thing to be done. Some
thing had to be done, and we agreed upon this, that we would make a strong
demonstration on Savannah, and take advantage of that demonstration to move
off to Fernandina and take that place; frighten them at Savannah and then go
and take Fernandina. But there were certain things to be done besides. This
demonstration was to be made in a particular way, which I Avill relate in order
that the whole thing may be properly understood.
Three gunboats were to enter the Savannah river on the north side. These
three boats were to escort General Viele with a considerable force which I was
to send with him, and a quantity of guns which we had already put on board
flats — twelve or fifteen guns already mounted on carriages ; they were to take
these down there, and the gunboats were to cover the landing of them. This
battery was to be erected on Venus Point, and afterwards another battery was
to be erected on Bird island, directly opposite. The three gunboats were to
be used so as to cause the people of Savannah to believe that we were going
up the river. Captain Davis, with half a dozen gunboats, and General Wright,
with a brigade of three regiments, were to enter Warnar sound, pass up Wil
mington Narrows, and make a threat of going up to Savannah by way of
Wilmington river — up Wilmington Narrows through Augustine creek. That
was done on the 27th or 28th of January.
While this was being done, Commodore Tatnall of the rebel service came
down with a fleet of several vessels, supposed to be loaded with provisions,
and went down to Fort Pulaski. We fired on these boats from Wilmington
Narrows on one side and Wright river on the other — a pretty wide range — and
stopped a portion of them; the rest ran down to the fort. The object of the
Savannah people undoubtedly was to provision Fort Pulaski. No doubt they
thought that would be their last chance to do so, and that our gunboats were
going up to Savannah.
We were two or three days about this. Then the force under Captain Davis
TESTIMONY. 301
and General Wright fell back into Warsaw sound, and there lay at anchor.
The demonstration on the other side remained in statu quo. General Viele was
there with his artillery, ready to land it on Venus Point whenever he could get
it there. But the gunboats did not go around into the river as was agreed upon,
and these people lay there from the 28th or 29th of January until the 10th day
of February before that battery was put up.
By Mr. Wright :
Question. This force, under General Viele, then remained there some thirteen
days?
Answer. Yes, sir ; about that time. I think the battery was put up the 10th
of February. And during all that time the enemy were provisioning Fort Pulaski ;
boats were running up and down the river nearly every day. I urged the
matter on all I could. I went over to the flag-ship and had consultations with
Commander DuPont very often, and, as I understood it, he ordered Captain
Rodgers to go into the river. But he did not go in, occupying a great deal of
his time in sounding the river. But in the meantime our men in charge of the
engineer officer cut logs and made a corduroy road across the island, so that the
artillery could be landed at another point and taken across there. The road
was not constructed with that object at all, fbr I expected to have the artillery
towed around on the flats on which they were, and landed on the point. But
they could not do it without being supported, for Tatnall was watching us all
the time. But I directed the engineer officer to construct a corduroy road across
there, because, after the battery was erected, we wanted to keep up a communi
cation with our base without being obliged to go around the point. I became
so tired of the delay that I gave General Viele orders to go into the river, and
land and erect that battery, whether the navy would assist him or not. I went
down myself, intending to see that that was done. But when I got down there
I found that the battery had been landed on the island at another place, and I
therefore permitted them to go around the other way. They took the artillery
across the island the next night, and the battery was erected without molesta
tion. The enemy came down the next day to drive us off, but were themselves
driven back. After this battery was constructed we constructed a similar bat
tery on Bird island, which completely blocked the enemy there. Then three
vessels took position in my rear. However, the thing all turned out well,
with the exception that the delay of ten or twelve days enabled the enemy to
put six or eight months' provisions into Fort Pulaski. When I found out the
feasibility of getting into the Savannah river, as I have stated, I made up my
mind that the slow, tedious, and expensive process of reducing Fort Pulaski by
bombardment would be unnecessary, and calculated that the construction of
batteries there, thus cutting the fort off from supplies from Savannah, would
be all that would be required to reduce the work ; and I think it would have
been but for this delay, which enabled them to provision the fort from Savannah.
After I had constructed these forts, as I have related, I was unwilling to risk
the reduction of Fort Pulaski by simply cutting it off, for the prisoners them
selves told me that they had then some nine months' provisions in it. I there
fore continued my work of erecting batteries on Tybee Island to bombard the
fort. With regard to the other portion of that demonstration Commodore Du
Pont promised that the demonstration should not be more than five or six days
in being made ; that is, that the fleet and my brigade should not remain in War
saw sound more than five or six days at the utmost. I told him that it would
be utterly impossible to keep the troops long on the transports there without
being sick ; and it was only in consequence of that agreement on his part that
I consented to the demonstration. But my brigade remained there under Gen
eral Wright in Warsaw sound, exposed to the most stormy portion of the winter
from the 27th of January until about the last of February. I looked upon that
302 TESTIMONY.
whole month as lost. I had to recall one of those regiments and send them
back to Hilton Head on account of ship fever. It may, however, have redounded
to our benefit by giving the enemy an opportunity to withdraw their guns from
the southern forts, so that they could offer no resistance to us. After making
this demonstration the expedition left for Fernandina about the first of March.
In the meantime the Georgians evacuated St. Simon's and Brunswick, and took
all their forces and artillery from there and carried them to Leavenworth, and
when the expedition got to Fernandina it found the • enemy in the process of
evacuating that place. They had got off all their guns with, I think, the ex
ception of about fifteen. Having taken Fernandina with so much ease the ex
pedition kept on and took St. John's, which was also evacuated. They also
took Jacksonville end St. John's Bluff, and they kept on around to St. Augus
tine, which was also evacuated, having been evacuated by the enemy the evening
before our expedition arrived there. All these places down there fell without
striking a blow, in consequence no doubt of the threats upon Savannah and
our victories at the same time in the west.
It will be observed that though I early made requisition for means to move
my land forces, those means never reached me. The light-draught steamers
that I asked for were obtained and sent to me, leaving New York the latter
part of December. For some reason or other, probably on account of stress
of weather, they put into Hatteras inlet, and I am informed that they were
seized by the Burnside expedition. They never reached me. I was informed
by the Assistant Secretary of War the other day that they were still with
General Burnside. Of the 100 rowboats I asked for about 50 reached me,
but not until about the 27th of March, some three days before I was relieved
from that department.
I have dwelt at some length upon the two plans I formed for taking Savan
nah. Having formed one plan, I conceived another and a shorter one ; that
I have recounted at some length, that of taking Savannah by a coup de main.
That last plan failing, of course I reverted back to the former plan. I supposed,
of course, that we were to be allowed to pursue that plan, especially as the
authorities at Washington had sent me a siege train which I had applied
for, not knowing what were the character of the defences about Savannah ;
not that I thought I should be under the necessity of laying regular siege to
Savannah, but simply that I desired to be upon the safe side, to be piepared
for any event. Without answering my communication they sent me the siege
train, which reached me in February.
W^hen Commodore DuPont and myself agreed to the demonstration upon
Savannah for the purpose of the more easily taking Fernandina, it was fully
admitted by us both that it would be utterly impossible then to take Savannah
by coup de main, as the opportunity for doing so had been allowed to pass, and
the batteries and forts about Savannah were probably ready to fire upon us at
any moment; that the guns would be mounted upon them the moment this
demonstration was made. This was the case, as we learned from prisoners and
contrabands. Savannah, also, receiving an accession of all the heavy artillery
down at St. Simon's, and a portion of that at Fernandina.
The results of the expedition may be summed up as follows : The occupation
of the whole coast from North Edisto, South Carolina, to St. Augustine, Florida,
and so occupied as to be of permanent tenure ; the return to the federal gov
ernment of three of the permanent fortifications stolen by a reckless and un
principled party ; thfi holding of 50,000 rebel troops on the line from Bruns
wick to Charleston, thus far lightening the burden of the war on the northern
borders of the rebel States.
It is safe for me to say that the object of the expedition has been thoroughly
accomplished. But in consequence of our unlocked for success, had the means
of transportation I early asked for been put into my hands, far more would have
TESTIMONY. 303
been easily accomplished. Savannah, a most important strategic point, would
have been in our possession ere this, could my plans have been pursued ; or, if
I had been timely warned that I would not have been allowed to carry out
those plans as far as the taking of Savannah, such other disposition of our
troops would have been made in the meanwhile as to create consternation
among the enemy in another quarter. For the country's sake, not my own, I
deeply regret that I should have been stopped in my course on Savannah.
The acquisition of Fort Pulaski was indispensable, it is true ; but the acquisi
tion of Savannah would have thrown the whole State of Georgia into our hands,
and, supported by Burnside's victories in the north, would have rendered the
capture of Charleston and the acquisition of all South Carolina an easy
conquest.
On the 3d of March I received a sort of semi-official letter from General
McClellau, written on the 14th of February by himself, not through his adju
tant general. He writes thus in regard to my operations :
" After giving the subject all the consideration in my power, I am forced to
the conclusion that, under the circumstances, the siege and capture of Savan
nah do not promise results commensurate with the sacrifices necessary. When
I heard that it was possible for the gunboats to reach the Savannah river above
Fort Pulaski, two operations suggested themselves to my mind as its inevitable
result. First, the capture of Savannah by coup de main, the result of an in
stantaneous advance and attack by the army and navy. The time for this has
passed, and your letter indicates that you are not accountable for the failure to
seize the propitious moment, but that, on the contrary, you perceived its advan
tages. Second, to isolate Fort Pulaski, cut off its supplies, and at least facili
tate its reduction by a bombardment.
" Although we have a long delay to deplore, the last course still remains to
us, and I strongly advise the close blockade of Pulaski, as well as its bombard
ment so soon as the 13-inch mortars and heavy guns reach you. I am confi
dent that you can thus reduce it. With Pulaski you gain all that is essential :
you obtain complete control of the harbor ; you relieve the blockading fleet,
and render the main body of your force disposable for other operations. I do
not consider the possession of Savannah worth a siege after Pulaski is in our
hands ; but the possession of Pulaski is of the first importance.
" The expedition to Fernandina is well, and I shall be glad to hear that it is
ours. * * i * * * * * # *
" In the meantime it is my advice and will that no further attempt be made
on Savannah, unless it can be carried with certainty by a coup de main. Please
concentrate your attention upon Pulaski and Fernandina."
He also informed me in that letter that he was not aware, until the day he
wrote, that I had sent for a siege train. In a letter written the 8th of March I
informed General McClellan that, agreeably to his instructions, no further pre
parations would be made for an attack on Savannah.
I desire to do General McClellan justice in regard to this matter. He con
sidered that the taking of Fort Pulaski was the most important thing to be done.
I agreed to that myself, that Fort Pulaski was more important than Savannah
alone ; but I could not see why we could not take them both.
In this same letter, too, General McClellan desired me to study the problem
of Charleston. He thought it was much more desirable to take Charleston than
Savannah, and informed me that measures would be very soon taken, after cer
tain movements had been effected, for the capture of Charleston and the forts
around it. I had already studied the problem of Charleston, and had commu
nicated my views to him upon that subject. I also wrote him another letter on
the same subject.
304 TESTIMONY.
On the 21st of March I received, through Commodore DuPont, a letter, dated
the 5th of March, more decidedly official in its character, through the Adjutant
General's Office, directing me to continue my operations against Pulaski, and
proceed no further against Savannah. I had already been directed by General
McClellan to abstain from any further preparations for the siege of Savannah,
and to confine myself to the siege of Pulaski and the taking of Fernandina.
Both the Navy and the War Departments seemed to insist upon our taking Fer
nandina, showing the importance they attached to that place. It is seen that
my views down there and the views of the authorities here were somewhat dif
ferent. What I regarded as the most essential operations they did ciot seem to
care much about. On the 26th of March I wrote, through the Adjutant Gene
ral's Office, to the War Department, as follows :
" Your letter of the 5th recommends me to reduce Fort Pulaski in preference
to attacking Savannah. In my letter of the 14th of December last, the depart
ment will perceive that my plan was to carry on both at once. The essential
features of that plan I have not departed from, and have been very desirous of
carrying out, particularly after the opportunity we discovered for taking Savannah
by coup de main failed for want of co-operation of the navy, the particulars of
which the department is already apprised of. I humbly bow to the decision of
my superiors at Washington ; but still, general, from the point here I can but
regret that my plan could not have been carried out. I had every confidence in
it, and believe it would have been executed with not so much sacrifice as the
general seems to imagine."
I then go on and state that the preparations for the bombardment of Fort
Pulaski are being made as rapidly as possible, and say :
" The work is of such a character, you are well aware, that we must be in a
state of perfect preparation before opening fire. It is hoped that we shall be
permitted to go through this job early enough in the season to afford a pretty
large force in the direction of Charleston, the nucleus of which I have formed
in the shape of two regiments on the North Edisto river."
There is something to be said in regard to the distribution of my forces. A
great deal has been said in the country in regard to the occupation of Beaufort ;
because it was a fine city, I suppose. It was said that, two weeks after having
occupied Port Royal, I had not occupied Beaufort, and that was considered an
evidence of inactivity. Now, my plan at first was to not occupy Beaufort at
all. The place is entirely untenable by the enemy ; a single gun-boat up there
can keep the enemy out of the place. The enemy never pretended to occupy
that island. The only reason that we occupied it was that the enemy got to
blockading the streams there by driving piles down in them. I concluded that
they had some important object in doing that, and thought it necessary to oc
cupy that island so as to stop that proceeding on their part. Had it been my
object to have gone into the interior and occupied the railroad near that point,
I should have wanted to have occupied Port Royal island. I could have gone
up and occupied that railroad, but I had no idea of doing anything of that sort.
I could have set myself down there with a force of the enemy on each side of
me, but it would have required a force of 50.000 men to have maintained the
position. But my object was to obtain possession of the Savannah end of the
line. But the moment I committed myself to the other point I would be in
volved in an affair that would require the sending out of some 30,000 or 40,000
men to maintain the position, and we should never have been able to do any
thing upon Savannah or Charleston with these troops. For that reason I did
not pay much attention to the occupation of Port Royal island when I went
there. But afterwards I felt that it was necessary to occupy it, to prevent these
people from coming down and blockading us. After we occupied Port Royal
island, the enemy came down and undertook to build forts. They were said to
have been mounted with heavy guns. General Stevens took a brigade over
TESTIMONY. 305
there and drove them off, and took the guns. I directed them to return after
the object of the commission was accomplished ; we had not pushed on to the
railroad. My object, at that time, was Savannah, for which we wanted all our
available troops. But if I had anticipated that we should not be allowed to
make any operations against Savannah, I should have gone up to the railroad
and occupied that. I am sorry I did not. After being forced to cease opera
tions upon Savannah, then General Stevens and myself came to the conclusion
that we would take possession of this country up there on the railroad; and
preparations were being made for that purpose when I left. We thought it
would be a healthy country ; and I think it should be occupied this summer.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. There is another railrond around to Charleston from Savannah ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; around through Augusta, Georgia, and but a few hours
further than the direct road from Savannah.
Question. What is to prevent our troops from going up to Savannah, now
that Fort Pulaski is taken ?
Answer. They have now a great many fortifications there.
Question. The new fortifications you have referred to ?
Answer. Yes, sir. They are very strongly fortified there. I do not think
you could very well take Savannah by way of the river without a great fight at
the mouth of Augustine creek. Charleston is much more assailable than Sa
vannah at this time. If you want to go to Savannah on fast land, you must
go by way of Wilmington river and Ossabaw sound. All the country below
is one complete marsh, where men cannot walk.
Question. What force did you estimate the enemy had in front of you there ?
Answer. There has been, since the first of December, from Savannah to
Charleston, on the railroad, some 40,000 men, perhaps. The country there is
divided into districts, and there are two or three brigades in each district. They
have fortified all the streams, and have an extended system of earthworks for
the protection of the railroad, which, however, can be carried.
Question. Could you, immediately after the capture of Port Royal, have taken
Savannah and Charleston if you had marched on them at once ?
Answer. No, sir. There was not the slightest opportunity to do anything of
the sort. You will remember that, by the evidence I have already given, that
even as late as the 20th of January, when we discovered that there were not
more defences about Savannah than I have stated, it was utterly impossible,
utterly impracticable, to get to the city to take it. I could have gone, and
wanted to go ; but the navy said it was impracticable for them to go there ; and
if it was impracticable in January it certainly was in November. Indeed, we
knew a great deal more of the country in January than we did in November.
Question. Do you think your instructions or the conclusions of your council
were ever communicated to the rebels in any way ?
Answer. I have no reason to suppose they were, though I was very fearful
before we left here that something of the kind might be done, but I have no
reason to suppose that it was done. I think that perhaps it would be well for
me to state more fully in regard to the impracticability of our taking Savannah
and Charleston when we got there. All my staff officers and some other officers
and myself were well occupied from the 1st to the loth of January in ascertain
ing the practicability of moving over the low marshy country between Hilton
Head and Savannah. Most of it had to be done at night. Of course, we could
do nothing in the Savannah river at night. It was fifteen days before I could
notify Commodore DuPont that I was ready to go to Savannah. So, even if
the navy had thought it feasible for their gunboats to go into the Savannah
river, it would not have been possible to have gone directly to Savannah at the
j time of the landing at Port Royal.
Part iii 20
306 TESTIMONY.
Question. How would it have been had you followed the retreating rebels
and gone up by land?
Answer. We had no means of moving an army by land.
Question. No transportation]
Answer. No, sir; no land transportation. The country there is a network of
marshes, swamps, creeks, and ravines. We were located on islands, and re
quired a particular kind of transportation in order to move. With so large a
force,, you must be well prepared in order to move at all. This expedition con
templated combined operations of the fleet under Commodore DuPont and cer
tain laud forces under command of myself. Neither of us had command or
control of the whole matter. It was a divided command. An officer of land
forces cannot command a naval officer, nor can a naval officer command an officer
of the army. Until I was furnished with -the means tl had asked for in my
letters, it was utterly impossible for me to do anything without being in con
nexion with the naval fleet there. I was dependent entirely upon the navy for
any movement I made, until I got means for acting independently, which I
never did get.
Question. Was it necessary to detain for so long a time so large a number of
transports as you had there ?
Answer. That was rather the fault of circumstances. To carry out fully the
object of the expedition required the taking of Fernandina. It was uncertain
when the navy would be ready to go there, and I did not feel myself authorized
to break up the expedition in that respect by ordering the vessels to be unloaded
and to return north. It was understood that it would not require more than
fifteen days to supply Commodore DuPont with the ammunition he desired
before he could, in his estimation, proceed with safety.
Question. You retained the transports for the Fernandina movement 1
Answer. Certainly; thinking that almost every day we would be prepared to
start. But it was postponed from day to day, until finally, after the ammunition
did come and everything was ready, Commodore DuPont got orders to attend
to something else. I then took the responsibility, so far as I was concerned, of
breaking up that part of the expedition, by ordering the vessels to be unloaded
and sent north. By that time the vessels had been waiting there a month or
more. As I have said before, for a long time I had believed that the second
part of the expedition — that against Fernandina — had become unimportant.
The great trouble was that there was no one there responsible for the whole
command. If Commodore DuPont or myself had had the sole command I
think we could have accomplished a great deal more.
Question. You say that the usage of this government is such that officers of
one service cannot command those of another. What, in your opinion, is neces
sary to remedy that 1
Answer. There should be some law giving the command of a combined naval
and land expedition, say, to the senior officer.
Question. Cannot the President, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy,
designate an officer of one service to command both ?
Answer. He may have the power to do so; but as it has never yet been ex
ercised, there is no precedent to govern in such cases.
WASHINGTON, April 17, 1862.
General T. W. SHERMAN — examination resumed.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. What time was originally fixed for the sailing of your expedition ?
Answer. When this expedition was first broached to me, when I was before
TESTIMONY. 307
t
the cabinet, it was stated that it was necessary for the expedition to be off by
the first of September — the first week in September, I think, was the time
mentioned.
Question. Can you state briefly the causes of the delay1?
Answer. There were several causes of delay. The most prominent ones
were raised in the council assembled by General Scott. In the minds of the
members of that council the most important cause of delay was the climate. It
appeared to be the general opinion that the climate would be too severe for our
northern soldiers to land anywhere on that coast in the month of September.
General Scott was very much in favor of having me go to the Secretary and
have the expedition postponed. I told the council that the idea of the cabinet
was to have the expedition start early in September, so that it could land there
before cotton was picked. Commodore DuPont also raised objections to going
at that time. He said he thought he should not be ready; that all his gunboats
would not be in readiness then. It was therefore generally concluded that the
expedition should be postponed to, at least, the first of October, unless there
were some reasons of state — I think that was the expre'ssion used — why it
should go in September. While one day in the office of the Secretary of State
talking with the Secretary, Commodore DuPont came in and informed the Sec
retary that he was requested to ask him if there were any reasons of policy of
state why this expedition should leave in the month of September. The Sec
retary replied that there were none that he knew of. The inference, of course,
was that the Secretary was perfectly willing for the expedition to be postponed
until October, if there were good reasons for doing so. It was therefore con
cluded, with the approval of the President and Secretary of War, I think, that
the expedition should not start until October.
Question. What was the character of the force under you ? Were they dis
ciplined troops, troops taken from the army of the Potomac, or were they new
troops raised for your expedition ?
Answer. I was directed by the Secretary of War to visit the different New
England States, and consult with the governors of those States on the subject
of furnishing the troops for this expedition. I did so, and saw all of them ex
cept the governor of Vermont. I also saw the governor of New York. I
consulted with these governors upon the subject of furnishing a certain quota of
troops for this expedition. I had a circular drawn up by the Secretary of War
to these governors, requesting them to furnish a stated number of troops, the
whole number amounting to twelve regiments. These governors promised me
the troops should be furnished as soon as they could *be organized. I was not
able to get any troops of any experience. None that I had had been drilled ;
some of them even came without arms. And not only that, but even the ad
vantages we were expected to make use of, before the sailing of the expedition,
were ignored in this way. I was originally required to concentrate all these
troops on Long Island, and there form a camp of instruction and train them
preparatory to sailing. I had concentrated three regiments there, when I was
directed by telegraph to proceed immediately to Washington city with all the
troops I had. I did so ; I came promptly to Washington. After that the con
centration of troops for this expedition was made at Washington city, and at
Annapolis, Maryland, according as the troops came in. Those that came first
came to Washington city; those that came last did not join us until we got to
Annapolis. The consequence of this was that our troops were brigaded in
different positions in this city, where they could not well be maneuvered ; in
fact, where circumstances would not permit much instruction to the men. I was
very sorry for it, but I could not help it. I could not get more than three regi
ments together in any one place. I found a little vacant place out towards the
Congressional burial ground, and some other little places in different parts of
308 TESTIMONY.
the city, where I collected my men together. They were scattered all around
the city, and had little or no opportunity for instruction.
Question. Was there any delay in consequence of waiting for these troops to
be raised for your expedition 1
Answer. I cannot say there was any delay on that account. Still, if the
original purpose had been adhered to of starting the expedition off in September,
the troops would not have been forthcoming. In some of the States the troops
that were raised for the expedition, instead of coming to me, were ordered to
"Washington. There was a panic here two or three times during the organiza
tion of this expedition, which caused all the troops to be sent to Washington.
Question. Were these troops, which were raised for you but sent to Wash
ington, finally made over to you ]
Answer. No, sir; not all of them. For instance, the State of Massachusetts
had two or three regiments organized early in September, which I supposed I
was to have. But I did not get one of them.
Question. They were absorbed in the army of the Potomac ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I supposed, as a matter of course, that Colonel Wilson's
regiment was to be given to me ; but it was not, and that was the case with two
or three other regiments. In consequence of an apparent threat upon the city
of Washington, or what was supposed to be a threat, a great many of the troops
intended for this expedition were ordered to Washington, and were finally ab
sorbed in the army here. The three regiments I brought down here myself I
succeeded in retaining, and others were added to my command afterwards.
Question. You took fresh regiments that arrived here, and not those that had
been drilled here]
Answer. Yes, sir ; those that General McClellan gave me to take the place of
those absorbed in his army were raw troops. He did not give me a single
regiment of experienced troops. When General Stevens joined me at Annapolis
he was very anxious to get his old regiment of which he was once colonel.
General McClellan refused to let him have them. After two or three days
telegraphing, I finally telegraphed directly to the President, stating how im
portant it was that we should have that regiment. At first he gave way to
General McClellan, but finally I succeeded in getting his order for them. It
was the 79th regiment, formerly under Colonel Cameron, then under Colonel
Stevens. There had been a mutiny in the regiment, and a portion had been
sent out to the Tortugas. The remainder I succeeded in getting, and those were
all the experienced troops I was able to get.
I was sent for one night to a conference in the house of the Secretary of
State upon the subject of this expedition. I thought it a fine opportunity to
broach this subject, for I felt a little sore about the character of the troops
assigned to me. The President was there, with several members of the cabinet,
General McClellan, and Commodore DuPont. I broached the subject, and
stated several reasons why a portion at least of my command should be troops
of some experience. Commodore DuPont supported me in my argument. I
suggested that inasmuch as General McClellan was not going to push forward
any of his troops for some time, which was evident from the drift of the con
versation that night — that he was not going to move forward for at least two
months — I suggested that he should turn over to me a few of his old regiments,
and take some of these raw troops off my hands. General McClellan replied
that he thought I was asking too much of him ; that he had given me my old
battery. By the way, he had given me my old light battery ; the one I had
formerly commanded. I did prevail upon him to let me have that. He said,
" You have your old battery, and I think you have done pretty well." I ap
pealed to the President, thinking it was then just the time to speak, but the
President coincided with General McClellan, and thought I was well enough off.
TESTIMONY. 309
and there the matter rested. It was after that that I got this 79th regiment —
the Highland regiment.
Question. At what time did this conference take place ?
Answer. It must have been somewhere between the 1st and 5th of November.
I am positive it was on my last visit to Washington.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Have you seen the law passed by Congress for the cultivation of
cotton lands ?
Answer. I have seen it, and examined it pretty carefully.
Question. What do you think of it ? Will it answer the purpose ?
Answer. In my opinion it is the exact sort of legislation the subject required.
It not only covers the course being pursued down there at this time, but it goes
further, and leaves it optional with the government to pursue this particular
Bourse, or change it into leasing the lands if it should find that plan would work
best. It gives them a fair opportunity to carry out both experiments, which I
am very glad to see. I think the course being pursued there now is the best
that could be adopted, and this law sanctions and legalizes it, and gives also the
option to pursue any other course that may be deemed best.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. As I understand you, with ten or twelve additional regiments you
could have taken Savannah ?
Answer. I would have risked myself upon Savannah without any additional
troops at all, if I had only been furnished with the means of transportation. I
was not so much in want of troops as of transportation. We had altogether too
many troops to lie still. What I wanted the most was means of moving the
troops I had. From the time I landed there until I left I received an increase
of force, consisting of five regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and one battery
of light artillery. When I left the command I left there upwards of 17,000
men. I landed there with about 12,000 men ; so that we were pretty strong in
troops there.
Question. Then you would have undertaken the capture of Savannah without
any additional troops if you had had sufficient transportation ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I would have done it. Whether it would have been wise
or not the result -must have determined.
Question. What additional force would you have wanted to have taken
Charleston in addition to Savannah 1
The witness : You suppose Savannah to be in our hands before going to
Charleston ?
Mr. Gooch : I mean for you to have a force to use in your own way, and at
your own time, necessary to take both Savannah and Charleston. I do not
mean you to move the same day on both.
The witness : That is, the expedition is to go out there to take both of those
cities in the way we may please. We would have to take one place and hold
it, and, as a matter of course, that would absorb a great many troops ; and you
mean to have the coast occupied as it is at present ?
Mr. Gooch : Yes, sir ; I mean to ask what additional troops you would require
for that purpose?
Answer. I would have felt myself perfectly safe with 25,000 men in addition
to what I had there.
Question. Now in relation to transportation : What additional transportation
would you have needed to have taken those two points 1
Answer. With regard to the taking of Savannah, there was no trouble about
that ; with regard to the taking of Charleston there is a great deal of guess
work, without visiting a great many of those localities. Indeed, the problem of
310 TESTIMONY.
the capture of Charleston would have to be determined before we could make a
very accurate estimate of the amount of transportation required. It would de
pend upon the manner in which we calculated to capture it.
Question. Then what additional means of transportation would you have
required to have taken Savannah 1
Answer. Over and above what 1 had, I wanted one hundred row-boats, capable
of carrying from 30 to 40 men each ; at least five light-draught steamboats,
capable of carrying from 800 to 1,000 men each, and not drawing over six or
seven feet each. We wanted, also, at least two hundred more Avagons and teams,
requiring somewhere about 1,000 horses and mules. That was what' would be
really necessary. Of course, I would not have waited for all that transportation,
but at a pinch I could have done with a portion of it, at the risk of some delay,
and probably considerable suffering on the part of the troops. With regard to
the amount of transportation it would require to take Charleston, I should want
some little time to reflect upon that matter before I could give an understanding
estimate upon that subject. I suppose that it is very likely that the same
amount of transportation that we would use to take Savannah would be used to
take Charleston, and perhaps would be all that would be necessary.
Question. You would probably require no additional transportation -to take
'Charleston 1
Answer. Probably none. At all events, I think I would have tried it. How
ever, I will make another remark about that. The amount of transportation
that I have mentioned as necessary to take Savannah is precisely what I asked
for in November and December last. The calculation at that time — and I have
not changed my opinion upon the subject since — was that that transportation
would be sufficient to meet any demands that could have been required of the
army during the whole winter, whether we went to Savannah or to Charleston,
or to other places. It may have been deficient, but I think that with that
amount of transportation I should have been ready to go anywhere where cir
cumstances would require me to go. In regard to the number of troops required
to take Savannah, I would say that 5,000 troops in addition to what is down
there would be sufficient * to take Savannah; and I should want some 20,000
more to take Charleston. .
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Could you have taken Charleston with 12,000 or 15,000 troops in
addition to the force you had when you landed ?
Answer. I can hardly say. I should hardly have liked to have risked it.
When I arrived at Port Royal I obtained information, statistics, &c., at Port
Royal, that there were 10,000 troops at that time in Charleston, and I have no
reason to suppose that the number has been diminished at any time since.
Question. What force, in your judgment, would have been necessary to have
taken Charleston at that time ]
Answer. I think we should have been perfectly safe in moving on Charleston
with 20,000 men.
Question. If after taking Charleston you had destroyed the place, could you
not with the same force have moved on and taken Savannah 1
Answer. Destroyed Charleston.
Question. Yes, sir. Could you not then have taken Savannah with the same
troops 1
Answer. I suppose we could if we had chosen to abandon the harbor of
Charleston. But I hardly know what object would have been gained by taking
Charleston without holding it, even if you had destroyed it. We should have
wanted to have held it, for the harbor there is an important one. There is a
great deal to be done before you go to the cities ; and therefore I think we
could have hardly taken those two places without 25,000 additional troops ?
TESTIMONY. 311
Question. Has not the time gone by for taking and holding those places this
summer 1
Answer. I think the time is rapidly passing. I think Charleston may be
taking during this month or the month of May; if we work briskly during the
month of May I think we may take it. But if it is not taken then I should
hardly advise any operations against it until fall, because Charleston is the
most sickly portion of the coast.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Did you not have a large amount of steamship tonnage in the em
ploy of this expedition ?
Answer. We had a large amount.
Question. Also of sailing vessels as transports ?
Answer. We had very few sailing vessels during the latter part of the expe
dition; we had some. And the number of steam transports were diminished,
finding they were so expensive, and cheap sailing vessels were substituted for
them. During the latter part of the expedition the bulk of the business was
done with sailing vessels.
Question. Have you any knowledge of the cost of the expedition for steamers
and transports ?
Answer. Do you mean the total cost 1
Question. Yes, sir.
Answer. I can speak only from memory at this time. But from what I can
recollect of the examination of the report of persons and articles hired by Cap
tain Saxton for the month of March, I think it is something short of $2,000,000.
But I am only speaking from memory.
Question. In your judgment have not these vessels been nearly paid for by
these charters 1 That is, has not their equivalent of value been paid for by
these charters ? In other words, would it not have been cheaper for the govern
ment to have bought them ?
Answer. I think it would have been very wise if some of the steamers had
been purchased for the government at the outset of the expedition, and I so
said at the time. Some of these vessels that have been in the employment of
the expedition since its commencement, I think, have nearly eaten themselves
up by the sums paid them by the government, which are about equal to their
value.
Question. Have not the government furnished coal in some instances to these
vessels ]
Answer. Yes, sir ; as a matter of necessity.
Question. Do you know at what cost it was furnished ?
Answer. No, sir; I do not. I know nothing about it.
Question. In your judgment should not the government have made some ar
rangement with the owners of these vessels by which they could have furnished
themselves with coal ?
Answer. If anything of the kind could be done, it would have been very well.
But I do not see how the government could have made any other arrangement
to supply steamboats out there with coal than the one that was made.
Question. Should not the owners of these steamboats have paid the full value
of the coal there rather than have paid merely New York prices ?
Answer. I think so. But that is a matter of detail that I know nothing about.
If they have been supplied at New York prices there, I think it is rather hard
upon the government. My impression has been that there should have been a
private coal-yard at Port Royal, before this time, as a matter of private enter
prise, where the owners of steamboats could have supplied themselves with
coal.
Question. Have you been satisfied with the manner in which the transporta-
312 TESTIMONY
tion has been managed there 1 I refer to the detention of the transports there
for so long a time, &c.
Answer. It has been my habit to carry on the public service with the great
est amount of economy that I have been capable of. I never was aware before
of so much expenditure in the way of transportation as there was in this expe
dition, I must confess. I have been somewhat aggrieved on several occasions
this winter, that we should be such an expense to the government in the way
of transportation. I have looked into the matter several times. I have inves
tigated it to see how this expense could be reduced. I have consulted with my
chief quartermaster, Captain Saxton, on this subject on several occasions. I do
not think that we have been able to do much good, any further than to have
employed a large number of sailing vessels, and used them wherever sailing
vessels could be used. That thing had some effect in reducing the expenses.
But I must confess that I have never felt completely satisfied in regard to this
matter, even up to the last. My impression is, and has been, that these steam
transports have been paid too high a price; a price that may have answered
very well for a short time, when they were first chartered. But in the long run
I think the price has been too high, and that has been my impression all the
time. However, it is a matter of detail that belonged to the quartermaster's de
partment with which I never could well interfere. If I had had time in New
York to have looked into this matter, I think we could have got this expedition
off much cheaper. But we were obliged to get up everything in a hurry ; the
the wliole matter was arranged in great haste. But I am very sure that it was
expected when these large steamers were first employed they would not be
employed more than 20 or 30 days at the furthest.
There was another thing, in connexion with the transportation, which caused
me some uneasiness, but for wrhich I was not responsible. There were six
steamers that lay in Wassaw sound upwards of thirty days, doing nothing in
the world but holding a number of men upon them, when it was promised me
that they should not lay there over five days, before they should be started off
on this Feruandina expedition.
Question. In whose charge was that?
Answer. I was in charge of the laud forces, and Commodore DuPont in charge
of the sea forces. We combined an expedition against Savannah. The idea
was that six gunboats and a brigade of soldiers, under General Wright, should
make a demonstration on the south side of the river. When the demonstration
was completed they were to fall back into Wassaw sound, and there to remain
until the fleet at Port Royal was ready to join it and proceed to Fernandina. I
agreed to that demonstration with the express understanding that this brigade
should not remain in Wassaw sound more than five days. I insisted repeatedly
that I could not afford to keep a brigade of troops and all the necessary trans
portation in Wassaw sound any length of time, but that the matter must be
concluded in five days, or I could not agree to it. It was agreed that they
should get out of the sound in five days at the furthest. Now, who is responsi
ble for the delay I will not say, but it was thirty-two days before the expedition
was got off, and these transports were lying there perfectly idle all that time.
Question. Did you ever learn any good reason why they were detained so
long"?
Answer. No full reason was ever given to me. I have been told unofficially
that the navy was out of ammunition, and was waiting all this time for a sup
ply from the north. I have already mentioned that when we first landed at
Port Royal there was a delay of a month in reference to the same expedition
to Fernandina.
Question. What was the cause of that first delay ]
Answer. They were waiting for ammunition ; and then, when the ammunition
came, orders came to Commodore DuPont to distribute and sink the stone fleet
TESTIMONY 313
all up and down the coast. That, of course, broke up the expedition at that
time, and I unloaded the vessels and sent them back to New York.
Question. Your troops were debarked?
Answer. The troops had been on board three weeks when we got there, and
I had them debarked ; but the stores, ordnance, &c., intended for that particular
locality 'were left on board the transports as long as there was any prospect that
the expedition would proceed.
Question. Did the naval part of your expedition use an unusual quantity of
ammunition at Port Royal?
Answer. I think Commodore DuPont told me that in the Port Royal affair
he used about two-thirds of the ammunition he had brought with him, so that
he did not consider it safe to start for Fernandina with the amount he had left,
in which I think he was wise.
APPENDIX.
Copies of reports of a commission appointed by the Navy Department in refer
ence to expeditions to the southern coast.
WASHINGTON, July 5, 1861.
SIR : We have the honor to inform you that the conference, in compliance
with your wishes, communicated through Captain DuPont, has had under con
sideration that part of your letters of instructions of the 25th ultimo which relates
to the necessity of occupying two or more points on the Atlantic coast, Fernan
dina being particularly mentioned as one of those points.
It seems to be indispensable that there should exist a convenient coal depot
on the southern extremity of the line of Atlantic blockade, and it seems to the
conference that if this coal depot was suitably selected, it might be used, not
only as a depot for coal, but as a depot of provisions and common stores, as a
harbor ©f refuge, and as a general rendezvous or headquarters for that part of
the coast.
We separate in our minds the two enterprises of a purely military expedition,
and an expedition the principal object of which is the establishment of a naval
station for promoting the efficiency of the blockade. We shall have the honor
to present plans for both expeditions ; but we will begin with the latter, pre
mising, however, that we think both of them should be conducted simultaneously.
Fernandina is, by its position, obviously the most suitable point for a place of
deposit, answering at one end of the line to Hampton Roads at the other. In
addition to its position in this respect, it enjoys several other advantages almost
peculiar to itself and well suited to the object in view.
It has fourteen feet of water on the bar at low water, and twenty at high
water, a convenient depth for all steam vessels of the navy, either propelled by
screws or side-wheels, rated as "second class steamships," and under ; for all
of those rated as " first class steamships," which are propelled by screws ; and
by [for] most of the same class propelled by side-wheels, when light ; and by
[for] all the newly purchased and chartered steamers of every description, with
the exception, perhaps, of one or two of the very largest mail-packet steamers
when deeply loaded.
These depths are perfectly convenient for the new sloops and gunboats now
on the stocks, and for the ordinary merchant vessels chartered for freight. The
main ship channel, over St. Mary's bar into Fernandina harbor, though not
direct, is by no means tortuous or difficult ; it is easily defined by buoys, and a
range by means of beacons renders the passage of the bar itself secure.
A steam-tug will always be at hand to take in sailing vessels when necessary
314 TESTIMONY.
Inside of the bar there is an unlimited extent of deep water accommodation,
and also the protection of smooth water before reaching the land-locked basins.
The anchorage in Amelia river possesses the quiet and safety of an enclosed
dock. Repairs of all kinds may be carried on there without the fear of accidents
arising from motion of the water.
The town of Fernandina and the wharves and depots of the Florida railroad
company furnish conveniences the value of which need not be enlarged upon.
If the seizure were conducted so suddenly as to prevent the destruction of
Eroperty amd buildings, (which it would be difficult to replace,) the facilities for
inding and storing coal and other materials will be found ,ready for use.
Another feature of the port, and one which has appeared to us of sufficient
importance to engage your particular attention, is the isolated position of Fer
nandina, territorially and in population. Fernandina is on an island, bounded
by the ocean on one side and having on the other an interior poor and uninter
esting in all respects, sparse in population, remote from large cities or centres of
military occupation, and not easily accessible by railroad or water communication.
By the census of 1850, the population of Fernandina was about 600; it is now
1,000; St. Mary's, 700; Darien, 550; Jacksonville, 1,145; St. Augustine, 1,934.
The distance, by water, from Fernandina to St. Mary's is 9 miles ; from Fer
nandina to Brunswick is 35 miles; from Fernandina to Darien is 51 miles;
from Fernandina, by railroad, to Baldwin is 47 miles ; from Baldwin, by railroad,
to Jacksonville is 20 miles ; from Fernandina, by water, to Savannah is 120
miles; from Fernandina, by Water, to Charleston is 166 miles; from Fernandina,
by railroad, to Cedar Keys is 154 miles; and from Fernandina, by railroad, to
Tallahassee, by the railroad to the Baldwin Junction and Alligator, nearly two
hundred miles, (192 miles.) With all the above mentioned places there is water
communication, except Cedar Keys, Tallahassee, and the railroad stations be
tween them.
But it is apparent that any military opposition of weight must come from
Savannah and Charleston, principally through Cumberland sound; and the
depth (less than ten feet in some places) of this line of interior navigation would
require the transportation of the troops in the light steamers employed there.
These steamers are so light and devoid of shelter, that an expedition would
hardly be undertaken if Amelia island were properly garrisoned.
The environs of Fernandina form a natural protection against an attack by
land. They consist of marsh and sand, which alone compose the shores of the
^ rivers and bayous.
We are careful to avoid making this communication unnecessarily long by
entering upon a comparison of Fernandina with other places in the same region
of coast; such as Brunswick, for example, which is now connected by railroad
with Savannah, and being more in the interior is less healthy ; or St. John's
entrance, which could be fortified against us, and has an insuperable objection
in its bar. But we take pains to say that such comparisons have formed a large
part of our study of the whole subject. We have not spoken of the peculiar
advantages of Fernandina as a depot and naval station without attaching a
meaning to the word.
Although an open and rapid communication with the Gulf of Mexico, by the
Florida railroad to Cedar Keys, accomplished in eleven hours, would undoubt
edly be desirable, still it has not entered into our project to recommend the
maintenance of this communication. To do so would employ a force dispro-
portioned to the possible benefits to be derived from it. The Central railroad
to Tallahassee, which connects with this road at Baldwin, is completed as far
as Alligator, and for a certain distance from Tallahassee east, about twenty miles.
The country on the line of the road is thickly wooded, and has few inhabitants.
A road of such length (154 miles) in an obscure and inhospitable district may
be easily rendered impassable.
TESTIMONY. 315
Fort Clinch is not thought to be defensible in its present condition ; and the
sand batteries on the shore can, probably, be easily turned.
The water is so smooth, in ordinary times, on the outer shore of Amelia
island, that a landing can be effected there with facility, and will, in our opinion,
be advisable at more than one point. This landing cannot be covered by large
ships, especially such as the " screw frigates." Vessels of small draught must
be selected for this duty, and when the points of landing are fixed upon, the
lines of approach for the covering vessels must be distinctly traced out.
The Florida railroad, from the west shore of Amelia island across the river,
is built on piles for the distance of about one mile, similar to the long bridges
across the Bush and Gunpowder.
When the attack is made one or more small gunboats might take the back
entrance, through Nassau inlet and sound, and prevent the destruction of this
bridge by the rebels. Nassau entrance is, no doubt, unguarded. Nassau bar
has only five feet of water on it, and even this depth is not to be relied upon ;
launches may therefore be»employed. A rapid survey, immediately preceding
the attack, will correct any misapprehension on this point. The preservation of
this trestle bridge is worth an effort. The remainder of the road can be replaced
with less cost, because it runs through a naturally level country.
It is estimated that three thousand men would take and hold the place, with
the assistance of such force as could be furnished by the fleet. After the place
was taken a portion of the defensive force would be found on board the vessels
in port. Thus the number of troops to be added to the marines and seamen,
employed in the attack and subsequent defence, would not, probably, at any
time, exceed this number of three thousand.
The details of the expedition to Fernandina, if decided upon, will foil under
the several bureaus of the War and Navy Departments, and the chiefs of the
expedition, to whom the conference will be always ready to offer such informa
tion and make such suggestions as may result from their careful study of the
ground.
The sailing directions for the port of Fernandina, the instructions for the
disposition of the buoys and beacons, the outer and inner anchorage, the pilotage,
and the meteorology of this section of coast will hereafter be furnished by the
conference from the archives of the Coast Survey.
It is known that Fernandina is healthy, and that it can supply wood and
water in abundance. Its market supplies remain to be developed.
Finally, we will repeat the remark made in the beginning of this report, that,
we think this expedition to Fernandina should be undertaken simultaneously
with a similar expedition having a purely military character.
We are preparing a brief report on the latter, which we shall have the honor
to submit in a few days.
We have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servants,
S. F. DUPONT,
Captain United States Navy and President.
J. G. BARNARD,
Major U?iited States Engineers, Member.
A. D. BACHE,
Superintendent United States Coast Survey, Member.
CHARLES PLINY DAVIS,
Commander United States Navy, Member and Secretary.
Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington.
316 TESTIMONY.
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 13, 1861.
SIR : We have the honor to inform you that, in further prosecution of the
duties assigned us, we have made a careful study of three of the most important
of the secondary bays or harbors on the southern coast, for the purpose of mili
tary occupation. These are Bull's bay, St. Helena sound, and Port Royal
sound — all on the coast of South Carolina.
We shall describe each one of them separately, offering some suggestions as
to their advantages and the best mode of occupying them ; and we will endeavor
to explain, by a comparison of their relative merits, the grounds for preferring
the two former over the latter for immediate occupation. We have taken them
up in the order of their situation, from north to south.
Bull's bay, which has been justly called a noble harbor of refuge, is fifteen
miles southeast of Cape Romain, and twenty-two miles from the main bar of
Charleston habor. The passage into it is direct, there being but one single
course over the bar. The light-house is plainly in sight, being less than four
miles distant from the outer curve of the bar, and its bearing, together with the
soundings and buoys, when properly placed, makes the entrance easy. Twenty
feet may be carried in at high water of common tides, and fifteen feet at low
water. The channel-way is marked by breakers on either hand, and inside
there is a snug, well-protected anchorage in deep water, with good holding
ground.
Bull's bay is situated below the parallel at which the West India hurricanes
leave the coast, which very much increases its value as a harbor of refuge.
Bull's island, from which the bay takes its name, is six and a half miles long, and
about a mile and a half wide. The northeast bluff, at the entrance, is high and
wooded, and admits of being strongly fortified without delay or great expense.
But batteries erected to defend the entrance may be taken in the rear, by land
ing about three miles south of the northeast bluff, and keeping on the beach till
within a mile of the light-house, where a wood road, near a fence, passes close
in the rear of the entire range of sand hills commanding the entrance.
It is suggested, therefore, that the extremity of the island should be secured
by an enclosed work on the point, and a line of intrenchments across the island,
at a distance of two miles (more or less) from the light-house.
For defence, Bull's bay possesses this striking advantage, that it can be held
at a single point. Excepting the small sand key, Bird island, there is no fast
.land from which it can be attacked ; Bird island is two miles off, not easy of ac
cess, and insignificant.
It is not probable that any defensive works constructed by the rebels will
oppose a very formidable obstacle to the occupation of the place ; but it is to be
considered that its proximity to Charleston subjects it to assault. This assault
may be made by combined forces from both directions, for there is interior water
communication with the Santee on the north as well as with Charleston on the
south. Vessels drawing not more than four and a half feet can come out of the
Santee, through Alligator creek at the " Horns," pass within Cape island and
Raccoon keys, traverse Bull's bay, and keep inside all the way to Charleston.
Very few white men know the whole route, but many negroes are familiar with
it. There are six " divides," or places where the tides diverge, or converge,
between Cape Romain and Charleston harbor. Four of these run dry at low
water, and the other two are encumbered with mud and oyster banks. At this
season of the year, however, the rice crops having been carried to market, there
is but little intercourse with the Santee district by water. Taking these liabili
ties into account, it is thought that four thousand men, well intrenched, would
hold the island ; though without an exact knowledge of its topography it is im
possible to speak with certainty.
The island affords good water, and timber for constructing wharves for coal-
TESTIMONY. 317
ing, or for other uses, if needed. In this respect, and as a harbor of refuge,
there is no point north of Charleston that can be made so useful. It is so easy
of access, and so perfectly healthy in the hot season, that the authorities of
Charleston have recommended it for the seat of a quarantine during their
stranger's (or yellow) fever months.
The military occupation of Bull's bay secures the easy command of the four
inlets (Price's, Caper's, Dewee's, and Breach inlets) lying intermediate between
it and Charleston harbor. Neither of these enjoy any trade now ; but De-
wee's inlet has seven feet at low water, or twelve feet at mean high water, and
an excellent anchorage in four fathoms on the inside. It might prove a useful
harbor to vessels of light draught. A deep creek, navigable for boats at low
water even to Station Fuller, (see chart,) enters Dewee's inlet. From Fuller to
Mount Pleasant is nine miles, and it is connected with Hocobaw Point, in rear of
Fort Moultrie and Castle Pinckney, for the greater part of the distance by a well-
travelled road in a fine forest. The high road from Charleston to Georgetown,
through Christ Church parish, passes at an average distance of four miles from
the shore. It is well-conditioned, the resort of a regular travel, and preserves
a communication with the banks of the two Pedees that would suffer no inter
ruption from our occupation of Bull's island.
St. Helena sound, situated nearly midway between Charleston and Savannah,
is particularly well adapted to promote the efficiency of the blockading squad
ron. There are two anchorages, which are healthy throughout the year — one,
near Otter island on the north, and one near Hunting island on the south ; and
the other bay is so wide that these two roadsteads may be considered wholly
independent of each other. There are three channels of approach ; the east,
the southeast, and the south channels. The first has only eight feet on the bar
at mean low water, and fourteen feet at high ; the second, which is a little less
direct, has ten and sixteen feet; and the third. has seventeen feet at mean low,
and twenty-three feet at mean high water. It should be remarked that the
mouth of South Edisto river is embraced within the northern limits of this sound.
The South Edisto is the Edisto proper, the North Edisto being the outlet of
Wadmelaw sound and the Dawhoo, while the Edisto itself is a long river, from
which large quantities of lumber are sent annually to Charleston. It is navi
gable for vessels drawing nine feet of water up to Governor Aiken's rice plan
tation at Ichassee, where it communicates with the North Edisto river through
the Dawhoo. The Dawhoo is navigable for steamers drawing not more than
six feet, at all times of tide, under the direction of a pilot. Thirteen feet of
water at mean low, and nineteen feet at mean high water, can be carried into '
the South Edisto, and there is good anchorage inside, west of Big Bay island,
in five fathoms ; but the anchorage on the north side of the bay which we first
mentioned, that under Otter island, is the better and healthier of the two. The
continuous ranges of sand shoals which compose the bar at the several entrances
of St. Helena sound extend, unfortunately, six miles to seaward, and the land
is low and difficult to distinguish. The channels, therefore, if used, must be
distinctly marked with buoys, the light-ship must be anchored in a suitable
place, and the light-house which has been built on Hunting island, together
with the beacon-light near it, must be maintained. Capable pilots must be at
hand. The delta shoals in St. Helena sound are long and narrow ; between
them are deep and very regular channels, running in directions nearly parallel
to each other, that may be called natural as regards the rivers of which they are
the drains. Beyond these delta shoals a mass of irregular shoals extend out to
the southward from Fenwick and Otter islands, (separating South Edisto from
the sound,) which, by breaking the sea in easterly storms, preserve compara
tively smooth water in the sound.
The Ashepoo, Combahee, Bull, Coosaw, Morgan Island and Hunting Island
rivers empty into the sound. To complete our topographical description we must
318 TESTIMONY.
speak of them in order. The Ashepoo enters the sound at Otter island, and at
its mouth, under the shelter of the island, is the safe and healthy anchorage we
have twice mentioned — safe in all weathers and healthy in all seasons — requir
ing protection from no other point than Otter island. Near the anchorage, but
separated from it by the delta of the Ashepoo and Combahee, is another equally
healthy and safe anchorage in six fathoms of water, equidistant between Otter
and Morgan islands, and nearly a mile and a half (nautical) from each, not
easily molested therefore from the land if Otter island were in our possession.
In crossing the bar and ascending the sound, to reach the anchorage, a vessel
need not approach Hunting island so near as two miles or Otter island nearer
than a mile and a half. The Ashepoo is navigable, for vessels drawing nine
feet of water, twelve miles above the point of Otter island, where they can sup
ply themselves with fresh water on the last of the ebb. Seven miles above is
the mouth of Mosquito creek, which connects with South Edisto through Bull's
cut. The light-draught steamers, plying on the inland passage from Charles
ton, south, go through this cut, descend the Ashepoo, cross the Combahee bank
through a small channel, and thence ascend the Coosaw to Beaufort and Port
Royal Ferry. This is only possible for steamers drawing five feet ; those of
larger draught must pass outside of Otter island. We have to penetrate to the
depth of six miles into the sound of St. Helena to reach the point of junction of
the Combahee and Coosaw rivers. The first of these rivers is navigable for
vessels drawing ten feet of water some twenty miles up. Fresh water may be
had on the ebb about ten miles up. There is a boat connexion with the Ashe
poo about ten miles up. The Coosaw is broader and shoaler than the Com
bahee. It forms a part of the interior navigation from Charleston. Steamers
drawing eight or nine feet will run outside from Charleston to St. Helena sound,
and entering the latter by the most convenient channel, according to the tide,
will proceed up the Coosaw to its junction with the Beaufort river at the brick
yard, and thence down to Beaufort on the inside way from Savannah and Florida,
or the same steamer may continue up Coosaw river to its head, near Port Royal
Ferry, and go thence through Whale Branch into Broad river and Port Royal
bay. Vessels bound up the Coosaw may go by the way of Morgaji river to
PaiTOt creek, which connects the two rivers by a fifteen feet channel. All these
connexions are readily traced on a map of a suitable scale. They are pointed
out in detail, because you will perceive from them how large a tract of country,
and how extensive, important, and complex a series of lines of interior trade
and navigation will be threatened and commanded by the military possession of
St. Helena sound.
Hitherto we have specified two anchorages as desirable ; it remains for us to
speak of the third and the best. The south channel, as we have said before,
has seventeen feet at low water, and twenty-three feet at mean high water ; it
is, therefore, quite superior to the others. It leads to an anchorage in five fath
oms of water, within half a mile of the northeast point of Hunting island, and
near the new lighthouse. Both the anchorage and the adjacent shore are
healthy throughout the year. The island is about six miles long, with an av
erage width of little more than half a mile to Johnson's creek. It is wooded,
and is stocked with deer, being used as a game preserve. A small creek, (John
son's,) with a narrow channel fifteen feet deep near its mouth, runs close to the
shore. This is a suitable place for a coaling depot. There is timber for con
structing a wharf, for which there is a natural site near the mouth of a small
creek. We have said that the two anchorages on the north and south sides of
the sound are independent of each other. It is so ; but the isolation of that
which is protected by Hunting island is the most complete. Here, as in Bull's
bay, and in these two places alone, the military occupation of a single point,
remote and inaccessible to a large force, except by great expense of time, labor,
and money, secures the roadstead, the depot, and the channel of approach ;
TESTIMONY. 319
and, moreover, this channel is the best of the three leading into St. Helena
sound, from the broader space of which it is effectually separated by a natural
barrier of banks, partially dry at low water. Neither shells nor solid shot
could molest the shipping; nor, hardly, projectiles from rifled camion. And
the possession of this anchorage commands a- considerable extent of inland nav
igation, though less than that on the north side. Vessels of heavy draught can
pass into Morgan river by turning the spit of a shoal near Hunting Island point,
and those of light draught by an inner channel between Oyster and Egg banks.
Vessels drawing ten feet of water may take an inside passage from Hunting
island to Port Royal bay, entering the latter through Station creek.
Three points of meeting of the tide occur. The channel is bold, in general,
but intricate, requiring a pilot. Many wooded hammocks and one large house
must be passed within pistol-shot. Between St. Helena sound and Port Royal
bay are found four inlets — Tripp's, Skull, Pritchard's, and Trenchard's— -of
wrhich the first and last only, having ten and thirteen feet respectively at high
water, can be made available for the uses of commerce.
It is estimated that four thousand men, in addition to the co-operating naval
force, would be sufficient to take and hold Hunting island, which would be de
fended like Bull's island, by an enclosed work on the point, and a line of en
trenchments across from the sea to Johnson's creek, at some distance from the
light! The entrenchments would be less extreme on account of the island be
ing much narrower.
In order to fill out our notes on this vicinity, we shall observe that at the
eastern end of St. Helena island, which forms the right bank of the outlet of
Morgan river into St. Helena sound, stands the plantation of Mr. Coffin, at
whose place commences a public road called the Sea-side road, that extends
thirteen miles to Port Royal bay, at Land's End. Two miles from Mr. Coffin's
a road diverges to the right, leading to Ladies' island and Beaufort, distant
eleven miles. Both these roads are lined with the residences of gentlemen, and
sea-island cotton plantations. Parrot creek, joining Morgan and Coosaw rivers,
has been referred to ; opposite to it is Village creek, leading to a village on a
bluff, the summer resort of the St. Helena planters. Four fathoms may be car
ried up Morgan river to Dalthay island, which is separated from St. Helena
sound by a creek. This creek unites at its head with Cowan creek, while the
latter separates St. Helena from Ladies' island. Boats pass by this route from
Beaufort to St. Helena sound. The road to Beaufort from Ashton's, just men
tioned, crosses the creek by a bridge, at the plantation of the late Mrs. General
Eustis. Ladies' island, at the head of Morgan river, is a little more than a mile
wide. The town of Beaufort is on the opposite shore of the river of that name.
A road leads from Mr. McKee's plantation, at the head of Morgan river, across
to the bluff opposite Beaufort.
The above description will enable you to form an idea of the interdependence
and of the intercommunication by boat and carnage between the islands filling
up the head of St. Helena sound and the waters emptying into it; of the ad
vantages to be derived from its military occupation ; and of the opposition, with
its means and facilities of combination, which this occupation is likely to pro
voke.
Port Royal bay is the finest harbor south of Chesapeake bay, which it
resembles in capacity and extent. It is approached by three channels, the least
of which has seventeen feet of water, while the two others have nineteen feet at
mean low, and twenty-five feet at mean high water. Several of our screw frig
ates of the first class can pass the bar, and when the entrance is once made a
whole navy can ride at anchor in the bay in uninterrupted health and security.
The bar, however, is badly situated ; the narrowest and shoalest part is so far
out from the headlands, which generally furnish natural beacons and sailing
marks, that a conspicuous object is needed on the spot.
320 TESTIMONY
The light-ships should be replaced, and large buoys should be planted in
proper places. (An open screw-pile basket-beacon, well braced, might be put down
with great advantage in a well protected spot, under the the lee of Martin's In
dustry and the southeast breakers.) We are looking ahead a little in saying
this. The absence of light-vessels, beacons, and buoys, will by no means pre
vent access to the bay. The ships of the expedition will pass through a lane of
small vessels anchored on the borders of the natural channel.
It is probable that the entrance to the harbor has bee-n fortified on both sides,
and especially at Bay Point. This point may be approached in the rear by land
ing at Pritchard's inlet, next east of Trenchard's inlet, near high water, pulling
through the creek connecting the two, down Trenchard's inlet to a point near
Luce Station, and thence passing along the beach and through the woods to
Bay Point. On the Hilton Head side it is more difficult to take the point in the
rear.
rn
The entrance is over two miles wide ; there is fine achorage under Bay Point ;
on the shore is a number of rough houses, the summer resort of planters. Un
der the head of St. Helena we have entered into some details respecting the
interior communications and navigation, that need not be repeated. The town
of Beaufort, on Port Royal island, lias no commercial importance. During the
hot weather, when the planters are in their summer residences, the population
numbers about two thousand; at other periods of the year it has but little more
than five hundred inhabitants. A battery of eight guns, it is said, has been
erected at the eastern end of the town.
Water may be had at the station Port Royal, Land's End, St. Helena sound,
or by sinking wells from six to ten feet deep anywhere along shore, or casks at
Bay Point. Near this point may be constructed a wharf for a coaling station,
above the mouth of the little creek that appears on the coast survey chart. The
piece of marsh between the fort land and deep water (on the chart) must be
crossed by a bridge. Timber grows close by. The woods, directly in the rear
of the sea-beach, consists , chiefly of pine, interspersed with chinquapin and live
oak. Portions of the island are clear and open. Near the beach there are many
clumps of myrtle bushes matted together with jack vines and Cherokee roses.
The island is healthy where exposed to the influence of the sea breeze. Perry
island, which separates Beaufort and Broad rivers, is about five miles long, and
is devoted to the culture of sea-island cotton. Broad river is navigable up to
the Charleston and Savannah railroad station at Pocotaligo. Steamers and sail
ing vessels from St. Helena pass around Port Royal island and enter Broad
river by way of Port Royal ferry and Whale Branch.
Port Royal is one of the wealthiest of the sea islands, and is devoted to the
culture of sea-island cotton. Besides the passage of communication between
Port Royal bay and St. Helena sound, through Whale Branch, there is a nar
row passage, having nine feet at low water, between Lemon and Daw islands,
going down the Chechesee river, and entering Skull creek. A depth of nine
teen feet may ba carried from Port Royal bay up Chechesee river to Foot Point,
on the Colleton river. This range, a distance of miles, was surveyed in
1859, with reference to a naval depot and coaling station at Foot Point.
Hilton Head island, which is devoted to the culture of sea-island cotton, ex
tends from Port Royal bay to Calibogue sound, and thirteen feet may be carried
up the Chechesee through Skull creek to the sound, which constitutes the inland
passage to Savannah. The outer shore of Hilton Head island is so effectually
protected by Gaskin bank, and the shoals inside of it, that a landing is practi
cable in moderate weather. This is facilitated by an inshore channel within
the outer breakers. It may be stated, as one general fact, true of the whole
coast of South Carolina, that there~are from one to two feet less water on the
bars during and immediately after westerly gales, and as much more during and
after northeast and southeast gales; the latter cause the heaviest sea. Another
TESTIMONY. 321
general fact is that those are the most healthy sites which are open to the direct
action of the sea breeze. Sheltered points close to the sea shore will often be
unhealthy, while others, with a southern exposure, six or eight miles inland,
will be perfectly healthy during summer and autumn.
For the military occupation of Port Royal bay, it would be necessary, in order
to escape molestation, to hold three points, and this would probably involve, as
the easiest method of holding them, the occupation of the three islands of which
these points form part; that is, Hilton Head island, Parry's island, and Philip's
island. It is difficult to give any precise estimate of the exact number of troops
required to hold these islands. At the present moment, when most of the
southern troops are in Virginia or Tennessee, it is triable that, notwithstand
ing the contiguity of Savannah and Charleston, no very large bodies could be
concentrated against us, but the operation would be likely to withdraw the
troops from the north. This effect, almost certain as it is, will compensate us
for the application of a considerable force at this point. Six thousand men
might take possession of Port Royal, but to hold it permanently would probably
require ten or twelve thousand men, in addition to the available navy contingent.
Of these three places, Bull's bay, St. Helena sound, and Port Royal bay, we
have no hesitation in recommending the immediate military occupation of the
first, for the reasons already fully given in the preceding pages, viz : its acces
sibility, direct channel, safe anchorage; all of which make it a most convenient
harbor of refuge, and its being securely held by the possession of a single point.
With regard to St. Helena sound and Port Royal bay there is more room for
doubt. We have compared the two somewhat as follows : If Port Royal has
the greater depth over the bar, twenty- three feet to twenty-five, yet the bar of
the former is eight miles from the land, whilst that of the latter is only three
and a half miles. St. Helena is held by the occupation of a single point. Port
Royal requires that three points should be taken and fortified. The entrance
of the former is six miles wide, and the west channel can only be molested from
Hunting island. That of the latter is only two miles wide, and the attacking
fleet will be subject to fire from both sides. The resources for wood and coal
are about the same in each. St. Helena is more central between Charleston
and Savannah ; Port Royal commands a larger interior communication and
trade. The whole bay of Port Royal comprises one large, open space, capable
of containing any number of vessels anchored in one body. The anchorages of
St. Helena are divided, and distinct from each other. It seems to us that St.
Helena ought to be seized before Port Royal, because it will be so much more
easily taken and held. The former is a comparatively obscure place, little
known, and but little resorted to, while the latter is constantly talked of as the
first point of attack, and is closely looked after. Stephen Elliott, jr., of Parry
island, a nephew of George P. Elliott, has been employed in fortifying Port
Royal, every foot of which he is familiar with, while not a planter knows St.
Helena.
Finally, believing that the three points we have recommended will suffice for
the purpose of coaling stations and harbors of refuge for the blockading squad
rons, we are not disposed to recommend any immediate measures for the taking
of Port Royal. The putting of twelve or fifteen thousand men thus in the im
mediate neighborhood of Charleston and Savannah, and the presence of a con
siderable fleet in this noble harbor, would, doubtless, be a sore annoyance to the
rebels, and necessitate the constant maintenance of large forces in those cities
and on those shores. Yet the same force, naval and military, organized as an
expedition, and held in hand at New York for a blow anywhere, would threaten
not only Savannah and Charleston, but the whole southern coast.
If, in the organization of such a force, its destination should be absolutely
undefined, the threat would be equally against every important point of the
southern coast, from Hatteras to the Rio Grande. The simple putting to sea of
Part iii 21
322 TESTIMONY.
such a force, if it were only but to return again to its post, would cause general
alarm, and the Gulf States could no longer permit their troops to swell the
armies of Virginia.
The force thus organized, after having, by frequent embarcations and disem-
barcations, used as a means of threat, and thus perfectly drilled to its intended
service, might, at last, be permitted to strike its blow, whether at New Orleans;
or Mobile, or Pensacola, or Savannah, or Port Royal, or that focus of rebellion
— the scene of the great indignity offered our flag — Charleston, might be de
cided at the last moment.
We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants,
S. F. DUPONT, '
Captain United Stutes Navy, President.
A. D. BACHE,
Superintendent United States Coast Survey, Member.
J. G. BARNARD,
Major United States Engineers, Member.
CHARLES PLINY MILES,
Commander United States Navy, Secretary and Member.
Honorable GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.
WASHINGTON, April 15, 1862.
Captain RUFUS SAXTON sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am a captain in the quartermaster's department — an assistant
quartermaster.
Question. Where have you served during the present war ?
Answer. My first service was with General Lyon, in Missouri; I was his
chief quartermaster. I served with him during the siege at the St. Louis
arsenal, and also at the attack on Jackson. I continued to serve with him
until a short time before the battle of Springfield. I was then ordered to
the department of Western Virginia, where I served with General McClellan
during his campaign there as his chief quartermaster. When that campaign
was over, I was sent to New York city to assist General Sherman in organ
izing his expedition to Port Royal. I organized that expedition and went
with it to Port Royal, and served there until a week ago last Sunday.
Question. What force had General Sherman under him there ?
Answer. When I left there were about 17,000 men there.
Question. What time did you arrive there ?
Answer. Early in November last. We left New York in October. We
met a very severe storm on the way down, which scattered our fleet. We
thought at first that it would annihilate our expedition, but it did not. We
collected it together again, and proceeded to our destination.
Question. What number of vessels had you in that expedition ?
Answer. I do not recollect the exact number.
Question. You had the whole army on board ?
Answer. Yes, sir; we had 15,000 men afloat, besides the naval force.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Your vessels were all chartered ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
TESTIMONY. 323
Question. Were all the vessels chartered by you? Here is a list of ves
sels chartered, purporting to give the names of those chartering them. Did
you charter all assigned you in this list? — (Senate Executive Document No.
37, 37th Congress, 2d session.)
Answer. [Examining the list.] Yes, sir; the list is correct.
Question. Are all you chartered contained in this list ?
Answer. I do not recollect of any others than those mentioned here.
Question. There are some schooners mentioned here as being chartered
by you ?
Answer. Yes, sir; we chartered them down at Port Royal; we found it
cheaper to do so than to keep the steamers there.
Question. Did you charter the steamers by the day ?
Answer. Yes, sir, mostly; some few of them by the month. I think the
most of them were chartered by the day.
Question. The Atlantic and Baltic were chartered by the day ?
Answer. Yes, sir; at $1,500 each; the Yariderbilt and Ocean Queen were
chartered at $2,000 a day each.
Question. The prices contained in this list are correct ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. For what time did you charter these steamers ?
Answer. It was entirely indefinite — as long as the government might want
them. Some few of them we had to agree to take for a certain length of
time; but I avoided that whenever I could, and sought to keep it entirely
optional with myself when they should be discharged. Some of the owners
insisted that they should be retained in service a certain number of days,
or they would not let me have their steamers at all.
When I went to New York to charter these vessels no one knew about
the expedition, or that any such expedition was going, and I kept it secret;
and in that way I got the vessels a great deal less than I should have done
had I let it be known in New York that I was going to charter so many
vessels. No two persons were allowed to know at that time that this ex
pedition was to be fitted out.
Question. Did you charter the vessels directly from the owners them
selves ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Without the intervention of brokers or agents ?
Answer. I consulted with two men who understood shipping as advisers.
I had no agents at all.
Question. There were no agents between you and the parties owning the
vessels ?
Answer. No, sir; I was a stranger there, and I employed 'men who knew
about ships to advise me; to see the owners of the ships and the vessels;
but there was no one between me and the owners.
Question. So far as you know, were there any commissions paid by the
owners of these vessels to any of these parties ?
Answer. No, sir; not that 1 know of. If there had been., and I had known
it, I would not have taken the ships. No commissions were paid, to my
knowledge. If I had supposed that there had been any, that would have
been a reason for my not taking the ships. I received nothing myself, and
I did not allow anybody else to take anything, to my knowledge.
Question. It has been charged that these vessels have been detained at
Port Royal at a very heavy expense.
Answer. There has been no vessel detained there that was not absolutely
necessary.
Question. Take the steamer Marion; how long has she been there?
Answer. A very long time; I do not recollect how many days. We were
324 TESTIMONY.
operating all along the whole coast. We had possession of the coast from
the harbor down to Augustine, and we kept vessels there for days and
weeks, because we did not know how far we would have to go, or where.
Question, Did you use these vessels for that purpose ?
Answer, Yes, sir; altogether. Sometimes we kept vessels there for
weeks, and did not use them at all; but it was the understanding of General
Sherman that they would be used. I sent the vessels home as soon as I
could learn they would not be needed, and I did not keep them after we
were through with them.
Question. How many did you keep there ?
Answer. Sometimes more, and sometimes less. At first we had to land
everything through the surf in small boats. There was no pier there, and
sometimes it would be so windy for days that we could not do anything.
We set to work immediately to build a pier, and finally finished it, when we
could unload much faster. The vessels were then unloaded and sent home,
except those that we considered it necessary to keep for our operations
Question. How many steamers did you have there for fifty days ?
Answer. A great many, I should think. I cannot tell the number.
Question. Were they not idle most of the time ?
Answer. Yes, sir; they were idle. They had loads on, however. There
were cargoes on them that we could not get out. We used to work our
men in the water night and day taking out the cargoes. We were waiting
some weeks for the navy to move to operate down at San Augustine.
Question. But all this time the cost of these vessels was running on at
the rate of from $1,000 to $2,000 a day ?
Answer. Yes, sir; they were lying there idle all the time. It was a
matter over which I had not the slightest control. I was merely an agent.
No vessel could leave there without the order of the general commanding.
Question. Did you represent to the general commanding that there was
an enormous expense going on ?
Answer. Yes, sir; a great many times.
Question. .Could you not get from him authority to send them home ?
Answer. We could not spare them. It was not safe for the army there
without these vessels. We did not know what force they had in front of
us, and without these vessels we had nothing to fall back upon. It was
supposed that there were some 60,000 or 70,000 of the enemy in front of us.
Question. You kept these vessels as a refuge— something to fall back
upon, should it become necessary to do so ?
Answer. Yes, sir; and to move troops also. We could do nothing there
except by water.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. How many men did you say you had in front of you ?
Answer. We estimated that there were some 60. 000 on the line, including
those in Savannah, along the line of the railroad, and in Charleston.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Have yo*u any data with you which would enable you to tell
how long you kept these steamers there ?
Answer. I have in my office.
Question. In this city ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I have given certificates for the time the vessels served
there. It will all appear in the quartermaster's office.
Question. Can you furnish this committee with a list of steamers and
other vessels that you chartered, and the time for which you gave them
certificates ?
TESTIMONY. 325
Answer. Yes, sir; I will do that.
Question. Do these charters for the steamers in every instance cover all
expenses ?
Answer. The whole running expenses, coaling and all. I chartered the
fleet that took down our force of 15,000 men, and we took them down there
without losing a single vessel which I chartered, or losing a single life, and
we passed through one of the severest storms ever seen on this coast.
There were vessels lost, but none that were chartered by me.
Question. According to the terms of the charter-parties, the owners of the
vessels that you chartered were to furnish coal ?
Answer. Yes, sir; every one, except the Ben Deford, perhaps. For that,
I think, I agreed to furnish the coal, but all the rest had to furnish coal for
themselves. They received a great deal of coal from the government, but
every pound of coal that they got from me I charged on their charter-party.
Question. Why did you furnish coal to them ?
Answer. It was when they had none down there.
Question. Was it not rather their business to furnish the coal than yours ?
Answer. Yes, sir; but the charter stipulated that in case the government
furnished coal they should pay for it.
Question. How did you charge the cost of the coal ?
Answer. At New York prices.
Question. Then you gave them the cost of transporting the coal down
there ? ^
Answer. They would not charter to pay for coal what it might be worth
wherever they got it. They agreed to furnish coal and to run the ships;
but if they used government coal they, were to receive it at New York
prices.
Question. Did you furnish coal to the whole of them?
Answer. No, sir; not to half of them. I furnished it only in cases of ab
solute necessity, when they were entirely out of it, and were ordered off
somewhere and had no coal. Then I let them have government coal which
had been sent down there.
Question. Sent by the government ?
Answer. Mr. Tucker sent it.
^ Question. The government transported the coal down there, and then fur
nished it to the owners of these steamers at New York prices ?
Answer. Yes, sir; that was in the charter; they would not make any
other agreement.
By the chairman:
Question. What is the expense of running one of those steamers that
you chartered, for instance, at $1,000 a day ?
Answer. I cannot tell; I am not acquainted with the cost of running
ships. I know that it would cost the government a great deal more than it
would cost a private company. But I am not able to say what it would
cost.
By Mr. Odell:
Question^ Did you keep an account of the cotton shipped from there, or
was that shipped under your superintendence ?
Answer. It was shipped under my superintendence at first, but afterwards
it was all turned over to Colonel Reynolds, the government agent. I com
menced the collection of the cotton, and got it under way before Colonel
Reynolds got down there, and when he came I furnished him transportation
for it.
Question. Has the cotton exported by yonr expedition anything like com
pensated the demurrage of the ships there ?
326 TESTIMONY.
Answer. No, sir; it has not, if you reckon the steamers.
Question. I mean reckoning all.
Answer. No, sir; it has not.
Question. Has it half done it ?
Answer. No, sir; I should think not. I do not imagine there has been
more than $700,000 worth of cotton shipped; certainly not more than a mil
lion of dollars worth. I do not think the cotton has been sold for its full
value. It was very fine cotton, arid I think worth more than it was sold for.
Question. Are these vessels still there?
Answer. Very few of them are there now. I sent them off as fast as we
thought we could spare them.
Question. There has been a large number of vessels chartered to take
coal there, chartered either by yourself or others ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. It has been said that care has not been taken to clear these
vessels out as soon as might be.
Answer. All I can say is, that any such charge as that is false. Every
precaution was taken to get them off as soon as possible We worked our
men night and day in the water to get the coal landed and the vessels sent
off. We got piers erected as soon as possible, and had the coal landed as
rapidly as possible. And even after we had done that, it was a question
whether the greater length of time it took to coal the steamers from the
docks was not enough to make up for all the demurrage in keeping the coals
on the vessels and loading the ships directly from the coal transports. I
know that I worked for the interest of the government as well as I could,
and so did my assistants. I pronounce all such statements as that false.
Question. You refer to sending off the transports ?
Answer. I refer to every vessel down there, so far as the unloading them
is concerned. Every effort was made to unload those ships rapidly. I
worked night and day at it, as did my agents — night and day, Sundays and
all. Ships may have been detained there when it was not necessary. But
I am not responsible for that. That comes under the commanding general.
Every ship was sent off as quickly as I could get orders to send it; and I
could not send it before.
By the chairman:
Question. What is the condition of the army there in regard to their health
and efficiency ?
Answer. They were very healthy when I left. There seemed to be very
little sickness there. In the course of the winter it was otherwise; it was
very sickly for a time; but that we attributed to working the men in the
water night and day, carrying stores ashore — especially the working them
in the water after night.
Question. Why did you not employ contrabands for that business ?
Answer. We did employ a great many of them. We could not have got
along without the assistance of the contrabands. They worked very cheer
fully, and were of great assistance to us. But it is a very great undertaking
to supply an army of 17,000 men on shore from vessels, without piers to land
the stores upon.
Question. There seemed to be a time when the army might have advanced
upon Charleston and Savannah, and have proceeded into the interior. Do
you know any reason why that was not done ?
Answer. No, sir; I do not. I suppose the officers in command were not
• aware of the panic that seized the people there after the taking of Port
Koyal. After we took the forts there, there was a complete panic through
out the whole southern country. We could have gone into Savannah at
TESTIMONY. 327
that time with 200 men, I believe. And the reason we did not, I suppose,
was because the condition of the country was not known.
Question. Do you know what were the orders from headquarters to the
commanding officers of the expedition ?
Answer. Their orders were to open two harbors on the southern coast, in
order that the blockading squadron should have some place to go into when
necessary. They were to open two ports, if possible; one certainly.
Question. Were their orders sucfe as to prohibit their making expeditions
into the interior ?
Answer. Not so far as I am aware.
Question. In brief, what was the condition of affairs that you found there ?
You have already said that there was such a panic created by your landing
that Charleston and Savannah might have been taken easily. In regard to
the white inhabitants there, did they leave the country ?
Answer. They deserted the country, leaving everything behind. They
tried to take their negroes with them, but they would not go. They shot
down their negroes in many instances because they would not go with them.
They tied them behind their wagons, and tried to drag them off; but the
negroes would not go. The great majority of the negroes remained behind,
and came into our lines.
Question. What is the condition of the negroes there now ?
Answer. It is improving very much. There have been a great many
articles Bent down to them from the north. Ladies have gone down there,
and are teaching them, and they are going to work on the plantations now;
and I think their condition is very much improved.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Has the culture of the soil been gone into to any great extent ?
Answer. To quite a large extent.
Question. Enough to give employment to the contrabands ?
Answer. Yes, sir. There is no trouble about employing them if they can
receive the products of their labor. I have been told by many of the negroes
that if they can be assured that they will receive the benefit of their own
labor, they are ready to go to work. They can take care of themselves.
Question. What has been your hospital accommodations there ?
Answer. At first they were very poor. But we have a very good hospital
there now.
Question. The accommodations now are all that are necessary ?
Answer. Yes, sir; we have a hospital there 1,300 feet long — a temporary
hospital — raised up from the ground and well ventilated; as good a hospital
as there is in the country anywhere.
Question. Well appointed?
Answer. Yes, sir; with good, skilful surgeons, and everything necessary to
make the sick comfortable. I built it myself, and I know all about it. I
think that in the course of the spring, and certainly if we go into the inte
rior, there must be a great deal of sickness from the malaria that arises
from the swamps, and which is very dangerous. But I think there will be
no difficulty in remaining at Hilton Head all summer. Beaufort, too, I think
is healthy, and also Tybee island and a great part of the Edisto. But the
trouble is, that going into the interior will bring us into these malarious
swamps.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question Could you not have used a large force there to good advantage ?
Answer. Yes, sir; we needed a larger force. We could have used 50,000
men to great advantage, and ought to have had them.
328 TESTIMONY.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. What could you have done with that force, if you had had it?
Answer. We could have taken Savannah and Charleston, both.
Question. How early could you have done that ?
Answer. Very soon after we received the force, I think.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Has there been any time when you could not have taken Charles
ton and Savannah with a force of 50,000 men ?
Answer. No, sir; no time at all.
Question. You mean by 50,000, if your force had been increased to 50,000 ?
Answer. Yes, sir; we then could have taken both of those places at any
time. We should have first marched to their railroad and cut off their com
munication, and then we could have moved from Pocotaligo, which was very
near our line, to Savannah a|jd Charleston.
Question. Do you know whether application was made for more force ?
Answer. I do not know certainly about that. I know that application
was made for horses and wagon trains, for I made the application myself,
but they were not supplied. It is my impression that General Sherman
applied for more troops; I am pretty sure he did.
Question. What did you want with horses and wagons ?
Answer. To make these onward movements. We wanted to move on
Savannah, and also on Charleston.
Question. You say " we wanted to."
Answer. By that I refer to the whole army.
Question. Including the general in command ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Then why did you not move on Savannah ?
Answer. There were two plans of action. The generaPs orders, I think,
were to secure two harbors on the coast, to make a place for the blockading
squadron to go into in case of bad weather. Having taken Port Royal, we
found that a great deal more fell into our hands ; indeed we got possession of
the entire coast. The question then arose whether it would be better to take
possession of all the harbors on the coast and hold them, or to keep the force
inland and m-ove directly on Savannah. And I think that upon consultation
with the Navy Department the decision was that it was better to occupy the
coast. And in consequence of that the movement upon Savannah was given
up until re-enforcements should arrive.
Question. If your force had been increased to 50,000 men, you could then
have occupied the coast, and taken Charleston and Savannah, too ?
Answer. I think so ; I know that if I had been in command I should have
liked very much to have had an opportunity to have attempted it.
Question. In army operations, as a general thing, can a considerable por
tion of colored people be used without putting arms into their hands ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; they are ready to do anything for us.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Could they not be made use of in fortifications in the sickly
season ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; with very great advantage.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. If our army should remain in the south, would it be possible to
employ quite a large number of negroes to aid and assist the army ?
Answer. Yes, sir. We have some five hundred now employed in the Port
Royal department. They will do anything we tell them to do.
TESTIMONY. 329
Question. As a general thing do you find them willing to work ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Are they reasonably intelligent ?
Answer. Some of them are very intelligent, while others are not. There
is a wide distinction between them in that respect.
Question. In your opinion, what could you have accomplished if, within,
say, sixty or ninety days after you landed there, you had been re-enforced to
75,000 men ?
Answer. I think we could have taken military possession of the greater
portion of South Carolina and Georgia I think that there are a great many
loyal men there who would have joined our cause the moment there was a
show of force there to sustain the cause of the government. I think we
could have taken possession of all their lines of railroads and all their prin
cipal towns. I have conversed with a great many prisoners whom we have
taken there, and have frequently found men in the middle and lower condi
tions of life to whom this rebellion is exceedingly distasteful. They only
serve in the rebel ranks because they are forced to do so.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Is that the general verdict of the men you have taken prisoners ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; of that class.
Question. That they are in the rebel army because they are obliged to be
there ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; and they have told me that if they could only be
assured that they would not be forced to violate their oath of allegiance,
they would take it and go back to their homes.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. It is, then, your opinion that if we had taken military possession
of South Carolina and Georgia, as we might have done, with an army of 75,000
men, we should have found a large portion of the people ready to give in
their allegiance to the government as soon as they could have felt assured
of protection ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; that is my opinion.
Question. And by not doing that before this time, has not the best season
of the year for operations in that country been lost ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I think it has.
Question. Have you had sufficient transportation to have taken such an
army from Annapolis, or some other point in this vicinity, to the southern
coast ?
Answer. Yes, sir, by making several trips.
Question. How many trips would it have required to have taken 75,000
men down there ?
Answer. Our fleet took down between 14,000 and 15,000 at one time.
The best policy would have been to have employed some of those large
steamers that could have gone down there in 60 hours. They would have
taken the troops down very rapidly.
Question. How long would it have taken, with the means of transporta
tion that you had, to have transferred 60,000 men from the Potomac to your
scene of operations ?
Answer. I should think it might all have been done in a month.
Question. And without any very great increase of expense to the govern
ment ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I think a great portion of the army of the Potomac
might have been taken down there, and have fought several battles, and
come back here again before they were needed for operations here, and been
330 TESTIMONY.
all the better prepared to fight here from the experience they would have
gained.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Would it have been possible for the enemy, with the means of
transportation at their command, to have concentrated an army down there
in time to have met the force that we could have taken there ?
Answer. I think not. We should have taken possession of the railroad
lines at the very first, and could have retained all the advantages we had
in the beginning.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Has this been a subject of discussion among military men
where you were, that the seat of war should have been transferred to the
cotton States ?
Answer. Yes, sir. We have all along felt that that should have been done.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. In your judgment would it have been safe to have trusted
arms in the hands of the colored men there ?
Answer. Yes, sir, I think it would.
Question. They would have used them against the rebels ?
Answer. Most undoubtedly. There can be no question about that.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Have the enemy in any instance armed their slaves ?
Answer. We understood that they had one or two regiments of slaves in
New Orleans. But I do not think they could rely upon them at all.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. You think they could be relied upon to fight for our side ?
Answer. I am sure of that.
Question. Are the local attachments of these negroes very strong ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you think that if slavery should be abolished that we of the
north would be seriously troubled by their coming among us ?
Answer. No, sir. I do not think they would leave their old homes wil
lingly. It is my impression that if 37ou would give each of these negroes a
little strip of land to cultivate for themselves, enough to support themselves
and their families, they would take care of themselves, and the remaining
land would soon become worth more than all the land and all the negroes
were worth before.
Question. In your opinion, has it not been a military mistake that we have
not before this made use of the muscle of the blacks to aid us in putting
down this rebellion ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I think so.
TESTIMONY.
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TESTIMONY. 333
BURNSIDE EXPEDITION.
WASHINGTON, March 19, 1863.
Major General A. E. BURNSIDE recalled and examined.
By Mr. Gooeh:
Question. Will you give the committee a statement of all matters of in
terest connected with the origin and operations of the coast division, com
monly known as the Burn side expedition ?
Answer. In the early part of September, 1861, I was in command of the
provisional brigades in the city of Washington, which were formed from
the new troops as they arrived. During that time I had several conversa
tions with General McClellan with reference to the blockade of the Potomac,
and movements of discontented people in the southern counties of Maryland
on the boarders of the Patuxent river, as well as along the coast of the
eastern shore counties of Virginia and Maryland. During one of those con
versations I said to him that I thought it would be well to organize a division
composed of men from the eastern States, and to equip vessels of proper
draught and capacity to operate in those waters, with a view to taking posses
sion of points on the rivers and coast occupied by the enemy, and prevent
the occupation of other important points. He said that he had long felt the
want of something of that kind, and he would be very glad if I would ma
ture the plan of which I had been thinking, and submit a written proposi
tion to him. I did so. The plan was about as follows:
To organize in the eastern States regiments near the sea-coast, composed
as much as possible of men who knew more or less about steamers, sailing
vessels, surf-boats, &c., and to arm and equip a sufficient number of vessels
of light draught to carry this division of men, (which at that time it was in
tended should number about 10,000 men,) so. that they could be moved
quickly from one point on the coast to another. The object in arming these
vessels with heavy guns was to enable them to overcome any slight oppo
sition that they might meet with on the rivers or coast, without the necessi
ty of waiting for assistance from the navy, which might not be at hand.
All these vessels were to be well supplied with surf-boats, launches, and
other means of landing troops. The vessels were to be of the lightest draught
possible, in order to navigate all the bays, harbors and rivers of the waters
of the Chesapeake bay and of North Carolina.
It was first contemplated to place this division at work in the waters of
Chesapeake bay, and the rivers running into it, then to be transferred to
the waters of North Carolina. This plan was approved by General
McClellan, and I carried it to the Secretary of War, had it approved by him,
and got the necessary orders issued for the fitting out of the command. I
then repaired to New York, and from there to New England, where I suc
ceeded in getting the troops, and in fitting out the best vessels that could
be obtained; as soon as the expedition was fitted out it repaired to Annapolis.
The three brigades of the division were commanded by Generals Keno,
Parke, and Foster. In the meantime I had been informed by General
McClellan that it had been decided to send the expedition into the waters of
North Carolina. I was summoned to go to Washington, where, in the
presence of the President, Secretary Seward, General McClellan and Com-
334 TESTIMONY.
modore Goldsborough — to all of whom I explained the nature of my force —
it was decided that I should sail at the earliest day possible to Hatteras inlet,
cross into the sound in connexion with a naval fleet, t6 be under the com
mand of Commodore Goldsborough, and take if possible, first, Koanoke
island, and then such other points as it should appear necessary to hold on
the coast and the sounds of that State. I returned to Annapolis, and at
once made my arrangements for embarking*. Having received my instruc
tions from General McOlellan, I sailed from there on the 8th of January,
1862. When the expedition was twenty miles out from Fortress Monroe,
the commanders of the vessels having been furnished by me with sealed
orders, opened them, and the whole fleet concentrated at Hatteras inlet, as
had been contemplated. Upon leaving Fortress Monroe we were overtaken
by a very severe storm, which continued almost incessantly for twenty eight
days. The history of that period is so well known that it is not worth while
to go into a detail of it.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. How many vessels did you lose in that storm ?
Answer. We lost three steamers and some half a dozen sailing vessels —
sloops and schooners. There were but three lives lost by the storm. By
the 6th of February we succeeded in getting all our vessels, with our troops
on board, over the bulkhead at Hatteras inlet. We started at once for
Koanoke island, where the fleet concentrated, and on the night of the 7th
succeeded in landing our troops under cover of our own gunboat Picket
and the naval gunboat Delaware; there were some 7,500 troops landed in
all, the remainder of them having been left at Hatteras inlet. During the
day of the 7th, and before landing the troops, the naval portion of the expe
dition, together with the armed troop vessels, engaged the shore batteries
until the troops commenced landing.
On the morning of the 8th the command was moved forward. At a point
one mile and a half from the landing we came upon an intrenched position
of the enemy of which we had been informed by spies. After some four
hours' fighting we succeeded in carrying that position. The troops were
then pushed rapidly up to the head of the island, at which point the whole reb«l
garrison was captured before they had time to embark. Their vessels ran
up the sound without them.' We took about 2,700 prisoners and 44 guns.
The next day the naval part of the enemy's fleet was followed by our
naval fleet, under Commodore Rowan, and overtaken at Elizabeth, where
they were all either destroyed or captured.
Our vessels had suffered very much from the violence of the storm, so
that it required a considerable time to repair them.
By the 8th of March we had everything in readiness for another move
ment. The troops were embarked, and, in accordance with the instructions
given to us, we sailed for Newbern. We landed, under cover of Commo
dore Rowan's gunboats, at a point about eighteen miles from there, at the
mouth of Slocum's creek, early on the morning of the 13th — getting about
7,500 on shore. From that point the troops marched up to within five miles
of Newbern, where we came upon the enemy's intrenchments on the night
of the 13th. Early on the morning of the 14th we engaged the enemy, in
conjunction with the naval fleet, and in two and a half hours carried their
intrenchments, capturing three batteries of field artillery and all their shore
batteries — in all, about 69 guns — and took some 500 prisoners, and all their
camps, quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance stores. Their army saved
itself by retreating across the Trent river and destroying the two bridges
over it, which prevented us from following them.
Within two or three days I started General Parke's division down across
the country with a view to investing Fort Macon, which was the next point
TESTIMONY. 335
we were ordered to attack. The bridges between Newbern and Beaufort,
which was opposite Fort Macon, were destroyed by the enemy. But General
Parke succeeded in taking possession of Moorehead City and Beaufort in two
days.
Within a week the bridges on the road were repaired, and hand-cars,
which we had taken with us in the vessels, were placed upon the track, by
means of which we were enabled to transport all the means necessary to
besiege Fort Macon.
We labored under great difficulty in getting across Bogue sound on to the
banks, in order to invest the fort, as there were no vessels or boats at Moore-
head City or Beaufort, and Cove sound was guarded by the batteries of the
enemy. The fort also protected the entrance to the harbor. General Parke,
on the second or third day after he reached Moorehead City, discovered a
small sailing vessel coming up Bogue sound, and at once sent out a launch
(which we succeeded in carrying over the country on a hand-car) with some
armed men and captured her. On it we found a mail of the enemy and
some corn for the fort, of all of which we took possession. With this vessel
General Parke succeeded in throwing across, during the forepart of the
night, some 200 men who held their position on that bank until they were
re-enforced the next night; and finding some scows on the opposite bank,
they were brought over, and he succeeded within a week in getting his
whole command of 3,500 men on to the banks. The channel across there
was very intricate and shallow, and the transportation of the troops was
attended with very great difficulties.
After .getting the troops over, the heavy guns, mortars, and ammunition
were then transported across, together with some horses to move them; at
which time General Parke commenced the erection of batteries in the sand
hills outside of the fort; and by the morning of the 25th of April we were ena
bled to open our batteries upon the fort. That afternoon at 4 o'clock the
enemy ran up a white flag. During the time of the siege we communicated
with the vessels outside by means of surf-boats, and those vessels joined
in the attack on the 25th.
Our batteries ceased firing as soon as the white flag was discovered, and
I was placed in communication with the commanding officer of the fort,
and arranged with him for a meeting the next morning at six o'clock, on
board my vessel, which was lying just off Beaufort. At eight o'clock the
articles of capitulation were signed. We then went on shore and General
Parke received the fort with all its armament, and the arms of the garrison,
from Colonel White, who had been in command of the fort.
An expedition was then sent to Washington to take possession 'of that
place ; and subsequently one was sent to Plymouth to take possession of
that place, and our boats held Elizabeth City and Edenton, and points on
the Chowan river up as high as Winton.
From that time up to the 4th of July nothing of great importance oc
curred in the department, excepting some demonstrations threatening the
rear of Norfolk. During one of those demonstrations General Reno had a
sharp engagement with the enemy at South Mills. After having accom
plished the purpose of his expedition he returned with his force to Newbern.
We held so many points and so long a line of coast that it was not
possible to spare from any one point any force for an important expedition ;
a great many unimportant scouts and skirmishes occurred in the mean time.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Will you state the strength of the several positions of the
enemy at Roanoke island, Newbern, and Fort Macon, and the obstacles you
had to overcome in taking those places ?
336 TESTIMONY.
Answer. At Roanoke island we were forced to land at a point below the
shore batteries, on a very low and swampy shore. The men in leaping from
the boats were at once more than knee-deep in mud and water. After going
up a short distance from shore, a hundred yards or so, they came upon a
causeway, some ten feet wide, which led up through a dense thicket and
swamp for a mile and a half to where we found the enemy's battery. In
front of the battery, for some 800 yards, the enemy had cleared away all
the timber and undergrowth, so as to give full play to their guns over the
ground in front as well as down the causeway.
General Foster led off with his brigade and occupied the enemy in front
of the battery, just in the skirting of timber which bordered this cleared
space. As soon as General Foster had got into position General Reno
turned his brigade off to the left, and General Parker turned his brigade off
to the right, with a view to flanking the battery. The moment the troops
left the causeway they found themselves from knee to waist deep in mud
and water in that dense thicket. They succeeded by extraordinary efforts
in getting into positions which gave them a flanking fire upon the battery.
As soon as the enemy became at all shaken by this fire the troops charged
forward into the cleared space and carried the works. This was the first
time the troops had been under fire, and in my estimation no troops ever
behaved more gallantly. The enemy retreated in great confusion and were
closely followed, as I have before said, by our forces, and all on the island
captured.
At Newbern the enemy's intrenchments extended from the Neuse river
to an impenetrable swamp, the borders of which run parallel to the river,
and within a mile and a half of the river bank. Across this space of a mile
and a half the enemy had a continuous line of intrenchments, rifle-pits, and
redans for field-pieces. On the river bank there was a part of thirteen
heavy guns commanding the river and protecting the line of intrench merits.
In front of this line, as we had to approach it, the timber was cleared away
as at Roanoke island, and our troops had to be deployed in the timber
which skirted this clearing. The three brigades engaged the whole line of
the enemy's works, until General Parke's brigade succeeded in breaking
through the centre, when the line of works was charged by the brigades of
General Foster and General Reno, and carried. Three batteries of light
artillery behind the intrenchments and in the redans, as well as all the shore
batteries, were captured. As at Roanoke, the troops in this action behaved
as gallantly as any men could.
At the siege of Fort Macon the hardships and difficulties which the troops
had to undergo in the transportation of the guns, mortars, ammunition, and
provisions, through the intricate channels and over the sand-hills, exceeded
anything that I have ever known in the way of land service. It was all
performed by the men without a murmur.
It would be well to state here that I was most cordially supported in
everything I attempted to do by Generals Foster, Reno, and Parke, and the
navy never failed to co-operate.
On the 4th of July we heard of the retreat of General McClellan's army.
I received a telegram from the President of the United States saying that I
better send at once all the infantry possible to the support of General Mc-
Clellan. The message was sent by telegraph as far as Fort Monroe, and
from there sent through to me by way of the canal which we had just suc
ceeded in opening, it having previously been obstructed by the enemy. I
at once decided to go myself, with as much force as could possibly be
spared, to Fort Monroe. The troops were at once embarked, and we arrived
there, I think, on the 7th of July.
TESTIMONY. . 337
Question. What was the amount of the force under your command on
the 4th of July, and at different periods previous to that time ?
Answer. I cannot give the exact figures, but it was very nearly as follows:
We reached Hatteras inlet with 11,500 men. We left a portion at Hatteras
inlet, and succeeded in landing on Roanoke island from 7,000 to 7,500 men.
A garrison was left at Roanoke island. Upon going to Newbern, I took a
portion of the force that had been left at Hatteras inlet, landing at New
bern with about 7,500 men. At the siege of Fort Macon General Parke
had about 3,000 or 3,500 men. In other words, our whole force, up to that
period, was about 11,500 men. After the siege of Fort Macon we received
re-eriforcements, which made our force something over 15,000. Of that
number I took to Fort Monroe a little over 7,000 men, and was joined there
by a division from General Hunter, which increased my command to about
11,000 men. — (See testimony upon "Army of the Potomac.")
FORT DONELSON, ETC.
WASHINGTON, July 9, 1862.
General LEWIS WALLACE sworn and examined.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. Where do you reside ?
Answer. In the State of Indiana.
Question. What is your position and rank in the army ?
Answer. I am major general of volunteers.
Question. Will you please to give us as condensed a statement as you
can conveniently of what you have witnessed about the conduct in the
west that may be of interest and importance to this committee ?
Answer. In the first place I would state that my knowledge of opera
tions in the west extend only to the conduct of my own particular com
mand. I do not think I ever had the honor to be present at a council of
war except upon one occasion.
Question. What occasion was that ?
Answer. That was the day before the troops marched from Fort Henry
to the attack on Donelson. I was then a brigadier general, commanding a
brigade. Upon notice from General Grant, I, with others commanding brig
ades, went on board his boat and attended a council of war. The question
before us was whether the troops should immediately march upon Donelson or
not. It was a very unceremonious council of war ; no formal opinions were
expressed at all. We all appeared to be of the same opinion, and that was
that the troops should march upon Donelson. We being, as I said, quite
unanimous on that point, of course there was no debate. Marching upon
Donelson being agreed upon, the question was as to the time of marching.
There were some who held to the opinion that we should march immediately.
A few thought we better wait a day or two for re-enforcements. The re
sult of it was that the main body of troops marched at once. I was left
behind on that occasion, with my brigade, in command of Fort Henry. The
rest of the troops were gone two days before I received an order to bring
my command up. I immediately marched with my command and reached
there on Friday. Of course I was ignorant of the position of our army, and
knew nothing of the lines of the enemy. I arrived at Fort Donelson, and
Part iii 22
338 TESTIMONY.
was put in command of a division. I had no time to organize my division,
except as it marched past me, going to take its position, I had my posi
tion assigned to me, and went and took it. The battle opened on Saturday
morning. My orders were simply to hold the position I occupied, which
was in the centre of the line of attack. I was to hold it for the purpose of
repelling any sally from the enemy's lines. I had no authority whatever
given me to make an offensive movement, and I accordingly held my posi
tion. The battle commenced early Saturday morning on the extreme right.
General McGlernand's command was attacked, the object of the enemy be
ing, if possible, to drive him from the right, that they might have a road by
which to get out from the fort. I did not see it ; I knew nothing about the
particulars of the fight. I only knew that it was McClernand's command
that was engaged.
I very soon, however, saw the resnlts; I saw a large portion of his com
mand coming back in confusion. I had in the meantime sent in a portion
of my command to re-enforce him. The brigade I sent him reached him,
but, like all the rest, it was compelled to fall back. I am glad to say, how
ever, that it fell back in good order. The prospect looked very gloomy for
a little while. 1 could find nobody who could give me an intelligent opinion
or account of what was transpiring. It was a matter of great solicitude
to me to know whether the enemy were pursuing. I finally saw an officer,
now dead, and through information obtained from him, I obtained some
knowledge which enabled me to take up a position with my remaining
troops, aod fortunately took it just in time to repel -the enemy. They were
following in rapid pursuit, but were repulsed. There was no fighting after
that until about 3 o'clock in the day.
About 3 o'clock I was ordered to take my command over to the right and
make an attack there, for the purpose of recovering the road that had been
lost in the morning. I did so. My command immediately took the position
and held it ail that night. In the morning, while I was making dispositions
to storm the works of the enemy, they sent out a flag of truce, and told me
that they had surrendered, and that the place was ours. Of course, I marched
in and took 'possession of that side of the fort.
Question. How many prisoners did you take there ?
Answer. I never saw the official report of them. My opinion, however,
formed from the statements of rebel officers, is, that between 13,000 and
15,000 prisoners were taken there. I went over the ground, and came to
the conclusion that it was a matter of marvel, and must always remain a
matter of marvel, that we took the place. I was not more rejoiced than
astonished at our success.
Question. If it had not been for the decision of your council to nif/ve for
ward, and to do it promptly, is it not very probable that your campaign
there might have been a failure ?
Answer. To do General Grant justice, I will say that I became satisfied
at the council that it was his determination to march in any event I am
satisfied that he had determined in his own mind, no matter what the opinion
of the council might have been, to march on Donelson. I am therefore sat
isfied that the result would have been the same, no matter what conclusion
the council might have reached.
Question. Did you get your instructions from Was-hington how to proceed
in those matters, or did they come from officers in the west ? What do you
know about that ?
Answer. All I knew about orders was when I received them myself. I
received them through the proper channel. I always understood, as a matter
of course, that all orders for movements came from General Halleck. Those
I received were passed down through the regular channels to me.
TESTIMONY., 339
Question. Was there any time or opportunity, while operating at Donel-
8on, for you to receive orders from Washing-ton by telegraph ?
Answer. I do not know.
Question. How far were you from the nearest telegraph station ?
Answer. The nearest I think was at Paducah.
Question. How far off was that?
Answer. Probably some forty or fifty miles.
Question. Too far off to direct a battle, of course ?
Answer. I think so. After the battle of Fort Henry the wires were
brought up to Smithlaud, and then they were very promptly brought across
to Fort Henry. That was after the battle of Donelson, however, whether
the march upon Donelson was ordered by General Halleck, or whether it-
was undertaken by General Grant of his own accord, I do not know. I do
not know who indicated that movement.
Question. Is it a common thing in battles for commanders of divisions
and brigades to know so little about what is going on, about the position
of the enemy, &c.? It would appear that there is a great deal of uncer
tainty as to what is going on.
Answer. I know nothing about other armies. But I have understood
from what military reading I have had, that every army, whether on the
march or in action, has its head, and that all movements come from that
head, as a matter of course.
Question. From your statement it would appear that there was not much
connexion between the heads of divisions in this battle of Donelson. Do not
I BO understand it ?
Answer. Yes, sir; you do. I saw General Grant in the battle of Donelson
on Saturday but once. I saw his adjutant general and one of his aids pass
ing along the lines on different occasions. But I saw General Grant but
once, and that was at three o'clock in the afternoon. He then ordered this
attack on the night I have spoken of. He first gave the order to General
.McClernand; but General McClernand not having the troops in readiness at
the time, requested me to make the attack. I sent two or three messages
to General Grant on Saturday morning, while the disaster to McClernand
was occurring, requesting or asking permission to send him re-enforcements.
But my messengers did not get to him. He afterwards explained it by
saying, that at that time he was on board the gunboats. I, however,
assumed the responsibility of sending re-enforcements to General McCler-
nand.
Question. You had to act on your own judgment ?
Answer. In that particular, I did.
Question. And in doing so you saved the army, did you not ?
Answer. I am satisfied my command repulsed the enemy; I know they
did. They were not pursued.
Question. Please proceed and state in regard to your movements after that.
Answer. After the battle of Donelson, an hour after General Grant arrived
and took possession of the town of Dover, and the enemy's works, and the
prisoners, I received an order to proceed with my division back to Fort
Henry. I immediately proceeded to execute the order, and what took place
at Donelson afterwards I do not know. I marched back to Fort Henry, put
my division in position there, and lay there for some days. I then received
information that we were going up the river. The transports arrived and
our troops were put on board. We moved up the river in a kind of column.
General C. F. Smith was in command of that movement. That part of it, I
think, was unquestionably conducted with most soldierly ability. There is
no doubt of that; it was a very orderly proceeding. The embarking of so
340 TESTIMONY.
many troops on board the transports, always a matter of considerable diffi
culty, was done in good order and with celerity.
Question. To what place did you go ?
Answer. We moved up the river to Savannah. t I learned from General
Smith what was the object of the movement. It had in contemplation an
attack on Corinth. We arrived at Savannah, and lay there a day or two,
while the general was obtaining information as to the nature of the country,
the number of the enemy's forces, &c. He was very frank with me. For
the first time, I may say, I was satisfied with the treatment I received. He
told me what his designs were, and I frankly state my opinion that if Gen
eral Smith had retained his health we would have had Corinth, and there
would have been no battle at Fittsburg Landing. Without any delay he
undertook his preliminary movements. One of them was conducted by Gen
eral Sherman, an attack on, or an effort to break, the Memphis and Charles
ton railroad east of Corinth. Owing to a rise of water there, the general
failed, although he tried most gallantly to carry out his orders. I was sent
with my division to break the road running from Jackson, Tennessee, to
Corinth. Not having so far to march, I was more successful than General
Sherman, arid succeeded in burning the bridges and tearing up the track.
From the information given me by General Smith, I considered these move
ments as preliminary. Those roads being broken, he intended to march
right straight on Corinth. Unfortunately he was hurt, got sick, and had to
turn the command over.
Question. To whom ?
Answer. The command was turned over to General Grant. General Grant,
as I understand, made a disposition of what forces we had there, the exact
number of which I do not know. I think there were between 30,000 and
40,000 effective men. He put the main body of the troops at Pittsburg
Landing. My division he put at Crump's Landing, six miles below Pittsburg
Landing. The object of putting me there was to observe the road to Purdy,
four miles beyond that point. That railroad offered the enemy a facility for
sending troops and getting on our right flank. We lay there a considera
ble time, waiting for General Halleck, as I understood. That was merely
my understanding, however.
One Sunday morning I heard cannonading in the direction of Pittsburg
Landing. I heard it very early in the morning, and from its continuance I
very soon became satisfied that a battle was going on. I commenced, as a
matter of course, making what I considered the best disposition of my
troops, becAuse I had no doubt that the enemy would attack me.
As near as I can now recollect, about 8 o'clock, or 8.15 in the morning,
General Grant passed up the river on a boat. He stopped and asked me a
few questions, and directed me to hold myself in readiness for orders.
What took place on Sunday morning at that battle I have no personal
knowledge of. I only know from the remarks of others there is a great dis
pute as to whether General Grant was surprised or not. I do not undertake
to say that the general was surprised. But from the statements of soldiers
•of some of the regiments, I am satisfied that some of his regiments were
surprised. But on that point I will endeavor to do justice to General Grant.
My opinion is that if there was a surprise, the responsibility does not pro
perly attach to him. If any one could have gone to his headquarters and
seen the immense mass of details that he had to attend to, he would readily
have understood how absolutely impossible it was for him to go around the
picket lines and see whether they were all right or not. From the very na
ture of his situation he had to confide much in the officers.
About eleven or half past eleven o'clock that forenoon I received an order
in writing, unsigned, brought me, as I understood, by Quartermaster Baxter.
TESTIMONY. 341
He at that time was on General Grant's staff. I was told that he had re
ceived the order verbally from some officer coming down the river, and had
stopped on board a boat to write it out. It was brought to him verbally,
and he put it in writing and brought it to me. The order directed me to
move up with my division and take position on the extreme right of our
lines, as they were on Sunday morning; and upon arriving at that point to
form in line of battle at right angles with the river. As I understood it,
the point to which I was to march was between three and four miles from
* the river.
I started exactly at 12 o'clock, giving my men* time to eat their dinners,
• I marched in the direction indicated to me, and got within probably two and
a half miles of the point at which I was to form a junction with our forces,
when I was overtaken by an aid of General Grant, Captain Rowley, who
told me that our lines had been beaten back from the point to which I was
Vmarcbing', and were then not far from the river. He gave rne, in other
words, quite a disastrous account of the fight. I received, however, no
countermanding of my previous order, tfo directions were given to me;
merely a statement of a fact. It was a very serious fact, however. It threw
the responsibility of my movements upon myself. The question with me
was, whether I should go on in pursuance of my order, or should I counter
march and take another road that would take me to Pittsburg Landing, and
form a junction there. For reasons satisfactory to myself I concluded that
I would endeavor to take the other road, called the river road, following the
windings of the Tennessee bottom, crossing Snake creek — a place very diffi
cult to pass at all times on account of its boggy bottom — crossing Snake
creek about a mile from Pittsburg Landing. Subsequent events satisfied
me that I did the best thing I could have done, for if I continued on as I
started at first, I should have met Prentiss's fate, and been taken prisoner
or destroyed
While I was marching to the other road I met two other officers of Gen
eral Grant's staff, his adjutant general and Colonel McPherson, and they gave
me, if anything, a still more gloomy picture of the condition of the fight.
They informed me that our troops were gathered almost immediately around
"Pittsburg Landing, and that it was a very desperate struggle, and that I
would, in all probability, have to fight my way to them. Again there were
no orders or directions to me; and understanding nothing said to me to be
in the nature of an order, I think I would have been justified in going back
to Crumps Landing with my command for the purpose of saving it. I did
not do that, however. I went on arid met a great many fugitives escaping
from the battle.
At dusk in the evening I crossed Sante creek . My foremost regiment went
in in line of battle, and passed under the guns of the enemy. It was so
dark, however, that they did not fire at us. Of course I reported to Gene
ral Grant immediately upon forming the junction. The battle was then over
for the night at least. He told me to occupy the road I had marched in on.
There was a council of war that night; at least I understood so. I did not
attend it. It was my own fault, however. I went once to try to find it and
could not, and then went back. I asked for a diagram showing me the enemy's
lines and our own lines. It was promised me, but I never got it. I had to
take a soldier and go myself in the night and ascertain as well as I could
the position of the enemy relatively to my own position. Having obtained
that knowledge, the best I could, I made the best disposition of my troops
that I considered possible. I selected a position for my batteries at a point
which I thought would enable me to command the enemy's batteries, or at
least to fight them. Between one and two o'clock that night I laid down
and tried to get some sleep. But it stormed all night, raining terribly, and
342 TESTIMONY.
the gunboats kept up a fire every five minutes, so that sleep was almost
impossible.
The next morning, a little after daybreak, one of my batteries opened
fire; the enemy replied, and the battle began. While this fight between the
batteries was going on, General Grant rode down to where I was. He gave
me the simple direction to march forward with my command, in a direction
that was direct!}" at right angles with the river. That was about all the
order I received. I marched them forward accordingly, having dislodged
the enemy's batteries. They had two batteries. Having driven them back,
I pushed forward with my command. I had nobody to tell me the nature
of the ground. I got on a hill opposite, where I had been, and rode forward
and found out that if I persisted in going forward in the direction I was then
going, I should find myself and my whole command in this almost impassable
bottom of Snake creek. I was not disposed to go there. I saw a chance,
as I thought, of turning the enemy's left flank. I accordingly changed the
direction of my command by a left half wheel, and we pushed forward.
The skirmishers were all the time engaged. The batteries changed their
position two or three times, and their supports, as a matter of course, had
to follow them. I did not see General Grant until about 4 o'clock that after
noon. I was left entirely to my own direction, except the simple direction
which I had received at first. General Sherman was on my left, and I had
some conversation with him. I told him I would endeavor to act in concert
with him; that I would depend upon him to support my left flank, which he
readily agreed to do, and which he did do. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon
General Grant came down to where I was — I had driven the enemy back
then — and told me to change my direction again. As from the original posi
tion I was marching in a left oblique direction. The new change of position
would take me back almost in the original direction I started from. I obeyed
nis order, of course, and marched on. About that time the enemy broke,
and after that I understand it became a rout. I followed them from that
point probably a mile and three-quarters. I then halted and sent my cavalry
out on my left, knowing there was nobody on my right, to find out who were
supporting me. They brought up directly against the enemy's pickets, and
then came back and reported. I sent them then in a direction left in my
rear; but not finding anybody in that direction to support me, and finding
the enemy on my left, I dropped back probably three-quarters of a mile
and took up quarters for the night in the tents from which our troops had
been driven on Sunday morning, and there I remained for the night. At
3 o'clock the next morning I formed line of battle, expecting an order to
pursue the enemy; but no order came. We took up our position there and
waited. The result of it all is, that so far as any orders in the battle were
concerned, I did not know of any orders except the two I have mentioned.
The result of the second day's battle was in our favor, and the enemy were
routed.
Question. What turned the scale ? What movement of the troops decided
it in our favor on the second day of the battle ?
Answer. It is very difficulty to say. I cannot sit in judgment on what
was done, fcr I do not know what was being done. I could only tell how
the battle was going by the sound of the cannon and musketry. That on
the left sounded to me like a steady advance during the day. The troops
to the centre repulsed our troops two or three times. I had to halt three
times to wait until the support of my left came up. I turned their left flank;
at least I thought I did. They were compelled to send strong columns from
their centre to strengthen their left. On the enemy's right wing, I under
stood that General Nelson and the troops of Buell's command turned their
right. So that the enemy were driven back in that way.
TESTIMONY. 343
Question. With all your opportunities of knowing what was going on in
the west, could you tell whether you were acting upon some general plan
from Washington, or were you acting upon a plan inaugurated in the west?
I refer now to all your movements in the west ?
Answer. I can only speak for myself.
Question. Well, in all your movements did you know anything about any
plans from Washington ?
Answer. No, sir. That was a matter frequently discussed among us, but
nobody knew. I could not see such a plan. I do not pretend to say there
was not such a plan. I do not profess any knowledge about the matter.
I confess to you I was profoundly ignorant in regard to the whole conduct
of that campaign. I was profoundly ignorant of the intentions of it until
they were shown to me by the movements of it. During the most of it I
was a brigadier general of volunteers; and it is my opinion that there is not
much importance attached to the opinions of such officers; and believing
that to be the case I never thrust myself forward. I always believed it to
be unmilitary to ask, when orders came, " what does it mean?" — " What is
the object of it?" — "Is it a part of a system?" I never asked such ques
tions. I ventured two or three times to make suggestions. I better not
have done it.
Question. I gather from your remarks that so far as your own fighting
was concerned, it was not done in accordance with any general plan from
Washington ?
Answer. Not that I know of. It was not done, as I understood it, in ac
cordance with any plan from anywhere. You understand that it is the duty
of an officer to obey his orders without questioning. Suppose I issue an
order to a subordinate: it would be very improper for him to demand to
know the reasons for it. In other words, that would result in having a
general council of war consisting of all the officers and all the soldiers: a
thing impossible in itself.
I was at General Halleck's headquarters once after he arrived at Pittsburg
Landing. I remained there about five minutes. My business was to see
about the reinstatement of an officer who had fought gallantly in my division
at the battle of Pittsburg Landing, and who I thought had been unjustly
dismissed the service. The reply of the general to my application was very
unsatisfactory to me. I got on my horse and rode off, and never went near
his headquarters after that. I remained in my own camp, and when he sent
orders to me I executed them to the best of my ability.
After the battle of Pittsburg Landing, when the movement against Corinth
was inaugurated, I found myself put in what was called the reserve, with
General McClernand. Singularly enough, General McClerriand and myself
were both of us then major generals of volunteers. As to the operations
against Corinth, it is but simple truth for me to say that of my personal
knowledge I know nothing about it, except that I was there. My command
policed the roads from Pittsburg Landing; to Corinth. We built bridges
and corduroyed the roads. My command was scattered from almost the
advance to within about ten miles of Pittsburg Landing. It would have
taken me a day, I think, at any time, to have concentrated my command, if
I had been brought up to act as the reserve. I think I understood the mo
tive. I have no part in the siege of Corinth — had no hand in it. I heard
the guns, and two or three times I had my command in readiness to march,
upon receiving orders — had them formed upon their color lines. That is as
near as I got to the siege.
Question. Had you much difficulty in getting along on account of mud
and the bad roads ?
344 TESTIMONY.
Answer. At the time the roads were almost impassable. I do not think I
ever saw anything like it before.
Question. And yet you pushed through ?
Answer. Yes, sir. At times the roads were almost literally impassable,
and yet I got through.
Question. Could you account for the long delay in making the attack on
Corinth, thus permitting the rebels to get away ?
Answer. Of course I can account for it, by simply saying that I suppose
that General Halleck, from the information he possessed , was satisfied that
the enemy were there in force, and he thought it wiser to approach the place
cautiously. He approached it systematically, I thought. And if the enemy
were in superior numbers, or even equal to us in numbers, there is no ques
tion about the wisdom of his method of approach. It was slow, but it was
very safe.
Question. What means had you of knowing the force of the enemy at
that time ?
Answer. Had I myself of knowing ?
Question. Yes, sir; or any of you in the army. Had you any means of
even approximately getting at the force of the enemy at the time you were
approaching Corinth ?
Answer. I had my scouts employed. But my scouts were generally sent
out in the direction of Purdy. Their operations were confined to that direc
tion, and never in front. From the citizens of Purdy, and from men who had
deserted from the rebel army, we got all the items of information we received.
Negroes once in a while would give us information.
Question. Would the negroes give you correct information ?
Answer. I would to-day take the statement of a negro, whom I knew to
have means of knowing, in preference to the statement of a white man
there.
Question. They were, then, the most reliable source of information you
had in that country ?
Answer. I have no doubt of it.
Question. What was the practice, generally speaking, of the officers com
manding our forces in regard to availing themselves of information to be
obtained in that way ?
Answer. That depends upon circumstances. When I was upon an expe
dition, having for* the time being to act independently, I accepted their in
formation, and acted upon it.
Question. And you found it safe to do so ?
Answer, Certainly. I will illustrate : I come up to a house where I find
a man or woman at home. I take dinner there, and ask them questions for
the purpose of getting information of the enemy's movements, their position,
and their numbers. Perhaps I pursue my questioning in regard to late visits
on their part to that neighborhood. To these questions they give certain
answers. My negro servant, a contraband, under my direction in all such
cases, betakes himself to the kitchen, where he asks questions of the ne
groes. When we start off he comes to me and gives me information
directly the opposite of that which I have received from the whites there.
Question. Which do you find out to be correct ?
Answer. The chances are ten to one that the information I receive from
the whites is false, while that which the negro brings rne is correct. That
is why I would give more credence to the statements of a negro than I
would to those of a white person.
Question. What did you understand to be the force of the enemy at
Corinth ?
Answer. There was such a conflict in the statements that it was almost
TESTIMONY. 345
impossible to tell. My opinion was that the force there approximated to
100,000 or 110,000 in all ; of which number from 20,000 to 25,000 were
sick. I always supposed that their effective force was in the neighborhood
of 90,000 men.
Question. At that time what was our effective force ?
Answer It is impossible for me to tell. Nobody knew that except the
commanding general and his assistant adjutant general.
Question. Was it, in your judgment, as large or larger than their force ?
Answer. My judgment is that our force was larger than theirs ; that it
was larger than theirs by 10,000 or 15,000 men.
Question. How was it as to the equipment and armament of the two
forces ?
Answer. From the specimens of their arms which I saw there, I should
say that they had quite as good arms as we had — I mean their small arms.
Question. How about their heavy artillery ?
Answer. That I don't know anything about; they took them all away —
left none behind.
Question. Did they lose any of their trains, and not succeed in getting
them away, in consequence of the burning of a bridge ?
Answer. I understood that they lost some trains by mistaking some order,
and burning the wrong bridge. But what was taken then I never knew. I
was informed that they burned some of their trains. It is proper for me
to state here that, in answering many of these questions, I am simply giv
ing my opinions. As a matter of course, there are in General Halleck's
headquarters reports and documents which would answer these questions
more correctly than I can. Of those reports I know nothing. I may be
mistaken, hugely mistaken, in many opinions I have expressed. My means
of information were very limited, and it is very probable that I may be
mistaken in some things. Still, I have given you frankly my opinions.
Question. You say that at the time of the battle of Monday, at Pittsburg
Landing, you pursued the enemy until you found you were not supported.
Do you know why you were not supported ?
Answer. I do not.
Question. Could not our army have driven the enemy from Corinth at that
time, routed as they were, if we had pursued them ?
Answer. There is no question about that, in my mind. I think we could
have done it. I never knew the reason why we did not pursue the
enemy. On the night after the battle at Pittsburg Landing I required my
men to lie down in order of battle; in other words, on their arms. I had no
more doubt that, when the morning came, I would be ordered with my
division, co-operating with other divisions, to pursue the. enemy, than that
I was then a living man. I waited for those orders, and waited; but they
never came. Why they did not, I do not know, nor did General Grant ever
inform me. I have heard it stated that it was on account of orders that he
had. Whether he had any orders I do not know.
Question. Orders from whom ?
Answer. Said to have been from G'eneral Halleck; but General Halleck
was not on the ground at that time. But I had no idea that General Halleck
had any idea that there would be a battle fought, or that there had been
one fought. I knew of no telegraphic communication with General Halleck.
In regard to its being a rout of the enemy, I would say that some regiments
in the rebel army went off in order. But the concurrent testimony given
since of citizens then living in the neighborhood has satisfied me that my
conjecture of that day was true — that they did go off in a rout. A Union
man, who was in Corinth at the time they returned, says that he saw but
one command comeback in order; and that was Breckinridge's. They cut
346 TESTIMONY.
up their wagons; they destroyed their provisions, or at least large quanti
ties of meal and flour; they left their wounded and their dead behind them.
If they had gone off in order they would not have done that. It is a very
strong necessity that compels a general to leave his dead and wounded be
hind him — particularly his wounded. I do not mean to say that they left
all their wounded behind them. There were two days' fighting. * The
wounded of the first day, I suppose, they got off pretty generally. But
the wounded of the second day's fight were not taken off. They threw away
a great many of their arms. They burned some of their tents; others they
left standing. Now I have every reason to believe that, within three or
four days after that fight, they carne out from Corinth, or their rear guard
on this side of Corinth came back, and recovered large quantities of arms,
and hauled off wagons and caissons that they had left behind, while we were
lying in our camps.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Do you understand why the operations of our armies in the
west have been suspended ?
Answer. I have not the remotest idea of the reasons for the recent sus
pension of operations there.
Question. Have you any knowledge in your possession which would indi
cate that a suspension was necessary ?
Answer. A suspension of two weeks' time, in that neighborhood, was
necessary, in my opinion, in order to put the Memphis and Charleston rail
road from Corinth to Memphis in running order.
Question. Is there any necessity for rebuilding those other roads in Ten
nessee which our army is now engaged in rebuilding ?
Answer. I never could see the necessity for rebuilding any of the others,
except the road from Purdy to Corinth. Purdy is near to Pittsburg Land
ing. Crump's Landing would also have furnished a place for the shipment
of supplies to the army. That section of the road, 1 think, ought to have
been repaired.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. How many days would it have taken to repair that road ?
Answer. I think it took about two days, or two and a half.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Had it not been for the suspension of operations of our army
in the west, would it have been possible for the rebels to have brought to
Richmond any re-enforcement from their army there ?
Answer. No, sir; I think not. At least I cannot see how it would have
been possible for them to have done it.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. You think they could not have done it ?
Answer. I think not. I cannot pretend to any positive knowledge in re
gard to the matter; I can only give ;ny opinion, from the best information
I have got. But I am inclined to think that Beauregard sent what troops
came from the west to the east, at least a portion of them, before Corinth
was evacuated. It is ray opinion now that Beauregard never intended to
fight us at Corinth.
Question. The fight for Corinth was fought at Pittsburg Landing ?
Answer. Entirely.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. What is the course of policy of our leading commanders in the
TESTIMONY. 347
west in regard to the protection of rebel property. What was it during
the time you were out there ?
Answer. All property was protected.
Question. Was it not all, or nearly all, rebel property ?
Answer. Rebel property was protected in common with the property of
Unionists.
Question. Was it not known to you all that it was nearly all rebel pro
perty that was protected ?
Answer. It was very seldom that wo did not know the character of the
man whose property we came upon.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Were there many Union men to be found after you got into
Tennessee ?
Answer. I have reason to believe that there were. I think there are a
great many more Union men there than many suppose; a great many more
than will show themselves to be such, particularly in Tennessee; but they
are overawed and cowed; they have long since been disarmed, and I think
have to-day reached that point when they never will take up arms even to
defend themselves.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Was there any distinction made, that you were aware of,
between the protection of the property of Unionists and the property of
rebels ?
Answer. I never made any distinction, and I know of no instance where
any distinction of that kind was made. Under the orders that we all had,
our duty was to protect all property. Now, if you ask me if that was con
sistent with my feelings, I will say very promptly that it was not.
Question. You did not give those orders then in accordance with your
own judgment, or because you believed them to be right?
Answer. I gave those orders simply because they were in conformity with
orders that I had received. I would have made rny soldiers comfortable
upon the property of anybody, Union man or secessionist.
Question. Have your soldiers not suffered very much when you could have
made them comfortable by taking rebel property that was within your reach ?
Answer. Yes, sir; they have; I know it, for I have seen it.
Question. Has not that policy been very discouraging to your command ?
Answer. I have no doubt of it. I never want to command a column again
through a country under those circumstances.
Question. In your judgment, will a continuance of the policy we have
pursued ever subdue the rebellion ?
Answer. Never, on earth. I understand, reasoning from general prin
ciples, that there are but two principles upon which you can sustain a govern
ment by the people — one is that of love, and when you cannot get their love
then you must make them fear you.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Has that policy tended to make the people out there Unionists ?
Answer. A certain class of citizens it may have conciliated to some
extent', But those conciliated by it are Union people, were in the beginning
and are yet, and would have been under all circumstances. It conciliates
no secessionist The secessionist whose property is protected by our troops
is a secessionist still. He stands in his porch, or at his door, sees our
-column advance, expresses his gratitude perhaps to the officer commanding
for what he has done; his property is safe; not a blade of grass upon his
348 TESTIMONY.
premises has been touched. But the moment the column is gone, he is as
much of a secessionist as ever, and laughs at your clemency. There is no
question about that.
I recollect an instance that occurred out there in Tennessee. I went up
to the gate of a secessonist, the owner of a beautiful property between
Somerville and Memphis. In order to prevent his property from being in
jured, as his house was full of women and children, 1 had the negroes bring
all the tubs and barrels he had on his premises out to the gate and fill them
with water, and keep them filled for my troops when they passed. That
man was sitting in his porch, and alongside of him were two women, the
wives of rebel officers then in the army. I knew them to be such, and I
knew him to be a secessionist.
Can anybody doubt what my feelings would have prompted me to have
done under the circumstances ? It was to have said to my troops, " boys,
here are plenty of blackberries; yonder is an orchard full of ripening plums;
you can see them on the trees from this distance; now help yourselves."
It was to tell the boys, " come, here is a cool, shady place — a nice, grassy
la*wn — lie down and rest yourselves." It was to say, " yonder is a well of
good, pure, cool water — draw it and help yourselves; fill your canteens with
water fresh from the bucket and not from those tubs.'7
I recollect that just about that place a poor soldier went arid squatted
down in the fence corner to get out of the hot sunshine; as I passed him he
made a remark, intended, I have no doubt, for me to hear, but said in such
a way that, if I noticed it, he could say that he did not notice that I was
there. Said he, " boys, isn't this a damned nice business to protect secesh
property as we go along, and we can't get a plum to eat off those trees." I
paid no attention to it, but rode along ; but you must not think I did
not feel it.
As a general rule I endeavor to make my soldiers comfortable, even when
I am not comfortable myself; I see that their tents are pitched before I
pitch mine. I see that they have their rations issued to them before I get
anything for myself to eat. In that way I get their respect; in that way
I look for their respect, and I never look for it that I do not get it.
During the last march I made, from Purdy to Memphis, I foraged on the
enemy.- I subsisted my cattle upon their corn-cribs, &c., giving the rebels
vouchers for what I took. My quartermaster invariably gave a voucher to
this effect — stating what property had been taken, and its value as near as
he could get at it. Then he appended this condition to it, that it was to
be paid for whenever Mr. So-and-so gave satisfactory proof to the United
States government that he was a loyal man. In that way I got along on
that march.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. Could you generally have subsisted your army in the west by
pursuing that policy ?
Answer. In some places you could not. There were some districts that
were absolutely stripped. In other districts you could have done it.
Whether you could have subsisted your whole army in that country is a
different question ; I do not think you could. That was the very region of
country that the rebels had subsisted their great army in for so long a
time; and when they left it, they endeavored to leave it as barren as "possi
ble before us.
Question. Are our commanders in Memphis, and at other points in the
west, at this time, taking care of rebel property and returning their slaves ?
Answer. I think not. We endeavored to execute^ General Halleck's order
as far as possible.
TESTIMONY. 349
Question. Did not that require you to do all that ?
Answer. We never construed it in that way. I will tell you how I
managed it, A man's negro came into my camp. The soldiers will smug
gle them in, and there is no help for it. A negro makes his appearance
inside the camp, but how he gets in the Lord only knows. In a very short
time, in all human probability, you find some fellow looking around for
his negro; for his bright mulatto Jim, or his black boy Sam, or Jake. He
will want you to go and look him up for him. We will not do that. Then
v he wants a pass to go around and find him. Unless it is not a place where
secrecy is a matter of no importance, we tell him he cannot have it. If he
comets in and says he saw his negro in the camp of a certain regiment, I
will send an order to the colonel of that regiment to turn that negro out of
the camp, to put him outside of our lines. I then inform Mr. So-and-so:
"Your negro is not in my camp; he is outside of our lines; if you can catch
>hirn you can do so." Where the negro belongs to a Union man, I have no
hesitation at all about the matter. If I am satisfied he is a Union man,
I issue a peremptory order to the colonel of the regiment in whose camp
the negro is, to give him up to his master. But where I have the slightest
ground of belief that he is a secessionist, I do not trouble myself to give
him up.
Question. Has it not cost our government a vast amount of money in
Memphis and about there, feeding and protecting and taking care of rebels ?
Answer. I cannot say that it has. I am free to say that I do not think
many of them have been fed by us.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. When you come to rebel property in abundance, and our troops
need it, what do you do ?
Answer. Well, I take it.
Question. You say the practice is the other way ?
Answer. The practice is to take forage with you. But I seize the forage,
giving the voucher I have already mentioned. My quartermaster takes it,
and gives a voucher to pay when the party 4 makes himself satisfactorily
known to .the government as a Union man.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Would not our prospects of putting down the rebellion be better
if we were to raise an army and take it down there with the understanding
that it was not to be used to protect the property of rebels or to return their
negroes to them ?
Answer. I do not believe we can raise another army soon except upon
such a principle. Our best friends there are the negroes. They might be
made very valuable to us, not only to do our work, but as a means for obtain
ing information ; and I cannot understand the military policy of refusing
the proffered friendship and good will of all that people.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. That has never been used in that army, as I understand it ?
Answer. It has never been used. The labor of that class of people has
never been used. How far the generals have acted upon information to be
obtained from them I cannot say.
Question. Our own men have dug the ditches and built the intrcnchments
there ?
Answer. Yes, sir. The rebels pursue a different policy. They had 4,000
negroes at Fort Pillow, and those negroes built all those miles of intrench-
ments; and when they evacuated that place, I have every reason to believe
that they took the most of those negroes along with them.
350 TESTIMONY.
Question. Suppose we had used negroes to have dug the intrenchments
in ffont of Corinth, instead of using our own soldiers, what, in your judg
ment, would have been the difference in mortality among our troops ?
Answer. That can only be a matter of conjecture.
Question. I want your opinion merely ?
Answer. My conjecture is that it would have saved a great many valuable
lives ; I cannot approximate to the number. And another thing is certain :
our troops would have been at all times fresh for battle.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Is it or not your opinion that the use- of negroes for all such
purposes as you indicate would greatly increase the efficiency of our forces
in that country ?
Answer. Undoubtedly. By that I mean this, more or less ; it is possible
to organize the negroes in such a way, making them part of a brigade or a
division for instance, and giving them proper instruction and keeping them
in proper order and in a certain state of discipline, charged with certain
duties, as to relieve our soldiers in a great measure from those very duties
that in most instances are most onerous.
Question. Have you ever felt authorized to use negroes for the purposes
you have indicated ?
Answer. I have never felt myself authorized to do it; in fact, I could not
do it, for I have never yet, so far as I can recollect, been so situated as to
feel myself authorized to issue rations to them. I would have had to
have fed them as a matter of course, and I have had no authority at any time
to issue rations to them.
Question. Then all that is required to accomplish this object is to author
ize the commanders in the field to receive within their lines such negroes as
choose to come, and to use them for such purposes as they could be used
for to relieve our own soldiers and promote their efficiency ?
Answer. Had I been President of the United States I would have issued
that order a year ago.
Question. Would you carry, the matter to the extent of arming the ne
groes, or would you merely use them in the capacity you have indicated ?
Answer. It would be unjust and cruel to require the negro to form part
of our army and do the labor of the army, and yet not give him the means
of defending himself.
Question. Then you would arm him ?
Answer. I would arm him. I am looking at this question not as a politi
cian, but as a soldier.
Question. In other words, in order to put down this rebellion, you would
make use of all legitimate instrumentalities which you found within your
reach ?
Answer. Yes, sir; and thank God for sending them to me.
Question. And you regard it proper and right to use every man, whoever
he may be, who offers his services ?
Answer. He would be an idiot who would not. I look at this matter as
a soldier. It is to me precisely as if, in the midst of a battle, when the *
battle was going against me, God Almighty should stretch 'out his right
hand with a brand in it, and say to me, "Take and use this brand, and I
will help you," and I should turn my back upon it. It is a most astonishing
thing to me that men should hesitate about the matter.
Question. What would be the effect upon the army of the adoption of this
policy ?
Answer. There are certain men in the army who at first would give play
to their prejudices; and, in view of the prejudices of our soldiers, I would
TESTIMONY. 351
never, unless it was in a moment of extreme peril, ask a regiment of negroes
to take their place in line of battle and fight side by side with our soldiers.
When I propose to arm the negro, I propose it as a matter of humanity. I
would require no man to labor for me under such circumstances and not
give him the means to defend himself. I do not propose to put the negro
upon an equality with the soldier. I propose to make him follow our army
in a subordinate capacit}7. I propose to make him follow our army as a
laborer, believing that it frequently happens that labor, such as the negro
can perform, is of just as much importance to be done as it is for the
soldier to fight in battle. For instance, I pass the house of a well-to-do
secessionist to-day — one that I know to be a secessionist. I stop at his
door and ask him if he has got any good cooks; if he has, I would take
them, for 1 should need their services. To every company in each regiment
I would give at least two good negro cooks, to every regiment I would
give at least a company of negroes as laborers, and to every brigade of
soldiers I would add a regiment of negroes for laborers. ,
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. And have them armed ?
Answer. Of course I would.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. And in that way you deem you would greatly promote the
efficiency of the army ?
Answer. Yes, sir; and as an incentive to the negroes — though it is my
opinion that the great mass of the negroes do not need any incentive to join
us — I would say, '; Here, I will feed you, clothe you, protect you, and give
you the means of self-protection. Now, follow my arm}7, labor for us, and
when this war is over you shall be free."
Question. What would be the effect upon the army by the adoption of
that policy ?
Answer. It would be good ; there is no doubt about it.
Question. Both soldiers and officers, in your opinion, would be gratified
and pleased with it ?
Answer. Why, sir, do you not suppose that the poor soldier laboring in
the trenches would be gratified if he could find a substitute ready and wil
ling to take his place ? Human nature furnishes the answer to that ques
tion.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. And all of the negroes thus employed in our army would be
withdrawn from the plantations of the rebels?
Answer. Yes, sir ; and that, I should say, was the reason above all others
why that should be done. Permit me to explain my idea about that. To
day I am marching my column past the house of a secessionist. I go to the
gate or the door and ask the folks about the house, and in all human proba
bility I will find that the man's wife and children and his negroes have been
left behind to take care of the property. I ask where is the man of the
Jiouse. I am told that he is gone. I ask where has he gone. They do not
know. Go to the negroes privately and ask them, and they will tell you
that he is hiding in the woods, or else he is in the rebel army. Suppose
that the man is in the rebel army. Do you not see the difference between the
position of that soldier in the rebel army and the farmer who is a soldier
in our army ? Many of our soldiers are farmers. Take two soldiers in the
opposite armies who are farmers. The rebel farmer soldier has his field
hands at work on his farm at home ; they plant it and cultivate it for him,
and when the harvest cornes they gather it and put it in his granaries. It
is not so with our northern farmer soldier. When he is away in the army
352 TESTIMONY.
his farm to a great extent, if not altogether, goes untended and unsown; or
if he has any harvest it goes unreaped, unless his neighbors, through charity,
do it for him. Is not the inference inevitable? He must be blind who
does not see it. In the one instance the man is. away, but his farming goes
on as well as if he were at home, and his harvest is gathered and stowed
away. And do we take it under our present policy ? No, sir; it is there in
his barns, and we protect it for him, unless we happen to be marching as I
was upon my last inarch, when I had permission to take it if I needed it,
Now, is it not military policy to strike at a man's operations as well as at
himself? I would take every negro from every secessionists7 farm, if for
no other purpose than to prevent him from being able to work his farm, for
just so far do I deprive that southern army of food. I would do it more par
ticularly this year than ever. You may stop by the fences, as you go
through the country, and you will see in almost every wheat fieldand corn
field last year's cotton-stalks. They have this year, in obedience to orders
from headquarters, put corn and 'wheat in the fields where last year they
planted cotton.
To sum it all up: I do not want to set our soldiers to murdering people; all
the ordinary amenities of war should be observed; but for God's sake do
let our armies make war.
Question. You do not want our armies to go through the enemy's country
like organized peace societies ?
Answer. No, sir; I do not; nor like knight-errants, each general travelling,
with his train following him, in search of some enemy to fight him, and
doing it upon the pure principles of the chivalry of olden times.
Mr. JULIAN. Northern chivalry.
The WITNESS. That is well said.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. They have no such chivalry.
Answer. Just imagine for a moment a southern army let loose in Indiana
or Ohio. Suppose that Beauregard's army had got into Indiana ; what
would he have spared ? They make war ; they are bold, and are powerful
simply because they are bold. When they want soldiers they do not hesi
tate; they conscript them. Yet we hesitate. This is a moment of desperate
emergency; and yet you and your friends here will not pass a drafting law.
You should have upon your statute book a law which will bring every militia
man from Pennsylvania, New York, New England, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan,
&c.f and bring them here in a week if necessary. You need not tell me the
impressed man will not fight. I know they will fight. They have shot at
me often enough for me to know that.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. If, in place of acting according to General H/illeck's order No.
3, we had received the negroes that came to our lines, and got all the infor
mation we could of them, what would have been the effect upon the progress
of our cause, do you suppose ?
Answer. It would have been a great deal owing to the locality. A gen*
eral ought to exercise discretion in regard to negroes; he- ought to have
discretion in regard to them. There are places where it would have been
impolicy for him to have pursued that course. Of that he must be the judge.
Question. I mean if we had availed ourselves of all the information we
could have obtained of them in regard to the movements and plans of the
enemy, would it not have been of essential service to us ?
Answer. There is no doubt of it. In making war I would regard that
TESTIMONY. 353
man as crazy who would refuse information, I do not care from what source
it comes.
Question. Have you ever found any information they have given to be
unreliable and untrustworthy ?
Answer You must take a negro's statement with allowance, from the very
nature of the man. He is an extravagant creature, prone to exaggeration.
When he says that he saw 7,000 of the enemy pass through a certain place
the day before I would divide his estimate by two, and that would be nearer
correct. I would not doubt that he had seen the enemy; I would only
doubt the correctness of his estimate of their numbers. If he said that he
had passed through a camp of secessionists the day before, I would believe
him.
Question. Is he trustworthy as to his loyalty?
Answer. There is no question about that. The last march I made, to
Memphis, was an ovation. At every plantation the negroes would come
and just line the fences as we passed; and the evidences of their- feeling
were unmistakable. They only waited for a little encouragement to. have
gone with us. And that is the very trouble about the matter; too many of
them would come. I could have taken three times as many negroes with
with me into Memphis as I marched white men in there. I propose to use
the negro purely as a military instrument.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. You mean that you would use that number of negroes that could
be used to advantage ?
Answer. That is what I mean. I would not cumber my army with them.
CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS.
WaSHiNGTON, February 2, 1863.
Major General B. F. BUTLER sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. Will you please give the committee a concise account of your ad
ministration of the department of the Gulf?
Answer. I left Fortress Monroe on the 24th of February last, on the steamer
Mississippi. After being run aground by the carelessness of the captain, and
stopping at Port Royal to refit, I got to Ship island on the 23d of March. I
had under my command 13,700 troops, all New England regiments but three,
and from every State in New England except Rhode Island. Those three
other regiments were western regiments, from Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
On the 15 tli of April we left Ship island with 8,000 troops — which were all we
"had transportation for — to attempt to get to New Orleans. Two of the trans
ports were steamers, the rest were sailing vessels. We entered the Mississippi
and remained there during the attempted bombardment of Forts Jackson and
Philip, until the morning of the 24th of April. We had agreed with Admiral
Farragut, before the bombardment commenced, that if the bombardment failed
to reduce the forts and he could run by enough of his fleet to clear the river
above of the rebel gunboats, which would otherwise shell us off the levee if we
attempted to land, we would go out of the Southwest Pass, come round in the
rear of Fort St. Philip, and wade through the marah until we could get on to
Part iii 23
354 TESTIMONY
the hard land, and in the rear of both the forts, so as to cut them off entirely
from any supplies, and if possible take Fort St. Philip by assault. On the
morning of the 24th of April, when Farragut succeeded in getting by the forts,
I put that plan into execution, and landed 3,000 men here, (pointing to the place
on the map — west of Sable island, at the quarantine station.) We had to row
seven miles before we struck where we could find good footing. Then I threw
a body of men across the Mississippi and entirely hemmed in the forts. The
night after that was done the garrison of Fort Jackson mutinied against their
officers, turned their guns against them, and the majority of them surrendered
to our pickets. Commodore Porter, who lay below with the mortar fleet, had
the day before, the 27th, sent up a flag of truce, asking the fort* to surrender.
He did not learn that we had captured the men in the forts. The next morn
ing the officers sent down word that they were willing — as well they might be —
to accept the terms offered them the day before. The white flag was hoisted
and they surrendered.
In the meantime, leaving General Williams in command, I had gone up the
river to join Farragut and to take part, if necessary, in the correspondence be
tween him and the authorities of New Orleans. In that correspondence I
advised that the city should be bombarded unless the forts about it were sur
rendered. The forts were the exterior defences, and, I thought, should be
surrendered with the city. That was the origin of the notice to them to leave
the city in forty-eight hours. Before that time expired the forts on the river
surrendered, as well as the forts at the entrance of Lake Pontchartrain — Forts
Pike and Wood. At that time my steamers were all around in the rear of Fort
St. Philip. Some of the men had got across on the levee, and I had to get my
steamers back again into the river so as to transport my troops up to the city,
so that it took us until the 1st of May to get up. I had one steamer that would
carry from 1,000 to 1,500 men, and another that would carry something like
500 men. I could get up to New Orleans only about 2,000 men at a time. As
soon as I got up that number I landed and took possession of the city, and
posted guards in and around it. Owing to an accident to these same steamers,
it was a fortnight before I got any more men up there. So that I really lay for
a fortnight in New Orleans — with guards posted in a city seven miles long and
two and a half miles wide — having, within the city, only 250 men, as a reserve,
whom I could call into line on a sudden occasion. The enemy thought I had a
great many more men than that, for my men were very busy moving about in
the daytime ; and it so happened, too, that the papers all said that we landed
10,000 or 15,000 troops. We Jiad the advantage of bragging a little on our
side. The men were marched about pretty lively, so that they might learn the
streets, and thus appeared to be a great many, more especially as I had those
parts of four or five different corps, so that it looked like a great many regi
ments. We never had any trouble after the first day in the city. I found,
when we got there, that the people were in a state of absolute starvation. There
were not twenty days' provisions in the city, and they were wholly dependent
upon the Red river and Mobile for their supply. I went into consultation with
the city council. We fitted out boats to go to Mobile, where they had large
supplies of provisions, and from which place, before we took New Orleans,
provisions were got by means of the Jackson railway. The city council agreed
that they would run the boat, and even, and fairly, and honestly, to bring in
provisions. At the same time they agreed to go up the Red river and purchase
provisions there. Two boat loads of provisions did come down from the Red
river, and then Governor Moore stopped the further trade, and said we should
have no more provisions from that part of the country. Representations were
made to him by the leading citizens of New Orleans that my army had pro
visions enough, but the citizens were starving, but without effect. I found be
fore long that this committee that had brought these provisions over "from
TESTIMONY. 355
Mobile were very careful, in their distribution, to distribute the provisions only
to the families of confederate soldiers. So that I was really in the condition
simply of having the Union citizens starving, while the provisions belonging
to the city were fed out to the families of confederate soldiers. There was a
" free market," but it was established and managed for the purpose of supplying
only the families of confederate soldiers. When I found that out I shut up the
"free market" and took charge of the distribution myself. In the meantime
I found, in one of the warehouses in the city, some 2,000 tierces of beef which
haft belonged to the confederate army, and distributed that amongst the poor.
I organized a relief association, and levied an assessment of $350,000, as a relief
fund, on the cotton factors who had, by a published card, advised the planters
not to bring in their cotton, as they said, for the purpose of forcing foreign in
tervention. And upon another set of men who had subscribed a million and
a quarter of dollars for the defence of the city I assessed them 25 per cent, on that.
Among the earliest things which claimed attention was the quarantine and
state of the health of the city. I organized a thousand men, to be employed at
a dollar a day, to clean the streets ; to be paid out of this " relief fund" thus
assessed, arid allowed them to buy of our commissaries their rations at the
government prices, which was making their employment a charity, at the same
time we made them earn their living. Thereupon the city council, by way of
getting up a quarrel between me and the poor men, said, " This is a poor,
mean, Yankee piece of business. In the confederacy the laboring men got a
dollar and a half a day." And thereupon voted an extra fifty cents a day to the
laborers, subject to my approbation, hoping that I would veto it. But I an
swered them at once that I was very glad they had fifty cents a day extra to
spare for the laborers, and that I would rather pay them a dollar and a half a
day than a dollar. And the men were accordingly employed at a dollar and a
half a day, for a time, and were employed from that time until I left.
In the meantime the need of the relief commission grew, until I was feeding,
on an average, about 10,000 families a day, nearly 3^ persons to each family,
making about 34,000 persons. About 1,200 of these families were Americans ;
of the rest, about 4,000 families were British subjects, and the remainder were
French, Spanish, German and Italian, &c. So that, while foreign resident offi
cers were quarrelling with us for our harsh treatment of their subjects, we were
feeding 34,000 persons, of whom a little over 4,000 claimed to be American
citizens. That feeding was continued as long as I was there ; and that was in
addition to employing about a thousand — sometimes a little more and some
times a little less — every day in cleaning the streets and building up the levees,
and putting the city to rights, generally. All the drainage of the city is done
by means of canals, and we cleaned out between ten and eleven miles of canal,
some of which had not been cleaned for twelve or fifteen years. The conse
quence was that we had comparatively no sickness in the city of New Orleans.
I had a regiment, a thousand strong, in the city during the months of July and
August, and it buried but one man. There was some swamp fever at Carrolton,
nine miles above, where the rebels had made a fortification which it became
necessary for us to occupy.
I established a very strict quarantine. I would not allow any vessel that
came from an infected port to come up to the city under thirty days. If she had
anything like a perishable cargo it was taken out and thoroughly overhauled
and fumigated. This strictness created a great deal of ill feeling among the
merchants. A New York merchant would start his steamer laden with flour
from New York to Havana, and thence to New Orleans, taking a great number
of passengers on board, with large freight, and if he had to lay at quarantine
for thirty days, while flour was running down from $40 to $20 "a barrel, he, of
course, felt very cross about it — especially if another New York merchant, who
did not touch at an infected port, was allowed to come up and make a large
356 TESTIMONY.
profit on his cargo. If an English or a French vessel was allowed to come,
•that would cause complaints from the ships of all other nations who were forced
to remain at quarantine ; each charging that favoritism had been shown to the
other. Eut it was necessary, and I strictly adhered to it. That was illustrated
by this : I did allow a small steamer from New York to come up ; the captain
stating that he. touched at Nassau merely to take in coal, and was there but a
short time. It turned out, however, that he did take passengers on board, one
of whom had the yellow fever after he arrived at New Orleans. I immediately
had the square shut up completely, allowed no one to enter or leave it, white-
wasl^ed everything, cleaned the square up, fumigated it, and when the man
died buried him, and pretty much everything he had ever looked at. • This
ended the matter ; we did not have another case of yellow fever in New Or
leans. That, however, demonstrated the fact that yellow fever is not indigenous
there, but requires to be imported, and that it may be quarantined even after it
has been brought into the river. It, perhaps, can be fully done only by mili
tary measures ; but it was effectually done there, although they had every
where on the coast — at Matamoras, Galveston, Sabine Pass, and at Pensacola,
and I had five or six cases down at quarantine.
About the 5th of June I sent off the first troops I got frona Ship island to
take possession of Baton Rouge. I then learned that there was no other garrison,
or fortifications, or guns, between there and Vicksburg. We went up and took
Natchez with the gunboats, and it has been practically in our possession ever
since. The mayor and people of Natchez behaved very well.
I learned that there was a garrison of 1,500 or 1,500 men at Vicksburg,
and somewhere about the 5th of June I sent General Williams up there with
somewhere in the neighborhood of 4,000 men, including two batteries of artillery,
to co-operate with Commodore Farragut in taking Vicksburg. We heard of the
retreat of Beauregard from Corinth ^oon after that expedition left. The next
thing we knew about their movements, Villipigne's division and Breckinridge's
division of the rebel army came to Vicksburg. That determined Farragut to
run by the battery at Vicksburg and communicate with Davis above Vicksburg.
He also wanted to get up there before Davis came down, so as to protect the
other end of our cut-off that we had determined to make. He ran by and
opened communication. We sent up to Halleck's army for re-enforcement,
because we had heard that 30,000 men had gone off with Buell to Chattanooga,
and we supposed that 10,000 or 15,000 would be enough to hold Memphis in
that direction, and there would still be left a force that could be sent down to
•operate against us; especially was this desirable, as we had already heard that
Villipigne and Breckinridge had come down to Vicksburg with 15,000 men.
There was an awful mortality in the enemy's ranks there, and they never had
at any time over 9,000 men there fit for duty.
Grant having sent down word that he could not send us men, that there was
none left, that they had all gone forward, General Williams determined to land
at Warrenton, about eight miles from Vicksburg, and fight his way up on the
bluff, being aided as much as possible by the gunboats on the river. But in the
meantime the malaria struck down our men, so that we brought of the force we
sent to Vicksburg only a little over 1,000 well men. This prevented Williams'^
movement. When that force returned, Farragut ran down the river again past
their batteries, and came down with us. On the way down we stopped at Port
Hudson, and some men went on shore and examined, but found no fortification?
there then. When we got to Baton Rouge we had a little less than 1,000
effective men of Williams's up-river force, and much less than that number went
out to battalion drill and dress parade. Thereupon Breckinridge, with all the
men he could spare, about 8,000 men, came down on the Jackson railroad to
Camp Moore, above Poiichatoula, and marched across sixty miles and camped
ten miles from Baton Rouge. More than one-half of all my effective force, after
TESTIMONY. 357
garrisoning Pensacola, Ship island, and the various forts, and Algiers, on the
opposite side of the river from New Orleans, was up the river at Baton Kouge,
after General Williams returned there. It was supposed by the rebels that if
they could overcome my force there that I would not have enough left to man
the lines at Carrolton, above New Orleans, and to guard the approaches from
Lake Pontchartrain, and therefore a movement upon New Orleans would be
practicable. Upon that theory they made the attack upon General Williams
at Baton Rouge. But they were very badly repulsed, very badly beaten in
deed. The death of General Williams put a good officer in command, but one
with so little experience, and with his small force he did not dare pursue. I
think' if General Williams had lived he would have pursued the rebels, cut
them off, and destroyed their entire force. I had issued an order that any con
federate soldier who chose to desert and leave the rebel army might come into
New Orleans and register his name. There had come into New Orleans up to
this time something over 6,000 men, who had been soldiers in the confederate
army, and registered themselves as paroled prisoners. So that I had in New
Orleans nearly twice as many men who had been soldiers in the confederate army
as I had of Union soldiers. I had asked for leave, which had been granted, to
recruit my regiments. I recruited in Louisiana all of my old regiments up to
the full standard, raised two new white regiments, and four companies of cav
alry — all of men living in Louisiana. They fought bravely at Baton Eouge.
Out of 460 men of the 14th Maine who were in line nearly 200 of them were
recruits from Louisiana. They, of course, were healthy men, not having suf
fered the troubles either of Camp Parapet or Vicksburg. I ordered $S a month
to be paid out of the provost fund to the widows and mothers of quite a number
of Louisiana soldiers that were killed under our flag, because I knew it would
take a long time to get it from Washington, and I wanted to encourage others
to enlist. The provost fund was made up of fines and forfeitures, sales of con
fiscated property, and two dollars charged for each pass, &c. I asked for
liberty to raise five thousand native Louisianians, and raised nearly that
number, including recruits in the old regiments. White recruiting began then
to fall off, because of the high wages beginning to be paid for white labor on
the plantations, in order to save the sugar crop where the negroes had left. I
had written to Washington for re-enforcements, but they replied that they could
not give me any, though they wrote that I must . hold New Orleans at all
hazards. I determined to do that, if for 'no other reason, because the rebels had
offered a reward for my head, if they could catch me, and it would have been
rather inconvenient to me to have lost it. White recruiting had come to an
end, and I could get no re-enforcements from Washington.
Upon examining the records I found that Governor Moore, of Louisiana, had
raised a regiment of free colored people, and organized it and officered it ; and
I found one of his commissions. I sent for a colored man as an officer of that
regiment, and got some fifteen or sixteen of the officers together — black and
mulatto, light and dark colored — and asked them what they meant by being
organized under the rebels. They said they had been ordered out, and could
not refuse ; but that the rebels had never trusted them with arms. They had
been drilled in company drill. I asked them if that organization could be
resuscitated, provided they were supplied with arms. They said that it could.
Very well, I said, then I will resuscitate that regiment of Louisiana militia. I
thereupon issued an order, stating the precedent furnished by Governor Moore,
and in a week from that time I had in that regiment a thousand men, reasonably
drilled and well disciplined ; better disciplined than any other regiment I had
there, because the blacks had been always taught to do as they were told. It
was composed altogether of free men ; made free under some law.
There was a very large French x and English population in Louisiana. I
ascertained that neither French nor English law permitted French or English
358 TESTIMONY.
subjects to hold slaves in a foreign country. According to the French law,
any French citizen who holds slaves in a foreign country forfeits his citizenship.
According to the British law, any Englishman holding slaves in a foreign
country forfeits 66100.
I thereupon issued an order that every person should register himself; the
loyal as loyal ; French subjects as French subjects ; English subjects as Eng
lish subjects, &c., under their own hands, so that there could be no mistake in
the books of the provost marshal. That was accordingly done.
I then said to those who claimed to be French and English subjects :
" According to the law of the country to which you claim by this register to owe
allegiance, all the negroes claimed by you as slaves are free, and being free I
may enlist as many of them as I please." And I accordingly enlisted one
regiment and part of another from men in that condition. We had a great
many difficulties about it. But the English consul came very fairly up to the
mark, and decided that the negroes claimed as slaves by those who had registered
themselves as British subjects were all free. So that I never enlisted a slave.
Indeed, it was a general order that no slave should be enlisted.
In the meantime I was informed from Washington that it would be very
desirable to have congressional elections held in that portion of Louisiana which
was under our control. The difficulty about that was that New Orleans was
divided into two election districts. The lower district was composed of the
lower part of the city of New Orleans, and all of the State below the city.
The other district comprised the remainder of New Orleans, and all along
the river above for 60 miles to Donaldsonville. I therefore sent an expedition
under General Weitzel to Donaldsonville, and swept doAvn through that country
to Berwick bay ; drove out the enemy, who were there in considerable force,
and brought the whole of that region, from one end to the other, within the
Union lines. I thus got under the control of the American soldiery nearly the
entire two districts now represented by Mr. Flanders and Mr. Halm. General
Shepley, as military governor, then issued his proclamation for an election, in
order that every man in those districts should be allowed to vote who had taken
the oath, and had the other qualifications prescribed by the laws of Louisiana ;
and everybody did vote. There were seven candidates running in one district
and two in the other.
In taking possession of that district, which had theretofore been in the posses
sion of the enemy, we obtained possession of a region of country containing more
sugar plantations and more slaves than any other portion of Louisiana. Some
15,000, perhaps 20,000, slaves came, by that one expedition, under our control;
and as Congress had passed a law declaring that all slaves, held by rebels in
regions that afterwards came into our possession, should be free, all those slaves
became free. And I enlisted a third regiment and two batteries of heavy artil
lery from among these negroes thus made free. Two of these colored regiments
were employed in guarding the Opelousas railroad, running from Algiers to Ber
wick bay; and when I left there they were still thus employed. For the
other regiments I had enlisted I found this use : The planters there, while some
claimed to be loyal and some disloyal, had come to the conclusion not to lay
down any " ratoons " of sugar cane, as they are called ; that is, pieces of cane
are laid in the ground in order to preserve their eyes from injury by frost, and
when the season comes they are planted and the new cane springs up from
these eyes. They had come to the conclusion not to lay down any ratoons,
and to preserve no seed for other crops, so that if the President's proclamation
of September should be followed, as they feared, by one in January, declaring
the slaves free, they would throw them upon us, and we would have nothing for
them to do, and nothing for them to eat during the coming year from the crops. I
therefore employed, for many weeks, the last regiment that I raised in laying down
cane — cutting it down and laying it in the ground to protect the eyes from the
TESTIMONY. 359
frost. And I have no doubt that in that way I have made sufficient provision
for the coming cane crop upon the plantations necessary to be worked by the
government ; and also in preserving sweet potatoes and corn for the next
year's planting, to find employment and sustenance, if these 15,000 or 20,000
negroes should be thrown upon us, provided we went no further. I turned
over to my successor, of soldiers, 17,800, including the black regiments, though
I had but 13,700 to start with. The Jews, who have been, in my judgment,
one half of the cause of this war, as they are among the principal supporters
of it in the south, followed Weitzel's army over into La Fourche county, and
attempted to buy up every thing that was there for a nominal price, both from
loyal and disloyal men. I had foreseen that state of things. Of course I knew,
as early as any one, at least, when I was going to make a move, and where I
was going to make it. And on the 18th of September, some month or so be
fore I got ready to start the expedition under General Weitzel, I published an
order that there should be no more selling of property by disloyal men, so that
I could set aside all those sales which I knew would be attempted to those
Jews. The army moved on the 26th or 27th of October, and these Jews fol
lowed the army and, whenever they could get by, they would go to the planters
and buy sugar at $30 a hogshead, and so on. I then issued my order, No. 91,
that all property in this newly acquired territory should be sequestered, not
confiscated ; should come under the power of the United States. Whenever it
belonged to disloyal men it should be taken for the United States, and when
ever it belonged to loyal men they might take the proceeds and keep it. I
ordered that the whole of the property that could be should be gathered up and
brought to the city of New Orleans ; there to be sold at public auction, and an
accurate account kept of each lot of property ; the money to be subject to the
claim of whoever it might concern. And I appointed a commission of the best
men I could find in my army to administer that order. We got ready to do that
about the middle of November ; and from that time we received and sold some
thing over $800,000 worth of sugar and cotton, and the money in the hands of
the commission was turned- over to General Banks when I left there. I also
turned over to the commissary $160,000 for property we had captured ; and
into the quartermaster's department we turned over $36,000.
I have charged myself, in my accounts with the War Department, with
$1,088,000, which I had received from taxation, assessments, fines, and for
feitures, and confiscated property in one way or another, in behalf of the United
States. I sent home here to the treasury the sum of $345,000. When I came
away I turned over to General Banks $160,000 and odd dollars. About
$525,000 I expended in nine months, feeding of the poor and in the employ
ment of labor. The rest I hold myself responsible for in various accounts and
by vouchers, which I hope the government will allow, as the sums were ex
pended in good faith.
I found, when I got to New Orleans last April, that the banks had apparently
sent off all their specie. There had been $9,000,000 of specie in New Orleans,
but I could not find half a million in the banks. I became very soon convinced
that all of it had not been sent off. After a little examination I found that only
about half of it had gone. I found one loyal cashier there, the cashier, of the
Bank of America. He went up into the Red River region under the name
of Beef, and succeeded in obtaining and bringing down on a river steamer in
barrels $625,000 in specie, belonging to the Bank of America. That was all
we got back from without our lines that had been sent away. The rest of it
was taken to Atlanta, Georgia. Mr. Memminger, the secretary of the treasury
for the Confederate States, informed the bankers of New Orleans that the con
federacy would not touch this specie; but just before I left he informed them
that the confederacy had need of it, but would be responsible for it.
A negro would come in now and then and tell me that there was money buried
360 TESTIMONY.
in such a place; that a quantity was in the French consul's office, &c. I began
looking about and making the bankers exceedingly uncomfortable. At last they
sent a committee to me to learn if their specie was got back into then- vaults in
any way whether it would be safe. I told them it would be as safe as it
ever was. Thereupon they brought out of their various hiding places about
$4,000,000 of specie. And when I came away there was about $4,000,000 of
specie in the bank vaults, and about $1,500,000 which was in the possession of
the French and Dutch consuls, and which caused a great deal of correspondence
between Mr. Johnson and myself, and the State Department,
I have spoken of my administration so far as regards aliens. They registered
themselves under an order which I issued. The same order required all loyal
citizens to register themselves ; and it also required every man who claimed to
be a subject of the Confederate States to register himself as an enemy of the
United States, and to bring in, when he registered himself, a schedule of all his
property. I waited, before I did that, until the 23d of September, till the ex
piration of the sixty days' notice given in the President's proclamation of the
23d of July. I required these rebels to bring in a list of their property and
to register themselves over their own signatures in the books of the provost
marshal as enemies of the United States, if they claimed so to be, and would not
take the oath of allegiance. And some 4,000, out of a city of 160,000 inhabit
ants so registered themselves. I required every man and woman above the
age of eighteen so to register themselves, in order to settle the rights of the
United States in their property. All the rest, besides the 4,000, either took the
oath of allegiance or claimed to be subject to some foreign flag. There was
registered property to the amount, of some millions of dollars, which I held
under the law to be confiscated.
My object in doing this was to settle titles, because I had some experience in
looking up confiscated titles. A large portion of the landed property of Massa
chusetts depends upon confiscation titles. As all property was against the revolu
tion at that time, so all property in the South is now in favor of the rebellion.
The act of Congress provides that the fact of a man having aided and abetted the
rebellion, and not having returned at the time to his allegiance, shall be a good
plea to bar any suit for the recovery of his property. And I supposed I might
have occasion to sell the property of these rebels, and it would bring a great
deal more money, and the title would be a great deal better, if I had under the
former owner's own hand that he was an enemy of the United States at the
time. This explains what is meant by a registered enemy — in the department
of the Gulf — a man who, after the 23d of September, 1862, registered himself
as a friend of the confederate government, and as an enemy of the United States,
and when he did so he was obliged to hand in a list of all his property. It is
fair to say that many men of large means did so.
After that I had no hesitation in taking the property of any man who had
thus registered himself, and using it in any way or form for the benefit of the
United States or my troops. Up to that time I never allowed my officers to
occupy the houses or use the property of any others than officers in the rebel
army. Afterwards, however, when 1 found a good house that belonged to a
registered enemy, we had no hesitation in turning him out and using it, because
we held that it was confiscated to the United States, and was United States
property. And whenever any officer used a house in that way it saved to the
government commutation for quarters.
There is one subject which it is due to myself I should say something about.
I have heard something about "sugar speculations by the commanding general."
I desire to make a statement upon that subject. On the 16th of May, or about
that time, I was in New Orleans, and had twelve or fifteen transport ships which
were under charter at so much a day, or so much a month — the United States
to find them in ballast to get home again. Now, be it known, that there is not
a stone in all that part of Louisiana which we occupied to throw at a dog ; and
TESTIMONY. 361
it will not do to put mud into a transport vessel for ballast, because the earth
would settle to the bottom, and the water come to the top, and wash about and
make trouble. The only way to ballast these vessels was to send them to Ship
island, where there was no wharf for a ship of any draft of water to load at
when it got there ; and the only means of giving her ballast was to wheel white
sand into boats, take the boats alongside of a vessel, and then hoist the sand on
board ; and it became a question of importance to me how these vessels were
to be ballasted.
In the meantime the guerrillas were going about all through the country ad
vising the planters to destroy all their cotton and sugar, telling them it would
be confiscated by the United States if they did not destroy it. To put a stop
to that, I issued a general order saying that all such stories were lies ; that if the
people would bring their cotton and sugar into New Orleans it would have safe
guard and be bought. But there was another misfortune. I had in all $75,
and that would not go a great ways in buying cotton and sugar. I had no
quartermaster at that time ; he had not got down ; and no quartermaster's funds,
and the entire funds of the expedition, so far as I know, was the aforesaid $75.
I went to a banker, who had known of me in happier times, and agreed to bor
row of him $100,000, giving him drafts therefor, as I used it, on my private
banker ; and with that money I caused to be bought sugar, rosin, turpentine, &c.,
enough to ballast these vessels, and for a large vessel 200 tons of ballast would
be required. To illustrate the advantage of this : Take the steamer Mississippi,
for instance ; I had her there with a swept hold ; if I had sent her to Ship
island for sand, it would have taken her thirty hours to get there — call it a day —
which would be $1,500 ; then it would take ten days to put 250 tons of sand
on board of her; that would be $15,000 more. It would have taken four days
to have got the sand out of her after she had got at the wharf in New York, be
sides the expense of carting it away from the wharf, which would hav& cost a
great deal. So that it would have cost at least the sum of $20,000 to get her
home in ballast. Now, I gave five dollars a hogshead for the sugar ; the quar
termaster at New York complained that it took two days to unload that sugar,
and that it cost more to unload it than they could get for it. He did not think
that by not putting in sand I had saved some $1,200 freight, in addition to
saving $20,000, which I would have had to pay.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. You chartered the vessels to deliver them back in New York ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; at so much a day or month, to be delivered in ballast in
New York. I bought $60,000 worth of sugar, and tar and turpentine. At the
same time I wrote to the War Department, stating exactly what I had done —
stating that I had no right to use the money of the United States to make these
purchases, and even if I had the right, I had no United States money to use.
I wrote that I had used my own money, but that the government could take
the property I had bought, and sell it for the benefit of the United States if
they chose, provided they would answer my drafts here. If they did not choose
to cover my drafts, and would inform my agent of that feet, he would take care
of the property for myself and pay the drafts ; for I had bought the sugar at
two cents and a half per pound, when it was selling in New York at six cents ;
and tar at three dollars a barrel, when it was selling in New York at thirty-
eight dollars. One would therefore suppose that I would be willing to take
the property if the government did not want it. Being the agent of the govern
ment, however, and paid for my time, I had no right to do that.
The government let my drafts go to protest for non-acceptance, while the
matter was getting settled, but finally concluded to assume the business and paid
my drafts. They took the tar and turpentine for their own use ; they had no
occasion to sell that. The shipments of sugar that went to Boston alone paid
362 TESTIMONY.
to the government after all expenses the sum of $17,550 16, and the freight
upon it was $12,436 32. So it paid a net profit to the government.
As this matter may be brought up some time hereafter, when things are
not as fresh in the mind as they are now, I make this statement with your
leave, for the purpose of placing these facts upon the record. I can say that I
would have given, if I had been allowed the chance for the speculation, $100,000
for the profits.
Question. Did you consign this property to your private banker in Boston ?
Answer. Yes, sir, of course, for I had nobody else to consign it to. I con
signed it to my agent so that he could have the property to pay the drafts. The
government, so far as they were concerned, let the drafts go to protest, and my
friends had to raise the money to pay them.
Question. Was all the property bought and shipped through your agency
not shipped on your account, and sold on account of the government ?
Answer. All the property bought and shipped by me, or through my agency,
was shipped not on my account, but for the government, if they chose to take it.
Question. And the government did take it ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I had two views in purchasing it. One was to ballast
the government transports ; and the other was to let the people there know that
if they brought their cotton and sugar to New Orleans they could sell it.
There was one difficulty I found then. Nobody in the port could trade at
that time but me. They might buy and sell, but they could not send it out of the
port, for it was not opened until the first of June. After the port was opened,
this made the shipmasters grumble very much. What they wanted of me was
to allow them lay days, say twenty, to go home in, five days to get ballast, &c.,
as the case might be, certify that I discharged them there, so they could wait until
the port was open and make profit on their return cargoes. And one who was
sensible enough to be discharged without lay days, actually, as I am informed,
made $60,000 on his profits home.
After the opening of the port there was but one restriction upon trade in New
Orleans, and that was that the trader should be a loyal citizen of the United
States, and have taken the oath of allegiance. No one was allowed to teach or
preach, or deal in New Orleans after the first day of June, if we knew it, who
was not a loyal man.
And I would like to refer to another matter right here. I never shut up any
church in New Orleans. I shut lip the ministers, but kept the churches open
and found chaplains for them. I see it has been commonly stated that General
Banks had reopened the churches in New Orleans. He could not have done
that, for they were not closed. I provided chaplains for the churches, and paid
the choir and sexton, &c., out of the provost fund. And I shut up the ministers
who were disloyal. One had been a private in the rebel army ; another had
preached against the government ; and a third had expressly refused to take the
oath of allegiance or use the form of prayer required by his church service.
Question. Then, on the 1st of June, you gave orders for trade 1
Answer. Then came the proclamation opening the port.
Question. And on the opening of the port you threw trade open to every
one?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. You gave no special permits to any one ?
Answer. No, sir. Everybody who would pay $2 could get a permit.
Question. Did you give special permits to anybody to trade in the country 1
Answer. No, sir ; except to sutlers to carry supplies for the troops. I gave
any loyal man a pass, whoever he was, to go into the country ; and I sent an
official letter to the commander at Mobile, being the nearest person in authority
I could deal with, telling him I would allow neutral foreigners to exchange with
him salt for cotton — a bag of salt for a bale of cotton, and pay the difference —
TESTIMONY. 363
and that cotton should go to English or French subjects, and go out on neutral
bottoms, if he chose. That was forwarded to Richmond, and they refused to
do it. Governor Pettis, of Mississippi, made a point upon it, and there was
almost a rebellion between the State government of Mississippi and the con
federate government, as I am informed ; and just before I came away Governor
Pettis said that he would send out the cotton at all hazards. My object in that
was especially to keep the governments good natured in London and Paris. I
wrote my action in that matter to Washington as long ago as the 19th of July
last, but I have not yet got any answer to it.
Question. What regulations had you in reference to the towage of vessels up
to New Orleans from below ?
Answer. The only regulation was that government vessels should be first
served. After that towage should be open to all.
Question. Did you, by any order, give special permits to special vessels ?
Answer. No, sir. For the first month after we got there the only tow-boats
there were government boats.
Question. Did those government boats do the towage ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And the proceeds of that labor performed accrued to the govern
ment '?
Answer. Tes, sir. The only wrong that ever took place about that was that
different vessels would bribe the captains of the tow-boats to give them preference.
I discharged one captain for taking a bribe. He was the only one I got at.
There was one man, who had a cargo of ice, complained because I ordered up
two transports loaded with government troops before I let the tow-boat take his
vessel up. That was when I had only 250 extra men in New Orleans. Of
course, I could not tell him then why I would not allow his vessel to be towed
up first. But I have since told him, and now he is one of the best friends I
have.
By the chairman :
Question. On what day did the knowledge of General Banks coming to New
Orleans to supersede you get to New Orleans ?
Answer. On the 23d of November, eleven days before General Banks left New
York, it was known in New Orleans that I was to be superseded by him ; and a
bet of $100 to $10 was made in a secesh club room that within twenty days I
would be relieved by General Banks. General WeitzePs scouts brought in the
same news from the Teche ; and a drunken broker, whom I had put on Ship
island for three months, and who had served out his time there, came to General
Shepley as early as that day and boasted of the fact of my being superseded ;
and five days before General Banks left New York I wrote here to Washington
in consequence of the information I had got. On the 16th day of December,
the day I turned the command over to General Banks, Jeff. Davis had come
down to Jackson, only forty miles from Vicksburg, upon an expedition to
strengthen the defences on the river to meet Banks 's expedition. Yet after
knowing all that, he, on the 23d, issued his proclamation that I should be
treated as a felon, knowing that on the 16th I had turned over iny command to
General Banks.
Question. Have you any means of knowing the causes for your removal ?
Answer. I have no knowledge. I have asked everybody I have seen in
Washington, and nobody has been able to tell me. •
By Mr. Gooch:'
Question. What kind of soldiers do these black men make whom you took
into your regiments ?
Answer. I had two regiments of them guarding the railroad for six weeks
364 TESTIMONY.
before I came away ; and they were as well disciplined, as well drilled, and as
orderly as any soldiers I had in the department of the Gulf, and I had some
there as good as any in the armies of the United States.
Question. Can any number of blacks fit for soldiers be obtained in that sec
tion of country ?
Answer. Black men are like white men : they do not all want to fight. But
a much larger proportion of black men will enlist for soldiers than of whites
who have enlisted in any loyal State in the Union. They will enlist volun
tarily*; come forward -of their own accord ; for they take great pride in the posi
tion of soldier.
By the chairman :
Question. And their habits of submission to the whites will make them easier
to discipline ?
Answer. They are already disciplined. They have already learned to do
exactly as they are told, and that is a thing we never can teach our white
soldiers.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. In your judgment, then, the best interests of the service require
that black regiments shall be organized and taken into the service ?
Answer. I have no doubt upon that subject any more than I have that the
best interests of the service require that we should look for aid wherever we
can get it. The black regiments will be efficient just in proportion to their
intelligence, like white regiments ; and, while the more intelligent white men
make the best soldiers, the next class in intelligence, the next best, &c., when
with the black man you strike the same degree of intelligence, the black men
will make as good soldiers as the white.
By the chairman :
Question. Then you do not hold with that reputed maxim of Frederick the
Great, that the more stupid the man the better the soldier 1
Answer, No, sir ; and I do not believe he ever said that. I want soldiers as
intelligent as possible. When you ask me if black men will fight, I will give
you this answer, which is a philosophical one : The very reason why they are
now, and their ancestors were, slaves, is that they were captured in war, in
hand-to-hand conflicts, and sold as slaves. They started into slavery in that
way. They come from a fighting race, or they never would have been slaves.
INVASION OP NEW MEXICO.
WASHINGTON, July 15, 1862.
Colonel B. S. ROBERTS sworn and examined.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. What is your position and rank in the army 1
Answer. I am a brevet lieutenant colonel in the regular army, and a major in
the third regular cavalry.
Question. Where have you been in service latterly?.
Answer. For the last two years in New Mexico.
Question. Were you in service in New Mexico at the time so many officers of
the United States service there left and went over to the rebels ?
TESTIMONY. 365
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Are you aware of any conspiracy, or acts that would indicate the
existence of a conspiracy, to turn over New Mexico to the rebels ? If so, will
you please give a statement of what you know in regard to that matter 1
Answer. Colonel Loring, a well known secessionist, was sent to New Mexico,
in the spring of I860, to command that department. Soon after Colonel Lor
ing assumed the command an expedition was formed, consisting of the mounted
rifles, now the third cavalry, against the Mescaloros Apache Indians. Six com-
* panics of the regiment, under the command of Colonel Crittenden, were Assem
bled at Fort Staimton. A march was made in the direction of the Apaches,
who were on the line of Texas, between Texas and New Mexico, but none were
found. Previous to this the Apache Indians had been induced to leave the
vicinity of Fort Staunton, upon representations made to them by Captain Clai-
bourne, one of the leading rebels, that the small -pox was there, or in the neigh
borhood, and that if they did not leave they would have the small-pox. It
appears to me that this was a pretence to get up a campaign, as Indians leaving
a military post and refusing to return are regarded as showing evidences of hos
tility. Colonel Crittenden, who is one of the leading rebels, was in command
of the expedition. I joined him, at Fort Staunton, with two companies of cav
alry. While at Fort Staunton, Colonel Crittenden, having been drunk for a
long time, was about leaving the post, and had his ambulance brought up for
that purpose. He sent for me, as I would be left in command, and told me he
was going to Fort Union. In the course of the conversation he said to me :
'•Colonel, we have known each other a long time, and I am going to tell you my
plans. I am going to bring the regiment all here; I am going to bring the other
companies from Fort Union, Fort Craig, and Fort Albuquerque, and I am going
to march the regiment into Texas and deliver it over to the confederate States."
This was about the 1st of May, 1861. He said: "Will you obey my orders,
and march with me 1" I told him that I considered him crazy, for he would be
attempting what he could not succeed in doing, and I tried to dissuade him from
his purpose. He said that all hell could not persuade him from it, and repeated
the question to me again: "Will you march with me, and obey my orders'?"
I then told him that, as he had made known to me the object of the expedition,
I would not obey his orders or march with him, but would resist any such
attempt writh all the force I could. In the course of the day he called to see me
at my headquarters, and asked me if I would take a furlough. I told him I
would. My object in doing so was to get away from the post for the purpose
of defeating his object, by giving information of it to others. I went immedi
ately to Santa Fe. and had a private interview with Colonel Loring, who com
manded the department, and his adjutant general. I there became satisfied that
they were in the conspiracy also. I was treated very rudely by them; told that
I was neglecting my duty and had no business to come there, and was ordered
immediately back. I, however, succeeded in giving notice to Captain Hatch,
commanding at Albuquerque, and had him give notice to Captain Morris, com
manding at Fort Craig, and to other'officers in the Territory, of this conspiracy,
for the purpose of putting them on their guard, and causing them to disobey the
orders of the commanding officer of the department, or of Colonel Crittenden.
Within a few days all the officers concerned in this conspiracy left the country,
by the shortest route, for Texas, and abandoned the service of the United States.
Before leaving Fort Staunton for Santa Fe, I had notified my lieutenant of
what I had learned, and told him all about it. I also sent for my orderly ser
geant and prepared a plan for them to resist, if any attempt was made before I
"could succeed in preventing the movement. The plan was for them to seize the
ordnance which was in the company quarters where my company was quar
tered, and resist any such order, if any attempt was made in my absence to
carry this conspiracy into execution. My impression is that those officers left
366 TESTIMONY.
so hurriedly in consequence of their being convinced that they would be ar
rested and put in irons if they remained. They left the country as rapidly as
they could get out of it. I was informed by a number of the soldiers and the
sutler at Fort Staunton, the orderly sergeant of Captain Claiborn's company,
and others in that company, that Captain Claiborn had made several harrangues
to his company to persuade them to desert the service of the United States and
go with him to Texas. And I have no doubt, from information received from
others, that all the other officers who left had used their influence with all the
soldiers in the country to persuade them into this conspiracy, by representing
to them that there was no longer any Union, that it was dissolved, and they
never would be paid by the government ; but if they would go to Texas their
payment would be guaranteed to them. They told them that they had promises
of money for that purpose from Mr. Hartt, a man of great wealth at El Paso.
But the men proved loyal, and not one went with the officers. The most of
those officers, among them Colonel Loring, Colonel Crittenden, Captain Clai
born, Captain Wilcox, Lieutenant Jackson, Lieutenant McNeil, and a great
number of other infantry officers, made their rendezvous at Fort Filmore, twenty
miles from the Texas line, and near old El Paso. They there used great ex
ertions to induce the command of Major Lynde to desert, by representing to
them that they were under no obligations to serve this government longer ; that
the Union was dissolved ; that they would never be paid if they remained ; but
they would guarantee their pay if they would go over to the confederate service.
And, in rny opinion, so many officers, far outnumbering the loyal officers who
were at the post, demoralized the command of Major Lynde to such an extent
that his surrender was consequent upon that state of demoralization, as he had
no confidence that his men would fight. After the surrender of Major Lynde,
the regular troops left in the department of New Mexico were mainly assem
bled at Fort Craig. All the regular troops in the Territory amounted, according
to my recollection, to about 1,200 men. This force was wholly insufficient to
hold the Territory against the invasion of the Territory under the rebel General
Sibley, who commanded the Texans. We were without supplies, without
money, without clothing, without means of transportation, without subsistence,
and without any efficient sinew of war for offensive or defensive operations.
Our condition, as I have been informed by General Canby, who is in command
of that department, has been frequently represented by him to General Thomas,
the adjutant general of the army of the United States ; but during the year
1861, and the first four months of the year 1862, up to the time that I left, we
had no relief in the shape of re-enforcements ordered by the department here
in Washington, or of supplies or money. We were reduced to short rations as
early as January last, and continued on short rations at Fort Craig, where the
main body of the troops was as late as April of this year ; and the troops in
the field from Fort Craig were on short rations in the campaign against the
Texans. No supplies of any kind, or subsistence, was received from the States,
and the country produced nothing. The volunteers that came into the Territory
and saved Fort Union, and enabled General Canby to hold Fort Craig, were
brought in on General Canby's urgent and repeated representations to the gov
ernor of Colorado that the Territory would be lost unless he sent in volunteers
and saved Fort Union. The arrival of those volunteers, in my estimation,
saved New Mexico to the United States.
Question. Proceed and give your own connexion with the military operations
in the Territory.
Answer. On the 8th day of August, 1861, I was assigned by general orders
from General Canby to the command of that portion of New Mexico south of
Albuquerque to Texas, and placed on duty according to my brevet rank of
lieutenant colonel ; and I continued in command of all the troops in the field in
the southern district up to the 16th day of April, 1862, after the last battle was
TESTIMONY. 367
fought with the Texans at Peralta. Immediately upon being put in command
of the southern district of New Mexico, I proceeded to fortify Fort Albuquerque,
which, up to that time, was a mere defenceless post with adobe buildings. I
was in command of all the troops in the field at the battle of Valverde, on the
21st of April, from Sj o'clock in the morning until a quarter before three in the
afternoon, when General Canby arrived on the field with re-enforcements.
Question. What were the relative forces engaged in that battle ?
Answer. I commenced the action in the morning with 220 regular cavalry, at
the ford of the Rio Grande, against the whole of Greene's regiment of cavalry,
on the opposite side, amounting to 800 men.
Question. With what success ?
Answer. I forced him from the ford and drove him from his position a mile,
and brought up my battery and planted it at the ford — it was McRae's battery —
supported by two companies of regular infantry and two companies of New
Mexican volunteers. With this force I fought the whole Texan army until
half past eleven o'clock.
Question. What was the number of the Texan army ]
Answer. During this time I was re-enforced twice, and at half past eleven
o'clock it amounted to over 2,000 men. I succeeded, with McRae's battery, in
silencing one of their batteries, destroying two guns and one caisson, and forcing
the two batteries in other positions to withdraw. At half past eleven I was re-
enforced by the whole of the regular infantry, 720 men, under command of
Captain Selden. I threw this force immediately across the river at another
crossing and, as soon as line of battle could be formed, charged the whole
Texan force with the bayonet and drove them back from all their positions on
to their baggage, repulsed a charge, led up two companies of lancers supported
by two regiments of cavalry, killing great numbers. It was the most gallant
repulse of the bayonet I ever saw in my life. The troops allowed them to come
within fifteen paces of them before drawing a trigger, and then literally anni
hilated the leading company. After this repulse of the enemy and driving them
from their positions, I changed the position of McRae's battery and crossed it
over the river, continuing the artillery fire until General Canby came on the
field at a quarter before three o'clock. The good service of McRae's battery
had so annoyed the Texans for seven hours that they resolved to take it at all
hazards, and making a demonstration to charge the dismounted cavalry on our
extreme right, which drew off some of the supporting troops of the battery, an
overwhelming charge was made upon the battery from the extreme right of the
enemy, and after desperate fighting, in which one company of infantry lost
twenty-two men killed at the guns, the horses all killed or wounded, Captain
McRae, commanding the battery, killed, Lieutenant Mitchell, the next in rank,
killed, Lieutenant Bell twice wounded, the overwhelming force of the enemy
succeeded in capturing the battery. Under the direction of General Canby
the force fell back in order, re-crossed the river, and fell into the fort.
Previous to this, about one o'clock in the day, a train of the Texan army,
which was yet on the sand-hills, was to a large extent destroyed ; a herd of
cattle stampeded, and driven off in great numbers, and great numbers of their
mules captured. General Sibley having succeeded in getting between Fort
Craig and its supplies, and having demanded the surrender of the fort, and fear
ing a failure to take it by siege or assault, proceeded on up the Rio Grande, and
there being no troops to oppose him he marched through the country, and took
possession of the capital at Santa Fe. In the attempt of his forces to march
upon Fort Union from Sante Fe he was fought in the canon Gloriata by the
Colorado volunteers and some 300 or 400 regulars, with artillery and cavalry,
and defeated on the 27th of March, and, according to my recollection of the
dates, on the 29th of March his forces fell back into Santa Fe; and Colonel
Slough fell back towards Fort Union on the pickets. On the 1st of April I
368 TESTIMONY.
moved the regular forces, except the wounded, from Fort Craig to make a junc
tion with the Colorado volunteers, and the regulars serving with them, to attack
General Sibley wherever he could be found in the Territory. I reached Al
buquerque on the evening of the 8th of April, and made an immediate demon
stration upon the city to discover their batteries. I made a feint of a real at
tack, intending to pass by under cover of the feint, reach the mountains, and
join the other forces, under Colonel Ball. I lay before Albuquerque on the 9th,
continuing these demonstrations, having set large bodies of men at work with
spade and pick, as if throwing up intrenchments. Immediately after nightfall
I withdrew all my forces, made a night march, reached the mountains, and in
three days' forced march succeeded in joining my command to that of Colonel
Ball's. The two columns on the 14th, immediately upon making this junction
made forced marches, having heard that General Sibley was in full retreat, and
fell upon his rear on the morning of the 15th of April, at Peralta, capturing a
large train and a large number of prisoners, and killing a large number of his
escort. Peralta was bombarded on the 15th by the combined batteries of our
two commands, and at night the two commands advanced to a close investment
of the place. During the night, under cover of the darkness, and during a
sand-storm, which lasted all that twenty-four hours, General Sibley succeeded
in withdrawing from Peralta and crossing the river. His rear was attacked, a
large portion of his train captured, and some of his guns were taken. He con
tinued his retreat, abandoning his guns and wagons, leaving his sick and wounded
behind him, and his dead to be buried by us. After a close pursuit for 150
miles, he was obliged to break up his forces into small parties, take to the moun
tains, and reach Arizona in small parties, having left all along the line of his
retreat his ambulances and the private and public stores of his entire command,
burning his gun carriages, and concealing his guns in the changing^sands of the
plains, so that but few of them were discovered. That closed operations in Ne\r
Mexico up to the time I left.
Question. What recognition from the government have you had for the ser
vices you have rendered in New Mexico ?
Answer. My services have been recognized by General Canby, commanding
the department of New Mexico, in several reports, an extract from one of which
I herewith submit :
"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
" Fort Craig, New Mexico, March 1, 1862.
"SiR: ********
"I desire to bring to your notice Colonel Roberts, 3d cavalry, for some time
past the energetic and efficient commander of the troops at Fort Craig, and on
the 21st the immediate commander of the troops at Valverde until half-past two
o'clock. He was there, as he has always been, distinguished for coolness,
gallantry, and efficiency.
" I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,
" E. R. S. CANBY,
" Commanding Department.
^ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY,
" Washington, D. 6V
I anf informed by General Canby, in a letter dated Santa Fe, May 13, 1862,
that, in addition to that brief recognition of my services, a special report of my
services, and of other officers of the department, during the past twelve months,
has been made. I also- brought here from General Canby a letter to the adju
tant general, in which he informed that officer that he had relieved me from duty
in New Mexico, and had sent me as the bearer of triplicates of his reports and
the flags which had been taken from the enemy in the different battles; assigning t
TESTIMONY. 369
as a special reason for ordering me to report at Washington, that I had been in com
mand of the troops in the field in New Mexico, and that, being mustered out as a
volunteer colonel, he did not see fit to require me to serve there under those I
had been commanding, and he recommended me in that letter to the consider
ation of the government for mv services in that department. On reaching
Washington, and delivering these letters and these trophies to the adjutant
general, about the 20th of June, I was received by that officer in a very rude
and discourteous manner. I was told that General Canby had no right to order
me in on such a pretence, and that he should bring it immediately to the notice
of the Secretary of War, and have me returned to New Mexico — or words to
that effect. On the 25th of June General Thomas addressed to me the following
order :
" WAR DEPARTMENT,
"Adjutant General's Office, Washington, June 25, 1862.
<: SIR : The Secretary of War directs that you immediately join your regiment
in New Mexico.
"I am. sir. very respectfully, your obedient servarft,
" L. THOMAS,
"Adjutant General.
" Brevet Lieutenant Colonel B. S. ROBERTS,
"Major 3d United States Cavalry, Washington, D. C."
He has in no manner expressed to me any acknowledgment of any services
whatever I have rendered in New Mexico, nor has he spoken to me about the
condition of the army there, although in the letter from General Canby it is
mentioned particularly that I have a full knowledge of the condition of the
military forces of New Mexico, and of all past operations, and requests that I
may make them known. I have brought to the notice of General Thomas im
portant matters requiring his attention, and that of the War Department, but I
have not been able in any way or manner to represent the condition of affairs
in New Mexico, its wants, or to get the acts of General Canby in any manner
confirmed — acts which of necessity General Canby, without authority, was
obliged to order.
General Canby appointed non-commissioned officers to act as officers, because
there were companies there without a single commissioned officer to a company.
They have been acting for five or six months as such officers ; most of them
have drawn no pay as soldiers for twenty months or two years. They have
been at all the expense of officers in clothing themselves, in living, and in pur
chasing horses, but they can draw no pay as officers until the action of General
Canby is recognized by the War Department. I have strongly urged General
Thomas to have this recognition made, to have their acts as officers legalized,
as some acknowledgment of their faithful, gallant, and meritorious services
since they have been promoted. But he has done nothing either in this or in
any other matter that I have brought to his attention.
Instead of acknowledging any of the services I have rendered in New Mexico,
he has interfered with the President to persuade him to withdraw an order that
he had given to promote me to a brevet brigadiership in the army, and I am
undoubting in my belief that he has never brought to the notice of either the
Secretary of War or the President the names of any of the officers who have
been mentioned by General Canby for the consideration of the government for
their meritorious services in New Mexico, and their gallant conduct in battles
there.
Question. Can you account for this course of conduct towards you and the
men who served with you so .gallantly in the field?
Answer. It appears to me to be the determination of General Thomas not to
Part iii 24
370 TESTIMONY.
acknowledge the services of the officers who saved the Territory of New Mexico,
and the utter neglect of the adjutant general's department for the last year to
communicate in any manner with the commanding officer of the department of
New Mexico, or to answer his urgent appeals for re- enforcements, for money,
and other supplies, in connexion with his repudiation of the services of all the
army there, convinces me that he is not gratified at their loyalty and their suc
cess in saving that Territory to the Union.
Question. Were those troops that 'have been so treated the men who saved
that Territory to us?
Answer. Yes, sir; and I want to say, for the credit of the rank and file of
that army, that but one solitary man of them has deserted from the regular army
in New Mexico during all these hardships and troubles, while all the officers I
have mentioned, and many others, have deserted to the enemy.
Question. Can it be possible that these men, the rank and file as well as the
officers, after rendering these important services, have gone without pay for
nearly two years ?
Answer. Yes, sir. It is now from twenty months to two years that the most
of these soldiers have been without pay.
Question. How did the men live all that time without pay ?
Answer. We had nothing for them but their clothing and parts of rations, and
nothing else ; but they served with the utmost willingness. Many of them made
the campaign without drawers and some of them without socks. We reduced the
rations at different times. It was first reduced to 16 ounces of flour, then to 12
ounces, and at one time there was no flour. The saving of the soldiers gave
them about four ounces a day, but this was but a short time. At one time we
were reduced to one day's rations of four ounces a day for all the men who were
left to hold the post while we were driving the Texans out of the Territory,
and yet I have never heard a complaint from a soldier there.
Question. How did it happen that there were so many disloyal officers in that
particular division of the army ?
Answer. By the withdrawal from the Territory of most of the loyal officers.
Question. How was that 1
Answer. It so happened that most of the loyal officers belonging to the differ
ent commands in New Mexico were withdrawn from the Territory, and a large
majority of those remaining were disloyal.
Question. If the rank and file had been as disloyal as the officers were, the
Territory would have been lost ?
Answer. Certainly it would, for there would have been n5 force there to
have held it. At Fort Staunton, after the disloyal officers had all left, I found
the men in bad humor, and I did not know what to think of it. I thought it
might be because they had not been paid for a long time, and had been ex
pecting it. Every paymaster in that country went off and carried off the funds
with him. I formed my command — all of them — on parade. I told them it
was a time when true and loyal men were called upon to make sacrifices; that
the government was in trouble ; that the paymasters in the country who had
had the money to pay them had all gone ove.r to the southern confederacy; that
it might be a long time that they would be without pay before the paymasters
could get funds to pay them in this time of trouble, and come there to pay them ;
but I told them it would be sure to come ; that the government would be main
tained; and I appealed to their manliness and gratitude, as they had been sus
tained by the government in its time of strength, to stand by it in its time of
need; that it was the time for men to shoAv their good qualities. After that
I never heard a complaint of any kind from them, or knew a man to grumble or
decline to do his duty because he had not been paid, fed, or clothed. I requested
the non-commissioned officers, the most intelligent of them, to state to the men
that though the officers of the army had deserted in so many instances, the ex-
TESTIMONY. 371
ample should not be followed by the men; that officers, although they were
bound by a higher duty and higher obligations to serve the government, yet
they had never taken the oath to serve the government for a specific period, and
might have had an idea that they had a right to go when they pleased. The
soldiers were, however, under an oath to serve five years honestly and faithfully,
and no soldier could leave without violating his oath and having the reproach of
deserter and perjurer follow him through life. The non-commissioned officers
soon afterwards all assured me that the men were perfectly contented.
Question. What force is there in New Mexico at this time, as near as you can
estimate ?
Answer. My impression is that there are about 900 regulars of all arms, two
regiments of Colorado volunteers, and probably 1,500 volunteers from Califor
nia have now reached the Territory, as they were last heard from at Tucson.
Question. Do you know of anything that would indicate any fault or neglect
on the part of the commanding general in New Mexico in representing to the
government the state of things there, or did he report to Washington the con
dition of affairs there; and if so, with what success?
Answer. I have, at different times, received from the commanding general of
that department a great number of letters, in which he informed me, while I was
in the southern district, of his efforts to' represent to the government at Wash
ington the state of things in the Territory, and to get re-enforcements and supplies
into the Territory. I had no- money in the department, and yet was expected
to fortify Fort Craig, subsist the army there, enroll volunteers, and defend the
country, all without means. And in representing the impossibility of doing all
those things, these communications with the general commanding were had. He
has since told me, and that, too, but a very short time before I left New Mexico,
that he never yet had heard from the War Department at Washington, or
received any answer to the communications that he had made on these subjects.
I will make one exception : When General McClellan entered upon the com
mand of all our armies, and General Canby communicated to him the state of
affairs in New Mexico, General McClellan, as General Canby informed me, im
mediately answered the letter, and told him that he was astonished to learn the
state of things there, and that it would be repaired without any delay.
Question. To whom were the communications of the commanding general in
New Mexico sent here ?
Answer. His communications to the government are made through the ad
jutant general of the army.
Question. Have you any means of knowing whether his communications ever
reached the Secretary of War or the President?
Answer. I have no means of knowing; but I have every reason to believe
that they never have been brought to the attention of either of those officers.
Question. What reasons have you for entertaining that opinion ?
Answer. I know that General Canby, in his reports, has recommended a large
number of officers in New Mexico for meritorious services and gallant conduct
to the Secretary of War and to the President for promotion, and not one pro
motion has yet been made.
Question. Were the vacancies, made by officers going over to the rebels, ever
filled by appointments made here ?
Answer. They were filled by appointments, but the officers so appointed had
not joined up to the time I left. They have been permitted to remain all last
winter and last fall at or near Fort Leavenworth. I met them about five hundred
miles from Santa Fe, on their way to New Mexico, as I was coming in from that
Territory about six weeks ago. But at that time the Texans had been all driven
from New Mexico, and there was no enemy in the countrv.
Question. Are those officers who have thus failed to reach that Territory
under the pay of the government before they reach there ?
372 TESTIMONY.
Answer. They are all entitled to pay, and I presume are under pay.
Question. And during all this time are those who rendered the service in New
Mexico not paid according to the rank of the service they rendered?
Answer. No, sir. I was myself assigned to duty according to my brevet
rank of lieutenant colonel. I had all of the time the command of a brigadier
general, and exercised it in the field ; and yet I have been refused my lieuten
ant colonel's pay, and I do not know of any officer who has been assigned to
duty there according to his brevet rank who has not been without pay, except
as they would accept drafts upon the treasurer at New York and other place*
east, there being no money in the Territory.
Question. Is there anything else that came under your observation that it
would be important and proper for this committee to know ? If so, please
state it.
Answer. I can see that there has been great culpability on the part of some
officers in the War Department in Washington in not sustaining General
Canby in his great efforts to save New Mexico. He was forced to make ap
pointments from the ranks of the best men, non-commissioned officers to act as
commissioned officers, in consequence of the great number of officers who de
serted and went over to the enemy. General Canby has made the strongest
representations of the necessity and propriety of his action, and has urged, in
the strongest terms, upon the War Department, the ratification of these acts.
Yet they have done nothing ; and bince I have been in Washington, although I
have repeatedly called at the Adjutant General's office for that purpose, I have
not been able to get the acts of General Canby legalized. I can represent the
hardships of some of the cases if the committee desire.
Question. State one or two of the most prominent, if you please.
Answer. One young man who had the courage to stand up at Fort Bliss and
Franklin against the secessionists was thrown into prison there, and kept in
confinement, and, I believe, in irons, for a very long time, and his life threatened.
He succeeded in making his escape, and in reaching Fort Craig, having under
gone great hardships, having been several days (three, I think) without any
thing to eat, and without water. He passed around the range of mountains
known as the Sierra Blanca and came into Fort Craig. He gave the most im
portant military information, and in consequence of his loyalty, and the servi
ces he had rendered, General Canby appointed him an acting lieutenant. He
served in that capacity five or six months as I remember. He was my aide-de
camp at the battle of Valverde, and his conduct there was not only meritorious,
but it was highly distinguished for zeal, daring, and efficiency. This young
man came on to Washington in the hope of getting his appointment legalized
by having it acted upon by the War Department, but he has not succeeded..
He was in the service for six months and over at great expense, and rendered
distinguished service, and yet he is on his board here and without pay. It is
the general sentiment of the army in New Mexico that it has been ignored by
the War Department at Washington. It was a. common saying in the army
there that it had been sold.
ACCOMACK EXPEDITION.
WASHINGTON, January 28, 1862.
Colonel HALBERT E. PAINE sworn and examined.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army 1
Answer. I am colonel commanding the 4th Wisconsin regiment ,
TESTIMONY. 373
Question. Where are you stationed ?
Answer. At Baltimore now.
Question. Did you go down to Aceomack with the expedition under General
Lock wood ? ,
Answer. I did.
Question. With your regiment ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I did not start with him, but I was subsequently under
him.
Question. Where did you first come upon the rebel camp ?
Answer. The first rebel camp we got to, there were no rebels in the camp.
The first place we got to occupied by the rebels that amounted to anything was
at a place called Oak Hall, in Virginia.
Question. How long after you reached this deserted rebel camp was it before
you commenced the pursuit of the rebels ? Give us a narrative, as brief as
possible, of your movement.
Answer. I landed with the 4th Wisconsin, Nimm's battery, and Richards's
cavalry, opposite White Haven, Maryland, on the forenoon of the 5th of No
vember, which was Tuesday. I marched that day to Princess Anne, a distance
of about eight miles. The next day I marched to Snow Hill, where we re
mained one week, and then marched to Newtown. We reached Newtown, I
think, on Wednesday evening. On Sunday, the 17th, we marched from New-
town to Oak Hall, and arrived there the same day. On the 20th we left Oak
Hall and marched to Drummondtown, reaching there the next day. We left
Drummondtown on the 26th, and camped the first night at Pungoteague, the
next night at Franktown, and the third day we arrived at Eastville.
Question. What was the distance between Drummoudtown and Eastville ?
Answer. I think it was not far from thirty-six miles, so that our average
day's inarch was only about twelve miles. But I will not be absolutely sure
about that.
Question. Did you capture the arms of the rebels ? Did they give them up
to you, or did they simply disperse with their arms ?
Answer. I will tell all I know about that. When we were at Oak Hall, one
day, with General Lockwood's permission, I took a detachment from my regiment
and Richarcts's cavalry and went down to what is called Chingoteague inlet;
and during my absence a detachment of the 5th New York regiment, the 21st
Indiana, with a section of Nimm's battery, were sent forward by General Lock-
wood to a lower point of the peninsula, and I saw no more of them until I
reached Eastville some time after. It was in the lower country, not very far
from the extreme point of the peninsula. They probably had more to do with
this business of taking arms, capturing cannon and muskets, than we had.
Question. What do you know about the capturing of cannon and muskets,
from what you heard among the officers ?
Answer. I saw in the court-house yard at Drummondtown six or seven can
non, with caissons, that had been taken from the rebels ; I think taken at
Pungoteague Landing, from a fortification I afterwards saw there, and brought
up to Drummondtown. I heard that there were some muskets in a jail at
Drummondtown, but I never saw them, and was never able to learn the history
of those muskets, whether they were captured, or whether they were found
there in the jail.
Question. What was done with these cannon that were captured ]
Answer. They were there the last I saw of them.
Question. Did you capture any shot or shell, any munitions of war, or any
provisions ?
Answer. We found at Oak Hall a small quantity of sweet potatoes and a
email quantity of oats, which I think belonged to the rebel army encamped
Acre before we arrived. "But of that I am not certain.
374 TESTIMONY.
Question. What was done with them ?
Answer. We consumed the most of them. We took them from those who
had them. I told them that if they were private property they would be paid
for ; but if not, they would be used as captured property belonging to our gov
ernment. I think the conclusion of it was that they gave up any claim to the
property. It did not amount to much.
Question. Do you know anything about the capture of fugitive slaves upon
that expedition, and their being returned to rebel masters 1
Answer. Not of my own knowledge. I have heard a great deal said about it.
Question. State what you heard among officers there.
Answer. We marched to Eastville, the southern limit of our march. We
then returned, by slow marches, to Pungoteague Lauding, to embark from that
point to Baltimore. While we were lying there at Pungoteague, I went one
day with Major Van Norstrand, the surgeon of our regiment, to call upon General
Lockwood, who was quartered in a private house pretty near the landing.
While the surgeon and I were there, he remarked to us that a fugitive slave had
been found by his owner, somewhere in the neighborhood of that camp, who
had come up from a town lower down, and I think he said he had caused him
to be taken out and flogged.
Question. Who caused it to be done ?
Answer. General Lockwood. Neither Major Van Norstrand nor myself made
any response to that remark. I think we did not either of us look at him.
After a moment's silence he remarked that " he only had the slave slightly
tickled." I think he used the word " slightly ;" I know he used the word
11 tickled." He said something more upon the subject ; I said nothing. I know
nothing else about that except what I heard from the officers of the regiment.
Question. Do you know whether any cavalry horses were given back to their
owners after having been captured by our soldiers ?
Answer. The officers of our regiment took a large number of horses which
they supposed to belong to rebel cavalry officers, and I believe all of them
were given up except one.
Question. By order of the general 1
Answer. Yes, sir. 1 do not know but they all went into the hands of the
rebel officers finally. They were taken from our possession.
Question. Can you tell whether any attempt was made to administer the oath
of allegiance to these pretended owners before these horses were given up to
them, or whether they took the oath 1
Answer. I never heard of any attempt being made to administer the oath to
them ; it may be that that attempt was made, and it may be that the oath was
administered. But I never heard of any such thing.
By the chairman :
Question. You said that all but one horse was given up. What was done
with that ?
Answer. I do not know that all were given to the rebels, but they were
taken from us. There was one very fine horse taken by the adjutant of
our regiment. He made application to the government, through General
Dix, for leave to purchase that horse at its valuation, and finally consent was
given by the government. He did intend to buy the horse, but finding it was
foundered he would not take it.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Do you know what was done with those horses ? Whether some
of them went across the bay or not ?
Answer. I do not. I know that some of them were taken home by their
owners.
TESTIMONY. 375
Question Do you know anything about the return of arms and ammunition
to the rebels after they had been captured 1
Answer. The arms that my soldiers took we took in small numbers, generally
one or two from a house. They would go into a house sometimes with permis
sion and sometimes without permission, I think — not to my knowledge, however;
without permission — and take them in small numbers, one or two in a place.
I do not know that I recollect of any muskets being returned ; I recollect that
some small weapons, a pistol for example, was restored by order of General
Lockwood.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. What do you know about the return of provisions captured from
the rebels, returned under order of General Lockwood?
Answer. I think I never heard of any such thing ; I do not now remember of
having heard of it.
Question. About the flogging of slaves that came to your camps : what do
you know, on the information of other officers besides General Lockwood, as to
his ordering slaves to be flogged?
Answer. The rumor of that circumstance of which I have spoken ran through
the camps. I heard of it from different sources.
Question. Were any arms laid down by the rebels ?
Answer. I never knew anything about anything being laid down. But, as I
said before, a part of the 21st Indiana and the 5th New York, with a section of
Nimm's battery, went ahead of us. And what may have been done by them I
do not know. There were some arms in the jail at Drummondtown, as I was
told, which may have been surrendered by the rebels.
Question. Did any of the rebels in Northampton county return to their
allegiance ?
Answer. Not to my knowledge.
Question. Do you know anything about General Lockwood sending outside
of Northampton county to get a loyal man to take the post office in that county?
Answer. One day while at headquarters, at the lowest point on the peninsula
to which we marched, I heard one of his staff — I do not now recollect who — say
that no man had yet taken the oath of allegiance. And I was then informed
who had been appointed postmaster; but I cannot now recollect his name.
Question. There were very few loyal men, if any, in that region, then?
Answer. I do not know of more than two ; I never heard of more than two
men about Eastville that I thought were loyal men.
Question. Did the rebels in that county disperse by reasorijof General Dix's
proclamation, or by reason of the military force brought against them ?
Answer. I will tell the facts, and then you can judge for yourselves. I did
not know what the object of the expedition was at all. I was ordered to White
Haven, and to march to Snow Hill, and to be there with my force on a certain
day and await orders. I was there awhile, and there received orders to report
myself to General Lockwood, who would take command of the force which up
to that time were with me. I did report myself to General Lockwood when he
arrived, and he took command of the force. We marched, as I have already
stated, to Newtown At Newtown was a detachment of the 21st Indiana, and
during the day upon which we arrived there a part of the 5th New York — about
.500 men — arrived there. Subsequently portions of the 17th Massachusetts,
6th Michigan, 2d Delaware, and Purnell's (Maryland) Legion, arrived; I think
about half of each regiment. I did not know up to that time what the object
of that expedition was ; I do not know now. I do not know who planned it ;
whether by the President, the commander-in-chief, General Dix, or who it was.
General Lockwood sent me from Newtown to Oak Hall, on the 17th, with
my own regiment, Nimm's battery, Richards's cavalry, and detachments of the
376 TESTIMONY.
21st Indiana, the 5th New York, and the 6th Michigan, under my command.
And it was on that day, on that march, that we expected to meet the rebels be
tween Newtown and Oak Hall. We crossed the boundary line between Mary
land and Virginia that day. We expected to meet the enemy during the day,
and marched in such shape as to be ready for them. But we did not meet them.
We found the roads obstructed near the boundary line by fallen trews ; we found
some intrenchments thrown up, but the enemy had fled, and AVC came to their
camp which they had left. We were informed that they had left on Friday
night. I was informed by a Dr. Watson, who was a Union man, that he had
been forced into their service as one of their soldiers — impressed into their
service; that he retreated with them; that they went down very rapidly from
Oak Hall on Friday night to Drummondtown, and there dispersed.
Question. How long was that after the proclamation ?
Answer. The proclamation was issued from Newtown, I think, some time be
tween the 13th and the 17th. It might have been issued before the 13th.
Question. What was the date of this dispersion 1
Answer. The Friday they dispersed was the 15th, I think.
Question. Did General Lockwood tell you, or state in your presence, that the
line of policy under which the campaign was conducted was in accordance with
orders from headquarters of the department, or headquarters of the army ?
Answer. I cannot say that he ever in my presence made any discrimination
as to the source of the authority or policy he was acting under, whether ivoin.
the headquarters of the army or the headquarters of the department. I have an
order which may throw some light on the subject.
Question. What is that order?
Answer. It is as follows •
"HEADQUARTERS PENINSULA BRIGADE,
"Newtown, Md, November 15, 1861.
"General Orders, No. 11.]
" In consideration of the importance attached to the present expedition by the
commander of the army and the general commanding the department, and the
proximity of the enemy, no officer or soldier will be allowed to remain out of
camp at night, unless by the special permission of the general commanding this
brigade ; and any violation of this order will occasion the necessity of placing
every one so violating it under arrest.
" By command :
" Briadier General LOCKWOOD."
I was in General Lockwood's office at Eastville, and we fell into conversation
respecting the policy of the expedition, its objects, &c., and his mode of con
ducting it.
Question.* Will you state what General Lockwood said about it ?
Answer. From what > General Lockwood said to me, I inferred that it had
come to his knowledge that criticisms had been made by some persons on his
course there. He showed me his instructions from General Dix, and requested
me to read them, and assured me that it had been his honest purpose to conform
his duty there strictly in accordance with the instructions of the major general.
I read the instructions, and I was satisfied from what I had observed of General
Lockwood's conduct, and from the tenor of those instructions, that it was Gen
eral Lockwood's honest purpose to execute the orders which he had received
directly and literally.
Question. Have you a copy of the instructions under which General Lock-
wood acted ?
Answer. I have not. When I started on that expedition I did not know what
I was going for, or what superior officers were to go with me. I followed in-
TESTIMONY. 377
structions in writing that General Dix gave me. General Lockwood informed
me that he did not know he was to command that expedition until he left Balti
more, though he had thought for some time that he should command an expedi
tion to the Eastern Shore of Maryland.
Question. I think that you have stated that on the march from Drummond-
town to Eastville you averaged about 12 miles a day ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How did it happen that you marched only that far in a day ?
What was the cause of your detention?
Answer. I do not know. The orders from General Lockwood were to con
sume three days in the march from Drummondtown to Eastville. The march
from Oak Hall to Drummondtown was a longer march than 12 miles a day ; but
I cannot give the exact distance.
Question. Were the rebels in advance of you in making the march from Oak
Hall to Drummondtown 1
Answer. We arrived in their camp at Oak Hall on Sunday afternoon ; they
had left it the Friday evening before.
Question. How far in advance of you were they then ?
Answer. When we reached Drummondtown I do not know where they were.
I never heard where they were.
Question. I have been informed that the enemy were immediately before you,
and that by a rapid march you could have captured them, with their baggage
and ammunition.
Answer. We lay at Newtown from the 13th to the 17th. That was not very
far from their camp at Oak Hall. They left Oak Hall before we left Newtown.
I never heard of our being nearer to the rebels than the distance from Newtown
to Oak Hall, which was not far from 20 miles.
Question. You do not know how far they may have been in advance of you 1
Answer. I was told by Dr. Watson, a man in whose statements I place im
plicit confidence, that they went, and he went with them, from Oak Hall to
Drummondtown, and that that was the last place they were together; there they
scattered and dispersed.
WASHINGTON, January 28, 1862.
Captain W. P. MOORE sworn and examined.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. What is your rank and position in the%rmy ?
Answer. I am captain of company E, 4th Wisconsin regiment.
Question. Were you on the Accomack expedition, under General Lockwood ?
Answer. I was.
Question. Will you state what you know about the flogging or returning of
fugitive slaves, under the direction of General Lockwood, during that expedition?
Answer. I did not see anything of the sort myself; 1 only heard reports.
Question. Reports from whom?
Answer. From some officers of our regiment.
Question. What did they report to you ?
Answer. They reported that while we were at Pungoteague, on our return
from Eastville, General Lockwood had had some one of the Purnell Legion, or of
the Delaware regiment — the Purnell Legion, I think — flog a slave for running
away, and had him returned to his master.
Question. Flog a slave and return him ?
378 TESTIMONY.
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Is that all that was reported to you on that matter ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I think so.
Question. What do you know about the return of cavalry horses to rebels
after they had been captured ?
Answer. I know there were a number of horses, from six to twelve, that I
saw. The most of them were taken by our regiment. I did not see any orders
for delivering them up ; but I know they were delivered over to General Lock-
wood. What became of them after that I do not know, except by report.
Question. What was reported to have been done with them by General Lock-
wood ?
Answer. The report was that some citizen was there and swore the horses
were his, and that they were returned.
Question. Do you know whether they were returned ?
Answer. I do not. I did see one little black mare that we had had in our
regiment. I saw some citizen have it afterwards ; who he was I do not know.
It was said that she had been returned to him.
Question. Do you know anything about the capture of arms and ammunition
that was returned afterwards to the rebels by order of General Lockwood ?
Answer. No, sir ; I do not.
Question. Were you at Drummondtown when General Lockwood arrived
there ]
Answer. I was.
Question. Did he make a speech there to the rebels 1
Answer. He was reported to have so done. I did not hear the speech. I was
down town that afternoon that he made the speech.
Question. You do not know what he said 1
Answer. I do not, except by report.
Question. Did you hear General Lockwood say anything about his policy
about the returning or flogging of fugitive slaves 1
Answer. No, sir ; I did not. I had no personal intercourse with him. All
that I know about that came through orders — through our colonel.
Question. Do you know what those orders were ?
Answer. They were orders to allow no negro to come within our lines; that
was when I was officer of the day. I believe I was not ordered to catch them.
I do not think I received any such orders as that. I know there were a number
of persons in search of fugitives, who came into our camp to search for them.
Question. Do you know anything about the return of a number of fugitive
slaves from Baltimore to Pungoteague, Virginia, or whether they were simply
lauded at the wharf, or whether their masters were sought after ?
Answer. I do not. I know that a steamer came down, and it was reported
to me that some slaves can^e in at the time.
Question. How many 1
Answer. I do not know; I think four or five.
Question. Do you know what became of those slaves that came on that
steamer ?
Answer. I do not.
Question. Do you know anything about the laying down of arms by the
rebels ?
Answer. I never saw any that were laid down by the rebels that I know of.
I saw a great many arras that were reported by different parties to have been
found at different places.
Question. Did any of the rebels of Northampton county return to their alle
giance after you went down there ?
Answer. I think they did, some of theln. I do not know that they took the
oath. There was one man who reported himself to me as having been in the
TESTIMONY 379
rebel army. He said be had been drafted in, and was glad of an opportunity to
get out.
Question. Were there any loyal men at all in that region 1
Answer. I talked with half a dozen men, I think, who talked as if they were
loyal to some extent. They did not seem to be very enthusiastic in the matter.
Question. Did not the general have to look to the country outside of that
county to find a postmaster ?
Answer. There was a postmaster at Drummondtown at that time who was
looked after. I do not know whether he found him or not.
Question. Do you know whether the line of policy under which General
Lockwood acted was in accordance with orders from the headquarters of the
department, or the headquarters of the army ?
Answer. I think they were from the headquarter?, of the department — from
G-eruTal Dix ; at least I saw the proclamation that General Dix issued, and
•heard the instructions that were given to Colonel Paine.
Question. What were the instructions to Colonel Paine ?
Answer. They were that we were to be very careful in our intercourse with
the citizens, and allow no slaves to come within our lines ; they were very par
ticular on that point, and to keep the soldiers very strictly within the lines, so
as not to have them meddle with the citizens at all, as we were going there for
a very particular purpose. We went down, in the first place, to protect the
polls, to protect the loyal citizens in Somerset county, Maryland, from those in
Virginia, who it was supposed would come over. Afterwards these same in
structions, that we had applied down in Virginia, were read over to us again ; I
cannot remember the full particulars. I will state that I was informed by a
man that I met there in Virginia — he reported himself- as a citizen — that the
rebel forces did not have much to fear from General Lockwood, because an
agent of Smith had seen General Lockwood while he was at Newtown, and
there was some kind of agreement or understanding between them that he would
not harm the rebels.
Question. Smith was the rebel general 1
Answer. Yes, sir. I think they called him Colonel Smith. He was com
manding the force. This report I also got from some of the men who talked
with the slaves there.
Question. What was the distance between Oak Hall and Drummondtown ?
Answer. I think the distance by the most direct route was twenty miles ;
but one road was blocked up, and the way we marched made it about twenty-
four miles.
Question. What was the distance between Drummondtown to Eastville 1
Answer. We made three marches to get there; one, I 'think, of 15 or 18
miles, and two of 12 miles each. I think it is 36 or 38 miles.
Question. What time w?s consumed in the march from Oak Hall to Eastville 1
Answer. We left Oak Hall, I think, on Thursday morning — the fifth New
York went the night before — and marched that day to Drummondtown. We
remained there until after the next Sunday. I think it was Monday or Tuesday
that we started from Drummondtown to Eastville, and got to Eastville on the
2Sth of November.
Question. What I want to know is why you were so slow in passing between
those points, being in pursuit of the rebels ?
Answer. There was no reason for it at all, that I know.
Question. Could you not, in your opinion, have captured the rebels, with their
ammunition and provisions, if you had made a quick march, such as was pos
sible ?
Answer. I think if we had started out from Snow Hill as soon as we could,
we could have taken them without any doubt. But after we got to Newtown,
380 TESTIMONY.
on Friday night, the rebels left. I think they left the night after we got into
Newtown, or the night after that.
Question. The rebels dispersed ?
Answer. I do not know whether they dispersed or not ; they left their fortifi
cations — that was the rumor we got at the time. I think if we had marched on
vigorously, we should have marched right upon them in their fortifications, and
I have no doubt we would have taken them.
WASHINGTON, January 28, 1862.
Colonel GOVERNEUR K. WARREN sworn and examined.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army?
Answer. I am a captain of topographical engineers, and colonel of the fifth
regiment New York volunteers.
Question. Were you in the Accomack expedition under General Lockwood?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. After you left Baltimore and reached Accomack county, where did
you first come 011 a rebel camp ?
Answer. We found no rebel camp.
Question. Found none?
Answer. No, sir ; we found where a camp had been.
Question. Where was that ?
Answer. I have not got my journal with me, and I do not recollect. We
passed it the first day's march, before we arrived at Oak Hall.
Question. It was near Oak Hall 1
Answer. It was nearly to Oak Hill — about two or three miles from there.
We found an earthwork thrown up.
Question. How long were you occupied in pursuit of the retreating forces ?
Answer. I do not think we made any march that might be considered a pur
suit of the retreating forces. We got orders to march. The rumor had come
that the rebels had disbanded, and we never saw anything more of them, ex
cept the ruins of camps, old field-works, and occasionally arms thrown away.
Question. You knew they were in advance of you?
Answer. We went prepared to clear the road of anything. We had informa
tion of the fact that they had all disbanded, and they must have preceded us
three or four days.
Question. What is the distance between Oak Hall and Drummondtown ?
Answer. I cannot give the exact distance. The whole thing consisted in a
direct march, the same as I have made on the plains a hundred times.
Question. What is the distance between Oak Hall and Eastville, and how
long were you on the march ?
Answer. We left Newtown on Sunday morning, and I believe the whole com
mand followed. We got to Oak Hall that Sunday evening. We remained
there until Wednesday noon. On Wednesday noon Colonel McMillan, with
his 500 men, and myself having 500 men and two field-pieces, left and arrived
at the same place on Wednesday evening. The next day we marched 24 miles,
to Drummodtown, and encamped at a mill. The next day we passed Puugo-
teague, and another earth-work at a place called Dr. Henderson's, about 16
miles from there, and remained and rested until the next day at 10 o'clock.
Colonel McMillan went on, and I remained there. I got to Eastville on Sunday.
Question. Just a week from the time you started from Newtown ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; a week and 12 hours.
TESTIMONY. 381
Question. Why did you stop at Oak Hall from Sunday evening until Wed
nesday 1
Answer. I do not know all the reasons, but I suppose it was on account of
the want of transportation and the want of provisions. We did not have trans
portation enough, when we started from Newtown, to take all our tents. We
started with half our tents and a limited amount of provisions.
Question. You were in pursuit of the rebels during this time, or on an expe
dition for that purpose ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. If you had had the transportation you ought to have had, and had
m.uie a vigorous march, could you have captured them with their ammunition
a\ui provisions'?
Answer. I think it is very doubtful if we could by going to Newtown first. It
i.j. my opinion that if we had landed at Pungoteague — however, I never thought
'much about that ; I know that at the rate they fell back there was very little
chance of our catching them.
Question. What do yon know about General Lockwood flogging fugitive
slaves and returning them to their claimants '?
Answer. I do not know that he ever flogged any.
Question. Did any slaves come to your camp ?
Answer. No, sir ; not that I know of. The orders were strictly to keep them
out of the camps, and there were none of them harbored there or lingering
around the cauip, to my knowledge. My camp was always separate from, the
rc;:t after we left Eastville. It was not generally near the others. The only
thing that might seem to have a bearing upon that subject was this: General
Lockwood sent a Mr. Clark, of Northampton, one day to my camp with this
order :
"DECEMBER 1, 1861.
" COLONEL : Mr. Clark, the bearer, informs me that a servant of his is in the
zouave camp. Please give him every facility to recover him ; and if found,
send him to me with a file of troops. He has broken the law, and I will pun
ish him.
" Very respectfully,
"H. H. LOCKWOOD,
" Brigadier General Commanding.
" To COLONEL of 5th N. Y. Regiment"
There was no man that Mr. Clark could point out as his servant in the camp,
although every facility was given him to look around. This is, if it could be
called a search, the only one I have any knowledge of.
Question. Do you know anything about cavalry horses being captured and
delivered back to the rebels by General Lockwood ?
Answer. I do not know of any such thing. I have heard ef such things,
but I do not know anything about the merits of it.
Question. Did you hear of it from officers of your regiment 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Do you know anything about the rebels themselves being captured
and turned loose on taking the oath of allegiance ?
Answer. No, sir. *
Question. Were you at Drummondtown when General Lockwood arrived
there ?
Answer. No, sir ; I do not know exactly where we were. 1 suppose we were
at Eastville when he got to Drummondtown.
Question. Do you know anything about restoring arms and ammunition to
the rebels after they had been captured ?
382 TESTIMONY.
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Do you know anything about contrabands that came on board a
vessel from Virginia to Baltimore that were said to have been delivered up ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Were they landed at the wharf?
Answer. I will tell you what I know about that. I was ordered to return to
Baltimore with the 17th Massachusetts regiment when it got orders to return
home. I was not very well at the time, and General Lockwood ordered me
home on that steamer, arid my regiment returned afterwards under command of
the lieutenant colonel. I know what he told me — that some three or four col
ored men secreted themselves on board when he lay at Pungoteague, and came
to Baltimore, and he gave them up to the civil authorities.
Question, Who gave them up ?
Answer. Lieutenant Colonel Duryea, of the -5th New York regiment.
Question. Were the claimants of those fugitives there demanding them ?
Answer. Not that I know of; I presume they were not.
Question. Did General Lockwood cause inquiries to be made at Baltimore for
the claimants ?
Answer. General Lockwood has not been at Baltimore at all since then. He
remained at Eastville, or at Pungoteague, or Drummondtown, somewhere there.
He did not come up with any troops, and I do not know that he has ever bee»n
to Baltimore since.
Question. Were there any loya.1 people in Northampton county ?
Answer. I should say that strictly there were none — none that I saw. They
were of this class of people, opposed to taking up arms. All that I saw claimed
to be opposed to taking up arms against the government ; considered that the
vote of Maryland had settled their policy, that their interests were one ; but
their sympathies and feelings in the rebellion were with the south.
Question. Did any of them return to their allegiance ?
Answer. I think they did.
Question. Did they all take the oath ?
Answer. It was not done when I was there. I saw a great deal of them.
The citizens of Northampton county came very freely into the camp, and we
had very free and frequent conversations with them.
Question. Can you tell whether the rebels dispersed on account of General
Dix's proclamation, or on account of the military force you brought against
them?
Answer. I think it was both combined — the proclamation backed by the mil
itary force.
Question. Was the line of policy that General Lockwood adopted in accord
ance with orders from the headquarters of the department, or the headquarters
of the army?
Answer. That I do not know. I supposed he acted under instructions from
General Dix; they were authorized, I believe, at the headquarters of the army.
That, of course, is entirely outside of my knowledge.
Question. Did you ever see General Lockwood's instructions, under which he
acted?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. You do not know what they were ?
Answer. No, sir.
TESTIMONY.
WASHINGTON, January 28, 1862.
Colonel G. K. WARREN sworn and examined.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Were you in the affair at Big Bethel, Virginia ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was your rank then ?
Answer. I was lieutenant colonel of the 5th New York regiment — zouaves.
Question. Will you give us a brief account of what you know of that affair ?
Answer. I was officer of the day the day before, and joined my regiment at
9 o'clock in the morning. I had been on the ground six days previously, and
had reconnoitred it, though nobody there present knew that I had done so.
When I arrived on the ground two companies of our regiment were deployed
as skirmishers in advance, skirmishing along at least half a mile in front of the
whole command. The rest of the regiment were drawn up in line of battle, and
two other regiments were in the road just to the rear. Everything was halted
then. I asked and obtained permission to join the reconnoitring party. This
advanced party had discovered that there was an enemy there in position. I
went forward with the two companies of skirmishers and ordered an advance.
We advanced pretty close up to the swamp or creek in front of the position, and
as we did so the enemy opened on us with artillery down the road, the balls
going over our heads. We pushed up as rapidly as we could, until we got
within 200 or 300 yards. When they saw us their fire was directed in the
woods where we were, and it was pretty heavy. I ordered a halt, and went back
to report. Our regiment was ordered up to support, and took position in front
of the battery, but sheltered by the woods. Lieutenant Greble came up with
guns and drove away the .enemy's guns, which commanded the road ; they were
not protected. I stayed in front long enough to see that they had guns under
cover of some work. I then went back and reported, or suggested, to Colonel
Duryea that we better hold on to the position we had.
I went back and informed General Pierce of the state of things, and told him
that he better send one regiment around on each flank to get across the creek,
and as soon as they commenced firing on the flank we could go in on the front.
H« told me to convey that order to the colonels. The order was given and
the movement was commenced. The 3d regiment had a chance to go under
cover, by going off to the left about half a mile, and could have gone down
across the swamp and got behind the battery, all the time being under cover of
the woods. But the direction to do so was not specific. I supposed at the time
that they had all the information they might have had, and I did not give
specific instructions. I only told them to go. They went right across the field,
and when they got pretty close up they had a pretty heavy fire from the battery.
They fell back to a position towards where we were.
Question. Then if they had gone around they would have flanked the battery?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. That was the intended order?
Answer. Yes, sir. If Colonel Townsend had gone into the woods the enemy
would have been compelled, judging from what I have since learned, to have
left the ground at once, or run the risk of having everything captured. He
would have been masked, and they would not know where he was until he had
taken the battery in the rear. A portion of the regiment on the other flank did
cross the creek, so I am informed, but they were not in a good position, but
were brought pretty near as much in front of the battery as we were. After
that I did not hear any further commands given. We remained in position
under fire for two hours, pretty well sheltered by the woods.
Question. Your men firing during the time ?
384 TESTIMONY.
Answer. Some of the time, but not much. We remained there waiting orders.
I was with my regiment, nud did not see General Pierce. I supposed he was
waiting for re-enforcements, as we had two regiments on the road coming up.
They did come up, and finally took position in front, where they were directed,
I believe. Then General Pierce called a meeting of the colonels ahout what
should be done, and news of some sort came from General Butler by his aid.
I am sorry to say they all determined that we had better retire. 1 opposed it
myself.
Question. You think the battery might have been easily carried?
Answer. Yes, sir; I am certain of it. Then they went off the ground. 1
told General Pierce that if he was going to retire that he ought to make the
same disposition as if he was going to advance. He detailed a regiment, as he
says, to cover a retreat. From what I knew of the troops there, I urged him
to stay himself in the rear. My own regiment was the first that was ordered
off. He did not remain, and the regiment he ordered did not remain. They
all went right off, one after the other — marched off as they did off parade. The
men were as well under command as at any time. The 2d New York regiment
"brought off a gun.
While this charge was going on Lieutenant Greble was killed away up in front
at his gun. His cannon was spiked by his men, as they could not draw it off,
and the second New York drew it off, and ten men of the first New York regi
ment brought away his limber and the body after all that. And then Dr. Wins-
low and myself remained on the ground, 1 think, an hour and a half, and brought
off the wounded we thought could live, every one of them; we had to draw
them off in hand-carts. I thought at the time they abandoned the battery,
about the time these re-enforcements came up, was a good time to have taken
possession there. I think they left the works while we were on the ground.
We saw no one. We went up all through the woods and were not fired at. I
was dressed in this red zouave uniform. I went down with six or seven men
about one o'clock in the day, and put Lieutenant Greble on the limber and went
right down the road in plain sight. There was no general there at the fight at
all.
Question. And the men were not well handled I suppose?
Answer. General Pierce, as I have learned since from the proceedings of the
court-martial, was never mustered into the service of the United States, and
really had no right to command the colonels there, and I think he felt it, though
they did not know it.
Question. Are there any other material points that you think of?
Answer. I think the plan of the fight, which was got up beforehand, from the
very beginning involved a failure, &o much so that I was ready to state that it
was planned for a failure, and must have been one except by great good luck.
Question. What were the particulars of the plan, as briefly as you can state1
them ?
Answer. It was planned for a night attack with very new troops, some of
them had never been taught even to load and fire. It was planned to proceed
from two different points, distant from each other six or seven miles. The
ground between was unknown, and then the map which General Butler furnished
was a wrong map, made in 1819, and the roads were all laid down wrong. The
specific points of instructions were that the troops at Newport News being some
three miles nearer should start about an hour after the others. The true state
of the case was that they were about four miles nearer, and that brought on the
collision which took place, and which was inevitable. I think the two regi
ments, when they arrived on the ground in the early morning, finding things
not at all as they had been instructed, were justified in firing on each other. I
am satisfied of that.
TESTIMONY. 385
WASHINGTON, January 28, 1S62.
Colonel S. A. BEAN sworn and examined.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am lieutenant colonel of the 4th Wisconsin regiment.
Question. Were you in this Accomac expedition, under General Lockwood ?
Answer. I was.
Question. Whereabouts did you first come upon the camp of the rebels after
reaching that county, or a camp that had been occupied by the rebels 1
Answer. We came on their camping ground at Oak Hall, about twelve miles
south of the Maryland and Virginia line.
Question. How long were you in pursuit of the enemy 1
, Answer. I do not know that we were properly in pursuit of them at all.
Question. You thought you were, I presume ?
Answer. No, sir ; I do not know that we thought we were.
Question. You went down there after them, did you not ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; we went after them. We thought we were to have a battle ;
thought we would meet them when we were at Newtown, that is, near the bor
der ; but after we got to Oak Hall we knew they were all dispersed. But be
yond that, we did not know what was the reason of our action at all.
Question. What did yon do when you found their camp evacuated ?
Answer. We were marched to their camp, and camped upon the same ground
that they had, and waited there three or four days, and then went to Drum-
mondtown.
Question. Were you at Drummondtown when General Lockwood arrived
there 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did he make a speech to the people there ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; he accompanied the army previous to that. He took
command of the army at Newtown. He made a speech to the people at Drum
mondtown.
Question. Did you hear the speech ?
Answ^er. I did not. I heard numerous accounts of it.
Question. You do not know what he did say 1
Answer. Not positively ; I only know from hearsay.
Question. What was the purport of the speech as you learned from others ?
Answer. I learned from others that the purport of the speech was to assure
the people of the security of their slave property, and of his sympathy with
them in holding slaves ; that he was a slaveholder himself, and his father had
been before him ; and he advised them to punish their slaves very severely if
they attempted to run away. That, I think, was the general purport of the
speech as I heard from others.
Question. Did you learn that he avowed any policy in regard to returning
fugitives ? Was there anything said about that in that speech ?
Answer. No, sir ; I do not recollect that there was anything said about that.
Question. What was the distance between Oak Hall and Drummondtown ?
Answer. About twenty or twenty-one miles.
Question. How far from :Drunimondtown to Eastville ?
Answer. About thirty-five miles,
Question. How much time did you consume between Oak Hall and Eastville ?
Answer. We were twelve days from the time we started to the end of our
journey.
Question. Where did you tarry ]
Answer. We tarried at Oak Hall four days.
Part in— 25
386 TESTIMONY.
Question. Why did you tarry there so long ; and why did you consume so
much time in marching between those places ?
Answer. I do not know.
Question. Was there any military necessity that you know of ?
Answer. No, sir ; I do not think there was.
Question. Do you know where the rebels were that you were hunting 1 How
near them were you at any time in that march 1
Answer. We arrived at Oak Hall on Sunday. They broke up their camp
the Friday night before, as I understood from parties on the ground, and we
supposed that they were just south of us trying to escape. We did not know
positively that they were.
Question. Your march was in the direction of the rebels, as you supposed ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What is your opinion about whether you could have overtaken
them or not if you had made a quick, rapid movement, as you might have done,
instead of occupying twelve days ?
Answer. It was said that the rebels had dispersed ; that they had gone to
their several homes. We could never have overtaken them that way ; but we
understood, from popular rumor and reports of responsible persons, that there
was a large body of troops there who had been in the regular service w^ho had
fled south, gone beyond Eastville, and were trying to escape over to the main
land. I suppose if we had made a rapid march, we might have overtaken them.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. What was the number of that body of rebels ?
Answer. About six hundred, according to our information.
Question. What do you know about General Lockwood's flogging slaves ?
Answer. Nothing positively ; nothing except what I have heard said.
Question. Did you hear it from officers 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. From officers who professed to know 1
Answer. Who professed that General Lockwood told them he had done it.
Question. Did they mention any particular cases he had mentioned ?
Answer. There were two officers who told me that General Lockwood told
them that he had caused runaways to be flogged.
Question. Do you know anything about the capture of some cavalry horses
from the enemy 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How many were there, and wrhat was done with them 1
Answer. There were a good number of horses taken. I took some myself —
three horses — in connexion with other officers under my direction. They were
all returned but one.
Question. To their owners ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Under whose orders ?
Answer. The general's.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Had you satisfactory evidence that they had been used by the
rebels ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And their owners were rebels ?
Answer. Well, sir, that point was the point of dispute. I took one horse which
was reported to me as belonging to Captain Henderson, at Druinmondtowu, who
TESTIMONY. 387
was captain of a cavalry company there. Afterwards his brother, a Dr. Hen
derson, appeared and claimed him. He brought before me a certificate from the
general, guaranteeing the possession of the horse to him, and I refused to deliver
the horse iipon the certificate without further explanation. So I took Dr.
Henderson and his certificate to the general, and asked him about it. The gen
eral told me that the doctor claimed the horse as his. I told the general I knew
the doctor claimed the horse, but I also knew the horse had been used by his
brother, a captain in the rebel service, and with the doctor's consent. The
doctor said it was not with his consent. I asked him if he did not know that
his brother took the horse. He said "Yes." I asked him if he ever demanded
the horse of his brother, and he said " No." I asked if his brother and his horse
had not been frequently at his house. He acknowledged that he could have
taken him at any time. I then asked him if it was not with his consent that
his brother had taken his horse. He said he supposed it was. But the general
afterwards gave him up.
Question. How many horses, in all, were captured ?
Answer. I could not say exactly ; quite a number.
Question. Did you understand, from information from others, that they were all
delivered back ?
Answer. Not absolutely all. There were some of the horses for whom no
claimants appeared. I took no horses for whom claimants appeared.
Question. Most of them were delivered up 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; all but a very few.
Question. Were there any loyal people down there?
Answer. In Accoinac county there were. In Northampton county there were
none that 1 found. My sources of information were quite numerous.
Question. Did any people take the oath of allegiance to the government?
Answer. None that I heard of.
Question. Do you know whether any of these horses were taken over the
bay to the Virginia side ?
Answer. No, sir; I do not know that, of course. I should have stated, per
haps, in connexion with that affair about Henderson, that I was informed by his
own slaves that his brother was in a regiment in the rebel service.
Question. Did you capture any arms and ammunition ?
Answer. Personally, I did not take any arms. My soldiers did.
Question. That is what I mean. What was done Avith them?
Answer. There were a few muskets taken • that is all. A few were found in the
woods. I sent out a company one time, having received some information, and
they found a few muskets — five muskets — and some ammunition buried in the
woods.
Question. What was done with them ?
Answer. They were handed over to the general.
Question. What did he do with them ?
Answer. I do not know. I presume, of course, he kept them. They were
army muskets.
Question. Were you at Baltimore when some contrabands were brought on a
steamboat there ?
Answer. No, sir. There were some contrabands brought to Pungoteague
while I was there. They did not come from Baltimore.
Question. How many were there ?
Answer. There were five, I believe.
Question. Do you know what became of them ?
Answer. Returned to their owners, I think.
Question. Rebel owners ?
Answer. Yes, sir. These went to Baltimore, and came back. I did not see
them until they came back.
388 TESTIMONY.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Do you know anything about General Lockwood, hunting for a
postmaster, having to go outside of Northampton county to find a postmaster
who was loyal ?
Answer. Nothing except rumor ; that was the rumor.
Question. Do you know whether the rebels dispersed by reason of General
Dix's proclamation, or of your presence there with a military force ?
Answer. It is a difficult thing to tell the motives in their minds for dispersing.
I know they dispersed at the time they received the proclamation. I know that
soldiers who were in the army there say that they dispersed on account of ex
aggerated reports that they received of our forces.
Question. Do you know what General Lockwood's instructions were ?
Answer. I heard of them, but I did not see them.
Question. Do you remember the substance of them ]
Answer. I do not ; I cannot tell.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Did you capture an amount of provisions, (bacon, &c.,) at any
point where you were, that was supposed to have belonged to the rebel army ?
Answer. No, sir ; we took nothing of that kind. We made no captures of
that sort.
Question. Do you know anything about compensating the rebel owners of
property for what was taken by our army ?
Answer. Property that was reported to have been stolen. I know that sol
diers took things, and the most abundant compensation was made for everything
that was taken, or claimed to have been taken.
Question. Large compensation 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; according to the general's order.
Question. In every instance ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Even where they were known to be rebels ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I did not learn that any distinction at all was made be
tween rebels and others.
Question. As a rule, the property of rebels was always given up, or paid for
by the commanding general of your division ]
Answer. Yes, sir.
WASHINGTON, January 2S, 1862.
Major EDWARD BACON sworn and examined.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. Major of the 6th Michigan.
Question. Were you connected with the expedition to Accomac county, Vir
ginia, under General Lockwood 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. When did you first come to where a rebel camp had been ?
Answer. On Sunday, November 17 ; at least, I think that is the time.
Question. After finding this camp that the enemy had left, how long did you
wait before you went in pursuit of the enemy ?
Answer. Until November 21.
Question. Four days ?
Yes, sir.
TESTIMONY. 389
Question. Do you know of any reason for tliat long delay ?
Answer. I am not familiar with the nice points of the quartermaster's depart
ment ; but I know of no reason. I know it was unnecessary.
Question. Had you pressed on with the expedition, is it your opinion that
you might have overtaken and captured the enemy ]
Answer. Yes, sir. I could have killed enough of them to have given every
one of my men a scalp, if they had let me.
Question. You know of no reason for the delay 1
Answer. Nothing but mercy and leniency.
Question. It was a peace-principle expedition1?
Answer. That is it.
Question. Can you tell me the distance between Oak Hall and Drummond-
town ?
Answer. It was variously stated at twenty-one or twenty-two miles.
Question. Do ymi know the distance from Drummondtown to Eastville ?
Answer. It is thirty-five miles.
Question. Then the distance from Oak Hall to Eastville is fifty-six or fifty-
seven miles ?
Answer. Just about that.
Question. What time did you occupy in making the march from Oak Hall to
Eastville?
Answer. We left Oak Hall November 21, and reached Eastville November
.28. We arrived at Oak Hall, from Newtown, on the 17th.
Question. So that, in point of fact, you were some twelve days in getting
from Newtown to Eastville 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know anything about the rendition of fugitive slaves, or the
flogging of any fugitives by order of General Lockwood ?
Answer. I know it circumstantially, but not from my own sight.
Question. State what you know.
Answer. At Drummondtown one slave having attempted to escape, or having
escaped, I could not state which, the sentence against him was, to be whipped
with fifteen lashes. The blows were inflicted by one Massey, or Macy, who
was put in jailer as a Union man, the old jailer being supposed to be a seces
sionist. One or two of my men boarded there.
Question. That was done by order of the commanding general 1
Answer. That was the statement.
Question. Was the owner of this slave reputed to be a secessionist ?
Answer. On that point I could not state. He seemed to be possessed of the
same idea that all seemed to have, that their bondage was at an end when the
northern army came near them.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. He ran away and came to your lines ?
Answer. That was the substance of the report, as stated. I know that is what
the negroes believed all about us, and supposed so at first.
By Mr. Chandler :
.Question. Supposed they would be protected when they came within our
lines ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know anything about any cavalry horses being taken and
given back?
Answer. I know quite' a number of horses were captured that had been used
by the enemy, and those horses were given back to the people on various grounds.
There was some sort of investigation. 'Men came and claimed their horses, and
390 TESTIMONY.
the general heard their statements, and they usually received back their horses.
Many of the horses, however, were not given back, but were kept by the gen
eral, or under his control in some way.
Question. As a rule, were they given up or retained ?
Answer. They were taken away from their captors, but what disposition was
made of them, after they left our possession, I could not tell. But I have no
doubt, from statements made to me, that the most of them were given back to
citizens. Those persons to whom they were given back generally represented
themselves to be Union men, or the horses were claimed by Union men, or
some claimed a share or interest, or that the secessionist who had used him did
not really own him, or that the Union men had been compelled to let them be
used. There was every possible dodge resorted to to get back their horses.
Question. Horses that were known to have been in the service of the enemy ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know of any of these horses having been sent across the
Chesapeake to the other side, after having been given up 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Do you know whether any of these rebels who professed to lay
down their arms were required to take the oath of allegiance ?
Answer. I do not know that any of them were. There was an offer — as I
understood it, being frequently in the general's quarters, and hearing the state
ment — that they might take the oath of allegiance ; and some few did volunta
rily take it.
Question. Do you know whether any of those men to whom horses were
given back took the -oath of allegiance before they received back their horses 1
Answer. It was not required. Whether they did take it or not I do not know.
When I say it was not required, I mean that that was the universal understand
ing of the matter; inasmuch as, by the proclamation under which we went out,
if they laid down their arms, they were to be protected in their property.
Question. They were not required to take any oath of allegiance ?
Answer. Nothing was stated about the oath there. It was the common un
derstanding that no oath was required.
Question. Do you know anything about the capture of arms or ammunition ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; we captured both anus and ammunition in considerable
quantities, but a very inferior quality of arms, (flint-lock muskets, old swords,
and the like,) the better quality having disappeared. These arms were univer
sally found concealed. There may have been some exceptions that I do not
know of. Most all were concealed, either in houses or buried in the ground or
in the woods. We found scarcely any arms that would be really dangerous,
except some cannon.
Question. The cannon you took possession of and kept, I suppose 1
Answer. They were at Drummondtown when I last saw them.
Question. Do you know anything about the capture of ammunition in any
considerable quantities 1
Answer. No, sir; nor of arms in any considerable quantity. We brought in
a small number of arms at a time, which were found concealed.
Question. Did you capture any considerable amount of forage or provisions
that belonged to the rebels ?
Answer. No, sir; not that I know of.
Question. How were the people in that region ] Were there many Union
people there?
Answer. No, sir.
^Question. Mostly secessionists 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. When forage, or property of any sort, kind, or description, was
taken from these rebels, were they remunerated for it ?
TESTIMONY. 391
Answer. I know that we usually took fodder to sleep on rather than sleep
on the ground ; and if we had horses to feed, and there was no feed provided by
the quartermaster, we usually took fodder. It was cornstalks and corn leaves.
They did not have hay in that country. Sometimes we found straw, and took
a sufficient quantity for our use. That was strictly forbidden ; but the orders
became a dead letter.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Did you pay for it?
Answer. I understood that they were well paid for it every time.
Question. Do you know anything about any slaves having been returned from
Baltimore to Pungoteague, Virginia 1
Answer. I saw a small steamboat arrive, and it was generally understood that
there were four or five runaway slaves on the boat, who had gone up with the
5th (Zouave) New York regiment, and were brought back.
Question. Do you know anything about a speech that General Lockwood
made on that expedition to the people at Drummondtown I
Answer. I heard a portion of it.
Question. What was the character of that speech?
Answer. I viewed it something in this form: "Will your negroes be taken
away from you? No. If any slaves come inside of the lines, you may search
for them. I am not a slave-catcher; but you shall have every opportunity to
get your negroes back. If necessary, I will have the men brought out of the
tents, the tents struck, and the men formed in a hollow square, and you may
then go through and search for your slaves." He proceeded further in review
ing General Dix's proclamation ; said that every word of General Dix's procla
mation should be carried out ; that they should be protected in their property.
He advised them to meet on a certain day in the magisterial districts, and vote
to annex themselves to Maryland; follow Western Virginia as an example.
Speaking of himself, he said he was a slaveholder, and that they should be pro
tected in their right to their slaves.
Question. Can you tell whether any arms were laid by down by bodies of
rebels?
Answer. I know of none.
Question. They dispersed without their arms ?
Answer. They concealed their arms systematically.
Question. Do you know whether any returned .to their allegiance, or took the
oath of allegiance ?
Answer. I do not know of anything of the kind. I heard that a few did
take the oath of allegiance.
Question. None, of your own personal knowledge ?
Answer. No, sir ; it was the general understanding that a few took it.
Question. Do you know whether the general went out of Northampton
county to find a loyal man to keep the post office in Northampton county 1
Answer. I do not know. I heard such a report, but I do not know any
thing on that point.
Question. Do you know whether the rebels dispersed on account of General
Dix's proclamation, or on account of your force ?
Answer. On account of our force, and the proclamation assuring them pro
tection in their property.
Question. What was their manner towards you when you were among them ?
Did they act like loyal citizens ?
Answer. No, sir ; only waiting a chance to rise again.
Question. Then, in your opinion, the pacification was not a very important
matter, so far as this government was concerned?
Answer. Worth nothing except while one or two small garrisons are there.
392 TESTIMONY.
Tlie people arc weak and cowardly ; inferior to their own slaves, the majority
of them, and may be held down by a small number of troops.
Question. Did General Lockwood state that his line of conduct was in accord
ance with instructions had from headquarters 1
Answer. He referred to some instructions for his conduct.
Question. Did you ever see those instructions ]
Answer. I saw a lengthy paper in his hands, but did not read it.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Did you hear it read 1
Answer. I heard a few lines read, that was all.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. You took no prisoners of war 1
Answer. One of my captains took a rebel ceptain, (Captain Fletcher,) who
was a prisoner when I came away. There were two or three other rebel officers
that my men captured, who were handed over to General Lockwood. Others
were let go. The general made this distinction : that those who had been
made to serve by compulsion he would let go, but the volunteers — the regulars,
as they, were called by the secessionists — ought to be arrested if the officers
could oe found.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Do you know whether this Captain Fletcher was subsequently
released ?
Answer. I do not know what became of him. There were two or three
others brought in by this same captain of mine. He seemed to have a peculiar
faculty for hunting them up.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. On the whole,, you had rather a peaceable expedition ]
Answer. We did not see any blood let, or a blow struck. The object was to
bring about a good feeling towards our government by an exhibition of good
will towards them.
Question. Did you see any exhibition of good feeling towards our govern
ment ?
Answer. Not the least of it,
Question. What was your opinion about the sympathies of General Lock-
wood — that they were with our troops or with the rebels ?
Answer. He is just as good a Union man as a man who has been brought up
a slaveholder can possibly be.
WASHL\GTON, February 12, 1862.
Captain JOHX H. KNIGHT sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What is your position in the army ?
Answer. I am assistant adjutant general of General Lockwood's brigade,
with the rank of captain.
Question. You accompanied him to Accornac, through the campaign there?
Answer. I did.
Question. Will you tell us what you think material to be stated in regard to
that campaign 1
Answer. We went into Accomac county, Virginia, and found that the forces
TESTIMONY 393
which Lad been in arms tliere against the government had dispersed, and gone
we did not know where; to their homes we supposed. We proceeded to take
military occupation of the two counties, and General Lockwood administered
the affairs down there.
Question. Did he take any military stores 1
Answer. He took all the military stores that he heard of.
Question. What amount of arms did he get down there?
Answer. I think there were some 600 or 700 old muskets.
Question. Did he take any cannon ?
Answer. Yes, sir; he took some eight or nine pieces of artillery ; took several
pieces of cannon that had no carriages — old iron pieces ; found some of them buried.
Question. What kind of muskets did he take?
Answer. They were common muskets. Some of them were Springfield mus
kets altered to flint-lock. They were all either flint-locks, or altered from
flint-locks.
Question. What did he do with the arms he took \
Answer. He has them in store yet, under guard ; the artillery he uses down
at the inlets. He has guards at every inlet along the coast, and uses these
pieces of artillery there ; has them on board of some vessels he took, wrhich be
longed to persons some of whom had run off.
Question. The papers have accused him of dealing a little too fairly with the
secessionists there ; I do not know upon what authority.
Answer. I do not think there is any foundation at all for that. Now, in
regard to horses and negroes, (and I suppose when that is explained all is ex
plained :) When we went down there we found three kinds of horses, which
had been used in the rebel service. One kind was those which had been bought
by the rebel government; another kind was those which had been used by the
officers ; and the third kind was those which had been used by the privates who
had gone into the ranks and taken their own horsey from the plough, and were to be
paid for their use. He wrote to General Dix, asking him what he should do in
regard to these horses. Before he received an answer he seized the horses be
longing to the rebel government and those owned by the rebel officers, and kept
them; those belonging to privates he seized, but let the owners have them upon
giving a written pledge that they would return the horses when called for.
Those persons came to him and claimed that they had submitted to the govern
ment, had laid down their arms, and intended to be obedient, &c., and wanted
their horses. The general allowed them to take them upon giving written
pledges for all the horses, which pledges he now has on file.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Let them have their horses on parole ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; the privates. Those belonging to the rebel government,
and the horses of the officers he has now. General Dix wrote to him, approv
ing what he had done.
By the chairman :
Question. General Dix approved upon being informed that he had allowed
the privates' horses to be taken on parole ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. The officers' horses he confiscated ]
Answer. Yes, sir ; he has them yet. I will say that a great many of these
men, as we found afterwards, had been pressed into the rebel service ; some of
them who are known to have been loyal all the time. When they were pressed
into the rebel service they refused to take the oath of allegiance to the rebel
government, and had made arrangements to desert as soon as we had advanced
into that county.
394 TESTIMONY.
Question. Did General Lockwood require them to take the oath ?
Answer. I do not think he did. Some of them he made take the oath,
whore he had evidence of their disloyalty. I know I have great packages of
the forms of the oath of allegiance in my office — thousands of them. But he
did not, as a general rule, require the oath of allegiance of those persons who
came and got their property. It did not occur to him, I suppose. Now, in
regard to the negroes : When he learned that the negroes had worked on the
rebel embankments there, he wrote to General Dix to know what he should do
about them. General Dix wrote back to him, sending him a copy of the con
fiscation act of Congress, passed at the last session. General Dix told him he
could do nothing with this property ; that it had to be condemned by a court ;
but, still, that General Lockwood had done right in holding on to the other
property. In regard to the negroes, General Dix did not know what to advise
him ; to take his own course. Now, General Lockwood, for fear that he would
some day be called upon to produce these negroes, had inventories made — one
for Accomac and one for Northampton county — of all the negroes who had
worked on the embankments, so that he should know where to put his hand on
them if called upon for them. It is impossible for the negroes to get away, for
he has guards there, so that they cannot be run off. He obtained from the ne
groes a knowledge of a great many facts connected with that matter, the tools
they worked with, and all that. A great many of these negroes were used by
persons who had hired them of their masters and mistresses. We took from
the .slaves themselves their own statements. A knowledge of the matter got cir
culated around among the slaves, and they would come in and inform us of what
they had done, and we took notes of it, under General Lockwood's order.
Question. Did he p,unish any of them because of their leaving their masters
and coming into the lines 2
Answer. I never heard of such a thing. The only case of the kind I know
of was one that the general told me about just as I left there. It had occurred
at Pungoteague. In accordance with instructions from General Dix, General
Lockwood had issued an order strictly forbidding the negroes coming within the
lines of his -camp. When we went down there the negroes flocked to the camp
by hundreds. They were a great nuisance there. Their masters were coming
to the camps, complaining that their elaves had been secreted there. The colo
nels of the regiments said they had earned out their orders. But there was one
negro man who had troubled him both at Drumniondtown and at Eastville — all
the way down. He had driven him away three or four times, and told him he
could not do anything for him. When he got to Pungoteague he found him
there, on board one of the boats, where he had secreted himself, trying to get
off. The general told Lieutenant Lammot to take the boy out and whip him in
the presence of the negroes there. General Lockwood told me, just before I
left, about it, and said that he was sorry he had done it, for he expected it
would be misrepresented, and he would have difficulty about it. When I heard
of it I addressed Lieutenant Lammot a letter, and received this one in reply :
"HEADQUARTERS,
" Drummondtoum, Va., February 6, 1862.
"CAPTAIN : In reply to your letter of the 5th instant, in reference to the whip
ping of a fugitive slave by order of General Lockwood, I will state the facts as
they came under my own observation :
" General Loekwood had frequently forbidden slaves from coining within the
lines, and, I believe, this one in particular had been repeatedly driven off. But
on the arrrival of the general at Pungoteague, the owner of this slave came to
him and complained that our troops had secreted, within their lines, a negro
boy .belonging to him, and upon search this one was discovered. Whereupon
General Lockwood directed him to be whipped, and desired me to see it done,
TESTIMONY. 395
not only as a punishment to the negro for his persistent disobedience of orders,
but to deter, by this example, other negroes from doing the same thing, and thus
bring upon our troops the undeserved name of 'negro stealers.'
"I saw the boy taken out and twenty-one lashes administered with a small
apple switch over his waistcoat, his coat having been removed for the purpose.
The punishment was anything but severe, and such as might be taken by any
school-boy without a whimper. But it had the desired effect of relieving Gen
eral Lockwood from the annoyance to which he had been subjected on this
account.
" This, I believe, is the full statement of the facts as they occurred and came
to my own knowledge.
" I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
" C. E, LAMMOT,
" 1st Lieutenant and Aide-de- Camp.
"Captain JOHX H. KNIGHT,
" Assistant Adjutant General, Peninsula Brigade.1'
This is the only instance, and I never heard of this before General Lockwood
told me about it.
Question. This was done at General Lockwood's instance ?
Answer. Yes, sir. General Lockwood issued strict orders forbidding the
slaves coming into camp. He issued orders for the capture of rebel property.
I have one here in which he orders the taking of a carriage and horses, some
ladies having waved a rebel flag from the carriage and hurrahed for Jeff. Davis
He would allow no one to hurrah for Jeff. Davis in the presence of his troops.
There was one man, a very respectable person, who was shot by one of the
guards in the hips for persisting in shouting for Jeff. Davis. He stated to Gen
eral Dix that he had taken inventories of the property of .persons who had gone
off to the other side, (many of them are not in arms and some are,) for the pur
pose of being able to obtain it in case a general confiscation act is, passed. He
has taken inventories, I suppose, of more than $50,000 worth of property.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. That is, in view of a confiscation act being passed by Congress, so
that he can put his hand on the property ?
Answer. Yes, sir. In reference to the whipping of this negro, he did it in a
moment of passion, when he was annoyed almost to death by these negroes
coming into his lines, when he had positive instructions from General Dix for
bidding their being allowed to come within our lines. I never heard of it until
the morning before I left, except from the papers, and I had treated it as an idle
rumor. I did so because there is no more loyal man living than General Lockwood.
Since he has been there it has been his constant effort to crush out all disloyalty.
By the chairman :
Question. What is the condition of things there now among the people in
regard to their loyalty ?
Answer. I think it is a very happy condition. At the election which took
place there on the 25th of January, the Union triumph was so complete that it
shows a healthy tone of sentiment existing there. At the election held for a
rebel congressman some time before we went down there, there were but about
600 votes cast in the two counties; while at the election on the 25th of January
there were over 1,200 votes cast, being more than two-thirds of all the voters
in the counties.
Question. Was that in Wise's old district ?
Answer. Yes, sir. Our troops are now quartered on Wise's property there.
The men who have been elected there now are men who have been Unkm men
396 TESTIMONY.
all through the troubles there ; who had been persecuted, threatened at the
polls, their lives threatened, and public meetings held in regard to them.
Question. You observed that many of these men were coerced into the rebel
service ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How was that done when a majority were Union men 1
Answer. The majority were not Union men formerly, nor one-third of them.
In Northampton county I believe the vote originally was every man for seces
sion ; not a vote for the Union cause. In Accomac county the majority voted
against secession.
Question. Is there anything else that you deem material to be stated 1
Answer. I do not know that I could state anything else in this connexion. I
simply wanted to let you know how matters have been conducted down there.
'General Dix announced to me that his plan was one of conciliation, to win these
people back to their allegiance; and General Lock wood has endeavored to con
ciliate them in every manner that he could and not violate the laws, and so far
as his duty to the government would permit him to do so 1
By Mr. Odcll1:
Question. Do you think the people there would remain loyal if our troops
should be taken away?
Answer. 'General Lockwood has written to General Dtx and General Mc-
Clellan that he has more troops there than is necessary, and that he can be
spared for a more active field. He says that Colonel Wallace, with two regi
ments of home guards, can protect the telegraph lines there, and asks that he
may be assigned to a more active field. I think that General Lockwood is a
man that should be placed in a more active field. He is a graduate of West
Point, and has been in the military all his life, and has shown considerable
ability in his writings upon the subject. About the telegraph : He was about
issuing an order when I left, making the offence subject to the penalty of death
for cutting the wire — proceeding upon Halleck's plan with bridge-burners in
the west. He has so posted the troops to protect the line so that there will be
a soldier at every three hundred yards ; and the troops for that purpose, and to
guard the inlets, are all that are needed there now.
WASHINGTON, February 13, 1862.
Colonel JAMES W. McMiLLAN sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army, and where are you
stationed ?
Answer. I am colonel of the 21st Indiana volunteers, and am stationed at
Baltimore, under command of General Dix.
Question. What do you know in regard to the campaign into Accomac
county, Virginia, under General Lockwood ?
Answer. I know that in the forepart of November — about the 13th — we started.
I had been told by General Dix that there would be a campaign set on foot. I
was the ranking officer, and had orders to proceed to Newtown and report to
General Lockwood.
Question. You were there under General Lockwood?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I reported to him there on his arrival.
Question. General Lockwood has been accused of some unmilitary conduct —
something in regard to his dealings with secessionists and appropriating public
TESTIMONY. 397
property lie had taken, &c. These accusations have gone forth. I want yon
to state what you know about his administration as regards those matters.
Answer. I know of nothing he has done in conflict with the rules and regu
lations governing the army of the United States ; and having been in command
of the advance after we left Newtown, or rather Drummondtown, I took pos
session of a great deal of property.
Question. What kind of property ?
Answeri I took cannon, muskets, swords, horses, &c. — property that belonged
-to the confederates. The horses that had been sold to the confederate govern
ment were turned over to the quartermaster, and I understood were held as
confiscated to the government of the United States. The horses that had been
in the service of the southern confederacy, that had been owned by the persons
claiming them, or having them in possession at the time, and who were to have
been compensated for the use of them, were not confiscated, but were returned
"to their owners. But all the horses we could find that had been sold to the
southern confederacy, whether paid for or not, were held as confiscated to the
United States, and were turned over to the quartermaster.
Question. What was done with the cannon and the muskets you took ?
Answer. The cannon I sent to Drummondtown from Pungoteague. I cap
tured seven there and sent them up to Drummondtown. The muskets were of
a very worthless character, but they were put in the jail at Drummondtown,
and the. keys delivered to the quartermaster. When I left there they were still
in the jail, in the possession of the quartermaster of the brigade.
Question. How long were you there ?
Answer. I was there until the 4th or 5th of December. I was in advance,
and went down as far as I could go — down to Cape Charles light-house, or as
near to it as we could get.
Question. Do you know anything in the administration of that department
inconsistent with an officerlike course on the part of General Lock wood 1
Answer. Nothing, except his making a speech. I do not think that is ex
actly consistent with the duty of an officer. The making a speech is about the
only thing I know of that I consider inconsistent with the duty of an officer.
Question. What portion of the people there seem to be loyal, and what por
tion opposed to us?
Answer. When I came away it was with the impression that they would all
become loyal, and I so reported to General Dix. They are clannish there.
They are not very well informed, and they go in clans upon any subject. I
found there, I think, a very strong disposition, upon the part of quite a number
of the citizens, to become loyal to the government, and they all told me so. If
they could be assured and satisfied that they would be protected, they would
submit to the Constitution and laws of the United States. They believed that
that portion of Virginia would, in any event, be attached to Maryland, and
wherever Maryland went they must go. The probability was, they argued, that
even if the rebellion was successful, the Potomac river and the Chesapeake bay
would be the dividing line, and they would be under the northern government.
Question. Do you know of General Lockwood holding any improper inter
course with the rebek, or with persons who were secessionists ?
Answer. No, sir ; and I do not think, from his conversation with me, that he
would have done any such thing. I believe he is as strictly loyal as any per
son can be, and he manifested a desire to be a little more harsh with those peo
ple than his instructions would warrant.
Question. How about the slaves of secessionists coming into your camps 1
What was done with them?
Answer. We were ordered to prohibit slaves from coming about our camps.
That order was given by General Lockwood, and I understood that it was in
accordance with his instructions from General Dix. When I went on in ad-
398 TESTIMONY.
vance, lie furnished me a copy of General Dix's instructions to be governed by.
I did not have any particular instructions from General Lockwood. The orders
were to prohibit the slaves coming about our camps.
Question. You do not know of his returning any of them to secessionists ?
Answer. No, sir. I heard a report that he had one whipped a'nd driven out
of the camp.
Question. What do you know about that 1
. Answer. Personally I do not know anything about it. I was in the advance,
and it was done by some troops in rear of me.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. What kind of a speech was that that General Lockwood made ?
Answer. I did not hear the speech ; I was not there. I only spoke in dis
approval of it, because I think speech-making is not the duty of an officer.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. In speaking of the unofficerlike conduct of making that speech, you
merely referred to the fact of making the speech, and not to the character of
the speech?
Answer. That was all.
By the chairman :
Question. Is there anything more you desire to state as illustrating or throw
ing light upon that campaign ?
Answer. Nothing more than I think the campaign was as successful as it
was possible for it to have been under the circumstances. And I believe any
expression or charge against General Lockwood's loyalty is unjust. I may
have an opinion as to his capacity as an officer, but I think it is unjust to make
any charge against his loyalty. Being intrusted with the advance, I probably
became more fully acquainted with his opinions than any other officer in his
command.
WASHINGTON, February 13, 1862.
Captain HOBART sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am captain of company K, of the 4th regiment of Wisconsin
volunteers.
Question. Were you under General Lockwood in the Accomac expedition ?
Answer. I was. I went down there, and proceeded to Princess Anne and
Snow Hill, and to Newtown, where General Lockwood joined us. I was there
and around about him during the entire campaign, until I returned to Balti
more. I was present at the time he delivered his speech that has been referred
to. It was delivered on the court-house steps at Druminondtown.
Question. What was the occasion of his making that speech ?
Answer. It was in consequence of the desire of the people of Accomac
county to know what they should do in the interim, having no local govern
ment of their own. It was made on the day the county court was to have sat.
General Lockwood had forbidden any court to be held, as its organization was
responsive to the confederate government. There was a very large turnout by
the people of the county there, and they desired to hear from General Lock-
wood what was to be their destiny — what was to be their government during
TESTIMONY. 399
tliis interim. I was near him and heard his speech, which was very short, and
m substance very similar to a speech made by the colonel of my regiment at
Snow Hill, in response to the desire of the people there to be informed upon
the same subject.
Question. That speech of General Lockwood has been violently criticised.
Can you give us an idea of it 1
Answer. The speech was very short ; the whole of it was merely an elabora
tion of General Dix's proclamation that he held in hand and commented upon.
, I judged from his manner that he was not much given to speech-making. He
took up the several points in General Dix's proclamation, and elaborated upon
them very briefly. He stated to the people that, in the absence of any govern
ment in Accomac, he felt it his duty to protect them in their persons and in
their rights until they could take the initiative and form some government for
their own protection. There was a sensitive fueling among the planters there
>as to what should become of their slaves in the absence of all law officers. He
told them that, until they could form a government under and responsive to the
government and Constitution of the United States, he felt bound, with his mili
tary power, to protect them in their persons and property. He recommended
an immediate movement on their part — I think the next Saturday, for notice
could not be given to the people before — to take steps at once to reform their
government, to take the oath of allegiance, and proceed to construct a local gov
ernment. Until that tune, he said he should feel it to be his duty to protect
them in their persons and property. He made use of one or two expressions
which probably have given rise to much that has been said. I heard those ex
pressions. There were very few soldiers present, but a large number of the
citizens of the county. He assured them that he did not come among them as
an enemy to their institutions ; he came there to represent the Constitution and
government of the United States. Said he, " It must be obeyed, and it shall
be obeyed. I will march those troops I have here from one end to the other of the
peninsula, and I shall command obedience, and you must yield. But I do not
come here as an enemy to your institutions ; I have no cause to be an enemy to
them. I am myself a slaveholder, and my father before me held slaves." That
was about the substance of his speech. But from that there was a feeling ex
cited in the camp that they were under a slaveholder, and they did not want to
be under a slaveholder, &c. That was really the only point in the speech to
which there was any exception taken. It was very brief; not more than twice
as long as what I have said here about it.
Question. What was his treatment of the soldiers ?
Answer. Well, sir, I know considerable about that. When he arrived at
Newtown, and took charge of the army, he enforced strict military discipline.
Our officers had gone off to hotels, some to boarding-houses. He ordered them
all to camp, to remain with Aeir soldiers. He issued an order prohibiting the
sale of liquor to officers or soldiers. He went around and saw that his orders
were enforced. He was very strict and somewhat severe in carrying out these
orders ; and in passing over the peninsula he took great pains to prevent the
soldiers from preying upon the farmers, seizing their chickens, &c. He was so
severe that it created some dissatisfaction. But I do not hesitate to state, under
oath, before this committee, that the severity of his discipline was one of the
chief causes of our gaining the affection of the people of that country. They
had expected, as I know from intercourse with them, that we were come down
there to lay their country desolate, and to rob them of all they possessed. That
.was what they had been told. And I think the course of the general had much
to do with winning back the feelings of this people. As to their loyalty, I had
occasion to see many of the people of Northampton and Accomac, and I am
satisfied that, setting aside a few of the leading men, the middle classes of the
people there are now loyal, and desire to remain so.
400 TESTIMONY.
By Mr. Odcll :
Question. Did your officers and men come to appreciate the rigor of General
Lockwood, with reference to forbidding the sale of liquor and prohibiting ab
sence from camp, as being what was proper and right ?
Answer. I think they did. I think they became satisfied that was the way
to keep the regiments under good discipline ; that the officers should be with
them constantly, sharing with the men all their privations and perils. There is
one point that has been mooted in this matter in reference to the taking of
horses. I know all about that matter. I saw it all, and was in among it all,
and although I took no horses whatever, I will give my impression about it. In
going through the peninsula a disposition sprang up among some of our officers
to possess themselves of fine horses. I think, in many instances, it proceeded
from a desire simply to get hold of contraband property — of property that be
longed to the confederates. I have good reason to believe that negroes
were
employed and sent out over the country to find out where there were fine horses
that had been impressed into the confederate service. And when such horses
were discovered they were taken and brought into our camps. In nearly every
instance they were brought in by the staff officers of the regiments ; and at one
time it created quite a feeling' on the part of captains as to whether they had
not the same right to forage the country to find blooded horses as the staff
officers of their regiments. General Lockwood adopted the rule which has been
referred to by Colonel McMillan in his testimony here. In all instances where
he found that these horses had not been actually transferred to the confederate
government, he permitted them to be taken by their owners; and I know that
the order of General Lockwood, as carried out in these two counties, making
that distinction clearly, and returning to the owners who were loyal, who had
not contributed to the confederate army, these horses, had a very salutary effect
upon the people there.
Question. As far as you know, did he return any horses to disloyal citizens 1
Answer. Not that I know of. I will say one thing in relation to those horses.
The horses of A'ccomac and Northampton counties, when Smith, the rebel com
mander, organized his force there, were all pressed into his service.
Colonel McMillan, (previously examined:) As I myself took all the horses
that were taken by authority, I will state that I took possession of all that I
could find that had been in the confederate service, except those that had been
pressed into service. There were two classes of horses in the confederate ser
vice besides those that had been pressed into the service : One class was those
that had been bought by the confederate authorities. The other class was those
that had been taken by their owners when they went, and for the services of
which they were to be paid. General Lockwood allowed the owners of the
second class to take their horses. But those that had been sold to the confede
rate government, whether paid for or not, were not returned. Many of them
had been sold, not paid for, and then returned by the confederates to their own
ers to reimburse them to that extent. But in every case of that kind fliey were
taken and turned over to the quartermaster, and held as confiscated to the gov
ernment. And I think that General Lockwood, under his instructions, could
not have done otherwise than he did in regard to that class of property.
The chairman : Do you know whether any horses were returned to disloyal
men?
Colonel McMillan : That is a question of considerable nicety. I think they
were all disloyal when we arrived there ; but they laid down their amis in obe
dience to the proclamation, with a determination to be loyal. When I say all
were disloyal, of course there were d, few exceptions. But the most of them
were disloyal; that is, they had become identified with the southern confede
racy ; they supposed it was a reality, and was likely to succeed. General Lock-
TESTIMONY 401
%
wood delivered horses to them, to some even who had been in the militia of
the confederacy, not in the regular army. But those persons had expressed
their determination to be loyal to the government of the United States.
Mr. Odell : Have they kept faith ?
Colonel McMillan : Yes, sir.
Mr. Odell: And are now loyal?
Colonel McMillan: That is my opinion. They have since voted almost
unanimously for officers holding authority under the government of the United
States.
Mr. Julian : -Do you think they would continue loyal if our army should be
taken away ?
Colonel McMillan : Yes, sir ; I think if the southern confederacy should be
a success, there would be little disposition to go with it, if it was practicable.
If it should be a failure, there would never be any uneasiness or dissatisfaction
•among them. That is the conviction I had when I came away from there.
When I left I think they were convinced that under no circumstances could
they be a portion of the southern confederacy ; that they were geographically
a portion of Maryland, and Maryland would be held at all events.
The witness, (Captain Hobart:) I will simply make one remark. I have the
same opinion the colonel has expressed in reference to a large portion- of North
ampton county, where all, or nearly all, the horses were taken. I think that in
their feelings and prejudices they are with the main State across the bay. But
still I think they did not wait until we arrived with our forces before they aban
doned that idea, The means of communication had been cut off for a long time,
and they knew hardly anything until we arrived there as to what was going on.
They all yielded, laid down their arms, and professed to be willing to be obe
dient to the government of the United States.
Mr. Odell : Did not these horses that were returned belong to farmers who
had left their farms when they were pressed into the rebel service, as a general
thing ?
Witness : Yes, sir.
Mr. Odell, (to Colonel McMillan:) Do you not know that those horses were
delivered on parole, on written pledge or receipt that they should be returned
when called for.
Colonel McMillan : Certainly. At the time they were delivered up by Gen
eral Lockwood it was with the understanding that if the government should
claim them as confiscated they should be returned.
Mr. Odell : And the horses are now under parole in that way ?
Colonel McMillan : Unless the thing has been decided, they are.
Mr. Odell : So far as General Lockwood is concerned, the horses are under
parole, are they not?
Colonel McMillan: So I understand.
^ WASHINGTON February 13, 1862.
Major F. A. BOARDIV^AN sworn and examined.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am major of the 4th Wisconsin regiment.
Question. Were you under General Lockwood on his Accomack expedition ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know anything about the delivery of horses back to parties
claiming to own them?
Part iii 26
402 TESTIMONY.
Answer. Ye&, sir.
Question. State what you know about that.
Answer. The horses were at General Lockwood's headquarters. The owners
came after them, and the general allowed them to take them conditionally — that
is, subject to the order of the government in case they were confiscated; then
they were to be restored to him.
Question. On his demand?
Answer. -Yes, sir.
Question. Were all the horses, so far as you know, delivered up in this way {
Answer. I believe so, with the exception of those belonging to men who have
escaped and crossed over into Virginia.
Question. And those he confiscated I
Answer. Those were confiscated, I understood.
Question. As a general thing, did the horses thus delivered belong to farmers ?
Answer. They were generally hired — that is, they took them whether the
owners were willing or not, and agreed to pay for their services so much a week.
I concur with what Captain Hobart has testified to in every respect, As to the
flogging the negro, General Lockwood told me about that. There was but one
negro flogged. The general told me the negro had been hanging about the
camp for some time; our regiment was about embarking for Baltimore, and the
negro would not be driven away. Therefore the general had one of the Delaware
or Maryland soldiers take him out and give him a brushing, some fifteen or
twenty blow^s with a switch — nothing to hurt him at all. He said he did it for
the purpose of having the negro go among the others and tell them he had been
flogged, and that would prevent them coining around our camps, and among us.
We had strict orders to prevent them coming about the camp. General Lock-
wood desired me to make this explanation in case I heard anybody refer to the
matter. He said he had heard that it had been reported about the camp, and
had created some feeling against him among the officers and men. He said it
was entirely from a misunderstanding of the case.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Was the owner a loyal man 1
Answer. I do not know anything about the owner of the slave. I know there
was a man came to the camp who had lost a negro. He was a loyal man by the
name of Dr. Irby. He finally found his negro before we left.
Question. Did he get him by the help of the army ?
Answer. I think not. I think that he was found by some men he had out
after him.
Colonel McMillan, (previously examined :) There is one other thing I may
state in regard to catching negroes. I refused to have anything to do with it in
any way, shape, or form. The owners requested me to arrest them and put
them in jail. I told them they had taken their negroes to build fortifications,
and had then got scared and run off home faster than the negroes could ; they
had taken part against the United States, and I would not condescend to arrest
their negroes under any circumstances. I spoke rather sharp to them some
times. On one or two occasions I was told they reported the matter to General
Lockwood ; but he never referred to it at all in any conversation with me. I
refused to send an escort with men who came to my camp while I was at Pun-
goteague to search it. I refused either to go myself or send an officer to hunt
for negroes in the camp. I told them they could go and look, and the men
would not disturb them. But they refused to go to the camp and reported the
matter to General Lockwood, who. however, paid no attention to it.
TESTIMONY. 403
By Mr. Odcll :
Question. (To Major Boardman.) Have you anything else to state about the
matter ?
Answer. No, sir ; there is nothing I think of.
Question. What is your opinion of the loyalty of the people there, and the
influence of our army among them ?
Answer. I think it was very beneficial. I think the expedition was entirely
successful in every way.
Question. Is that indicated by the result of the election last month ?
Answer. I think so.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. How long were you in making your march during that expedition '{
Answer. The 4th Wisconsin left Baltimore the first Monday of November,
and returned to Baltimore the first Sunday in December.
Question. I mean how long was it from the time you landed down there until
you finished your expedition ?
Answer. About a month.
Question. What was the distance you marched ?
Answer. I cannot tell.
Colonel McMillan : It was about seventy miles from Newtown to Eastville ;
and I went some eighteen or twenty miles further.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. (To Major Boardman.) Why were you so long in making that
march, being after the rebels ?
Answer. The first portion of the expedition sent down was not sufficient for
the purpose. The rebels would have fought us with that small force ; and
General Dix sent force enough to make them lay down their axms" without hav
ing any fight, and to accomplish his ends peaceably. It was the other portions
of the regiments coming down that detained us longer than we would have been
detained otherwise.
Question. You waited for them ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. It has been reported that General Lockwood paid exorbitant
prices for everything he got from the rebels.
Answer. Not to my knowledge ; I do not know anything about that.
Colonel McMillan : All that I got was about 130 bushels of sweet potatoes,
for part of which I paid thirty cents a bushel, and for the rest twenty-five cents
a bushel ; and we got some beef at six cents a pound.
BATTLE OF WINCHESTER.
WASHINGTON, May 22, 1862.
Colonel JOHN S. MASON sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am a captain in the regular army, and colonel of the 4th regi
ment of Ohio volunteers.
Question. Were you at the battle of Winchester, in March last ?
404 TESTIMONY.
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Will you give us a concise account of that battle ?
Answer. To do so, it may be well for me to state some matters that pre
ceded the battle itself.
Question. Please do so, in your own way.
Answer. On the morning of the Monday preceding the battle, March 17,
I was directed by General Shields to make a reconnoissance in the direction
of Strasburg. He placed at my disposal a squadron of cavalry and two
companies of my own regiment, the 4th Ohio, with instructions to examine
the by-roads, and to ascertain what force the enemy had in front of us, and
look at the enemy in front. I went out the main road, examining those to
the right and left. When we arrived at the town of Newtown, a distance
probably of six or seven miles, we encountered the pickets of the enemy
and drove them through the town. That was about 2 o'clock in the after
noon. I then turned off to the left, on to the Front Royal road, and exam
ined that from there back to Winchester. I reported to General Shields the
result of the reconnoissance.
General Williams was present at the time I made my report, and sug
gested that it would be well to make a reconnoissance in the direction of
Strasburg, and see what there was then in our front, before General Banks's
column should leave us. He said that he could support me with about 6,000
men. Arrangements were immediately made to carry that suggestion into
effect. I was ordered to be in readiness to march the next morning at 4
o'clock, on the Front Royal road. My instructions were to proceed down
the Front Royal road, taking some cavalry with me, and leaving some men
on the way to communicate with General Shields's column, and to try to get
in the rear of the enemy, whilst General Shields, with the main division,
moved down the regular Strasburg route. He furnished me with a squadron
of cavalry, two sections of artillery, two regiments of infantry, and my own
two companies of infantry I had had the day before. We moved down until
we carne to the last road turning to the right before reaching Front Royal.
I turned to the right, and in going into the town of Middletown — about 13
miles from Winchester, on the main road, though I had come by a somewhat
circuitous route — we encountered the enemy's pickets, and drove them be
fore us until they arrived at Cedar Creek bridge, which they had covered
with combustibles, ready for burning. They burned the bridge before we
could approach them. They then opened upon us with a battery of artillery
from the opposite bank of the creek, to which we replied for some little time.
There was very little effect on either side, the distance was so great,
As one of my regiments had by that time marched some 27 or 28 miles,
and was a great deal fatigued, and as it was near sunset, within a few
minutes of it, I concluded to wait until morning, and then cross the creek
under cover of our batteries. Shortly afterwards, probably within three-
quarters of an hour, General Shields arrived with his whole division. After
examining the ground, he concluded to wait until morning before going
forward.
The next morning we moved forward without opposition, the small force
in our front having left, until we arrived at Strasburg. At Strasburg the
enemy opened upon, us from a battery which they had planted upon a hill in
front of us. General Shields sent for Colonel Kimball, Colonel Tyler,
Colonel Sullivan, and rdyself to come forward. He stated that he was under
• the impression that Jackson's whole force was in front of UK, and he should
make his dispositions for battle immediately. He placed his batteries on a
hill on our right, supported by the three brigades of infantry in the rear,
leaving me on the extreme left, and near the turnpike, with his cavalry
force, (I suppose the cavalry numbered from 300 to 350,) and the same in-
TESTIMONY. 405
fantry force I had the day before — two regiments and my own two com
panies.
I was ordered, as soon ns our artillery opened, to move forward on the
main road with the cavalry, supported by a regiment of infantry. We
moved forward about a mile and a quarter, when, upon arriving on the crest
of a hill, we were fired upon by our own batteries. Fortunately, the fire,
though well directed, caused only the .loss of a few horses. The force of the
enemy in my front was principally cavalry. They had, I thought at that
time, two guns; they may have had three. As we approached them on one
hill they would fall back to the next and open fire on iis again. General
Shields came up in person, bringing up his division, and pursued the enemy
a distance of perhaps five miles, throwing out a regiment of infantry as
skirmishers in front, followed by a section of artillery. He continued the
pursuit until about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday. He then re
turned to Strasburg with his whole force, leaving a strong picket on the
hills towards the enemy.
On Thursday morning General Shields ordered the whole command to
return to Winchester, giving me, with the same force I had taken out, the
rear guard. We arrived in Winchester about dark on Thursday evening
without seeing any of the enemy. It was reported to me that there were a
few of the" enemy's cavalry on the route, but I did not see them; they did
not annoy us at all; there was not a gun fired.
The general had had his headquarters in the town of Winchester; but
when he returned from Strasburg he moved back about two miles beyond
the town, a little to the left of the Martinsburg road. His whole command
was encamped in that vicinity — from there to about four miles out. His
nearest camp was probably about two miles from town, except the two
companies I had had near his headquarters when in town.
• All was quiet on Friday. In conversation with General Shields and
others on Friday we all came to the conclusion that our reconnoissance
had been successful; that there was no enemy on that front; that Jackson
was off a long distance, and that all we would have to do, until we had got
things in readiness for an advance, would be to picket well in front.
On Saturday there was considerable firing during the early part of the day ;
but for a good while I do not think anybody but those engaged really knew
what it was. Some thought it was some of General Williams's men who were
discharging their guns, firing at targets, or something of the kind. About
four o'clock in the evening, however, General Shields passed through the
town with his whole division, and I joined him as he passed through town.
He moved out to the front. When he got out about a mile and a half the
enemy opened upon us with artillery. I was not close up at the time, and
therefore cannot give an accurate account of what transpired. When, I
arrived on the ground General Shields had just been wounded, and was be
ing taken into a house on the side road. Dr. McAbee, who was with me,
dismounted, and went into the house with him.
I asked who was in command, arid found that for the time being I was the
senior officer present. One of our batteries had gone into position on a side
hill, and was firing. I ordered it to cease firing, as any further firing was
useless. Before I had made any further dispositions, the general's aids came
forward, and gave some orders in reference to the batteries ceasing firing
and the encamping the first brigade on the ground for the night, throwing
out a strong picket to the front. That was Colonel KirnbalPs brigade. The
brigades of Colonels Sullivan, Tyler, and my own, with the two companies
of my regiment, were ordered. I do not think Colonel Tyler had got up
through town at all. He had been ordered out, but had not got forward.
Colonel Sullivan's brigade, I think, had just got through town. Colonel Tyler
406 TESTIMONY
went back to his old camp, \nd Colonel Sullivan's force encamped on the
outskirts of the town. General Shields was carried into town in a carriage.
On Sunday morning, just about eight o'clock, after breakfast, I called on
General Shields, and he directed me to go to the front, and take my adjutant
and orderly with me, and make a reconrioissance from different points of the
field, with reference to the force and disposition of the enemy, &c., and to
report to him. When I got out I found that Colonel Kimball had thrown
forward the 8th Ohio, deploying them as skirmishers in front, and that he
had two of his regiments, with a battery of artillery, posted near him, and
about a mile and a half from town. We examined the ground to the front
for some distance, and became satisfied that there was no force there greater
than the force that had made the attack the night before, which we all sup
posed was Jackson's rear guard, under Ashby, which we had pursued to
wards Strasburg. Colonel Carroll had deployed six of his companies, of the
8th Ohio, on the left, near the wood, where he encountered quite a force of
infantry and cavalry, and, I believe, two pieces of artillery. I was not close
enough to perceive the full effect of the fire. They had quite a heavy little
skirmish there, which lasted probably fifteen or twenty minutes. Colonel
Carroll sent back for re-enforcements, and Colonel Kimball ordered up the
14th Indiana, under Colonel Harrow, to support him.
About this time, which was about ten o'clock — a little after, perhaps —
Colonel Sullivan's brigade appeared on the field, and was thrown to the left
of the road, in support of Colonel Carroll. The apparent intention of the
enemy at that time was to turn our left, and Colonel Kimball threw the most
of the force he had on the left.
In the mean time Colonel Kimball and myself rode forward and examined
the ground to his right and left. He remarked that he would hold the hills
on the right and in advance. General Shields had directed him to press the
enemy in front and pursue them. But Colonel Kimball concluded that if
they were in any force in front we better hold on any good ground we had.
There was a succession of rolling ground, high points and knobs, one of
them very high, but all commanding positions, overlooking the valley, to
our front and left. We threw forward a battery on one of the advanced
hills, and kept up an artillery fire from that position nearly the whole
morning up till two* o'clock.
About twelve o'clock I went into town and reported to General Shields
that we could discover nothing more than we had seen during the day pre
vious; that up to that time the enemy certainly were not in any force, and
that we thought it was nothing but Ashby. And it afterwards turned out
that up to" that hour there was no other force there.
General Shields directed me to return to the field and continue my obser
vations. I immediately went back, and found that during my absence the
enemy had been very heavily re-enforced, and that there was an evident in
tention on their part to endeavor to turn our right. I rode up to Colonel
Kimball, who was then on the advanced hill to the right that I have spoken
of, and had been playing a battery of artillery for some time, to which the
enemy were replying. The battery was supported by the fourteenth In
diana, four companies of the eighth Ohio, and, if I mistake not, the sixty-
seventh Ohio. I omitted to state that early in the morning I remarked
that it would be well to 1?hrow some troops over to our right. There was
a wood there, near where the main fight afterwards occurred. Colonel
Kimball replied that he had already sent the eighty-fourth Pennsylvania
over there, and they were holding the wood. That was early in the morn
ing, probably between nine and teu o'clock. He also remarked, when I
asked him to ride forward and look at the ground to the front, that now he
had his flanks sufficiently protected he could look well to the front. About
TESTIMONY. 407
four o'clock, I should think it was, Major Armstrong, of General Shields's
staff, came laughingly up to me, and said: "Perhaps Colonel Kimball will
say to me, as McClellan did to Lander, that I am too suggestive. I re
marked to him," said he, " that he better occupy that hill on our right."
Said I, " he better occupy it, or they will open a battery upon us." Even
while I was speaking, the enemy did open a battery upon us from that hill.
I understood that Colonel Kimball was at that time making dispositions to
occupy the hill. The enemy came up to that position in eonsiderable force,
and planted a battery there to reply to the one we had on this advanced
hill. Colonel Kimball remarked at once that he must take that battery.
He sent myself, my adjutant, Lieutenant Greene, and Lieutenant Blinn, of
the fourteenth Indiana, I think, to bring up Tyler's brigade. Tyler's brigade,
in the mean time, had advanced along the road, and was held in reserve.
When Tyler arrived he was thrown immediately over to the right, behind
a skirt of woods, passing through a little valley up on the hill, being
ordered to move forward and take the position the enemy occupied. As
soon as Tyler became engaged, Colonel Kimball at once sent forward the
fourteenth Indiana, which was supporting our battery on the hill in front,
the eighth Ohio, and the sixty-seventh Ohio. In the mean time he had sig
nalled to Colonel Sullivan, who was on the field to the left, to send over
some regiments. The next regiment that arrived was the thirteenth In
diana, which was thrown right in on the left to support Colonel Tyler. That
was followed by the sixty-seventh Ohio and a portion of the fifth Ohio.
The eighty-fourth Pennsylvania had come up early in the engagement from
the rear, and was still on that flank. The sixty-seventh Ohio scarcely got
'iinder fire. The others came up in the order named, if I remember rightly.
The musketry fire lasted about two hours.
During that time I was by the side of Colonel Kimball on horseback, and
I think that he made every direction with reference to the dispositions of
troops that was made. Of course he did not give any instructions to the
troops after they had passed into the wood on the hill towards the stone
wall, for then each commanding officer manosuvred his own troops. The
re-enfor^cements of Tyler were led into the field by my adjutant, Lieutenant
Greene ; that is, they were led by him to their position. It happened in
this way : After the fight became pretty heavy, quite a number of men at
tempted to leave the field, stragglers running back, Colonel Kimball asked
me and my adjutant, Lieutenant Greene, to ride forward and try to turn these
men back. My adjutant went off in one direction, and I went in another.
The direction I took brought me up among the wounded and the surgeons.
I turned back quite a number of stragglers, and forced quite a number of
men who were able to walk. Lieutenant Greene went off a little further to
my left, and came across quite a number who had taken advantage of the
confusion to go to the rear. After he had got back into the woods, he found
a regiment coming in, and showed them the road into the woods. He con
tinued showing the other regiments to their position as they came up.* Tke
firing ceased about dark, after it had become so dark that we could not dis
tinguish friend from foe. I then left the field, and rode into town and re
ported to General Shields the result of the fight. Shortly afterwards Colonel
Kimball came in and reported to the general. General Shields directed me
to picket strongly in front, and to pursue at daylight.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Did you hear the report from Colonel Kimball to General
.Shields ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
408 TESTIMONY.
Question. Can yon tell us whether Colonel Kiraball acted that day on his
own responsibilit3r, or in pursuance of orders received from General Shields ?
Answer. 1 was satisfied at the time that he acted on his own responsi
bility ; and I have always held that opinion.
Question. How far distant from the field of battle was the house in which
General Shields lay wounded ?
Answer. It was fully four miles.
Question. At what time did you leave General Shields in the afternoon ?
Answer. I think it was between one and two o'clock.
Question. Were you and he then both of the opinion that it" was only
Ashby's force that was in front of you ?
Answer. I was of that opinion; and the general remarked at the
time that he thought there was only Ashby's force there. He also said that
Kimball wanted re-enforcements, but Kimball wanted more troops than were
necessary for the force opposed to him.
Question. When you then left General Shields did you immediately return
to the field ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you found that the battle had already commenced with this
superior force of the enemy ?
Answer. Yes, sir; that is, we were then making dispositions for the bat
tle. The firing of the artillery had become heavier, but no infantry had then
become engaged, though they had been sent forward to the woods.
Question. Do you know at what time the first news reached General-
Shields that there was a greater force of the enemy there than Ashby's ?
Answer. He did not know it at the time I left him in the afternoon, be
tween one and two o'clock ; I can say that. But I cannot say when he
received positive information upon that point. Colonel Kimball had reported
to him that he thought the force in front of him was stronger than Ashby's
force. But when I left General Shields I certainly was under the impression,
and I know General Shields was also, that the force there was nothing but
Ashby's.
Question. The forces on the field during the day were directed. by Colonel
Kimball ?
Answer. That is my belief.
Question. And the next morning the pursuit of the enemy was commenced ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. By order of General Shields ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; General Shields directed the pursuit. He directed me
during the night to collect the re-ehforcernents that were coming in, and
have them rendezvous at a certain point, at the edge of town, to wait his
orders, and just after daylight he gave me an order to move forward and
report to Colonel Kimball, who was in pursuit.
Question. Do you know at what time General Banks left Winchester ?
Answer. I know from hearsay that it was between twelve and one o'clock
on Sunday, the day of the battle.
Question. • And at that time it was believed that there was only Ashby's
force opposed to you ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know when General Banks refurned ?
Answer. I think it was about daylight on Monday morning
Question. Do you kno*w how far he had gone ?
Answer. I understood that he went as far as Harper's Ferry.
Question. And there heard of your engagement at Winchester ?
Answer. Yes, sir, and that caused his return ; and his troops were ordered
back in consequence of that attack.
TESTIMONY. 409
Question. He then assumed command ?
Answer. Yes, sir, on his return. He made his appearance on the field
between nine and ten o'clock on Monday, I think. The first intimation I had
that General Banks had returned was just after daylight on Monday morn
ing ; I had ridden down towards the depot, as I was expecting Donelly's
brigade, of Williams's division. 4 met Colonel Donelly coming in, and asked
him where his brigade was. And as I rode back to report to General
Shields, I saw General Banks and his staff at his own quarters, apparently
just arrived. I rode on up to where General Shields was, and a moment or
two afterwards General Banks came in — just about daylight on Monday
morning.
Question. Then, if I understand you, you are satisfied that General Shields
did not suppose that Jackson was present with his force until after you
left him on Sunday, at about two o'clock ?
Answer. I am satisfied that was his impression. It was my impression.
We were talking freely about the matter. I do not think he thought there
was any other force there than Ashby's. I know General Banks had that
impression, and that was the reason he left Winchester on Sunday.
Question. Then the truth about that battle is, that it was not the result of
any strategy or skill on the part of General Shields, by which he succeeded
in getting the enemy into a position where he could successfully give him
battle; but the good planning, if there was any, was on the part of the
enemy, and the victory to our troops was the result solely of the good fight
ing on the part of our men ?
Answer. I am of the opinion that the strategy was on the part of the
enemy, and that the victory was due solely to the good fighting of our men.
I do not believe that very many of our command expected a fight with Jack
son within two weeks at any rate.
WASHINGTON, May 22, 1862.
Dr. H. M. McABEE sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am surgeon of the 4th Ohio volunteers, with the rank of major.
Question. Were you present at the battle of Winchester ?
Answer. I was with General Shields during the battle. I was not present
on the battle-field.
Question. Will you state to the committee what you know in relation to
that battle — what came under your own observation ?
Answer. My relation to General Shields aad the command at the time
was simply this: On the evening of Saturday, when General Shields was
wounded, I was called to dress his wound, and found him prostrated with
the shock to his nervous system. He said his arm would be dressed soon,
and he would then take his horse. We attempted to put him in an upright
posture to dress his. arm, and he fainted. He then said he would have an
open carriage brought, which was ordered. But upon attempting to sit up
again to have his arm dressed, he again fainted. We abandoned that, and
proposed to send for an ambulance in which to take him to town. At first
he declined to be taken in the ambulance, but finally consented, and was
thus taken to town.
I remained with him all that night. The next morning all his staff went-
to the field,, and he asked me to act as an aid to him that day. He and
410 TESTIMONY.
I were alone in his room nearly all day of Sunday, except occasionally when
for a few minutes some of the messengers would be there. I received the
messages from the field, and opened them and read them for him. And I
wrote almost all the messages he dictated during that day and the night
following. I think he regarded himself to be in command of his division,
but not in active command on the field. And I think that is the light he
intended his orders or messages to be taken. That is, he did not propose
to make the dispositions of the forces in the field. His messages were
mainly addressed to Colonel Kimball, in the shape of suggestions or gen
eral instructions as to how this or that should be done; not as orders for
the specific movements of this or that body of troops.
He was under the impression until a late hour of the afternoon, until three
o'clock, I think, that he was being trifled with by Ashby's command. He
issued a great many messages to Colonel Kimball, but none of them in the
shape of specific orders; rather as suggestions, he relying on Colonel Kiin-
balPs discretion as to whether it was advisable to adopt them or not, when
they should be received upon the field.
Question. How long did you remain with General Shields at that time?
Answer. I remained with him from the time he was wounded, on Satur
day afternoon, until about 10 o'clock on Monday morning.
Question. There have been statements that there was a great scarcity of
surgeons and medical ^attendants at that time, and that there was great suf
fering on the part of our wounded for that reason. What was the fact in
relation to that ?
Answer. I know something about that. About noon, or a little after noon,
on Sunday, when our wounded were beginning to be brought in, applica
tion was made to General Shields to have me detailed in charge of the hos
pitals in Winchester. He had asked me in the morning to remain and act
as his aid during the day. He declined to release me, detaining me with
him for his own purposes. Another detail was therefore made. Messages
were received at his rooms several times during the evening and night of
Sunday, complaining that there was a want of surgical aid.
After the work of the day was mainly over, at the suggestion of an officer
who came in I requested General Shields to allow me to go out for two or
three hours and assist in dressing the wounded. It was granted me, and I
was out about two hours and a half, coming in again about 11 o'clock at
night.
I am satisfied that there was not a sufficient number of surgeons there to
take care of the wounded; and no arrangements had been made, not even
so much as a single bunk or bed prepared previous to the engagement.
There was not even any understanding, I think, until the day was some
what advanced, as to where the wounded should be carried.
Question. Why did you not remain and assist in taking care of the
wounded ?
Answer. I was under General Shields's particular orders.
Question. Was his wound of such a character as to require the constant
attendance of a physician ?
Answer. No, sir. I think not.
Question. Could you not get leave, after you had been there and seen
how he was, to go out and assist in dressing the wounds of the soldiers ?
Answer. I did not feel at liberty to make such an application, after a
similar application had been made by the medical director and refused.
The officers of General Shields's staff were all absent, and I was alone with
him almost all the day.
Question. I mean at night, after the battle was over, could you not have
TESTIMONY. 411
remained out during the night- to assist in dressing the wounds of the
soldiers ?
Answer. I think I could.
Question. Why did you not do so ?
Answer. I considered myself as obeying his orders to remain with him.
My duties during the day, and the night after the battle, -and the Monday
morning following, were not mainly in connexion with my position in the
army. They were services for which I had no commission, and for which I
was entitled to no credit, and for which I, of course, received none
Question. Did not General Shields have his staff after the battle was over ?
Answer. Not long; they went to bed directly after they returned.
Question. His start came in from the field ?
Answer. Yes, sir; but retired soon after. And during the night I remained
in his room, as I had done during the day, receiving the messages to him
and writing his orders.
Question. How many officers were on his staff ?
Answer. Three or four
Question. Did they all come in and retire to bed ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And left you to perform their -duties, when you should have
been attending to the wounded soldiers; is not that the fact ?
Answer. That is, I suppose, the fact.
By the chairman:
Question. You have observed that General Shields supposed, up to 3
o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, that it was Ashby's cavalry who were
trifling with him ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. At what time did he become aware that Jackson was there in
force ?
Answer. I think somewhere along between 3 and 4 o'clock in the after
noon.
Question. What did he do when he ascertained that fact ?
Answer. He could, send no more forces on the field, for they were all there
then.
Question. Did he assume the command then ?
Answer. Not in any other sense than he had done before.
WASHINGTON, May 22, 1862.
Colonel WILLIAM HARRON sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am colonel of the 14th Indiana volunteers.
Question. Were you at the battle of Winchester 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Will you give the committee, a short statement of what fell
under your own observation at that time ?
Answer. Towards 5 or 6 o'clock, on the day previous1, Saturday, I was
ordered to get my regiment out and move as rapidly as I could to the front.
Question. By whom was that order issued ?
Answer. By Colonel Kimball, acting as brigadier general. I moved them
about two miles to the front, and was there ordered to halt. I saw nothing
412 TESTIMONY.
of the skirmish that took place that afternoon; I wa^ olf to the left of where
it occurred.
Question. Tell the committee what occurred the next day.
Answer. We remained in that position until the next morning. About 10
o'clock I received an order from Colonel Kimball, through an aide-de-camp,
to move forward rapidly down the turnpike, I proceeded down the turn
pike about one mile. The order was to put myself in position to support, if
necessary, Colonel Carroll, whose regiment had been sent forward as skir
mishers. No point was indicated to me where to rest. About the time I
halted my regiment, still upon the left of the road, I received a farther order
from Colonel Kimball, through his acting adjutant, to move yet further front,
the report being that Carroll was being hardly pressed. I then moved forward
until I reached Kernstown, and formed my men upon the left of the road, Across
a meadow, and remained there two hours. During this time the enemy
had opened a battery upon our extreme left, and fired upon us very vigor
ously, but injured only one or two men. Colonel Carroll fell back with his
line of skirmishers to my extreme left, leaving between Colonel Sullivan's
command, in my rear, and myself an open space about sufficient, by pro
longing his line, for one regiment. At this moment I received an order
from Colonel Kimball to look .well to the left, as he was fearful that the
enemy were trying to turn our flank. I moved my regiment back, connect
ing with Colonel Carroll with my left, and then rode forward to him, telling
him what order I had received. He said to me, " I am looking out carefully
for that." We remained there for some time; I cannot say how long. I did
not take much note of time then. The next order I received was from
Colonel Kimball to move my regiment across the road to the right, and
form it on the immediate left of the battery at which he was stationed on a
hill. I did so, remaining there considerable time, perhaps a half or three-
quarters of an hour; when from our extreme right a very rapid and vigorous
fire of artillery was opened upon us, and from some concealed men imme
diately in our front. While waiting, in that position, for what might trans
pire, Colonel Tyler's brigade, upon our extreme right, commenced a fire
upon the enemy's extreme left. As soon as his fire demonstrated that the
engagement was becoming general, Colonel Kimball turned to me and or
dered me to move as rapidly as possible to the support of Colonel Tyler,
pointing out with his hand the direction I was to take, and telling me to
tall in as nearly on his left as I could. I then moved forward until we rose
a hill and entered the fight, to the left of the 5th Ohio, about 25 minutes
after the fight had commenced. From that time, as the fight was continued,
I think the men were at no time stationary. The enemy started as soon
as we commenced the attack upon them; they commenced falling back, and
continued that backward movement, rallying themselves, from time to time,
and firing upon us; so that my men, at no time, were entirely stationary.
Sometimes they were moving very slowly, until they reached the stonewall.
At that time they opened a concealed and very destructive fire upon our
regiment. The 84th Pennsylvania, in the mean time, had become engaged,
as also the 61th Ohio. Colonel Murray having been killed at that time, the
84th Pennsylvania became a great deal disorganized.
Whilst this was progressing the 13th Indiana moved up on our extreme
left, coming to the left of the stone wall. They received three or four fires
from the enemy before they returned any. They delivered their first fire
upon them from their front rank, at about 100 yards distance. Upon the
delivery of the second fire, from the rear rank of that battalion, the enemy
commenced a rapid retreat, and from that time, for 15 or 20 minutes, it was
a complete rout.
That is about as correct a history as I can give of the matter.
TESTIMONY. 413
Question. Whom did you understand to be«in command of our. forces on
the Sunday of the battle ?
Answer. Colonel Kimball, I supposed.
Question. Did you receive any orders at any time from any one else ?
Answer. No, sir, none; except it was through some one authorized by him
to give them.
Question. Did you receive any orders from General Shields ?
Answer. No, sir; I received none directly from him. All that I received
came through Colonel Kimball or some of his aids.
Question. Do you know whether any orders came from General Shields
through Colonel Kimball ?
Answer No, sir; I do not. In truth, I did not see General Shields from
the time he came on the field on Saturday until some time after the battle of
Sunday. The order to myself to enter into the contest with my own regi
ment was given to me by Colonel Kimball in person. I had command of his
own regiment, of which I was the lieutenant colonel, commanding the regi
ment at the time. He look great pride in his regiment, and kept it under
his own personal observation.
WASHINGTON, May 22, 1862.
General J. C. SULLIVAN sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am a brigadier general of volunteers.
Question. From what State ?
Answer. From the State of Indiana.
Question. Have you received a military education, and what service have
you had ?
Answer. I received an education in the naval service, and have had seven
years' service in the navy of the United States.
Question. Were you present at the battle of Winchester, in March last ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Will you give to the committee a 'short statement in regard to
that battle ?
Answer. From Saturday afternoon ?
Question. Yes, sir.
Answer. I was in command of a brigade. On Saturday afternoon I heard
firing to the front, but could obtain no information as to the cause of that
firing. About 5 o'clock I was told that the enemy were driving in our
pickets; that they had been fighting all day. I immediately called my
aids and told them that, if that was so, in a short time it would be neces
sary for us to move. I directed them to go to our regiments and get them
in readiness to move. At that moment an aid of General Shields rode up
and said that the General wanted my brigade to move forward at that
time. We were out two miles on the Martinsburg side of Winchester. I
formed my brigade, and rode up to General Shields's headquarters for orders.
When I arrived there I was told that the general had gone out to the front
where the fighting was. A moment afterwards another aid rode up and
told me that- the general wanted my brigade to move rapidly to the front.
In moving my brigade through the town I perceived the shells of the enemy
exploding within the city limits. Shortly afterwards I was told that the
general was wounded, and was told to halt my brigade where it was, just
414 TESTIMONY
this side of the city; and I was told to picket the town and the roads
leading into it on each side.
I called on the general just after dark, and was there told that he con
sidered that the attack was made by only Ashby's cavalry; that he did not
suppose that Jackson's force was near there.
The next morning early the general sent for me, and told me that the
enemy was gone; that there was no danger of Jackson's fighting again;
that he knew him, and Jackson was afraid of him, and that I could go
out and pick out a camp.
In riding to the front with the assistant adjutant general I selected a
nice piece of ground, but thought I would ride to the top of a hill and see if
I could not throw a regiment over it. At that moment the enemy opened
fire upon us with artillery. The fight lasted until about 3 o'clock, I should
think, when the musketry fire commenced. I saw none of General Shields's
aids at all; and if he had been in command he ought to have sent orders to
me by his own aids. Colonel Kimball's aids came to me, but none of General
Shields's aids came to me. During the afternoon Colonel Kimball requested
assistance from me — the request coming as from himself — and i sent him
four regiments.
At night after the battle I received an order from General Shields — I had
only 500 men at the time— to attack the enemy the next morning with the
force I had. I started at daylight to do it, and pursued them for some time.
We all considered there that Colonel Kimball was in command during
the battle of Sunday; that was our understanding.
Question. Did you understand that Colonel Kimball directed the move
ments of our troops during the battle of Sunday ?
Answer. Entirely.
Question. That was your opinion ?
Answer. Yes, sir. It was impossible for anybody else to have done it.
It required some one to be on the ground, to see its conformation, the posi
tion of the troops and the movements of the enemy, to be enabled to direct
our troops properly.
Question. You consider that it would have been impossible for any man
several miles distant from the battle-field to have directed the operations
of the day ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I think so.
Question. In regard to th'at battle, do you think it was brought about by
any strategy or skill of any of our generals, in getting the enemy into a
position where they could be beaten ; or was the strategy on the part of the
enemy, and the victory the result of good fighting on the part of our troops ?
Answer. I believed that the fighting of our troops gained the victory;
that there was no strategy on our part at all. I had orders to drill my
troops; to commence Sunday morning, before the fighting commenced. I was
to drill my troops and get them ready for the fight to come off at some
future time.
Question. Drill them preparatory to action when ?
Answer. At some future time — we did not know when. The general is
very fond of underrating the troops. Some movements had been made in
skirmishing that I was not aware of. The general wanted the men drilled
to move in certain ways in skirmishing, and had ordered me to commence
the drill on that Sunday; I objected, because my men had' been on picket
all night and were very much fatigued.
Question. That order had reference to no immediate engagement ?
Answer. No, sir. I was to take my brigade and occupy the front on Sun
day, and commence drilling.
TESTIMONY, 415
MONITOR AND MEBEIMACK,
IN THE SENATE or THE UNITED STATES,
March, 11, 1862.
On motion by Mr. WILSON, of Massachusetts,
.Resolved, That the select committee on the conduct of the war be directed
to inquire into the late engagement between the rebel steamers and the
vessels of the United States, near Fortress Monroe, with all the circum
stances that led to such destruction of the property of the United States,
and that they be authorized to send for persons and papers.
Attest : J. W. FORNEY, Secretary.
WASHINGTON, March 19, 1862.
Captain GUSTAVUS V. Fox sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. We have been directed to inquire into the late engagement
with the rebel iron-clad ship Merrimack, at Fortress Monroe. (The resolution
of the. Senate was then read to the witness.) Will you please state what
you know about that engagement and the causes of the disaster to our
shipping there.
Answer. The Cumberland and Congress were attacked by the rebel vessel
Merrimack, which was invulnerable. She fired into the one and destroyed it,
and ran into the other and sunk it.
Question. The Cumberland and Congress were sailing vessels ?
Answer. Yes, sir'; Commodore Goldsborough told me that his instructions
about these vessels had not been followed out. He had directed that they
never should be left without a steam-tug with which to manage them. The
Merrimack attacked them when it was slack water, and had them completely
at her mercy. But she got a very good pounding herself before she de
stroyed them.
The shaft of the Roanoke was broken about the 5th of November, and it
was believed that it could be repaired in about two months. That was the
report made to us. But upon inquiry it was found that every forge in the
country capable of doing the work was employed. There being a large
number of contracts out for steamers, every one of which must have a shaft,
every available forge in the country was running to the utmost of its capacity.
Finally we found one establishment that agreed to forge the shaft, but re
fused to turn and finish it, which, of itself, is as important and difficult a
matter as the forging. The government had no adequate means to turn
such an enormous piece of forging. They undertook it, however, with such
means as they had at the New York navy yard, and it is now about finished —
although it broke every piece of machinery they had which was put upon
it, and special machinery had to be made for it,
The Roanoke was left at Fortress Monroe at the request of Commodore
Groldsborough, and the sailing vessels were kept there at the request of the
military authorities. A week before this affair happened the Congress was
ordered away from there, but for some reason she was suffered to remain
there for a time. The department, as well as the country, knew that the
416 TESTIMONY.
Merrimack was coming' out. But my feeling was that we could manage her,
and I have no doubt we should have done it, had not the Minnesota got
aground. But for that the Merrimack, having but three guns on each side,
could not have disabled her before the Minnesota could have got alongside
of her.
Question. Which was the fastest ?
Answer. The Minnesota could sail two miles to the Merrirnack's one.
, By Mr. Wright:
Question. What would you have done if you. could have got up along
side of the Merrimack ?
Answer. Run into her and destroyed her; her iron plating would not have
protected her against that.
Question. You think her greater speed would have enabled her to do that?
Answer. Yes, sir; and it would have crushed her, broken her in two. She
is a large vessel, and her frame can be broken in almost any part by a vessel
of the size and weight of the Minnesota running into her end on. It is well
known that even our common wooden steamers have run into the docks and
piers of New York city, and penetrated them to the distance of ten or
twelve feet, though they were built of heavy timbers and filled with stone,
broken granite, &c. But the Minnesota, having to pass over a shoal place
to reach the Merrimack, ran aground; and she was the only vessel there
able to cope with the Merrimack.
By the chairman :
Question. The Minnesota was a vessel of the same size as the Merrimack
before the latter was cut down ?
Answer. Yes, sir; the Minnesota, Roanoke, and Merrimack, were of the
same class.
By Mr. Wright : .
Question. The Minnesota was not plated with iron ?
Answer. No, sir; and for that reason she would not -do in a contest with
the Merrimack hour by hour. But she is sufficiently protected to stand the
hammering of the Merrimack until she got alongside of her. The proof
of that is that the Merrimack fired at her all day and put twelve shots right
through her, and did not destroy her.
By the chairman :
Question. What is the ca|ibre of the guns of the Merrimack ?
Answer. She has three 9-inch guns on a side, and has a rifled gun at each
end, which is said by them to be a 100-pounder.
Question. What is the calibre of the guns of the Minnesota ?
Answer. She has 9-inch guns, the same as the Merrimack, with a pivot
10-inch gun. The gun of the Monitor is 11-inch calibre. This matter of
iron-clad vessels was brought up by the department a year ago, and Oon-
fress was asked for an appropriation of $50,000 in July to test the different
inds of plating, which was refused. We went to the President and he held
a meeting at General Scott's office, and we were authorized to go ahead, without
waiting for Congress, and make these iron plates. But when we came to
call for proposals, which we did without authority from Congress, we ran
against this difficulty — that there was a limit to the making of these vessels-
There is no preparation for making the plates in this country, except by
forging them, which is altogether too slow and tedious fer the necessity.
There is but one rolling mill in the country that can make the plates by
rolling, and that is the one that made the plates for the Monitor. You can
plate vessels with railroad iron, as the Merrimack has been plated, and you
TESTIMONY. 417
might make a half a dozen Monitors, but then you run aground. All nations
have become satisfied of the value of these iron-plated vessels, and the
agents we sent abroad six months ago found that all the establishments
there were engaged to their utmost, and consequently they found difficulty
in obtaining any plates at all.
Question. Is it possible to take this Merrimack by boarding ?
Answer. No, sir. She has a sloping roof of 45 degrees, covered with
tallow as thickly as it can be put on. You could not climb up her sides,
which are on the slope some 15 or 16 feet, I should think, the only flat por
tion being in the centre. There is no possibility of boarding her, or of
heaving shot and shell down, her smoke stack, as has been proposed. There
is no way of taking her except by running her down, except it be by a fight
between her and the Monitor, which would be like a contest between knights
in the tournaments of olden times, where each was incased in armor, and
the result depended mainly upon the quality of the armor.
By Mr. Wright:
Question. What is the comparative speed of the Merrimack and the
Monitor ?
Answer. The Monitor is a little the fastest; not much, but still enough to
enable her to keep clear of the Merrimack. There is no way for those two
but to lie close to each other and fire under this armor. The captain of the
Monitor thinks he did put a shot into her right under the water's edge. As
she retreated she sagged down aft, showing that she had got a leak. But
as she steamed off she showed that she had her machinery all right. My
impression is that she is now shifting her guns for the heaviest guns in the
southern confederacy.
By the chairman:
Question. Did it ever occur to the Navy and the War Departments, before
this Merrimack was prepared, to see whether it was not well enough to take
Norfolk, shipping and all ?
Answer. The matter of taking Norfolk has been talked over a great deal.
The movement of Genera].' Butler taking Newport News was in reference to
the ultimate possession of Norfolk, The President at that time was very
much in favor of it, and it was believed that it could be done without any
difficulty. I think there is a memorandum here from General Butler, dated
some time in the latter part of May, when he was down there, setting forth
the feasibility of capturing Norfolk.
Question. How came that to fall through ?
Answer. That I could not say. The matter was presented to General
Scott. I can give you my impression about it.
Question. Do so, if you please.
Answer. My impression is that the panic in regard to Washington that
occurred after the battle of Bull Run blocked this enterprise as it seemed
to block every other enterprise that was proposed elsewhere. General
Butler had at one time got as high as 11,000 men down there, and they
were still sending troops to him until this panic here, when they were all
taken from him except some 4,000 or 5,000 men.
Question. The ghost of Bull Run was in the way.
Answer. Yes, sir; and it also put off DuPont's expedition two or three
months. We could get no soldiers after that for any of our expeditions.
Question. If I understand you in regard to the condition of the Roanoke,
she had her shaft broken, and the Navy. Department set about repairing it
with as much expedition as they could ?
Answer. It was done by telegraph the same day we heard of it.
Part iii 27
418 TESTIMONY.
Question. And the difficulty was finding an establishment not already
engaged that was competent to undertake the work ?
Answer. Yes, sir; it was estimated that two months would be all that
would be necessary for the work under ordinary circumstances. Orders
were at once given to contract for the shaft, but we found great difficulty
in getting anybody to take hold of it. We went to parties and begged
them to undertake the job; and everyone refused but one establishment,
who said they would forge the shaft but would not turn it. Now, turning
requires as much time, if not as difficult a job, as forging it. Having no
one in the whole country to do that, we had to take it to the New York
yard, where there was no adequate machinery to do such an enormous piece
of work. After the making of some machinery for the purpose, the work
was commenced, and it is now about completed.
Question. You were at Fortress Monroe during the action ?
Answer. I was there the second day.
Question. What is your opinion in regard to the ability of this Monitor to
cope with the Merrimack?
Answer. Well, sir, it was an uneven fight, but the Monitor has proved
herself a little the superior. But then you must consider that the Merrimack
had got a tremendous pounding the day before from the Cumberland. The
Cumberland dismounted one of her guns, injured two others, and shook her
plates all over her. The Monitor fought under very great disadvantages.
She had been three days coming from New York, and the pipe that brought
fresh air down into her hold was not high enough to keep the sea out, and
had to be closed, so that they were almost suffocated. They had but little
sleep, and got there at half-past ten at night, and at once Went to work
to prepare for action, and went into the action the next morning at eight
o'clock with a vessel entirely novel to everybody on board. They had had
but very little drill, and were not w ell acquainted with each other, and
deserve very great praise for going right into the midst of the rebel vessels
and attacking them as they did. When the rebel vessels moved down upon
the Minnesota, on Sunday morning, as she was lying there helpless, this
little thing pushed right off in the midst of them, when she soon disappeared
in the smoke. The next that was seen, everything was running away from
her, except the Merrimack.
Question. What is the size of the Monitor compared to that of the Merri
mack ?
Answer. In tonnage she is about one-fifth the size of the Merrimack. She
will be handled the next time with a great deal more rapidity than she was
this time. But the Merrimack has got warning of the customer she has to
deal with, and they will resort to every means they have to render them
selves more formidable. The engines of the Monitor are now being increased
so that with them they can get a knot and a half more speed out of her.
Even now she can be handled more easily than the Merrimack.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. Why did not she follow the Merrimack ?
Answer. She was disabled herself, and it was not known to what extent.
The pilot-house is only a log-cabin of iron logs twelve inches thick. The
man who was steering and the captain were standing in the pilot-house,
looking out, and one of the rifle shots struck right in front of his eyes. It
broke one of the 12-inch logs of iron, and threw down the plate, and disabled
the captain. It was feared his eyes were gone entirely. The more vul
nerable part of the vessel being apparently very much injured, they hauled
off to see what the damage was. The Merrimack hauled off too, and went
off up to Norfolk. My impression is that but for that unfortunate shot, dis-
TESTIMONY 419
abling the captain, in whom the crew had great confidence, he would have
demolished the Merrimack entirely. She was evidently leaking very badly
when she went off, while the Monitor, except the damage to that pilot-house,
was entirely uninjured.
By the chairman:
Question. What is this pilot-house ?
Answer. It is a square house of iron logs twelve inches through. One of
the logs was broke, the plate was thrown out of place, and they did not
know but what the next shot might knock the whole thing off, and then it
would be gone. I told Mr. Ericsson that he ought to make it round, but he
thought it was strong enough to resist any shot. They are now building
an inclined wood-work of heavy timber around it and covering it with iron.
That was probably completed day before yesterday. Mr. Ericsson was told
about making it round, but he said no balls could break it, and it did not
break but one piece. We have ordered Mr. Ericsson to go ahead and build
six ILOFO as soon as he possibly can, and they will be great improvements
upon this one, and carry 15-inch guns.
Question. It was said that cast-iron instead of wrought-iron shot were
used, for fear the latter would burst the guns.
Answer. That is true. The wrought-iron shot weighs 185 pounds, and the
cast-iron shot about 169 pounds, and as those shot did not break on the
Merrimack there was no advantage in using the wrought-iron shot.
Question. They did not break ?
Answer. No, sir; they glanced off.
Question. We understood that upon the trial the cast-iron shot broke ?
Answer. So it will when fired against a perpendicular wall. These 11-
inch guns are shell guns, and 85 or 86 of the wrought-iron shot make the
weight of the gun. It is not safe to fire from a gun a shot of more than
one one hundred and fiftieth part of the weight of the gun; if the gun should
burst in there we would lose the vessel, and it is too great a risk to under
take. The officer in command of her now, one of the most excellent officers
in the navy, told me down there that at the last pinch he thought he should
put in a wrought-iron shpt. But Captain Dahlgren yesterday received a
letter from him in which he wrote that, upon thinking the matter over, he
had concluded that it was too great a risk to do so. Captain Dahlgren
has sent him down a brown shot, which weighs no more than a cast-iron
shot, and will not crumble; the two have been tested with a steam trip
hammer, and while the cast-iron shot at one blow was broken all to flinders,
nine blows of the trip-hamrner only crushed the brown shot. These guns
are intended to fire shell mostly, and are not constructed for solid shot —
though solid shot are fired from them sometimes when occasion demands it;
but when we do so we are not sure but the gun will give away at any
moment, and that would probably blow the tower off.
Question. You say you were expecting the Merrimack there some time
before she came out ?
Answer. When Commodore Goldsborough came back I heard him remark
to Captain Van Brunt, "I only got your letter a day or two ago, in which
you write that you were sick and tired of waiting for the Merrimack, and
hoped she would come out."
Question. They thought they were able to cope with her ?
Answer. I have no doubt we could have done so, but for the fact that she
took us at a disadvantage when the tide was low, and we had no steam-
tugs ready. The Secretary of the Navy has written down to Commodore
Goldsborough to inquire what directions he had given, and what had been
neglected on the part of the officers he had left behind. All I know is that
420 TESTIMONY.
the commodore remarked to me that he had given orders that those vessels
at Newport News should never be left without a tug to manage them, should
the Merrirnack 'come out.
Question. They were left without those tugs ?
Answer. So I understand.
Question. Who was in fault in that ?
Answer. The senior officer down there, in the absence of Commodore
Goldsborough, is Captain Marston, of the Roanoke.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. Have you ever ascertained the force of the enemy at Norfolk ?
Answer. I was told at Old Point that they bad 15,000 men at Norfolk,
and it was believed 18,000 men on the York peninsula.
By the chairman:
Question. Do you think of anything else material that you desire to state ?
Answer. I do not know that there is, except that 1 do not think we have
been sufficiently alive to the power of these iron-clad vessels. And I think
that both ourselves and the country at large have got a lesson that we
have needed. I am willing to take my share of it. I do not know how we
should have got it but for this affair — as it terminated. If we had been
successful we should have slept in fancied security for the next twenty-five
years, but for some such disaster hereafter.
Question. Is the Merrimack a sea-going vessel ?
Answer. No, sir. It is utterly impossible for her to go to sea,
'Question. What is your opinion of the European iron-clad vessels ? Are
'they sea-going vessels ?
Answer. It has been denied that the Warrior is a sea-going vessel But
fl -see that Lord Paget, one of the admiralty, has stated in Parliament that
the reports of her commander speak of her in the highest terms of praise,
. saying that she behaved perfectly in the most terrific weather. They are
i laying down a large number of these vessels, and are laying down vessels
very similar to this one of ours; that is, vessels with cupolas, circular
.towers.
Question. Is this vessel, the Monitor, different from their ships ?
Answer. Entirely.
* Question. She is a new invention ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; she is a perfect mechanism throughout.
Question. Did you say they were building the like of her in Europe ?
Answer. This revolving tower is nothing new. It has been experimented
'upon in England for a year and a half, and was found to answer admirably;
but it was believed* by them that it could not be turned at sea. But there
is nothing in the experiments abroad, that I have seen, that indicates a
•vessel similar to Ericsson's. His vessel, as against cannon now used, is
absolutely invulnerable.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. What would be the effect of one of these fifteen-inch solid shot
mpon her?
Answer. It would probably knock her all to pieces ; that is what we will
come to at last; we will probably go on until we have guns that will throw
shot of a ton weight, until we shall have guns so large that no vessel can be
built that will be protected against the shot. A fifteen-inch solid shot would
knock the tower of the Monitor all to pieces. This one hundred-pound bolt
that struck the tower went four and a half inches into the solid iron, and left
the. head of it sticking in there.
TESTIMONY. 421
By the chairman :
Question. Did the bolt break ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; all except the head, which was left sticking in. If
it had been a steel bolt it would, probably, have gone right through.
By Mr. C handler :
Question. It was a. rifled shot?
Answer. Yes, sir ; they all have a brass fuse in the end. We found the
one belonging to this shot. The Monitor was struck twenty-three times,
and this was "the greatest indentation that was made.
Question. What is the reason you cannot mount one of these 15-inch
guns in the tower ?
Answer. It can be done. We have a fifteen-inch gun at Hampton Roads,
which could be fitted in there if the tower had been made in Mew York
especially for it, but the tower now would have to be all taken apart to get
it in. They are going to make all the others for fifteen-inch guns, and have
the towers twelve inches thick ; this one is seven inches.
By the chairman :
Question. How long do they suppose it will take to get these vessels out ?
Answer. It will take four months to get the first one out, but if we can
get rid of this Merrimack with this little Monitor, they would have no hesita
tion in taking the Monitor right into Charleston.
Question. Have we any more iron-clad vessels ?
Answer. We have another nearly ready; it will be ready in about ten days.
Question. Where is that ? In Boston ?
Answer. No, sir ; in Mystic, Connecticut.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Those now being built are different from this Monitor ?
Answer. Yes, sir. The one at Mystic is more like an ordinary vessel,
plated with iron, with masts, to go to sea with a crew. It is not invulnerable
as the Monitor is.
By Mr. Wright :
Question. What is the cost of the Monitor ?
Answer. She cost the government $275,000, and the builders say they
have lost $25,000 on her. These vessels can be stopped from going into a
harbor by stretching ropes or seines across, for the propeller would suck
them right in, and get them all wound around it, and would have to go into
dock to get cleared of them. I suggested to Mr. Ericsson to enclose his
propeller entirely in an iron netting with large meshes, which would pre
vent any such thing as that.
PROTECTING REBEL PROPERTY.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, June 16, 1862.
On motion of Mr Wilson the following preamble and resolution were adopted :
Whereas a communication, dated Front Royal, Virginia, June 7, 1862, was
published in the New York Tribune of June 14th instant, containing the fol
io wing statements and charges, viz :
422 TESTIMONY.
" During the week our men suffered severely. I never before knew what it
was to be without shelter for days and nights in a terrible storm, without food
and without the means to procure it. Men and horses were completely ex
hausted. Although the storm is now over, the sun shining, and everything
presenting a cheerful appearance, we are even yet unable to procure the neces
saries of life for man and beast, while there is plenty here belonging to the
rebels in arms, carefully guarded by our own men, but no one permitted to take
a particle. I do know where there is a commissary store belonging to the rebels,
very near our late camping ground, with corn, bacon, &c., which our commis
saries were not permitted to touch, but which was carefully guarded by our own
soldiers, while our own division was in great danger of mutiny by reason of
starvation. Rebel corn can be procured here in abundance, and also bacon,
flour, &c. Yet our orders are that it shall not be touched. Now, if I were in
my own sweet home, and would read of such warfare here in this hot-bed of
treason, I would not believe it. But I ain here and see it for myself, and I
affirm that it is true. Nor is this all. I believe that the 160 rebel prisoners
confined here are now better fed and cared for than our own brave soldiers.
Almost every rebel house in Front Royal is guarded by our soldiers, while the
inmates freely express their contempt for our government, and some of them
demand nothing less than gold and silver, and enormous prices, for their bread
and meat. In a word, everything that can be done for the benefit and comfort
of our enemies seems to be done, while our own soldiers must put up with what
they get, which is about half rations, little or no shelter, and forced marches
through storm and mud, day and night." Therefore be it —
Resolved, That the select committee on the conduct of the war be instructed
to make inquiry of and concerning the truth of said statements and charges,
and report to this House as soon as practicable the result of such inquiry, with
such recommendations in the premises as in the judgment of the committee the
public interests may require. And if said allegations be true, that the committee
report to this House the name of the commanding officer of such troops.
Attest :
EM. ETHERIDGE, Clerk.
WASHINGTON, July 21, 1862.
B. H. MORSE sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army 1
Answer. I have no rank, though I am called major. I have been in the
government employ since the first day of April last, in the valley along the
Manassas Gap railroad. My business has been the collecting of and sending
in to the government abandoned rebel property all through upon the line of
railroad commencing at Manassas.
Question. State what you have been doing ]
Answer. I have been collecting abandoned rebel property. In the first place
I collected all the property that could be got hold of, that was left there by the
rebels when they evacuated that place.
Question. Under whose orders have you been acting ?
Answer. In the first place I was acting under the orders of Colonel Baker,
the special agent of the War Department ; and after he got through I acted
nnder the order of Captain Ferguson, quartermaster.
Question. Under whose orders was Captain Ferguson acting ?
Answer. Under Quartermaster General Meigs. I have taken this ground.
TESTIMONY. 423
as I have been upon that line of railroad, under instructions, wherever I found
a farm that was abandoned, or the property simply left in the hands of an
overseer; or, as was the case in many instances, a negro would be left upon
the place, and all the property would be left in his charge, while the owner
was in the southern army, my instructions have been to take that property and
send it in to the government ; horses, cattle, sheep, hogs, grain, personal property.
In most cases, where we find property in that situation, if it is left long it is all
taken away and scattered, so that we can get nothing. If we could get at it in a
short time after the army has left we could sometimes get pretty large amounts.
A Captain Fletcher, who lives very near Upperville, was killed at the battle
of Front Royal. I visited his place, after consulting with General Geary, and
found Go head of cattle there and 800 bushels of wheat, and various things, all
amounting to some $3,000 or $4,000. And I was about to visit the place of
John A. Washington, who was killed in battle some time ago. His wife is
dead, and his property is left in the hands of an overseer there. But I received
a summons from General McDowell to report myself at Manassas, at his head
quarters there. I reported to him immediately, the day before yesterday. He
took the ground that all property that was left in the hands of an overseer, no
matter whether a white man or a negro, the government should not touch ; and
that if they called for a guard they were to have the property protected. He
requested me to desist from any further operations until I had seen him further
about it, in the course of two or three days ; so that my operations now in
that neighborhood have ceased. I have a drove of cattle coming in from there,
which I took, and which will, probably, be in to-night. I think, 108 head. I
have been very careful, and endeavored not to touch any property unless it
was in such a situation that there could be no question about it.
Question. You mean the property of rebels ?
Answer. Yes, sir, abandoned rebel property ; the property of those who are
voluntarily in arms; those who have accepted office under the southern con
federacy, or who have been fighting against us.
Question. Have you been acting under these instructions : that, wherever you
found that parties had left their property and gone into the rebel service as
officers, arid have left their property in charge of overseers, you have taken it
for the use of the government'?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you keep an account of the property taken ?
Answer. Yes, sir; and if any of the parties require receipts — that is, the
heirs of the property, for instance — I give receipts in the usual manner, to be
accounted for after the close of the war, if they prove their loyalty.
Question. And your instructions from General McDowell prohibited your
pursuing that course any further until further orders ?
Answer. He stopped me ; but the quartermaster under whom I act thinks I
ought to go on and perform my duty the same as I have done. There is a very
large amount of property in that section. It is a rich country, and there is
any quantity of grain there.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Is there enough there to feed our army ?
Answer. There is enough there to feed any number of men; and it is a great
temptation to the enemy to come back there and possess themselves of that prop
erty, if for no other purpose; and I am satisfied they will attempt to do so, if they
are short of food where they are. The secessionists who live there are very
sanguine that will be done, I can assure you. The Union people who live in
Front Royal, and in that vicinity, are moving their families away from there
because they do not dare to live there now. Three families came down on the
train that I came down on yesterday ; they dare not stay there any longer.
424 TESTIMONY.
The residents there say that Jackson will very soon be back there, within a very
few days, surely ; and that, too, seems to be the opinion of the officers and
soldiers with whom I have talked.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. That he will come back ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Do you think of anything else you can communicate to us in con
nexion with your operations, except what you have already stated ?
Answer. I can only state what I have seen through the lines. There is very
great dissatisfaction among the Union people, and among our officers and men,
with the course pursued by General McDowell in that section of country 1
Question. In what respect ?
Answer. They say that he presses very hard upon the Union portion of the
community, not fearing to tax them to any extent as he passes through, while
he protects the property of rabid secessionists there. That is the general speech
of the people there. There seems to be but one opinion about it.
Question. Do you know, of your own knowledge, in relation to it, whether
that be true or not 1
Answer. I do not know except what people have told me, because I have not
come in direct connexion with General McDowell, except in regard to my own
matters.
Question. Do you know of the property of General Ashby being protected
there, day and night 1
Answer. I stayed at that house three nights ago. That property has now all
been taken away and scattered. There were but four head of cattle there, which
I took possession of, or left directions that it should be done.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Do you know where that property has been taken ?
Answer. By the soldiers and people who have been along there.
Question. By our soldiers or theirs ?
Answer. By our soldiers, who happen to get at it. This very property which
General McDowell pretends to protect as he passes through, after his army is
gone, is taken by irresponsible persons, who step in and take it, and use it as
they think proper.
Question. What do you mean by "irresponsible persons?"
Answer. I mean persons who have no business to take it. Our own soldiers
do it as well as Jackson's soldiers.
Question. Jackson forages for his army as he goes along 1
Answer. Yes, sir. I know he does, because he took a large amount of prop
erty during his late raid up there.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. He has no heavy trains with him ; does not haul his supplies with
him?
Answer No, sir.
Question. Were you there at the time that General Geary fell back 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What do you know about the amount of property destroyed on
that retreat ? >
Answer. The amount that was destroyed was by the 104th New York regi
ment at Broad Run. I did know something near what was destroyed there.
The value of the property was less than $3,000.
TESTIMONY. 425
Question. Do you know anything about new cases of arms or guns being
destroyed ?
Answer. I was told at the time that there was something like twenty guns
destroyed there that had been condemned.
Question. Was there any occasion, so far as you could see, for the destruction
of that property ?
Answer. There was no occasion, in my opinion. General Geary himself told
me that the train was there long enough for them to have loaded everything on
the train, and he felt very bad that that was not done. His own regiment had
everything prepared, and they saved everything on that retreat. This other
regiment came in there, and was not under his command over ten hours.
Question. Was there any occasion for a retreat at all ?
Answer. That I do not know. I supposed it was done under orders. I sent
teams myself from Manassas up to Gainesville to get all the baggage of the
12th Pennsylvania cavalry, who were stationed all along there, and bring the
property down for fear there might be something left.
WASHINGTON, July 2, 1862.
Captain FREDERICK MYERS sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What is your position and rank in the army 1
Answer. I am in the quartermaster's department, with the rank of captain.
Question. Under whom have you been serving of late ?
Answer. Since the 16th of April last I have been serving under General
McDowell, as chief quartermaster of the department of the Rappahannock.
Question. Do you know the course of policy pursued by General McDowell
in relation to the property of rebels in that department ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; in a great measure, since I have been with him.
Question. Will you state to the committee what it has been, so far as you
know ?
Answer. His instructions to me have been always to take what property the
government required, giving receipts to the proprietor, to the effect that such
property had been taken • and to allow no person to take it except regularly
authorized agents of the quartermaster's and commissary's departments.
Question. Wherever you have found rebel property which was needed for the
army, in such quantities that you could take a portion of it, arid still leave the
owners enough to provide for their present subsistence, has that property been
taken ?
Answer. Yes, sir; and at times we have exceeded that. On one occasion,
I now recollect, I was forced to give orders to take the property, where we
were not leaving enough to feed the family there ; but I promised that if I
could I would return a portion to them. It was 100 barrels of corn ; and the
man begged me not to take it ; but I had to take it.
Question. Have you known of any instance where corn, or grain of any kind,
in large quantities, has been guarded for a time by our troops, and then left in
the possession of the rebels 1
Answer. No, sir. I know of but two cases where there was any large quan
tity, and that has been taken. I mean by large quantities, 3,000 or 4,000
bushels.
Question. I mean where there has been any considerable quantity, more than
enough for the subsistence of the family ?
Answer. Xo, sir; I do not. I know of no protection, except to growing
426 TESTIMONY.
crops that we might want ourselves. In such cases, and for that purpose, we
have tried to save the fences. The understanding was with General McDowell
and myself, and, I believe, with his officers, that we might need those growing
crops ourselves, and that we better save them. The grass and clover we did
not view as growing crops, and we used them wherever we found them ; and
the fences around the fields also, when we required them.
Question. How long were you at Fredericksburg ?
Answer. I thing we arrived there on the evening of the 22d of April, and we
left there about the 23d or 24th of May.
Question. Who was the military governor of Fredericksburg ?
Answer. General Patrick.
Question. Was he military governor all the time you were there 1
Answer. I will not be certain. That information does not come in my office
exactly. I think that when we expected to move on Richmond, the order was
for General Doubleday to relieve General Patrick. That, I think, was either
the day we left there, or the day previous. Whether or not he did relieve
General Patrick, I do not know.
Question. Do you know what was done in pursuance of that order ?
Answer. I do not.
Question. Do you know whether General Doubleday ever took up his quar
ters in Fredericksburg?
Answer. I do not.
Question. Do you know whether or not General Patrick, after General Double-
day had been ordered to relieve him, resumed his position of military governor
there ?
Answer. Not unless he has done so since he went back there again. He went
back, I think, a week or ten days ago.
Question. Do you know whether General Doubleday ever acted as military
governor of Fredericksburg 1
Answer. I do not know it personally. I heard that he was left behind as
governor.
Question. You do not know how long he may have acted as such military
governor ?
Answer. No, sir ; I do not. The understanding was that he was to be mili
tary governor when General Patrick should leave ; and when General Patrick
did leave it was supposed that General Doubleday was military governor.
Question. During your service under General McDowell did you observe any
disposition or desire on his part to protect rebel property for the sake of leaving
it again in the possession of rebels?
Answer. No, sir ; I never saw anything of that kind.
Question. Do you know what his orders have been in relation to restraining
the soldiers under his command from committing depredations ?
Answer. I could not tell you the wording of the order ; it was an order in
which he said they would be severely dealt with for anything of the kind.
Question. Are those orders any more stringent than are necessary for the
wholesome police regulation and discipline of the army 1
Answer. No, sir. I always supposed those orders were for the purpose of
promoting and preserving the discipline of the army, and that the proper men
in each department would take whatever was necessary.
Question. Will you state what you know with reference to what passed be
tween General McDowell and a Mr. Morse — a man said to have been acting as
an agent for the government in collecting rebel property ?
Answer. It was reported to me that Mr. Morse was taking rebel property of
all kinds. I saw him, or his agent, with a large flock of sheep ; and it was re
ported to the chief commissary, Captain Sanderson, that some of those sheep
had been disposed of. I asked who this Mr. Morse was, and was told that he
TESTIMONY. 427
was an officer in the employ of the government, in the quartermaster's depart
ment. I asked him to report to me personally, and he said that he was acting
under orders of Captain Ferguson, quartermaster. He showed me his orders,
and I took them in to General McDowell ; General McDowell read them, and
told me to direct Mr. Morse not to take any more property until he could com
municate with the Secretary of War, as he wished to know the operations of all
officers in his department, and the authority by which they were there. He
directed him to remain there until he could telegraph to the Secretary of War
about it. It was that same day that General McDowell got hurt, and I have
heard nothing more on the subject.
Question. Did you consider that the course pursued by this Mr. Morse was
irregular ?
Answer. In some cases I did. In the case of taking property and selling it
on the road — I considered that irregular. In one case where a horse was stolen,
taken out of a plough, it was taken to him, and, instead of its being turned over
to the government, I found it in the hands of a restaurant keeper.
Question. Had it been sold to him1?
Answer. I do not know whether it had been sold to him or not. I did not
make any inquiries about that. It was in the hands of a restaurant keeper,
who at first refused to give it up, but was directed to do so. I thought it was
very irregular for property to be taken in the name of the government and then
be sold to private individuals.
Question. Who is Captain Ferguson?
Answer. He is depot quartermaster at Alexandria. These things that were
sold did not belong to my department, but to the commissary department.
What was done with them I do not know.
WASHINGTON, July 15, 1862.
Colonel HERMAN HAUPT sworn and examined.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. What connexion have y*ou had with the army ?
Answer. I am a colonel on the staff of General McDowell, and chief of con
struction and transportation.
Question. When did your connexion with the army commence, and what
services have you rendered?
Answer. I was telegraphed about the 20th of April to come to Washington,
and was requested by the Secretary of War to see General McDowell, and un
dertake the reconstruction of the railroad between Aquia Creek and Fredericks-
burg, in order to facilitate some forward movements upon Richmond. I repaired
to Aquia Creek, where I had an interview wilh General McDowell, and learned
the position of affairs. I found that it was impossible for General McDowell to
advance until the road between Aquia Creek and Fredericksburg was recon
structed, and the bridges on the road rebuilt. All the bridges between Fred
ericksburg and Aquia Creek had been burned ; three miles of track had been
torn up and the rails transported below Fredericksburg; the cross-ties placed
together in piles and burned, and the wharf and buildings at Aquia Creek
burned to the water's edge.
I commenced operations as soon as possible — within two or three days ; I set
men at work in the woods to cut cross-ties, transported rails from Alexandria ;
worked night and day, using lanterns at night, and in three days reconstructed
the three miles of road, and in about two weeks completed the whole of the
428 TESTIMONY.
road and rebuilt the bridges from Aquia Creek to Falmouth, opposite Fredericks-
burg, so as to enable transportation to be commenced.
During all this time General McDowell was daily upon the work, urging it
forward with all possible expedition, and inquiring continually of me whether
he could in any way facilitate my operations; whether there was anything
which I needed that it was in his power to supply.
About the time of the completion of the road to Fredericksburg the greater
part of General McDowell's army was concentrated at Falmouth. At that
time, or about that time, Yorktown was evacuated, and arrangements had been
made by General McDowell, as was understood, with the permission of the
President and the Secretary of War, to commence immediately a movement
upon Richmond direct from Fredericksburg.
Question. What force had General McDowell at Fredericksburg at that
time, with which to move on Richmond?
Answer. His force exceeded somewhat 40,000, after General Shields's division
had joined him.
Question. Were you present at any interview between the President and
General McDowell, about that time]
Answer. About the 28th of May I was present at General McDowell's
headquarters ; the President, the Secretary of War, and I think the Secretary
of the Treasury, were there. In my presence General- McDowell remarked to
the President that Shields's division had joined him in very bad condition, out
of shoes, clothing, and ammunition ; that he would like very much to move on
Saturday, but that he could not possibly be ready on that day ; that Monday
was a little too late. He wished very much to move on Sunday, but knowing
the President's objections to these Sunday movements, he would prefer to ask
his advice in regard to it. The President said to him that he should make "a
good ready," and start on Monday morning.
On Saturday night the bridge across the Massaponax river, six miles below
Fredericksburg, which had been prepared for burning by the rebels for about
two weeks, was set on fire, they being apparently informed of our intended
movements ; and the rebels retreated, as was understood, to a distance of about
twenty-five miles below Fredericksburg. Anticipating this movement, we had
prepared a bridge ready to be loaded upon cars, which would be thrown across
a stream in a single day, or less than a day, by means of which we expected to
advance to a distance of twenty-five miles. Then by forced marches the whole
of the corps of General McDowell was to be taken to Richmond, where he would
be able to act in concert with General McClellan.
But on the Sunday after the visit of the President I received a message re
questing me to go immediately to headquarters. I complied at once. I found
General McDowell there very much depressed. He had just received orders to
take his whole force to Front Royal. He had replied to the President that it
would be impossible to accomplish the object proposed, the capture of Jackson,
and by attempting that he would lose an exceedingly favorable opportunity,
perhaps the most favorable opportunity they ever would have, of securing the
early fall of Richmond. But, nevertheless, he would, of course, obey orders,
unless those orders were countermanded, or something to that effect. The orders
were not countermanded, and the movement towards Front Royal was com
menced immediately.
I was requested by General McDowell to accompany him. I replied that I
could not immediately do so, without leaving the transportation in great confu
sion ; that I must first regulate the transportation, which would require a day
or two, and then I would be with him.
I joined him at Manassas, two or three days afterwards. I learned from him
that the bridges had been burned, and a portion • of the track torn up on the
Manassas Gap railroad. I sent for the construction corps, started the same
TESTIMONY. ' 429
night for Rectortown, constructed two bridges the next day, Friday, five more
011 Saturday, and reached Front Royal about Sunday noon, having reconstructed
the track on the mountains on Sunday morning.
During this time General McDowell had been using every exertion to for
ward his troops by forced inarches, and succeeded in reaching Front Royal, as
I understood from him, one hour before the time fixed by the President for
him to be there. When I reached Front Royal there appeared to be an engage
ment going on ; frequent discharges of artillery were heard ; and General Mc
Dowell was about 'moving out with his forces, expecting a general engagement.
He requested nie to hurry on the supplies and re-enforcements. I returned im
mediately on an engine, and on the same afternoon I put 5,000 troops into Front
Royal; but they were not needed, as Jackson had escaped.
Question. Had you any conveisation with General McDowell as to army
movements, and as to what was his policy ?
Answer. I had frequent conversations with him on the subject ; and he was
always a very decided advocate of vigorous and prompt action.
Question. Did General McDowell ever express any unwillingness to act
under, or in concert with, General McClcllan I
Answer. He always expressed a perfect willingness and a desire to act in
concert with him. He frequently said that he was willing to act in any capa
city whatever, provided something could be accomplished. His great desire
appeared to be to move forward and act in concert with General McClellan to
secure the fall of Richmond. That seemed to be his great desire, to press for
ward and hurry the fall of Richmond.
Question. Did you hear General McDowell say anything with regard to his
movement up to Front Royal ; that he had, for instance, so much further to
move than Jackson had to retreat that there was no chance to overtake him?
Answer. Yes, sir. He said it would be impossible for him to overtake Jack
son, as he (General McDowell) had nearly three times as far to advance as
Jackson had to retreat, and consequently there would be no possibility of over
taking him at that point. And again that it would be very difficult for General
Fremont and himself to effect a junction at the place and time designated. He
felt confident that Jackson would escape before he could, by any possibility,
get there.
Question. What, in your judgment, would have been the result of an advance
by General McDowell upon Richmond, at the time he had made his arrange
ments for such an advance ?
Answer. I have no doubt that Richmond would have been taken within a
very few days. General McClellan's army at that time was probably 50,000
stronger than it is at present, being now wasted by casualty and disease. Gen
eral McDowell's force was 40,000 strong, and in a very few days, probably in
three or four days, he could have been in front of Richmond ; and the two
armies, acting in concert with each other, would have either caused Richmond to
capitulate, or the rebels would have retreated, as on other occasions. We would
have obtained possession of the city in either case.
Question. What do you know about the protection of rebel property by order
of General McDowell ; what was his policy in regard to that f
Answer. I am able to speak confidently upon that subject, because I have
had frequent conversations with him about it. The instructions given by him
to his officers have been to take not only the property of rebels, but any property
that was necessary for the supply of the army ; but that in all cases it should
be done by proper authority. He never would permit individuals to straggle
over the country and plunder on their own account, robbing farm houses and
insulting citizens. He has extended protection to those who were defenceless.
Where quiet citizens have remained at home, attending to the cultivation of
1 their land, and pursuing their legitimate business, not in arms against the gov-
430 TESTIMONY.
eminent hi any way, if they have asked protection he has generally allowed a
sentinel to be placed in their houses ; one man, not a number of men ; one man
staying there during the whole time, not being relieved, so that the number
required for this service was very small.
Question. Do you know of his seizing any rebel property 1
Answer. A large amount of corn was taken along the line of the road between
Aquia Creek and Fredericksburg ; grain of different kinds. At Fredericksburg
we took possession of a foundry and machine shop, which was converted into a
repair shop for the use of the road and the repair of engines and cars. A track
was laid to it, and it was used for that purpose. He has never hesitated, that I
am aware of, to take any property which was necessary for the use of the army.
He gave orders to his troops that they should not tear down fences, and expose
growing crops of grain to destruction. The reason assigned for that was that
we would probably need that grain ourselves ; and if we starved the people
completely out, we would probably have to support them. In taking grain from
the inhabitants of the country, General McDowell directed that enough for their
support should always be left, and also enough for seed. But in very many
cases, after grain to that extent had been taken, leaving sufficient for the sup
port of the families, individuals belonging to the army have robbed the people
of everything that remained, leaving them without a particle of food. This
occurred in numerous instances that came under my own observation.
WASHINGTON, June 20, 1862.
General ABNER DOUBLEDAY recalled and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. Will you state, in your own way, as briefly as you can conve
niently do so, the course of conduct of our generals and officers in regard to
the protection of the property of rebels, and their treatment of rebels, so far
as our armies have gone, to the extent that the same has come to your
knowledge ?
Answer. Upon my arrival in Fredericksburg, to report to General Mc
Dowell for duty
Question. What time was that ?
Answer. About the 23d of May, I should think 1 received a long
lecture on the necessity of doing my best to conciliate these secessionists;
the people about there, who were said to be all secessionists. The general
told me with a great deal of pride and satisfaction, apparently, that he had
succeeded in guarding and protecting their property for a long distance
around there.
Question. The property of these rebels ?
Answer. Yes, sir; he said that there had been some little disorder, or that
some fences had been taken down by General Shields's brigade. I under
stood him to say that he would have Shields's brigade rebuild them, if he
was going to stay there. At that time he supposed he was about leaving
for Richmond. He said that he had sent men to repair all around the neigh
borhood every fence that had been taken down. He said he thought the
leading rebels were not quite as bitter now as they had been ; that they
acknowledged that he guarded their property better than it had been
guarded by their own troops; that there was better discipline among our
troops, and better guards around their property. He then directed me to
remain as military governor of Fredericksburg, and to guard the railroad,
while he went on to Richmond with his troops. He directed me to go over
TESTIMONY 431
and see General Patrick, who was then the military governor of Fredericks-
burg, and get from him such orders and directions as he had received, in
order that I might be posted as to the state of affairs before entering upon
the discharge of my duties. I went over to see General Patrick, but found
that he was absent.
Being over there, and my baggage and tents not having arrived, and as I
had to reside in the city of Fredericksburg, my duties being there, I inquired
if there was any house belonging to a noted secessionist who was absent,
fighting in the rebel army, that I could take for a temporary residence. The
residence of a Dr. Carmichael was pointed out to me as fulfilling those con
ditions. He was at Richmond, and his son was in the rebel army. They
had apparently abandoned the place. I went to the house, and found that a
woman, an interloper, had moved in the house the day before. She said she
had come there to take care of the property for Dr. Carmichael. I told her
that I was coming in there to stay a few days, and I thought it would be
more pleasant for her to move elsewhere. I told her to lock up everything
particularly valuable in one room, and take the key of that room with her.
She sent for her son, an Episcopal minister there, named Randolph. He
came and talked to us ; his mariner was very offensive ; he gave us to un
derstand that he was a rampant secessionist. He attempted to argue with
some members of my staff about our injustice, or something to that effect,
in bringing on this war. But they set him adrift very soon ; they gave him
some answers that did not please him. The next thing I knew I found that
this position of military governor of Fredericksburg was taken away from
me. I then left the house, upon finding that I was not to stay there, and
crossed the river to the north bank. After I had left the house, I received a
note from General McDowell, which I considered a very insulting one — or
rather it was from General King, but written by order of General Mc
Dowell — directing me to immediately leave that residence, and give it up to
Mr. Randolph, this secession minister. I mention this as an instance of the
power these secessionists seem to exercise there. I understood that he re
presented us as having pillaged the house, carrying off bedding, &c. I di
rected my men not to take anything away from the house, except some seces
sion arms and ammunition which I considered it dangerous to leave there.
In my interview with General Patrick to receive instructions, or rather to
obtain information — I will use that* expression — in regard to my duties as
military governor there, he informed me that there were some six or seven
of the principal men there who were very bitter secessionists ; that one of
them in particular, named Brandon, who lived out between the pickets of
the two armies, and who had been protected by us, had written several very
insulting letters to him. He stated that when our troops first came there
these leading men were very violent indeed in .their secession talk and lan
guage ; but he thought they had begun to be a little afraid now, and had
latterly quieted down somewhat in their expressions.
Question. Do you know anything about the detailing of our soldiers to
guard the premises of any of these secessionists ?
Answer. The soldiers, in many cases, have been utterly worn out with the
duty of guarding the premises of secessionists. I will mention one case
which will illustrate this matter. Two soldiers went up to a residence
where there is a pump or well of water, and asked for a drink. A young
woman came out, and, pointing to the canal full of dirty ditch water, told
them they might drink that ; and abused and insulted them very grossly,
calling them contemptible Yankees, and such narries. The soldiers went off
without making any reply. But a guard was immediately detailed and sent
to the house to guard the premises.
Question. By whose order was that guard detailed ?
432 TESTIMONY
Answer. By order of General Patrick, who was carrying out the orders of
General McDowell in the premises. The soldiers complain that while they
are doing this duty of guarding secession houses and property the secession
women insult them, drawing up their dresses as they pass them ; and that
they are obliged to listen to treasonable language, and the abuse of the
Yankees and their institutions.
Question. Is there any attempt to provide for the army, by foraging on
the enemy, or these secession people there ?
Answer. I do not know how that is. I captured very heavy amounts of
forage, which were concealed in places in town ; forage belonging to the
confederate army, which I thought might have been taken before, had there
not been such extreme delicacy about entering secession residences. I
would mention also, that although the secessionists whose farms are guarded
are apparently satisfied, yet, as you cannot guard everybody's farm without
consuming the entire army for that purpose, those whose farms are not
guarded are loud in their complaints, and the demands for sentinels to
guard the houses of these secessionists, in almost every case, come, not in
the form of a request, but in the form of exceedingly insulting demands.
Question. Is any regard paid to these insulting demands to have guards
detailed for that purpose ?
Answer. I did not pay any regard to them. I have understood, however,
that the}7 have been attended to just the same as the others. Among several
who came to me with such requests, a woman came to me, stating that her
husban'd and sons were in the rebel army, and demanded that I should im
mediately send up a guard to protect herself and property, not that any
outrage had been committed there, but because there might be. I know
that is the usual form in which they come ; that of insolent and insulting
demands.
Question. In your opinion, as a military man, could not the expenses of
this war be greatly diminished by treating these rebels as enemies, and
foraging our armies upon them as far as possible ?
Answer. Immensely diminished. I do not believe we can keep up the
war without doing that. I heard of immense flocks of sheep, belonging to
secessionists of the most violent character, within easy reach, which are
not touched, while we are paying for cattle from Pennsylvania and else
where, perhaps, to go down from Washington along the Potomac river. We
are guarding their property for them, very carefully guarding it, while they
are in the rebel army righting us.
Question. You say that we are extensively guarding the property of rebels,
while they are in the rebel army fighting against us ?
Answer. Yes, sir. And one of those secessionists — a classmate of Henry
A. Wise in college, a wealthy man, one of the leading men there — told me
that we might guard every rod of their property, and still they would guard
us just the same. It was stated to me that some of the market gardening
belonging to them which we had been guarding had been sent to their
friends in the rebel army at Richmond. We had kept a sharp watch over
it, to keep our soldiers from touching it, and that is the way they had
disposed of it.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. How did they treat your -men while on guard? Did they give
them anything to eat whije guarding their property?
Answer. In consequence of my having entered this secession house, all
my men were taken away from me and placed under the command of
another general. The men made very bitter complaints of their treatment
by these secessionists; but being outside of my command, I cannot tell
TESTIMONY. 433
about that. The men complained that the secessionists looked upon them
as so many hogs that had been put in the houses for a time; that the women
would draw up their dresses contemptuously as they passed them, and make
insulting remarks in their presence; and their food would be put out to
them as though they were some unclean animals that must be borne with
for a time. Those are the complaints of the soldiers; but they were soldiers
who were beyond my jurisdiction.
Question. You have no reason to suspect those statements of the soldiers
to be untrue ?
Answer. No, sir.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. What, in your judgment as a military man, should be the course
to be pursued by a general marching through the portions of country you
have marched through with General McDowell, with reference to the treat
ment of the people there, and with reference to the disposition made of any
property they might have which would be useful to our army ?
Answer. Our course should be, in the first place, to encourage Union men
and develop the Union element in the country. I have found in every place
where I have been about a certain proportionate number of prominent vio
lent secessionists, whom our army have been protecting and conciliating,
instead of punishing. I am satisfied that if such men as those should be
punished, the Union element would immediately develop itself. But the
Union men are now paralyzed by the power, wealth, and influence of these
secessionists, and their threats of future vengeance. I would not have
these secessionists received and treated as friends — dined and wined, and
having all requests coming through them; and have the power of this gov
ernment pass through their hands from us to the Union men. Whatever
authority was to be given should be given to the Union men. I would mete
out to these men the same measure they mete out to our men. They carry
off our men to Richmond, tying them to the backs of horses and mules, and
carrying them off in that way. For every Union man they treated in that
way I would take one or more of the most violent secessionists of the
neighborhood, and hold them as hostages. That course would protect
Union men. And if the property of Union men was destroyed by these
secessionists, I would destroy their property, or hold it responsible for the
loss. The Union men are continually haunted with the fear that as we do
not put our foot down firmly and remain there, but simply put it down and
withdraw it after a little while — they fear that the moment they develop
their Union sentiments they will become marked, and be liable to seizure
the moment we retire, and their property be left in the hands of their and
our enemies. I would prevent marauding by the soldiers, by sending out
mounted patrols on all the roads.
Question. Where you found grain and forage of any kind, what would
you do ?
Answer. I would take it without any hesitation. And instead of driving
down, at a heavy expense, herds of cattle from Washington, I would take
the cattle, and horses, and sheep there, and give the owners certificates. If
they are loyal men, they would get their pay; if they are disloyal men, they
ought not to be paid — or I would attach some condition, such as if they
become loyal by a certain time, and then continue loyal, they should be
paid.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. Are there sheep left there now ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Part iii 28
434 TESTIMONY.
Question. I supposed the rebels had taken all such things foraging for
their army.
Answer. We came upon Fredericksburg so suddenly that there were im
mense quantities of such things that they could not take off.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Do you find it to be true that the leading rebel men have been
the men who have been received with favor by our officers in command, and
preference given to them over men who are Union men ?
Answer. I think so. I think they have been courted for the purpose of
conciliation and keeping the country quiet. I find that the Union men have
not been regarded; that very little attention has been paid to them; that
they have been treated as people of very little earthly consequence; while
the others have been sent for and dined and wined and treated as people of
high consideration.
Question. What has been the effect of that course of conduct ?
Answer. The effect has been utterly to dishearten the Union men. They
say they will have to abandon all their property and leave their homes if
this thing is to go on.
By Mr. Julian:
Question. Has that course conciliated the rebels ?
Answer. Not in the slightest degree. As I have before stated, one of
them said to me that we might guard every atom of their property, and
still they would hate us just the same. They have their sons and brothers
in the rebel army, and are all fully committed to this rebellion. If we conquer
them, they sink into insignificance; if they succeed, they rise into promi
nence and importance.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Your opinion is that this rebellion must be conquered and not
coaxed down ?
Answer. We must whip them; that is the only thing for us to do.
WASHINGTON, June 20, 1862
Captain E. P. HALSTED sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am a captain, and assistant adjutant general on General Don-
bleday's staff.
Question. What facts have come under your observation touching the
manner in which rebel property is protected by soldiers of our army de
tailed for that purpose ?
Answer. One particular instance, which General Doubleday has omitted tc
state, is this: Seven men of the 76th New York regiment were posted some
six or seven miles down the river from Fredericksburg, away from the mair
body of the army, to guard the houses of four secessionists there, when, ii
case of any accident, they were liable to be cut off and captured. In regarc
to the protection of the property of secessionists there generally, I know
from observation, and from information received from reliable sources, tha
all that General Doubleday has stated is true. And, furthermore, I am w
formed by Major Livingston, of the 76th New York regiment, whohasbeei
TESTIMONY. 435
military governor down there for a time, that, for two weeks after General
McDowell commanded the town by his guns, the cars were running on the
railroad from Fredericksburg every night, as soon as their operations were
covered by the darkness, carrying off all the property they could get out of
town, in the way of grain, &c. I speak of this, as it might lead to further
investigation on your part. And I think Major Livingston might afford you
very reliable evidence on the subject. And for two weeks before the troops
were sent to the other side of the river to prevent any property from being
taken away, the markets were guarded very sedulously by our soldiers, and
their produce was sent off to Kichmond.
Question. Sent to Richmond ?
Answer. Yes, sir; sent to Richmond. This information I have from the
military governor; of course, I do not know it myself personally.
Question. Where is that military governor ?
Answer. He is down there yet. He has recently removed from town, and
is now doing duty with his regiment.
Question. By whose permission did you understand this to be done ?
Answer. I did not understand that it was done by any person's order, ex-
sept so far as the guarding of secession property, and the conciliatory policy
towards the rebels, have allowed it to be done. It has rather been permitted
than ordered.
Question. Did General McDowell know that these things were going on ?
Answer. I could not say that he did. When the secession mail was cap
tured by Major Livingston, it was some five miles from town, with a woman
and a man in a carriage driving it. One woman, whose husband is in the
rebel army, had a pair of Yankee-made boots which she was taking to her
husband. Those letters, which the Secretary of War has now, were con
cealed under this woman's clothes. She was brought back and searched,
and the letters taken from her.
Question. Do you know what were the contents of those letters ?
Answer. I read only a few of them. I glanced over some of them. I do
not recollect the contents of them well enough to state them, or much of
them. As far as I read them, they all concurred in this: that they had not
been insulted or abused by any of our troops; that the conducts in town
had been very kind to them.
Question. How far out are our troops ever detailed to guard rebel prop
erty ?
Answer. I do not know of any case where they are further out than in
that case I have already spoken of — some six or seven miles down the river.
Question. Has the detailing of men to guard rebel property been carried
.on to such an extent as to impede the operation of our forces there and to
weaken our army any ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I think every detail for such guard has a tendency to
'weaken the army. And since the general has been there, whenever parties
ihavo asked for a guard, they have said invariably that they were allowed a
guard by General McDowell, in every instance; and there have been a great
•many instances of their demanding a guard. They come as though they
Deemed it their right, and demand it.
Question. In your judgment, could not the expense of our army be im-
nensely reduced if we were to treat the rebels as enemies, and forage upon
hem?
Answer. Yes, sir; I think it could be. I am told that there are, between
he Rappahannock and Potomac rivers, thousands of bushels of grain stored,
md there are herds of cattle and sheep. And up to the time that Major
Livingston and General Doubleday were in command of the town, there has
)een in the town a large quantity of grain, the most of which General Dou-
436 TESTIMONY.
bleday seized. He did not believe in the policy of allowing it to be shoved
off to Richmond to support the rebel army. Now they may go anywhere
from the south bank of the Rappahannock and take all their produce to Rich
mond; and I understand they do it now.
There are one or two circumstances I would speak of in regard to
those captured letters. One of them, written by a lady to a friend in
Richmond, I think, speaks of a General G. who came to her house to eat
strawberries and cream; they discussed times less perilous than the pres
ent, and soon they found their hearts heaving deep sighs. She expressed
the hope that he would be the next military governor. We took it that the
reference was to General Gibbon, who, a few nights since, sent two of his
staff to the town to escort the Reverend Mr. Lacy to his tent, on the north
side of the river, to dine with. This Reverend Mr. Lacy, I understand, is
the brother of the Major Lacy who was captured the day that General Mc-
Call gave up the command there and left for Richmond. I refer to that to
show the feeling of some of our military officers, and as, perhaps, explain
ing this mild, conciliatory policy.
Question. Is this Lacy a secessionist ?
Answer. Yes, sir, notoriously so, and one of the most influential and bit
ter men in town.
. By Mr. Odell:
Question. Do you refer to the minister ?
Answer. Yes, sir, and to the other man also. The other man was one of
the most zealous secessionists. Whenever there was a town meeting held,
before the ordinance of secession was passed, Major Lacy was present, ex
horting the people to go for secession, so I am told there. He owns a ver^
large estate where General McDowell has his headquarters ; and on the
morning of the same day that Major Lacy was arrested, application was
made to General Doubleday for permission to arrest him ; stating that there
was information that he was about 10 miles out from town at his farm
house. The application, in writing, was sent to General McCall by an aid
of General Doubleday, and it was refused, with the statement that he
thought it was not worth while.
A day or two days before the arrest of Major Lacy, General McCall re
leased six prisoners, I think, in all; four of whom, we learned afterwards from
a captain of the 4th Pennsylvania cavalry, were at that time with theii
regiment again, (as he understood from one of his scouts) — the 9th Virginia
cavalry.
By the chairman:
Question. Released six prisoners to go back into the rebel ranks ?
Answer. He gave them liberty to go back into their own country again
and being soldiers of that regiment, they went back to their regiment again
That is the milk and water policy of conducting this war.
Question. Is there anything more you think of connected with the treat
ment of the rebels ?
Answer. I do not think of anything further. General Doubleday's state
ment was very full.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. When you speak of forage, &c., in Virginia, to what extent c
country do you refer ?
Answer. We have information extending —
Question. We do not want your information. What do you know ?
Answer. I know nothing about it, except this fact.
TESTIMONY. 437
Question. Do you know this fact, that General McDowell has fed his
xi my, since he started, upon the rebel grain and forage in the valley ?
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Is that so ? Do you know whether he has or has not ?
Answer. I know that he has not entirely.
" By Mr. Odell :
Question. Do you not know that he has to a great extent ?
Answer. I do not.
Question. Do you know that he has to any extent ?
Answer. I do.
Question. Do you know of his taking possession of large quantities of
^rain and forage, and giving the owners receipts for it, for the foraging and
ceding of his army ?
Answer. I do not know that it is so ; it may be so.
Question. Have you heard it was so ?
Answer. I heard that he did capture a large quantity of grain when he
irst went there. I heard that from the 4th Pennsylvania cavalry.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Tell us all you know about that, either from your own obser
vation or from what you have heard from others ?
Answer. Of course I know only what I have heard. I do not know it to
my great extent.
By the chairman :
Question. We want the general idea of how the thing is conducted?
Answer. Captain McRae, of the Freeborn, lying there at Fredericksburg,
;old me that he had information of large quantities of grain, as I have al-
•eady stated, between the Rappahannock and Potomac rivers.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Do you know anything — I do not mean from actual knowledge
nerely — as to what has been the course pursued by General McDowell in
•eference to that matter ? Whether, where he has found abundance of grain
vnd forage, he has guarded it and left it in the possession of the rebels, or
^nether he has seized it for the use of his own army ?
Answer. I have understood generally that he has not taken it for the
support of his army, but it has been guarded and then left.
Question. Where it was in large quantities ?
Answer. In considerably large quantities.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. How have you learned that ?
Answer. From different individuals ; officers of the army.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Can you tell us who can give us information upon that point ?
Answer. I heard it spoken of by Colonel Lord, of the 35th New York, for
one, and I have heard Major Livingston speak generally of these things.
By the chairman :
Question. Major Livingston was provost marshal there ?
Answer. He was provost marshal and military governor there. I do not
think of any others at this time. I do not know of a single foraging party
being sent out to forage, or anything of that kind.
438 TESTIMONY.
WASHINGTON, June 21, 1862.
Major JAMES H. TRIMBLE sworn and examined:
By Mr. Covode:
Question. Where do you reside when you are at home ?
Answer. In Westmoreland county, Pennsylvania.
Question. What is your position in the army?
Answer. Major of the 4th Pennsylvania cavalry.
Question. I understand you have been down in the neighborhood of the
Rappahannock, at Fredericksburg.
Answer. Yes, sir; I have. I came up from there, getting here last night.
Question. Will you state what you and your command have been engaged
in there ?
Answer. I have been engaged in scouring the country around between
here and there, and out beyond there.
Question. How far have you advanced beyond Fredericksburg ?
Answer. I do not rightly know. I think that at the time that Lieutenant
Martin captured this Major Lacy, he was out some eighteen or twenty miles
south and west of the city of Fredericksburg.
Question. Who is Lieutenant Martin ?
Answer. He is first lieutenant of company C, of the 4th Pennsylvania
cavalry ; a company that I raised myself.
Question. What force had Lieutenant Martin with him at the time he
made this dash and captured Major Lacy ?
Answer. When I send out scouts on such expeditions we generally take
men out of two or three different companies. He had with him some of
company C, a part of a company that your son, George Covode, brought into
the regiment, and a part of company A.
Question. Has your command (the 4th Pennsylvania cavalry) been made
use of to guard rebel property ?
Answer. Yes, sir; where we are encamped, or were encamped when I
came away, we were guarding a corn-crib of about 3,000 bushels of ears oi
corn. We had a guard right around it. It was right about the centre of
our encampment. And we had to guard that man's strawberry patch; he
was very much afraid that our boys would get over into it and destroy it.
And I had to guard his spring-house. And finally, about dark, he called
upon me for a guard for his house. Our horses were suffering, and I did not
like the idea of guarding that corn-crib when we needed the forage so much.
I had pushed about 300 head of horses through there for forty-eight hours
without a bite. I lost a splendid horse.
Question. When there was feed in plenty in the neighborhood ?
Answer. Yes, sir; but under General McDowell's orders we could not take
it; we must pay for everything that we take. We were bound to protect
property as we passed through. Our orders were very severe. I pastured
some horses once.
Question. Is there not a great unwillingness on the part of the soldiers
in our army to be used for that purpose ?
Answer. It is near about played out, I judge. The men have got tirec
of passing through the enemy's country and having to protect their prop
erty, and then be insulted by the women there; they are tired of it.
Question. Does this protecting their property do any good ? Does it gaii
their good will ?
Answer. Not a particle ; I do not see that it does a particle of good
Right above where we were there were some negroes cutting some whea
the other day, and some of the boys went up to get a little for their horses—
TESTIMONY. 439
a handful of wheat to give them a bite. Soon word was sent down, and I had
to send up a lot of men and arrest them and bring them back. We have no
hay; what little feed we get down there for our horses is oats.
Question. There is plenty of good pasture there ?
Answer. There are lots of good pasture — splendid pastures — there.
Question. And yet you have lost horses from starvation ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; they gave out on account of our work.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. You could get forage by paying for it ?
Answer. Yes, sir; but we have not the money to pay as we go along, and
there are numbers of them who will not sell to us at any rate. I have given
orders on the quartermaster's department for forage, where they would let
us have it; I have also turned my horses into a clover field, and given orders
on the quartermaster to pay for it.
Question. Did you not have to put men there to guard your horses ?
Answer. Yes, sir; there would be a corner cut off for me, and I had to
place men there to guard the horses.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Did you make a bargain to give them so much for that ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I told them what I would give them — about what I
thought it was worth.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. You fix your own price ?
Answer. Yes, sir; what I think it is worth.
Question. You took what you pleased ?
Answer. No, sir; I did not.
Question. Who limits you ? You are not allowed as you go along to feed
your horses in the fields and pastures wherever you please ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Are your orders such that you must let your horses starve to
death instead of doing that ?
Answer. Our orders are to protect the property as we pass through.
Question. So stringent that you cannot put your horses into the fields ?
Answer. Yes, sir. If we obey them strictly.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. Have you not had to take the property of professed Union men
because the secessionists would not sell you any of their property ?
Answer. I do not know as I have, because in that section of country I do
not know many Union men. On the other side of the Occoquau — about five
miles on the south side of that creek — I met with a man whom I took to be
a Union man, by the name of Joy. I think probably he is a Union man.
He has given us the privilege and not asked us a haet — given to my men
as far as he was able.
Question. You know this of your own knowledge, and you have yourself
had to give orders to our troops to go and guard this property ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Day and night ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. If it were not for these restrictions thrown around the property
of the rebels, could you not forage on the enemy, and support the army ?
Answer. Yes, sir. We could keep our stock and everything in first-rate
plight.
440 TESTIMONY.
Question. In your judgment, does the present mode of warfare in that
country tend to gain us the day ?
Answer. I never was an abolitionist, but still I think we must take other
measures if we would quell this rebellion.
Question. What do you mean — to use the negroes 1
Answer. Yes, sir. I would arm the negroes; give them arms, and let
them assist us.
Question. What do you know of organized guerilla parties of farmers
there ?
Answer. I do not know much about them. I have the names here of
some three men who were said to have been in the rebel army, and who
came home here a short time ago. They are now officers of a guerilla party
of farmers, of about 120 men. These men live in what is called the
" Maple Bottom Flats." I cannot tell just exactly where that is. There is
a railroad station on the railroad that runs up to Manassas called Lee
Station, and this guerilla party is made up of farmers in the section of
country around there. These three men are named John A. King, Mortrivel
Cornell, and William Lin. This William Lin is said to be the ringleader.
There is a man by the name of John Finch, who lives in that neighborhood.
He has a very nice farm there. He has had to leave his farm, and has lost
all his stock. And on last Saturday, I think it was, he was then leaving
there with a little two-horse wagon, into which he had put his family and
some few little things, and was coming up to the city here. Yesterday I gave
these names to one of the captains of Colonel Biddle's command down here
at Aquia creek, and told him I thought it would be well to send out a squad
of infantry into this neighborhood, as it would not be far, and have them
watch the manoeuvres of those men ; watch them both day and night.
Question. As far as you observed, is not the whole white population of
the country there turning guerillas — none of them at work ?
Answer. I cannot say that I have seen any whites at work there, without
it was some woman working in some little garden-patch. On the Rappa-
hannock all the work is done by slaves. I did not see any white men at
work there at all.
Question. Were they cutting their wheat there before it was ripe ?
Answer. It did not look to me to be near ripe. They were cutting it and
letting it lay in swathes.
Question. What do you think was their reason for cutting it so early ?
Answer. I think it was because they want to make use of it.
Question. Could you not seize that wheat now if you were allowed to do
so?
Answer. Yes, sir; I could.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. You say you are guarding a corn-crib which has about 3,000
bushels in it ?
Answer. Yes, sir; it is a large, common log-house.
Question. And you say that at the same time your horses were suffering
for want of feed ?
Answer. We have not feed enough. We have to draw rations (oats) now
from Fredericksburg, and we do not get as much as we should have.
Twelve pounds of oats, with no hay at all, is not enough to do horses for
twenty-four hours.
Question. What do you understand to be the intention in relation to that
corn-crib 1 Are you to leave it in possession of the rebel owners ?
Answer. Of course.
TESTIMONY. 441
Question. You do not understand that it is ever to be taken for the use of
our army ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. You understand that it is not to be taken ?
Answer. Yes, sir; that it is to be left there.
Question. Have you ever known of any instances where any corn-cribs,
or any kind of provender, of any description, in large quantities, have been
guarded and left ?
Answer. No more than what we have done ourselves.
Question. Have you guarded any such property for a while, and then left
it when you passed on ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. In large quantities ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do your instructions go to the extent of guarding this property,
and leaving it in possession of the rebels, when we need it for the use of
our own troops ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; that is our instructions ; to guard it and leave it. As
long as we are there, we are bound to guard it and protect it all.
Question. Your instructions extend to this extent: that you are not
allowed to pasture or feed your horses in the fields ?
Answer. Yes, sir; that is our instructions. I would take it in this way:
that, according to orders, we must protect all property as we pass along. I
look at it in this way: that if we turn our horses into a pasture field, we
are trespassing, not protecting it.
Question. You are disobeying orders ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you understand that to extend throughout the whole army ?
Answer. As far as our command, at any rate.
Question. Have you known of any instance where, by orders of superior
officers, property has been taken, such as grain, &c. ?
Answer. No, sir; we have not.
Question. You have known no such instance ?
Answer. I think we sent out a squad while on patrol duty in this city here,
pretty early in the spring.
Question. I refer to General McDowell's command.
Answer. No, sir; we have never taken anything in that way.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. I understood you to say that in some instances you go into a
field and forage your horses, and pay as you choose for it ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How do you reconcile that with your positive orders not to do
it?
Answer. I did that because my horses had given out; and I was obliged
to do it.
Question. Were you censured for it ?
Answer. I have had no report of it, at any rate.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. Have you bargained with parties for permission to do so ?
Answer. I turned my horses into one field without bargaining.
By Mr. OdelU
Question. Do you not feel competent to do that whenever necessity re
quires it?
Answer. I do not knowj we have to obey orders.
442 TESTIMONY.
Question. Do you not do it when necessity requires it?
Answer. I never did it, except in that one field.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. When you are passing by the corn of a secessionist, and you
are actually in need of that corn for your horses, do you feel that you violate
your orders to take it ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. When you set our soldiers to guard their strawberry patches, do
they ever give them any ?
Answer. I never heard the boys say they ever got any. And they know
very well that they dare not go and take any themselves; because if they
should, and it should be reported, they would be punished. That is our
orders; we are to punish them severely if they touch a haet. They must
protect what they are placed over to guard. If they do not do it, we punish
them severely.
WASHINGTON, June 30, 1862.
General IRVIN McDowELL re-examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
The following preamble and resolution were read to the witness:
" HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, June 16, 1862.
" On motion of Mr. Wilson, the following preamble and resolution were
adopted:
" Whereas a communication, dated Front Royal, Virginia, June 7, 1862,
was published in the New York Tribune of June 14, instant, containing the
following statements and charges, viz:
" 'During the week our men suffered severely. I never before knew what
it was to be without shelter for days and nights in a terrible storm without
food, and without the means to procure it. Men and horses were completely
exhausted. Although the storm is now over, the sun shining, and every
thing presenting a cheerful appearance, we are even yet unable to procure
the necessaries of life for man and beast, while there is plenty here belong
ing to the rebels in arms carefully guarded by our own men, but no one
permitted to take a particle. I do know where there is a commissary store
belonging to the rebels, veiy near our late camping ground, with corn,
bacon, &c., which our commissaries were not permitted to touch, but which
was carefully guarded by our own soldiers, while our own division was in
great danger of mutiny by reason of starvation ! Rebel corn can be pro
cured here in' abundance, and also bacon, flour, &c.; yet our orders are that
it shall not be touched. Now, if I were in my own sweet home, and would
read of such w'arfare here in this hotbed of treason, I would not believe it.
But I am here, and see it for myself, and I affirm that it is true. Nor is
this all. I believe that the 160 rebel prisoners confined here are now better
fed and cared for than our own brave soldiers. Almost every rebel house
in Front Royal is guarded by our soldiers, while the inmates freely express
their contempt for our government, and some of them demand nothing less
than gold and silver, and enormous prices, for their bread and meat. In a
word, everything that can be done for the benefit and comfort of our ene
mies seems to be done, while our own soldiers must put up with what they
get, which is about half rations, little or no shelter, and forced marches
through storm and mud, day and night.'
TESTIMONY. 443
"Therefore be it—
" Resolved, That the select committee on the conduct of the war be in
structed to make inquiries of and concerning the truth of said statements
and charges, and report to this house, as soon as practicable, the result of
such inquiry, with such recommendations in the premises as, in the judg
ment of the committee, the public interests may require. And if said alle
gations be true, that the committee report to this house the name of the
commanding officer of such troops."
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Are the statements embodied in that preamble true or false ?
Answer. Some of them are true, and some of them are false. It is true
that the men had little shelter after a forced march, and were very much
exposed. It is not true that they were without food, or without the means
to procure it. It is true that the men and horses were very much exhausted.
It is not true that they were unable to procure the necessaries of life for
man and beast. I do not know whether the writer of that knew where there
was a commissary store of the rebels. If he did, he knew more than I did.
I should think that is hardly likely to be true. I do not believe it is true.
It certainly is not true, if the one he says he knew was carefully guarded
by our own soldiers. I put no guard over a rebel commissary at all. He
says, •" Rebel corn can be procured in abundance, and also bacon, flour, &c. ;
yet our orders are that it shall not be touched." I will answer that soon.
He says, " I believe that the 160 rebel prisoners confined here are now
better fed and cared for than our own brave soldiers." I think that is very
likely. They were in a house, to begin with, and the citizens of the place
gave them things from their own houses.
Here is a report of the chief of the commissary department, in answer to
an inquiry as to whether or not the troops at Front Royal were at any
time without supplies from the government:
" Received June 28, 1862, from Manassas.
"12. 30 p.m.
" COLONEL: At no time that I am aware of were the troops short of subsist
ence at Front Royal. A wagon train and a railroad train arrived the very
day their requisitions ran out, and HartsufPs and Ricketts's brigades, and
Shields's division, were immediately supplied, through their commissaries, by
me in person, acting for Captain Willard, then acting as post commissary.
Bayard's brigade may have suffered, but from causes beyond our control.
"Bayard's brigade was not at Front Royal, but had gone over to Strasburg,
and were swallowed up in General Fremont's arnr^.
" I am under the impression the salt did not arrive with the other subsist
ence, but came up next day. At Fredericksburg, the provost marshal,
Colonel Gates, under direction of General Patrick, seized and turned to the
commissary about 500 bushels of corn meal, and 1,500 barrels of flour, for all
of which the proper certificates of indebtedness were tendered. At Front
Royal, to prevent speculation, I seized 367 barrels arid 19 sacks of flour
stored in Mr. Western's mill, of which I issued to the citizens (they paying
for the same to the miller or his agent) 34 barrels; the balance I turned over
to General Ricketts, who returned it to the owner. I have no official in
telligence, nor do I know of any other seizures, except by marauders in this
department.
" Respectfully,
"JAMES S. SANDERSON,
Captain, and Chief Commissary.
"Colonel E. SCHRIVER, Chief of Staff."
444 TESTIMONY.
I have answered generally as to this, that the troops were at no time with
out their full supply of subsistence, brought there by railroad or wagon
trains from Manassas to Front Royal. I did prevent the men from robbing-
houses. I will read my order on that subject, which, perhaps, may have
been one of the causes of this resolution:
" HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT RAPPAHANNOCK,
"Front Royal, Virginia, June 3, 1862.
"General Orders No. 18.]
" There has been, recently, so much irregularity on the subject of levying
contributions, and so much misconception on the part of many commanders
and their officers as to their powers and duties in this respect, that it has
become necessary to call the attention of all concerned to the subject, to the
end that the gross abuses which have been committed may cease.
"Paragraph 491, Army Regulations:
" ' When the wants of the army absolutely require it, and in other cases,
under special instructions from the War Department, the general command
ing may levy contributions, in money or kind, in the enemy's country occu
pied by troops. No other commander can levy such contributions without
written authority from the general commanding in chief.'
" This paragraph applies to domestic as well as to foreign enemies.
" No other commander than the general-in-chief of an army can levy con
tributions without written authority from such general-in-chief. Yet not
only do other commanders, but corporals and privates even undertake to
assume the power, without authority from any one. Such conduct is simply
pillage, theft, or robbery.
" When, in the judgment of the major general commanding, the wants of
the army under his command require it, he will exercise, as he has already
most freely done, this extraordinary power, and will prescribe fully by whom,
when, in what way, to what extent, and in what measure those contributions
shall be levied. The allowances of the government to the army, issued
through the quartermaster and subsistence departments, are to be obtained
by commanders, by requisitions on the proper officers of those departments;
and if they have not the supplies to meet those requisitions, they will apply
to their superiors in the department, and the articles will be furnished, if on
hand, if the requisitions be approved, or means will be taken to obtain them.
"No one has the right to take private property for public uses, except
those whom the major general commanding may authorize. Those who take
for private uses will be tried by a military commission for stealing.
" Commanders are especially enjoined to protect growing crops, and not
suffer them to be trodden down, save in cases of manifest necessity.
"No one has a right to enter private houses, and thus disturb non-com
batants — women and children.
" The above, without in any way wishing to seem even to interfere or
suggest to others the course to be pursued in respect to the subject here in
question, will apply to the troops of the department of the Rappahannock,
whether within or beyond the department limits.
"By command of General McDowell.
" SAM'L BRECK, Assistant Adjutant General."
The system which I pursued was to take flour, corn, or whatever was
necessary, and take it by the officers of the quartermaster's and commissary
departments, and issue it. But as a matter of economy in the use of sup
plies, and as a measure Of discipline, I would not permit men with arms in
their hands to go and take whatever they might deem necessary from houses
TESTIMONY. 445
along the roads. Troops that are allowed to do that soon become utterly
worthless.
It may seem hard to put men to guard property, but otherwise you must
pursue a course which will seem to be harder still. General Pope tells me
that out west they pursue a much simpler plan. They put men out on a
march as patrols, with orders to shoot every man who attempts to enter a
private house.
Generally, therefore, in regard to the letter embraced in this preamble, it
is not true that the troops suffered for the want of the ordinary supplies of
the government. It is true they suffered from the exposure to rains and by
forced marches. That is a kind of suffering incidental to the service they
performed; not from my own orders simply, but from what was required by
my superiors. That forced march was made without my wish and against
my judgment. But I carried out my orders as well as I could. It rained
and stormed all the while. The men went without their knapsacks, so that
they might move the faster; and they suffered accordingly. But they did
not suffer for want of food, unless it was through the neglect of their officers,
for the food was there.
The statement that I protected property is true I did it on principle.
And I think you can accomplish nothing in any military department without
you act on that principle. As a question of economy in the use of these very
supplies, as a question of discipline among the men themselves, you cannot
allow them to do as they please, and to plunder as they go through a country.
Question. What were your orders and instructions to your quartermasters
and commissaries in relation to supplies in the possession of rebels, where
they were found in abundance — where a man was found to have more than
was needed for the necessary subsistence of his family and those dependent
upon him for the time being ?
Answer. I gave orders at Fredericksburg under which we took largely
of flour and corn.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Belonging to rebels ?
Answer. I did not ask to whom it belonged, but took it wherever I found
it. I always found that whenever the men wanted to take anything from a
house, the owner was sure to be a rabid secessionist. I did not make a test
of administering the oath of allegiance, because I thought a scoundrel
might take it and a conscientious man might not. But I took what was
necessary for the service and gave a receipt for it, stating that the person
from whom the property was taken would be entitled to payment at the end
of this rebellion, provided he could prove that he had been a faithful and
loyal citizen of the United States from that time forth. I made but two or
three payments all the time. I paid one man, a very old man, who had
some grain which we took ; and I paid a poor man, a blacksmith, whose
only means of subsistence was the work of his shop. I needed the shop and
everything he had in it to shoe my horses. I took possession of his premises
and all the coal which he had, for which I paid him five dollars. There was
another case of a woman at Front Royal. I did not ask whether she was
a rebel or not, or whether she had rebel kindred in the army of the confede
rates. She was a widow woman, and had in her house some of our wounded
soldiers, and had shown every attention to them. That woman I paid for
what things I took from her. We took some bacon from- her, and, I think,
some corn and flour. I also gave her a safeguard — the second safeguard I
have given on the other side of the river. The other safeguard was given
to a northern man in possession of a mine on the other side of the Rappa-
hannock, who had suffered a great deal from guerilla parties, and who also
446 TESTIMONY
was suffering from some of our troops, for our troops strayed all over the
country. I tried to protect the growing crops. I tried to have the wheat
protected until it arrived at maturity; for whether we want it or not, or
whether it was for them, it was a thing that was desirable to be had.
Question. What do you mean by "if it was for them ?"
Answer. In that country the men are mostly gone; there are none but
women, children, arid negroes left behind. They must be fed. I fed a great
many hundreds of women and children there, who had nothing to eat and
came to me for assistance. I used to ask the negroes how they expected to
live. They would say that their masters had left them a little bacon and
corn. The next day, perhaps, I would find that the soldiers had been there
and taken what little bacon and corn had been left, under the general idea
that they were entitled to take what they pleased. If these people do not
get something to eat from their growing crops, we will have to feed them.
Therefore I looked upon it as a matter of principle that I should do what I
could to protect growing crops. I did not protect clover or pasturage; that
was used abundantly and freely.
Question. Did you in any cases protect large quantities of corn and other
articles of subsistence by our soldiers when our army was in the vicinity,
and then, when our army left, leave those articles in the possession of the
enemy ?
Answer. I know of no such case as that, except what I have just seen in
the letter of Captain Sanderson. I directed him to seize the flour in the mill
there. He writes that he did seize it, and turned it over to General Rick-
etts, who returned it to the owner. This is the first I knew of that.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Will you state to the committee exactly the course of conduct
pursued by you with reference to rebel property and the protection of the
rebels themselves in your late department of the Rappahannock ?
Answer. As to the rebels themselves, or their families that I found in the
country, (the non-combatants — the women and children,) I gave them all the
protection I could. As to the property that I found there which was neces
sary for the army, I caused it to be taken by the quartermaster or com
missary and issued to the troops ; causing it to be accounted for as prop
erty belonging to the government, or which the government had seized for
its own use, requiring a statement or receipt to be given ; which, I am very
free to say, I do not think was invariably done, though I tried to have it
done. The statement or receipt was given to the possessor of the property,
stating that he would be entitled to be paid for it at the close of this rebel
lion, provided that he shall show from that time forth he has behaved him
self as a loyal citizen of the United States. I have paid but three persons,
I believe, anything for what I have taken from them — the cases I have
already referred to. [After a pause:] I am not certain but there was
another case, that of the only Union man said to be in Fredericksburg — a
Mr. Clark, a northern man, who has since left and gone north. He was,
perhaps, paid for some supplies. I have taken a great many barrels of
flour, and thousands of bushels of corn, a great deal of pasturage, a great
deal of lumber, a large machine-shop, a foundery, quantities of forage, long
and short ; corn meal, beef cattle, &c.; and have taken, or authorized to be
taken, a quantity of horses by General Shields, and whatever other sup
plies he might need or find necessary on his trip up the Valley. That is
what I have positively done. What I have forbidden to be done can be seen
from my order, which I have read here.
Question. Have you in any instances caused to be protected large quan
tities of corn and grain of any kind, and left it in the possession of disloyal
citizens ?
TESTIMONY. 447
Answer. I am not aware of anything of the kind. I could with great
difficulty answer that question. I had a command which extended over a
great many square miles. I gave general orders, and what was done under
those general orders, I, of course, cannot tell. What may have been done in
one portion of the department under those general orders, I do not, of course,
know until the case is brought to my attention. It may be that this case is
the one that may have caused your inquiry. It is the case of property down
the Rappabannock, below Fredericksburg, of some property that was guarded
there, belonging to a Mrs. Grey. I had taken from her abundantly of corn;
reduced her stock of corn to as low a point as she could bear. I did not see
it myself. I sent down General Van Rensselaer to make examination of
two cases down there, alleged to be cases of great hardship — cases of women.
I have taken all but what is called the reserve corn — that which is necessary
to carry the family through until the next crop can be made available I
gave orders that the reserve corn should not be touched. I have taken a
great many barrels of corn from the place of Mrs. Grey. She was living on
the place with a large family, taking care of the place herself. I quartered
a regiment of cavalry on her place, almost around the house itself. They
took abundantly from her; but this reserve corn I ordered should not be
touched, because so much corn had been taken from her. I did take more
at last, and then representations came up to me that if more was taken they
would be left in a state of starvation; and I sent General Van Rensselaer
down to examine into the matter.
Question. Your directions were to leave that only which was necessary
for the subsistence of the family ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; that which was necessary to subsist them until they
could use their next crop. In that part of the country the farms are very
large : there are many negroes and many children upon them. The white
men, perhaps, have gone off with the rebel army, leaving the farms under
the care of negroes. The men have left, while the women and children — the
helpless portion of the family — are left behind. There may have been quite
a large quantity of corn left for the use of non-combatants in such cases.
Question. The intention was to leave only enough to subsist them ?
Answer. That is all. It was done upon reports of officers that I sent there
to examine. Without knowing that that was the case you refer to, that may
be the case, and there may be other cases. The principle I went on was to
take whatever I could, without leaving the people to starve, except in the
last extremity.
Question. That is, you would not take all unless it was necessary for the
subsistence of the troops ? «
Answer. Yes, sir. When the question was whether the people should
starve or my troops should starve, then I would take it for my troops.
Question. I now desire to call your attention to an order made by you,
which was read in the Senate the other day by Mr. Wade. The order is as
follows ;
"HEAI>QUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK,
" Opposite Fredericksburg, Va., May 26, 1862.
" Special Order No. 68.]
" Colonel Meredith, commanding the 56th Pennsylvania volunteers, will
furnish from his regiment a guard for the house and property of Mr. L. J.
Huffman, who lives near Bell Plain. Colonel Meredith will see that no more
corn is taken from Mr. Huffman, and that no more fencing is disturbed. The
448 TESTIMONY
guard will be so placed as to make this sure, even if it should be necessary
to place a sentinel over every panel of fence.
" By command of Major General McDowell.
" SAMUEL BRECK,
" Assistant Adjutant General.
" Colonel S. A. MEREDITH,
" Commanding 56th Pennsylvania Volunteers."
Have you any statement or explanation which you desire to make in
reference to that matter ?
Answer. This Mr. Huffman lives at Bell Plain, a few miles south of Aquia
creek. Bell Plain was chosen by me as a temporary landing and depot for
my supplies, which were required for the troops at Fredericksburg, until
such time as the railroad from Aquia creek to Fredericksburg should be
completed and could be used for the bringing up of supplies. When we
first came to Bell Plain we found that a house at that place had been
destroyed by the rebels. In a field close by were several grain-houses full
of corn in the ear, and there was a large field of clover which had been put
in by drilling; it was a beautiful field of clover. I seized upon all his corn for
the government, and turned my beef cattle into his clover field, and took the
remains of his house to build a wharf — and camped my troops upon his place.
Some time afterwards, I cannot tell how long, while going from Aquia creek
to Fredericksburg in company with Mr. Seward, Mr. Stanton, and Mr Chase,
the owner of this property came to see me, and asked me if he could get any
compensation for the damage my troops had caused him, and also if he could
have any protection in putting in and taking care of his growing crops for
the next season. He said that I had taken all his corn except a little he had
at his house for family use, and that the troops were committing a great
many depredations upon the enclosures immediately around his house.
There was a second house there ; there had been another, but it had been
burned down.
I told him that as to compensation, I could make him none. He said that
he had taken no part in this war, and that he had refused to give supplies
to the other side. The proof of that was that he had these supplies when
I got there. He said that he had not gone away as most of his neighbors
had done, but had remained on his farm to take care of it, and to see if he
could raise something of a crop for the coming year. I told him that I
would take no more corn from him; would not take what was left, and that
I would, so far as I could, protect him in his efforts to raise a crop; that
I would give him the usual receipt for the property I had taken, but I could
make him no payments.
I gave him an order at that time, which he carried to the commanding
officer at Bell Plain. Subsequently the commanding officer at Bell Plain
was changed, and another regiment went there. Mr. Huffman came to
Fredericksburg and complained to me that my order had not been complied
with; that the soldiers were still depredating upon his premises, burning
his fences, so that his crops were in the commons. He asked if I could
give him some protection. His house was close by the wayside, on the
road used for bringing supplies from Bell Plain to Fredericksburg, and the
road was constantly being passed over by trains, teamsters, bodies of
troops, and stragglers, and he was very much exposed.
Having taken from him all that I thought he could spare, and he having
suffered much damage at our hands, I reiterated the order, or rather I gave
directions to my staff officer to reiterate the order, in pretty strong terms,
to the commanding officer at Bell Plain, directing that the man should be no
further molested, but that he should be protected in his efforts to put in his
TESTIMONY. 449
crop; that his fences should be spared, and that a guard should be detailed
to see that this was done. The terms of the order I did not see when it
was made out, nor were my directions to the staff-officer given to him in
the terms which he used.
Question. Your directions were merely that a stringent order should be
issued to that effect ?
Answer. That is all It is very seldom that a commanding officer sees
to details of that kind. Mr. Wade said, in his remarks in the Senate, that
the man was as rank a traitor as there is on the face of the earUi. I never
knew anything about the man being a traitor. I should judge that if he
was a traitor he was a very mild one, from the fact that he was one of the
very few persons who remained in that part of the country, trying to culti
vate his farm. He certainly was a heavy sufferer from our presence. That
form of expression — " a sentinel to every panel of fence" — was merely this
young man's way of expressing the idea that the order must be complied
with, must be carried out, in some form or manner.
REBEL BARBARITIES.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED SATES, April 1, 1862.
On motion by Mr. SUMNER,
Resolved, That the select committee on the conduct of the war be directed
to collect the evidence with regard to the barbarous treatment by the rebels, at
Manassas, of the remains of officers and soldiers of the Unrted States killed
in battle there ; and that said select committee also inquire into the fact whether
Indian savages have been employed by the rebels in their military service, and
how such warfare has been conducted by said savages against the government
of the United States.
Attest :
J. W. FORNEY, Secretary.
Mr. Wade, from the. joint committee on the conduct of the present war, kegs leave
respectfully to submit a report, in part, as follows :
On the first day of April the Senate of the United States adopted the fol
lowing resolution ; which was referred to the committee on the conduct of the
war :
Resolved, That the select committee on the conduct of the war be directed to collect the
evidence with regard to the barbarous treatment by the rebels, at Manassas, of the remains
of officers and soldiers of the United States killed in battle there ; and that the said select
committee also inquire into the fact whether the Indian savages have been employed by
the rebels, in their military service, against the government of the United States, and how
such warfare has been conducted by said savages.
In pursuance of the instructions contained in this resolution, your committee
have the honor to report that they examined a number of witnesses, whose
testimony is herewith submitted.
Mr. Nathaniel F. Parker, who was captured at Falling Waters, Virginia,
testifies that he was kept in close confinement, denied exercise, and, with a
"Povf iii _ 9O
450 TESTIMONY.
number of others, huddled up in a room ; that their food, generally scant, was
always bad, and sometimes nauseous ; that the wounded had neither medical
attention nor humane treatment, and that many of these latter died from sheer
neglect ; that five of the prisoners were shot by the sentries outside, and that
he saw one man, Tibbetts, of the New York twenty-seventh regiment, shot aslie
was passing his window on the 8th of November, and that he died of the wound
on the 12th. The perpetrator of this foul murder was subsequently promoted
by the rebel government.
Dr. J. M. Horniston, surgeon of the 14th New York or Brooklyn regiment,
captured at Bull Run, testifies that when he solicited permission to remain on
the field and to attend to wounded men, some of whom were in a helpless and
painful condition and suffering for water, he was brutally refused. They offered
him neither water nor anything in the shape of food. He and his companions
stood in the streets of Manassas, surrounded by a threatening and boisterous
crowd, and were afterwards thrust into an old building, and left, without suste
nance or covering, to sleep on the bare floor. It was only when faint and ex
hausted, in response to their earnest petitions, they having been without food
for twenty-four hours, that some cold bacon was grudgingly given to them.
When, at last, they were permitted to go to the relief of our wounded, the
secession surgeon would not allow them to perform operations, but intrusted the
wounded to his young assistants, " some of them with no more knowledge of what
they attempted to do than an apothecary's clerk." And further, " that these
inexperienced surgeons performed operations upon our men in a most horrible
manner; some of them were absolutely frightful." "When," he adds, "I asked
Doctor Darby to allow me to amputate the leg of Corporal Prescott, of our
regiment, and said that the man must die if it were not done, he told me that I
should be allowed to do it." While Doctor Homiston was waiting, he says a
secessionist came through the room and said, "they are operating upon one of
the Yankee's legs up stairs." "I went up and found that they had cut off
Prescott's leg. The assistants were pulling on the flesh at each side, trying to
get flap enough to cover the bone. They had sawed off the bone without leav
ing any of the flesh to form the flaps to cover it ; and with all the force they
could use they could not get flap enough to cover the bone. They were then
obliged to saw off about an inch more of the bone, and even then, when they
came to put in the sutures (the stitches) they could not approximate the edges
within less than an inch and a half of each other; of course, as soon as there
was any swelling, the stitches tore out and the bone stuck through again. Dr.
Swalm tried afterwards to remedy it by performing another operation, but Pres
cott had become so debilitated that he did not survive." Corporal Prescott
was a young man of high position, and had received a very liberal education.
The same witness describes the sufferings of the wounded after the battle as
inconceivably horrible; with bad food, no covering, no water. They were lying
upon the floor as thickly as they could be laid. " There was not a particle of
light in the house to enable us to move among them." Deaf to all his appeals,
they continued to refuse water to these suffering men, and he was only enabled
to procure it by setting cups under the eaves to catch the rain that was falling,
and in this way he spent the night catching the water and conveying it to the
wounded to drink. As there was no light, he was obliged to crawl on his hands
and knees to avoid stepping on their wounded limbs ; and, he adds, "it is not a
wonder that next morning we found that several had died during the night."
The young surgeons, who seemed to delight in hacking and butchering these brave
defenders of our country's flag, were not, it would seem, permitted to perform
any operations upon the rebel wounded. "Some of our wounded," says this
witness, "were left lying upon the battle-field until Tuesday night and Wednesday
morning. When brought in, their wounds were completely alive with larvse
deposited there by the flies, having laid out through all the rain-storm of Mon-
TESTIMONY. 451
day, and the hot, sultry sunshine of Tuesday." The dead laid upon the field
unburied for five days; and this included men not only of his own, the 14th
regiment, but of other regiments. This witness testifies that the rebel dead
were carried off and interred decently. In answer to a question whether the
confederates themselves were not also destitute of medicine, he replied, " they
could not have been, for they took all ours, even to our surgical instruments."
He received none of the attention from the surgeons on the other side, "which,"
to use his own language, "I should have shown to them had our position been
reversed."
The testimony of William F. Swalm, assistant surgeon of the 14th New York
regiment, who was taken prisoner at Sudley's church, confirms the statement of
Dr. Homiston in regard to the brutal operations on Corporal Prescott. He also
states that after he himself had been removed to Richmond, when seated one day
with his feet on the window-sill, the sentry outside called to him to take them in,
and on looking out he saw the sentry with his musket cocked and pointed at
him, and withdrew in time to save his life. He gives evidence of the careless,
heartless, and cruel manner in which the surgeons operated upon our men.
Previous to leaving for Richmond, and ten or twelve days after the battle, he
saw some of the Union soldiers unburied on the field, and entirely naked.
Walking around were a great many women, gloating over the horrid sight.
The case of Dr. Ferguson, of one of the New York regiments, is mentioned
by Dr. Swalm. "When getting into his ambulance to look after his own
wounded he was fired upon by the rebels. When he told them who he was,
they said they would take a parting shot at him, which they did, wounding him
in the leg. He had his boots on, and his spurs on his boots, and as they drove
along his spurs would catch in the tail-board of the ambulance, causing him t&
shriek with agony." An officer rode up, and, placing his pistol to his head,
threatened to shoot him if he continued to scream. This was on Sunday, the
day of the battle.
One of the most important witnesses was General James B. Ricketts, well
known in Washington and throughout the country, lately promoted for his
daring and self-sacrificing courage. After having been wounded in the battle
of Bull Run, he was captured, and as he lay helpless on his back, a party of
rebels passing him cried out, " knock out his brains, the d d Yankee." He
met General Beauregard, an old acquaintance, only a year his senior at the
United States Military Academy, where both were educated. He had met the
rebel general in the south a number of times. By this head of the rebel army,
on the day after the battle, he was told that his (General Bicketts's) treatment
would depend upon the treatment extended to the rebel privateers. His first
lieutenant, Ramsey, who was killed, was stripped of every article of his clothing
but his socks, and left naked on the field. He testified that those of our wounded
who died in Richmond were buried in the negro burying-ground among the ne
groes, and were put into the earth in the most unfeeling manner. The state
ment of other witnesses as to how the prisoners were treated is fully confirmed
by General Ricketts. He himself, while in prison, subsisted mainly upon what
he purchased with his own money, the money brought to him by his wife.
"We had," he says, "what they called bacon soup — soup made of boiled bacon,
the bacon being a little rancid — which you could not possibly eat ; and that for
a man whose system was being drained by a wound is no diet at all." In reply
to a question whether he had heard anything about our prisoners being shot
by the rebel sentries, he answered: "Yes, a number of our men were shot. In
one instance two were shot; one was killed, and the other wounded, by a man
who rested his gun on the window-sill while he capped it."
General Ricketts, in reference to his having been held as one of the hostages
for the privateers, states : " I considered it bad treatment to be selected as a host
age for a privateer, when I was so lame that I could not walk, and while my
452 TESTIMONY.
wounds were still open and unhealed. At this time General Winder came to
see me. He had been an officer in my regiment; I had known him for twenty-
odd years. It was on the 9th of November that he came to see me. He saw
that my wounds were still unhealed ; he saw my condition ; but that very day
he received an order to select hostages for the privateers, and, notwithstanding
he knew my condition, the next day, Sunday, the 10th of November, I was se
lected as one of the hostages." " I heard," he continues, "of a great many of
our prisoners who had been bayonetted and shot. I saw three of them — two
that had been bayonetted and one of them shot. One was named Louis Francis,
of the New York 14th. He had received fourteen bayonet wounds — one through
his privates — and he had one wound very much like mine, on the knee, in con
sequence of which his leg was amputated after twelve weeks had passed ; and I
would state here that in regard to his case, when it was determined to amputate his
leg, I heard Dr. Peachy, the rebel surgeon, remark to one of his young assistants,
'I won't be greedy; you may do it ;' and the young man did it. I saw a num
ber in my room, many of whom had been badly amputated. The flaps over the
stump were drawn too tight, and some of the bones protruded. A man by the
name of Prescott (the same referred to in the testimony of Surgeon Homiston)
was amputated twice, and was then, I think, moved to Richmond before the
taps were healed — Prescott died under this treatment. I heard a rebel doctor
on the steps below my room say, ' that he wished he could taHe out the hearts
of the d d Yankees as easily as he could take off their legs.' Some of the
southern gentlemen treated me very handsomely. Wade Hampton, who was
opposed to my battery, came to see me and behaved like a generous enemy."
It appears, as a part of the history of this rebellion, that General Ricketts
was visited by his wife, who, having first heard that he was killed in battle,
afterwards that he was alive but wounded, travelled under great difficulties to
Manassas to see her husband. He says : " She had almost to fight her way
through, but succeeded finally in reaching me on the fourth day after the battle.
There were eight persons in the Lewis House, at Manassas, in the room where
I lay, and my wife, for two weeks, slept in that room on the floor by my side,
without a bed. When we got to Richmond, there were six of us in a room,
among them Colonel Wilcox, who remained with us until he was taken to
Charleston. There we were all in one room. There was no door to it. It
was much as it would be here if you should take off the doors of this com
mittee room, and then fill the passage with wounded soldiers. In the hot
summer months the stench from their wounds, and from the utensils they used,
was fearful. There was no privacy at all, because there being no door the room
could not be closed. We were there as a common show. Colonel Wilcox and
myself were objects of interest, and were gazed upon as if we were a couple of
savages. The people would come in there and say all sorts of things to us and
about us, until I was obliged to tell them that I was a prisoner and had nothing
to say. On our way to Richmond, when we reached Gordonsville, many women
crowded around the cars, and asked my wife if she cooked? if she washed? how
she got there ? Finally, Mrs. Ricketts appealed to the officer in charge, and told
him that it was not the intention that we should be subjected to this treatment,
and if it was continued she would make it known to the authorities. General
Johnston took my wife's carriage and horses at Manassas, kept them, and has
them yet for aught I know. When I got to Richmond I spoke to several gen
tlemen about this, and so did Mrs. Ricketts. They said, of course, the carriage
and horses should be returned, but they never were. " There is one debt," says
this gallant soldier, "that I desire very much to pay, and nothing troubles me
so much now as the fact that my wounds prevent me from entering upon
active service at once."
The case of Louis Francis, who was terribly wounded and maltreated, and
lost a leg, is referred to by General Ricketts ; but the testimony of Francis
TESTIMONY. 453
himself is startling. He was a private in the New York 14th regiment. He
says: "I was attacked by two rebel soldiers, and wounded in the right knee
with the bayonet. As I lay on the sod they kept bayonetting me until I re
ceived fourteen wounds. One then left me, the otherremaining over me, when a
Union soldier coming up, shot him in the breast, and he fell dead. I lay on the
ground until 10 o'clock next day. I was then removed in a wagon to a build
ing ; my wounds examined and partially dressed. On the Saturday following
we were carried to Manassas, and from there to the general hospital at Rich
mond. My leg having partially mortified, I consented that it should be ampu
tated, which operation was performed by a young man. I insisted that they
should allow Dr. Swalm to be present, for I wanted one Union man there if I
died under the operation. The stitches and the band slipped from neglect, and
the bone protruded ; and about two weeks after another operation was performed,
at which time another piece of the thigh bone was sawed off. Six weeks after
the amputation, and before it healed, I was removed to the tobacco factory."
Two operations were subsequently performed on Francis — one at Fortress
Monroe, and one at Brooklyn, New York — after his release from captivity.
Revolting as these disclosures are, it was when the committee came to exam
ine witnesses in reference to the treatment of our heroic dead, that the fiendish
spirit of the rebel leaders was most prominently exhibited. Daniel Bixby, jr.,
of Washington, testifies that he went out in company with Mr. G. A. Smart, of
Cambridge, Massachusetts, who went to search for the body of his brother, who
fell at Blackburn's Ford in the action of the 18th of July. They found the
grave. The clothes were identified as those of his brother on account of some
peculiarity in the make, for they had been made by his mother ; and, in order
to identify them, other clothes made by her were taken, that they might com
pare them. " We found no head in the grave, and no bones of any kind —
nothing but the clothes and portions of the flesh. We found the remains of
three other bodies all together. The clothes were there ; some flesh was left,
but no bones." The witness also states that Mrs. Pierce Butler, who lives near
the place, said that she had seen the rebels boiling portions of the bodies of our
dead in order to obtain their bones as relics. They could not wait for them to
decay. She said that she had seen drumsticks made of " Yankee shinbones," as
they called them. Mrs. Bulter also stated that she had seen a skull that one of
the New Orleans artillery had, which, he said, he was going to send home and
have mounted, and that he intended to drink a brandy punch out of it the day
he was married.
Frederick Scholes, of the city of Brooklyn, New York, testified' that he pro
ceeded to the battle-field of Bull Run on the fourth of this month (April) to
find the place where he supposed his brother's body was buried. Mr. Scholes,
who is a man of unquestioned character, by his testimony fully confirms the
statements of other witnesses. He met a free negro, named Simon or Simons,
who stated that it was a common thing for the rebel soldiers to exhibit the bones
of the Yankees. " I found," he- says, " in the bushes in the neighborhood, a
part of a zouave uniform, with the sleeve sticking out of the grave, and a por
tion of the pantaloons. Attempting to pull it up, I saw the two ends of the
grave were still unopened, but the middle had been prised up, pulling up the
extremities of the uniform at some places, the sleeves of the shirt in another,
and a portion of the pantaloons. Dr. Swalm (one of the surgeons, whose testi
mony has already been referred to) pointed out the trenches where the seces
sionists had buried their own dead, and, on examination, it appeared that their
remains had not been disturbed at all. Mr. Scholes met a free negro, named
Hampton, who resided near the place, and when he told him the manner in
which these bodies had been dug up, he said he knew it had been done, and
added that the rebels had commenced digging bodies two or three days after
they were buried, for the purpose, at first, of obtaining the buttons off their uni-
454 TESTIMONY.
forms, and that afterwards they disinterred them to get their bones. He said
they had taken rails and pushed the ends down in the centre under the middle
of the bodies, and pried them up. The information of the negroes of Benjamin
Franklin Lewis corroborated fully the statement of this man, Hampton. They
said that a good many of the bodies had been stripped naked on the field before
they were buried, and that some were buried naked. I went to Mr. Lewis's
house and spoke to him of the manner in which these bodies had been disinter
red. He admitted that it was infamous, and condemned principally the Louis
iana Tigers, of General Wheat's division. He admitted that our wounded had
been very badly treated." In confirmation of the testimony of Dr. Swalm and
Dr. Horniston, this witness avers that Mr. Lewis mentioned a number of in
stances of men who had been murdered by bad surgical treatment. Mr. Lewis
was afraid that a pestilence would break out in consequence of the dead being
left unburied, and stated that he had gone and warned the neighborhood and
had the dead buried, sending his own men to assist in doing so. " On Sunday
morning (yesterday) I went out in search of my brother's grave. We found
the trench, and dug for the bodies below. They were eighteen inches to two
feet below the surface, and had been hustled in in any way. In one end of the
trench we found, not more than two or three inches below the surface, the thigh
bone of a man which had evidently been dug up after the burial. At the other
end of the trench we found the shinbone of a man, which had been struck by a
musket ball and split. The bodies at the ends had been pried up. While dig
ging there, a party of soldiers came along and showed us a part of a shinbone,
five or six inches long, which had the end sawed off. They said that they had
found it among many other pieces in one of the cabins the rebels had deserted.
From the appearance of it, pieces had been sawed off to make finger-rings. As
soon as the negroes noticed this, they said that the rebels had had rings made
of the bones of our dead, and that they had them for sale in their camps.
When Dr. Swalm saw the bone he said it was a part of the shinbone of a man.
The soldiers represented that there were lots of these bones scattered through
the rebel huts sawed into rings," &c. Mr. Lewis and his negroes all spoke of
Colonel James Cameron's body, and knew that " it had been stripped, and also
where it had been buried." Mr. Scholes, in answer to a question of one of the
committee, described the different treatment extended to the Union soldiers and
the rebel dead. The latter had little head-boards placed at the head of their re
spective graves and marked ; none of them had the appearance of having been
disturbed.
The evidence of that distinguished and patriotic citizen, Hon. William Sprague,
governor of the State of Rhode Island, confirms and fortifies some of the most
revolting statements of former witnesses. His object in visiting the battle-field
was to recover the bodies of Colonel Slocum and Major Ballou, of the Rhode
Island regiment. He took out with him several of his own men to identify the
graves. On reaching the place, he states that " we commenced digging for the
bodies of Colonel Slocum and Major Ballou at the spot pointed out to us by
these men who had been in the action. While digging, some negro women
eame up and asked whom we were looking for, and at the same time said that
' Colonel Sloguu ' had been dug up by the rebels, by some men of a Georgia
regiment, his head cut off, and his body taken to a ravine thirty or forty yards
below, and there burned. We stopped digging and went to the spot designated,
where we found coals and ashes and bones mingled together. A little distance
from there we found a shirt (still buttoned at the neck) and a blanket with
large quantities of hair upon it, everything indicating the burning of a body
there. We returned and dug down at the spot indicated as the grave of Major
Ballou, but found no body there ; but at the place pointed out as the grave
where Colonel Slocum was buried we found a box, which, upon being raised and
opened, was found to contain the body of Colonel Slocum. The soldiers who
TESTIMONY. 455
had buried the two bodies were satisfied that the grave had been opened, the
body taken out, beheaded, and burned, was that of Major Ballon, because it
was not in the spot where Colonel Slocum was buried, but rather to the right
of it. They at once said that the rebels had made a mistake, and had taken
the body of Major Ballou for that of Colonel Slocum. The shirt found near
the place where the body was burned I recognized as one belonging to Major
Ballou, as I had been very intimate with him. We gathered up the ashes con
taining the portion of his remains that were left, and put them in a coffin
together with his shirt and the blanket with the hair left upon it. After we had
done this we went to that portion of the field where the battle had first com
menced, and began to dig for the remains of Captain Tower. We brought a
soldier with us to designate the place where he was buried. He had been
wounded in the battle, and had seen from the window of the house where the
captain was interred. On opening the ditch or trench we found it filled with
soldiers, all buried with their faces downward. On taking up some four or five
we discovered the remains of Captain Tower, mingled with those of the men.
We took them, placed them in a coffin, and brought them home."
In reply to a question of a member of the committee as to whether he
was satisfied that they were buried intentionally with their faces downward,
Governor Sprague's answer was, " Undoubtedly! Beyond all controversy!" and
that " it was done as a mark of indignity." In answer to another question as
to what their object could have been, especially in regard to the body of Colonel
Slocum, he replied : " Sheer brutality, and nothing else. They did it on account
of his courage and chivalry in forcing his regiment fearlessly and bravely upon
them. He destroyed about one-half of that Georgia regftnent, which was made
up of their best citizens." When the inquiry was put whether he thought these
barbarities were committed by that regiment, he responded, " by that same regi
ment, as I was told." While their own dead were buried with marble head and
foot stones, and names upon them, ours were buried, as I have stated, in trenches.
This eminent witness concludes his testimony as follows : " I have published
an order to my second regiment, to which these officers were attached, that I
shall not be satisfied with what they shall do unless they give an account of
one rebel killed for each one of their own number."
The members of your committee might content themselves by leaving this
testimony to the Senate and the people without a word of comment ; but when
the enemies of a just and generous government are attempting to excite the
sympathy of disloyal men in our own country, and to solicit the aid of foreign
governments by the grossest misrepresentations of the objects of the war, and
of the conduct of the officers and soldiers of the republic, this, the most start
ling evidence of their insincerity and inhumanity, deserves some notice at our
hands. History will be examined in vain for a parallel to this rebellion against
a good government. Long prepared for by ambitious men, who were made doubly
confident of success by the aid and counsel of former administrations, and by
the belief that their plans were unobserved by a magnanimous people, they pre
cipitated the war (at a moment when the general administration had just been
changed) under circumstances of astounding perfidy. Without a single reason
able ground of complaint, and in the face of repeated manifestations of modera
tion and peace on the part of the President and his friends, they took up arms
and declared that they would never surrender until their rebellion had been
recognized, pr the institutions established by our fathers had been destroyed.
The people of the loyal States, at last convinced that they could preserve their
liberties only by an appeal to the God of battles, rushed to the standard of the
republic, in response to the call of the Chief Magistrate.
Every step of this monstrous treason has been marked by violence pnd crime.
No transgression has been too great, no wrong too startling for its leaders.
They disregarded the sanctity of the oaths they had taken to support the Con-
456 TESTIMONY.
stitution ; they repudiated all their obligations to the people of the free States ;
they deceived and betrayed their own fellow-citizens, and crowded their armies
with forced levies ; they drove from their midst all who would not yield to their
despotism, or filled their prisons with men who would not enlist under their
flag. They have now crowned the rebellion by the perpetration of deeds
scarcely known even to savage warfare. The investigations of your committee
have established this fact beyond controversy. The witnesses called before us
were men of undoubted veracity and character. Some of them occupy high
positions in the army, and others high positions in civil life. Differing in po
litical sentiments, their evidence presents a remarkable concurrence of opinion
and of judgment. Our fellow-countrymen, heretofore sufficiently impressed by
the generosity and forbearance of the government of the United States, and
by the barbarous character of the crusade against it, will be shocked by the
statements of these unimpeached and unimpeachable witnesses ; and foreign
nations must, with one accord, however they have hesitated heretofore, consign
to lasting odium the authors of crimes which, in all their details, exceed the
worst excesses of the Sepoys of India.
Inhumanity to the living has been the leading trait of the rebel leaders ; but
it was reserved for your committee to disclose as a concerted system their in
sults to the wounded, and their mutilation and desecration of the gallant dead.
Our soldiers, taken prisoners in honorable battle, have been subjected to the
most shameful treatment. All the considerations that inspire chivalric emotion
and generous consideration for brave men have been disregarded. It is almost
beyond belief that the men fighting in such a cause as ours, and sustained by
a government which, ii> the midst of violence and treachery, has given repeated
evidences of its indulgence, should have been subjected to treatment never be
fore resorted to by one foreign nation in a conflict with another.
All the courtesies of professional and civil life seem to have been discarded.
General Beauregard himself, who, on a very recent occasion, boasted that he
had been controlled by humane feelings after the battle of Bull Run, coolly
proposed to hold General Ricketts as a hostage for one of the murderous pri
vateers, and the rebel surgeons disdained intercourse and communication with
our own surgeons taken in honorable battle.
The outrages upon the dead will revive the recollections of the cruelties to
which savage tribes subject their prisoners. They were buried in many cases
naked, with their faces downward ; they were left to decay in the open air ;
their bones were carried off as trophies, sometimes, as the testimony proves, to
be used as personal adornments, and one witness deliberately avers that the
head of one of .our most gallant officers was cut off by a secessionist to be turned
into a drinking cup on the occasion of his marriage. Monstrous as this revela
tion may appear to be, your committee have been informed that during the last
two weeks the skull of a Union soldier has been exhibited in the office of the
Sergeant-at-arms of the House of Representatives, which had been converted to
such a purpose, and which had been found on the person of one of the rebel
prisoners taken in a recent conflict. The testimony of Governor Sprague, of
Rhode Island, is most interesting. It confirms the worst reports against the rebel
soldiers, and conclusively proves that the body of one of the bravest officers in
the volunteer service was burned. He does npt hesitate to add that this hyena
desecration of the honored corpse was because the rebels believed it to be the
body of Colonel Slocum, against whom they were infuriated for having dis
played so much courage and chivalry in forcing his regiment fearlessly and
bravely upon them.
These disclosures establishing, as they incontestably do, the consistent in
humanity of the rebel leaders, will be read with sorrow and indignation by the
people of the loyal States. They should inspire these people to renewed ex
ertions to protect our country from the restoration to power of such men. They
TESTIMONY. 457
should, and we believe they will, arouse the disgust and horror of foreign na
tions against this unholy rebellion. Let it be ours to furnish, nevertheless, a
continued contrast to such barbarities and crimes. Let us persevere in the good
work of maintaining the authority of the Constitution, and of refusing to imitate
the monstrous practices we have been called upon to investigate.
Your committee beg to say, in conclusion, that they have not yet been en
abled to gather testimony in regard to the additional inquiry suggested by the
resqlution of the Senate, whether Indian savages have been employed by the
rebels in military service against the government of the United States, and how
such warfare has been conducted by said savages, but that they have taken
proper steps to attend to this important duty.
B. F. WADE, Chairman.
WASHINGTON, February IS, 1862.
NATHANIEL F PALMER sworn and examined.
[See Bull Hun testimony.]
By Mr. Covode :
Question. How were you treated while you were a prisoner in Richmond ?
Answer. Our fare was pretty rough ; we were kept closely confined, and had
no exercise except what we could get all huddled up in a room. Our food
was bread and beef only ; nothing else. Sometimes they would take the
water the beef was boiled in and put a little corn meal in it to thicken it, and
give us that for soup.
Question. Did you have any coffee 1
Answer. No, sir ; no coffee or tea, or anything of that kind. I believe some
of the wounded had a little coffee at first, but not long.
Question. How were the wounded treated there — the wounded prisoners ?
Answer. I suppose they were treated about as well as they could be. Their
statement was that they had no medicines ; but what facilities they had for
taking care of them was perhaps as good as could be had. But a great many
of them died who could have been saved if they had been at home where they
could have had proper treatment.
Question. Were there any men shot or abused there while in prison 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; five were shot.
Question. Under what circumstances ?
Answer. One was shot, I was told, as he was hanging his blanket out of the
window to air. Three others were shot while looking out of the window, and
one was shot in the room where I was. He had been to the sink, near the
window, where we all had to go to get water to drink, and was coming back to
his bed. As he came back, the light being in the middle of the room, he was
just in range between the window and the light ; and as he was on his way
back, when he was about ten feet from the window, he was shot, the bullet
going in his back and coming out of his breast and lodging in another man's
arm.
Question. Who was he ?
Answer. His name was Tibbetts, of the New York 27th regiment. He was
shot in the evening of the 8th of November and died on the 12th. I do not
remember exactly when the others were shot, because they were not in our
room.
Question. Did you find out why he was shot ?
Answer. No, sir ; only that the fellow could say he had killed a Yankee.
Question. What did they do with the man who shot him ?
Answer. He was taken and put in the jail or guard-house for four or five
days, and then they took him out and promoted him — made a corporal of him.
458 TESTIMONY.
WASHINGTON, April 2, 1862.
Dr. JAMES B. GREELEY sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. This committee have been directed by the Senate to collect evi
dence with regard to the barbarous practices of the rebels in disturbing the
graves of our dead at Bull Run, &c.; will you please state to the committee, in
your own way, what you know about that matter ?
Answer. I, with others, accompanied Governor Sprague, of Rhode Island, to
the battle-field of Bull Run, to endeavor to recover the bodies of Colonel
Slocum, Major Ballon, Captain Tower, and others.
Question. About what time was that ?
Answer. I think it was the 20th of March; either the 19th or 20th. We took
with us, as a guide, a Mr. Richardson, I forget his first name, who assisted at the
burial of Colonel Slocum and Major Ballou, to identify the spot where they
were buried. We arrived at the place of burial on the 21st, I think. The
hospital in which Colonel Slocum died had been burned, and we passed it. As
we were passing I saw a negro girl at a spring ; I questioned her about the
way to the battle-field, and she directed us. We made some mistake, which
we very soon discovered, when we turned back. Some of our party had been
left behind, and when we returned we met Major Anthony, who commanded
the escort. He informed us that they had commenced digging at a grave, and,
while digging, this colored girl came down where they were and asked them
what they were digging for. Said she, " if you are digging for the body of
Colonel Sloke — ," she hesitated about the name, saying two or three times,
" Colonel Sloke, Sloke." One of the party said "Colonel Slocuin." "Yes,
sir," said she, "that is the name; you won't find him ; the Georgia regiment
men dug him up some weeks ago, and first cut off his head and then burned his
body in the little hollow there," pointing it out to us. She told us that his
shirts were down in a place that she pointed out, and that his coffin had been
left in the stream, and afterwards used to bury a colored pauper in. We went
to the place she had pointed out to us, and found where there had been a fire,
evidently for the purpose of burning the body, as she stated. In raking over
the ashes we found a femur, or thigh bone, partly burned, some of the vertebrae,
or back bone, and portions of the pelvis bones. We also found, in a stream
near by, two shirts, both of them still buttoned together at the neck, partially
torn open in the centre, and with the wrists unbuttoned.
Question. How did they get the shirts off without unbuttoning at the neck ?
Answer. The head had been cut off. We called the attention of every per
son present to that fact. We supposed that this body thus burned was that of
Colonel Slocum. But when we found these shirts, Governor Sprague said Col
onel Slocum never wore such a shirt as that. One of the shirts was a silk
shirt, and the other was a striped shirt of some kind, I think. We had pro
ceeded with the full conviction that the body thus burned had been that of Col
onel Slocum ; and when Governor Sprague said those shirts were not those of
Major Ballou, we could not believe it possible, and went back to the graves to
examine them. Before we had arrived there, Mr. Richardson had described to
us the relative position of the graves of Colonel Slocum and Major Ballou.
While we were down examining the ashes, men were engaged in digging out
one of the graves — the upper grave ; and when we returned there they had dug
down nearly a foot, and had discovered nothing. Mr. Richardson was positive
the coffins had not been buried more than two feet beneath the surface. It was
very hard digging, and having discovered nothing after digging down a foot, I
suggested taking a sabre and running it down, by which we could very easily
discover if there was a cofiin there. I took a sabre myself and thrust it in the
TESTIMONY. 459
ground at least two feet, but could discover nothing. We then thrust it in the
place where Mr. Richardson said the other officer was buried, and we struck a
coffin not more than two feet below the surface. The coffin was taken out, and
the top taken off, when Colonel Slocum's friends recognized him at once, by his
uniform, and also by his countenance, his moustache, &c. Major Ballou's body
was not found in the grave. We then went to a house on the battle-field which
had been used as a hospital, in the yard of which Captain Tower had been bu
ried. We exhumed there at least seven bodies, which had been buried in their
garments, apparently just as they fell. They were buried with their faces
downward. Among them we found the body of Captain Tower. His orderly
was positive that when Captain Tower died he had on a very fine pair of boots ;
they were not on his body when we found him.
Question. Did you make any further search to ascertain whether there had
been any further mutilation of the bodies or barbarities practised upon the
dead?
Answer. No, sir. We made inquiries of the inhabitants there, and they all
corroborated the girl's story. There was a lad there, about fourteen years of
age, I should judge, and he was questioned very closely about it. Colonel
Sayles was with us, and was very skeptical about the burning of this body.
He questioned the boy very closely, but the boy stood the examination very
well. The boy said that it was the 21st Georgia regiment who came there, and
he saw the body burned. He said they put the fire out afterwards, because it
made such a horrible stench. He said that he knew, several days before, that
they were going to do it. After they did it, it was talked of a great deal in
the neighborhood, and they all condemned it.
By Mr. Wright :
Question. What could have been the object of digging up this body, after it
had been buried several months, and then burning it ?
Answer. I could think of no object.
By the chairman :
Question. You spoke of seven or eight bodies being buried with their faces
downward. What did you consider the significance of that 1
Answer. I did not know. My impression was that it was intended as a mark
of indignity ; it seemed so to me. Every one we exhumed was found buried
with the face downward, no matter in what position they lay. Sometimes
they would lie crosswise of each other, four or five packed in together, some
times with their legs sticking out of the ground, and all with their faces down
ward.
Question. Did you make any inquiries of the inhabitants to ascertain any
further than you have already stated ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. State it, if you please.
Answer. They spoke of this burning of Major Ballou's body particularly,
and several of them said they knew of the fact, supposing, however, that it was
Colonel Slocum's body. One man told me that the Georgia regiment was very
bitter against Colonel Slocum, because his regiment had been instrumental in
cutting them up very badly. I examined the remains in the ashes very care
fully. We brought them all home, and I examined them through my own
hands. I examined especially for teeth, for I knew if the head had been there,
the teeth would have been the last to have been destroyed. I found the femur,
or thigh-bone, which must have been that of a man over thirty years of age.
The angle at the neck of it indicated a man at least thirty years of age. The
body was proved to be that of a man by the pelvis-bone that was found ; but
we found no portion of the skull.
460 TESTIMONY.
Question. You have stated that you found that the shirts were buttoned at
the neck1?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. The wristbands, however, were not buttoned ]
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What inference did you draw from that ]
Answer. The shirts could not have been taken off from the body without the
head had been taken off, unless they had been unbuttoned.
Question. You understood that the head had been taken off?
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Did you hear anything said about the skulls of our dead being
used for drinking-cups, &c. ?
Answer. The negro girl and the young boy I have referred to said that the
Georgia regiment carried the skull of what they considered Colonel Slocum
home with them.
Question. You are satisfied that it was Major Ballou's body they had thus
treated 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; and another reason was that we knew Major Ballou had
lost a limb.
WASHINGTON, April 2, 1862.
Reverend FREDERIC DENISON sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. Have you heard the testimony of Dr. Greeley just given to the
committee ?
Answer. I have.
Question. Will you state whether you were with him during the examination
he has referred to, and whether you concur in what he has stated 1
Answer. So far as he has stated any matters uf which I was a witness, I
concur entirely. I accompanied Governor Sprague as a member of his staff;
we left here on Wednesday, the 19th of March, and returned here on Sunday
morning following. It was on the 21st of March that we went on the battle-field.
Question. If there is anything in addition to what he has stated that you
deem of importance you will please state it.
Answer. I would state, in addition to what he has stated in regard to the
grave of Major Ballou, that I accompanied the governor up through some pine
woods to a house where resided an old gentleman of the name of Newman, a
man I should judge to be sixty years of age. The colored girl had told us her
story, the lad had told us the same story, and we wanted to learn what we
could from others. This old gentleman seemed to be a man highly esteemed
by all who knew him, and we went to him and asked him what he knew about
the matter. He stated that the Georgia regiment, as he had understood, had
suffered severely from the Rhode Island soldiers in the battle of Bull Run, and
that through revenge they had exhumed this body, beheaded it and burned it.
He said he was not present when it was done, and had not seen it, but that
every one who had talked about it had said it was so. But he said that three
or four days after it was done he went down there, and saw the fire and the
bones, and the coffin, and that the coffin had been afterwards used to bury a
colored pauper in. I asked him to go to the spot and show it to me, and he did
so ; went with me directly to the spot and pointed it out to me, and also showed
TESTIMONY. 461
ne where the coffin lay when he saw it last, before it was used for the purpose
)f burying the negro pauper in.
Question. Did you understand what they did with the head after they cut it
)ff the body?
Answer. This Mr. Newman, or else the colored woman, I cannot recollect
which, said it was understood that the head was carried off south. They were
not witnesses of the fact. I guess they heard it was so. I looked particularly
imong the ashes, but saw nothing that to my eye looked like any portion of the
skull. In regard to the place where Captain Tower was buried, which was up
on the battle-field, I counted eight bodies, as they were laid bare. They were
buried in a pit, or a kind of a square hole, into which they had been thrown,
with the earth thrown in perhaps two feet deep over them. On top we found
an unexploded shell, which I brought with me. What it meant I cannot say —
whether a matter of accident or a mark of indignity. It hardly seemed to me
that it could be a mere accident.
Question. Did you observe whether they had been buried with their faces
down 1
Answer. Yes, sir; all of them.
Question. Did you make examination of other graves ?
Answer. We opened no graves except those containing the bodies of the dead
for whom we were seeking. There was another pit, not far from the one from
which we took Captain Tower. We did not open it, not knowing positively
that it contained any of our dead, though we suspected it contained the body of
Lieutenant Prescott. Mr. Newman spoke a great deal of this matter of exhum
ing, beheading, and burning the body of Major Ballou. He called it Colonel
Slocum, as that was what he had all along understood. He was very emphatic
in his declarations that it could not have been done by Virginians. He seemed
to think it a very barbaric thing, and wished to exculpate Virginians.
Question. Do you think of anything further that you desire to state?
Answer. In the pit from which we took the body of Captain Tower I counted
eight bodies. There may have been more there. We began at one end, and
uncovered until we came to the body of Captain Tower, and then opened it no
further. There was one body lying right across the feet of the others, and to
all appearance must have been trodden down very compactly, as there seemed
to be hardly room for a body there. There seemed to have been no attempt to
bury the bodies in any orderly, decent, or respectful manner. In regard to the
mistaking of the body of Major Ballou for that of Colonel Slocum by the
Georgians, it resulted from this, I have no doubt : Colonel Slocum was buried
in an oblong box — a square box; Major Ballou was buried in a coffin, or a box
which was coffin-shaped ; and it is supposed (of course we know nothing about
that) that they exhumed both coffins, and supposing the superior officer was in
the coffin, and not in the box, which was the one they meant to take, they took
the body of Major Ballou. Humor accordingly stated that they had taken the
body of Colonel Slocum. But his body we found. It was the body of Major
Ballou that they took. *
WASHINGTON, April 3, 1862.
General JAMES B. RICKETTS sworn and examined.
[See Bull Run testimony.]
By the chairman:
Question. Did you observe any barbarous treatment on the part of the enemy
towards our prisoners and wounded soldiers ?
Answer. On the field ?
462 TESTIMONY.
Question. On the field or elsewhere.
Answer. A party of rebels passed by where I was lying, and called out,
" Knock out his brains, the damned Yankee," referring to me. I said nothing
to them. When we were taken to this house there was a general want of
everything for our men. Of course I was on my back and could not see much.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. The house to which you were taken was what is known as the
Lewis House?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I was taken there in a blanket, and on the way I met
General Beauregard. Some one asked who that was, and the reply was that it
was Captain Ricketts. When General Beauregard heard my name he jumped
off his horse and spoke to me. He was an old acquaintance, but a year my
senior at the Military Academy. I had been a great deal at the south — in
New Orleans, Texas, and other places — and had been thrown a number of times
in his company. He told me my treatment would depend upon the treatment
that their privateers should receive.
Question. He told you that at that early period 1
Answer. Yes, sir. I was much struck with what he said. I asked him
where we were to be taken, and what they were going to do with us. He said :
" Your treatment will depend upon that of the privateers," and then directed
me to be taken to the Lewis House.
By the chairman :
Question. How long were you a prisoner in the hands of the rebels 1
Answer. I was two weeks at the Lewis House, and then I was in Richmond
up to the 18th of December.
Question. It has been said that the rebels mutilated our dead and killed our
wounded prisoners. Do you know anything about that ?
Answer. I know this : that Lieutenant Ramsay, my first lieutenant, who was
killed at my battery, was entirely stripped. The first one of the rebels who
asked my name was a Lieutenant Colonel Harman. He was a lieutenant in
the Mexican war, where I had known him very well. As soon as he heard my
name he asked me if I knew him ; and when he mentioned his name, of course
I knew him. He said to tile men with him, " Respect the captain's person ; he
is an old friend of mine ; don't take anything from him." And I had nothing
taken from me, on account of Hannan, I suppose.
Question. But your lieutenant was stripped ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What do you mean by that — stripped of his clothing ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; he had nothing left on him but his socks, so one of our
surgeons who saw him told me.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Do you know anything about their method of burying our dead ?
Answer. I know nothing except about their manner of burial in Richmond.
I could from my room overlook the place where they buried our dead. I know
they were buried in the negro burying-ground among the negroes. They had
no funeral service over them, but they were just taken out and put in the
ground in the most unfeeling manner. At the Lewis House there was a great
want of everything in the way of supplies, medicines, bandages, &c.
By the chairman :
Question. That may have been the case with their own men as well as ours
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was their general treatment of prisoners in Richmond ?
Answer. The general treatment of the prisoners there, I thought, was very i
TESTIMONY. 463
bad, indeed. We were very much crowded. Our diet was very meagre, in
deed. I subsisted mainly upon what I purchased with my own money, which
my wife brought me. That is the way I got along, and I assisted the others
all I could. For instance, we had at times what they called bacon soup, soup
made from boiled bacon, the bacon being a little rancid, which you could not
possibly eat, and the bacon was served with the soup ; and that for a man whose
system is being drained by a wound is no diet at all. Then we had some thin
beef soup, so thin that we were induced to ask one of the assistants how it hap
pened to be so, and we were told that it was first served to their own people in
the hospitals, and afterwards it was watered for us. They stopped giving us
tea and coffee, and we had to buy them for ourselves. We had to buy our
butter and eggs, and everything of that sort, beyond the mere prison fare that
they gave us.
Question. It has been said that they shot some of our prisoners while looking
out of the windows'?
Answer. I was not in the prison. I was too lame to be taken to the tobacco
factory. I was in the hospital all the time.
Question. Did you hear anything about that while you were there?
Answer. Yes, sir ; there were a number of our men shot. On one occasion
there were two shot, one was killed and the other wounded, by a man on the
outside, who rested his gun on the window-sill while he capped it ; while draw
ing back the hammer, in this position, it escaped from his fingers, came down
upon the cap, and the gun went off.
Question. That was an accident, was it ?
Answer. Well, sir, it was a very singular accident. If I should point a gun
towards you, instead of towards the ceiling, when I went to put a cap on, and
it should go off, it would, to say the least, be regarded as a very unpardonable
accident.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. You thought it was intentional 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; I did think so.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Do yon know whether that man received any punishment ?
Answer. The man was taken up, but he made some explanation and was
let go again. I considered it very bad treatment, also, to be selected as a hostage
for the privateers, when I was so lame I could not walk ; while my wounds
were still open and unhealed. General Winder came to see me. He had been
an officer in my regiment, and I had known him for twenty-odd years. He
came to see me on the 9th of November ; he saw my wounds, that they were
still unhealed ; he saw my condition. He that very day received an order to
select hostages for the privateers ; and, notwithstanding he knew what my con
dition was, the next day, on Sunday, the 10th of November, I was selected as
one of the hostages. I heard of a great many of our prisoners who had been
bayonetted and shot. 1 saw three of them, two of them had been bayonetted
and one of them had been shot. One of them was named Lewis Francis, of
the New York 14th. He had received fourteen bayonet wounds, one through
his privates, by which he lost one of his testicles. And he had one wound,
very much like mine, on the knee, in consequence of which his leg was ampu
tated after some twelve weeks had passed. And I would state here that, in
regard to his case, when it was determined to amputate his leg, I heard Dr.
Peachy, the surgeon, remark* to one of his young assistants, " I won't be greedy,
you may do it ;" and the young man did it.
Mr. Odell : I would state here that he has just had his leg amputated the
second time in consequence of the faulty manner in which it was done the first
time.
464 TESTIMONY.
The witness : It is surprising how that man lived through it all, old as he
was. I should take him to be over forty years of age.
Mr. Odell : He is over fifty years of age ; fifty-three or four, I should think.
The witness : I did not think he was as old as that. That only renders his
recovery the more surprising. I saw him, and my wife was with him, down
where he was, doing what she could for him ; she gave him some of my clothes.
Then there was a man named Briggs, of a Michigan regiment, who has a scar
on his hand now from a bayonet wound. He says he saw the rebels coming,
bayonetting our men and pillaging their pockets. He had a little portmonnaie,
with about eight dollars in it. He put it inside his shirt, and let it fall down
his back, and laid down on it. He was wounded, shot below the knee some
where. When they came to him they asked for his money, and commenced
thrusting a bayonet at him. He caught it in his hand, and as they withdrew it
his hand was cut by it.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Did this man who received so many bayonet wounds receive them
after he was a prisoner ?
Answer. He was not wounded at all at first. That was their method of
taking him prisoner, piercing him as much as possible. He was in their power
entirely ; there was no necessity for their doing any such thing, as there was
one man against several.
Question. Instead of demanding his surrender they bayonetted him ?
Answer. Yes, sir j it was entirely wanton on their part.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. And they supposed they had killed him ]
Answer. Yes, sir. Another man was shot through the body, and he fell, and
they supposed he was killed. Many of those men came into my room, and I
saw them there and talked with them ; and many of our men were badly am
putated ; the laps over the stump were drawn too tight, and soon the bones
protruded. A man by the name of Prescott was amputated twice, and was then
moved to Richmond before the laps were healed. He died from lockjaw after
he reached Richmond, and always said that it was the railroad that killed him.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Do you know anything more about the treatment of our prisoners ?
Answer. I heard a doctor on the steps below my room say that he wished he
could take out the hearts of the damned Yankees as easily as he could take off
their legs. Those little things show exactly the state of feeling on their part.
* By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What was their treatment of you, personally ?
Answer. I had no particular consideration shown me personally, excepting
from some persons whom I knew. I had a great many acquaintances in Rich
mond, and a great many among those in the field, for I had been a great deal in
the south. I had met many at Newport, a great many from South Carolina.
Those Charleston gentlemen treated me very handsomely. Wade Hampton,
who was opposed to my battery, came to see me, and behaved towards me as a
generous enemy should. He brought me a couple of bottles of ale, riding seven
miles to bring it to me.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. The papers have criticised their treatment of your lady, alleging
that they evinced a lack of respect towards the sex.
Answer. My wife, in the first place, joined me while I was at the Lewis House,
TESTIMONY. 465
on the field of battle. The first rumor she had heard was that I was killed.
When she heard that I was alive, but wounded, she started with her carriage
and horses to come to me. She almost had to fight her way out there, but suc
ceeded finally in reaching me on the fourth day after the battle. There were
eight persons in the Lewis house in the room where I lay, and my wife for two
weeks slept in that room on the floor by my side without a bed. When we got
to Richmond there were six of us in a room, among them Colonel Wilcox, who
remained with us until he was taken to Charleston. There we were, all in that
one room. There was no door to it. It was very much as it would be here if
you should take away the door of this committee room, and then fill up the
passage with wounded soldiers. And in the hot summer months the stench from
their wounds and from the utensils they used Avas fearful. There was no privacy
at all, because there being no door the room could not be closed. The hospital
'was an unfinished building, one half the windows being out of it ; and there we
were, a common show. There was a general interest to see Colonel Wilcox
and myself, as though they expected to see a couple of savages.
Question. Did not the officers of the southern army protect you from that
sort of indignity ?
Answer. They made some attempt to do it.
• Question. But they did not use the means they might have used?
Answer. No, sir ; and the people would come in there and say all sorts of
things to us and about us. In fact, people that I knew would-come in and com
mence discussions, until I was obliged to tell them that I was a prisoner, and
had nothing to say. When we went down to Richmond in the cars from Ma-
nassas, wherever we stopped crowds of people would gather around and stare
at us. At Gordonsville, particularly, crowds of women came around these to
see the prisoners and the Yankee woman. They would ask my wife if she
cooked, if she washed, and how she got there. Finally, Mrs. Ricketts appealed
to the officer in charge, and told him that it was not the intention that we should
be subjected to this treatment, and that if it was continued she would make it
known to the authorities. He then said he would stop it. General Johnston
took my wife's carriage and horses away from her at Manassas, and kept them,
and has them yet, for aught I know. When we got down to Richmond I spoke
to several gentlemen about it, and so did Mrs. Ricketts. They said that of
course the carriage and horses would be returned. But they never were. In
stead of that, when I was exchanged, and we were about to leave, they refused
Mrs. Ricketts a transportation ticket to Norfolk, obliging her to purchase it.
Dr. Gibson, who was in charge of the hospital, when he heard of it, said that
such a thing was very extraordinary in General Winder, and that he would
speak to him about it. I said that it made no difference, though I thought as
General Johnston had taken her carriage and horses and left her on foot, it
would be nothing more than fair to give her a ticket to Norfolk. Our prisoners
were treated very badly there, and I am surprised that some of them lived
through it, like that man Lewis Francis.
Mr. Odell. He is recovering, and though he has lost one leg, he is very anxious
to get back into the field again.
The witness. I must say that I have a debt that I desire very much to pay,
and nothing troubles me so much now as the fact that my wounds prevent me
from entering upon active service again at once.
Part iii 30
466 TESTIMONY.
WASHINGTON, April 7, 1862.
FREDERICK SCHOLES sworn and examined.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. "Where is your residence ?
Answer. City of Brooklyn, New York.
Question. What do you know in relation to the burial of our dead at Bull
Bun, and the treatment of those of our soldiers who fell there?
Answer. I proceeded to the battle field of Bull Run on Friday last, the 4th
of this month. We passed across the battle field, and proceeded to the place
where I supposed my brother's body was buried, which was on a knoll on
Chirm's farm. We found a trench there where bodies had evidently been buried.
I then proceeded to a stone house on Young's branch. The owner of that house
told me that on the Tuesday after the battle he saw two men sitting by a stone
fence, both of them wounded. One of them opened his waistcoat and showed
him a gash down the whole of his breast, and begged him for some water. The
other one was also badly wounded, and he wanted some water. He could not
tell me how the men were dressed, as he was very much excited from what he
had passed through. He told me about the number buried, and pointed out the
locality of several bodies buried in the yard of his house and in the vicinity.
We then proceeded over to the house of a free negro, named Simon or Simons,
and had a long conversation with him. He said he was a sutler, or rather kept
a little store, and supplied the rebel soldiers with eatables. He said the rebel
soldiers would come in his store with bones in their hands, which they showed
to him, and said they were bones of Yankees which they had dug up. He said
it was a common thing for the soldiers to exhibit the bones of "the Yankees."
From there we proceeded to the portion of the battle-field where Rieketts's bat
tery was. Near there I found a part of what I supposed, from the description
I had heard, to be the uniform of one of Rieketts's men. The ball had gone
through the left breast. On examining it I found a piece of the shirt sleeve,
and there was still some flesh in the sleeve. I found portions of the uniforms
of the Ellsworth Zouaves in the same state. In the bushes in the neighbor
hood I found a part of a Zouave uniform with a sleeve sticking out of the grave,
and a portion of the pantaloons sticking out. On attempting to pull it up I
found that the two ends of the grave were still unopened, but the middle had
been pried up, pulling up the extremities of the uniform in some places, and
pulling up the sleeves of the shirts and a portion of the pantaloons. There
were portions of flesh, as I found, remaining there. I found likewise the re
mains of one of the 14th New York regiment in the same condition, the grave
having been pried open. There were pieces of the backbone and some of the
ribs sticking up in the middle of the grave, where the centre had been pried up,
the two ends of the grave being unopened. Back in the bushes we found some
appearances of where bodies had been buried and washed out by the rains.
But those I have been speaking of had evidently been dug up. Doctor
Swalm, who was with me, pointed out the trenches where the secessionists
had buried their own dead, almost immediately adjoining where our dead had
been buried. Their remains had not been disturbed at all. After examining
there I went over to the house of a free negro named Hampton, as I under
stood he had assisted in burying some of our dead. He told me he hac
buried the bodies on the Chinn farm, in the trenches that we first found
He had been notified by a man named Benjamin Franklin Lewis to proceec
over there and bury the bodies there. They were buried on the Tuesday
after the battle. I spoke to him about the manner in which these bodie
had been dug up. He said he knew it had been done, and said it was mos
shameful. He said the rebels had commenced digging up the bodies two o
TESTIMONY. 467
three days after they were buried for the purpose, at first, of obtaining the but
tons on their uniforms ; afterwards they dug them up as they decayed to get
their bones. I asked him how they had dug up the bodies. He said they
had taken rails and pushed the ends down in the centre under the middle ot
the bodies and then pried them up in that way. He said that Lewis's men also
knew about it. I went over where some of Lewis's negro men were and inquired
of them. Their information corroborated fully the statement of this man Hamp
ton. They also stated that a great many of the bodies had been stripped
naked on the field before they were buried, and some were buried naked ; others
were buried with their clothes on. They said that numbers of them had been
dug up through the winter, and even shortly after they had been buried. I
went to Mr. Lewis's house, and after waiting some time he came in. I spoke to
him about the manner in which the bodies had been dug up. He said that their
whole army should not be blamed for that. He admitted it was infamous, but
said a few men had done it who could not be controlled.
Question. Did he say what soldiers they were who had treated the bodies of
our dead in this way ?
Answer. He condemned principally the New Orleans Tigers, of General
Wheat's division ; the Louisiana Tigers, I believe they were called. He said
they were the men who had done the principal part of it. He said that after
the battle the men went over the field and robbed all indiscriminately, both
friend and foe. He said they had all along been the cause of a great deal
of trouble, and that two or three of them had been shot during the winter for
mutiny. He said that the most of them had deserted their cause and were
over on our .side now. He said our wounded had been very badly treated ; and
Doctor Swalm told me about the unnecessary amputations that had been per
formed by the rebel surgeons. He said that limbs had been taken off unneces
sarily and in a very bad manner ; that, after the confederates had taken posses
sion of the hospital, they would not allow our surgeons to use the knife at all,
but used it themselves, and that some of the men had died in consequence of
their bad treatment, and from want of the necessary nourishment. He men
tioned a number of instances of men who had been actually murdered by bad
treatment. I spoke to Mr. Lewis about that, and he admitted that it was so.
He spoke of doctors on their own side who had spoken about the manner in
which the wounded had been cut and neglected and treated badly after the
battle. He said that he had become afraid that a pestilence would break out there
in the neighborhood, in consequence of the dead being left unburied. And
accordingly, on the Tuesday following the battle, finding the dead still unbturied,
he had gone out and warned out the neighborhood and had them "buried, send
ing his own men to assist in doing so. On Sunday morning (yesterday) I col
lected a party of men and went to the trench where I supposed my brother
might have been buried, and dug down to the bodies. We found them covered
by some eighteen inches to two feet of earth, just tumbled in any way, some on:
their sides and some on their backs. I found one body entirely naked. Upon
digging at one end of the trench we found, not more than two inches below the
surface, the thigh-bone of a man that had evidently been dug up after burial ;
and in digging at the other end of the trench, in throwing out the first shovel
ful of earth, we found the detached shin-bone of a man, which had been struck
by a musket ball and split ; a part of the thigh-bone was still attached to it.
The bodies at the ends had been pried up, the clothing at each end of the body
still in the ground, where the middle of the body had been pried up. The
other bodies were perfect. While we were digging there a party of soldiers
came up and showed us a part of a shin-bone five or six inches long, which had
the end sawed off. They said they had found it among many other pieces in
one of the cabins that the rebels had deserted. From the appearance of it,
pieces had been sawed off, out of which to make finger-rings. As soon as the
468 TESTIMONY.
negroes saw it, they said that the rebels had had rings made of the bones of
our dead that they had dug up ; that they had had them for sale in their
camps. As soon as Doctor Swalm saw the piece of bone the soldier had, he
said that it was a part of a shin-bone of a man ; and I compared it with the
detached shin-bone we had dug up — the one split by a musket ball — and they
corresponded exactly. The soldiers said there were lots of these bones scattered
all through the rebel huts, sawed into rings, &c. One of the men said he had
been looking for the body of his lieutenant, and had found where it had been
left in the bushes unburied. He had found the bones and portions of the
clothing scattered around by the hogs. They had buried the remains that
they gathered up on Sunday last, together with other remains that they had
collected Mr. Lewis and the negroes all spoke of Colonel Cameron's body,
and knew about its being stripped, and where it had been buried. They said
that General Johnston, I think, had sent around and collected some of the things
taken from the body; among others, a locket, and had endeavored to find his
coat. Some of the things had been found. He knew exactly where Colonel
Cameron's body had been buried. All the negroes and those in the neighbor
hood seemed to know all about it. I talked in the presence of the ladies in Mr.
Lewis's house of the manner in which our dead had been treated. Some of
them denied it ; it seemed to be well understood in the neighborhood that these
things had been done.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Did you find your brother's remains 1
Answer. I do not know that they were in either of the trenches that we ex
amined, unless it was the body that was naked and could not be recognized.
I am not certain that he is dead. I know that he was wounded.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Did you see any difference in the manner in which the confederates
had buried our dead and their own 1
Answer. I saw where one of their dead had been buried in a box, and after
wards his remains taken up and removed. A portion of the box was still there.
I saw a number of the graves of the confederate soldiers that had little head
boards placed at the head and marked. None of them have any appear
ance of having been disturbed. I noticed in one of the graves where the body
had been pried up a shoe with some of the remains still in it.
WASHINGTON, April 7, 1862.
Dr. J. M. HOMISTON sworn and examined.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. v Where is your residence?
Answer. No. 83 Sands street, Brooklyn.
Question. What is your position in the army 1
Answer. Surgeon.
Question. What position did you occupy at the battle of Bull Run ?
Answer. I was the surgeon of the 14th New York (Brooklyn) regiment.
Question. Were you present during that engagement ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Were you taken prisoner there ?
Answer. I was.
Question. We have been directed to inquire into the treatment our wounded
and dead received from the enemy there after the battle. Will you, in your
own way, give us a statement of what you observed there 1
TESTIMONY. 469
Answer. The place where we first commenced attending to our wounded,
whether through accident or some other cause, was fired into and became such
a dangerous place that we had to stop bringing the wounded there. I believe
there have been some reports about the hospitals being fired into. I have never
been able to satisfy myself whether that was done intentionally or not. I was
made prisoner on the field, and immediately taken inside the enemy's lines. I
told them that my wish was to attend to the wounded men, there were so
many of them wounded and crippled ; that I had remained voluntarily with
them for that purpose ; I asked as a privilege that I should be permitted to
attend to them. Two of the surgeons there permitted me to go to wash and
attend to the wounded ; I did so until just at dark, when a guard came up and
said that I must accompany them. I told them that it was my wish to remain
on the field ; that I desired to . remain all night with the wounded men, as there
were so many who needed attention, and some of them in a very helpless and
painful condition and suffering for water. I protested against being sent away
from the field at that time. They became very rude and talked in a very
ugly way, and insisted on my going with them. They marched me with a
party of prisoners, mostly privates, to Manassas ; they did not offer us even
water, let alone anything in the shape of food; we stood in the streets of
Manassas about an hour with a guard around us ; a crowd collected about us,
hooting and threatening in a very boisterous way what they would do with us.
We were finally put into an old building and left to sleep on the floor there
without anything in the shape of food being given to us. In the morning those
of us who were surgeons were brought up before the medical director, as he
was called, who took our names and then sent us back to the battle-field ; there
were three of us in that party ; we told them we were already faint and ex
hausted, having been without food for twenty-four hours. • They gave us some
cold bacon and sent us back to the battle-field. When we reached the battle
field they took us to the Lewis house, as it is called ; they had commenced
bringing the wounded in there, mostly their own. They finally allowed us to
have an ambulance, and we commenced picking up our wounded and bringing
them in ourselves, a guard all the while accompanying us ; we were then
ordered to report ourselves to a secession surgeon, a Dr. Darby, of South
Carolina. He said he had been sent there by General Beauregard to take
charge of the wounded. He would not allow us to perform operations upon
our own men, but had them performed by his assistants, young men, some of
them with no nore knowledge of what they attempted to do than an apothecary's
clerk. They performed the operations upon our men in a most horrible manner ;
some of them were absolutely frightful. I asked Dr. Darby to allow me to
amputate the leg of Corporal Prescott, of our regiment. I told him the man
must die if it was not done. He told me that it should be done, and that I
should be allowed to do it. I told him that there were some things I would
like to have ; that I had not the proper instruments to perform the operation.
He said he would furnish me with the instruments, and told me to sit down
and wait a few moments ; while I was sitting there, with another of our sur
geons, one of their men came through and said, " They are operating on one
of the Yankee's legs up stairs." I turned to the doctor, who was sitting there
with me, and said, " I am sure that is Prescott they are operating upon." I
went up stairs and found that they had cut off Prescott's leg, and the assistants
were pulling on the flesh on each side, trying to get flap enough to cover the
bone. They had sawed off the bone without leaving any of the flesh to form
the flaps to cover it. With all the force they could use they could not get flap
enough to cover the bone. They were obliged to saw off about an inch more of
the bone, and even then, when they came to put in the sutures, the stitches, they
could not approximate the edges within less than an inch and a half of each
other ; of course as soon as there was any swelling the stitches tore out and the
470 TESTIMONY.
bone stuck through again. Dr. Swalm tried afterwards to remedy it by per
forming another operation ; but Prescott had become so debilitated that he did
not survive.
Question. What kind of a man was Prescott T What was his character and
standing "?
Answer. He was a very fine young man, and had received a very liberal
education. It was almost impossible for us to get anything for our wounded
men there to eat ; they paid no attention to us whatever. We suffered very
much on acccount of the want of any kind of food for our men. They would
not even bring water to us. On the Monday night after the battle all the
wounded in that old house were lying there on the floor. They kept bringing
in the wounded until they were lying upon the floor rs thickly as they could be
laid. There was not a particle of light of any kind in the house to enable us
to move about among the wounded. They were suffering very much for water ;
but with all the persuasion I could use they would not bring us any water, and
the guard stationed about the house prevented us from going after any. For
tunately, I might say, it rained that night, and through the open windows
the rain beat in and run down the floor among the wounded, wetting and chilling
them ; still I was enabled, by setting some cups under the eaves, to catch a
little water for our poor soldiers to drink, and in that way I spent all the night,
catching water from the eaves of the house and carrying it to our wounded to
drink. As there was no light in the house, being perfectly dark, I Was obliged
to crawl on my hands and knees to avoid stepping on their wounded limbs. It
is not a matter of wonder that the next morning we found that several had died
there during the night. They seemed to be perfectly indifferent to the suffer
ings of our men — entirely so. There was occasionally a man here and there,
who seemed to have no connexion with the army at all, who appeared desirous
to extend some kindly assistance to our wounded ; but those connected in any
way with their army seemed to try to do everything to show their perfect
indifference.
Question. Did these young men — these assistants you speak of — perform any
operations upon their wounded ?
Answer. 1 think not much ; there were other surgeons there attending to their
wounded ; in fact, a great many of their wounded were taken away from there,
those who could be moved with safety, so that we had not the chance of know
ing so much what their treatment was. Dr. Swalm could tell you more of what
their treatment was while he was in their general hospital in Richmond. Many
of our men were left lying upon the field until Tuesday night and Wednesday.
Question. Our wounded men 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; some of them lay there upon the field until the Wednesday
after the battle. Men were brought in Tuesday night and Wednesday mo-ruing
with their wounds completely alive with larvae deposited there by flk'S. They
had lain out there through all the rain-storm of Monday, and the hot, sultry sun
shine of Tuesday, and their wounds were completely alive with larvae when
they were brought in on Tuesday night and Wednesday. Our dead lay upon
the field unburied, to my own knowledge, for five days, and I understood that
many of them were left there much longer. But I can speak knowingly up to
the time I left, that our dead were left unburied for five days. I was sent away
with Colonel Wood to Charlottesville, Virginia, by permission of General
Beauregard.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. You mean that some of the dead were not buried for that length of
time?
Answer. Yes, sir ; our men.
TESTIMONY. 471
By Mr, Odell :
Question. You mean your own regiment ?
Answer. Yes, sir; the 14th regiment. I do not think any of them were
buried at the end of five days after the battle.
Question. Were any other of our dead of other regiments left unburied ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; a great many were not buried at the end of that time.
There were some that died Monday night in the Lewis house that were taken
out and buried on the premises there the next morning.
Question. Do you know anything about the manner in which they were
buried ?
Answer. I could see from the house how they buried two or three of them ;
they dug a hole and put them in just as they had died and were carried out of
the house, and then covered them up as they were.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. How deep did they bury them ?
Answer. Those who were buried about the house were buried in holes not
dug over three feet deep. They buried those because their own safety re
quired it.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Did they bury their own dead at once after the battle ?
Answer.' Some were buried down about Manassas, generally; if there were
any friends there, their dead were taken away from the field and buried else
where.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Were they destitute themselves of medical supplies that they re
fused to assist you 1
Answer. They could not have been destitute, for they took all our supplies.
Even if they had had none of their own they could not have been destitute.
They even took our instruments away from us at last. They allowed us to
keep them for the time being, but gave us to understand that they belonged to
them. There were many individual instances of kindness extended to our
wounded. I know of one instance where one of our officers made himself known
to one of their officers as a free-mason, and that officer interested himself in
procuring permission from General Beauregard to send this officer to a private
house, with one of our surgeons detailed to attend to him. I was not a mason
then, but I have become one since I returned. As an instance of the manner
in which the surgeons of our arrriy were treated there, I will state that though
I was left on the field with only the clothes I had on, I received none of the
attentions from those of the profession on their side which I should have deemed
it my duty to have shown them had our positions been reversed. I had but one
shirt (the one I had on when I was taken prisoner) for a month ; and. I used to
wash that in the morning and go without it during the day that I might have
something clean to sleep in at night. The one pair of socks I had on when I
was captured I would wash myself until they were completely worn out, when
I wore my boots without socks, my feet and ancles becoming so chafed that it
was exceedingly painful for me to walk. Yet not one of their surgeons ever
offered me any article of clothing to enable me to keep myself clean and decent,
though I had to go this way for a month. It was not until some time after I
got to Charlottes ville that I had the opportunity of purchasing some of these
articles with my own money, and while purchasing them a crowd collected about
the store, making threats against " the damned Yankee," though I had a parole
from Beauregard himself. And when I came out I should probably have been
killed, for one ruffian there attacked me with a large bowie knife, when I had
forced my way nearly through the crowd, and I had but the bundle in my hand
472 TESTIMONY.
to ward off his blows, when an officer seeing my situation came to my aid and
drove him off after he had made several passes at me, and enabled me to reach
niy room in safety. For the first three days after the battle we suffered the
most for the want of food. Even Captain Ricketts and Colonel Wilcox, who
were in the house, had not enough to eat ; and had it not been for Mr. Lewis,
who owned the house, we should have suffered more than we did. On several
occasions he rode six or seven miles from where he was living to this house and
brought us food, which was about all we had to eat.
WASHINGTON, April 7, 1862.
Dr. WILLIAM F. SWALM sworn and examined.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Where is your residence 1
Answer. No. 28 East Warren street, Brooklyn.
Question. What is your position in the army ?
Answer. Assistant surgeon of the 14th regiment, New York State militia.
Question. Were you at the battle of Bull Run ]
Answer. I was.
Question. Were you made prisoner there 1
Answer. Yes, sir; at Sudley church.
Question. Will you state what you know in reference to the treatment of those
of our soldiers who were taken prisoners ?
Answer. I was there attending to the wounded when some cavalry rode up
and took myself and eight or nine other surgeons prisoners. We remained there
until Monday afternoon at 5 o'clock, when we were removed from the church
and taken to Manassas. There were some 300 wounded men in the church and
on the ground outside. When we got to Manassas we were told that it was un
intentional the taking us there and keeping us from the wounded. On Tuesday
morning we were ordered to be taken back. On the way back I was detailed
to the old Lewis house, and I attended to the wounded there in conjunction with
Dr. Norval, of the 79th New York. On Wednesday morning I was told by a
captain, as I judged from the uniform he wore, there were two $f our men alive,
but wounded, still on the field. He pointed up towards the Henry house, and
told me that I had better go and get them down. I asked him if I was allowed
to do so. He said I was, and gave me a guard of two men. I went up there,
and there I saw the most of our men buried. I was there surrounded by some
civilians, who were very insulting, until a chaplain came to my rescue and told
me that I must go to Manassas again. I was then placed behind a cavalry sol
dier and taken to Manassae, where I was taken before General Beauregard again.
I arrived there at, perhaps, 12 o'clock on Wednesday. He kept me thereuntil,
perhaps, 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and then gave me a pass to go and attend
to the wounded again. On my way back I was fortunate enough to get into a
wagon. It turned off towards the other Lewis house, and I went in there, and
saw Dr. Hoiniston. On Thursday Dr. Homiston was sent off with Colonel
Wood, and I did not see him again until I saw him in Richmond. The rebels
removed all their wounded, and left me alone entirely with several of our
wounded — Captain Ricketts, Captain Withington, and others. The food we
had was very scanty, consisting principally of hard crackers, and hardly enough
of them to subsist upon. There was a Major Creecy there, who was a relative
of Mrs. Ricketts or some of her family, and through him we got something for
our wounded men. He was stationed behind the last house on the field. It
was in that house that the operations on Prescott and others were performed.
TESTIMONY. 473
The time arrived for us to go to Manassas and from there to Richmond. We
went on — Captain and Mrs. Ricketts, Dr. Lewis, and myself. Corporal Pres-
cott, Colonel Wilcox, and others had gone on previously. Upon arriving at Ma-
nasses we remained there until evening, and then proceeded to Richmond — being
twenty-four hours on the way. There was one death occurred on the way while
in the cars from inattention, and was thrown from the cars while they were in
motion. It is true they said they would see the body buried. We arrived
in Richmond at ten o'clock at night, under charge of a second lieutenant,
who took us1 before Adjutant General Cooper. General Cooper told us to go
where we pleased, and to report ourselves to him on Monday at 9 o'clock. We
left, and could not get into any of the hotels, they were so crowded. I found
my way down to a tobacco warehouse at the foot of Main street. I went in
there and made arrangements to remain there altogether, and attended to the
wounded there on Sunday. On Monday morning, after some little trouble, I
managed to get to see General Cooper, who told me to come again on Tuesday.
I did not, however, go there again on Tuesday, but went to the prison and re
mained there. During my sojourn in the prison there, I was sitting one day
leaning back with my feet upon the window sill, when the sentry outside called
out to me to take them in ; I got up and looked out of the window, and saw the
sentry with his musket cocked and pointed towards me. Being cautioned by
some one there to get out of the way lest I should be shot, I left the window.
The commissary and quartermaster — one person, Mr. Warner, acting as both —
who used to feed our men, did as well as he could ; but the quality of the soup
given their men and that given ours was very different. The soup was made of
good enough meat, generally, but they put no vegetables in it. After from the
first to the third week they stopped giving us coffee altogether. Ai'ter some four
or five days 1 was removed from the tobacco warehouse, by order of General
Winder, to the general hospital, which was in charge of Dr. Gibson, surgeon
general. The nurses there were sisters of charity. The left portion of the
building, as you entered it, was set apart for our wounded, the right for theirs,
and the main body of the building was used as as an operating room. I noticed
that they used to bring in for their wounded nice biscuit, game, soft-boiled eggs,
toast with eggs upon it, &c. This was done by the sisters of charity. I asked
them to bring in some for our men, and was told that they had none. Of course,
seeing what I did, I knew how much to believe of that. As to the way in which
their operations were performed, I would mention the instance of Captain Mc-
Quade, of the 38th New York. He received a wound in the lower part of the
left leg, which rendered amputation necessary. The operation was performed
in Richmond, by a surgeon of the name of Peachy, I think. The flap was a
very good one, but, in consequence of inattention, the inside flap entirely morti
fied, so that they had to cut it completely off, leaving the bone protruding from
one and a half to two inches. Inflammation set in, and extended up the limb,
and in this condition he was taken down to the tobacco warehouse at mid-day,
his face exposed to the hot sun, and the result was, what might have been look
for, his death.
Question. How long were you on the battle field after the battle ?
Answer. I was at the Lewis house from fourteen to eighteen days. One
afternoon Captain Withington and myself concluded we would take a walk over
the battle field. This was some ten or twelve days after the battle. As we
walked around I saw some of our men still unburied, and some of them entirely
naked — shoes, stockings, everything they had had on stripped from them, and
their bodies left exposed, naked, on the field. Yet I saw a great many women,
ladies I suppose they would call themselves — walking about the field at that
time, apparently entirely unmoved. v I should judge that I saw ten or twelve of
tire 14th regiment unburied, many of the 71st regiment, and a number of others
whose regiments I did not recognize,
474 TESTIMONY.
Question. You spoke of going on the field at one time to get two wounded
men of the 14th regiment ; did you find them 1
Answer. No, sir ; as I have stated, I was surrounded by some civilians, and
not allowed to go up there
Question. Do you know anything of the manner in which they buried our
dead?
Answer. At the time I went up for the two wounded men, on the Wednesday
morning after the battle, I saw them digging some trenches, and saw some two
or three buried. They paid no attention as to how they put them in, but put
them in face downwards or in any other way, just as it happened. They
buried a number in a ravine that had been washed out by the rains — throwing
the bodies into the ravine, and covering them up with earth. In going over
the battle field lately I noticed where some of the graves had been opened by
pushing rails down under the bodies and prying them up. Many of the negroes
said they had seen the soldiers doing that.-
Question. What was their Dbject ?
Answer. As 1 was informed, it was to make drinking cups of the tops of the
skulls and rings of the bones, sawing pieces off for that purpose
Question. You sum it all up as very inhuman treatment.
Answer. Yes, sir; I do. I will tell you how Doctor Ferguson, of New York,
was treated. He was taking his ambulance for the wounded when he was fired
into. He took of his green sash, to show his calling, and his hankerchief, as a
sort of flag of truce, and waved them. A party rode up to him, and asked him
who he was. He told them that he was a surgeon of the New York State
militia. They said they would take a parting shot at him, any way. They
fired at him, and shot him in the leg. He was taken prisoner, and laid in the
ambulance. He had his boots on, and his spurs on his boots ; and as they
drove along his spurs would catch in the tail-board, causing him such agony
that he screamed out. One of their officers rode up to him, and placed his pis
tol at his head, and threatened if he screamed again he would shoot him.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. When was this ?
Answer. On Sunday, the day of the battle.
WASHINGTON, April 11, 1862.
Governor WILLIAM SP HAGUE sworn and examined.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. What is your present position?
Answer. I am governor of the State of Rhode Island.
Question. You have recently visited the battle field of Bull Run ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. For the purpose of recovering the bodies of some of your soldiers
who fell there last July ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Will you state, in your own way, what you saw and learned
there, in reference to the treatment of our wounded and dead by the rebels after
the battle of Bull Run?
Answer. As to the officers ?
Question. Generally, in regard to all. We have been instructed by the
Senate to investigate the statements made public, concerning the cruel and bar
barous treatment of our wounded and dead.
Answer. In that part of the field where I was our wounded were taken to
TESTIMONY. 475
two different places ; one was a storehouse at the point where the engagement
first took place ; the other was about three-quarters of a mile in the rear of the
battle field. Colonel Slocum and Major Ballou were taken to a position at the
rear. When the retreat commenced we had in this hospital, as it was termed,
several wounded rebel officers ; and there were also several of our men there,
who were promised, if they would stay with them, that they should be released.
They did remain. When I went out there a few days since I took three men
with me to designate the places where these officers had been buried. On
reaching the place we commenced digging for the bodies of Colonel Slocum and
Major Ballou at the spot which was pointed out to us by those soldiers. While
we were digging there some negro women came up and asked who we were
looking for; and, at the same time, said that "Colonel Slogan" had been dug
up by the rebels, some men of a Georgia regiment, his head cut off, and his
body taken to a ravine some thirty or forty yards below, and there burned.
We stopped digging and went to the place thus designated, where we found
coals, ashes, and bones mingled together. A little distance from there we found
a shirt and a blanket with large quantities of hair upon it. Everything there
indicated the buring of a body there. We then returned and dug down at the
spot indicated as the grave of Major Ballou, but found no body there. But at
the spot designated as the place where Colonel Slocum was burned we found a
box, which, upon having raised and opened, was found to contain the body of
Colonel Slocum. The soldiers who had buried the bodies of Colonel Slocum
and Major Ballou were satified that the grave that had been opened and the
body taken out, beheaded, and burned, was that of Major Ballou, because it
was not in the spot where Colonel Slocum was buried, but rather to the right
of it. They at once said that the rebels had made a mistake, and taken the
body of Major Ballou for that of Colonel Slocum. The shirt we found near the
place where the body was burned I recognized as one belonging to Major Bal
lou, as I had been very intimate with him.- We gathered up the ashes contain
ing the portions of his remains that were left and put them in a coffin, together
with his shirt, and the blanket and the hair found upon it, and some hair also
that was brought to us by a civilian who had expostulated with the rebels
against this barbarity.
Question. What was the name of that civilian 1
Answer. I do not know.
Question. He was a resident there ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; he resided near Sudley church. After we had done this
we went to that portion of the field where the battle had first commenced, and
began to dig there for the remains of Captain Tower. We had brought a sol
dier with us to designate the place where he was buried, who had been wounded
at the battle, and had seen from the window of the house in which he was
placed the spot where Captain Tower was buried. On opening the ditch, or
trench, where he was buried, we found it filled with bodies of soldiers, all buried
with their faces downwards. After taking up some four or five of them, we
discovered the remains of Captain Tower, mingled with those of the men, and
took them and placed them in a coffin and brought them home.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. The position of these bodies was such that you were satisfied that
they were buried intentionally with their faces downwards ?
Answer. Undoubtedly; beyond all controversy.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. Did you consider that that was done as a mark of indignity 1
Answer. Yes, sir; as an indignity.
Question. What could have been their object in doing these things, especially
what they did with what they considered the body of Colonel Slocuin1?
476 TESTIMONY
Answer. Sh eer brutality ; nothing else. They did it on accout of his courage
and chivalry in forcing his regiment fearlessly and bravely upon them, and de
stroying about one-half of that Georgia regiment, which was made up of their
best citizens.
Question. Were these barbarities perpetrated by that regiment 1
Answer. By that same regiment, as I was told. We saw where their own
dead were buried with marble head and foot stones, and the names upon them,
while ours were buried, as I have stated, in trenches. I have published an
order to my second regiment, to which these officers were attached, that I shall
not be satisfied with what they shall do, unless they give an account of at least
one rebel killed for each one of their own number.
WASHINGTON, April 11, 1862.
DANIEL BIXBY, jr, sworn and examined.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Where do you reside ?
Answer. I reside in this city.
Question. Have you been recently on a visit to Manassas and Bull Run?
Answer. I have.
Question. Will you state to the committee, in your own way, what you saw
and learned in relation to the condition of our dead there?
Answer. I went out in company with Mr. Gr. A. Smart, of Cambridge, Mas
sachusetts, who went to look for the body of his brother, who fell at Black
burn's Ford, in the action of the 18th of July. We took with us one who was
there at the time, to point out where *his brother fell. We found a grave there,
which was opened. The clothes there found were identified as those of the
brother of Mr. Smart, and were recognized from some peculiarities in the make ;
they were made by the mother. Other clothes of the same make, and with the
same peculiarities, were taken with us, with which to compare those we might
find in the grave. They were compared, and found to correspond exactly, We
found no head in the grave, and no bones of any kind ; nothing but the clothes
and portions of the flesh of the body. We also saw the remains of three other
bodies together that had not been buried at all, as we concluded from their
appearance. The clothes were there, which we examined by cutting them open,
and found some remains of flesh in them, but no bones. A Mrs. Pierce Butler,
who lived near there, said that she had seen the rebels boiling portions of the
bodies of our dead in order to obtain their bones as relics, the rebels not wait
ing for them to decay, so that they could take their bones from them. She said
she had seen drum sticks made of " Yankee shin-bones," as the rebels call them.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Are there any bones in a man's body long enough to make drum
sticks 1
Answer. The lower leg bone, the shin-bone, was used for that.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Did you see more than the one grave opened?
Answer. No, sir; that was the only grave we examined.
Question. You were satisfied from examination of the remains that the bones
had all been taken away?
Answer. Yes, sir; we examined the clothes thoroughly and found but one
small piece of bone, perhaps as large as your little finger ; that was all.
TESTIMONY. 477
Question. Did the body appear to have been taken up after it had been burried ?
Answer. We could not tell positively about that, but we thought it probable
that it had been.
Question. How deep was it burried ?
Answer. Two feet, perhaps; just covered over fairly. Mrs. Butler also said
she had seen a skull that one of the New Orleans artillery had, which he
said he was going to send home and have mounted, and was going to drink
a brandy punch out of it the day he was married. I understood Mrs. Butler to
say that the rebels had a force of some 90,000 men at Manassas, Centreville, and
Bull Run, until the middle of February, when they began to leave. The artil
lery and infantry that were stationed near where she lived she said went away
on the Friday before our troops went out there. But on Friday night they sent
back a regiment of cavalry to do picket duty, and on Saturday morning they
went away, and on Saturday afternoon our pickets and scouts came up there.
Question. On Saturday afternoon?
Answer. I will not be certain whether it was Saturday or Sunday afternoon.
They came up in the afternoon of the day the enemy left in the morning.
Question. Had you any converation with any other parties relative to this
matter ]
Answer. No, sir; we saw none beside our own party, except Mr. Butler and
his family.
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, April 16, 1862.
LEWIS FRANCIS, being sworn, testified that he resides in Hamilton street,
near Park avenue, in the city of Brooklyn ; was at the battle of Bull Run as a
private in the 14th regiment New York volunteers. As I was loading my
musket I was attacked by two rebel soldiers and wounded in the right knee
joint with a bayonet, when I fell. As I lay on the ground they kept bayonetting
me until I received fourteen wounds ; one of them then left, the other remaining
over me, when a Union soldier coming up shot him in the breast, and he fell
dead. I lay on the ground until about 10 o'clock the next day. I was then
removed in a wagon to a building used as a temporary hospital. My wounds
were then examined and partially dressed. On the Saturday following we were
removed to the Manassas depot, and from there we were removed to the general
hospital at Richmond. In October, my leg having partially mortified, I con
sented that it should be amputated, which operation was performed by a young
man. I insisted that they should allow Dr. Swalm to be present. I wanted
one Union man to be present if I died under the operation. The stiches and
the band slipped from neglect, and the bone protruded, and about two weeks
after another operation had to be performed, at which time another piece of the
thigh bone was sawed off. About six weeks after the amputation, and before it
healed, I was removed from the general hospital to the tobacco factory. On my
removal from the prison to Fortress Monroe another operation was performed,
when five pieces of bone were removed. I remained five weeks at this hospital,
when I was removed to Washington and spent a week in the hospital at that
place, when I was removed to Brooklyn, where an operation was performed by
Dr. Lewis Bauer, who removed two splinters of bone and sawed off another
piece of the thigh bone. Whilst at Manassas I recived for food but a small
amount of boiled rice and hard bread. At Richmond, whilst in the general
hospital, I was well fed; at the tobacco factory I had a. small amount of sour
bread and tough fresh beef. I should have perished for want, but a lady
named Van Lew sent her slave every other day with food, and supplied me with
clothing until January, when the officer in charge of the prison prevented her
from sending me any more provisions. After they had removed me from the
general hospital to the tobacco factory, they returned and removed the bed from
478 TESTIMONY.
under me, and removed all the pillows and bed clothing, and laid me on a blanket
on a cot, with another blanket to cover me. At this time I was covered with
bed sores, having lain in bed from July up to this time, December.
WASHINGTON, April 23, 1862.
Hon. SIMON CAMERON sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. We have been directed by the Senate to inquire into the barbarous
manner in which the wounded and dead of our army have been treated by the
rebels. Will you state to the committee what you know in regard to their
treatment of your brother, who was killed in the battle of Bull Run ?
Answer. After my brother fell in that engagement, I am informed that his
body was carried off by some of his men from the battle-field and placed, as was
supposed, in a secure place, so that it could be recovered by his friends after
the battle was over. There were eight men who took charge of the body and
carried it back off the field, four of whom were killed. The body was placed
in an ambulance and left there. When they returned, as I understand, they
found that the body had been thrown out of the ambulance upon the ground,
and his pockets rifled of his watch, purse, portraits, &c. The blanket that had
been left over the body was taken away, and, as we have learned since, the body
was thrown into a hole or ditch with several other bodies, and there covered up
with earth.
The morning after I heard of his death, Mr. Magraw, of Pennsylvania, for
merly State treasurer, called upon me and told me that he had some acquaint
ances among the rebels out there, and offered to go out and get the body of my
brother. I told him that I thought it would be of no use for him to go out there.
He went, however, and instead of being able to obtain the body, by order of
Generals Johnston and Beauregard he was made prisoner and sent to Richmond,
where he was kept four or five months.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. The rebels knew the body to be that of Colonel Cameron, your
brother ]
Answer. Yes, sir.
By the chairman :
Question. And they knew these messengers went out there solely for the pur
pose of obtaining the body ]
Answer. Yes, sir. They had no other object in going.
Question. And they took them prisoners of war and sent them to Richmond
and kept them there ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; and part of the time close prisoners. The body of my
brother, when lately recovered, was recognized by means of a truss which he wore.
WASHINGTON, April 24, 1862.
JOHN KANE sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Were you present at the battle of Bull Run ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
TESTIMONY. 479
Question. What position did you occupy there ?
Answer. I was sergeant in the 1 Oth company of the 79th regiment, and acting
orderly to Colonel Cameron.
Question. Were you near him when he was killed 1
Answer. Yes, sir; not more than 15 or 20 yards from him.
Question. Will you state the circumstances of his death, and what was done
with his body afterwards]
Answer. He was standing conversing with a lieutenant of the 10th company in
relation to taking off the wounded, when he received a bullet in his left breast and
fell while in the act of speaking. He endeavored to say something after he was
shot, but the blood gushed out of his mouth and nose, and he fell, dying almost
instantly. As soon as it was ascertained that he was dead, some eight men
placed his body across their muskets, and carried it back off the field, and placed
it in an ambulance of the second Maine regiment. The surgeon at first objected
to our placing a dead man in the ambulance, saying it was needed for the
wounded. But when we told him it was the body of Colonel Cameron, the
brother of the Secretary of War, he said we could put it in there.
At that time General McDowell rode up and told me to order our men, who
were scattering, to rally on the hill and try to form a square and prepare to
repel some cavalry who were coming. I replied that I was in charge of Colonel
Cameron's body, and wanted to take it back to Washington. He then told me
to pass the order to the first officer of the regiment I met, when I could return.
I mounted Colonel Cameron's horse and rode back, until I saw the major of the
regiment, to whom I gave the orders of General McDowell. General McDowell
coming along there, I informed him that I had given Jiis orders to the major of
the regiment, when I got permission to return to where I had left the body of
Colonel Cameron.
When I got back I met the surgeon of the regiment, who informed me that
the hospital had been taken possession of by the enemy, and several prisoners
taken ; and that if I went where we had left the ambulance with the body of
Colonel Cameron I would also be taken prisoner. I replied that it would not
much matter if I were, and that I should try to find the body. When I reached
where the ambulance was I found that some ten or fifteen of the rebel cavalry —
black horse cavalry, as I understood — had been there, thrown all the bodies out
of the ambulance, and driven it off for their own wounded. One of the surgeons
then told me that I had better make the best of my way to Washington, for if
I remained there I should be taken prisoner. I accordingly returned.
I afterwards went out with a flag of truce from Colonel McCunn's head
quarters to endeavor to get the body. I saw a Lieutenant Barbour, who was
the senior officer of the post at Fall's Church, to whom I gave my papers. We
were obliged to wait there until he communicated with Colonel Stewart. Towards
evening the messenger returned and said that we could not have permission to
go to Centreville, but they would forward the papers to headquarters, and would
.give me an answer the next day. The next day we returned, and were informed
that we could not have the permission we asked, because the papers were ad
dressed "to whom it may concern;" that it did not concern them, and if they
were not officially addressed they would not recognize any papers sent to them.
I asked Lieutenant Barbour to see that some mark was put upon^the grave of
Colonel Cameron so that it could be found, and he promised that he would do so.
When Centreville was evacuated in March last, I accompanied a party down
there to obtain the body of Colonel Cameron, but we could find nothing to indi
cate where the grave was. We asked one man living there — Mr. Lewis, I
believe — who we understood knew where the grave was, but he denied having
any knowledge of it, which I have reason to believe was false. I took the party
to where Colonel Cameron fell, and also to where the ambulance was that his
body was placed in. We met a slave, who said he knew where the body was,
480 TESTIMONY.
because he had heard his mistress — a widow Donn — say it was his body ; and
he had seen a locket, with a picture in it, and some papers that had been taken
from his body. The negro said the body had remained on the field from Sunday
till Thursday before it was buried, and that he had noted the place where it was
buried particularly, as he had understood that a reward would be paid for finding
the body.
We went to the place pointed out by the negro and opened the grave; we
found several bodies there ; they had to all appearance been thrown in in any
way, just as they came to them ; in endeavoring to remove the remains of Colonel
Cameron without separating them any, which we did by inserting a board under
the lower part of the body and pushing it gradually and carefully up towards
the head, we had to take off one of his arms and the skull of another body that
was lying on it; we recognized the body from the clothing on it; from a shirt
that I had myself bought for him in Washington, and from a truss that we found
on the body ; several officers with us, who knew Colonel Cameron, also recog
nized the body ; we placed the remains in a rough box coffin that we made there
and brought them away with us ; the other bodies in the same grave or ditch
appeared to be bodies of private soldiers.
Question. Had anything been taken from the body?
Answer. Yes, sir; we found his pockets turned inside out, and his watch, ring,
purse, locket, boots and spurs had been taken away; he had over $80 in his
purse, for on the morning of the battle I had taken out of his valise and given to
him four twenty dollar pieces and some smaller gold pieces; at the time he fell
I took his revolvers and keys, and brought them back with me.
Question. Did you make any inquiry as to the rifling of the body?
Answer. Yes, sir; and I was told that the body was rifled by some of the
black horse cavalry, and that some of the articles had been shown by one of
Stewart's cavalry.
Question. From whom did you learn that fact?
Answer. This negro said his mistress had told him so; and I heard others
speak of it; Lieutenant Barbour said he had heard something of it from his own
men.
Question. Who buried the body of Colonel Cameron?,
Answer. This negro said that he and two other negroes had buried the bodies
there; the other two negroes have been carried away, but this one managed to
remain some way ; an order was given by some one that each resident should
see that the bodies near their houses were buried ; that is the way these negroes
came to bury them; they dug the hole and put in it all the bodies they found
anywhere near.
Question. Did you ask this negro who had rifled Colonel Cameron's body ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; he said he did not know, except that he had heard his
mistress say that it was done by one of the black horse cavalry when they took
it out of the ambulance in which we had left it; the negro said the pockets were
turned inside out when he came across the body at the time they buried it.
WASHINGTON, May 7, 1862.
JOSEPH A. KIRBY sworn and examined.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Where do you reside t
Answer. In Wilmore, Cambria county, Pennsylvania.
Question. What has been your occupation ?
Answer. I have been engaged in telegraphing for the Pennsylvania railroad
company in the office of Colonel Scott, at Pittsburg.
TESTIMONY. 481
Question. Did Colonel Scott make you an offer to come to Washington, to
-engage in telegraphing here ?
Answer. He telegraphed for me, and I met him at the Continental Hotel, in
Philadelphia, on my way home in June last.
Question. Have you been a newspaper correspondent ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; for the Pittsburg Chronicle.
Question. From what places ?
Answer. All through the south. I corresponded on as far as Montgomery,
Alabama, until communication with the north was cut off after the fall of Fort
.Sumter. *
Question. Did you go to Pensacola 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; but I was at Montgomery when the order was sent to
Beauregard to commence firing upon Fort Sumter.
Question. How did you get your information of the attack ?
Answer. I roomed in the Exchange Hotel, in Montgomery, right opposite the
room of the confederate postmaster general, Reagan ; and a young man who was
with him told me that that day the ball would open at Fort Sumter. That was
the first information I had of it. I waited until the next morning, and then we
heard the news at Montgomery. As I supposed that the next attack would be upon
Fort Pickens, that evening at four o'clock I took the boat to Mobile, and from
there went to Pensacola, where I arrived at twelve o'clock on Saturday. I was
within sight of Fort Pickens, and spent Sunday and two days thereafter in the
rebel camp. I walked through all their fortifications — every one of them — was
in Fort Barrancas, saw where preparations were being made for new batteries,
and then returned to Pensacola, nine miles from the navy yard. The telegraph
office was close by the hotel where I stopped, and by going near I could tell by
the sound of the instrument, being an old telegraphic operator myself, what was
passing over the line, and I heard some conversation which led me to believe
that an attack was to be made on Fort Pickens. Cooper, from Montgomery,
telegraphed to Bragg that Fort Sumter had surrendered, and asked when he
was going to make the attack. Bragg did not himself send word ; but one of
the officers at Pensacola telegraphed to a friend in Macon, Georgia, that they
were to land on Santa Rosa island in a few days. That night I disguised
myself as a fisherman, and got a boat with a negro man to row it, and went
over to Fort Pickens, in an open boat, and gave Colonel Brown, Captain Clitz,
and Lieutenant Slemmer information of the intended attack. I had intended
to return to Pensacola again, and go home through the rebel lines up through
Virginia ; but Captain Clitz told me it would be dangerous for me to do so. He
said the information I had given him was important, and wanted to know what
he could do for me. He offered to send me home. Colonel Brown did send me
home, and I returned to New York in company with Lieutenant Slemmer.
Question. You say you took a negro along to row you over to Fort Pickens 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; but he did not know who I was until we had got into the
middle of the bay. I came to New York, and then met Colonel Scott by ap
pointment in Philadelphia. I then went on to Pittsburg, to see my friends, in
tending to come on to Washington to accept an appointment in the telegraph
department here. But while on my way here I heard of the battle of Bull
Run, and that spoiled all my plans about coming here.
I then went direct to Harper's Ferry, and offered my services to General
Banks as a spy, and was making arrangements to enter the rebel lines and go
on to Manassas, or to Richmond, or wherever else it was thought necessary.
One evening two of us went across the river, and we got rather too far into the
rebel lines. My companion laid down to rest himself, while I went on ahead
alone. In a short time I met three rebel scouts, who, when they saw me, fired upon
me, but did not hit me. I ran and got to the river, but could not cross, and they
came up and captured me. I pretended to be very glad when I discovered they were
Part iii 31
482 TESTIMONY.
the confederate scouts, and told them I was a Baltimorean, and was on my way
south. They asked me why I ran when I saw them. I said I supposed they
were federal scouts, which seemed to satisfy them, as they knew the federal sol
diers were close by. They took me before General Beauregard, at Manassas,
who asked me two or three questions. I remained there a few days. I was on
the battle-ground at Bull Run on the Sunday two weeks after the battle. On
the Tuesday after, I was sent to Fredericks burg, and from there went on to
Eichmond.
Question. What did you notice on the battle-ground at Bull Run, in regard
to the treatment of our dead by the rebels who were there?
Answer. There were a captain of the rebel army, and two or three privates,
teamsters, along with me. They all admitted that bodies of federal soldiers
had been burned on the same pile with dead horses ; they all admitted that.
Some of them thought it was very hard, very wrong. And I saw at least ten
bodies that were not more than half buried, and I did riot go over all the battle
field. 1 saw arms and legs and heads sticking up out of the ground ; they had
only a little earth thrown over them, and a little brush thrown over that. The
stench from the decaying bodies was very bad.
Question. Did you see where any bodies of our soldiers had been burned 1
Answer. I saw piles of ashes and bones, but I could not tell what the bones
were.
Question. You heard them say that they had burned the bodies of our sol
diers 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I heard them talking about it while I was there.
Question. You say you went to Richmond?
Answer. Yes, sir. I had an opportunity to escape, while I was at Fredericks-
burg, but I did not. I told them I was a Marylander and a secessionist, and by
talking to them made them believe I was a secessionist. But when they got me to
Richmond, they put me in one of their tobacco warehouses, with some Union
men who had been brought from Western Virginia. HoAvever, they let me out
when I had been there about five weeks, as I offered to do soldier's duty, and I
went to work on some fortifications near the James river, and acted as a guard
to some free negroes they had at work on the fortifications. The guns were
not mounted then. I was there a little over three weeks, when I was taken sick
and was relieved. I went to a private house on Main street, in Richmond, to
board, and was there Jwo or three weeks without any money or medical attend
ance or care whatever.
As soon as I got well enough to be able to go out, I walked to Petersburg,
as I could not leave the city by railroad without a pass. At Petersburg I got
on the train and went to Norfolk, intending to try and escape from there. I
was there two nights and one day, but found I could not get away, as so strict
a watch was kept in consequence of so many negroes escaping. I then re
turned to Richmond and worked in the laboratory there until the 10th of Janu
ary. Being out of money, I enlisted in the third Maryland battery as a substi
tute, receiving $180 in confederate money, which was as good as any other
there. I joined that battery because I expected it would be sent to join the
army of the Potomac ; and I intended, after finding out all I could about the
fortifications at Manassas and Centreville, to make my way to the Union lines.
But after Zollicoffer's defeat we were sent to East Tennessee to replace the ar
tillery he had lost. I do not recollect how long I was at Knoxville. I was
sent on one expedition up to Clinton, on Clinch river ; then on another expedi
tion to Kingston, on Holston river ; and then I was sent by General E. Kirby
Smith to Cumberland Gap with a pay-roll, to get certain men there to sign it,
and then to return with it. When I arrived at Cumberland Gap, one evening
I could see from a hill there the camp fires of the Union troops, and I made up
iny rnind to escape there. The next morning a regiment passed down the val-
TESTIMONY. 483
ley to drill, and I mixed in with the soldiers and passed the inner pickets with
them. When they became engaged in their drill I walked off, and after some
time I reached General Carter's camp. I gave him information of every regi
ment in East Tennessee, the number of men, the name of the commanding
officer, and the number and situation of the guns at Cumberland Gap. I was
sent home at the expense of the United States government, and came on here
about five days ago to get some employment from the government.
Question. What means of information had you concerning the strength of the
rebels at Centreville and Manassas ?
Answer. There were three young men in oar company who had belonged to
Calhoun's battery, of South Carolina ; they were at Manassas and were dis
charged, and then joined our company in January. They told me that there
were not more than 40,000 men at Manassas in December, and after that. All
admitted that there were not more than that.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Does that include their troops at Centreville ?
Answer. Yes, sir; that includes all except those at Aquia creek and those
under Jackson over the ridge.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. That includes Manassas, Centreville, and all around there ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; it included what they called the army of the Potomac
proper — not the Aquia army or the Shenandoah army. Having seen and
talked with hundreds of persons who had been there, I was satisfied all the
time that there were not more than 40,000 or 50,000 men there. That seemed
to be the understanding of all with whom I talked upon the subject.
Question. What knowledge had you of the armament at Manassas and Cen
treville — of the number of cannon there ?
Answer. I knew nothing except what I was told, that they had excellent
fortifications at Centreville, much better than they had at Manassas.
Question. Did you hear anything about their wooden guns]
Answer. I knew that they had wooden guns at Munson's Hill ; that they had
been using wooden guns and stovepipes all along. I got that information from
men who had been there. I knew an aide-de-camp who had been in the army
that had retreated before Patterson at Winchester. He told me about them.
They fully expected an attack at Manassas. I am confident of that from what
they told me.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Do you mean that they expected an attack upon Manassas last
falU
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. You think your sources of information, that there were not more
than forty thousand troops at Manassas and Centreville, are perfectly reliable?
Answer. I have no doubt of it. I talked with a great many who had been
there, and that appeared to be the general impression of them all. I thought
you folks here knew all the time that there were only about forty thousand
men there.
Question. What treatment did the Union men receive from the rebel army
where you have been, in Tennessee, &c.?
Answer. When General Carter made an advance on Big Creek Gap, Lead-
better's brigade, consisting of about three thousand five hundred men, went
there. We were to go up to Clinch river and meet General Carter's force,
484 TESTIMONY.
while G-eneral E. Kirby Smith was to bring up a force and get in his rear.
The horses for the cavalry and artillery of our army were supplied almost al
together from the Union men along the route. We never gave them any re
ceipts for them. We took every wagon arrd every horse from every Union man
we came across, and all the corn and hay they had — everything that we
wanted.
Question. Did the rebel army ever plunder their houses 1
Answer. I went with one of the quartermasters who was a captain, and ho,
with two others, went into the house of a man who had been obliged to leave
for Kentucky on account of his Union sentiments. I was ordered, and did so,
to go into a field and tell a negro who was ploughing there to bring down the
four mules he had and hitch them up in a wagon ; and we went into the smoke
house and took every bit of bacon the woman had. She said it was all she had
to keep her alive. We took her two negroes and blankets off the bed in the
house and carried them off. There was no receipt, or order, or paper of any
kind given her to show that this property had been appropriated by the rebels,
and no report was made of it through the proper authorities. I helped to carry
the meat and put it into the wagon. The woman was crying and the children
were crying as we were doing this. When I came across the mountains into
General Carter's camp, I inquired for the man. He was a captain in the Union
army. I told him what had been done.
I was on two of these expeditions. On one we went to the house of an old
man who had his wife with him. She was an old lady of sixty years of age ;
he was, I should think, seventy-five years of age. They had one negro boy to
cut wood, bring water, and do everything of that kind for them. He offered us
dinner. A commissioned officer who was with us asked him if he was a Union
man. He said he was, and that he could not deny it. The only thing he
regretted was that he had not died before Tennessee went out of the Union.
The officer said he was a damned old fool, and without saying another word to
him, he turned around and took his wagon, two horses, and his negro away from
him, so that the old folks had no means to help them get along.
Question. Are the officers and the masses of the army informed as to the results
of the battles that have been fought ?
Answer. I held a position as gunner in the battery to which I belonged, and
when I left I did not believe that Manassas had been evacuated.
Question. How long ago was that '?
Answer. About four weeks ago. We had heard that Columbus had been
evacuated by Beauregard, but were told that he brought away with him all his
supplies, every gun, and without the loss of a man. We did not know anything
of the troops leaving Pehsacola. They claimed a' victory for a while at Pea
Ridge, and then afterwards said nothing about it. The battle at Winchester
they told us was a drawn battle. The men are kept in complete ignorance of
everything that is going on, especially in the army. They never know how
badly they have been whipped.
Question. Did you know anything about the condition of affairs at Winchester
when Patterson was before it with his army 1
Answer. Only from what I heard from one of the aides-de-camp of one of the
rebel generals who was there.
Question. Did they admit that Patterson could have taken Winchester ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; and they expected he would take it when he advanced
within a few miles of it. The people there had pulled down all the secession
flags, and the Union people had got Union flags to raise as soon as our troops
should come, and were very much disappointed when Patterson turned away
and left.
Question. Did you find many Union men in the secession army 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; there are a great many of them, particularly among the
TESTIMONY. 485
Virginians, Tennesseeans, and North Carolinians. I do noi recollect of seeing
any from other States whom I thought to be Union men, except some few for
eigners from New Orleans. They have so many Union men in the secession army
in East Tennessee that they are afraid to give them arms of any kind in some
places, except squirrel rifles, and they even took them away, and gave them axes
and picks to clear away the woods, &c., so that they could get a range for
their cannon.
Question. You found a great many Union men in East Tennessee ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I found very few secessionists in East Tennessee. It
was a very rare thing to find a secessionist there. I was intimate with Parson
Brownlow's family, and was one of the guard set over his house for a time. I
knew Mr. Maynard's family, and was acquainted with his brother. I am ac
quainted with the whole, country all through East Tennessee, and also all about
Richmond, Virginia, and from there out to East Tennessee. We were over a
week going from Richmond to East Tennessee. The Union men threw the
train we were on off the track in Southwestern Virginia, near East Tennessee.
That is rather a common occurrence there. The secession troops never pass
through that country without loading their guns before they get to Southwestern
Virginia and into East Tennessee.
Question. What is the feeling in the southern army in regard to our com
manders ? Are there any of them that they fear more than others, or do they
appear to know much about them 1
Answer. From what I have heard the officers and men in the army say, I am
of the opinion that they would all be very sorry to hear that General McClellan
had resigned, or left the army. They admire him very much; but they were
very much rejoiced when they learned that Secretary Cameron had resigned.
Question. Why would they dislike to have General McClellan resign 1
Answer. It is principally on the negro question. They would fear that some
one else would take his place who would work more against him. They regard
him as the best friend they could have as a general, and think they could get
along better with him than any other general. They are very much afraid of
General Fremont.
Question. On account of his fighting qualities, or on account of his opinions
on the negro question 1
Answer. On account of the negro question.
Question. It would appear from that that they are more alarmed about the
negroes than about the fighting 1
Answer. Yes, sir. They are very much afraid, all through the south, that
the federal government will make some use of the negroes; that the negroes will
be interfered with and they be ruined ; and they admit that would have been done
before this time but for General McClellan.
Question. It is on account of the negro question that they feel so much in
terest about who commands our armies ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
WASHINGTON, March 26, 1863.
Mr. S. A. PANCOAST sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Where is your present residence, and where has your residence
been ?
Answer, In Hampshire county, Virginia. I am a New Jerseyman by birth,
but have lived in Hampshire county for the last fifteen years.
Question. What has been your occupation or employment }
486 TESTIMONY.
Answer. Manufacturer of iron.
Question. Have you been arrested by the rebels at any time; and if so, when?
Answer. I was first arrested and taken to Winchester, Virginia, before the
rebel General Carson. I was kept there three or four days, and then told by
him that there was no evidence against me, and I was released. Before I left I
asked him if it would be considered wrong for me to go north and get some
groceries, salt, sugar, &c., as we should suffer very much there on account of
the blockade during the fall and winter. He said no, that that must be winked
at. I then came on here and saw the President of the United States, and he
gave me a letter to General Scott, who gave me a permit to take over those
things. I then went home, and saw General Carson, Colonel McDonald, and
all the confederate officers within fifty miles of me, and got, in writing, their
permit to go on and buy these groceries, and the confederate army should not
take them from me when I brought them on. I came on here again. By that
time General Scott had resigned, and General McClellan had taken his place.
I got General McClellan's name to my paper, and went home again.
The night I got home — the 10th of November, 1861 — I was arrested, and
carried to Winchester on the charge of having carrier pigeons with me. I had
four little tumblers and a pair of ruff-necked pigeons, which my little son had
got in Baltimore. I was for a week kept there on parole. The provost marshal
was acquainted with me, and resigned his situation because Jackson demanded
that I should be put in prison. I was put in the guard-house, and remained
there ten days, suffering every indignity that could be put upon me. 1. applied
for a writ of habeas corpus, and was taken to Richmond the next night. The
lawyer whom I had employed said that there was no charge against me; it was
not what 1 had done, but what I might do; that it was in my power to injure
them, and therefore I was sent to Richmond. In Richmond I was kept in the
Main Street prison for three months, with the officers of the north. When they
were released I was put in prison with the citizen prisoners. There were from
500 to 700 citizens, with some soldiers there. For a week or two we had no
privy there, except by going down three flights of stairs. I have seen old men
of seventy or eighty years of age stand from 7 o'clock in the morning until 12
o'clock the next day before they had an opportunity of going down stairs.
Fifty cents and a dollar was frequently paid by those who had money for the
privilege of going down. That was the cause of our greatest suffering there.
While in the Libby prison we had soup and beef once or twice a week.
When the soup was brought into the room I have seen them pick the maggots
out of it before they ate it. If they did not eat that, they would have to go
without. After the battle of Williamsburg they picked out eight or ten of us —
the worst Union men there — and carried us to Salisbury, North Carolina, where
we remained about ten months. When we got there we were put into a small
building, and kept there, without being allowed the privilege of going out for any
purpose ; and there, again, our greatest sufferings were caused by the difficulty
of attending to the calls of nature. We had a box in the room, which we were
compelled to use until the stench became awful We s'uffcred very much during
the warm weather. We were often compelled to lie so thick on the floor that
one could not turn over without all turning over. After a while they allowed
us a yard containing five or six acres, where we were allowed to go in the day
time. At five o'clock we were compelled to return to the prison, which was then
closed, and we remained in a close room until eight or nine o'clock the next mom-
ing. We could cook only in the yard : there was no chance to do so in the
prison. On our way from Richmond to Salisbury we were hurried off one
morning because we had shown very great anxiety for McClellan to come to
Richmond after the battle of Williamsburg, and we talked pretty loudly and
freely about it. We started on the 15th of May, and arrived at Salisbury CHI
the 17th of May, being fifty-three hours on the road. We were seated 011
TESTIMONY. 487
benches without backs, (among us old men seventy to eighty years of age,)
and compelled to sit there for all those fifty-three hours, for the guard had pos
itive orders to shoot any of us Avho should stand up. I think that ride sent a
great many old men to their graves ; they never recovered from it. With the
exception of the chills and fever of the country, we got along a great deal
better than we did in Richmond. The deaths were not near so frequent. After
Mr. Wood, superintendent of the Old Capitol prison here, returned from his
visit to Salisbury, we were made to suffer very much, because we acknowledged
•that we were Union men. We were kept in close confinement from five o'clock
in the evening until eight or nine o'clock the next morning, without any fire, all
through the cold weather of the falj. From that exposure I was taken with
the inflammatory rheumatism, and suffered very much ; and at last a surgeon
who was very kind to me had me placed in a building out in the yard ; but this
was not done until they said there was no hope of my living long. For six
or eight weeks I could not get up, or dress or undress myself without assist
ance. At Richmond we had a loaf of bread a day, and it was always good;
but at Salisbury the bread was always sour ; but, with the exception of the
bread, our food at Salisbury was better than at Richmond. We had a small al
lowance, however — from seven to fourteen ounces of food for the twenty-four
hours. If we got fourteen ounces we thought we were doing very well indeed.
While in prison in Richmond a lot of "Louisiana Tigers," sentenced to confine
ment with ball and chain, were put in the prison with us, and they abused us
most shamefully. And at Salisbury, where we had a yard, the guard around
the fence would strike and punch at us with their bayonets if we got near
enough the fence for them to reach us. This they would do every chance they
could get. And while in the prison the guard below would, at times, discharge
their muskets up at the floor under our feet, and the balls would pass up among
us. This was done several times. Since the 1st of August, a year ago, until
we came away, we have buried 167 of our Union prisoners.
Question. What caused the deaths of those men '!
Answer. Mostly want of suitable provisions. There was nothing for them
when they were sick that was fitted for them. I think the most of them died
from want of proper food. We had a surgeon there, but he had not much medi
cine to give us. And when a father was taken out to be buried it was seldom
that the son, if he had one there, was allowed to go to his funeral. We were
abused the most by the refugees placed over us from Maryland and Washing
ton. When we were taken to Salisbury from Richmond they told us that we
need not take anything with us, and they would not allow us to doit; and
when we got to Salisbury we were compelled to sleep on the bare floor all the
•time we were there, except some feAv of us who had ticks furnished to sleep
on.
Question. How many prisoners were kept in the prison at Salisbury ?
Answer. Generally from 200 to 300. The clerk once told me that out of
400 names on the prison book mine was the only one that had no charge
against it.
Question. When were you discharged ?
Answer. We left on the 5th of March, 1863.
WASHINGTON, March 26, 1863.
JAMES M. SEEDS sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Where do you reside ?
Answer. In Cincinnati.
'Question. When and where were you arrested by the rebel?
488 TESTIMONY.
Answer. I was arrested on the 6th of November, 1861, at Columbia, Soutk
Carolina. When I was first arrested they took of the money I had on my
person $635. A few minutes after I was searched we started on the cars for
Richmond. I was arrested on suspicion of being; General Rosecrans going
through the country, and was searched for important papers which it was sup
posed I had upon me. The next morning after we started, after we had passed
Salisbury, North Carolina, I jumped off the train and made my escape, and
took what is called the Western Extension train, and went as far as that went,
74 miles, and then took the stage. I took the stage at Morganton, Buncombe
county, North Carolina. An extra train followed right on after me, and I was
again arrested just on the other side of the Blue Ridge. I was taken out of
the stage by a mob, and it was with great difficulty that some men, who were
friendly toward me, saved my life. I was then tied with my hands behind me^
and made to walk 17 miles to a town called Marion. There I again came very
near being hung. I was there searched very closely and thoroughly, by pulling off
my clothes and boots and searching them all, and $620 more was taken,
from me, partly paper and partly gold. I was then put in the countv jail, in
an iron cage, and locked up there that night with three thieves and two negroes.
The next morning T was taken out, again tied with a rope, and put in a two-
horse barouche and taken back to Morganton. There three dollars of stage-
fare was paid back to me, and then they took that from me. That night I was
made to walk six miles with my hands tied behind me, down to what is called
the head of the road. I was treated very well there. The men working on the
road there took the rope off me and gave me a comfortable bed. I found them.
all Union men. My arrest and re-arrest had been made by Georgia men — some
men of a Georgia regiment. I was then taken to Salisbury, North Carolina, where,
for the third time, I came near being hung. At Salisbury I was put in
irons and taken to Richmond. On the way, above Raleigh, a mob wanted to
take me out of the cars and hang me, but they did not do it. I arrived in
Richmond on the night of the 12th of November, 1861, and was put in a build
ing, called by them "No. 7," with some federal prisoners of war. The next
morning, still handcuffed, I was taken out of that building and put in the Heia-
rico county jail. A few days afterwards I had an examination before James
Lyons, and there they swore that, from all the evidence they could get, they
believed me to be General Rosecrans. Lyons himself told me that I ought to
have been hung; that they never ought to have brought me there. After that
examination I was taken back to the county jail. Lyons reported to their sec
retary of war that he believed me to be a spy, and recommended the govern
ment to hold me as such until he could get evidence enough to hang me. Some
time in February I sued out a writ of habeas corpus, employing as my lawyers
Messrs. Nance & Williams, a legal firm there. The suit was brought before
Judge Meredith, I think. He said that, according to the evidence, he would
have to discharge me from prison. A man named Patrick Henry Elliott was
the lawyer for the government, and had put in the plea that the government,
should hold me as a spy. When the judge made this remark, and he found
that I was about to be discharged, Elliott said he thought the secretary of war
would discharge me if my attorneys would go before him. My attorneys were
to meet Mr. Elliott, and did go before the secretary of war. Mr. Nance came
to the county jail afterwards, and told me that the secretary of war did make
out my discharge for release from prison, and that General Winder put in ob
jections to my being discharged upon the ground of being a Union man ; and
stated that when I was arrested there was a letter found on me, written by a
clergyman in Kentucky to a clergyman in Columbia, South' Carolina, recom
mending me as a good and reliable Union man. That is what Mr. Nance told,
me was done at the war office. The secretary of war then said that he would
hold me three or four clays longer, and give General Winder a chance to pro-
TESTIMONY. 489
cluce that letter. Mr. Nance came to see me about it, and I told him that there
was no such paper about me, and never had been. On the 18th of March I,
with others, broke out of the county jail at Richmond and tried to make our
escape. But I was recaptured on the Pamunkey river, and taken back and put
in the county jail again, and there heavily ironed. They did not iron me quite
so heavily as they did some, but more heavily than they did others. We were
confined in jail with negroes, thieves, and all kinds of criminals. We were fed
pretty well. But there were, at times, from eighteen to twenty negroes there,
and never less than four or five. On the morning of the loth of May we were
hurried off : to Salisbury, North Carolina, on the cars, as Mr. Pancoast has de
scribed, v thout the privilege of getting up from the seat under penalty of being
shot, and without anything to eat until along in the afternoon of the 16th of
May. While we were at Raleigh 1 got a man named Kaschmier, one of the
police, to allow me to send out and get some cakes. That evening they gave
each of us half a loaf of bread, and a slice of meat, both raw and fat. That is
all they ga~re us from the time we left Richmond until we got to Salisbury. And as
near as I can recollect, we were fifty-three hours on the road. When we left
Richmond they lied to me, and took from me my cot bed and cover, and said
they were not going to take us off, but were going to move us up in town ; that
they were going to burn the tobacco warehouses there, and were afraid we would
be smothered to death by the smoke if we remained in the jail. When we
reached Salisbury we were put in this little building described by Mr. Pancoast,.
and allowed no privileges of going out. One day while we were in that build
ing a sentinel commenced raising a fuss with one of the prisoners, and ordered
him to shut his mouth, and at the same time fired at him ; the charge, (a ball and
three buckshot) passed over his head and went into a joist above. He seized
another gun to fire at him, but was stopped.
I think we were ten days in that building and were then moved into what was
called the yard, with some brick houses about it, where our privileges were
much greater. At that time our provisions were about a half a pound of pork
and perhaps a pound of sour bread a day. This yard was afterwards enlarged
to about 100 yards square. Some time in June there were 135 civilian prisoners
brought there, and the yard was then enlarged to take them in. There was
nothing transpired, other than sickness and death, until after the prisoners of
war were carried off. Then they we're very severe on us for a while; but by
giving a written parole that we would not violate any of the regulations of the
prison, we were allowed to go back into this yard again. After being there a
while Mr. Wood, of the Old Capitol prison here, came on as a commissioner on
the part of the United States government to intercede for our exchange. They
had hoped to get some of us for the rebel army. After Mr. Wood and all the
officers of the federal army went away, we were treated very severely, for we
had declared ourselves to be Union men. They cursed us and called us all the
names they could think of, and our rations were not much more than two-thirds
of what they had been at first. Our rations had been decreasing gradually from
the start ; still, I think they were about as much as their private soldiers got, as
far as I could judge. They furnished me no bed from the time I went into that
prison until I came out. When I left Richmond I had some spreads which had
cost me about $750. When I went out they told me they were contraband,
and took them away from me ; and as far as I know they served all the pris
oners in the same manner. I had on an oil-cloth cape, and they raised that up
to see if I had any blankets hid under it. One night, while a Mr. Allen Leonard
was sitting at the prison window in Salisbury, singing Union songs, they shot
at us, and the ball passed in the window over our heads, and up through the
ceiling and floor above us, and missed the feet of one of the prisoners, as he was
lying on the floor, by only about four or five inches. Captain Waters, the com
mander there, was very abusive to the Union prisoners. When I was retaken
490 TESTIMONY.
after ray escape from the Richmond jail, they took $75 from me, giving me a
receipt for only $65. They explained that by saying that it would cost $10 to
fix the lock of the jail. Out of all the money they took from me I received
about $315 in confederate money. The money they took from me was gold
and silver and some paper, mostly Louisiana paper, some North and South Car
olina paper. After they had kept my money for some time, they sent me word
that there was $21 or $22 of the gold that was counterfeit.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Did they have the means of treating you better in the way of food,
&c., than they did! ...
Answer. I think they had. At the Libby prison the meat was bad while the
bread was good. I do not know as they could have furnished us more, but they
could have furnished us better food. At Salisbury we got more provisions
than at Richmond.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTHWEST,
Camp near Batesville, Arkansas, May 21, 1862.
SIR : The absence from my immediate command of those men and officers
who are best acquainted with the facts in regard to the employment of Indian
savages has delayed my reply to your communication of April 2, 1861, until
this time.
I have the honor to now lay before the committee the statements and affidavits
enclosed, from which it will appear that large forces of Indian savages were en
gaged against this army at the battle of Pea Ridge, and that the warfare was
conducted by said savages with all the barbarity their merciless and cowardly
natures are capable of.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. R. CURTIS, Major General
Hon. B. F. WADE,
Chairman of Committee on Conduct of the Present ,War.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTHWEST,
Forsyth, Missouri, April 12, 1862.
SIR : In compliance with your request, conforming to the wish of the joint
committee of Congress "to inquire into the fact whether Indian savages have
been employed by the rebels in their military service, and how such warfare has
been conducted by such savages against the government of the United States,"
I hereby certify upon honor that I was present at the engagement near Leetown,
Arkansas, on the 7th of March ultimo, when the main charge of the enemy's
cavalry was made upon our line; that there were Indians among the forces
making said charge ; and that from personal inspection of the bodies of the men
of the 3d Iowa cavalry, who fell upon that part of the field, I discovered that
eight of the men of that regiment had been scalped. I also saw bodies of the
same men, which had been wounded in parts not vital by bullets, and also pierced
through the heart and neck with knives — fully satisfying me that the men had
first fallen from the gun-shot wounds received, and afterwards brutally murdered.
The men of' the 3d Iowa cavalry, who were taken prisoners by the enemy,
and who have since returned, all state that there were great numbers of Indians
with them on the retreat as far as Elm Springs. Their affidavits will be fur
nished to you as soon as possible.
Respectfully submitted .
JOHN W. NOBLE,
Regimental Adjutant 3d Iowa Cavalry.
Major General SAMUEL R. CURTIS, Commanding.
TESTIMONY 491
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Southwestern District of Missouri :
1, Daniel Bradbury, on my oath, say that I am orderly sergeant of company
A, 3d Iowa cavalry, and that I war* present at the battle of Pea Ridge, near
Leetown, Arkansas, on the 7th of March, 1862, and I then and there saw about
three hundred (300) Indians scattered over the battle-field, without commanders,
doing as they pleased. On the 8th of March I saw what I would judge to be
about thousand (3,000) Indians marching in good order towards the battle-field,
under the command of Albert Pike.
DANIEL BRADBURY,
First Sergeant Company A, 3d Iowa Cavalry.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this the 30th day of April, 1862.
GLENN LOWE,
Adjutant 3d Iowa Cavalry.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Southwestern District of J\Iissouri :
I, John H. Lawson, on my oath, say that I am a private in company D, 3d
Iowa cavalry, and that I was present at the battle of Pea Ridge, near Leetowu,
Arkansas, on the 7th of March, 1862, and I then and there saw, as near as I
could judge, about one hundred and fifty (150) Indians scattered; they were
afterwards formed into companies and marched out of my sight in good order.
On the 8th of March I saw about two thousand (2,000) Indians, said to be under
the command of Albert Pike and Martin Green, marching towards the battle
ground in good order. These were all mounted — armed with shot-guns, rifles,
and large knives.
JOHN H. LAWSON.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this the 30th day of April. 1862.
* GLENN LOWE,
Adjuta.7it 3d Iowa Cavalry.
HEADQUARTERS THIRD IOWA CAVALRY,
Jacksonporf, Arkansas, May 11, 1862.
GENERAL: On the morning of the 7th of March I was on the battle-field of
Pea Ridge. While my command was engaging the enemy near Leetown, I saw
in the rebel army a large number of Indians, estimated by me at one thousand.
After the battle I attended in person to the burial of the dead of my command.
Of twenty-five men killed on the field of my regiment, eight were scalped, and
the bodies of others were horribly mutilated, being fired into with musket-balls,
and pierced through the body and neck with long knives. These atrocities
I believe to have been committed by Indians belonging to the rebel army.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CYRUS BUSSEY, Colonel,
Major General S. R. CURTIS,
Commanding Army of the Southwest.
492 TESTIMONY.
WOUNDED FROM FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
June 16, 1862.
On motion of Mr. Shellabarger,
Resolved, That " the committee upon the conduct of the war " be directed to
inquire and report to this house whether our soldiers who were wounded at
the battle of Port Republic upon the Sth and 9th instant were subjected to any
unnecessary neglect, either by refusal by any officer or surgeon to permit them
to receive surgical attendance or medical supplies from other than their own
brigade or division, or from any other cause. Also, whether they were subjected
to ariy such neglect by being left upon the cars, or otherwise, after their arrival
in this city ; and if any such neglect occurred, that they ascertain and report
the cause thereof.
Attest :
EM. ETHERIDGE, Clerk.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, D. C., June 18, 1862— 12J.
SIR : In answer to your note of this date, just received, I transmit a commu
nication from the surgeon general, which is all the information in possession of
this department in relation to the alleged neglect of our soldiers wounded in the
action of Port Republic.
Your obedient servant,
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
Hon. B. F. WADE.
MEDICAL DIRECTOR'S OFFICE,
Military District of Washington, June 15, 1862.
GENERAL : I have the honor to invite your attention to the conduct of Sur
geon David S. Hays, 110th Pennsylvania volunteers. He stated to me that
he arrived here last night, between 8 and 9 o'clock, in charge of about four
hundred sick and wounded men from Front Royal. He did not report his ar
rival at this office until after 9 o'clock this morning. Ambulances were at once
sent to convey the men to hospitals j and I also sent my assistant, Dr. Sheldon,
78th New York, to superintend their removal, which he did well. As this is
the second time that men have been neglected in this way by the medical of
ficer in charge, I respectfully request that efficient measures may be taken to
prevent its repetition. The conduct of Surgeon Hays is, I think, highly cul
pable, and without excuse. It is, I feel assured, only necessary to bring the
facts to your notice to have him dealt with as he deserves.
1 am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JONA. LETTERMAN,
Assistant Surgeon U. S. A., Medical Director,
Brigadier General W. A. HAMMOND,
Surgeon General U. S. A , Washington, D. C.
TESTIMONY. 493
[Indorsement.]
SURGEON GENERAL'S OFFICE, June 16, 1862.
Respectfully transmitted to the Secretary of War. Surgeon Hays has ex
hibited a total want of comprehension of his duties, if not the grossest inhu
manity. Whilst the men were being removed to the hospitalshe absented him
self, leaving the whole duty of taking care of these wounded soldiers to the
medical officers having charge of the ambulances.
I therefore respectfully recommend that severe and summary punishment be
awarded to Surgeon Hays. This is the second time within a short period
that surgeons bringing sick and wounded to this, city have neglected them.
An example would be highly beneficial.
WILLIAM A. HAMMOND,
Surgeon General.
Referred to the adjutant general, with instructions to dismiss Surgeon Hays
for iieglect of duty.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
SURGEON GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington City, D. C., June 22, 1862.
DEAR SIR: I enclose you for the committee all the telegrams received at and
Bent from this office relative to the sick brought by Dr. Hays. I also enclose
a copy of an order I had issued to Brigade Surgeon Cox for not having hos
pitals and stores.
The watchmen will report to-morrow. They both say positively that Dr.
Hays never came to the office till Sunday morning.
Yours, truly,
WILLIAM A. HAMMOND.
Hon. Mr. ODBLL, M. C., Wittardt' Hotel
[Received June 13, 1862.]
FRONT ROYAL, June 13 — 11.20.
SIR: One hundred and eighty (180) wounded of Shields's division have just
arrived here. We are without hospitals or other means for their comfort. I
desire your orders with regard to them.
Respectfully,
ABRAM L. COX, Brigade Surgeon.
WM. A. HAMMOND, M. D., Surgeon General.
[Received June 13, 1862 ]
FRONT ROYAL, June 13 — 3.50.^?. m.
SIR : I arrived here this morning with two hundred and eighty (280) sick
and wounded from Shields's division in charge. I reported to senior medical
officer at this place, but General Ricketts, first brigade, second division, refuses
to allow him to act. 1 am, therefore, without any medicines or dressings, which
Dr. Cox is not permitted to furnish. Please telegraph me what disposition I
shall make of them.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
D. S. HAYS, Surgeon in Charge.
Surgeon General HAMMOND, U. S. A.
494 TESTIMONY.
SURGEON GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington City, D. C., June 13, 1862.
Send your sick on to this city. Telegraph when they leave. You will be
ordered to report in person to the surgeon general.
WILLIAM A. HAMMOND,
Surgeon General.
Dr. A. L. Cox,
Brigade Surgeon, U. S. F., Front Royal, Va.
[Received June 14, 1862.]
MANASSAS, June 14, 1862 — 4.14^. m.
The train will arrive at Washington by 8 or 9 o'clock p. m.
D. S. HAYS, Surgeon in Charge.
Surgeon General HAMMOND.
[Extract.]
SURGEON GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington City, D. C., June 13, 1862.
SIR : * * * * And that Brigade Surgeon A. L. Cox,
United States volunteers, be directed to report to the surgeon general in this
city, to account for his neglect in not having provided proper hospitals and
other accommodations for the sick and wounded at Front Royal.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WILLIAM A. HAMMOND,
Surgeon General.
Brigadier General L. THOMAS,
Adjutant General United States Army.
WASHINGTON, June 20, 1862.
Dr. DAVID S. HAYS sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What has been your position and rank in the army?
Answer. Surgeon of the 110th regiment of Pennsylvania volunteers.
Question. Will you state, as concisely as possible, the history of your con
nexion with the sick and wounded who came to this city under your charge from
Front Royal?
Answer. After the battle of Winchester, on the 23d of March, I was in charge
of a hospital in that place, and I retreated with General Banks's column at the
time they left. I belonged to General Shields's division, and Dr. King, at
Williamsport, relieved me, and directed me to rejoin my regiment as soon as I
could. The rebels were then in Winchester, and I rode to Frederick on horse
back, and there got into the cars and came to Washington, and went from here
to Alexandria, and from there to Manassas. I was ordered from there to Front
Royal. When I got to Front Royal I learned of this fight on Monday. I got
on my horse, and, with two other surgeons, rode to Luray, where we arrived
about 2 o'clock in the day. Our medical director was not there. There were
a number of surgeons there, and there were several hospitals opened. Several
of us went to a hospital on the hill, where there were quite a number of wounded
TESTIMONY. 495
[yho had just been brought in. We were there with them that day, and the
nost of the night, dressing their wounds. The next morning (Wednesday
nomirig) our medical director, Dr. Bryant, placed me in charge of a hospital
uhere. I had not then received any orders from him, and was going on to join
oay regiment, but he stopped me and put me in charge of a hospital there. There
were no supplies or anything there. I sent to the provost marshal, and had
ittendants sent down, and also a steward, and proceeded to organize the hospital
as soon as I could. I drew rations and had them cooked, and proceeded to
Iress the wounds and take the names and regiments of the wounded. About
9 o'clock that night I received orders from Dr. Bryant to have my wounded
ready, with two days' rations, to leave for Front Royal, there to report to the
senior medical officer. I was up at work the most of that night. I again drew
rations for two days for the wounded. It took us the most of the night to dress
their wounds, and arrange all the other matters. We had to send around to the
bouses there to get kettles, &c., to cook the rations in. And I got some
^heets from houses there to make bandages and dressings for the wounded
men. Our orders were to be ready by 9 o'clock the next morning to pro
ceed to Front Royal, but we could not get the wagons ready until about
coon. We started about noon on Thursday, and drove fourteen miles, and en
camped in a clover field for the night. We had the rations in the wagons; and
each surgeon also received orders to have rations prepared for his own men.
I received an order to have rations prepared for the men in my own hospital.
I then rode on, leaving three surgeons with the wounded, to report and pro
vide hospital accommodations at Front Royal. I rode on about four miles, and
as it was then getting dark, and as we were told that the rebels had fired upon
our prisoners, we stopped at a house some five or six miles from Front Royal.
The next morning I rode into town and reported to General Ricketts. He
told me that Dr. Cox, his brigade surgeon, was the senior medical officer there,
but he was sick. I then went to the provost marshal to get hospital accommo
dations. With his assistance I obtained one hospital. I found Dr. Cox a short
time afterwards, and reported to him. He directed me to prepare hospitals for
the wounded, and I went to work and got three churches, into which I had the
straw from the wagons carried, and then the sick taken in. It took some time
to make these preparations. I then drew rations again, and as there were no
accommodations for cooking there, I had to get camp-kettles and do the best I
could.
Dr. Cox in the mean time had received orders from General Ricketts to join
his brigade, and I had then to continue in charge. I had no dressings there,
arid there were none in town, as Dr. Magruder had broken up the hospitals
there. I sent around to the houses, and got some sheets to make bandages of.
About dusk, Dr. Mosely, a brigade surgeon, sent me in some assistants.
As soon as I had reported to Dr. Cox, he telegraphed to the surgeon general
to learn what should be done with the wounded. That was in the morning,
some time before 12 o'clock. No answer coming, about 3 o'clock that evening
I telegraphed again. The next morning Dr. Cox received a despatch from the
surgeon general, directing that the wounded should be brought to this city.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. How many wounded had you there?
Answer. Before we went to Front Royal I made out the list in my hospital,
and one of the surgeons in charge of another hospital made out his list. But
the other surgeons had not time to do so. When I got to Front Royal I set my
steward to find that out, and he made it out to be 325 sick and wounded.
Question. How many surgeons had you along to take care of them ?
Answer. There were four assistant surgeons besides myself.
496 TESTIMONY.
Question. Was that enough to dress and take care of that number of sick and
wounded men ?
Answer. No, sir ; I do not think it was. Oa Saturday morning, about eight
o'clock, Dr. Cox received a despatch from the surgeon general directing him to
have the men brought to this city, and to report to his office.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Have you that despatch r
Answer. Yes, sir ; here it is :
" Send your sick to this city. Telegraph when you leave. You will be or
dered to report in person to the surgeon general."
That is signed " Win. A. Hammond."
As soon as Dr. Cox handed me that despatch, which was a short time after
he received it, I immediately sent a despatch to the surgeon general's office,
stating that we would leave about 11 o'clock that morning for Washington city.
I then went 10 work to have the men put on the cars. They could furnish us,
I think, with only seven cars. There were a few mattresses and some straw.
The worst cases I put upon the mattresses. I got them all loaded, and started
the train at about twenty minutes past 11 o'clock.
We came on to Manassas, and I got off the train there and immediately went
to the telegraph office, and telegraphed to the surgeon general that the train
would reach this city between 8 and 9 o'clock that night. We were at Manassas
about an hour, I suppose. I had dinner cooked and served there, and then
started on again.
A short time after we started the train stopped, and one of the assistants came
to me and reported that two cars with sick had been attached to the train at
Manassas, and that two of them had died. I had known nothing about that be
fore ; no one had reported to me that those two cars were to be attached to the
train. I sent ray assistant to see about it, and it was reported to me that the
two had died of fever.
At a station between Manassas and Alexandria I went into the telegraph
office to telegraph to the superintendent that we wished to cross Long Bridge.
The conductor said he would attend to that himself.
We then came on to Alexandria, and I immediately went to the superintend
ent's office. They asked me there if it was known in Washington that 1 was
coming. I told them that I had telegraphed twice to the surgeon general, and
I supposed they knew we were coming.
It was after dark when we started from Alexandria, and when we got across
Long Bridge I suppose it was between 9 and 10 o'clock. I expected to find
ambulances and surgeons in attendance, but there were none when we got here.
We waited for some time, and could not tell whether the cars were going to run
down to the depot or not. I inquired of the conductor, but he could not tell.
I told my assistant surgeons that I would go down and see if I could find out
anything about it, and would be back in a short time. Dr. Stidger and myself
then walked down to Willards'. Colonel Lewis and Captain Marshall, quarter
master, were with us. When we got there I asked what time it was, and found
it was very near 10 o'clock. Supper was over at the hotel, but Colonel Lewis
and Captain Marshall asked us to take some tea with them. Dr. Stidger and
myself went in and took some tea. It was raining when I came out. Some
• one told me that I should find the surgeon general's ofiice in the War Depart
ment. I drove around to the War Department and went into the hall. There
was a man there sleeping on the floor, and I proceeded to wake him up. Dur
ing the noise I made for that purpose some one came down the stairs. I told
him I wanted to find the surgeon general's office, and he directed me to the
place. I drove around there and went in, and found a watchman sitting there
I inquired if the surgeon general was in. He said he was not. I asked if any
TESTIMONY. 497
of his clerks were in, and lie said there was no one there. I then asked if he
would take a note to his house if I would write one. He said he did not know
where he lived, and that there were some despatches waiting for him there then.
Not finding any preparations made, and no one about, I concluded that it was
not the intention to do anything with the men I had brought in before morning.
I then got into a carriage and drove out to the train again.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. At what time was that 1
Answer. I do not know the time. When I got back there I found that the
citizens had been there and had got suppers for the men. They told me that all
had had their suppers. Some of them — I do not know how many — had been
taken from the cars and carried into some churches, and into a house just oppo
site the cars. I told Dr. Stidger that we better stay there until morning. "No,"
said he, "they are pretty comfortable now. The citizens will have them taken
over to the churches, and you had better go and get some sleep, and report as soon
as you can in the morning." I then went down to the hotel and went to bed.
That was about 4 o'clock in the morning, for when I went in I inquired of the
man there what time it was, and he said it was about 4 o'clock. I do not know
how long I slept, but as soon as I got my breakfast I went around to the sur
geon general's office. I am not quite certain, but I think he was not in when I
first got there. However, when I saw him I reported to him. I gave him my
order, in the first place, to take my wounded to Front Royal and report to the
senior medical officer there, and I also gave him General Rieketts's letter. I
told him I could not have got along at all had it not been for Dr. Mosely, who
sent me some assistants, the night I got to Front Royal, to dress the wounds of
the men. The surgeon general remarked : " Dr. Mosely, and you, too, deserve
credit for the way you have acted;" and he told me to call around again the
next morning, as he wanted to see me about Dr. Cox not receiving the wounded
men when they got to Front Royal.
He then sent me to the medical director's office, and I went there and reported
to him. I then told him that I had got in the night before, but had not found
any ambulances or surgeons in attendance, and had gone to the surgeon gen
eral's office, but had not been able to find him. He told me that he had not
received any despatches. He made out orders for ambulances to be sent over
there, and I went over immediately to the cars again. I found that nearly all
the men had been taken out of the cars and carried into the churches and some
houses there, and the citizens were engaged in preparing breakfast for them. I
asked for some bandages and some warm water, and proceeded to dress the
stumps of some of those who had had limbs amputated. I suppose it was a
half an hour or so after I got there before the ambulances arrived. The medical
director came over there and told me to set my medical assistants at work to
move the men, but to leave the worst cases in the churches. I set my assistants
at work. A surgeon came there and took charge. After all had been got off
but four of the worst cases, I told the . assistant medical director that I would
then go down and get my dinner, leaving my assistant surgeons there, and if
they needed me for anything they could let me know. I then went down to
the hotel. The next morning I went around and reported again to the surgeon
general. Said he, " I am going to have you dismissed." I asked him upon
what grounds he was going to have it done. He just handed me the charges
and told me to look them over. I glanced at them, and asked him if he would
not bring charges against me, and allow me an opportunity to defend myself.
" No," said he, " that is too tedious a process." He then told me that he was
going to send the charges right over to the Secretary of War, and I could go
and see him about it. I then went up to the War Department, and went into
the Secretary's office. The Secretary took up the paper and proceeded to read
Part iii 32
498 TESTIMONY.
it to ine. I told him I had glanced over it, and asked him to allow me to make
some explanations. He asked me if I did go to bed." I told him I had towards
morning, and was proceeding to explain, when he told me he would not hear me ;
not to interrupt him. He then immediately wrote an order to the adjutant gen
eral to strike me from the rolls. That is about as near as I can state the cir
cumstances of the case.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. You say you arrived here between nine and ten o'clock, Saturday
night, with your train ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And it stopped this side of Long Bridge, on the Island ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you left the sick and wounded in the train, and went with Dr.
Stidger to find the surgeon general ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you went to Willards' Hotel and got supper there ?
Answer. No, sir ; supper was over. I got some tea there.
Question. How long were you there 1
Answer. Not long, because I wished to get away as soon as I could.
Question. About how long ? Fix some outside limit to the time you were
probably there.
Answer. I went into Willards' Hotel, and went into the wash-room and
washed my face and 'hands, and then immediately went in to tea. It was a
very short time I was there.
Question. Was it a half an hour, or an hour, or two hours that you were
there 1
Answer. I was not there over half an hour.
Question. And you went from there to the War Department ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; it was there I was directed to go. I think it was Dr.
Stidger who told me that the surgeon general's office was in the War Department 1
Question. You found a man in the War Department who told you where the
office of the surgeon general was ]
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. You went to the surgeon general's office and found a messenger or
a watchman there 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What information did you obtain from him ?
Answer. I asked him if the surgeon general was in, and he said he was not.
I asked if any of his clerks were there, and he said not. I then asked if I should
write a note or a despatch would he take it to the surgeon general's house.
He said he did not know where he lived, and that there were some despatches
there waiting for him then. When I found that there were no ambulances
there to receive the wounded and sick, and that I could find no one, I con
cluded that they did not intend to do anything until morning.
Question. You made no further effort to find the surgeon general that night ?
Answer. No, sir ; I went immediately from his office back to the train again,
Question. At what time did you get back to the train ?
Answer. I do not know. I went immediately out there. I cannot tell ex
actly what time it was, but it was in the morning when I came in again.
* Question. I want to know how long a time you think it was from the time
you left Willards' till you got back to the train 1
Answer. I should suppose it was an hour and a half or two hours.
Question. That would make it about one o'clock when you got back there ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I should think it was something like that.
Question. How long did you remain there ?
TESTIMONY. 499
Answer. I was not there a great while. I went from car to car and saw Dr.
Stidger and some citizens there, and then I came back to the hotel.
Question. Did you look after your sick and wounded when we went over to
the cars that time ?
Answer. I went to the cars and was told that a number of them had been
taken from the cars and carried into the churches and some houses there. When
I went back to the train that night I went back to see what could be done, and
I was then told that they would be made as comfortable as possible there till
morning, and I concluded that, as they were comfortable there, and had had
some supper, I would wait until morning, as I was almost entirely broken down
and prostrated.
Question. When you went back to the train did you see your assistant sur
geons and the people moving any of them?
Answer. I did not see them moving any, but was told they were doing so.
Question. Did you go into any of the houses, or into any of the places into
which they were being carried, to see to any of them 1
Answer. No, sir ; I did not. I stated to Dr. Stidger that I proposed staying
there all night. But he said I had better go back to the hotel and get some
rest, and he would remain there.
Question. Did Dr. Stidger remain there?
Answer. Yes, sir ; so I was told.
Question. Did the other assistant surgeons remain there ?
Answer. When I went back there I was told they were in the churches. I
did not see them.
Question. Dr. Stidger went to the hotel with you the first time that you went
there ?
Answer. Yes, sir; and when I started out to find the surgeon general I told
him he had better go to the train, while I went to look up the surgeon general.
Question. And you found him at the train when you went back?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. You saw no other of the assistant surgeons there ?
Answer. No, sir ; I did not see them.
Question. You were told there that the men were being moved into the churches
and houses ?
Answer. Y. es, sir ; and that they would see that they were comfortable.
Question. Who told you that, besides Dr. Stidger?
Answer. I cannot recollect who they were ; they were citizens there, and
strangers to me.
Question. Did you have any persons very badly wounded or dangerously
sick on that train ?
Answer. There was one there badly wounded, and another there who had had
his leg amputated. There was one man who had been shot through the leg,
who died in the morning. I was of the opinion that he died of gangrene, and
that was also the opinion of Dr. Stidger.
Question. Did any die on your way down here, except the two who died near
Manas sas ?
Answer. That was all that was reported to me.
Question. You had charge of the whole of these men ?
Answer. I presume I took it because I ranked the other surgeons there. But
our orders were all alike.
Question. Were you present during the time of the removal of these men on
Sunday ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I stayed there until about two o'clock; I think it was after
two o'clock when I left there. The assistant surgeons were divided around to
the different hospitals, to see to and direct the loading of the ambulances. I went
to all the hospitals, and at the one I left last they reported to me that they had
f)00 TESTIMONY.
got them all moved. The medical director told me to leave the worst cases
there; not to remove them. There were two wounded men and two typhoid
cases that I concluded to leave there. The assistant medical director was there,
and assisting. I said to him that they were all removed from the churches, 'and
I would go down to the hotel, and he could send for me if he wanted me. Dr.
Stidger, Dr. King, and myself then went to the hotel. It was not earlier than
two o'clock.
Question. When did your duties in connexion with this train cease ?
Answer. I presumed they ceased as soon as I delivered them into the hands of
the authorities here.
Question. At what time did you consider that to be ?
Answer. As soon as the gentleman reported there I reported to him, and sup
posed that he then took charge. The man did not come there for some time
after I went out in the morning.
Question. About what time did he get there ?
Answer. I should think that it was about eleven o'clock. The medical director
was there before that time, I believe; and I supposed that they then took
charge of the men in the train.
Question. When he got there did he assume charge of the men, or did you
still retain the charge ?
Answer. I presumed he did. He had some attendants there whom I supposed
he brought with him, and had them carry out the wounded. I was assisting,
myself.
Question. Did you understand that he had the control from that time 1
Answer. Yes, sir?
Question. Did you return again after you went to the hotel, at two o'clock.
Answer. No, sir.
Question. You considered your duties ended then ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And that the sick and wounded men had been passed over to the
proper authorities here ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do any of the persons at the hotel know at what time you returned
there in the morning 1
Answer. There is one person there who, I think, does.
Question. Who went with you there ?
Answer. I returned alone about four o'clock Sunday morning. Colonel
Lewis had engaged a room for me.
Question. You had a room at the hotel when you went there ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. From whom did you learn that your conduct was disapproved ?
Answer. On Sunday morning, when I reported to the surgeon general, he
asked me why Dr. Cox had not received these men at Front Royal. I handed
him the letter of General Ricketts, which he said he would keep. I also handed
him my orders to take the men to Front Royal, and told him that Dr. Mosely
had assisted me greatly. He then said, " Dr. Mosely and you, too, deserve
credit for what you have done." And I heard nothing more until the next
morning about ten o'clock. I had been directed by the surgeon general to call
at his office on Monday morning to tell him about Dr. Cox. I do not think he
was there when I first went in. I found him there about ten o'clock. Dr.
Stidger went with me. The surgeon general had a paper in his hand. Said
he, " I am going to have you dismissed from the service." It astonished me,
and I asked him on what grounds. He commenced to read the paper, and then
handed it to me. I glanced over it, and then asked if he would not bring
charges against me in the usual manner, and allow me an opportunity to defend
TESTIMONY. 501
myself. He said that was too tedious a process. That was the first intimation
I had of any such thing.
Question. And you followed th& letter over to the office of the Secretary of
War?
Answer. The surgeon general said, " You can see the Secretary ; I am going
to send this to him." I went over to the War Department and saw one of the
Assistant Secretaries first. He had a paper there, which he commenced to read.
As I supposed it was the one relating to me, I told him what it was, and said
that I would like to explain the matter. He said he would take it in to the
Secretary, and I followed him into the Secretary's office. The Secretary took
the paper and commenced reading it. I told him I had read a portion of it at the
surgeon general's office. He asked me if it was correct. I told him I could ex
plain it if he would allow me. He asked me if I went to bed on Saturday night.
I told Liin I did go to bed, but I did not go to bed that night, but late in the
morning. I then told him I would explain if he would let me have a little time.
He told me not to interrupt him, and immediately wrote an order to the adju
tant general to strike me from the list.
Question. Did your assistant surgeons stay with the wounded during Saturday
night ?
Answer. I know that Dr. Stidger did.
Question. Do you know whether the other assistant surgeons stayed with
them that night 'I
Answer. 1 do not.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Have you heard that they did not remain there ]
Answer. I heard to-day, for the first time, that two of them, I think, went
into one of the houses there.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. When you went back to the train you saw none of the assistant
surgeons but Dr. Stidger?
Answer. He was the only one I saw.
Question. Did you leave any directions with Dr. Stidger 1
Answer. Yes, sir. But in the first place, before I left the train the first time
to hunt up the surgeon general, I told the other assistants to remain there.
When I got back I said to Dr. Stidger that we better remain there all night.
He said, "No; you go and get some sleep, and report as early as possible in
the morning, and I will stay here and take the direction." I told him to do so,
and to take the worst cases to a house there. The men had all had their sup
pers. That is often done by surgeons. I supposed when I gave Dr. Stidger
charge there that that was enough.
Question. When you went back again did you not deem it your duty, before
you left for the night, to see that the men were properly cared for, and that the
assistant surgeons were there on the ground?
Answer. Dr. Stidger is a very competent surgeon, and I supposed when I
gave him these instructions that he would assume the whole charge, which he
did.
Question. You and the other surgeons had had substantially the same duties
to perform?
Answer. Yes, sir; about the same.
Question. And their labors had been as arduous as yours had been 1
Answer. I do not think they had. I was the one who made the arrangements
for the hospitals at Front Royal, and had the superintendence t>f the whole
matter. I gave them instructions. I was running from place to place in Front
502 TESTIMONY.
Royal all the time, and I did all the business connected with the train. I gave
directions for the whole thing.
Question. Do you know whether Dr. Stidger stayed there all night ?
Answer. I am confident that he did. He told me that he did, and some of
the attendants remarked to me that he had stayed there.
Question. Two of the assistant surgeons went to bed?
Answer. Yes, sir ; at least I have been told so lately ?
Question. And the third one you do not know anything about]
Answer. No, sir. But when I gave them directions first to remain there, I
supposed they would do so. Dr. Stidger told me he would take charge there.
Question. Who were those three other assistant surgeons ?
Answer. Dr. McCune, assistant surgeon of the 14th Indiana ; Dr. Redlick,
assistant surgeon of the 84th Pennsylvania, and Dr. Barrow, assistant surgeon
of the 29th Ohio.
Question. Were not these sick and wounded men in such a condition that
they needed the attendance of every one of the surgeons there 1
Answer. I do not think so. There were quite a number of men put on who
were sick, but the majority of them, I believe, were convalescent. My impres
sion was, when I left that night, that they were all very comfortable, and that
they would be properly cared for. I had every confidence in Dr. Stidger.
Question. Was it, or not, your opinion that tfiose men needed the attendance
of all the surgeons there that night?
Answer. I did not think so. If there had been that number of men badly
wounded, four or five surgeons would not have been enough. But the majority
of the wounds were slight ones.
Question. Were there not enough of badly wounded men there to require the
attendance of all the surgeons there1?
Answer. No, sir; I do not think they required it that night.
Question. Is it' not necessary that the surgeon should be there on the ground
to see that the attendants perform their duty ?
Answer. It is presumed that when you have attendants appointed that they
come there with instructions, and that they carry them out. Besides that, I left
Doctor Stidger in charge over the whole matter. The cooks, nurses, and stew
ards were there with their directions.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. You say that you arrived in this city with the train between 9 and
10 o'clock at night?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you make any provision for these men to have their supper
before you left the train to find the surgeon general ?
Answer. Not the first time ; I did not.
Question. Then you went and got your own supper, and went to looking
around ? , t
Answer. I got some tea ; I had no intention to take supper when I went
there.
Question. And you got back to the train after some two or three hours, more
or less ?
Answer. I do not recollect how long it was.
Question. You had no idea, when you left the first time, that these men
would be cared for by the people on the Island ?
Answer. There were some citizens there while we were there. We came
there and waited some time before I left.
Question. 'Had you any idea that they would take care of these sick and
wounded men?
Answer. Yes, sir. There was a Mr. Lloyd there, I think. He said that there was
TESTIMONY. 503
ci church there that he would get the key of, and also that there was a hall below
that they would open. I said, "Very well, do so; I will go down." Before I
left the first time there were ladies there with coffee, &c., for the men. We had
got dinner for them at Manassas, at perhaps one or two o'clock.
Question. Did it not occur to you that it would be proper for you to go to see
the surgeon general at his residence ?
Answer. This is just the impression I had about the matter : When I found
no ambulances there — supposing, of course, that they had got my telegraphic
despatches — I thought that, as it was so late, they would not be removed to
the hospitals that night. We talked with one another about it there. There
were some gentlemen there, and we asked whether the cars would run on down
to the depot. The conductor told me they would not. By that time the citi
zens had got there, and I started down to report to the surgeon general. At
the hotel I told Doctor Stidger to go out to the train and superintend the whole
matter there. When I did not find the surgeon general at his office, or any one
there to attend to this matter — believing that they knew from my despatches
that we were coming — I supposed it was the intention to let the men remain
there all night. We all concluded so out there when I got back there. It was
then that Doctor Stidger told me that I had better go to bed and get some sleep, and
he would stay there and take charge of them. I never yet have neglected men
placed in my care. I can get the testimony of all the surgeons in my division
to that fact.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Have you made any publication in the newspapers in regard to
your case 1
Answer. I have authorized one to be made — but one.
Question. Have you a copy of that statement with you?
Answer. Yes, sir ; here it is, [handing it to Mr. Gooch.]
Mr. Gooch proceeded to read it as follows :
" THE CASE OF DR. HAYS AND THE SICK AND WOUNDED SOLDIERS. — Doctor
Hays makes the following statement in relation to the charges against him of
neglecting the sick and wounded soldiers under his care :
" On Tuesday, the 10th instant, I rode to Luray, Virginia, from Front Royal,
a distance of twenty-five miles, reaching Luray about 2 o'clock in the afternoon.
The wounded from the battle at Port Republic were then being brought in, and
I immediately entered upon the most arduous labors of attending to the necessi
ties of the wounded. Through that afternoon, and the night following, my la
bors were almost incessant. My labors of Wednesday were equally fatiguing
with those of Tuesday night, having the entire duty of establishing a hospital
thrown upon me. In the midst of this care and anxiety I received orders to
have all the wounded under my care, that could be transported, ready, with two
days' rations each, at 9 o'clock the following morning, to be transported to Front
Royal. This order was received by me about 9 o'clock on Wednesday night,
and the time allotted me in which to make these preparations allowed me but
little rest or sleep.
" After preparing the train, rations, and what few hospital stores could be ob
tained, the labor of loading these wounded men into the wagons can be better
imagined than described. The train was not ready to start until noon on Thurs
day, and that day we drove over the most wretched roads a distance of fourteen
miles. We stopped for the night in a clover field, where rations were cooked
and distributed. We reached Front Royal on Friday, about noon, with 325 sick
and wounded soldiers. Here they were unloaded from the wagons. Hospitals
were prepared, rations cooked, and the wounds of all dressed."
Question. You have said that you did not stop with your wounded men that
504 TESTIMONY.
Thursday niglit, but you rode on some five or six miles towards Front Royal,
in advance of them, and slept in a house there that night 1
Answer. Yes, sir. My medical director told me to ride on and report in Front
Royal, and get things ready there as soon as I could.
Question. You did not go into Front Royal that night 1
Answer. No, sir; but I got in there the next morning before the wagons got in.
Question. Why did you not go in that night 1
Answer. That was my intention, and I started on for that purpose, but some
persons told me that day, as they were bringing prisoners from Luray, they
were fired on by some parties.
Question. And that was the reason you stopped in that house over night 1
Answer. Yes, sir; and also because, as we came up towards the house about
dark, we saw several people standing on the porch of the house — a number of
men whom I supposed might be confederate soldiers. They came out and went
down by the side of the house. It startled us somewhat, and I said to the
other doctor who was with me that we would ride up and see. He rode down
to see where they came out at, but we could not see them. We went to the
house, and the man there told us that they were some of our men.
Question. Did you stay at that house that night 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you consider it safe to remain over night in a house from which
you had seen leave what you supposed might be confederate soldiers, then to
ride on and take your chances ?
Answer. I told them at the house that, some of our men were back a piece
and would be coming on. I told them this to produce an effect on them, should
the men I saw be confederate soldiers, who might otherwise come back that
night. They were in citizen's clothes, and I suppose may have been farmers
about there. But I was frightened and uneasy about it all that night, and went
into town the next morning as early as I could.
Question. What time did you get into Front Royal 1
Answer. 1 started pretty early, and suppose that I got* in there about eight
o'clock in the morning.
Question. What time did you start ?
Answer. We rode very slowly ; my horse had pretty nearly given out.
Question. Well, what time did you start 1
Answer. Between six and seven o'clock.
Question. How long did you get into the town ahead of your soldiers ?
Answer. I cannot tell you the time exactly, but I will tell you what I did ;
I went to the provost marshal's office and was told that he was out. I then
inquired for General Ricketts's headquarters, and was directed to them. But I
was directed wrongly the first time and rode to the wrong place. I was then
directed correctly, and rode out to General Rricketts's headquarters, about a mile
out of town, and reported to him that I had some sick and wounded soldiers
there.
Question. Can' you not tell us the time the soldiers got in without going over
all that 1
Answer. I suppose the first wagons got in about 11 o'clock.
Question. How long after you had got in there]
Answer. Some two or three hours after I got in. I had time enough to make
all the arrangements I could make.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. What were your orders ?
Answer. To leave the men at Front Royal and then to return to my regi
ment as soon as possible.
Question. By whose authority did you bring the men on here ?
TESTIMONY. 505
Answer. Nothing more than this : Dr Cox telegraphed to the surgeon general
and got the despatch which has been read here. He then wrote me a note to
act upon that despatch in his place, as he was required at headquarters.
Mr. Gooch resumed the reading of the published statement of Dr. Hays, as
follows :
"My orders were to report to the senior medical officer at Front Royal, leave
the sick and wounded at the hospitals there, and rejoin my regiment as soon as
possible. I reported to Brigade Surgeon Cox, and he declined receiving the
sick and wounded, having received orders from General Ricketts requiring his
services at the headquarters of his brigade. After reporting to Surgeon Cox,
perhaps my duty required me to return to my command — humanity demanded
that I should remain and care for the wounded, and remain I did.
"Immediately on arriving at Front Royal I reported to Surgeon Cox, and he
telegraphed to the surgeon general at Washington. I also, on the same day,
(Friday,) telegraphed to the surgeon general for orders. On Saturday, about
8 o'clock, Surgeon Cox received a reply from the surgeon general, when I
immediately telegraphed to the surgeon general at Washington, stating the
hour when the train would leave Front Royal for Washington. We left Front
Royal about twenty minutes after eleven a. m. At Manassas we gave the men
their dinner; and here I again telegraphed the surgeon general, saying the
train would arrive at Washington with the sick and wounded that evening be
tween eight and nine o'clock. At Alexandria we were delayed about one hour
waiting for an engine, and did not reach Washington until between nine and
ten o'clock Saturday night.
•'Here, to my utter astonishment, I found neither ambulance nor wagon, surgeon
or'attendauts in waiting. In fact, not the slightest evidence of preparation for
our arrival had been made.
"A stranger in a strange city, I made all the haste possible to find the office
of the surgeon general. That I found closed, and was unable to ascertain the
locality of his residence. After making every search in my power for some one
in authority to take charge of the sick and wounded, I returned to the train."
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Did you make any effort to find the residence of the surgeon
general ?
Answer. I inquired of the watchman at the office if he could take a message
from me to the house of the surgeon general ; he said he did not know where
the surgeon general lived, and that there were some despatches there waiting
for him then.
Mr. Gooch concluded the reading of the published statement, as follows :
"Here I found the kind people of the neighborhood in attendance, doing all in
their power to make the poor fellows under my charge comfortable as possible
under the circumstances. Many were then being taken to the churches and
houses that had been so generously opened for them. They were made as
comfortable as it was in my power that night to make them. My assistant sur
geons urged me to get to bed and get some rest, and report as early as possible
in the morning. They said (and I knew it) there was no use in my remaining
longer, and about four o'clock in the morning I went to bed. Before the
surgeon general was at his office in the morning I was there to make my report
and receive my orders. Immediately upon making my report and receiving my
orders (which to me appeared strange when considering that the surgeon general
was telegraphed of their coming — my orders from the surgeon general were to
find and report to the medical director, and he would send ambulances,) I re
turned to my charge and found them exceedingly comfortable and cheerful.
"This morning (Monday) charges were preferred against me by the medical
director and surgeon general, (without notifying me of the fact,) alleging gross
506 TESTIMONY.
neglect of duty, and the Secretary of "War ordered my name to be struck from
the rolls, without allowing me to make either argument or defence. Under these
circumstances, with these facts existing, I ask my friends, I ask the public, if
I am not being sacrificed in order to shield some one in a position much higher
than I from charges of gross negligence 1 Am I not made the scape-goat of
other men's sins 1 Who are the men in lucrative offices who should have pre
pared most bountifully for the reception of these sick and wounded soldiers ?
Ask the sick men, the wounded men themselves, if I neglected them. Ask the
assistant surgeons and attendants. They know if I shirked my work or shun
ned any responsibility ; and let them and the world say if the man who watched
over these poor fellows, day and night, for almost a week, ought to be disgraced
because somebody failed to provide for their comfort here.
« D. S. HAYS,
" Surgeon 110^ Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers"
Question. Were there any private houses open for these soldiers when you
got back to the train ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; there was one below the church.
Question. Do you know of any others ?
Answer. No, sir ; only that one.
WASHINGTON, June 21, 1862,
Dr. DAVID S. HAYS recalled and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. We understand that you desire to make some additions to your
statements of yesterday before this committee.
Answer. I wish to state in regard to the treatment of wounded men : When
men's wounds have been once properly dressed, they do not require the attend
ance of a surgeon all the time. Such I have found to be the practice since I
have been in the service. The principal surgeon gives this instructions to his
assistant surgeons, and also to the attendants. After the wounds have been
once dressed, all that is necessary to be done is to keep the wounds wet, moist,
apply cold water to them every half hour or hour, until the time comes to dress
them again. The great labor is usually the first treatment — in amputating and
dressing the wounds the first time. After that the labor required is slight com
pared with the first dressing.
The night we arrived here from Front Royal, when I left the train, Dr.
Stidger, one of my assistant surgeons, told me that he would take charge and
see that the men were all comfortable. And there was really no necessity for
my remaining there. And more than that, a physician needs sleep and rest as
well as other persons.
I can prove by all the surgeons, our medical directors, and officers, with whom
I have been connected since I have been in the division, that I have never
neglected my duty, never shirked it. And I can prove by the surgeon general
of Pennsylvania, who was in our division on the 23d of March, that I worked
very hard there, and was commended for it.
I really think, too, that the night I left these men they were more comfortable
than they could have been in any hospital in town — at least the majority of
them. Dr. Stidger said that he would take charge and see they were carried to
the houses and churches. The usual custom among surgeons i? for the surgeon
in charge to give directions to the others, and if those directions are not exe
cuted, the surgeon in charge is not responsible. If I give directions and they
are not carried out I have my redress.
TESTIMONY. 507
By Mr. Odell :
Question. What redress ?
Answer. I can bring charges against those who fail to carry out my directions.
Question. What good does that do the wounded men who have been neglected I
Answer. It does not do the wounded men any good, that is true ; but I can
have those punished who have not followed my directions.
Dr. Fais, the brigade surgeon of General KimbalPs brigade, left town this
morning. Before he did so, he gave me this letter, which I should like to have
read to the committee.
The letter was read, as follows :
" WASHINGTON CITY, D. 0., Ju^e 20, 1862.
" This is to certify that I am personally acquainted and have been an asso
ciate with Dr. D. S. Hays, of the 110th Pennsylvania regiment United States
volunteers, under command of Generals Kelley, Lander, and Shields, embracing
a period of eight months, and that during the above time I have invariably
found Surgeon Hays ready and willing to perform all the duties assigned to
him. I furthermore declare that during the above acquaintance with Dr. Hays
he has at all times manifested a laudable ambition to excel in promptness and
compliance with all orders from his superiors.
" On Tuesday, June 10, in company with Surgeon Hoop, of the 84th Penn
sylvania regiment, and Surgeon Hays, I was ordered to attend the wounded
brought from the battle-field of Port Republic, and I am happy to state that
Dr. Hays, among other surgeons, did not leave the hospital until the wounded
were cared for ; that he labored incessantly the greater part of the night ; and
that on the following morning he was at his post awaiting orders. Prior to his
leaving Luray for this city he remarked to me that ' he was worn out ; that he
preferred I would accompany the sick ; but that he was willing to undergo any
fatigue or any privation that would benefit our men.' With such feelings he
gathered up his wounded and took up his march to Front Royal.
" That Dr. Hays has discharged his duties faithfully and cheerfully, in camp
and on detailed duty, is a fact so apparent and plain to the whole medical corps
of Shields's division, that it would be absurd to intimate that he has been or
that he could be guilty of dereliction.
*********
" JAS. H. FAIS,
"Brig. Surg. 1st Brig, com 'd by Gen. N. Kimball, Shields's Division."
The witness : Here is another letter, from the surgeon general of the State of
Pennsylvania, which I would like to have read.
The letter was read, as follows :
" WILLARDS' HOTEL, June 21, 1862.
" SIR : Having since last November frequent opportunities of judging of your
professional skill and actions as a medical officer of Pennsylvania volunteers, I
cheerfully testify to my high appreciation of the manner in which your duties
have been performed. After the battle at Winchester, March 23, 1862, I per
sonally Avitnessed your untiring devotion to your duties in the Union Hotel
hospital, and on my return to Pennsylvania I repeatedly spoke of them in terms
of praise.
" The charge recently made against you of "gross neglect of your wounded
and inhumanity " has surprised me and all who know your energetic habits, and,
508 TESTIMONY.
I trust may be entirely disproved before a court of inquiry, as, I doubt not, they
will.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"HENRY H. SMITH,
" Surgeon General of Pennsylvania.
"Surgeon D. S. HAYS,
" 110M Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers"
The witness : I can prove by the surgeons in General Shields's division
now, and by the wounded men themselves, how I labored for them, and, posi
tively, I never had the slightest idea that I neglected my duty during that
journey until the subject was mentioned to me by the surgeon general.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. How many attendants had you for these men ?
Answer. I had seven attendants for the forty-four that were in my own hos
pital.
Question. How many had the others 1
Answer. That I do not know; I had no charge of the other hospitals. There
was a surgeon appointed for each hospital. After the train was loaded I super
intended the whole thing.
Question. Did you have especial charge of your own forty-four men, and each
of the others have charge of the men from his hospital ]
Answer. I had charge of my own men at Luray. All our orders read alike.
Question. No matter about the orders. Did you have special charge of the
forty-four men from your own hospital ? •
Answer. Yes, sir; and I presume I had the oversight of all the others.
Question. But they were not your special charge ]
Answer. I presume I had the oversight merely from the fact that I ranked
them.
Question. Did you continue to take charge of your own men from your hos
pital, and each of the other surgeons of the men from his hospital ?
Answer. I paid attention to the men of my own hospital on the train.
Question. You acted as their surgeon?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. The other surgeons did not interfere with them at all1?
Answer. They attended to mine as to their own. But I kept my own attend
ants and nurses with my own wounded.
Question. Did you know the men were to be removed from the cars into the
houses before you left them that night ?
Answer. Yes, sir. When we first got there we stayed around there and waited
to see if we could get any information. A short time after I got off the car a
gentleman came up and said that there was a church there for them.
Question. Yrou knew they were to be removed ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. When you went back there how many of your assistant surgeons
did you see there ?
Answer. I saw only Dr. Stidger.
Question. Did he tell you where the others were ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Did you know that they had gone to bed 1
Answer. I did not know it at that time. I was informed yesterday, for the
first time, by Dr. Burrows, that he himself and Dr. Redlick, of the 84th Penn
sylvania, went to bed. I am not certain whether he said the other one had
gone to bed or not.
TESTIMONY. 509
Question. What do you say about these assistant surgeons going to bed and
leaving their wounded ?
Answer. I say that they disobeyed my orders.
Question. Did you give them orders to remain there ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; before I left the first time I gave them orders to remain
there till I returned.
Question. Did you give those orders to each of those assistant surgeons ?
Answer. They were all standing together when I gave the orders.
Question. You gave the orders to all of them ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And each man knew what your orders were ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And those surgeons who went to bed disobeyed your orders ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you not consider it necessary that there should be surgeons in
attendance when those 300 or 400 wounded and sick men were being removed
from the cars to the churches and houses ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; and I supposed they were.
Question. When you went back did you go around and see the men ]
Answer. I went to some of the cars.
Question. You did not go through all the cars ?
Answer. No, sir ; I went through some of them.
Question. You saw but Dr. Stidger, and you inquired for none of the other
assistant surgeons ?
Answer. The first time I came I inquired where the three assistant surgeons
were.
Question. What were you told ?
Answer. Dr. Stidger told me that he had not seen them yet. I think lie
said they were then probably at the houses and churches. I know that was
my impression, and that they were supervising the carrying in of the wounded.
Question. You did not look around to see that they were there 1
Answer. No, sir; because Dr. Stidger said he would take charge and see
that the men -were properly cared for. It has been supposed that those men
who died were my men. That is not so. A great portion of iny men were
only slightly wounded. Where men are badly wounded, the dressing requires
a great deal of time and a number of attendants ; but after that is once done,
nothing is required but for the attendants to keep the wounds moist. The
greater part of my men were but slightly wounded, and a great many of them
walked from the hospitals to the cars and sat up.
Question. Still there were men who were so badly Avounded or so sick that
they died on the road and here 1
Answer. No, sir ; they were not my cases ; I knew nothing about them.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Did they not become your cases when you took charge of them ?
Answer. They were not reported to me. The person who attached those
cars to the train should have reported to me. I knew nothing about it until it
was reported to me that two men had died in the cars. There was one who
died the next morning of hospital gangrene. He was shot in the leg.
Question. Would it not have been well for that man to have had surgical
attendance the night before1?
Answer. Yes, sir ; and I supposed he had. But surgeons will testify that
when gangrene once attacks a limb it is usually fatal. But my principal duties
were to superintend the arrangements, and my assistants were to attend to the
wounded ; and the men themselves have told me that they never were better
treated than they were on that trip. A number of them met me on the street
510 TESTIMONY.
yesterday, and stopped me, and told me that that night their accommodations
were good, and that they got better suppers that night than they had had before
since they had been in the service. I had had almost nothing to eat since early
in the morning of that day. The men had their dinners at Manassas about two
o'clock that day. Wherever I have been the post surgeons would give direc
tions to the surgeons of the hospitals ; the post surgeon would supervise, and
the others would carry out his directions. That I considered to be my duty in
this case.
WASHINGTON, June 21, 1862.
Major JOHN 0. JOHNSON sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am major of the 110th regiment of Pennsylvania volunteers.
Question. Do you know Dr. D. S. Hays 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; very well.
Question. Did you come to this city with him when he brought some wounded
men from Front Royal 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Then you know nothing about that matter ?
Answer. No, sir. I only knew him while acting surgeon of our regiment. I
always found him a good and attentive surgeon — faithfully looking after the
wants of the men. He was considered one of the best surgeons in all the Penn
sylvania regiments. He was never absent from his post ; he was always there
rendering all the assistance he could. After the battle of Winchester, the 23d
of last March, he was detailed from his command, and placed in charge of the
Union Hotel hospital.
Question. Is that his general reputation in the regiment ]
Answer. As a good surgeon.
Question. That is his general reputation ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
WASHINGTON, June 21, 1862.
Lieutenant HENRY C. SPILMAN sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am a lieutenant and adjutant of the 110th Pennsylvania volunteers.
Question. Do you know Surgeon D. S. Hays ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know his reputation in the regiment as a surgeon 1
Answer. I do.
Question. Will you please state what it is ?
Answer. He has been connected with us for several months past. I have
always considered him a first rate surgeon 1
Question. Is that his general reputation in the regiment ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How long has he been with you ?
Answer. He has been with us some seven months.
Question. Did you come to this city with him when he brought some wounded
men here from front Royal ?
Answer. No, sir.
TESTIMONY. 511
WASHINGTON, June 21, 1862.
Captain S. L. HEWITT sworn and examined.
By Mr. Groocli :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army]
Answer. I am captain of company D, 110th regiment of Pennsylvania vol
unteers.
Question. Do you know Surgeon D. S. Hays ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I do. I have known him for a long time; I knew him
before he entered the army.
Question. What is his reputation and character in your regiment as a sur
geon?
Answer. It is very good — excellent.
Question. You did not come to Washington with him when he came here in
charge of the sick and wounded from Front Royal ?
Answer. No, sir. In regard to his reputation, I have always thought he had
a reputation beyond that of many other surgeons. After the battle of Win
chester he was the head of the hospitals there. He not only had his own regi
ment to attend to, but a half a dozen others to see to at the same time. Among
the men of our regiment his reputation is very good ; and we all are very sorry,
and regret, exceedingly, the misfortune that has happened to him.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Do you know why he was transferred from his regiment to the
hospital in Winchester ?
Answer. I do not know. I thought it was because he was a more thorough
going surgeon than the others.
Question. Have you not often heard it remarked that he was one of the best
surgeons in your regiments, and that it was for that reason that he was placed
at the head of the hospital ?
Answer. I do not remember hearing that remark exactly. I thought so my
self, I know. The men of our regiment, the 110th, thought he was more com
petent than other surgeons. Of course, they had more dependence upon and
more confidence in him than in any other surgeons.
WASHINGTON, June 21, 1862.
Colonel E. S. SANFORD sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Will you state your position here in connexion with the telegraph ?
Answer. I am military supervisor of army intelligence.
Question. Do all telegraphic communications sent from officers in the field,
and from the army generally, come to you ?
Answer. They come to the War Department office ; they are under my su
pervision.
Question. Do you recollect receiving, a week ago to-day, a telegraphic de
spatch from Surgeon D. S. Hays 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How many did you receive ?
Answer. I think there were two.
Question. Can you state the time when you received them ?
Answer. One was received in the morning. I cannot say at what hour it
was received, because that message does not happen to have been "timed," as it
512 TESTIMONY.
is termed ; that is, it did not have the time of its reception marked upon it. But,
judging from its position in the message book, it was, undoubtedly, early in the
morning.
Question. Do you recollect the purport of that despatch ?
Answer. In general terms, it stated that he would leave Front Royal at II
o'clock.
Question. With a train of sick and wounded soldiers for this city ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did he state at what time he would probably arrive here 1
Answer. Not in that message.
Question. At what time was the second despatch received ?
Answer. At 4.14 p. m.
Question. What was the purport of that despatch?
Answer. It was dated at Manassas, and received here at 4.14 p. m. It stated
that they had arrived at that place, and that the train would probably arrive at
Washington between 8 and 9 o'clock that evening.
Question. To whom were those messages directed ?
Answer. To Surgeon General Hammond.
Question. What was done with them 1
Answer. They are supposed to have been treated as all other messages are,
sent out immediately.
Question. Sent immediately to the surgeon general's office 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; it is supposed so. It is perhaps proper that I should ex
plain more fully than I have done my position there. Formerly I had nothing
to do with the practical part of telegraphing, that is, my position did not require
that I should have anything to do with the practical operation of the telegraph,
simply to have a supervision of all messages and intelligence. But since Colonel
Slager, the superintendent of military telegraphs, has been sick, I have filled
his place. For that reason I have given no instructions in regard to the practi
cal part of the business at all, nor did I look over it very closely, but left it
with the assistant superintendent, Mr. Eckert. But since this affair, and seeing
some comments in the newspapers about telegraphic despatches not being de
livered, I asked if these messages had been received. They turned to their
books and said they had been received. I asked what was done with them,
and they said they were sent off. I asked if there was any difficulty about
finding the place, and if any answer came bacjv, and they said no, from which I
inferred that they were promptly delivered.
Question. In the usual course of things, how long after these despatches
reached the War Department would they reach the surgeon general's office ?
Answer. Not over from ten minutes to half an hour.
Question. Have you any knowledge as to the time when they did reach
there ?
Answer. No positive knowledge.
Question. What is the best information you have upon that point 1
Answer. They have not been able to find yet or fix positively upon the or
derly who delivered them. They are tracing that matter out this morning, and
I presume they will be able to ascertain soon. There are changes occasionally
made in the orderlies. Instead of having a regular set of orderlies, they are
taken from a regiment, and do not remain permanently, but when the regiment
leaves they go with it, and they have to get a new set of orderlies.
Question. These messages have been received at the surgeon general's office
some time, have they not 1
Answer. We have no knowledge of that ; we have received no information
about that.
Question. You only know the time at which they reached your office, and
that in the usual course of business in the office they would have been received
TESTIMONY. 513
at the surgeon general's office in from ten to thirty minutes after they were re
ceived at your office 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Would or would not the surgeon general have known, upon read
ing the first despatch from Front Royal, if it was delivered to him, that that
train would probably reach this city that evening 1
Answer. 1 cannot say whether he would have known it. I should have
known it, and so would anybody familiar with railroad matters. I should have
presumed that from the distance.
WASHINGTON, June 20, 1862.
Dr. S. S. BURROWS sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What is your position in the army?
Answer. I am assistant surgeon of the 29th Ohio volunteers.
Question. Did you come from Front Royal, Virginia, last week with Dr. Hays
and his train of sick and wounded soldiers 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. At what time did you reach the city of Washington?
Answer. It would be a matter of a little uncertainty for me to state just the
time. I judge it was' between 9 and 10 o'clock at night.
Question. What happened after you got here ; what was done ?
Answer. We were left on Maryland avenue, on the Island. The cars were
switched off there. I saw Dr. Hays and the other surgeons. There were five
of us. We looked about and inquired to find who was to take charge of the
wounded there. We expected to find some one there to whom to report. After
making inquiries, and finding out that the cars were to be left there over night,
and after waiting some considerable time, Dr. Hays and Dr. Stidger went off
together to see if they could find the officials. I remained there with Dr. Mc-
Cune and Dr. Redlick. We went through the cars and saw the sick and
wounded. The citizens came in about that time, and commenced feeding them.
They had some food ; not enough for them, however. But the citizens came in,
and they were furnished with a plenty to eat and drink. Some cases were taken
to private houses. After the shower, I do not know exactly at what time that
was — after we had seen to the soldiers all around, and had seen that they had
plenty to eat and drink — Dr. McCune, Dr. Redlick, and myself went into a
house near by and stopped there over night. I saw nothing more of Dr. Hays
after he left and went off to search for some one to report to.
Question. When did you next see him?
Answer. It was the next morning, a couple of hours, or three hours, after I
was there. I was there again early in the morning.
Question. How many of the men stayed in the cars that night ?
Answer. I could not state how many.
Question. What proportion of them?
Answer. The most of them, unless they were taken out after I left. I saw
some of them removed.
Question. How many did you see removed from the cars that night ?
Answer. I do not know of but two, really. There was a captain who was
taken to A. Lamon's house, and another person whose name I do not know.
Question. Did any surgeon see him after he was taken to the house]
Answer. The next morning I went to all the houses.
Question. I mean, did any of the surgeons see him that night ?
Part iii 33
514 TESTIMONY.
/
Answer. I do not know that they did.
Question. Did you assist in the removal of either of those two men ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. You had' nothing to do with the removal of any of the wounded
men from the cars 1
Answer. Nothing more than I asked this man Lamon if the captain could
stay with him, and he said he could ; and as the captain had a special attendant
with him, I instructed him to take him there.
Question. Did the other surgeons go with you into the house where you
stopped over night ?
Answer. Yes, sir; two of them.
Question. Where did Dr. Stidger go*?
Answer. Dr. Stidger, I supposed, went with Dr. Hays.
Question. You left all the sick and wounded men in the cars except the two
you have mentioned?
Answer. If there were any others who went out they went out without my
knowledge.
Question. You left in a short time after the train arrived ?
Answer. No, sir; I should judge it was between 11 and 12 o'clock. We
went around to the different cars; that is, we did not all go into the same cars ;
some went in one car, and some in another.
Question. After you had gone through the cars then you left them ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you know at that time that any preparations were being made
to take these sick and wounded men into the churches ?
Answer. No, sir; not at that time.
Question. No arrangements had been made for that ?
Answer. Not when I left.
Question. What time in the morning did you get back to the train ?
Answer. I do not know just what time it was ; soon after sunrise — before
breakfast.
Question. Give us the hour as near as you can ?
Answer. I should judge it was 6 o'clock.
Question. Did the other surgeons go back with you ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. At what time did they get back ?
Answer. A short time after; I do not know exactly when.
Question. Then the fact was that neither of you three surgeons saw anything
of these men from the time you left them at 11 o'clock until 6 or 7 o'clock the
next morning ?
Answer. Not so far as I know.
Question. Do you think that is the proper way to treat wounded and sick
men?
Answer. We were expecting Dr. Hays back, and that they were to be re
ported to the authorities here.
Question. Did you think you were doing your duty as a surgeon, to leave
these men in the cars in that way, not knowing whether Dr. Hays would find
anybody, or would come back ? 0
Answer. I thought I had done all I could do for them ; all that I thought I
was able to do under the circumstances.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Would not your -services have been required if Dr. Hays had suc
ceeded in getting orders to have'the men removed ? You say he left for that
purpose.
TESTIMONY. 515
Answer. I did not know whether they were or were not to be removed that
night. I supposed that the officials here knew about it. I did not know what
arrangements were to be made.
WASHINGTON, June 21, 1862.
Surgeon General WILLIAM A. HAMMOND sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What is your position ? •
Answer. I am surgeon general of the army of the United States.
Question. Will yo'u state to the committee whether or not any telegraphic
despatches were received from Surgeon D. S. Hays last Saturday; and if so,
what was their character, and at what time were they received by you, or at
your office ?
Answer. Perhaps I better state all the despatches I received, in order to give
the committee a proper understanding of the wThele matter.
Question. You will please do so.
Answer. On Friday afternoon or Saturday morning — I think it was Satur
day, though it might have been Friday — I received a despatch from Brigade
Surgeon Cox, at Front Royal, stating that he had received information that a
number of sick and Avounded of General Shields 's division would reach Front
Royal in a short time ; that he had no hospitals or supplies for them, and asking
what he should do with them. I telegraphed to him to send them to -Washing
ton, and that he would be ordered to report himself under arrest here for not
having supplies and hospitals; arid I immediately applied to the adjutant gen
eral to issue that order. He has not yet reported himself, and this morning I
applied again to have a despatch sent to him to know why he had not reported
himself under that order.
I received a telegram from Surgeon Cox, I think it was, that the men would
be seat to Washington Saturday morning, and that I should be notified by tele
graph of the time they would arrive here. I heard nothing more about them
until Sunday morning. Some fifteen minutes after I got there a despatch was
handed to me. I have every reason to believe that Dr. Hays has stated cor
rectly as to the time he sent that despatch. There was a storm that evening,
and I suppose that delayed it. At least I did not get it until the next morning.
A few minutes after I received it Dr. Hays reported himself, and came into my
office. He stated that he had arrived the night before, and had tried to find me
and the medical director, and had not succeeded. He had to report that the
men were now at the depot, and asked what he should do with them. I ordered
him to go to the medical director and get ambulances, and have them removed.
They were sent in a short time, for the horses are generally kept harnessed, and
ready to move at a moment's notice. Dr. Hays represented his action to me in
such a light, his energy, &c., that I was so well satisfied, that I compli
mented him for his activity in the matter. I know that he excused himself for
not having reported to me the evening before, by saying that he could not find
me; but I did not think of that at the time. *When we went to .Dr. Letterman's
office he stated the matter to him. On Sunday afternoon I received a letter
from Dr. Letterman to the effect that Surgeon Hays had neglected his duty ;
had not reported the evening before, as he should have done, but had gone to
the hotel, and gone to bed, leaving the men there, and recommended that some
action be taken in regard to the matter, as that was the second time such a thing
had occurred. I took Dr. Letterman's letter, indorsed upon it a summary of its
contents, to the Secretary of War, and requested that he would inflict severe
punishment upon Dr. Hays, and have this course of conduct stopped.
516 TESTIMONY.
Dr. Hays soon after came in and I handed him the letter to read. He read it
and begged me not to send it. Said I, "You don't deny anything that is stated
there?" Said he, "No; I admit that I went to Willard's, but I came to this
office and tried to find you and I could not do it." Said I, "You don't expect
me to sleep in my office all night. It is utterly useless for you to tell me that
you could not find me in the city of Washington. They know at Willard's
where I live, and also where Dr. Letterman lives." There are also watchmen
in my office who know where I live, for I have frequently received despatches
from the office after office hours. I told Dr. Hays that I should have to send
that letter over to the Secretary. He begged that I would not, but did not deny
anything that was in it, only asserted that he bad tried to find me the evening
before and could not. He followed niy messenger out and I know nothing more
of what happened, except from hearsay. I have seen the order to-day, officially
published, directing that Dr. Hays be dropped from the army list.
Question. Did you read to him the letter you had received from Dr. Letter
man and your comments upon it 1
Answer. I gave it to him to read.
Question. Did you receive more than one despatch from Surgeon Hays while
he was in charge of that train?
Answer. I think I received altogether three despatches in regard to those
men. I received one from Dr. Cox informing me that the men were coming to
Front Royal, one from Dr. Cox or Dr. Hays, I do not know which, informing
me that the men had arrived at Front Royal and would leave for Washington,
of which I would be advised. After that I received nothing until Sunday
morning.
Question. Did you not receive a despatch stating, in substance, that they
would leave Front Royal for this city at 11 o'clock on Saturday morning?
Answer. No, sir; I have not seen any such despatch.
Question. Where was the despatch dated that you received on Sunday
morning ?
Answer. It was dated at Front Royal, I think. I received none on Saturday
stating when they would leave. The one I received on Sunday morning stated
either that they would leave there at a certain time or that they would reach
Washington at a certain time ?
Question. Was that despatch dated at Front Royal or Manassas ?
Answer. It was dated at Front Royal, I think. It may have been dated at
Manassas. The despatch is at my office. I know this, that if that despatch
had been received in time, the ambulances would have been there to receive the
men. The despatch either stated when they would leave (when by a simple
calculation I could have teld at what time they would have been likely to arrive)
or it stated when they would arrive. If the despatch had been received in tim'e
all would have been right. The fault I found with Dr. Hays was this : that
when he arrived here and found that no preparations had been made to receive
his men, he was bound to suppose either that his despatch had not been received,
or that something had occurred to prevent his men being attended to, and it was
his duty to find out what it was.
Question. We have testimony here that there were two despatches from Dr.
Hays received at the War Department on Saturday, one early in the morning
and the other in the evening. Tne first one was dated at Front Royal and
stated that the train would leave there at 11 o'clock, for Washington, with these
men. The other was dated at Manassas, and stated that the train would arrive
at Washington between 8 and 9 o'clock that evening. The first one was re
ceived in the early part of the day, the time not fixed. The other was received
between 4 and half past 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Have you received both of
those despatches ?
Answer. No, sir ; I think not. If they had both been received I think I
TESTIMONY. 517
should certainly have seen them, and have recollected them. No, sir; I am
certain I did not receive the first one ; I never saw it. The only despatch I
ever saw relating to the train arriving at all at any definite period, was the one
I saw on Sunday morning. When that reached Washington I do not know,
It did not reach my office, however, certainly, before I left there, which was
4 o'clock in the evening.
Question. Did you return to your office again after leaving it Saturday even
ing at 4 o'clock?
Answer. No, sir, I did not. I never return to my office after that time unless
there is some pressing business to attend to there, because I am on a board of
examination from 5 until 11 o'clock. I stayed at my office until 4 o'clock on
§aturday; that is my rule. I take my dinner at 4 o'clock, and at 5 o'clock I
go to this board of examination.
Question. What instructions are left with the persons who remain at the office
after you leave ?
Answer. I have never given him any definite instructions. He has been
acting under the instructions that have always prevailed there I presume. I
know that despatches have come to my house after I left.
Question. Does the watchman, who remains there, know where you live?
Answer. I presume he does. I have never asked him the question. The
messengers of the office know where I live, because I have sent things up to rny
house by them.
Question. Does the man who was there last Saturday night know where you
live ?
Answer. I do not know whether he does or does not. But the fact that mes
sages which are taken to my office after I leave come to my house would lead
me to suppose that he does know, because he must tell the man who brings the "
messages where I live.
Question. Then you received no communication whatever stating when that
train would leave Front Royal for Washington ?
Answer. I saw no communication whatever that that train left Front Royal
for Washington, until I saw the one that was handed to me on Sunday morning.
Question. You saw no communication, and had no knowledge of the fact on
Saturday ?
Answer. No, sir. The rule of the office is invariable, that whenever a despatch
comes announcing the coming of troops that are sick or wounded it is sent over
to the medical director at once, and he makes the necessary preparations. Now,
last night I received a despatch from Dr. Bryant, who was the one who had
been derelict before — the case referred to as the first case — Dr. Hays being the
second. Yesterday afternoon he telegraphed to me that he was coming, and that
he would let me know when the sick would arrive. He telegraphed again as to
when they would arrive, and I got the despatch at 2 o'clock in the morning.
la the first despatch he telegraphed me that they would leave Front Royal, and
asked that arrangements be made to have them properly cared for at Manassas
and Alexandria, which was done, and those men were properly taken care of.
Even if the despatches had not been received at all, or even if they had been
received and I had been grossly negligent ; if I had received the despatches
and had known perfectly well what had been done, and had not care enough to
send the ambulances down there for them — all that would not excuse Dr. Hays.
It was his business to have arrangements made, if he found none there.
Question. You deem that Dr. Hays was negligent in not finding you or some
person to take charge of those men that night 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; I do.
Question. That is, you think he should have done that ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; that is the point precisely.
Question. He says he went to the war office, found out where your office
518 TESTIMONY
was ; then went to your office and found that you were not there, and that
there was no one there to give him information. His own statement is that he
then concluded that it was not proposed that the men should be removed to
the hospitals that night. He then returned to the train, and after remaining
there some time he went back to the hotel and went to bed.
Answer. I do not know whether that is so or not. He did not tell me that
he even asked for me at the office. He never intimated the slightest thing of
the kind to me. I think it was told to me by some one who came there as his
counsel. But I did not want then to ascertain any more in regard to it, as I
knew this thing would probably come up here.
Question. Did he give you a statement of what he did do ?
Answer. No, sir ; except that he had tried to find me and Dr. Letternian and
could not.
Question. He did not give you any particulars of what he had done ?
Answer. No, sir; only generalities ; and I told him it was utterly useless for
him to tell me that he could not find either me or Dr. Letternian, for they knew
at Willard's where we lived. Dr. Letterman's office is at General Wadsworth's
headquarters ; he is on his staff, and could have been found at any time by ap
plying there.
Question. This might be true, might it not : You were known to him as the
proper officer to whom to report ; you were the surgeon general ; you were his
superior, and the officer to whom he would most naturally report.
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And, therefore, he hunted for you. In trying to find you he went
naturally, in the first place, to the War Department, and was told that your
office was not there, and was directed to where it was. He went from the
War Department to your office, and there he saw a watchman, as he says, and
inquired for you, and was told you were not in. He asked the watchman
whether he could take a message to you from him, and the watchman told him
he did not know where you lived, and that there were despatches then in the
office waiting for you.
Answer. I do not know about that ; I have not inquired of the watchman.
The counsel of Dr. Hays, who came to see me, told me something about that,
but I did not care to ask the watchman anything about it, as I understood the
matter was to be investigated here.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Would not the prompt delivery of Dr. Hays's despatch to you
have prevented all this difficulty ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; it would. But the fact of its not being delivered does not
relieve Dr. Hays.
Question. Suppose that Dr. Hays, after making these inquiries and failing to
find you, concluded that it was the intention not to have the men removed until
morning; what was then his duty as a surgeon?
Answer. I can hardly conceive that any surgeon could entertain the idea that
the men would be left there.
Question. I am assuming that he did conclude that you would take no steps
in the matter that night ?
Answer. Then his duty as a surgeon and an officer was to remain with those
men until he could find what was to be done with them. He was the command
ing officer of those men, and it was his .duty to stay with them. He could not
delegate that authority to any other person.
Question. What was the duty of 'the assistant surgeons with him 1
Answer. To remain there if he required them to do so. He was the respon
sible man. He could dispense with their services if he chose, but they could
TESTIMONY 519
not 'dispense with his. He could say to them, " You can go home ; I will stay
tere."
Question. How many surgeons in reality ought to have attended upon that
train of between 300 and 400 sick and wounded men that night ?
Answer. There ought to. have been at least a half a dozen surgeons. I would
say that those men were not properly cared for at Front Royal, owing to a point
between General Ricketts and his brigade surgeon. The facts of the case, as
they are respresented to me in official circles, are as follows : I recollect now
that the first despatch I received from Dr. Hays stated that the men had arrived
at Front Royal, and that General Ricketts refused to allow his brigade surgeon
to attend to them ; that there were stores there that he could not get. This
brigade surgeon was Dr. Cox. Dr. Cox was the one who was not allowed to
attend to these men, by order of General Ricketts, on the ground that they
belonged to General Shields 's division, and did not belong to his brigade, and
his medical stores should not be used for them. That is stated officially from
Dr. Hays. And I also have a letter from the assistant adjutant general to
General Ricketts's brigade, to Dr. Cox, inquiring by what authority he was
attending to the sick and wounded of General Shields's division. Those papers
I laid before the Secretary of War, with the request that he would have the
•conduct of General Ricketts investigated, because I considered it an outrage.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Is that General Ricketts the one who was in command of a battery
at the battle of Bull Run, and who was wounded and taken prisoner there ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; the same officer ; and that accounts, as I afterwards
learned, for Dr. Cox not having hospitals and stores provided for these men.
He said he had no hospitals and stores for them. It turns out that he had
stores, but General Ricketts had ordered him not to use them for that purpose.
Dr. Cox has been ordered to report himself here, but he has not yet come.
This morning I again telegraphed for him to come here immediately ; and if he
does not come I shall apply to the Secretary of War to have him dismissed the
service. Dr. Hays also told me another thing, which I have no reason at all
to doubt : that a number of sick men were put on board of his train (some
twenty or more) at Catlett's station, I believe, with whom there was no sur
geon, nurses, or anything of the kind, and that two of them died on the road.
But these are faults of the commanding officer. It is his duty to send a surgeon
with sick or wounded men whether they request it or not.
Question. Do you know anything more about those men than Dr. Hays told
you?
Answer. No, sir ; they sent no report — nothing whatever about them.
Question. How shall we ascertain about that matter ]
Answer. I do not know. The men were too sick, the most of them, to
answer any questions. I do not know Avhere they came from. I presume it
might, perhaps, be ascertained by following up the railroad conductors. The
fact is, the whole organization of that part of the army is more deplorable than
that of any other portion of the army.
Question. Is there any reason why that should be so ? ^
Answer. I do not know. I would not like to give my personal opinion in
regard to it.
Question. How should that difficulty be remedied?
Answer. I know no other remedy than changing the commanding officer.
Question. To whom do you refer now ?
Answer. I refer to General Shields.
520 TESTIMONY.
By Mr. Covocle :
Question. Do you know whether the despatch that was delivered to you on
Sunday morning had laid in your office over night, or was it brought over to
the office on Sunday morning ?
Answer. I do not know. I was informed on the day of Dr. Hays's dismissal,
or early in the morning the day after, that I would probably be called before
this committee, and I made no inquiries whatever about the matter. I will say
this : that Dr. Edwards, one of my assistants, remains in the office every evening
until 6 o'clock, and opens all the despatches that come there from the time I
leave until he leaves himself. If any despatch had come there before he left
he would have opened it."
Question. Do you recollect whether any other despatches were handed you
on Sunday morning at the same time this one you refer to was handed to you ?
Answer. That was the only one I have any recollection of. If there was
any other it was some unimportant one, of no particular consequence.
Question. From the despatches you had received previously, were you led to
believe that that train of sick and wounded would come in that night ?
Answer. No, sir.
WASHINGTON, June 23, 1862.
JOSEPH H. HILTON sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What is your position ?
Answer. I am a watchman in the surgeon general's and paymaster general's
departments.
Question. Where were you between the hours of six and twelve o'clock a
week ago last Saturday night ?
Answer. I cannot say about six o'clock.
Question. Well, between eight and twelve o'clock ?
Answer. I was in the building occupied by the surgeon general's and pay
master general's departments.
Question. Did any person come to the office that night in search of the sur
geon general, to your knowledge 1
Answer. Not to my knowledge.
Question. Where were you ?
Answer. At the office, at the door where I am regularly stationed all night,
We receive all the despatches that come there. If there are any for the surgeon
general, and he is in, I give them to him. If he is not in, I leave them in his
room.
Question. And they remain there all night ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. You had no orders to send them to his house 1
Answer. No, sir ; not until yesterday.
Question. Did any despatches come for him that night ?
Answer. There may have been some for him but how many I cannot say.
Question. Are you sure you received any for him that night]
Answer. I will not be sure about that ; but they come every night, and I
think some came that night.
Question. You have no distinct recollection of receiving any for him that
night 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. If any person had come there that night and inquired for the sur
geon general would you now recollect it ?
TESTIMONY 521
Answer. Yes, sir ; particularly if he had inquired for the surgeon general and
stated what his business was ; for I then should have directed him to Dr. Wood,
or some other surgeon who could have told him where to find the surgeon gen
eral ; I did not know where the surgeon general lived until last Thursday.
Question. Do you recollect distinctly whether you told any person that night,
who was inquiring if you could send a message to the surgeon general, that you
did not know where he lived, and that there' were then some messages there
waiting for him ?
Answer. No, sir ; I am satisfied about that.
Question. Was there any time that night that you were absent ?
Answer. No, sir; I was in the office all night, and until eight o'clock on
Sunday morning.
Question. You know a surgeon by his dress ?
Answer. Well, sir, I cannot say that I do.
Question. You would know an officer — a man with straps on his shoulders T
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Would you have remembered it if any man with shoulder-straps
had come to that door that night ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I think I would.
Question. Were there any other persons there to whom any one would make
a communication but yourself?
Answer. Nobody but Mr. Kelly, my associate watchman.
Question. Have you ever seen Surgeon Hays at any time to know him ?
Answer. I wouM not know him if he were standing here now.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. At which door are you stationed ?
Answer. At the main entrance door of the surgeon general's and paymaster
general's offices. «,••
Question. On which floor ?
Answer. On the lower floor, at the main entrance. I take all messages that
come there.
Question. Was there not a portion of that time that you were absent from
the door up stairs, on the surgeon general and paymaster general's floor ?
Answer. 1 never go up stairs without closing the main entrance door and
locking it.
Question. How do you get despatches into the surgeon general's room ?
Answer. I have the key of his room, which I keep down stairs, hanging on
a nail there. When I have a despatch for him I lock the street door, to keep
anybody from coming in, and then take down the key of the surgeon general's
room, and go up stairs and unlock the door, and go in and lay the despatch
upon the table, when there is nobody there to receive it from me.
Question. Why do you lock the street door when you go up stairs if you
have 'another watchman on duty with you?
Answer. Well, sir, that has always been my custom.
Question. Was it you that handed the despatches to the surgeon general the
next morning ?
Answer. No, sir ; I never hand them to him, except at night, when he is
there. His messenger hands them to him in the morning. The day watchman
relieves me at 6 o'clock in the morning. When despatches come in during the
night I distribute them around through the building, placing them in the proper
rooms for the surgeon general, the paymaster general, and paymasters who have
offices in the building, and in the morning the messenger puts 'them where they
belong.
Question. Do you know of despatches coming to the surgeon general some
times marked "important," and others not so marked?
522 TESTIMONY
Answer. I have never seen one marked "important;" not since I have been
in the building.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What persons came to the office inquiring for the surgeon general,
on the Thursday evening before, when you were on duty there? I understand
that you are on duty there on alternate nights ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I could not tell what persons were there on Thursday
night. A great many persons call every evening and inquire for the surgeon
general, and the paymaster general, and different paymasters there. Who came
there that evening I could not tell.
Question. I mean between the hours of 8 and 12 o'clock.
Answer. I could not tell. There may have been a dozen called there, and
there may have been not more than two or three.
Question. Did any officer call there on Thursday evening and inquire for the
surgeon general ?
Answer. As far as my recollection serves me, I do not think there was But
.1 cannot tell.
Question. How certain can you be about that ?
Answer. I cannot be certain.
Question. How certain can you be ?
Answer. They may have come, and I might have seen them and given them
an answer ; and they might not have come.
Question. Did any person come there a week ago last Thursday night, be
tween the hours of 8 and 12 o'clock, and inquire for the surgeon general, and
you tell them that you did not know where he lived ?
Answer. That might have been, for I did not know then where he lived.
Question. Did any person come there and ask you if you could send a mes
sage to him, and you told him that you did not know where he lived 1
Answer. No, sir. I am positive about that, because nobody ever asked me
that.
Question. On that Thursday night did you tell anybody that there were
despatches then up stairs for the surgeon general ?
Answer. No, sir. No such question was ever put to me by any gentleman,
in any shape or form, either that night or any other.
Question. Was there any person there on last Monday ' evening, between the
hours of eight and twelve o'clock, inquiring for the surgeon general, and who
asked you whether or not you could send a message or despatcn to him ?
Answer. No, sir ; that has never been asked of me.
Question. Do you know whether there was any message came there that
night for the surgeon general ?
Answer. Despatches came that night and I distributed them.
Question. Who brought them ?
Answer. Orderlies generally bring them; soldiers on horseback.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Have you any recollection at what time the assistant surgeon gen
eral left the office, on Saturday evening?
Answer. I could not tell. The doctors are generally coming in and going
out; all the time continually, and I cannot keep the run of them.
TESTIMONY. 523
WASHINGTON, June 23, 1862.
WILLIAM KELLY sworu and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. What is your occupation ?
Answer. I have been occupying the position of night watchman in the build
ing where the surgeon general's office is for the last fourteen years.
Question. Where were you one week ago last Saturday night, between the
hours of eight and twelve o'clock.
Answer. I go on that duty about half past three o'clock in the afternoon,
from that to four o'clock, every second day in the year; and I never leave
there, summer or winter, until the next morning. I bring my supper with me,
or have it brought to me.
Question. Were you on duty that night ?
Answer. Yes, sir; that evening and night all through.
Question. Do you know whether anybody came to that building that night,
between the hours of eight and twelve o'clock, and inquired for the surgeon
general ?
Answer. No person, to my knowledge or recollection, on that evening.
Question. Down to as late as twelve o'clock?
Answer. Yes, sir ; or through the night, as far as I can recollect or know. I
am very glad that it has happened, as I am called before you on this occasion,
that I recollect what happened that night.
Question. Why do you particularly recollect about that night 1
Answer. Because it was not so long ago, and the gentleman called upon me
the next morning.
Question. What gentleman 1
Answer. Dr. Hays.
Question. Why did he call upon you?
Answer. Ev^ry fourth Sunday I am on duty a part of the day. I went
home that morning, got a clean shirt and a bowl of coffee, and came back to the
building about eight o'clock. I was sitting at the door, as I usually do in warm
weather. My partner had gone a few minutes before. This gentleman, dressed
in uniform, came to the door as I was sitting there. I took him to be an officer
in the army of some grade. The first thing he said was to ask if the surgeon
general had come into his office. That is what made me think that, perhaps, he
had been there before. I told him he had not come in. The next thing he said
was "I have just arrived in the cars" — I forget whether he said "this morn
ing" or " last night." But what he said was that he had arrived in the cars
with between 400 and 500, I think, wounded soldiers in his charge, and he
could not remove them from the cars until he saw the surgeon general. 1 said,
"I am sorry I cannot inform you where his residence is, but there is a man up
stairs who can give you better information than I can." That was a laborer up
stairs. He went up stairs, to the best of my knowledge, and soon came down,
as if .in a hurry, and went right across the street from where I was sitting. He
was but a very few minutes gone when he and the surgeon general returned
together. They both seemed to be in a hurry.
Question. Had you ever seen that surgeon, Dr. Hays, before that Sunday
morning ?
Answer. Not to my knowledge.
Question. Was he there in the night time during the night previous ?
Answer. Not at all, to my knowledge or recollection.
Question. Could he have been there without your knowing it ?
Answer. I believe not at all."
524 TESTIMONY.
Question. Do you and your partner keep on the watch there, both of you, all
night ?
Answer. Yes, sir. And I have had another man there with me all the time
for these 14 years.
Question. Then you say you are confident that this Surgeon Hays was not
there ^during that night ?
Answer. To the best of my knowledge and recollection he was not there that
night.
Question. Was there any other person in charge there that night except you
and your partner ?
Answer. There is no other man in charge of that building at the present time
on those nights but me and my partner. Some time ago we had two substitutes,
but they have been withdrawn to the War Department.
By Mr. Covode : .
Question. Did you say that you did not know where the surgeon general
lived ?
Answer. I told this gentleman that I did not know at that time where he
lived.
Question. Did you tell him there were despatches there then for the surgeon
general ?
Answer. I told him nothing of the kind. He did not ask me that question.
It runs in my mind that he said something to me about despatches, or a despatch ;
but I did not take much notice of that.
Question. What is the laborer's name that Dr. Hays went up stairs to see?
Answer. His name is James Palmer.
WASHINGTON, June 23, 1862.
Dr. JONATHAN LETTERMAN sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. What is your position in connexion with the army ?
Answer. I am assistant surgeon in the army, and medical director of this dis
trict.
Question. Have you any knowledge of the case of Surgeon Hays, who came
from Front Royal to this city with a train of sick and wounded men last Satur
day night a week ago ; if you have, will you state to the committee all that
you know about the matter ?
Answer. When I went to my office on Sunday morning, as I entered one
door Dr. Hays came in the other. He told me that he had a nnrnber— I forget
now the exact number he stated, but it was a large number — of sick and wounded
men on Maryland avenue, in some cars there. He told me that he had got in
here between 9 and 10 o'clock the evening before ; that there were DO ambu
lances there, and the men had not been taken away. I asked him why he had
not come to my office and let me know about it. He said he did not know
where it was. I then sent ambulances over there and had the men removed. I
had received no telegraphic despatches from him, an<J knew nothing about the
matter before that Sunday morning.
Question. Is that all you know about the matter ?
Answer. That is all, except some little outside matters ; those are all the ma
terial facts that I know in the case. That is the statement Dr. Hays himself'
gave me Sunday morning, when I asked him why he had not been there before
to let me know about it.
Question. Do telegraphic despatches coming from surgeons in charge of trains
TESTIMONY. 525
of fiick and wounded come directly to you, or do they conic to the surgeon
general ?
Answer. Sometimes they come to the surgeon general and sometimes to me.
Question. More usually how is it ?
Answer. They come more generally to me, I think. I do not know how
many exactly the surgeon general gets ; but what he gets he sends to me.
Question. At the time you saw Dr. Hays and had this conversation with him,
to which you refer, did he not state to you that he went to the office of the
surgeon general the night before ?
Answer. Yes, sir,'; he did, and said he could not find him.
Question. Did he give you the particulars ?
Answer. No, sir ; that is the substance of what he said in regard to the matter.
Question. Did he tell you that he went to the office of the surgeon general
and there saw a watchman who told him that he did not know* where the surgeon
general lived ?
i Answer. No, sir ; I do not think he did.
Question. And that he could not find any way of communicating with the
surgeon general that night ?
Answer. I think not. My conversation with him was very brief, because as
soon as I learned the men were over there I immediately commenced to write
orders for the ambulances to go down and remove them.
Question. You addressed a letter to the surgeon general on this subject ?
Answer, Yes, sir.
Question. On what information did you base that letter ?
Answer. On what Dr. Hays himself told me.
Question. Do you know what Dr. Hays did that night, what care he took of
the men, or anything about that ?
Answer. No, sir ; I know nothing about that.
Question. You had no information upon that point ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Would he have been derelict in his duty if he had come to this
city, had gone to the surgeon general's office, had inquired for the surgeon gen
eral, and been told he was not there, and had then inquired where the surgeon
general lived, and been told by the watchman there that he did not know ; and
had then inquired if a message could be sent to the surgeon general, and had
been told that he, the watchman, did not know where he lived, and that there
were messages there for the surgeon general then; and had then gone back to
the train ?
Answer. I think he would. I think he should have inquired of the military
commander, and had him take such steps as were necessary. It is a military
rule to report to the military commander, when you corne to a place where a
military commander is. That is a rule of the service. I do not know whether
Dr. Hays understood it or not.
Question. You think he should have reported that night to the surgeon general,
or to the military commander, or to some person who should receive the report ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. You think Surgeon Hays was derelict on that point ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And it was on account of that fact that you addressed that letter
to the surgeon general 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. You know nothing of his course during the night ? .
Answer. No, sir. The only conversation I 'had with him was just what I
have stated to you.
Question. Suppose he had concluded that it was not possible for him to make
526 TESTIMONY.
his report that night to any person who was authorized to receive it, what was
then his duty as a surgeon ?
Answer. To remain with his men.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Did not Dr. Hays come to you and complain that he had got here
with these men, and there were no ambulances there, nor anybody to receive
them ?
Answer. He made no complaint of that kind on Sunday morning. On Mon
day morning he came to my office and said something of the kind.
Qnestion. Was that before or after you wrote that letter to the surgeon
general ?
Answer. Afterwards.
Question. What time on Monday morning was that1?
Answer. I do not recollect; it was some time in the forepart of the day.
By Mr. Goocl^:
Question. Was it before or after ten o'clock in the morning ?
Answer. Indeed, I cannot say ; we have so much to do there.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Had Dr. Hays at that time received notice of your letter ?
Answer. I think he had.
Question. And he made that complaint in justification of himself?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you not know that Surgeon Hays was in communication with
the surgeon general before he came here, and that the surgeon general had given
him all the directions which he had, which were to bring the sick and wounded
to Washington, and to report to him ? That the surgeon general was the one
that Dr. Hays was in communication with, and the only one ?
Answer. I have an indistinct recollection of a despatch sent by the surgeon
general up to my office. I have looked for that despatch and cannot find it,
and therefore I think it must have been sent somewhere else.
Question. Did you direct the surgeon general to order Dr. Hays at Front
Royal to bring the sick and wounded to Washington, or did the surgeon gen
eral do that on his own responsibility ?
Answer. I never gave any such order.
Question. Then it appears that Dr. Hays, having had all his correspondence
with the surgeon general, reported to him ?
Answer. Yes, sir; that is very natural. I received no despatches.
Question. Dr. Hays did not come to you until he was sent there by the sur
geon general ?
Answer. I did not see him until Sunday morning.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. When did you first learn that these men were coming from Front
Royal to Washington ?
Answer. I am not certain. I do not think I heard anything of it until Sun
day morning.
Question. Are you pretty clear on that point, that you had no intimation that
this train of cars with these men were coming here until Sunday morning ?
Answer. I had some intimation about the train coming, but I think it was
from, some other person that the despatch came.
Question. Had you any expectation of the train arriving here that night ?
Answer. Indeed, I cannot tell. I went up to the office after 9 o'clock on Sat
urday night, and there were no despatches at all there then.
TESTIMONY. 527
Question. Were you expecting the arrival of any train in this city at that
time ?
Answer. I think not. I very frequently go to the office at that hour of the
night.
Question. If you recollect going to the office that night, do you not know
whether you were expecting any train here ?
Answer. I recollected it, because Dr. Hays came to methe next morning, and
told me that he had come the night before ; and I wondered why he did not
come to my office the night before. My assistants were there until after 11
:>'clock.
Question. Do you recollect whether you were expecting any train that night ?
Answer. I think I did ; but I do not recollect whether it was Dr. Hays's
train or not.
Question. Does anybody sleep in your office ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
> Question. What are your instructions to him ?
Answer. That if any person calls for me with business of importance, he shall
2ome and wake me up at any time of the night.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. You always leave a man there who knows where you live ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Would you think you were doing your whole duty to leave a man
n charge of your business at your office who did not know where you live ?
Answer. No, sir; I should not. As soon as I took the quarters I now occupy,
[ took my orderly down there and showed him where I lived ?
Question. So that he could go over and find you at any hour of the night ?
Answer. Yes, sir; and he has done so at different times.
Question. If any other person here in position knew of a train of sick and
Founded coming in here, in charge of any surgeon, would it not have been the
luty of that person to make provision for receiving them, and look after them
.n some way.
Answer. I think so.
Question. If you had ordered that train loaded with sick and wounded to be
nought to Washington immediately, would you not have felt that it was your
3uty to look after them, and not be away from your office for 10 or 15 hours?
Answer. Yes, sir; I think it would.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Did you have any communication with anybody in relation to the
conduct of Surgeon Hays before writing that letter to the surgeon general ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. You did it upon your own motion, and not at the instigation of any
aody else?
Answer. Yes, sir ; upon my own motion.
Question. Had you heard any outside clamor raised in relation to the treat
ment which these men had received ?
Answer. No, sir; I did not know what treatment the men had received.
Question. You had then heard no complaints about it ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Your letter was based upon what Dr. Hays himself stated to you ?
Answer. Yes, sir. The same thing had occurred once before with a brigade
surgeon. I did not think it right, and that it should -be stopped and go no
further.
528 TESTIMONY.
WASHINGTON, June 23, 1862.
Dr. FRANCIS SALTER sworn and examined.
By Mr. Goocli:
Question. What is your rank and position in the service ?
Answer. I am a surgeon of volunteers, of the 7th Ohio regiment, and am
now in charge of the hospital in Hagerstown.
Question. What was your position prior to that ?
Answer. I have been acting brigade surgeon of the 3d brigade, General
Shields's division.
Question. Has Dr. Hays been under you ?
Answer. Yes, sir,
Question. What do you know in relation to him ?
Answer. I am free to say that he has always performed his duties as well
^as possible; always seemed exceedingly anxious to perform all his duties at
'all times. I have never known him to be absent from his post at any time;
he was always there ready for orders.
Question. Is there anything else which you would wish to state ?
Answer. I would be willing to answer any questions you may think
proper to ask me. I only desire to show that Dr. Hays has never been in
the habit of neglecting his duties. His habit has been just the reverse.
Question. Do you know anything about the particulars of this case where
Dr. Hays is charged with being derelict in the performance of his duty ?
Answer. I have heard, indirectly, about it. I think I am acquainted with
the circumstances.
Question. You know nothing about it of your own knowledge ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. If a surgeon should come to this city with 300 or 400 sick and
wounded persons in his charge, and rind himself unable to report to the
authorities here so as to have them taken charge of, because he arrived
here in the night, between 9 and 10 o'clock, what would then be his duty ?
Answer. To see the men provided for and made as comfortable as possible.
Question. What do you mean by "seeing the men provided for?"
Answer. To have them placed in as comfortable circumstances as possible
in the then existing state of facts.
Question. There being that number of sick and wounded men upon a train
of cars, either having to remain in the cars all night, or be removed that
night to buildings temporarily provided for them, would or would it not be
the duty of the surgeon in charge to be present, and superintend their
removal, and look after them during the night ?
Answer. During the most part of the night it would,
Question. At what time do you think it would be proper for him to leave ?
Answer. I think he could leave, temporarily, with instructions to others
to take his place.
Question. What do you mean by leaving temporarily ?
Answer. I should think an absence (luring the night of three hours would
be temporary.
Question. Would it be his duty, before he left, to see to it that all his
assistant surgeons were properly at work and taking charge of the men
in his care ?
Answer. It would be his duty to have his assistants ordered and instructed
properly as to what course they should pursue.
Question. And to see to it that they were doing that duty before he left ?
Answer. To have orders given to them.
Question. Suppose that he should leave his men for the purpose of going
away and reporting, and finding that he would not be able to give them over to
TESTIMONY. 529
the authorities here that night, he should come back to the train, would it
then be his duty to see to it that his assistants were on the ground and
doing their duty ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I think so.
Question. Would anything excuse his leaving, under those circumstances,
without seeing to that, unless it was a case of absolute prostration ?
Answer. It would be his duty to remain there, unless his own health pre
vented his doing so.
Question. You mean by that, unless he was physically unable to remain ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I would ask how many assistant surgeons were under
Dr. Hays's command at that time ?
Question. There were four of them.
Answer. I think, then, that for three or four hours he might leave, hav
ing such a staff under his command, provided they were at their posts and
doing their duty.
Question. And it was his duty to see that they were there ?
Answer. To issue orders to them to be at their posts.
By Dr. Hays, (who was present:)
Question. If I saw one of the assistants there, and supposed the others to
be in the churches, as I had ordered them to be there, would I be justified
in leaving ?
Answer. I think an order issued to one for the whole would be sufficient.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Do you mean that, not finding the authorities here, and having
to go back to the train again, it would be sufficient for him to issue his orders
to one of the assistant surgeons, or should he see them all ?
Answer. I think he might issue his orders to all through one.
Question. Would he be justified in going away without knowing whether
the rest of the assistant surgeons were there or absent, asleep somewhere ?
Answer. No, sir; unless he had evidence satisfactory to him of their being
there. If one of the assistant surgeons informed him that the rest were
there, I think that might satisfy him.
Question. If you had come back to the train under such circumstances,
you having charge of a train of sick and wounded men, would you have felt
that it was your duty to have given some personal supervision to the mat
ter, to see what was being done for these men ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I should.
WASHINGTON, June 2$, 1862.
Dr. LEWIS A. EDWARDS sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. What is your rank and position in the service ?
Answer. I am a surgeon in the United States army, now on duty in the
surgeon general's office. I am at present the senior surgeon. Dr. Wood
was the senior surgeon before he was commissioned as assistant surgeon
general. I ranked next to him.
Question. At what time did you leave the office a week ago last Saturday
evening ?
Answer. I cannot recollect very distinctly. I am hardly ever away from
there before 5 or half past 5 o'clock, and sometimes I remain there until
7 o'clock.
"Por-f iii . Q4
530 TESTIMONY.
Question. What despatches, if any, were received that day from Dr. Hays,
who was coming in with a train of sick and wounded men from Front Royal ?
Answer. That I cannot say. I was absent during the morning of that
day. I had been to Annapolis, and I came into this city between 12 and 1
o'clock, and went to the office and remained there until about half past 5
o'clock. Up to that time I do not recollect of any despatch arriving from
Dr. Hays. Whenever a despatch in relation to the transportation of sick
and wounded, and their accommodation in this city, arrives, it is sent im
mediately to the medical director that he may make arrangements for them.
Question. To whom does it come — to your office ?
Answer. To the surgeon general. If he is not there, I open it and act
upon it.
Question. You think you remained there that day until half past 5
o'clock ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. The surgeon general leaves at 4 o'clock ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. If a despatch arrives after the surgeon general has left, you
would open it if you were there ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you think any arrived while you were there that day ?
Answer. I do not think any did.
Question. You think you would have recollected it, if any had arrived ?
Answer. There are so many despatches arriving, and that being a mere
matter of routine, and one that would have been referred to the proper
office, if one had arrived, I should not, perhaps, have recollected about it.
Question. If one had come what would have been done with it ?
Answer. I should have sent it to the medical director, at the military
headquarters of this district.
Question. Have you any recollection, one way or the other, as to whether
a despatch did or did not arrive that day, between the time the surgeon
general left and the time that you left that office ?
Answer. I have no recollection at all of any coming of any kind, or from
any source. If one had come from Dr. Hays, or from any one in reference
to the sick, I might perhaps recollect it, because the next morning I saw
the train on Maryland avenue, with sick persons in it, and I might, perhaps,
have connected the two circumstances together, as relating the one to the
other.
Question. What is your conclusion in relation to the matter ? What is
your belief?
Answer. My belief is that no despatch was received.
Question. That is between the time the surgeon general left, and the time
of your leaving .
Answer. Yes, sir; there might have been one come in the morning before
I arrived. But if one had come it would have been immediately sent to the
medical director's office, and I would not charge my mind with it. Upon
every letter and despatch that comes into the office is noted the day it is
received.
Question. Do you keep a letter book ?
Answer. We note the time on the original letter or message itself.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. As that was Saturday, might you not have left a little earlier
than usual — s&y at 5 o'clock ?
Answer. No, sir ; it does not make an 3^ difference about my leaving, whether
it be Saturday, Monday, or any other day. I might have left a little earlier
TESTIMONY. 531
than half past five, but I think not. I came over from Baltimore that
morning, went immediately to the office, then over to the War Department
and back to the office again, and remained there; sending word to my family
that I had arrived, and would be at home to dinner. I think it was about
half past five when I went home.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. You have now made arrangements to have all despatches re
ceived after office hours sent directly to the surgeon general ?
Answer. All despatches received at the war office for the surgeon general
after office hours are now sent to the surgeon general's residence. The medi
cal director is the one who has charge of that matter; our duties are merely
administrative.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Did you know of that train being on its way here ?
Answer. No, sir; I did not hear anything of it until Sunday morning.
WASHINGTON, June 23, 1862.
JAMES PALMER sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What is your business ?
Answer. I am a laborer in the surgeon general's office.
Question. Do you know Surgeon Hays ?
Answer. I know him now when I see him.
Question. When did you first see him ?
Answer. I saw him for the first time last Sunday morning, a week ago;
did not know him then.
Question. Do you remember of seeing him a week ago last Sunday morn
ing ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you have any conversation with him, or he with you ?
Answer. I was sweeping out the hall, and he came in and asked if the
surgeon general was in, and I said no. He asked when he would be in, and
I said that he was generally in about half past 9 o'clock. He then remarked
that he had some sick and wounded soldiers here. I told him that he better
see the medical director. He said he was ordered to report to the surgeon
general, and I said nothing more to him. In a few minutes more he called
my attention again, and asked me to give him the medical director's residence,
and I did so. He then passed out of the building, and in a few minutes
more he came back with General Hammond. General Hammond was in
rather earlier that morning than he usually is; I suppose that Dr. Hays met
him.
Question. Is that all you know about it ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. At what time was it that you saw Dr. Hays that morning ?
Answer. It was some time between the hours of 7 and 9 o'clock. I could
not say exactly what time.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Was it before 9 o'clock ?
Answer. Yes, sir; but I was busy, and I did not look at the clock.
532 TESTIMONY.
WASHINGTON, June 24, 1862.
WILLIAM COOPER sworn and examined.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Where do you reside ?
Answer. I reside in this city, on what is called the Island here ; a few
doors east of the Island chapel.
Question. What is your occupation ?
Answer. I have no occupation at present ; I have been a police magis
trate, but I am not in commission now.
Question. What information can you give us in regard to the case of Dr.
Hays, in connexion with a train of sick arid wounded soldiers that was brought
in here on Saturday week last ?
Answer. My evidence as to Dr. Hays himself, begins at a late period of
the night.
Question. Just tell us what you know about it.
Answer. I saw Dr. Hays there, not knowing, however, who he was then.
From his appearance, and his attention to the sick and wounded, I presumed
that he belonged to the medical fraternity ; but whether he was principal or
secondary there, I did not know. He was very attentive, however ; I saw
him very busily engaged. Once or twice I entered into a little conversation
with him, which was interrupted by his going to see some patient.
Question. What time of the night was that ?
Answer. I cannot say ; but it was long after midnight. I did not look at
the time of night at all then, because I was very busily engaged, in con
junction with my family, in trying to do the best I could for the soldiers,
and I did not look at my watch, or make any inquiry as to the time of night,
until this circumstance took place. My sister and myself, and one of my
next neighbors, a lady, got into conversation together. I think one of the
soldiers was there forming a part of the group. A conversation ensued in
which the word "to-morrow" was used. I jocularly remarked, "what do
you mean by ' to-morrow ?' It is time you ought to be thinking of going to
church" — or something to that effect. "This is Sunday, recollect ;" and at
the instant, I pulled out my watch and looked at it ; and at the same time
this lady friend of mine said : " I think you ought ;" that is, ought to think
about going to church. I pulled out my watch at that time and looked at
it ; but whether it was twenty minutes past one o'clock, or twenty minutes
before two o'clock, I cannot recollect ; but it was considerably after one
o'clock. Some minutes after that, I saw Dr. Hays — who, by the way, I did
not know as Dr. Hays at the time — give a powder to one of the nurses, a
youth there, whom 1 observed to be very handy, and it struck my attention —
and the youth unfolded the paper, and poured the contents of it into a spoon
that he had borrowed of one of my family, mixed it with a little water, and
then gave it to a patient that was lying upon the floor of Island cbapel.
I was on the east side of the church when this conversation took place, at
the time I pulled out my watch, and it was some time after that conversa
tion that I saw Dr. Hays give this powder to the nurse, who administered it
to a patient who was lying on the floor on the west side of the chapel. At
that time it must have been very near two o'clock, if not quite.
Question. Did you see Dr. Hays at any time after that ?
Answer. Not that I remember. I did not go to Potomac Hall, where some
of the patients were.
Question. What was the condition of the sick and wounded at that time ;
had they been removed arid all cared for ?
Answer. As ,well as circumstances would possibly permit, I thought.
TESTIMONY. 533
Question. Into what building had they been removed ?
Answer. Into Potomac Hall, at the corner of South I) and llth streets., and
into Island chapel, at the corner of South D and 10th streets, which is near
my house. And the next day I know there were some in Grace church,
which is about a square and a half east of my house; but whether they
were removed there during the night or not, I have no means of knowing.
Question. Did you notice whether there was a large number of those sick
and wounded who were able to walk?
Answer. There were a great many of them who were able to limp about.
My attention was taken up with tLose in Island chapel, and I did not go into
Potomac Hall at all. And during the night, I know, before I went into
Island chapel at all, as I was standing in my porch, I saw several men in
couplets with their hands locked together and a patient sitting up on their
hands apparently unable to walk, and they were carrying them from the
cars into the church. «•
It was a stormy night, and several females of my family, and my son, and
others went over to give bread and other things to the poor fellows in the
cars, and they came home dripping wet. I remained at home getting things
ready to be carried over there, making tea, getting water ready, and all that
sort of thing.
Question. Do you think that everything was done that night that could
well be done for the relief of the suffering soldiers before Dr. Hays left ?
Answer. I have not the slightest doubt that everything was done before
he left that we were able to do. It was quite bedtime before the cars
arrived; indeed it was after my bedtime, before anything was done to take
the soldiers out of the cars; for we all thought that ambulances would come
and take them away; and though my usual time of going to bed is about
nine o'clock, yet having some curiosity to see whether the ambulances
would come, I sat in a rocking chair near the front window of my house,
waiting for them. I had dropped off asleep in my chair, when my daughter,
who is married, came in and woke me up, and said, "There are a number of
poor sick men here, and I think it is a shame that they are not removed;"
and she said something about opening Island chapel for them. And then a
number more of us got together, and got some bread and butter, and made
some tea for the soldiers, which, of course, took some time.
Question. You and others attended to the providing of their wants as
much as possible ?
Answer. We did so to the best of our ability, and on Sunday it was
rumored there, and generally believed, that another train would be in in the
course of the day, with a parcel more of sick soldiers, and about 3 or 4 o'clock
in the afternoon; and I had a hundred and odd loaves of bread piled up in
my kitchen and about 200 pounds of ice; and I went over to Island chapel
and to Grace church and told them that if they wanted any bread or any
thing of the kind, to send over to my house and get it. But no train arrived,
and after keeping the bread until Tuesday, I sent it back. The ice, of course,
all melted away.
Question. Have you any knowledge of the number that were carried into
the churches ?
Answer. I have no idea.
Question. Was there a considerable number ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I went into Island chapel, but I did not go much about
the church, because there were a great many females there — my own family
numbered pretty sharply; I should think there were seven or eight of them —
and they were all going around doing as much as they could; and I acted
pretty much as their lackey ?
534 TESTIMONY.
Question. You are certain that you saw Dr. Hays bestowing attentions
upon those men continuously up to 2 o'clock ?
Answer. I did; and when I read the order, No. 66, I had no more idea
that the doctor I had seen there was the surgeon in charge, there referred
to, than that I was; and I said, "served him right." But when I came to
find out who that surgeon was, I said it was essentially wrong.
Question. That is, you approved of the act of dismissing Dr. Hays until
you learned it was the same man you had seen attending the wounded men
there ?
Answer. Yes, sir. And I had no idea that this gentleman, [pointing to
Dr. Hays,] whom I had conversed with, and whom I had seen going about
among the patients, and exerting himself to the best of his ability, as I
thought — I had no idea that he was the surgeon in charge, but thought he
was only secondary; and therefore when I read the order, which 1 did on
Tuesday mornkig, at a friend's house, I said, "Served him right." I agreed
with the order then, and so did my family. But my sister says, " How can
that be ? That gentleman I talked with was Dr. Hays — at least, they called
him Dr. Hays." Says I, " What kind of a man was he ? " She described
him. But I thought it could not be Dr. Hays, for I knew that very often, in
describing persons in that way, people mistake one person for another; and
it was not until yesterday that I was positively convinced, of my own
knowledge, that the surgeon I saw there that night wlas Dr. Hays.
Question. And you are certain now that this Dr. Hays (pointing to him)
is the identical man who was attending to the soldiers that night.
Answer. This is the identical man.
Question. Did he say anything about having sent any despatches here
about his coming here ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. When did he tell you that ?
Answer. That night, at Island chapel.
Question. What did he tell you ?
Answer. He told me that he had telegraphed, I think at Front Royal,
that he was coming on with about 300 sick and wounded, and asked what
he should do with them, or something of that import; and be said he
received for answer, to come on. I think those were the words he said
he received in reply, or something equivalent to that; that is, to bring them
to Washington. He told me that when he arrived at Manassas he had there
telegraphed that he had arrived at that point, and that he would be in
Washington at a certain time. I do not recollect that he told me what
that time was.
Question. Did he tell you to whom he directed those telegrams ?
Answer. Not particularly, I think. He said "to the authorities," I think.
He may have said " to headquarters."
Question. Did the doctor complain that night that no attention had been
paid to his telegrams ?
Answer. Yes, sir. He appeared to be very much hurt, indeed, to think
that the men had been so neglected. And he said that the more neglected
he thought the men had been, the more deserving of credit he thought the
citizens there were for what they had done. I will not state positively
that I did not see Dr. Hays after 2 o'clock in the morning. I might have
seen him, and I might not; I could not state about that.
TESTIMONY. 535
WASHINGTON, June 24, 1862.
ANSELM HATCH sworn and examined.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. Where do you reside ?
Answer. I live in this city, on the Island, on 9th street and south D.
Question. Were you there a week ago last Saturday night, when a train
of sick and wounded were brought into the city ?
Answer. I was there between half past 10 and 11 o'clock, when I went
over from the city.
Question. What did you see done there that night ?
Answer. I saw citizens giving them refreshments, and taking them from
the cars into the churches and their houses ; I had several of them at my
house, and one of them slept in my bed, while I sat up and slept in a chair.
Question. How were those sick and wounded provided for ? Were they
taken from the cars that night ?
Answer. I saw a great many taken from the cars. They seemed to have
every attention possible paid to them.
Question. Where were they taken to ?
Answer. Some were taken into private houses, and some into churches.
Potomac Hall was the first one I recollect hearing mentioned. I had four
or five of them with me.
Question. Were there many of the citizens there attending to them ?
Answer. Yes, sir. A great many were around there: pretty nearly every
body was out there.
Question. Did you see any surgeons there that night ?
Answer. I heard that there were some there, but I did not see them. A
Mr. Woodruff, who was along in care of the wounded, and who stayed over
at my house, was up and around there until about 3 o'clock, I heard him say
at one time that he would go and see the surgeons, and I understood from
him that they were about. I paid but little attention to what was being
done, except what little I was able to do myself.
Question. You did not see Dr. Hays or any of the other surgeons ?
Answer. No, sir; I did not see any of them.
Question. You only know that the sick and wounded were cared for by
the citizens and made as comfortable as possible ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. You did not see a surgeon that night ?
Answer. No, sir. I did not go over to the cars that night.
Question. None of them went to your house to see the sick and wounded
there ?
Answer. No, sir. There was no one there that required the attendance
of a surgeon.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. Were there many there who could walk about ?
Answer. A great many of them got out of the cars and walked about.
Those at my house walked over there.
536 TESTIMONY.
WASHINGTON, June 24, 1862.
HAMILTON K. GRAY sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Do you live in this city ?
Answer. I do.
Question. What is your business ?
Answer. I am at present bookkeeper for Mr. Ryan, grocer, on the corner
of D and 9th streets.
Question. Did you see the train of sick and wounded soldiers that came
into this city a week ago last Saturday night; and if so, about what time
did you first see any of the soldiers ? Go on, and tell us all you know
about it.
Answer. I did not see the train when it first came in. I got to the train
about 11 o'clock, as well as I can recollect, and I was told that there were
some 300 and odd soldiers there. I immediately went to the assistance of
the soldiers, and seeing no surgeons around, I inquired of the soldiers where
the surgeons were, several of them said that Dr. Hays had gone to the sur
geon general's office to procure ambulances to have them removed to the
hospitals. After assisting the soldiers as much as I could — all in my power —
I met a surgeon, who I afterwards learned was Dr. Hays. A friend of mine
also came up to me at the same time and told me that Potomac Hall had
been procured for the accommodation of the soldiers. I informed Dr. Hays
of that fact, and he seemed to be very glad to know that we had procured
a place, and he set to work to have the soldiers removed; all that could be
removed. He seemed to be doing all he could for the relief of the soldiers.
He complained very much that there were no ambulances there to remove
them to the hospitals. He did not state anything that had transpired while
he was away looking for the surgeon general, but he told me that he had
telegraphed three times, once on his way down here, informing the authori
ties here that he was on the way here with soldiers, sick and wounded; yet
they were not provided with ambulances when they arrived here. I saw
him at times until a very late hour in the morning; and all the time he was
doing his utmost for the relief of the soldiers.
Question. What was the latest hour at which you can 'fix the time posi
tively that you saw Dr. Hays ?
Answer. The latest specific hour that I can fix positively was half past
twelve. I told some of the soldiers the time of night then. How long I
remained there after that I cannot say.
Question. You saw the doctor there as late as what hour ?
Answer. I am certain I saw him there as late as half past twelve o'clock;
how much later I cannot say.
Question. And at that time he was assisting in removing the soldiers
and doing all he could for their comfort ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you see any of his assistants ?
Answer. I saw only one.
Question. Do you know his name ?
Answer. I do not know him. I do not know as I should know him if I
saw him again. I recollect seeing one, and he said something to Dr. Hays
about going to take some rest.
Question. You saw no surgeon there after you got there until you saw
Dr. Hays ?
Answer. None at all. When I got there Dr. Hays was off looking for the
surgeon general, as some of the soldiers told me. In conversation with the
TESTIMONY. 537
soldiers they all spoke in the highest terms of their surgeons. Some per
son was complaining, I remember, of the soldiers being neglected by the
surgeons, and one young man who was wounded emphatically contradicted
it, and said the surgeons had done all they could for them.
Question. You say you heard some complaints of the surgeons ?
Answer. Yes, sir; among the citizens. %
Question. Not among the soldiers ?
Answer. None at all among the soldiers.
Question. Some of the citizens were complaining ?
Answer. Yes, sir. There are always some persons who take great delight
in finding fault.
Question. They were complaining that the surgeons had not done their
duty ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And it was then that this young man said they had been taken
good care of ?
Answer. Yes, sir. The only complaint I heard from the soldiers was
from one of them about having been carried twenty or thirty miles over a
rough pike road, shaking them almost to pieces.
Question. These men were in a bad condition ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. They suffered more there than they would if they had been
taken in ambulances to the hospitals ?
x\nswer. Yes, sir.
Question. And they would have suffered very much more than they did
if it had not been for the attention of the citizens ?
Answer. No doubt of it. They were very hungry. Every man seemed
as if he had not had anything to eat for two or three days, although some
of the men who were themselves very much exhausted would not taste any
thing until we had served the wounded. I am sorry I took no more note of
the time, but I did not think of the time then.
Question. Were the most of them taken out of the cars ?
Answer. Yes, sir. There were some of the wounded left in the cars who
begged not to be removed. They were in freight cars — very close cars.
We placed them where they could get air, and they seemed to be very com
fortable and very well satisfied. The next morning I went there, and they
seemed to be a great deal refreshed. One of the soldiers told me that he
thought that, if it had not been for the assistance they had received from
the citizens of the island, many of those who were low of typhoid fever and
of exhaustion would have died. In several cases we had to take them to
the churches almost by main force. They were so much exhausted that they
seemed to have lost all energy whatever.
'Question. You mean you had to carry them to the churches ?
Answer. Yes, sir. In some instances I saw some soldiers carrying other
soldiers on their backs.
Question. Those that were able to do so ?
Answer. Yes, sir; they helped each other as much as they could.
Question. There were five surgeons with that train. You saw two of them.
Do you know what became of the other three ?
Answer. No, sir; unless they were in private houses attending to the
soldiers there.
Question. You had no knowledge of them ?
Answer. No, sir; none but the one I saw with Dr. Hays. I talked some
with Dr. Hays myself; and I also saw him there the next day.
Question. How late did you remain there that night ?
Answer. I have no idea; it was very late when I left. I left when I found
538 TESTIMONY.
that nothing more could be done for them. The most of them seemed to be
asleep and well cared for; and I knew that they must need rest. I would
state, in addition to what I have already stated, that when I first got to the
cars there were a great number of soldiers who were outside of the cars,
and were able to move about without assistance from others.
WASHINGTON, June 24, 1862.
GEORGE H. MORSE sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. What is your occupation ?
Answer. I am a clerk at Willard's Hotel, in this city.
Question. At what hours were you on duty there ?
Answer. From about 10 o'clock at night until half past 6 o'clock in the
morning.
Question. Did Surgeon Hays come to your hotel and take tea on Saturday
night, a week ago ?
Answer. About ten minutes past 10 o'clock, Colonel Lewis and another
officer — a quartermaster, I believe — came in and registered his name, and
also the name of Dr. Hays. He said that Dr. Hays would be there after
awhile. I think it was between half past 10 and a quarter to 11 o'clock
that Dr. Hays came in, and I sent his baggage up to his room. He went
into the dining-room and took tea; he was not there over ten minutes, I
think, when he came out and asked me if I knew where the surgeon general
lived. I told him that I did not know. He said he had come here with a
train of sick and wounded soldiers; that he had telegraphed twice, and ex
pected to find ambulances and the necessary conveyances to take them to
the hospitals; but when he got here he found nothing there at all. He said
that he was a stranger here and did not know where to find anybody. He
inquired of several where the surgeon general lived, but could not find out.
When he came out of the dining-room it had commenced to rain, and he re
quested me to send up to his room for his rubber coat. I did so and he put
it on and went out, saying that he would go and try to find the surgeon
general. I did not see Dr. Hays again until he came in very late in the
morning. As he came in I looked at the clock, and saw that it was in the
vicinity of 4 o'clock. The exact time I cannot state.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Are you quite certain it was after 3 o'clock ?
Answer. I am.
0
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What office were you sitting in ?
Answer. At the office of the hotel, behind the counter.
Question. Who else came in about that time ?
Answer. No one that I have any recollection of.
Question. Did any other person come in after 2 o'clock ?
Answer. There are persons coming in after 2 o'clock every night.
Question. Do you recollect of any coming in that night ?
Answer. Not particularly. The reason why I recollect about Dr. Hays is
that I knew the object he went out for.
Question. Had you any conversation with him at that time ?
Answer. Not that I recollect.
Question. Did you ask whether he had found the surgeon general ?
TESTIMONY. 539
Answer. I did not.
Question. Did he say anything to you ?
Answer. I think he went right to his room and said nothing; that is my
impression. I may be mistaken.
Question You are sure he did not tell you whether he had found the sur
geon general.
Answer. I did not think to ask him that.
Question. Are you perfectly sure that you looked at the clock ?
Answer. I am.
Question. When was your attention first called to this matter, and that
you would be wanted to testify here ?
Answer. I did not know it until yesterday.
Question. Who saw you then about it?
Answer. Dr. Hays.
^ Question. What conversation passed between you and him ?
Answer. No conversation, except that he had been before this committee,
and they had sent him down to get me to testify as to the time he had come
in that night.
Question. What else passed between you ?
Answer. No other conversation.
Question. Nothing more ?
Answer. Nothing that I recollect of.
Question. He did not ask you whether you remembered the time that he
came in ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. No one has asked you whether you remembered the time ?
Answer. Mr. Chadwick, one of the proprietors of the hotel, asked me; and
Mr. Odell, of this committee, asked me night before last.
Question What did you tell Mr. Odell ?
Answer. I told him the same, I think, that I have told you here, very
nearly.
Question. Was that before you had the conversation with Dr. Hays ?
Answer. Yes, sir; it was night before last. I did not know anything
about coming here until I saw Dr. Hays yesterday evening.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Who first broached the subject with regard to your knowing
where the surgeon general lived ? Was it you to Dr. Hays, or Dr. Hays to
you ?
Answer. Dr. Hays asked me if I knew where he lived.
Question. I mean when he asked you to come here ?
Answer. He did not say anything to me then about the surgeon general.
Question. Did you say anything to him ?
Answer. No, sir. All he said was that you wanted me here to testify
about the time he came in.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Who was the first person who spoke to you about the time he
came in that night ?
Answer. I could not tell who was the first, because several about the
hotel have asked me. I did not know I was to be called upon to testify
until yesterday.
Question. Did anybody ask you before Mr. Odell did ?
Answer. I think so.
Question. Who?
Answer. I think Mr. Chadwick asked me. He is one of the proprietors of
the hotel.
540 TESTIMONY.
Question. When did he ask you ?
Answer. I could not state.
Question. Did he ask you within two or three days after the occurrence \
It was a week afterwards that Mr. Odell asked you.
Answer. My impression is that Mr. Chadwick asked me. He did not ast
me until after Dr. Hays was dismissed.
Question. Dr. Hays was dismissed on the Monday morning afterwards
You say you never had any conversation at all with Dr. Hays at the time ?
Answer. To the best of my recollection I never spoke to Dr. Hays aftei
that night until he came to me yesterday.
Question. Did he ask you then if you remembered at what time he cam*
in that night ?
Answer. He did not. He merely said you wanted me here to testify a*
to the time he came in.
Question. Do you know a Mr. Rider ?
Answer. I do.
Question. Did he ever ask you about this matter ?
Answer. He never did ?
Question. He never said anything to you about it ?
Answer. All that he ever said to me was this : I was sitting out in frori
of the hotel some days ago, and Mr. Rider came out there arid sat dowr
I did not know who he was then. I do not recollect what was said. I ha<
heard before that Mr. Rider had Dr. Hays's case in charge; and, from some
thing that he said, I thought that he was the man. I asked if he had Di
Hays's case in charge, and he said that he had. I said that I hoped tha
he would be able to clear him, as 1 thought it was a very unjust case an}
way.
Question. What else was said ?
Answer. Nothing more.
Question. Did he ask about what time Doctor Hays came in that night
Answer. He did not.
Question. Did you tell him ?
Answer. I did not. I did not say anything more to him.
Question. Did you not tell Mr. Rider anything at all about your kuowin:
about this case ?
Answer. I did not. To the best of my recollection, I said nothing inor
to him.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. Have you heard any other person connected with the hotel sa
that they knew where the surgeon general lived ?
:. Answer. I have heard Mr. Chadwick and one or two of the clerks say the
they did not know where he lived.
Question. Have you ever heard any of the others say they did kno\
where he lived ?
Answer. I have not.
WASHINGTON, June 25, 1862.
WILLIAM KIERNAN sworn and examined.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. Where do you live ?
Answer. On 4J street, between D street and Virginia avenue in this cit;
Question. What is your business ?
TESTIMONY. 541
Answer. I am a hackman. I own hacks.
Question. Were you on the stand, at Willard's, on Saturday night week ?
Answer. That is the night the wounded soldiers came here.
Question. Yes, sir.
Ansftver. Yes, sir; I was on the stand.
Question. Have you any recollection of seeing Doctor Hays — this gentle
man (pointing to him) that night, and taking him to the War Department,
and anywhere else ? If so state to us about it.
Answer. Yes, sir. I drove him down to the cars on Maryland avenue
first. He remained there some time. I could not state how long it was.
He wanted to go to the surgeon general's office, and I did not know where
it was. He told me to drive him to the War Department, and I drove him
there. He then told me to drive him from there to the corner of F and 15th
streets, arid I drove him there. He got out and went to the door, and a
man came to the door, and talked with him some 5 or 6 minutes.
Question. Do you know where the surgeon general's office is ?
Answer. I did not know until then. It is a large building right on the
corner of F and 15th streets.
Question. Did you see the man he was talking to?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Where was he ?
Answer. He was standing at the door when I saw him in the vestibule.
I was standing out at the hack, on the curbing.
Question. You are certain that the Doctor got out of the hack and went to
the door and talked to him ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you drive Dr. Hays back to the cars after that again ?
Answer. No, sir ; I did not drive him back to the cars. I drove him to
Willard's.
Question. What time of night was that as near as you can tell ?
Answer. I could not say exactly what time it was. It was late, I know.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Was it one o'clock ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; it was after one o'clock.
Question. Was it two o'clock ?
Answer. I cannot say. If it was not not two o'clock it was mighty
near it.
Question. Was it four o'clock ?
Answer. It was not four o'clock.
Question. What time did you put up that night ?
Answer. I did not put up that night at all. I stayed out all night.
Question. You put up some time ?
Answer. I put up in the morning.
Question. At what time ?
Answer. About six o'clock.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Did you get off your hack and go into the War Department
yourself ?
Answer. No, sir ; the doctor went in.
Question. Did you get off your hack at the surgeon general's office ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. You did not go in there ?
Answer. No, sir.
542 TESTIMONY.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. The doctor engaged you at Willards' ?
Answer: Yes, sir.
Question. You stand there ?
Answer. Yes, sir. %
Question. At what time did he engage you first ?
Answer. I do not know what time.
Question. As -near as may be ?
Answer. I judge it was somewhere between 10 and 12 o'clock.
Question. Who went with you when you drove down to the cars ?
Answer. There was another gentleman who went with the doctor to the
cars.
Question. How long did you remain at the cars ?
Answer. I do not know how long.
Question. State as near as you can.
Answer. I suppose we stopped there near an hour.
Question. Then where did you go ?
Answer. I think I drove right up to the War Department.
Question. And from there to the surgeon general's office ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And from there around to Willard's ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And the doctor then got out and went into Willard's ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you see him after he went into the hotel at that time ?
Answer. No, sir ; I did not see him after that.
Question. You left him there ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. You think that was as late as one o'clock ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I do. I know it was that late.
Question. You know it was as late as one o'clock ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did the doctor hire you by the hour ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How much did he give you for the hour ?
Answer. A dollar and a half.
Question. How much money did he pay you ?
Answer. He gave me three dollars. I did not charge him by the hour,
for I did not know the time when we started. He asked me what his bill
was when he got out, and I told him three dollars.
Question. Was that more than a dollar and a half an hour ?
Answer. No. sir. It would have come to more than that if I had known
the time.
Question. You charged him three dollars for all the time that he used your
hack ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
[Dr. Hays, who was present, was here asked how he reconciled the state
ment of this witness, that he drove him first to the cars, and then to the
surgeon general's office, with his own statement that he went first to the
surgeon general's office and then to the cars. The doctor said this witness
was mistaken.]
The witness : When this gentleman first engaged me, he asked me if I
knew where the office of the surgeon general was, and I told him that I did
not. He then went into the hotel to inquire, and came out and told me to
drive him to the cars, and I drove him down.
TESTIMONY. 543
Question. Is there any possibility of your being mistaken as to the route
you went that night ?
Answer. No, sir; I think I could go the same route over again.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. What number do you drive ?
Answer. No. 321.
Question. Who do you drive for ?
Answer. For myself.
Subsequently Dr. Hays, having left the committee-room, returned and said
that he desired to state that since hearing the testimony of the last witness,
he had reflected upon it and had become satisfied that the witness was cor
rect, and he himself had been mistaken. He stated that he had honestly
told the committee what he believed to be the truth, and until he heard
"the statement of the hackman, he had religiously believed that he went first
to the surgeon general's office and then to the cars. In that, however, he
was mistaken. Dr. Stidger did go in the hack with him to the cars, and
then he went to the surgeon general's office, and from there he went to Wil-
lard's and went to bed.
After some conversation with some members of the committee —
Mr. Gooch asked this question :
Question. Did you have champagne at supper ?
Answer. [By the Doctor.] Yes, sir; I took some with Colonel Lewis; but
not much.
WASHINGTON, July 5, 1862.
Dr. S. B. STIDGER sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. What is your position and rank in the army ?
Answer. I am assistant surgeon of the 1st Virginia regiment of infantry.
Question. Did you come to Washington with Dr. Hays when he was in
charge of a train of sick and wounded soldiers from Front Royal three
weeks ago to-day ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. At what time did you arrive here ?
Answer. I think it was between 9 and 10 o'clock at night — perhaps 10
o'clock.
Question. Go on and state what happened during the night.
Answer. After arriving here we waited some time expecting to be moved
up to the depot. Not finding ambulances there, we supposed we were not
yet at the end of our journey. After waiting for some time, we found one
of the men connected with the train, and asked him how soon we should
move up to the depot. He told me that he had unhitched the engine and
had switched off the train. We concluded, then, to go up town and report,
and see if we could ascertain the reason why no arrangements had been
made to receive us — to report in person to the surgeon general. We had
our hand-trunks with us going up, and stopped at Willard's and took sup
per, and then went back to the train. Dr. Hays had been complaining for
some time that he was unwell, and I suggested to him that he better go
back and make an effort to report. We learned at the hotel that the office
was closed, and we could make no report there that night. We were told
that by some person. I do not know whom. I suggested to the doctor that
he better go and try to find out where the surgeon general lived, and 1
544 TESTIMONY.
would remain there with the train until morning. We were then getting
the wounded into churches and halls. They had been fed. I told the doctor
that if he could find no person to whom to report, he better lay down and
get some rest, as he had been complaining for some days, arid I would re
main with the train until morning. During the night a doctor who lives on
the street where the train was, but whose name I do not recollect, came up
and asked me how it was that we were left there. I told him that I did not
know; that we were surprised that no arrangements had been made for our
reception; that the doctor in charge had telegraphed on the way, and that
we were in rather an unpleasant situation, as we had no medicines and
nothing to dress the wounds with. The doctor said that he would furnish
me with medicines, and I went to his office and got some brandy and some
morphine. Some dressings were brought there by the citizens, and I com
menced dressing the wounds of the men, and got through in the morning.
In the morning Dr. Hays came down and said that he had reported.
Question. Did you remain with the men during the night ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. During the whole night ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What other surgeons remained with you ?
Answer. No others.
Question. How many surgeons had you on the train ?
Answer. There were five, including Dr. Hays and myself.
Question. When did you last see the other three surgeons that night ?
Answer. As well as I recollect, the last we saw of them was about the
time that we left and went to the hotel.
Question. Did you see them after your return ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. They did not appear that night ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. They took no charge of the men during the night ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. You had between 300 and 400 sick and wounded men on that
train ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. During the night were most of the men removed from the cars
into the churches, (fee.?
Answer. There were enough removed to allow those remaining to lie
down comfortably in the cars.
Question. Many of them were removed during the night into halls and
private houses ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. You and Dr. Hays left the cars to go up and report ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you went to Willard's Hotel and there took supper ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you have a cooked supper ?
Answer. It was ready when we went in.
Question. It was cooked to order ?
Answer. No, sir ; I think not. They were eating supper when we got
there.
Question. Who were eating supper ?
Answer The boarders, I presumed they were.
Question. Did you not have a champagne supper that night ?
Answer. No, sir ; I think not. We had some champagne the next morn
ing, I think, ordered by Colonel Lewis.
TESTIMONY. 545
Question. Did you not have a champagne supper that night ?
Answer. I cannot be positive. I know we drank champagne with Colonel
Lewis.
Question. You drank it that night, did you not ?
Answer. Well, sir ; I think we did.
Question. Then when you and Dr. Hays came up to report why did you
not go to the surgeon general's office ?
Answer. We were told, on inquiring about the surgeon general's office,
thrft it was closed.
Question. Who told you that ?
Answer. I cannot tell you that.
Question. Where were you told that it was closed ?
Answer. At the hotel ; that it was after office hours. As far as my own
opinions were concerned, i thought we had reported when we sent our tele
graphic despatches here. Our object in going was to ascertain, if possible,
why there was nobody there to receive the men.
Question. You did not expect to ascertain that at Willard's Hotel, did you ?
Answer. No, sir ; but that was on the way, and we had our hand-trunks
in our hands and stopped there.
Question. You went to Willard's Hotel and inquired of somebody, you do
not know who, and was told that it was after office hours, and you made no
further efforts to find the office, but went back to the train ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; we went back to the train.
Question. Doctor Hays went back to the train with you ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you advised him afterwards to go to the hotel and go to
bed?
Answer. I told the doctor I would remain there until morning, and, if it
was possible, he better find out where the surgeon general lived, arid find
out what was to be done with the sick.
Question. What time was that suggestion made ?
Answer. I do not know exactly ; it was about as soon as we got back.
Question. That was in the neighborhood of twelve o'clock at night ?
Answer. I suppose so ; somewhere in that neighborhood.
Question. And the doctor acted on that suggestion ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; at least he left me.
Question. You do not know whether he went to the surgeon general's
office that night or not, but you know that he left you on the suggestion
you say you made to him about twelve o'clock ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I suppose it was about twelve o'clock, as near as I can
judge.
Question. At what time did you next see the doctor ?
Answer. It was in the morning. Really I do not know what time it was,
perhaps 8 o'clock, or after ; I will not be positive about the time ; I was
attending to the wounded in the lower hall. I do not know how long he
had been there before I saw him.
Question. You remained there all the night through ?
Answer. Yes, sir. After seeing to the men in the cars I went into the
church.
Question. Those men needed care that night ?
Answer. Yes, sir. Their wounds had not been regularly dressed for
some time, except that some dressings were changed, as far as we had
them, at Manassas.
Question. How many wounded men had you on that train ?
Answer. I should think perhaps 200.
Question. And some of them were badly wounded ?
Part iii 35
546 TESTIMONY.
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And one of the men died the next morning ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did any die during the night ?
Answer. There was a car attached to the train, the first of which 1 knew
was at Manassas Junction. I was passing along the train and heard some
complaining, and supposing it was some of our men, I got into the car to
see about it. The steward, in company with them, told me they were
taking them to Washington city, and that they had brought them fro"m
Catlett's Station. I do not know whether they were attached to our train
there or not. I think two of them died before we got in.
Question. Was there any surgeon with them ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. And you had these men added to your list to take care of?
Answer. No, sir. They were in charge of a steward.
Question. Do you know anything further about these men — where they
came from ?
Answer. Nothing more than what the steward told roe, which I have told
you. I think they belonged to- a New York regiment.
Question. How many were there of those men ?
Answer. I do not remember distinctly; but I think there were four,
Question. We had got the impression that there were two car loads.
Answer. That is not so; so far as I know.
Question. You say there were only four of them ?
Answer. There were four sick men, and I think two others in company
of them as stewards.
Question Did you ride back to the cars from the hotel in a hack ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What do you say in relation to those surgeons who left that
train of sick and wounded men, while you were about ? Were they not
negligent of their duty ? Did not their duty require them to remain and
take care of them 1
Answer. I thought so,
Question. You felt it your duty to remain and take care of them during
the whole of the night, after you returned ?
Answer. I did.
Question. And some other surgeon could have helped you to advantage ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Were you the surgeon in command there ?
Answer. No, sir; Dr. Hays was.
Question. Whose duty was it to direct those surgeons to remain ?
Answer. It was the duty of Dr. Hays.
Question. They were subordinate, and subject to the orders of Dr. Hays ?
Answer. Yes. sir.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Had they any right to leave without authority to do so ?
Answer. I hardly know how to answer that question, whether they were
under obligations to remain and act -as nurses.
Question. Was there not work for surgeons as well as nurses ?
Answer. I think so.
Question. And they were bound to stay and do their duty as surgeons ?
Answer. I think so.
Question. When you were removing between 300 and 400 sick and
TESTIMONY. 547
wounded men in the night to new places, was it not necessary for surgeons
to remain there with them ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I think this about it: that if they had remained we
would have got through our labors sooner, and then we would have been
under no obligations to sit up as nurses.
Question. You mean this, do you not: that if those surgeons ha
mained and done all they could for the men they might then, with propriety,
have taken some rest ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. But not until then ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question, And to have done that would probably have used up that night
pretty thoroughly ? '
Answer. Pretty much, I think; it would, at least, have been late in the
• night when we gbt through. I think I got through the next morning, per
haps, at 8 or 9 o'clock. I was not through when Dr. Hays came down the
next morning.
Question. That must have been 9 or 10 o'clock ?
Answer. I presume it was 9 o'clock.
Question. Is there anything further in relation to this matter that you
desire to state ?
Answer. Nothing I now think of.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. When you left the cars that night, to go to Willard's, did you
know that the other surgeons there were also going away ?
Answer. I believe the doctor, in my presence, ordered them to remain
there until he came back.
Question. He ordered them to remain ?
Answer. I think so. If I recollect rightly now, he told them to remain
there until we returned.
Question, You say you were at work, attending to the wounded, all night;
that being the case, knowing that you had so much to do, why did you ad
vise the doctor to go and lie down ?
Answer. At the time I told him that I did not know that I could get any
dressings, or any medicines, or that I would be able to do anything more
for the men. The doctor had been complaining for some time, ar\d I thought
he might as well have some rest.
Question. Why did you not know whether you could get dressings or
not?
Answer. We had nothing to make dressings of, and it was not until after
the doctor had left that a physician, residing on the street there, asked me if I
wanted anything. I told him that we lacked dressings and medicines, and
he said that if I would accompany him to his office he would let me have
some medicines. And some of the citizens then proposed to get something
for dressings.
Question. Was that before or after Dr. Hays went away ?
Answer. I think it must have been after; though I will not be positive
whether it was before or after he left.
Question. Did you make any effort to find where the other surgeons were
after you went back to the cars ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. When Doctor Hays went away was there anything there for him
to do, any business for him to perform ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Nothing that he could have gone right at ?
548 TESTIMONY.
Answer. No, sir ; I think his business was to make a report as soon as
possible, and have arrangements made to get the men taken away. That
was one object I had in view in having him leave. And I did not think
there was anything to do there, more than I could attend to at that time.
Question. What is the custom in the service in such cases ? Is it the
custom for the principal surgeon to attend to dressing the wounds and to
the sick himself all the time, or does he give orders to others to attend to it ?
Answer. We have been in the habit of going ahead, each man doing what
he could. Sometimes, however, I have known brigade surgeons to give
orders; superintending, but not doing much themselves.
Question. Did you hear the doctor complain of his health before he came
here ?
Answer. I heard him complain mostly on the way to Front Royal, when
riding on horseback. I believe I heard him complain at one time when at
tending to the sick at Luray. He said he was suffering very much.
Question. Was it the knowledge of his condition that induced you to
advise him to go and lie down ?
Answer. Yes, sir, and also because I did not think there was any necessity
for his being there. I must confess that I had a very strong inclination
myself to go.
Question. But you promised to remain there all night ?
Answer. Yes, sir, though I felt a very strong inclination to accompany
him when he retired.
Question. Were the men sleeping, many of them, or were they waiting
attention ? .
Answer. I do not think that many of them were waiting attention ; some
of them were; very few of them had been moved at that time.
Question. How did the men go away from the cars ? Had they to be
carried, or could the most of them walk ?
Answer. There were very few that had to be carried, except those who
had had amputations performed. There were very few taken away that had
to be carried.
Question. Do you know of the doctor telegraphing from Manassas that he
was coming ?
Answer. I only know that he told me that he had telegraphed.
Question. I noticed that you said some time since that you considered
that he had reported by telegraph from there ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I understood from him that he had reported.
Question. Where are those surgeons now, who went off and went to bed
that night ?
Answer. I do not know where they are. I do not know that they went
to bed.
Question. If it had not been for getting those medicines from the physician
you mention, and the dressings from the citizens, that night you would have
had nothing to do ?
Answer. No, sir. And the reason why we had no rations was that we
were ordered to take two day's rations, and take our men to Front Royal.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. You expected to leave your sick and wounded at Front Royal,
and that was the reason that you had no medicines or dressings ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. You think it was after the doctor left that you got the medicines
and dressings as you have mentioned ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I think one of the editors of one of the morning papers
here was there, and went with me to the doctor's office to get the medicines.
TESTIMONY. 549
CONVALESCENT CAMP.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
December 4, 1862.
Mr. Patton submitted the following, which were adopted :
Whereas it is reported that many abuses exist in connexion with the admin
istration of "Camp Convalescent," near Alexandria, and until they are cor
rected the health and lives of the thousands of our brave soldiers there stationed
will continue to be endangered, therefore be it —
Resolved, that the joint committee on the conduct of the war be directed to
inquire and report upon the foregoing, with such recommendations as they may
deem requisite.
Attest : EM. ETHERIDGE, Clerk.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
December 5, 1862.
Mr. Noble submitted the following, which were adopted :
Whereas many soldiers of the volunteer forces of the government are now,
and have for many months been, confined in "Camp Convalescent," unable for
duty, and are entirely without money or means to procure such necessaries as
would add to their comfort, they not having been paid their monthly dues from
the government, in many instances, for a period of from three to nine months,
therefore —
Resolved, that the committee on military affairs be, and are hereby, requested
to inquire what legislation, if any, is necessary to enable such soldiers, so con
fined and separated from their respective regiments, to receive and be paid their
regular monthly dues, and to report by bill or otherwise.
Attest : EM. ETHERIDGE, Clerk.
SIR : In reply to your communication, asking as to the condition of the con
valescent camp, I beg leave to state that in order to give you a correct idea of
the present condition of the camp it will be necessary to explain to you its his
tory, and some of the difficulties attending the organization of so large a body
of men, brought together from all divisions of the army, of all sorts of char
acters, and in such a variety of conditions. The camp was organized in August,
1862, and Colonel J. S. Belknap, of the 85th New York volunteers, placed in
command.
General Slough, the military governor of Alexandria, was directed to organize
a camp of convalescents, stragglers, and recruits, under the following regulations:
All officers absent from their regiments without a proper pass, approved by
their division commander, will, if their regiments are stationed in or near Wash
ington, be ordered to join them in arrest, and the fact will be duly reported to
cfcvision commanders by the provost marshal.
Every officer absent from hi? regiment without a proper pass, and icliose
550
TESTIMONY.
regiment is not near Washington, will be ordered by the officers of the provost
guard to report in person to the provost marshal, who will direct him in writing
either to proceed to join his regiment within twenty-four hours, or within the
same period to proceed to Alexandria, and report to the military governor of
that place for duty at the convalescent camp.
All recruits arriving, for regiments which are not near Washington, will be
sent to the convalescent camp.
At the time of the organization of the army, after the second Bull Run, the
army had just passed through Alexandria, and had left a large number of strag
glers, hence the necessity of some place being selected to collect them and dis
tribute them among their regiments. As the organization was intended only as
a temporary convenience, no record was kept until September 17th.
The following abstract of the morning report shows the immediate expansion
of the camp a result unexpected :
Abstract of morning reports of convalescent, stragglers, recruits, and paroled
and exchanged prisoners' camps, showing number of officers and men at vari
ous times from organization of the camps to January 31, 1863 ; also showing
gain and loss of each month.
Date.
Officers.
Enlisted men.
Aggregate.
Eeceived.
Sent away.
For duty.
Unfit for duty.
1862.
Sept. 17
15
1, 143
2,542
3,700
3,700
20
51
3,933
2.542
6,526
2,826
25
63
7,740
2^542
10,345
4,569
840
30
87
11,692
3,851
15,630
6,158
873
Oct. 5
94
9,937
3,950
13,981
2,783
4,432
10
100
8,538
2,520
11,158
1,220
4,043
15
100
7,168
3,498
10,766
2,466
2,858
20
100
7,334
3,556
10,990
720
496
25
50
6, 932
3,815
10,797
1,248
1,441
31
62
7,090
4,360
11,512
1,908
1, 193
Nor. 5
48
2,370
5,084
7,502
1,258
5,268
10
• 48
3,384
5,000
8,432
1,512
582
15
62
3,865
9,412
12,339
3,990
83
20
66
3,902
10,093
14,061
1,970
248
25
67
3,822
11,038
14,927
1,579
713
30
67
3,662
11,401
15, 130
1,535
1,332
Dec. 5
49
4,158
9,043
13,250
2,357
4, 237
10
46
2,594
7,774
10,414
1,446
4,282
15
38
2,683
8,667
11,388
1,937
963
20
35
2,729
8,810
11,574
1,653
1,467
25
35
2,995
11,252
14,282
3,917
1,209
31
44
2,594
8,070
10,708 928
4,502
1863.
Jan. 10
40
3,116
8,365
11.521 1,956
1, 143
20
71
2,172
7,435
9,678 1,179
3,022
31
57
2,579
7,706
10,342 2,183
1,519
TESTIMONY.
551
Recapitulation of gain and loss by months.
Received.
Sent away.
17,343
1,713
October . -.
10,345
14,463
11,844
8, 226
12,238
16,660
January . -._-____._
5,318
5,684
Number of officers and men estimated by Colonel Belknap, com
mandant, to have bec-n received and sent away prior to organ
ization September 17 . .--.
20,000
20,000
Number estimated to have "passed through" the camps since or -
°"anization of whom no account was taken
5,000
5,000
Total
82,088
71,746
82,088
Whole number sent away ... . ...... . ... .
71,746
Whole number now in all the camps
10. 342
That the growth was not anticipated by the quartermaster's department is
shown by the fact that about the 1st of November Colonel Belknap, with the
approval of General Slough, made requisitions for lumber to build barracks,
naming three thousand as the number likely to require accommodation.
The quartermaster general objected to filling the requisition "until it was
positively ascertained that barracks for so large a number would be required."
General Slough, foreseeing that the camp must become a permanent institu
tion, made requisition for barracks, which were not begun until on or about the
15th day of December. The hospital department being much neglected, the at
tention of the commanding general was early called to the fact. Two inspect
ors of the medical department had at different times inspected the hospital and
the camps, and reported that the surgeon in charge was incompetent.
After waiting some time for his removal, and for reforms in that department,
he, on the 17th of October, again called attention to the condition of things, and
begged that steps might be taken to improve that department. In the mean
time the camp had been divided into four parts, to wit : convalescents, recruits,
stragglers, and paroled and exchanged prisoners. On that day, numbering over
eleven thousand men, not including guards and employes, this number was sub
sequently increased to over seventeen thousand.
The provost marshal general of the army, on the 29th day of October, was
directed to send an officer from each corps, weekly, to convey to the regiments
such as were fit for duty.
General Slough used every effort to get the number at the camp reduced.
As the provost marshal was constantly interrupted in sending off the troops,
and as the surgeons in charge of hospitals either ignorantly or designedly sent
many to the camp who should have been discharged, the number continued to
increase until, at the end of November, it exceeded sixteen thousand.
About the 1st of December General Heintzelman took command of the de
fences of Washington.
As numerous complaints had been made as to the location of the camp, and
as General Heintzelman was convinced that the camp was to be permanent, I
was directed "to examine the country in the neighborhood of Alexandria with
a view to a permanent location."
552 TESTIMONY.
Dr. Taylor, of the army, who was then the medical director, accompanied
me. I selected the ground about four miles from Alexandria and about three
miles from the Long Bridge, and reported "that in view of the ground being
high and sandy, well sheltered and connected with Washington and Alexandria
by railroad, it was particularly suited for a permanent camp or hospital."
My report was approved by General Heintzelman, and an order was at once
issued to remove the camp and make arrangements to build barracks. This
was on the 26th of November.
It was now presumed that suitable provision was to be made for the comfort
of the inmates of this much abused camp, but it appears that the surgeon gen
eral had reported against it, I have no doubt, under the impression that the evils
(which had been greatly exaggerated) could not be remedied.
It appears, however, as the following letter of the assistant surgeon general
shows, that the recommendation of the surgeon general had induced the Secre
tary of War to issue an order breaking up the camp.
SURGEON GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., December 9, 1862.
SIR : Your letter of the 7th instant is received, calling attention to the condi
tion of the convalescent camp, near Alexandria.
In reply I must beg leave to disclaim, on behalf of the medical department,
all responsibility for the deplorable state of things existing in that camp.
I am aware that the unfortunate misnomer "convalescent" has created an
impression that this establishment was an outgrowth from the hospital depart
ment. Such is not the case. It was not established by directions from this
office, and its connexion herewith is as incidental as that of any other military
post. It was ordered by the general commanding the army of the Potomac that
the soldiers belonging to that army, returning to duty from the general hospitals
in this District, should be sent there, to be thence distributed to the regiments,
and in obedience to these orders all soldiers returned to duty from hospitals
within this District were sent to this camp. Several inspections were made by
medical inspectors, under orders from this office, from the report of the last of
which, made by Medical Inspector Vollum, I quote " as points prominent, it
would seem to any observer," viz : "Bad police, uncleanliness, bad ventilation,
and demoralization resulting from the promiscuous herding together, upon a
limited area, of herds of idle, undisciplined men."
Upon this report, made on the 22d ultimo, it was recommended by the surgeon
general that this camp be broken up, and, in conformity with this recommenda
tion, the Secretary of War has acted promptly in the case. It will be a work
of some days, however, even to break up a camp of this magnitude.
In the meantime it is known positively, at this office, that nineteen medical
officers are on the ground exerting every energy in the proper discharge of their
duties. And that, on the 20th of November, medical supplies for three months
were received at this camp.
The cause of the sad state of things now existing are, in rny opinion, first, the
great expansion of this establishment to a size much beyond its capabilities or
accommodation; and, second, the ill-judged plan of sending men recently from
hospitals to a camp crowded with undisciplined stragglers, and then, instead of
hurrying their departure from this place to their regiments, allowing them there
to remain until crowding and exposure prostrated them again upon a sick bed.
* * * # * *• * * * *
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JAMES R. SMITH,
Acting Surgeon General.
Colonel J. H. PULESTON,
Military Agent, of Pennsylvania, and
Chairman Executive Committee Pa. Relief Association.
TESTIMONY. 553
The order was issued soon after the 1st of December, but contained no pro-
vision for the disposition of the convalescents, and the usual number continued
to be sent from all parts of the country daily ; instead of lessening the evil it
was increased, and on representations of the facts to the Secretary of War, the
same day the letter of the assistant surgeon general was written, the order was
countermanded, and the following issued :
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, D. C., December 9, 1862.
Ordered, I. That the commanding general of the defences of Washington
establish at once a convalescent camp in the neighborhood of Alexandria,
Virginia.
II. That the quartermaster general cause to be erected immediately suitable
barracks for the accommodation of 5,000 enlisted men, with the proper compli
ment of officers, at the camp selected by the commanding general, defences of
Washington.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
At the date of the receipt of the above order Colonel Belknap was sick. He
had for over two months been in command of the camp, and was completely
broken down, and was advised by his surgeon to apply for sick leave.
The quartermaster's department informed General Heintzelman that it had no
quartermaster they could assign for the superintendence of building the barracks.
As it was necessary to commence the work at once, he directed two of his staff
officers to take charge of it — Colonel McKelvy, his chief commissary, as com
mander, and Captain Joshua Norton, an assistant quartermaster, as superin
tendent of the building. That they faithfully performed this duty is evident
from the fact that within a month most of the convalescents were quartered in
barracks, and the balance provided with suitable shelter in the new camp.
Another marked feature of improvement was manifest in the medical depart
ment. Incompetent surgeons were sent away, and experienced surgeons de
tailed. Dr. Page, an army surgeon of ten years' service, was placed in charge ;
and competent boards organized to discharge the sick and disabled, or send to
regiments such as were fit for duty.
This new order did not take the general supervision of the camp from General
Slough. He had faithfully executed his trust, and, under the adverse circum
stances, is entitled to great credit that the condition was no worse.
I am confident that 80,000 men, of the varied characters of .those that cir
cumstances over which the officers had no control have brought together, have
not, during the war, suffered less from sickness or exposure than those in this
camp.
The agent of the State of New York thus mentions its condition as early as
October 25 :
OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE AGENT, 252 G STREET,
Washington, D. C., October 25, 1862.
DEAR SIR : Yours of the 22d was duly received, and your inquiry concern
ing the camp of convalescents near Alexandria carefully noted.
I am aware of the feeling that exists in Albany, as well as other parts of the
State, in regard to this camp, not only from the enclosed telegraph of William
Olcotts, but from the various letters I have received from your city and else
where. While this feeling has grown out of the many letters that have been
published, written by visitors to this camp, and those who have labored ardently,
and contributed largely to its relief, which letters stated only such things as
have existed in the past to a greater or less extent, yet I am glad to be able to
say they do not now exist.
554 TESTIMONY.
The camp lias been removed on to grounds that were thoroughly policed
before occupancy. The tents are placed in single rows, giving the freest circu
lation of air, and the more feeble portion placed in one part of the camp, and
loose boards furnished to floor some portion, or all of this part of the camp
tents, and the balance with straw. Every man has been furnished with a good
army blanket, and all whose uniform was not sound and comfortable with new.
The men all have new, or fair shirts, and the requisition was made three days
ago for enough to give all their proper change. Socks had been furnished to
all who had none, and duplicates for all ordered. Their food is the regular
army ration, improved by more than the regular allowance of fresh meat and
all the vegetables that can be procured from government relief association stores,
but not as much as they need for their proper improvement.
An efficient post office department has been established, with ten men detailed
to its duties. The records are the most complete of any camp bearing any
comparison in difficulty, employing thirty clerks.
The entire labor, voluntary and official, has resulted in changing this camp
from one of confusion, filth, demoralization, want, and much real suffering, to
one of cleanliness, order, and comfort to the extent that can be created, so long
as permanent barracks are not built, with the following exceptions, which are
to be instituted soon, unless the entire camp is dispensed with, viz : To be
removed to grounds where water is easier of access ; substitute barracks for
tents ; build appropriate cook-houses, and give them a new physician in charge.
Colonel Belknap, of the 85th New York volunteers, is in command, and de
serves much credit for his energy and executive ability. Great credit is due to
the New York State Association committees and many voluntary laborers in the
field. It affords me great satisfaction to be able to announce to the public that
all the real cases of suffering have been relieved there, or removed to permanent
hospitals for their relief, except some sick in regular hospital tents, who are to
go into a convalescent hospital in Axexandria, who are able, and the balance to
the Mansion House.
The general condition of patients in hospital is comfortable, although daily
complaints are made, and many of them justly, but mostly through the ineffi
ciency of attendants and ward doctors in making requisitions.
The surgeon general is doing what he can to improve the hospitals in this
regard.
S. H. SWETTAND,
New York State Agent.
Hon. IRA HARRIS.
Sometime in January it appears, by proceedings of the Senate, that Senator
Harlan visited the camp He thus understandingly describes its condition :
" Now, I might illustrate what I mean by referring to the convalescent camp
across the river, mentioned by the senator from New Jersey, which I have
visited in person. I know the facts have existed there that were mentioned by
the senator last evening. Convalescent soldiers have been put into tents there
without blankets without beds, and without necessary clothing. At the time I
last visited that camp there were about eighteen thousand convalescent soldiers
in it. Perhaps ninety-nine in every hundred of them were living more comfort
ably than the majority of them live at home, and yet there were some who were
without overcoats, and without blankets, and without beds of any kind. But, on
inquiring of the proper officer for the cause, I ascertained that these destitute men
had come there on that very day, or the day preceding, without previous notice,
so that it was not yet possible for them to draw the necessary supplies from the
proper department. But they were not suffering on account of this destitution.
Although they had no overcoats that belonged to them in person, and no
TESTIMONY. 555
blankets, they were using blankets borrowed from other soldiers who had more
than enough. It was said, yesterday, that they were compelled to sleep on
brush. Mr. President, this may appear to those who have never lived in the
open air like a great cruelty. But, Mr. President, I have lived, for months to
gether, in the open field, not as a soldier, but in a situation where I had to pro
vide for myself and my associates, far beyond the settlements. I have had
some experience on this subject, and I will say to the senator from New Jersey
that I would very much prefer to sleep on a bed of brush than a bed of boards.
It is very far from being an uncomfortable bed, if men know how to make it.
Soft brush, covered with straw or blankets, makes an excellent couch, far more
comfortable than we always find in city hotels, and on which men may repose
more pleasantly than a majority of us at home — as comfortably as many of us
do in our own dwellings. Some are doubtless not properly provided for, and
( suffer great hardships. These cases are comparatively few, and are temporary,
'and are generally corrected as speedily as circumstances will permit.
" It is the recitation of these extreme cases which, I think, does the service
a great damage in the country. Benevolent gentlemen and ladies, without a
knowledge of all the facts and circumstances, shed tears over the sufferings of
our soldiers, and recite them to their neighbors, and create impressions which
do great injustice to the officers in charge. It is said that there has been much
suffering in that encampment. I have no doubt there has been ; but it has been
of this exceptional character. Men have been sent there from battle-fields who
have lost their clothing and blankets during the engagement, or threw them
away in flight. For the first day or the first night, before the officers have
been able to draw suitable clothing and blankets from the quartermaster's de
partment, they have been compelled to borrow or sleep with 'their brother
soldiers ; and in tents that have not been provided with board flooring, they
have cut boughs or branches of trees, and in this way provided for themselves
what was, in fact, a very comfortable place to sleep.
" In that encampment, when I visited it, I have found numbers of our govern
ment teams — four and six horse teams, mule teams — constantly employed in
hauling wood to the doors of the tents occupied by these men. Besides this,
the encampment is in the timber ; they are surrounded with groves. Now, I
cannot be made to believe that convalescent men — for these are not sick men,
they are men who are able to take care of themselves — will be likely to suffer
much for the want of stoves, when they can have wood for the cutting, and are
surrounded by timber. There are cases of suffering, and very frequently these
cases of suffering arise on account of the prodigality of the soldiers themselves.
It is much more pleasant to praise our brave troops in the field than to speak
of their faults ; but we find men in civil life that have faults, and some of these
men, unfortunately, find their way to the army. There are soldiers who, for a
glass of grog, will sell their blankets or coats, and then come to the agent of a
sanitary commission, or a State agency, and make most piteous appeals for as
sistance on account of their destitution. Why, sir, it is known to those who
have investigated this subject personally, that they often sell their munitions ;
that they carry their cartridges to traders and sell them for spirits, tobacco, or
other little luxuries they may desire. Not unfrequently these men have de
serted from the army, and have been arrested here at the depot, and have been
sent to the convalescent encampment to await the necessary means of trans
portation to their regiments. For the purpose of eluding the vigilance of the
proper officers of the government, they throw away their blankets and their
overcoats, swap off all their military garb, and secure citizen's dress of a far in
ferior character, and of course suffer during severe weather, if arrested and re
turned ; and persons visiting this encampment and seeing these parties thus
improperly clad, are melted into tears on account of their sufferings, when it
has all been brought about by their own folly, prodigality, or crime, for which,
if the articles of war were rigorously enforced, they would be shot. A careful ex-
I
556 TESTIMONY.
animation of these cases of suffering will establish the fact that officers of the
army, medical and otherwise, are not the inhuman characters we might be in
duced to believe from some remarks which have been dropped even in the Senate.
There are bad and incompetent officers, doubtless, at many of these hospitals,
but I believe a large majority of them do the very best it is possible for Christian,
humane gentlemen to do under the circumstances by which they are surrounded.
The physicians in charge of the hospitals connected with the armies in the
field, of course, are not always able to procure the necessaries for the sick and
wounded men, nor are the commissaries always able to do so for the well men.
The casualties of war necessarily produce these difficulties ; and I suppose that
the troops, when they enter the service, do it with a tolerable comprehension of
the hardships which they may be called upon occasionally to suffer. They ex
pect it, and endure it without a murmur when they know it cannot be remedied.
I have reason to believe, and do believe, that there is far less complaining
among the soldiers themselves in the field than by friends at home."
Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, truly said, " That is a military camp under
military rules and regulations."
There are surgeons there who have duties to perform. I do not mean to say
that they are fully performed.
From seventy to eighty thousand men have passed through that camp within
the last six months. On the 10th of this month there were about five thousand
there ; eight hundred of them from my own State. I have visited the camp
repeatedly, and I know something about it. I think the camp has been very
badly managed, and the surgeon general thinks so, too, for he had a report
from one of .his inspectors, Colonel Vollum, who reported against it, and re
commended that certain action be taken to reform it, which action was referred
to the Secretary of War. I called upon the Secretary of War with a copy of
it, and he said that he would place it in the hands of General Heintzelman,
under whom this camp is. This camp, however, is not a hospital. It has no
resemblance to a hospital.
Mr. Ten Eyck replied : It has a hospital name.
Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts. Yes, sir, just as a regiment has- a hospital
ha
name ; but it is a camp where the men who have been away on furlough,
have been in the hospitals, and have been pronounced convalescents, go, in order
to be transferred from there to their regiments.
(Dr. Vollum might have recommended that competent surgeons be sent there.
The surgeons in charge of general hospitals should have been instructed not to
send to this camp fit subjects for discharge.)
About the time of this discussion it was stated in the Senate that many of
the inmates of the camp were without blankets. The committee on the conduct
of the war were instructed to inquire into the facts. I have never seen their
report ; but I do know that a portion of the committee visited the camp, and
that not a single person was found who was not well supplied with clothing,
and every man had a blanket.
It is well known to officers accustomed to duty in the field that although
there is much less suffering in such a camp, there is more grumbling. Almost
every school district at the north has had a representative in this camp ; some
from their own misfortunes, but many of them have been of the poorest material
of our army — the most useless of all soldiers — stragglers.
I trust I do no injustice to the real convalescents in this camp ; there are
many there who have proved to be good soldiers in the field, who were good
soldiers when in camp, and will continue to be of credit to their regiments and
honor to their States.
I do not desire to cast censure on any of the officers. I have no doubt all have
done what they thought advisable to relieve the suffering of the sick, wounded,
and unfortunate, yet their office has been a thankless one.
TESTIMONY. 557
I have neglected to mention one great difficulty in the organization of this
camp, viz : the officers have not been permanently assigned to duty there ;
many have looked upon it as a kind of Botany bay, instead of making the
comfort of the unfortunate soldier a pleasure and duty ; many of them, however,
have, and are now, serving faithfully, and are entitled to praise rather than
censure.
Since the 1st of February the number in the camps has been lessened daily ;
on the 15th the number at the convalescent camp proper was only 5,300.
It has been recommended that a portion of the men not fit for duty in the
field, but who, under the present system, are necessarily discharged, shall be
organized into companies and regiments for garrison duty, I am confident that
the services of one-third of those who are discharged will be of great value,
if so organized.
I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
S. H. LATHROP,
Lieut. Col., Assist. Inspec. Gen., Department of Washington.
Hon. DANIEL W. GOOCH,
Committee on Conduct of War.
TRADE IN MILITARY DISTRICTS.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
January 12, 1863.
On motion of Mr. Alley,
Resolved, That the committee on the conduct of the war be directed to en
quire what rules or restrictions, if any, are applied to trade in those sections of
the country now under military occupation, and whether any officers in the ser
vice of the goveniment are, or have been engaged in trade or speculation, or
affording special privileges or facilities to other persons to do so, and to report
the facts to this House.
Attest: EM. ETHERIDGE, Clerk.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 29, 1863.
SIR : In accordance with the request contained in your letter of the 13th
instant, I have the honor to enclose copies of all rules, regulations, and restric
tions, issued by this department for the government of trade in those portions
of the country now under military occupation. These rules, regulations, and
restrictions are based upon regulations issued August 28, 1862, by the Secretary
of the Treasury, concerning commercial intercourse with insurrectionary States
or sections, and for the purpose of enforcing them.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
Honorable B. F. WADE,
Chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Adjutant General's Office, Washington, August 29, 1862.
General orders, No. 119.]
The following orders are published for the information and government of all
concerned :
558 TESTIMONY.
ORDER RESPECTING TRADE REGULATIONS.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, D. C., August 28, 1862.
The attention of all officers and others connected with the army of the United
States is called to the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury concerning
commercial intercourse with insurrectionary States, or sections, dated August
28, 1862.
I. Commandants of departments, districts, and posts, will render all such mil
itary aid as may become necessary in carrying out the provisions of said regu
lations and enforcing observance thereof to the extent directed by the Secretary
of the Treasury, so far as can possibly be done without danger to the opera
tions or safety of their respective commands.
II. There will be no interference with trade in, or shipments of, cotton, or
other merchandise, conducted in pursuance of said regulations, within any ter
ritory occupied and controlled by the forces of the United States, unless abso
lutely necessary to the successful execution of military plans or movements
therein. But in casBs of the violation of the conditions of any clearance or
permit granted under said regulations, and in cases of unlawful traffic, the
guilty party or parties will be arrested and the facts promptly reported to the
commandant of the department for orders.
III. No officer of the army, or other person connected therewith, will seize
cotton, or other property of individuals, unless exposed to destruction by the
enemy, or needed for military purposes, or for confiscation under the act of Con
gress ; and in all such cases of seizure the same shall be promptly reported to
the commandant of the department wherein they are made for his orders the-rein.
By order of the Secretary of War.
E. D. TOWNSENI),
Assistant Adjutant General.
Official: E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, February 3, 1863.
SIR : I have received your letter of the 13th ultimo, (covering copy of a res
olution of the House of Representatives on the subject,) requesting me to furnish
to the committee on the conduct of the war, "a copy of all rules, regulations,
and restrictions issued by your" [Treasury] "department for the government of
trade in those places indicated in the resolution" — (to wit : in those portions of the
country now 'under military occupation) — " said copy designating all rules,
&c., &c., which have been, but are not now, in force, as well as those in force at
the present time."
In compliance with your request, I now transmit copies of all letters, circulars,
rules, &c., &c., upon the subject, emanating from or approved by this depart
ment from 2d May, 1861, to 20th January, 1863, inclusive.
I also transmit an analytical chronological index of the same, which may
facilitate the labors of the committee in investigating the subject.
With great respect, ,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
Hon. B. F. WADE,
Chairman Committee, on Conduct of the War, Senate.
TESTIMONY,
559
LIST OF DOCUMENTS.
No.
Date.
Subject of document.
1861.
May 2
16
29
30
4
June
12
August 22
31
9 j Septembers
10
11
12
10
10
21
13 | October 2
14 2
15 3
16 i Novembers
17 12
18 U
19 j 25
20 i 30
21
22 I
23 Dec.
24
25
26
27
1862.
January 15
27
February 14
27
28 I
29 i March
30
31
2s
4
7
29
Circular to collectors, surveyors, and other officers of the customs, in
pursuance of the proclamation of the President of April 19, 1861.
Circular letter, allowing supplies to go forward to certain cannel-coal
mines in Western Virginia.
General letter of instructions to special agents, relative to exchanges,
&c., announcing the policy that commerce should fallow the flag.
Modification of restrictions promulgated May 2, 1861, on trade with
Western Virginia.
Letter to sundry persons — committee of citizens of Paducah, Ken
tucky — concerning restrictions upon free trade with Kentucky.
Circular to officers of the customs in addition to instructions of May 2, 18 61.
Circular instructions to collectors and other officers of the customs,
superseding instructions of May 2 and June 12, and embracing proc
lamation of the President of August 16, 1861, in pursuance of ac
companying act of Congress of July 13, 1861.
Circular prohibiting trade with Paducah, Kentucky.
Circular designating what communication with insurrectionary sections
is in accordance with law.
Order restricting trade in Kentucky with points south of Louisville, &c.
Instructions to special agents concerning restrictions on trade in Ken
tucky, west of the Cumberland river.
Circular to officers of the customs, relating to unwarrantable seizures
of property.
Permits for sutlers at Cairo, Illinois.
Order mitigating restrictions on trade with Paducah.
Authorizing shipments of products from Kentucky, west of the Cum
berland.
Regulations of trade with Paducah, &c.
Circular to officers of the customs in regard to seizures.
Authorizing trade with blockading squadrons.
Restrictions on trade in pork with Louisville, Kentucky.
General regulations relative to securing and disposing of the property
found or brought within the territory occupied by the United States
forces in the disloyal States.
Instructions to agents appointed to Territory above described for pur
poses there alluded to.
Instructions to agents appointed to receive property alluded to in the
foregoing regulations. *
Modification of restrictions of November 25, 1861, on trade in pork
with- Louisville, Kentucky.
Rules required to be observed by steamboats navigating the Ohio river.
Rules for steamers between Pittsburg and Cincinnati.
Instructions in duties of special agent to Nashville, Tennessee, relative
to trade in cotton and other products.
Communication from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of
War, requesting him to advise the generals in command of the act
of Congress of July 13, 1861, so far as it directs how commercial
intercourse with the insurrectionary sections shall be regulated and
controlled.
The President's license for commercial intercourse.
Rules and regulations concerning internal commercial intercourse
under act of Congress of July 13, 1861.
Communication from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of
War, concerning interference with rules of March 4, 1862.
Circular to officers of the customs, modifying the rules and regulations
of commercial intercourse of March 4, 1862.
560
TESTIMONY.
List of documents — Continued.
Date.
Subject of document.
1862.
April 4
7
22
May
22
12
12
16
17
23
June
July
18
August 15
28
September 8
22
22
24
25
October 1
1
4
23
Novembers
8
Order restricting trade in Tennessee to persons authorized by Governor
Johnson.
Rules governing shipments to or by sutlers, under act of Congress of
March 19, 1862.
Order that the question of the detention and seizure of goods shall be
decided by the surveyor of the last port to be passed on the route of
transportation.
Rules for commercial intercourse adapted to trade in the west.
Proclamation of the President opening certain ports to trade.
Regulations relating to trade with ports opened by proclamation.
Appointment of acting collector, and general instructions regulating
trade at New Orleans.
Modifications of the restrictions upon trade on the Mississippi.
Circular to collectors of Atlantic ports concerning clearances to ports
opened by proclamation, enumerating articles contraband of war.
Form of permit issued to officers of the customs to grant clearances to
ports under blockade.
Circular to collectors relative to sending supplies to the relief of
Norfolk.
Rules for trade at Memphis, Tennessee.
Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of War,
embodying the modm operand in the transmittal of supplies to places
declared by the President to be under blockade.
Additional instructions to tbe acting collector at New Orleans.
Certificates of permission to trade to be granted to loyal parties.
Instructions to special agents to co-operate in establishing rules for
reopening trade with places heretofore in insurrection.
Instructions to surveyors of customs (west) requiring steamers to take
out regular clearances each trip, &c.
Instructions to surveyors in western districts relative to trading boats.
Modification of instructions of June 27, 1862, to the acting collector at
New Orleans.
Regulations concerning internal and coastwise intercourse, to which
are appended the accompanying orders of the Secretary of War and
the Secret try of the Navy, also the act of Congress of July 13, 1861,
and the supplemental act of May 20, 1862.
Special orders concerning trade on the Mississippi river below Memphis,
promulgated by the Treasury Department in conjunction with the
military commander.
Special instructions to the collector at Baltimore concerning restric
tions on trade.
Order imposing additional restrictions on the trade with Kentucky and
Tennessee, west of the Cumberland river and north of the Ohio.
Order restricting trade on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad.
Order restricting trade between Parkersburg and Point Pleasant,
Western Virginia.
Further instructions to the acting collector at New Orleans relative to
trade below the city.
Communication to the Secretary of State as to the effect of treasury
regulations upon trade in, and exportation of cotton and other pro
ducts of the insurrectionary sections, in connexion with a letter from
William P. Mellen, special agent, (of September 26, 1862,) in rela
tion to the cotton trade of the southwest, &c., and the reply of the
. Secretary of the Tieasury of this date.
. Rules governing trade in Tennessee, adopted by Major General Grant.
Additional rules restricting trade in the west and south.
Regulations restricting trade north of the Potomac.
Instructions relative to trade on the Kanawha river.
TESTIMONY.
List of documents — Continued.
561
No.
Date.
Subject of document.
1862.
63
November 5
Restrictions on trade on the north side of the Ohio river.
64
25
Restrictions on trade in Maryland, and appointments of boards of trade.
65
December 2
Board of trade at Memphis dissolved.
66
12
Circular relating to trade below Memphis issued by Thos. H. Yeatman,
esq., special agent.
67
12
Restrictions on trade on the north side, of the Ohio river modified.
68
16
Trade below Helena, Arkansas, prohibited ; no trade opened below
Memphis.
69
22
Order suspending trade with points in Kentucky and Tennessee.
1863
70
January 24
Modification of restriction upon trade in salt in Kentucky advised.
71
January ....
Conditions upon which trade with Helena, Arkansas, is opened.
No. 1.
Circular to collectors, surveyors, and oilier officers of the customs.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, May 2, 1861.
On the 19th of April, 1861, the President of the United States, by proclama
tion, declared the ports of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas under blockade, and on the same month, by another
proclamation, declared the ports of Virginia and North Carolina, also, under
blockade, since which proclamation this department has received reliable infor
mation that attempts are frequently made to furnish arms and munitions of war,
provisions, and other supplies to persons and parties in those States in open
rebellion against the constitutional authorities of the Union.
It becomes my duty, therefore, to instruct you to cause a careful examination
to be made of the manifests of all steam or other vessels departing from your
port with cargoes whose ultimate destination you have satisfactory reason to
believe is for any port or place under the control of such insurrectionary parties,
and to compare the same with the cargo on board ; and if any such manifest be
found to embrace any articles of the description before mentioned, or any such
articles be found to constitute part of the cargo, you will take all necessary and
proper measures to prevent the departure of the vessel and to detain the same
in your custody until all such articles shall be removed therefrom and for further
proceedings, according to law.
You will also make a careful examination of all flatboats and other water
craft without manifests, and of railroad cars and vehicles arriving at or leaving
your port, laden with merchandise, the ultimate destination of which you have
good reason to believe is for any port or place under insurrectionary control ;
and if arms, munitions of war, provisions of war, provisions or other supplies are
found, having such destination, you will seize and detain the same, to await the
proper legal proceedings for confiscation or forfeiture.
In carrying out these instructions, you will bear in mind that all persons or
parties in armed insurrection against the Union, however such persons may be
organized or named, are engaged in levying war against the United States, and
that all persons furnishing to such insurgents arms, munitions of war, provis
ions, or other supplies, are giving them aid and comfort, and so guilty of treason
within the terms of the second section of the third article of the Constitution;
Part iii 36
562 TESTIMONY.
and you will therefore use your utmost vigilance to prevent the prohibited ship
ments, and to detect and to bring to punishment all who are in any way en
gaged in furnishing to such insurgents any of the articles above described.
You will, however, on the other hand, be careful not to interrupt, vexatiously
or beyond necessity, by unwarranted or protracted detentions and examinations,
the regular and lawful commerce of your port.
You will report forthwith whether any, and if any, what, additional measures
may be necessary, in your judgment, to carry into full effect the foregoing di
rections; and you will report to this department, from time to time, your action
under these instructions.
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
N. B. — Among prohibited supplies are included coals, telegraphic instru
ments, wire, porous cups, platina, sulphuric acid, zinc, and all other telegraphic
materials. S. P. C.
MEMORANDUM. — This circular of instructions was superseded by the cir
cular published on the 22d day of August, 1861.
No. 2.
Circular letter to surveyors of the customs west, allowing supplies to go forward
to certain coal mines in Western Virginia.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, May 15, 1861.
SIR : You are hereby authorized to allow goods and provisions, comprising
the necessaries of life, to pass through your port from Philadelphia for the use
of the workmen in the Cannel coal mines of Western Virginia ; and all coal
shipped from thence to your port to go forward or land without interruption.
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
ENOCH T. CARSON, Esq., Surveyor, Cincinnati, Ohio.
CHAS. W. BATCHELOR, Esq., Surveyor, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.
No. 3.
General letter of instructions to IVilliam P. Mellen, special agent, relative to
exchanges, and announcing the policy that commerce should follow the flag.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, May 29, 1861.
SIR : I have little doubt that the exchange of provisions and supplies, except
munitions of war and other articles usually prohibited, would be more useful
than injurious. The difficulty, however, is this : The States controlled by in
surrectionists, especially by insurrectionists exercising the powers of govern
ment, can hardly be regarded otherwise than as hostile communities, with which
the United States are, for the time being, at actual war. The rules applicable
to the relations of war must be applied. If war existed between this country
and England, no trade whatever would be permitted. American property
TESTIMONY. 563
shipped to England and English property shipped to the United States would
be liable to seizure. So constant experience teaches us that property shipped
to the insurrectionary States is liable to seizure and actually seized ; and if the
property of citizens in those States shipped to the United States is not seized,
it is simply because the federal government desires to treat them, as far as prac
ticable, not as enemies, but as citizens.
I see no way in which safe intercourse can be established between citizens of
the loyal States and those under insurrectionary control. The question is not
one of revenue nor one of rights in a state of peace, but a question of supplies to
enemies, and is controlled by considerations belonging to a state of war. The
best thing to be done, it seems to me, is to establish the power of the govern
ment in co-operation with the people of Kentucky and Western Virginia within
those limits, and to let commerce follow* the flag.
, This policy opens Missouri, Kentucky, and Western Virginia to trade, and
will extend southward as rapidly and as far as the authority of the federal gov
ernment can be restored.
Continue your conversations with reflecting men, and let me know the result.
Yours, &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
WM. P. MELLKN, Esq.,
Special Agent, Cincinnati, Ohio.
No. 4.
Modification of the restrictions on trade with Western Virginia, promulgated
May 2, 1861.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, May 30, 1861.
SIR : It is the purpose of the government, whenever practicable, consistently
with its effort to restore the supremacy of the Constitution and laws, to miti
gate, in favor of all citizens of the United States who remain loyal to the Union,
the rigorous measures found necessary to suppress the insurrection. With that
view, the instructions of the 2d instant, prohibiting the transmission of supplies
to the insurgents, will not be enforced against the citizens of Western Virginia,
who have so signally manifested, by recent acts, their continued attachment to
the Union.
You will, in future, be careful that provisions and other like commodities,
intended for consumption in Western Virginia, shall be permitted to proceed to
their destination without interruption, satisfying yourself, of course, in every
case, that such is the bona Jide destination of the articles.
The substance of the foregoing instructions was communicated to you by tele
graph on the 29th instant.
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
ENOCH T. CARSON, Esq.,
Surveyor, fyc., Cincinnati, Ohio.
Similar letters of instructions were sent to the collectors of the various west
ern ports.
564 TESTIMONY.
No. 5.
Concerning restrictions on free trade with Kentucky via Paducah. — Letter to
committee of citizens of Paducah.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, June 4, 1861.
GENTLEMEN: On the 24th ultimo, the following despatch was sent from this
department to William Nolen, collector at your port :
"'Bona Jide' trade between States not under insurrectionary control, of
which States Kentucky is one, is under no restrictions, but the sending of sup
plies of any kind, directly or indirectly, for the aid and comfort of insurgents,
in or through Kentucky or any other State, is strictly forbidden."
Instructions have been sent to the collectors of various western ports not to inter
fere with the shipments of supplies bona fide intended for consumption within
any State acknowledging and fulfilling its federal obligations. If, therefore,
any obstruction is opposed to the sending of provisions or other supplies, it
must be because the officers of the government at the places from which the
supplies would be forwarded have reason to believe that those supplies will reach
insurgents in arms against the Union and its government.
Some facts, such as the petition of certain citizens of Paducah to the Ken
tucky legislature for the fortification of the place, the support of that applica
tion by the senator from the district, and the arming of parties of men, avowedly
intending to join the conspirators in insurrection, afford some ground for that
belief. If the belief be a mistaken one, it will be easy to remove it by such
manifestations on the part of the people of the town and surrounding country
as will leave no doubt of their loyal attachment to the Constitution, the Union,
and the flag of our fathers.
If the collector at Paducah has executed, and will continue to execute, im
partially and completely, the order heretofore sent him, prohibiting supplies to
parties levying war against the United States, and their aiders and comforters,
all obstructions in the way of complete restoration of commercial intercourse be
tween Paducah and loyal towns and States will be removed.
It is the earnest wish of this department that every part of the country may
enjoy, in the most ample degree, the benefit of the Constitution and the laws,
faithfully upheld and honestly administered, for the protection of every right and
every interest.
Yours, &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
Messrs. J. CAMPBELL, J. H. TERRELL, S. B. HUGHES, R. C. WOOLFOLK, R.
ENDERS, H. ENDERS, Paducah, Kentucky.
No. 6.
Circular to collectors, surveyors, and other officers of the customs.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, June 12, 1861.
SIR : Referring to the circular instructions of the 2d ultimo, prohibiting the
transmission of munitions of war, provisions, or other supplies to parties in in
surrection against the United States, you are now further instructed to exercise
the utmost vigilance in arresting and detaining all merchandise, of whatever
TESTIMONY. 565
character, the ultimate destination of which you have satisfactory reason to be
lieve is for insurgents against the United States, or for places under their control.
If you are satisfied, either from the nature of the articles or otherwise, that
any merchandise, wherever destined in name, is in fact destined for persons or
combinations in actual insurrection against the government of the United States,
you will cause the same to be seized and proceeded against for forfeiture.
If, however, you are satisfied that any merchandise transmitted for States or
places under insurrectionary control is not intended for actual insurgents, and
has been shipped or forwarded without intent to afford aid or comfort to such
insurgents, or otherwise to violate the law, you will* simply detain such mer
chandise, and notify the shippers or forwarders, or their agents, of such deten
tion, and state the cause thereof. If such shipper or forwarder, personally or
by agent, shall satisfy you that the merchandise so arrested will not be sent to
any place under insurrectionary control, but will be either returned whence it
came or be disposed of in good faith for consumption within loyal States, you
will restore possession of the same, and allow such disposition thereof to be
made as the parties in interest may desire.
You will regard all States in which the authority of the United States is
temporarily subverted as under insurrectionary control; but any portions of
such States in which the laws of the Union and the authority of the federal
government are acknowledged and respected, will be considered as exempt from
any interruption of commerce or intercourse beyond such as may be necessary
in order to prevent supplies going to insurgents, or to places under their control.
It is the intention of the department to leave the owners of all property per
fectly free to control it in such manner as they see fit, without interference
or detention by officers of the federal government, except for the purpose of
preventing any use or disposal of such property for the aid and comfort of in
surgents, or in commerce with States or places controlled by insurgents.
I am, &c., &c., &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
MEMORANDUM. — This general circular of instructions was superseded by the
more comprehensive circular of August 22, 1861.
No. 7.
Circular instructions to collectors and other officers of the customs.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, August 22, 1861.
The attention of collectors and other officers of the customs is called to
the act of Congress entitled "An act further to provide for the collection of
duties on imports, and for other purposes," approved July 13, 1861, and the
proclamation of the President of the United States of August 16, 1861, made
in pursuance thereof, both of which are annexed.
In view, therefore, of the act aforesaid, and the proclamation of the Pres
ident of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, I hereby direct and
instruct the officers of the customs to use all vigilance in preventing com
mercial intercourse with the inhabitants of States in insurrection, except in
the special cases in which it may be allowed by license and permit as therein
set forth. The instructions of May 2 and June 12, 1861, heretofore in force,
will be regarded as superseded by the more comprehensive provisions of
the act and proclamation. The collectors and other officers of the customs
566 TESTIMONY.
will report all seizures made under the proclamation to the proper district
attorney, for such proceedings as the law and facts may justify in each
case; and they will also, as soon as practicable, and as frequently afterward
as may be convenient, report their views in relation to the commercial inter
course contemplated, and the permits proper to be granted or withheld.
In the forms accompanying the weekly returns required by circular of the
5th August, 1861, to be made to this department, collectors and other officers
of the customs will be careful to state what permits are asked for the ship
ment of goods, by whom asked, and the grounds on which the applications
are based.
The attention of the collectors and other officers is especially directed to
fifth and subsequent sections of the act.
S.-P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
By the President of the United States of America.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas, on the 15th day of April, 1861, the President of the United
States, in view of an insurrection against the laws, Constitution, and govern
ment of the United States, which had broken out within the States of South
Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas,
and in pursuance of the provisions of the act entitled " An act to provide
for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insur
rections, and repel invasions, and to repeal the act now in force for that
purpose," approved February 28, 1795, did call forth the militia to suppress
said insurrection and to cause the laws of the Union to be duly executed,
and the insurgents have failed to disperse by the time directed by the
President; and whereas siich insurrection has since broken out and yet
exists within the States of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas;
and whereas the insurgents in all the said States claim to act under the
authority thereof, and such claim is not disclaimed or repudiated by the
persons exercising the functions of government in such State or States, or
in the part or parts thereof in which such combinations exist, nor has such
insurrection been suppressed by said States :
Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, in
pursuance of an act of Congress approved July 13, 1861, do hereby declare
that the inhabitants of the said States of Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia,
North Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Missis
sippi, and Florida, (except the inhabitants of that part of the State of , Vir
ginia lying west of the Alleghauy mountains, and of such other parts of
that State and the other States hereinbefore named as may maintain a loyal
adhesion to the Union and the Constitution, or may be, from time to time,
occupied and controlled by forces of the United States engaged in the disper
sion of said insurgents,) are in a state of insurrection against the United
States; and that all commercial intercourse between the same and the inhab
itants thereof, with the exceptions aforesaid, arid the citizens of other States
and other parts of the United States, is unlawful, arid will remain unlawful
until such insurrection shall cease or has been suppressed; that all goods
and chattels, wares and merchandise, coming from any of said States, with
the exception aforesaid, into other parts of the United States, without the
special license and permission of the President, through the Secretary of the
Treasury, or proceeding to any of said States, with the exceptions aforesaid,
by land or water, together with the vessel or vehicle conveying the same,
or conveying persons to or from said States, with said exceptions, will be
forfeited to the United States; and that from and after fifteen days from the
TESTIMONY. 567
issuing- of this proclamation, all ships and vessels belonging in whole or in
part to any citizen or inhabitant of any of said States, with said exceptions,
found at sea or in any port of the United States, will be forfeited to the
United States. And I hereby enjoin upon all district attorneys, marshals, and
officers of the revenue and of the military and naval forces of the United
States, to be vigilant in the execution of said act, and in the enforcement of
the penalties and forfeitures imposed or declared by it; leaving any party
who may think himself aggrieved thereby to his application to the Secretary
of the Treasury for the remission of any penalty or forfeiture, which the
said Secretary is authorized by law to grant, if, in his judgment, the special
circumstances of any case shall require such remission.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand arid caused the seal of
r -, the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington,
this 16th day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and sixty-one, and of the independence of the United States of
America the eighty-sixth.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
By the President :
WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.
An act further to provide for the collection of duties on imports, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That whenever it shall, in the judgment
of the President, by reason of unlawful combinations of persons in opposition
to the laws of the United States, become impracticable to execute the revenue
laws and collect the duties on imports by the ordinary means, in the ordi
nary way, at any port of entry in any collection district, he is authorized to
cause such duties to be collected at any port of delivery in said district until
such obstruction shall cease; and in such case the surveyors at said ports
of delivery shall be clothed with all the powers and be subject to all the
obligations of collectors at ports of entry; and the Secretary of the Treasury,
with the approbation of the President, shall appoint such number of
weighers, gangers, measurers, inspectors, appraisers, and clerks as may be
necessary, in his judgment, for the faithful execution of the revenue laws at
said ports of delivery, and shall fix and establish the limits within which
such ports of delivery are constituted ports of entry as aforesaid. And all
the provisions of law regulating the issue of marine papers, the coasting
trade, the warehousing of imports, and collection of duties shall apply to the
ports of entry so constituted in the same manner as they do to ports of
entry established by the laws now in force.
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That if, from the cause mentioned in the
foregoing section, in the judgment of the President, the revenue from duties
on imports cannot be effectually collected at any port of entry in any
collection district, in the ordinary way and by the ordinary means, or by the
course provided in the foregoing section, then and in that case he may direct
that the custom-house for the district be established in any secure place
within said district, either on land or on board any vessel in said district
or at sea near the coast ; and in such case the collector shall reside at such
place, or on shipboard, as the case may be, and there detain all vessels and
cargoes arriving within or approaching said district, until the duties imposed
by law on said vessels and their cargoes are paid in cash : Provided, That
if the owner or consignee of the cargo on board any vessel detained as
aforesaid, or the master of said vessel, shall desire to enter a port of entry
in any other district in the United States where no such obstructions to the
568 TESTIMONY.
execution of the laws exist, the master of such vessel may be permitted so
to change the destination of the vessel and cargo in his manifest, whereupon
the collector shall deliver him a written permit to proceed to the port so
designated : And provided further, That the Secretary of the Treasury shall,
with the approbation of the President, make proper regulations for the
enforcement on shipboard of such provisions of the laws regulating the
assessment and collection of duties as, in his judgment, may be necessary
and practicable.
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That it shall be unlawful to take any
vessel or cargo detained as aforesaid from the custody of the proper officers
of the customs, unless by process of some court of the United States ; and
in case of any attempt otherwise to take such vessel or cargo by any force,
or combination, or assemblage of persons, too great to be overcome by the
officers of the customs, it shall and may be lawful for the President, or such
person or persons as he shall have empowered for that purpose, to employ such
part of the army and navy or militia of the United States, or such force of
citizen volunteers as may be deemed necessary, for the purpose of preventing
the removal of such vessel or cargo, and protecting the officers of the
customs in retaining the custody thereof.
SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That if, in the judgment of the President,
from the cause mentioned in the first section of this act, the duties upon
imports in any collection district cannot be effectually collected by the
ordinary means and in the ordinary way, or in the mode and manner provided
in the foregoing sections of this act, then and in that case the President is
hereby empowered to close the port or ports of entry in said district, and in
such case give notice thereof by proclamation ; and thereupon all right of
importation, warehousing, and other privileges incident to ports of entry
shall cease and be discontinued at such port so closed until opened by order
of the President on the cessation of such obstructions. And if, while said
ports are so closed, any ship or vessel from beyond the United States, or
having on board any articles subject to duties, shall enter or attempt to
enter any such port, the same, together with its tackle, apparel, furniture,
and cargo, shall be forfeited to the United States.
SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That whenever the President, in pursu
ance of the provisions of the second section of the act entitled "An act to
provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions, and to repeal the act now in force for that
purpose," approved February 28, 1795, shall have called forth the militia to
suppress combinations against the laws of the United States, and to cause
the laws to be duly executed, and the insurgents shall have failed to disperse
by the time directed by the President, and when said insurgents claim to
act under the authority of any State or States, and such claim is not dis
claimed or repudiated by the persons exercising the functions of government
in such State or States, or in the part or parts thereof in which said combi
nation exists, nor such insurrection suppressed by said State or States, then
and in such case it may arid shall be lawful for the President, by proclamation,
to declare that the inhabitants of such State, or any section or part thereof,
where such insurrection exists, are in a state of insurrection against the
United States ; and thereupon all commercial intercourse by and between
the same and the citizens thereof and the citizens of the rest of the United States,
shall cease and be unlawful so long as such condition of hostility shall continue.
And all goods and chattels, wares and merchandise, coming from said State
or section into the other parts of the United States, and all proceeding to such
State or section, by land or water, shall, together with the vessel or vehicle
conveying the same, or convejnng persons to or from such State or section,
be forfeited to the United States : Provided, however, That the President
TESTIMONY. 569
may, in his discretion, license and permit commercial intercourse with any
such part of said State or section, the inhabitants which are so declared in
a state of insurrection, in such articles, and for such time, and by such per
sons, as he, in his discretion, may think most conducive to the public interest ;
and such intercourse, so far as by him licensed, shall be conducted and
carried on only in pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of the Treasury. And the Secretary of the Treasury may appoint
such officers, at places where officers of the customs are not now authorized
b}' law, as may be needed to carry into effect such licenses, rules, and regu
lations ; and officers of the customs and other officers shall receive for
services under this section, and under said rules and regulations, such fees
and compensation as are now allowed for similar service under other pro
visions of law.
SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That from and after fifteen days after
'the issuing of the said proclamation, as provided in the last foregoing section
of this act, any ship or vessel belonging in whole or in part to any citizen
or inhabitant of said State or part of a State whose inhabitants are so declared
in a state of insurrection, found at sea, or in any port of the rest of the
United States, shall be forfeited to the United States.
SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That in the execution of the provisions
of this act, and of the other laws of the United States providing for the
collection of duties on imports and tonnage, it may and shall be lawful for
the President, in addition to the revenue cutters in service, to employ in
aid thereof such other suitable vessels as may, in his judgment, be required.
SEC. ^. And be it further enacted, That the forfeitures and penalties incurred
by virtue of this act may be mitigated or remitted, in pursuance of the
authority vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by the act entitled "An
act providing for mitigating or remitting the forfeitures, penalties, and
disabilities accruing in certain cases therein mentioned," approved March
third, seventeen hundred and ninety-seven, or in cases where special cir
cumstances may seem to require it, according to regulations to be prescribed
by the Secretary of the Treasury.
SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That proceedings on seizures for forfeit
ures under this act may be pursued in the courts of the United States in
any district into which the property so seized may be taken and proceedings
instituted ; arid such courts shall have and entertain as full jurisdiction
over the same as if the seizure was made in that district.
Approved July 13, 1861.
No. 8.
Circular to surveyors of the customs of western ports, restricting trade with
Paducah.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, August 31, 1861.
SIR: The following telegram was sent to }rou on the 26th instant:
"Permit no goods destined to Paducah to pass your port."
You are to be strictly governed by it.
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
To SURVEYORS OF CUSTOMS at Cairo, Ills.; Evansville, Ind.; Louisville, Ky.
570 TESTIMONY.
No. 9.
(All communication with insurgent districts, without special permit, is in viola
tion of law. )
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, September 3, 1861.
SIR: Instances of communication, by land and water, with the States con
trolled by the insurrectionists, are still frequently brought to the knowledge
of this department.
It is to be distinctly understood that all communication, whether for com
mercial or other purposes, without special permit, is, and since the date of
the President's proclamation of the 16th ultimo has been, in violation of law;
but it is also to be understood that no permit of any collector, or other
officer connected with this department, is of any validity as a sanction to
such intercourse, except as expressly authorized by the license or permission
of the President of the United States, through the Secretary of the Treasury.
All goods and chattels, wares and merchandise, going to or coming from
a State under insurrectionary control, and every vessel or vehicle convey
ing property or persons, to or from such States, is forfeited to the United
States, and must be seized and proceeded against as so forfeited.
Any circumstances requiring or justifying the mitigation or remission of
any such forfeiture will be duly considered, on application to the Secretary
of the Treasury, in whom, by act of Congress, the sole power of sudi miti
gation or remission is vested.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
No. 10.
Trade in Kentucky, south of Louisville, restricted.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, September 10, 1861.
SIR: Information having been received that prohibited goods, arrested by
inspectors in southern parts of Kentucky and reshipped for Louisville, are
forcibly taken from the cars at Elizabethtown and transported by wagons
into Tennessee, you are hereby instructed to give no permits for provisions
or supplies to any point in Southern Kentucky where the execution of the
law is thus obstructed, and none whatever for any description of goods or
property where the quality, description, or other circumstances indicate an
intention to take them to Tennessee or other State in insurrection.
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
*C. B. COTTON, Esq.,
Surveyor, Louisville, Kentucky.
TESTIMONY. 571
No. 11.
•
Instructions to special agents concerning restrictions on trade in Kentucky west
of the Cumberland river.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, September 10, 1861.
SIR: Reliable information having been received that the section of the
State of Kentucky lying west of the Cumberland river is so far under insur
rectionary influence that the laws of the United States and the orders of the
government cannot be executed therein by the civil authorities:
Now, therefore, in pursuance of law, and of the proclamation of the Presi
dent of August 16, 1861, you are hereby instructed to prevent, as far as
possible, and so long as such insurrectionary condition shall continue, all.
Commercial intercourse between the citizens of said section and of the States
named in the said proclamation and citizens of other States and parts of
States, except in cases of special permission, under such rules and regula
tions as may be established by this department; and you will use your
utmost vigilance to prevent all goods and chattels, wares and merchandise,
as well as arms, munitions of war, and other supplies, from being sent to
said section, or to any of the States named in the said proclamation, no
matter in what part of your district the same may be found or what may be
the nominal destination thereof, except under special permission, as above
stated.
In case of seizure under circumstances rendering the property liable to
forfeiture, you will at once report the same to the district attorney of the
United States, for his advice and action thereon.
In case of arrest and detention of goods, &c., the transmission of which is
attended by circumstances rendering it probable that the ultimate destina
tion thereof is for places under insurrectionary control, but not amounting
to evidence of forfeiture, you will at once notify the owner or shipper of the
detention, and allow him to dispose of the same as-he may desire, upon satis
factory assurance from him that the goods, &c., shall not be sent to any of
the places hereinbefore prohibited.
To obviate inconvenience and unnecessary trouble to loyal shippers and
owners, the permits of any collector or surveyor of customs covering mer
chandise should be respected by every other officer, unless he may have
information concerning the same not probably possessed by the officer
granting the permit.
You will also cause careful examination to be made of all trunks, pack
ages, and other articles used in the transportation of merchandise, letters,
or other modes for conveying goods or communicating information to per
sons in insurrection; and in cases of detection, you will take possession
thereof; and you will also retain the person so offending in custody; at once
reporting the case to the district attorney of the United States.
You are referred to the acts of July 13, 1861, and August 6, 1861, as well
as to the proclamation of the President of the 16th ultimo, as particularly
bearing on the subjects above named. And you will from time to time
report your proceedings to me, and suggest any additional measures which,
in your opinion, may tend to subdue this rebellion.
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
WM. P. MELLEN, Esq.,
Special Agent, Cincinnati, Ohio, et al.
572 TESTIMONY.
No. 12.
Circular to collectors and other officers of the customs, concerning unwarranta
ble seizures of property, &c.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, September 21, 1861.
In order to prevent seizures of property belonging to citizens of insurrec
tionary States not warranted by the acts of Congress relating to that sub
ject, it is thought advisable to direct the special attention of the officers of
the customs to the provisions of these acts.
The 5th section of the act of July 13 provides that all goods and chattels,
wares and merchandise coming from or proceeding to a State or place
declared by proclamation of the President to be in insurrection, together
with the vessel or vehicle conveying the same, or conveying persons to or
from such State or place, shall be forfeited to the United States.
This section obviously applies to all property in transit, or purchased or
provided with a view to transit, between loyal and disloyal States, and espe
cially to property forming the subject of commercial intercourse. Such
property, wherever found, is liable to seizure, and the only redress of par
ties who think themselves aggrieved is by appeal to the Secretary of the
Treasury, who is invested by law with full power of mitigation and remis
sion.
The 1st section of the act approved August 6 declares "that if any per
son or persons, his, her, or their agent, attorney, or employe', shall purchase
or acquire, sell, or give any property, of whatever kind or description, with
intent to use or employ the same, or suffer the same to be used or employed,
in aiding, abetting, or promoting such insurrection, * * * or any per
son or persons engaged therein; or if any person or persons, being the own
ers of any such property, shall knowingly use or employ, or consent to the
use or employment, of the same, as aforesaid, all such property is hereby
declared to be lawful subject of prize or capture wherever found."
No doubt can be entertained that this section was well considered, and
that its operation was intended to be limited to property used in further
ance of the insurrection only.
Seizures under the act of July 13 should be made by the officers, or under
the direction of officers, of the Treasury Department ; and all district at
torneys and marshals of the United States should afford all practicable coun
sel and aid in the execution of the law.
Seizures under the act of August 6 should be made by the marshal of the
district in which such property may be found, under the general or particu
lar direction of the district attorney or other superior authority. For such
seizures there is no power of mitigation or remission in the Secretary of the
Treasury; but the district attorney or other superior authority may direct
the discontinuance of any proceeding in relation thereto, and the restoration
of the property seized.
It will be seen from an inspection of these provisions of the acts of Con
gress that no property is confiscated or subjected to forfeiture except such as
is in transit, or provided for transit, to or from insurrectionary States, or
used for the promotion of the insurrection. The only exception to this rule
of forfeiture is that, made by the 5th section, of ships belonging, in whole or
in part, to citizens of a State in insurrection, which are declared to be for
feited after fifteen days from the date of proclamation, without reference to
actual or intended use. Real estate, bonds, promissory notes, moneys in
deposit, and the like, are, therefore, not subject to seizure or confiscation
in the absence of evidence of such unlawful use. All officers, while vigilant
in the prevention of the conveyance of property to or from insurrectionary
States, or the use of it for insurrectionary purposes, are expected to be care-
TESTIMONY. 573
ful in avoiding unnecessary vexation and cost by seizures not warranted by
law.
S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
No. 13.
Permits for sutlers at Cairo.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, October 2, 1861.
SIR: I have received your letter of the 24th ultimo, informing- me that, at
the request of Generals Grant and McClernand, you have granted permits
^for sutlers' goods, upon the production of certificates from the proper offi-
*cers showing the parties to be duly appointed, and upon their taking an
oath, filed at your office, not to vend any of such goods except to those be
longing to the United States army.
Your course is approved, and you will continue to exercise the most vigi
lant care to prevent any evasion of the law.
*********
I am, £c.,
S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
D. ARTER, Esq., Collector, Cairo, Illinois.
No. 14.
Mitigation of restrictions on trade with -Paducah.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, October 2, 1861.
SIR: You are hereby authorized to allow the transit of small lots of goods
to loyal citizens of the United States in Paducah, Kentucky, provided the
consent of the military commandant at that place be previously obtained.
A telegram to this effect was sent in reply to your despatch of yesterday.
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
A. L. ROBINSON, Esq.,
Surveyor, &c., Evansville, Indiana.
No. 15.
Authorizing shipment of products from Kentucky west of the Cumberland.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, October 3, 1861.
gIR: ********
There is no objection to the shipment of tobacco or any other article from
that region west of the Cumberland to loyal States, and you will be expected
to exercise a sound discretion in permitting or preventing shipments thither.
It is riot possible to determine all cases arising from the circumstances of
a country partially in military occupation by our troops by a general rule.
Yours, &c.,
S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
WILLIAM P. MELLEN, Esq.,
Special Agent, Cincinnati, Ohio.
574 TESTIMONY.
No. 16.
Regulations of trade with Paducah.
PADUCAH, Kentucky, November 5, 1861.
SIR: General Smith has assumed entire control as to what may pass out
of his lines here, either for family use or purposes of trade in the neighbor
hood * * * -* * * * *
He has agreed that if the applicant will bring to him a bill of items of
the articles he wants, not exceeding twenty-five dollars in value for family
use, or seventy-five dollars for purposes of trade, with the certificate of one
of the committee indorsed that it is proper to allow it to go, he will allow
it to pass out. I hope to find, on my next visit here, that this arrangement
has given general satisfaction. The Jews here are making a good deal of
fuss, because the committee will not indorse them more freely for permits,
under which they can continue their troublesome practices. * * *
If you purpose permitting exchanges of western staple products and un
objectionable merchandise for Tennessee cotton, tobacco, and turpentine,
value for value, this place may be one good point for exchange. I think
the permitting of such exchanges would be exceedingly advantageous to
our side, provided the cotton, tobacco, and turpentine are first delivered here,
and then the articles allowed to be given in exchange restricted, so as not
to give them munitions of war, leather, men's shoes or boots, woollen blank
ets, and perhaps woollen goods generally, salt, lard oil, harness, and saddlery.
The reasons for permitting such exchanges, and particularly its effects in
Tennessee, will readily occur to your mind. I am often questioned on the
subject, and will be glad to have an expression of your views and intentions
at your early convenience, that I may indicate them to persons inquiring.
* " * * * * * * * * *
Respectfully, yours, &c.,
WM. P. MELLEN, Special Agent.
Hon. S. P. CPIASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
Approval of foregoing arrangement and instructions of the Secretary of the
Treasury.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, November 12, 1861.
SIR j * * * Your arrangement with General Smith in relation to
permits is satisfactory.
**********
You are authorized to allow exchanges to be made at Paducah, of western
staple products arid unobjectionable merchandise for Tennessee cotton, to
bacco, and turpentine, value for value; provided the cotton, tobacco, and tur
pentine are first delivered at Paducah, and that no munitions of war, leather,
boots or shoes, woollen blankets or goods, salt, lard oil, harness or saddlery,
be allowed to be given in exchange.
The transactions under this permission must be guarded with the utmost
vigilance, and every precaution taken to prevent any undue advantage
being taken thereof.
**********
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
WM. P. MELLEN, Esq., Special Agent.
TESTIMONY. 575
s
No. IT.
Circular to collectors and other officers of the customs.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, November 12, 1861.
The following regulations will be observed in regard to seizures of vessels
made in pursuance of the 6th section of the act of July 13, 1861:
First. All such seizures must be made by the collector of customs, or other
proper revenue officer, except in case of his absence or disability, or where
immediate action is necessary, and no such officer is at hand to make the
seizures.
Second. In all cases of seizure, the collector, or other officer acting in his
stead, shall notify the proper district attorney, who will at once institute
•proceedings for the condemnation of the vessel. After the commencement
of such proceedings, if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the district at
torney instituting them that the vessel is owned in part by persons not
citizens of any State or part of a State in irisurrt-ction against the United
States, and not residing therein, and that she will not be employed in aiding
the existing rebellion, or in violating any law of the United States, such
vessel may be discharged on bail being given, according to the course of
admiralty proceedings, for the share or shares owned by any person or per
sons residing in any such insurgent State or part of State; in which case
the proceedings so instituted will be prosecuted, without delay, to condem
nation and sale of such insurgent interest, and as to the remainder of the
vessel, the forfeiture thereof will be remitted.
Third. Should there be any unusual delay in the commencement of such
proceedings, or should there be any other circumstances rendering it proper,
in the judgment of the collector, or other officer acting in his stead, that the
vessel should be released from custody before the commencement of pro
ceedings, the same may be done; provided the collector, or other officer
acting in his stead, shall be satisfied that no such improper use, as before
mentioned, is to be made of said vessel. And one or more of the owners
residing in loyal States shall give a bond, with sufficient sureties, to the
United States, in double the value of the share or shares thereof owned in
any such insurgent State or part of a State, with the condition that the ves
sel shall be safely, and in good order, returned to the collector or other officer
in whose custody she may be, within such time as he shall direct, and with
out any change in the ownership of said share or shares; and with the further
condition that the vessel shall at all times be subject to any order or decree
of the court in which any proceedings for her condemnation may be insti
tuted, or of any appellate court to which the same may be removed; and
with the further condition that any costs or other moneys which shall be
awarded by either of said courts, in said proceedings, shall be paid; together
with such other conditions as the collector or other officer shall deem just
and expedient, in order to secure the objects contemplated by the act afore
said. The execution of such bond and the discharge of the vessel shall not
delay the institution or prosecution of proceedings for the condemnation of
the insurgent interest, but the same shall be commenced and prosecuted, in
all respects, so far as practicable, in the same manner as if the vessel still
remained in the custody of the officer.
The district attorney will notify the collector, or other officer making the
seizure in his stead, of the commencement of proceedings for the condemna
tion of the vessel, of the time of trial of the suit, of the result of the trial,
and of the time of sale, (if a sale be ordered,) and the result thereof.
S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
576 TESTIMONY.
No. 18.
Authority to trade with blockading squadron.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, November 14, 1861.
SIR: Your letter of the 17th ultimo, transmitting an application from
Messrs. Sprague, Soule & Co. and others, merchants ot Boston, under date
of the 15th ultimo, requesting permission to transmit a vessel to the block
ading squadron with supplies, is received. I see no objection to allowing
such a legitimate trade as is proposed, and you are hereby authorized to
give clearances to vessels despatched by the parties referred to, requesting
them to use steamers and to give bonds in double the value of the cargo,
with sureties, to your satisfaction, that they will communicate only with the
blockading vessels of the United States, touching at every port in our pos
session in the insurrectionary States. They will also submit a list of offi
cers of said vessels to this department for approval.
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
J. Z. GOODRICH, Esq.,
Collector, Boston, Massachusetts.
No. 19.
Restrictions on trade in pork with Louisville.
LOUISVILLE, Kentucky, November 25, 1861.
SIR: ********
I have advised Surveyor Anthony, of New Albany, to grant permits for
the shipment to this city of all hogs offered; but to require, as a condition
precedent to granting the permit, that the party into whose possession they
are to come here make an affidavit that neither the hogs nor the product
thereof shall leave the city, by his knowledge or consent, without the per
mission of the surveyor; and also that he will support the Constitution of
the United States. On the affidavit is to be indorsed the bond of the buyer
here, without surety, to only dispose of the hogs and product in pursuance
of the asseverations of the affidavit.
I am, &c.,
WM. P. MELLEN, Special Agent.
Hon. S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
This restriction was approved by the Secretary of the Treasury by letter
to Mr. Mellen dated November 30, 1861; modified December 13, 1861.
No. 20.
General regulations relative to securing and disposing of the property found or
brought within the territory now or hereafter occupied by the United States
forces in the disloyal States.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, November 30, 1861.
In order to the security and proper disposition of the productions of the
soil and of all other property found within the limits of States or parts of
TESTIMONY 577
States declared to be in insurrection against the United States, and now
occupied or to be hereafter occupied by the troops and authorities of the
Union, the following regulations are established :
There shall be appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, with the ap
probation of the President, agents to reside at such ports or places as are
or may be occupied by the forces of the United States, whose duties shall
be to secure and prepare for market the cotton and such other products and
property as may be found or brought within the lines of the army or under
'the control of the federal authorities.
To enable such agents to fulfil the duties devolved upon them, the military
and naval authorities, under proper instructions, will render such military
protection and aid as may be required to. carry out the intentions of this de
partment.
All persons held to service for life under State laws, who may be found
within such limits, may be employed by the agent, who will prepare lists
embracing the names, sex, and condition of such persons, and, as near as
may be, their respective ages, together with the name of any person claim
ing their services, which lists shall be in triplicate — one for the rnilitary com
mandant, one for the files of the agent, and one to be immediately forwarded
to the Secretary of the Treasury.
The persons so listed will be organized for systematic labor in securing
and preparing for market the cotton, rice, and other products found within
the territory brought under federal control. Pay-rolls will be prepared,
and a strict account of the labor daily performed by each person entered
thereon, for which a proper compensation shall be allowed and paid to the
laborers. The amount of such compensation will be fixed, in proportion to
the service rendered, by the agent and approved by the military command
ant and by the Secretary of the Treasury.
An inventory of all horses, mules, and other stock, vehicles of transporta-
;ion, and other property, will be carefully made, and a copy transmitted to
;he Secretary of the Treasury, signed by such agent.
A record of all products taken possession of will be made, and those of.
each plantation kept distinct. When prepared for shipment, the packages
Tom the several plantations will be plainly marked and numbered, so as to
be easily distinguished.
An account of all provisions of whatsoever character found on each plan-
;ation will be taken, and such provisions will be used, so far as may be
necessary, for the sustenance of the laborers thereon. Any deficiencies of
subsistence will be supplied by the United States commissary, upon the
requisition of the agent, to whom they will be charged, and for which he
will account.
The cotton and other articles, when prepared for market, shall be shipped
to New York, and, so far as practicable, by the returning government trans
ports; and all shipments shall be consigned to the designated agent at New
York, unless otherwise specially directed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
A carefully detailed account will be kept by the agent of all supplies fur
nished by the government and of all expenditures made.
Each agent will transmit a weekly report of his proceedings to the Secretary
of the Treasury, and render his accounts in duplicate monthly for settlement.
All requisitions, bills of lading, and invoices will be countersigned by the
military commander, or by such officer as he may designate for the purpose.
Each agent will so transact his business and keep his accounts that as
little injury as possible may accrue to private citizens who now maintain or
may within reasonable time resume the character of loyal citizens of the-
United States.
S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury,
Part iii 37
578 TESTIMONY
No. 21.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, November 30, 1861.
SIR: With the approbation of the President of the United States, and by
virtue of the authority vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by the act
of July 13, 1861, I hereby appoint you a special agent to proceed to —
to receive and take charge of all cotton, rice, or other products of the soil,
and of all other property found or brought within the territory now or here
after occupied by the United States forces in the State of .
For the purposes of this appointment, and to carry out the views of the
government, the chief military and naval commandants at will re
ceive the necessary instructions from the Secretary of War and the Secre
tary of the Navy to afford you proper military protection, and to detail such
aid as may be requisite in the fulfilment of these instructions, not incom
patible with their military duties.
You will^on your arrival, forthwith make lists of all persons held to ser
vice for life within the military lines, or who may from time to time claim
the protection of our forces, noting their names and sex, and as near as may
be their respective ages, and the names of the persons to whom their ser
vices are alleged to have been due.
You will organize the persons thus listed, as may be found most conve
nient, for work in picking cotton, conveying it to the gin-houses, ginning,
baling, and otherwise preparing it for market. If any rice plantations fall
within your supervision you will take the necessary steps to gather into
the storehouses all unhoused crops, and, if the proper machinery is at hand,
have the rice hulled and prepared for market. If machinery and conveniences
for preparing either product for market are not accessible, you will take
E roper measures to have it shipped in its rough state to New York. The
jngth and character of the voyage would seem to require the shipment of
rice in bags rather than in bulk.
. You will also take an account of all other produce, whether native or for
eign, and ship to New York such as is not perishable and not wanted for
the troops. Whatever may be required for the troops you will deliver to
the officer authorized to receive it, taking therefor his receipt, setting forth
the quantity, character, and estimated value of the article so delivered.
You will cause complete pay-rolls to be prepared, on which you will enter
the names of all the persons employed under your direction, and you will
determine the compensation proper to be allowed, if approved by the com
manding officer, and inform the laborers that the sum allowed will be paid
to them as compensation for their own use and support.
It is presumed that the provisions upon the respective plantations, of which
you will make an inventory, (as also of all stock, plantation tools, vehicles
of transportation, horses, mules, &c.,) will be sufficient for the sustenance
of the laborers and employes. For any deficiency you will make your re
quisitions at stated periods upon the government commissary, keeping a dis
tinct account thereof, and charging, so far as practicable, to the product of
each plantation whatever expenditure is incurred in securing, preparing, and
shipping such product to market.
When such product is ready for shipment you will affix such shipping
marks as may be necessary for identification, adopting the same mark for
the whole production of a plantation, and varying the marks to accord with
the various plantations or reputed owners.
Shipments must be made as rapidly as the cotton or other articles can be
prepared and means of transportation afforded; and you will give such advices
of each shipment to the agent in New York as will enable him to keep his
TESTIMONY. 579
accounts of advances and sales, with each mark or with each plantation, dis
tinct from the others. You will be supplied from time to time with the neces
sary bagging and bale-rope for the cotton and bags for other shipments upon
your requisition on the agent in New York. All such bags, bagging, rope,
or other articles required, you will be careful to count, measure, or weigh,
when received, and charge to each shipment the quantity delivered and used
for the products shipped.
For all shipments you will make out invoices and bills of lading, in tripli
cate, forwarding one of each to the consignee, one to the Secretary of the
Treasury, and retain one subject to the disposition of the military com
mandant of the port. All requisitions, bills of lading, and invoices must
be countersigned by the commandant-in-chief, or such officer as he may detail
for the purpose.
In order to'economize freights, you will give preference in shipments to
returning transports.
It is presumed that all clerical force required can be furnished by the
military commandant, by detailing persons competent to perform such ser
vice, and you will procure, so far as the military commandant shall not be
able to supply you, necessary stationery, blank books, &c.
You will keep a record of all your proceedings, and report to this depart
ment weekly, as much in detail as practicable, and will send duplicates of
your requisitions to the Secretary of the Treasury.
With these general instructions, I confide in your activity, integrity, and
practical knowledge of the duties assigned to you to carry out the views of
this department with the utmost economy and vigor. Your first care should
be to secure the maturing crop which being sea-island cotton must be picked
as fast as the bolls open, otherwise it will fall and become damaged, if not
entirely ruined; and in all your action you will endeavor so to transact your
business and keep your accounts that no unnecessary injury may accrue to
private citizens who now maintain or may within a reasonable time resume
the character of loyal citizens of the United States.
With great respect,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
No. 22.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, November 30, 1861.
SIR: With the approbation of the President of the United States, and by
virtue of the authority vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by the act
of July 13, 1361, I hereby appoint you agent of this department to receive,
on account of the United States, and to take charge of all consignments of
cotton or other articles shipped to you by direction of this department.
Until otherwise directed, you will be governed in the disposition of such
cotton or other articles by these general instructions. You will keep an
accurate account, by names and numbers, and such other distinctive marks
as may be forwarded to you by the respective agents and shippers, of each
consignment received, debiting such consignment with whatever expenses
may be paid by you on its account, whether of freight, labor, storage, or
commissions, and credit such consignment with the gross proceeds of sales
when realized, and so keep your accounts that the net receipts arising from
each shipment may be at once known, and thereby the aggregate net re
ceipts arising from the products of each plantation and owner be distinctly
set forth.
580 TESTIMONY.
You are hereby authorized and directed to sell the cotton or other pro
ductions received by you at public auction, after due notice of time and
place being given in two newspapers in Boston, three in New York, and
two in Philadelphia, at least ten days prior to the sale, unless, from the
perishable nature of the article, it is deemed expedient to dispose of it im
mediately after its receipt, in which case you will pursue such course as
you deem best for the interest of all concerned.
It is suggested that large lots of cotton, if from the same plantation,
bring in the foreign markets enhanced prices over small or promiscuous
lots, and therefore the entire crop of a plantation should, in the absence of
reasons to the contrary, be so offered.
You are expected to procure, upon the most economical terms, and for
ward to the respective agents, upon their requisitions, proper bags, bagging,
bale-rope, twine, needles, or other articles required for the preparation of
the cotton, rice, or other productions for market, and also blank bills of
lading, blank books, and other stationery in reasonable and proper quanti
ties for their use; and you will advise them from time to time of any defi
ciencies in making up the bales or other packages, or in their marks arid
numbers, or in the invoices sent, and offer such suggestions as, in your
opinion, will tend. to increase the market value of the articles to be for
warded, and give effect to the wishes and intentions of the government.
You will make a special deposit with the assistant treasurer at New
York, to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States, of the gross pro
ceeds of all sales, taking duplicate receipts therefor, which you will retain
as your voucher for such payment. Your accounts must be rendered
monthly, in duplicate, and transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury.
You will report weekly your general transactions under this appoint
ment, specifying any receipts or sales of articles, and the receipt and filling
of any requisitions made upon you by the agents of tlje department.
A copy of the instructions to the agents is enclosed for your further in
formation.
Before entering on the duties of your office, you will execute an official
bond to the United States in the sum of $50,000, agreeably to the form
accompanying these instructions, and take the oath of office and allegiance
prescribed therein, following the directions as to the execution of the bond
and other requisite acts noted at the foot of the form.
You will be allowed a compensation at the rate of twenty-five hundred
dollars per annum.
Kespectfully, yours,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
No. 23.
Modification of the restrictions on trade in pork with Louisville, Kentucky, of
November 25, 1861.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, December 13, 1861.
SIR : In addition, (as to shipments of pork, to which your attention was
called in my letter of the 30th ultimo,) it must be borne in mind that Louis
ville is a loyal city; and, unless you are satisfied that the supplies are in
tended for disloyal parties in that part of Kentucky held by the insurgents,
or under insurrectionary control, or destined for States in rebellion against
the government of the United States, or to give aid and comfort to the
rebels, you will protect the merchants and traders of that city in their
TESTIMONY. 581
operations, and allow them the same facilities for the transaction of busi
ness as are enjoyed in other loyal cities.
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
WM. P. MELLEN, Esq* Special Agent, Cincinnati, Ohio.
No. 24.
Rules required to be observed by steamboats navigating the Ohio river.
1. No boat shall receive on board any freight, baggage, or parcel, unless the
same is accompanied with a permit of a duly authorized officer of the Treasury
Department.
2. No boat shall put off or discharge any freight, baggage, or parcel, at any
place different from that named in the permit as its place of destination.
3. All army supplies, shipped under military orders, are excepted from the
above rules ; but this exception does not extend to goods of sutlers, or others,
designed for trade or sale at military posts.
4. No boat, running below Louisville, having taken freight on board at any
point where there is a surveyor of customs, shall depart from such port before
exhibiting a true manifest of its entire cargo to such surveyor, and obtaining
from him written permission to proceed on the voyage ; and, on arriving at the
port ending the trip, such manifest shall be delivered to the surveyor thereof
before discharging any part of its freight. In case there is no surveyor there,
then such manifest shall be delivered to the surveyor of the last port passed on
the trip where there is such an officer.
5. To prevent inconvenience to shippers at way points, and to enable boats
to take all proper freights, baggage, and parcels, at such points, without violat
ing the above rules, an -"aid to the revenue" will be placed on all the boats
desiring it, authorized to grant permits for the shipment of all such way -freights,
baggage, and parcels, provided the boat will carry and accommodate such aid
free of charge.
6. A fee of twenty cents, for the permit, will be charged on each shipment
made for purposes of trade. But family supplies, goods of families moving,
and articles sent to soldiers by their friends, shall be exempt from such charge.
7. All boats violating the above rules will be proceeded against pursuant to
law, and no permits will be granted for the shipment of any freight, baggage,
or parcel on board any boat having violated any of the above rules.
By order of the Treasury Department.
WILLIAM P. MELLEN,
Special Agent.
Dated January 15, 1862.
The foregoing rules were approved by the Secretary of tfie Treasury by
letter dated January 18, 1862.
582 TESTIMONY.
No. 25.
Rules for the steamers on tlie Ohio river between Pittsburg and Cincinnati.
CINCINNATI, Ohio, January 27, 1862.
All steamboats navigating the Ohio river, between Pittsburg and Cincinnati,
are required to observe the following rules :
1. Same as promulgated by Mr. W. P. Mellen, January 15, 1862.]
2. Same as promulgated by Mr. W. P. Mellen, January 15, 1862.]
3. 'Same as promulgated by Mr. W. P. Mellen, January 15, 1862.]
4. Corresponds with the sixth rule of Mr. Mellen of January 15.]
5. Boats clearing for points below Cincinnati will report a manifest of their
cargoes to Enoch T. Carson, esq., surveyor of that port, and be governed by
his instructions.
6. Every steamboat, clearing at the port of Pittsburg, must take out, at the
custom-house, a regular "clearance" for each trip, for which a charge will be
made of fifty cents. To this rule there are no exceptions.
7. [Corresponds with rule of William P. Mellen, special agent, of January
15, 1862.]
THO. HEATON,
Special Agent Treasury Department.
No. 26.
Instructions in duties of special agent to Nashville, Tennessee, relative to trade
in cotton and other products.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, February 14, 1862.
SIR : With the approbation of the President of the United States, and by
virtue of the authority vested in the Secretary, of the Treasury by the act of
July 13, 1861, I hereby appoint you a special agent to proceed to Tennessee,
with the forces of the United States, to receive and take charge of all cotton,
tobacco, and other products or "property, which it may become proper to seize,
as forfeited or abandoned to the United States, and to discharge all such other
duties for the protection of the interests of the United States as may be assigned
to you.
For the purposes of this appointment, and to carry out the views of the gov
eminent, the proper military and naval commandants of the United States
forces in the west will receive the necessary instructions from the Secretary of
War and Secretary of the Navy to afford you proper military protection, and to
detail such aid as may be requisite in the fulfilment of these instructions, not
incompatible with their military duties. In the disposition of the property so
seized or abandoned you will necessarily be governed, to some extent, by the
character of the product or property so taken possession of, and must exercise
a sound judgment and discretion in relation thereto.
Cotton taken possession of must be prepared for market in the manner usual
in that locality, if the surrounding circumstances will permit with safety ; if,
however, you shall deem it necessary to security to make immediate shipments,
you will promptly do so, and send such cotton, distinctly marked, to Hiram
Barney, collector of customs at New York, forthwith, advising him of the quan
tity and character of such shipments. If, from any cause, such shipments can
not be made to Mr. Barney direct, you will forward it to Mr. Barney, to the care
of Charles B. Cotton, surveyor of customs at Louisville, or Enoch T. Carson,
TESTIMONY. 583
surveyor of customs at Cincinnati, as the most direct or certain conveyance may
dictate, advising both Mr. Barney and Mr. Cotton (or Mr. Carson, as the case
may be,) thereof, instructing the latter to receive and forward the same to Mr.
Barney, collector of customs at New York.
If, under proper authority — viz., the permits of the surveyor of the customs
at Cincinnati, Louisville, or Paducah, or the permits of other surveyors, coun
tersigned and permitted by the surveyors above named — parties present them
selves to you for the purpose of purchasing cotton or other property in your
possession as the property of the United States, you are authorized to sell such
property at prices governed by its value in the loyal States, less the cost of
transportation and other necessary charges, receiving in payment therefor only
lawful money of the United States, which moneys, as well as others corning into
your possession as the property of the government, you will promptly deposit,
or cause to be deposited, in the designated depositary at Louisville or Cincin-
•nati, as may be most convenient, to the credit of William P. Mellen, special
agent.
It may become necessary, to the prompt security of cotton and other articles,
that you sjiould command bale-rope and bagging, and other supplies for like
purposes, aiid you are therefore authorized to make requisitions upon the sur
veyors at Louisville or Cincinnati, dependent upon the latter source of supply,
for such quantities as may be deemed essential, taking great care to restrict
such requisitions to the smallest amounts. You will require invoices to be sent
to you of quantities and values, which you will verify by examination of the
articles by weight, measure, or count, when received.
No shipments from Tennessee must be allowed without your previous assent
and a permit granted by you, for which permit you will exact a fee equal to one-
half of one per cent, on all articles not purchased of you. For such as are sold
by you you will grant the permit without charge. No permit to be granted
until all dues to the United States are previously paid.
For all shipments you will make out invoices and bills of lading in triplicate,
forwarding one to the consignee, one to the Secretary of the Treasury, and re
tain one, subject to the disposition of the military commandant of the United
States forces in Kentucky.
All permits, whether granted for individuals or merchandise, and all requi
sitions, bills of lading, or invoices, whether coming from or going to Tennessee,
must be countersigned by the commandant of the department, or such officer as
he may detail for the purpose.
It is presumed that all clerical force required can be furnished by the military
commandant by detailing persons competent to perform such service ; and you
will procure, so far as the military commandant shall not be able to supply you,
necessary stationery, blank books, &c.
You will keep a record of all your proceedings, and report to this department
weekly, as much in detail as practicable, and will send duplicates of your re
quisitions to the Secretary of the Treasury.
With these general instructions, I confide in your activity, integrity, and
practical knowledge of the duties assigned to you, to carry out the views of this
department with the utmost economy and vigor.
In all your action you will endeavor so to transact your business and keep
your accounts that no unnecessary injury may accrue to private citizens who
now maintain or may within a reasonable time resume the character of loyal
citizens of the United States.
Your compensation will be five dollars ($5) per day and your necessary ex
penses, of which you will keep an accurate account.
Very respectfully,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
ALLEN A. HALL, Esq., Special Agent.
584 TESTIMONY.
No. 27.
Communication from the Secretary of tlie Treasury to the Secretary of War,
requesting him to advise tke generals in command of the act of Congress of
July 13, 186], so far as it directs how commercial intercourse with the insur
rectionary sections shall be regulated and controlled.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
February 27, 1862.
SIR : I beg leave to call your attention to the fifth section of the act of Con
gress of July 13, 1861, " further to provide for the collection of duties on imports
and for other purposes."
Under the act the President, on the 16th day of August, 1861, issued his
proclamation declaring the inhabitants of the States of Georgia, South Carolina,
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Louisiana, Alabama, Texas, Arkansas,
Mississippi, and Florida, (except the inhabitants of that part of the State of
Virginia lying west of the Alleghany mountains,) to be in a state of insurrection.
All commercial intercourse, therefore, between the inhabitants of the insurrec-*
tionary region and the citizens of the loyal States is and must remain unlawful,
until, by proclamation, the President shall declare the conditions of hostility to
have ceased; and all goods and merchandise, and all vessels or vehicles convey
ing the same, or conveying persons to or from the insurrectionary district, are
forfeited to the United States. The only exception from the law is that of in
tercourse permitted by the President, and conducted in pursuance of rules and
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
A few permits, authorizing such intercourse, have been granted, with the
sanction of the President, and it is contemplated to establish regulations in
accordance with which it may be carried on hereafter.
If you think it useful, will you be pleased to advise the generals command
ing in tlie insurrectionary region of the existence of this law, and of its pro
visions, in order that mistakes prejudicial to private and public interests may
be avoided as far as practicable.
With great respect,
S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
Hon. EDWIN M. STAN TON, Secretary of War.
MEMORANDUM. — Rules and regulations, concerning internal intercourse, framed
under act of July 13, 1861, were adopted and promulgated on the 4th of March,
1862. It came to the knowledge of the Secretary of the Treasury that orders
(or permits under sanction) of the military, in some sections, militated against
the regulations of the Treasury Department, another communication was ac
cordingly sent to the Secretary of War on the 7th of March, 1862, on the
above subject, q. v.
No. 28.
License for co?nmercial intercourse. — By tlie President of tlie United States.
Considering that the existing circumstances of the country allow a partial
restoration of commercial intercourse between the inhabitants of those parts of
the United States heretofore declared to be in insurrection and the citizens of
TESTIMONY. 585
the loyal States of the Union, and exercising the authority and discretion con
fided to me by the act of Congress, approved July 13, 1861, entitled " An act
further to provide for the collection of duties on imports, and for other purposes,"
I hereby license and permit such commercial intercourse, in all cases within the
rules and regulations which have been or may be prescribed by the Secretary
of the Treasury for the conducting and carrying on of the same on the inland
waters and ways of the United States.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
WASHINGTON, February 28, 1862.
No. 29.
Rules and regulations concerning internal commercial intercourse under act of
Congress, July 13, 1861.
By virtue of the authority confided to the Secretary of the Treasury by the
act of Congress approved July 13, 1861, entitled "An act further to provide
for the collection of duties on imports, and for other purposes," and in pursuance
of the license of the President of the United States, permitting commercial
intercourse in certain cases under said act, the following rules and regulations
are hereby prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury for conducting com
mercial intercourse between the inhabitants of those parts of the United States
heretofore declared by the President to be in insurrection and the citzens of the
loyal States of the Union ; which rules and regulations are to remain in force
so long as the condition of hostilities shall continue, unless sooner modified or
revoked :
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, March 4, 1862.
First. All licenses shall be issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, and all
applications therefor must be made in writing to him, stating specifically the
purposes for which the license is desired ; and if for general or special trade,
setting forth the character and aggregate value of the merchandise to be trans
ported, the destination thereof, and the proposed route of transportation, and
also the character of the merchandise, if any, desired in exchange, with the pro
posed route of transit thereof and its destination.
Second. Before the delivery of any license the party therein permitted to
trade shall execute a bond to the United States, with sufficient sureties, in the
penal sum of at least twice the amount of the trade so licensed, which bond
shall be subject to such approval and conditioned in such terms as shall be
specified in the license.
Third. All transportation to be made by virtue of any license shall be made
under permits, to be issued by such duly authorized officers of the Treasury
Department as shall be designated in the license, which permits shall specify
the number and kind of packages, with the marks thereon, and in general terms
the character thereof.
Fourth. When application is made for a transportation permit, the applicant
shall file with the officer authorized by the license to grant such permits a copy
of the license under which application is made, which copy shall be compared
with the original and certified by such officer, and also correct invoices in du
plicate, signed by the consignor, showing the actual values of the merchandise
at the place of purchase, and also a statement in duplicate of the route of transit
and destination of the merchandise to be transported and the consignee thereof.
The applicant shall also make and file with such officer an affidavit that the
values are correctly stated in the invoices, and that the packages contain nothing
586 TESTIMONY.
except as stated therein, and that the merchandise so permitted to be transported
shall not, nor shall any part thereof, be disposed of by him or by his authority
or connivance in violation of the terms of the license.
Fifth. All transportation shall be permitted, and all exchanges supervised,
either at Cincinnati, Louisville, Paducah, St. Louis, or such other place as may
hereafter be specified by the Secretary of the Treasury. Transportation per
mits shall be granted by the surveyor of the port whence the transit commenced,
or by other officers named in the license for that purpose, and all exchanges
shall be supervised by such officer as may be designated for that purpose in the
license, and the amount of such permit shall at the date of its issue be indorsed
upon the original license.
Sixth. All packages whatsoever, before being permitted to go into any part
of the United States heretofore declared by the President to be in insurrection,
shall be examined by a duly authorized officer, which examination shall be cer
tified and approved by such officer as shall be specified in the license.
Seventh. For each permit granted under the provisions of these rules and
regulations there shall be charged and collected one-half of one per cent, upon
the value of the merchandise, so permitted, at the place of purchase, which shall
be collected by the officer granting the permit before delivery thereof.
Eighth. All officers acting under these rules shall keep an accurate record
of all their transactions under the several licenses granted by the Secretary of
the Treasury, and shall make weekly reports to him in relation thereto, as much
in detail as practicable, transmitting with such reports a list of all permits
granted, and one of the duplicate invoices and statements, upon which shall be
indorsed the date of the authority under which such permit was granted.
Weekly returns shall be made of all fees and emoluments received.
Ninth. All licenses and permits shall be liable to modification or revocation
by the Secretary of the Treasury.
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
MEMORANDUM. — These rules and regulations were modified by the general
circular of March 29.
No. 30.
Communication from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of War,
concerning rules, of March 4, 1862.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, March 7, 1862.
SIR : I enclose copies of rules and regulations concerning internal intercourse,
framed under the act of July 13, 1861.
Great dissatisfaction exists on the Ohio river on account of the preference
given to the Saint Louis trade by the orders of General Halleck. Will you be
good enough to telegraph both General Halleck and General Buell that the
law does not authorize commercial intercourse except upon the license of the
President, under the rules and regulations established by the Secretary of the
Treasury 1
I should be very glad to remit this trade to the charge of military officers,
and to be relieved from all duties connected with it ; but the law is imperative,
and until repealed, must be complied with.
* *•# * * * * * * *
With great respect,
S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treatury.
Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
TESTIMONY. 587
No. 31.
Circular to officers of the customs modifying the rules and regulations for
internal commercial intercourse, of March 4, 1862.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, March 29, 1862.
SIR : It is desirable to remove, as far as may properly be done, tke restric
tions upon commercial intercourse between the loyal States and those States
and parts of States heretofore declared, by proclamation of the President, to be
in insurrection, and which may resume and maintain a loyal adhesion to the
Union and the Constitution, or may be occupied and controlled by the forces of
the United States engaged in the dispersion of the insurgents.
The rules and regulations governing internal commerce, heretofore prescribed
r)y the Secretary of the Treasury, are therefore hereby so far modified as to
authorize the respective surveyors of the customs at the ports of Pittsburg,
Wheeling, Cincinnati, Madison, Louisville, New Albany, Evansville, Paducah,
Cairo, and St. Louis, to issue permits for the transportation of merchandise and
for the exchange of the same for money or products of such States and parts of
States, upon application being made to them respectively, if satisfied of the
loyalty and good faith of the applicant, and upon the filing of an affidavit, prop
erly executed, that the permit so applied for shall not, if granted, be used so
as to give, in any way, any aid, comfort, information or encouragement to
persons in insurrection against the government of the United States, or under
insurrectionary control and direction.
You will hereafter cease collecting any percentage or fees for permitting the
transit and exchange of merchandise between the citizens of loyal States and
loyal citizens of insurrectionary sections of the country occupied or controlled
by the forces of the United States, other than the usual charge of twenty cents
for such permit so granted, and you will make no charge for permits for mer
chandise forwarded from any place in a loyal State to another in the same or
other like State, nor exercise any supervision over the trade between such States,
except such as may be necessary to prevent supplies of any description being
furnished to insurgents.
It is furthermore directed that no permits be granted for any articles forbidden
by the military authorities to be transported into the territory occupied by the
forces of the United States. Parties, therefore, desiring licenses and permits for
commercial trade, under the rules and regulations as herein modified, will here
after make their application direct to the proper surveyor and not to the Secre
tary of the Treasury.
I am, &c., &c., &c.,
S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
(See regulations of August 28, 1862.)
No. 32.
Trade in Tennessee to be restricted to persons authorized by Governor Johnson.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, April 4, 1862.
SIR : I this day send you the following telegram:
" Your suggestions are approved. Let permits to trade in Tennessee be re
stricted to persons authorized by Governor Johnson, or committees appointed
by him, to receive and dispose of the goods. As he is military governor of
588 TESTIMONY.
Tennessee, the sole authority to appoint such committees belongs, necessarily,
to him, though he will probably confer with Mr. Hall."
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
WM. P. MELLEN, Esq.,
Special Agent, Cincinnati, Ohio.
(Copy of the above sent to Governor Johnson.)
No. 33.
Rules governing shipments to or by sutlers, under the act of Congress of
March 19, 1862.
1st. All surveyors, before granting permits to ship merchandise to or for
sutlers, shall require the exhibition of the original certificate of appointment of
such sutler, pursuant to the act of Congress of March 19, 1862, and that a
copy thereof be filed with him.
2d. The date of permitting each shipment, and the value thereof, shall be
indorsed on such original certificate, and a corresponding record thereof shall be
kept by the surveyor granting the permit.
3d. Not more than three thousand dollars worth of goods shall be permitted
to be shipped by, to, or for, any one sutler per month.
4th. The sutler or his agent shall deposit duplicate invoices of the goods to
be shipped with the officer granting the permit.
5th. The invoices shall show truly the goods to be shipped, their value, and
the number and description of packages containing them.
6th. The application for permission to ship shall be in writing, and shall state
that nothing shall be shipped under it except as allowed by the above act of
Congress; the route of transportation and the destination of the goods; that
they belong in good faith to the sutler by or to whom they are to be shipped,
and shall not be disposed of by him, or with his knowledge, connivance or
assent, except to the officers and soldiers of his regiment, and to them only in
such quantities as may be proper for their individual use or consumption ; and
every such application shall be sworn to.
7th. Surveyors, before granting permits, may require bond with surety in such
cases as they think necessary, to prevent a violation of the law, in a penalty
equal to the value of the goods permitted, and conditioned that there shall be no
violation of the terms of the application and affidavit by the shipment thereof.
8th. All shipments by or for sutlers shall be subject to the same rules and
regulations as shipments of other persons for purposes of trade.
WILLIAM P. MELLEN,
Special Agent Treasury Department.
Dated April 7, 1862.
These rules were approved by the Secretary of the Treasury in letters of the
30th of April and 19th May, 1862, and were adopted by the special agents
throughout the western districts.
TESTIMONY. 589
No. 34.
The question of detention and seizure of goods to be decided by the surveyor of
the last port to be passed on the route of transportation.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, April 22, 1862.
gjR .###*#***
You will allow all goods now detained by you, because unaccompanied
by a permit, to be sent forward immediately, and you will not in future detain
any articles on that account. The question of detention and seizure of goods
en route from eastern cities to points in States heretofore declared by procla
mation to be in insurrection against the government of the United States will
be decided by the surveyor of the last port to be passed on the route of trans
portation ; and you will receive the certificate to that effect of any collector or
surveyor of customs as sufficient evidence of the loyalty of the shipper. You
will continue to issue permits for goods shipped from Pittsburg and from
eastern ports, as heretofore, when requested so to do.
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
GHAS. W. BATCHELOR,
Surveyor, fyc., Pittsburg, Pa. •
No. 35.
Rules for commercial intercourse adapted to trade in the west.
The following rules were approved by the Treasury Department April 20,
1862, and were adopted and published by the special agents of the department
in the western district on the 22d April, 1862:
Whereas commercial intercourse has been duly authorized between the
loyal States and those States and parts of States heretofore declared to be in in
surrection which may resume and maintain a loyal adhesion to the Union and
Constitution of the United States or may be occupied and controlled by the
forces of the United States engaged in the dispersion of the insurgents, which
intercourse is to be governed by such rules and regulations as are or may be
prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury:
Now, therefore, the said intercourse and all transportation connected there
with shall be subject to the following rules and regulations :
1. All applications for permits to ship, transport, and trade shall be ac
companied by the original invoices of the merchandise to be shipped, which
invoices shall state the number and description of the packages containing the
same, duplicates of which shall be filed with the officer granting the permit.
2. All steamboats navigating the western and southwestern rivers below
Louisville are required to observe the following rules, viz : [MEMORANDUM. —
The rules referred to were the seven rules adopted and published by William
P. Mellen, special agent, on the 15th day of January, 1862, q. v.]
3. All applications for permits to ship or trade under the above-named au
thority shall state the character and value of the merchandise to be shipped,
the consignee and destination thereof, the number and kind of packages with
the marks thereon.
4. All applicants for permits to ship and trade shall make and file with the
officer granting the permit an affidavit that the values of all merchandise are
correctly stated in the invoices, true copies of which shall be annexed to the
affidavit, and that the packages contain nothing except as stated in the invoices;
that the merchandise so permitted to be transported shall not, nor shall any
590 TESTIMONY.
part thereof, be disposed of by him or by his authority, connivance, or assent,
in violation of the terms of the permit; and that neither the permit so granted,
nor the merchandise shipped under it, shall be so used as in any way to give
any aid, comfort, information, or encouragement to persons in insurrection
against the United States ; and, furthermore, that the applicant is loyal to the
government of the United States, and will, in all things, so deport himself.
5. No permit shall be granted to ship merchandise to States or parts of
States heretofore declared to be in insurrection except for delivery to such persons
residing or doing business therein as shall be recommended therefor by an officer
of the government duly authorized to make such recommendation; and no per
mit shall be granted for the shipment of merchandise from such States or parts
of States except by persons with similar recommendation.
6. Surveyors, before granting permits, may require bond with surety in such
cases as they think necessary, to prevent a violation of the law, in a penalty
equal to the value of the merchandise permitted, and conditioned that there
shall be no violation of the terms or spirit of the permit, nor of the assevera
tions of the affidavit above provided for.
7. No permit shall be granted to ship intoxicating drinks, or anything else
forbidden by the military authorities, into the territory occupied by the forces
of the Ignited States or heretofore under insurrectionary control, except upon
the written permission of the commandant of the department in which such
territory is embraced, or of some person duly authorized by him to grant such
permission. This rule does not apply to ale, beer, and Catawba wine.
8. To facilitate trade and guard against improper transportation, " aids to the
revenue" shall be appointed, from time to time, on boats desiring it, and en
gaged in the trade of the west and southwest, which aids shall have carriage
and be reasonably compensated by the respective boats upon which they are
appointed, and they may grant permits for the shipment of way -freights on
their boats, subject to the approval of the surveyor of the first port to be passed
on the trip where there is such an officer; and no permits will be granted for
transportation into States and parts of States heretofore declared to be in in
surrection, except on boats carrying such aids to the revenue.
By order of the Secretary of the Treasury.
WM. D. GALLAGHER,
Special "Agent Treasury Department.
ST. Louis, April 22, 1862.
MEMORANDUM. — The foregoing rules and regulations were essentially modi
fied by the special agents on the 17th May, 1862, as per copy of rules for
" trade on the Mississippi," (received from Mr. Gallagher in a letter of same
date,) q. v.
No. 36.
PORTS OPENED TO TRADE.
By the President of the United States of America.. — A 2)rocJamation.
Whereas, by my proclamation of the nineteenth day of April, one thousand
eight hundred and sixty-one, it was declared that the ports of certain States,
including those of Beaufort, in the State of North Carolina ; Port Royal, in the
State of South Carolina ; and New Orleans, in the State of Louisiana, were,
for reasons therein set forth, intended to be placed under blockade ; and whereas
the said ports of Beaufort, Port Royal, and New Orleans have since been
blockaded ; but as the blockade of the same ports may now be safely relaxed
with advantage to the interests of commerce: Now, therefore, be it known that
TESTIMONY. 591
I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, pursuant to the authority
in me vested by the fifth section of the act of Congress approved on the 13th
of July last, entitled " An act further to provide for the collection of duties on
imports, and for other purposes," do hereby declare that the blockade of the
said ports of Beaufort, Port Royal, and New Orleans shall so far cease and de
termine from and after the 1st day of June next that commercial intercourse
with those ports, except as to persons and things and information contraband
of war, may from that time be carried on, subject to the lawfc of the United
States and to the limitations, and in pursuance of the regulations which are pre
scribed by the Secretary of the Treasury in his order of this date, which is
appended to this proclamation.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
United States to be affixed.
Done at the city of Washington this twelfth day of May, in the year of our
»r i Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the independ-
L ' "J ence of the United States the eighty-sixth.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
By the President :
WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State.
No. 37.
Regulations relating to trade wit/i the ports opened by proclamation.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, May 12, 1862.
1. To vessels clearing from foreign ports, and destined to ports opened by procla
mation of the President of the United States of this date, viz : Beaufort, in North
Carolina; Port Royal, in South Carolina; and New Orleans, in Louisiana, licenses
will be granted by consuls of the United States, upon satisfactory evidence
that the vessels so licensed will convey no persons, property, or information con
traband of war either to or from the said ports, wThich licenses shall be exhibited
to the collector of the port to which said vessels may be respectively bound,
immediately on arrival, and, if required, to any officer in charge of the blockade;
and on leaving either of said ports every vessel will be required to have a
clearance from the collector of the customs, according to law, showing no viola
tion of the conditions of the license. Any violation of said conditions will
involve the forfeiture and condemnation of the vessel and cargo, and the exclu
sion of all parties concerned from any further privilege of entering the United
States during the war for any purpose whatever.
2. To vessels of the United States clearing coastwise for the ports aforesaid
licenses can only be obtained from the Treasury Department.
3. In all other respects the existing blockade remains in full force and effect,
as hitherto established and maintained, nor is it relaxed by the proclamation,
except in regard to the ports to which the relaxation is by that instrument ex
pressly applied. . ..
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
592 TESTIMONY.
No. 38.
Appointment of acting collector, and general instructions regulating trade at
New Orleans.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, May 16, 1862.
SIR : You are hereby appointed special agent of the Treasury Department
for the district of New Orleans, and, until there shall be a duly appointed col
lector of the customs for the said district of New Orleans, you will assume the
duties of that office as "acting collector."
On receipt of these instructions you will proceed forthwith to New York, and
hold yourself in readiness for the first steamer to New Orleans. On arrival in
New York you will report to Mr. Collector Barney, and exhibit to him these
instructions for his information. Mr. Barney has been heretofore instructed, by
telegraph, to select a competent person to act as deputy collector, one as ap
praiser, and a third as entry clerk of the custom-house, who will accompany
you to New Orleans, and, as these parties will be familiar with the duties of the
custom-house, they will materially assist you in the proper administration of the
revenue laws at that port.
After conferring with Mr. Barney, and making yourself familiar with the
duties of collector, as far as time will permit, you will proceed with your assist
ants to New Orleans, and assume the charge of the custom-house there. On
your arrival you will advise the military commandant of the powers conferred
upon you, and freely confer with him, when necessary, in relation to imports
and exports, in order that articles contraband of war or otherwise forbidden may
be neither imported nor exported, or, if imported, may not be thrown into con
sumption.
On your assuming the duties of collector it will doubtless become necessary
to appoint additional subordinate officers. You will be careful to select none
disaffected towards the authority of the United States, nor those entertaining
views antagonistic to the policy of the administration. These officers may be
appointed from citizens of New Orleans, provided you are satisfied that they
possess the qualifications above stated ; otherwise selections will be made from
the military of the United States, after consultation with General Butler, or the
officer in command. You will report your proceedings under these instructions,
with the names of all parties appointed, as frequently as there are mail commu
nications with Washington. In all your official communications, of whatever
nature, you will sign yourself " Special Agent of the Treasury Department and
Acting Collector of Customs." The compensation of the officers of the customs
at New Orleans will be the same as that heretofore allowed at that port, in re
gard to which the Commissioner of the Customs will instruct you.
I transmit herewith a copy of the instructions to the collectors of the ports
authorizing clearances, the provisions of which you will faithfully observe.
You will grant no clearances to ports under control of the insurgents, nor allow
steamers, or other craft, to ascend the Mississippi, or any of its branches, in op
position to the wish of the military authorities, or when you have reason to
believe such vessels intend to proceed to places in the United States under
insurrectionary control, and you will be careful to observe the provisions of the
act of July 13, 1861, as well as all other acts consequent upon the present
condition of the country, applicable to the port of New Orleans. Vessels clear
ing from your port will be required to exhibit a manifest of cargo, which will be
taken on board, under the strict supervision of an officer of the customs ; and if
all the conditions of the license have been complied with, you will indorse the
clearance to that effect. Vessels arriving at your port, whether from foreign or
domestic ports, will be unladen under the strict inspection of an officer of the
TESTIMONY. 593
customs, and you will be careful to enforce the provisions of law as well as the
regulations of the Treasury Department. If there shall be any violation of law
or regulation by any vessel arriving at or within your port, such as conveying
persons, property, or merchandise, contraband of war, or failure to exhibit her
license and manifest to you immediately on arrival, or of any other violation of
law sufficient to forfeit the vessel or cargo, you will forthwith seize the vessel
and cargo and report the facts to the proper law officer, in order that proceed
ings may be instituted with a view to her condemnation and forfeiture. If
proper law officers, appointed by the government, shall not have reached your
port, or if no court of the United States, having jurisdiction of the matter, shall
have been organized at the time of seizure, you will send the vessel and cargo,
under safe custody, to the care of the collector of customs at New York, or any
other loyal port, reporting to him all the facts in the case, in order that he may
take the proper steps for the condemnation and forfeiture. The officer in com
mand of the squadron will furnish you the means to carry out the above in
structions. All moneys collected by you, you will keep in some safe and proper
place, and for their full security you will, if necessary, call upon the command
ing general for such aid as may be required. You will render your accounts in
accordance with your instructions from the commissioner of customs.
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
GEO S. DEMSON, Esq.,
Special Agent and Acting Collector, District of Neiv Orleans.
No. 39.
Modification of the restrictions upon trade oil the Mississippi.
ST. Louis, MISSOURI, May 17, 1862.
The Secretary of the Treasury having directed that the restrictions hereto
fore placed upon the trade and transportation of the interior shall be removed
as fast as may be done with safety, notice is hereby given that, on and after
the 24th instant, the regulations governing the commerce of the upper Missis
sippi and its tributaries will be so far modified as that —
1st. All merchandise, other than munitions of Avar, may, without permits,
pass from the loyal States into the city of St. Louis ; into all that part of the
State of Missouri lying immediately on the Missouri river, and all north of that
river; and into all the States of the northwest, and also the territories thereof;
and all the custom-house supervision over this trade is abolished, except such
as may be deemed necessary to prevent supplies of any description being fur
nished to insurgents.
2d. Merchandise destined for any place in that part of the State of Missouri
lying south of the Missouri river must still be covered by custom-house permits
before it can go forward, but the charge heretofore collected for the same is
hereby discontinued.
3d. All the duties heretofore devolved upon surveyors and other officers of
the customs, except such as are abolished by these modifications, those officers
are expected still diligently and faithfully to perform, to the end that this de
sirable removal of certain restrictions upon trade may not operate to the preju
dice of the government, or in any manner strengthen the hands of those who
are in rebellion against its authority.
4th. The regulations established for conducting the commerce of the loyal
States with the States and places recovered from the insurrectionary forces by
Part iii 38
594 TESTIMONY.
soldiers of the United States engaged in suppressing the rebellion remain un
changed.
W. D. GALLAGHER,
Special Agent Treasury Department.
Circular to collecto't s of Atlantic ports concerning clearances to ports opened by
proclamation, enumerating articles contraband of war.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, May 23, 1862.
SIR : In pursuance of the provisions of the proclamation of the President,
modifying the blockade of the ports of Beaufort, Port Royal, and New Orleans,
and the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury relating to trade with
those ports, no articles contraband of war will be permitted to enter at either of
said ports, and you will accordingly refuse clearances to vessels bound for
those ports, or either of them, with any such articles on board.
Until further instructed you will regard as contraband of war the following-
articles, viz : Cannons, mortars, fire-arms, pistols, bombs, grenades, fire-locks,
flints, matches, powder, saltpetre, balls, bullets, pikes, swords, sulphur, helmets
or boarding caps, sword-belts, saddles and bridles, (always excepting the quan
tity of said articles which may be necessary for the defence of the ships, or
those who compose the crew,) cartridge-bag material, percussion and other caps,
clothing adapted for uniforms, resin, sail-cloth of all kinds, hemp and cordage,
masts, ship timber, tar and pitch, ardent spirits, military persons in the service1*
of the enemy, despatches of the enemy, and articles of like character with those
specially enumerated.
You will also refuse clearances to all vessels which, whatever the ostensible
destination, are believed by you, on satisfactory grounds, to be intended for
ports or places in possession or under control of insurgents against the United
States, or that there is imminent danger that the goods, wares, or merchandise,
of whatever description, laden on such vessels, will fall into the possession or
under the control of such insurgents. And in all cases where, in your judg
ment, there is ground for apprehension that any goods, wares, or merchandise
shipped at your port will be used in any way for the aid of the insurgents or
the insurrection, you will require substantial security to be given that such goods,
wares, or merchandise shall not be transported to any place under insurrec
tionary control, and shall not in any way be used to give aid or comfort to such
insurgents.
You will be specially careful, upon applications for clearances, to require
bonds, with sufficient sureties, conditioned for fulfilling faithfully all the condi
tions imposed by law or departmental regulations, from shippers of the following
articles to the ports opened, or to any other ports from which they may easily
be, and are probably intended to be, reshipped in aid of the existing insurrec
tion, namely : Liquors of all kinds, coals, iron, lead, copper, tin, brass, tele
graph instruments, wire, porous cups, platina, sulphuric acid, zinc, and all other
telegraphic materials, marine engines, screw propellers, paddle wheels, cylinders,
cranks, shafts, boilers, tubes for boilers, fire-bars, and every article, or any other
component part of an engine or boiler, or any article whatever which is, can, or
may become applicable for the manufacture of marine machinery, or for the
armor of vessels.
I am, &c., &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
TESTIMONY. 595
No. 41.
Form of permit issued to officers of the customs to grant clearances to ports
under blockade.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, , 186 .
SIR : The War Department having certified that the shipment proposed to be
made by to , consisting of the following articles, viz :
, is required for military purposes, and having requested that the
transportation of the same may be permitted, you are hereby authorized to grant
a clearance for the same, subject to the condition that all parties interested in
the proposed shipment shall have first taken the prescribed oath of allegiance,
and that the vessel and all her cargo are to be forfeited to the United States if
any other goods are found on board of her than those specified above, on ex
amination by the custom-house officers, or by the military or naval authorities,
after clearing for .
You will insert the above condition in the clearance, and you will also require
a suitable bond, that none of the articles so conveyed shall be used with the
consent or knowledge of the shippers, or their agents, to give aid or comfort to
the insurgents.
I am, very respectfully,
Per order. ,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.
, Esq., Collector, Spc., fyc.
No. 42.
Circular to certain collectors relative to sending supplies for the relief of
Norfolk.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, June 5, 1862.
SIR : The Secretary of War has just sent me a telegram from General Dix,
representing that much suffering exists in Norfolk, and asking that some ship
ments of provisions may be made to that place for the relief of the inhabitants.
As Norfolk is a blockaded port, this can only be done as a military measure,
and at the request of the Secretary of War.
I have therefore verbally advised the Secretary, through his chief clerk, that
I would refer the matter to the several collectors of Baltimore, Philadelphia,
New York, and Boston, with instructions to confer with any reliable and loyal
persons who may be disposed to make a shipment, consisting exclusively of
provisions and clothing, and materials for clothing ; and in case any such person
is found, to request him to forward at once a statement of the articles proposed
to be shipped, with a request for a clearance, to this department. On receipt of
the statement, and a request, it will be submitted to the Secretary of War, and
the clearance authorized, on his statement of the military necessity and request,
in the usual way.
It is not best to authorize more than one, or, at most, two shipments from
each port, until further instructions as to the character and urgency of the
necessity.
I am, &c., &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
J. Z. GOODRICH, Esq., Collector, 8fc., Boston.
HIRAM BARNEY, Esq., Collector, &c., New York.
WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Esq., Collector, fyc., Philadelphia.
HENRY W. HOFFMAN, Esq., Collector, fyc., Baltimore.
596 TESTIMONY.
No. 43.
Rules for trade at Memphis.
A "local board of trade" was appointed for Memphis by W. D. Gallagher,
esq., special agent, consisting of Messrs. B. D. Nabers and C. P. Ware, to which
W. P. Mellen, esq., special agent, added Mr. Ruel Hough. June 17, 1862.
The following rules were established at the same time :
1. The military commander of the post details a squad of men to be at the
landing at all times, and on the arrival of every boat to see that no merchandise
is taken from the landing, except upon permits first obtained from the board of
trade.
2. The board of trade grant permission to receive and sell goods to such per
sons only as take the usual oath as to disposing of them ; and the oath of alle
giance is made a part of the affidavit.
3. The military pickets around the city are allowed to pass out of the city
only such persons with merchandise as have the permit of the board covering
the merchandise.
4. The board permit persons in and out of the city to purchase family sup
plies in such quantities as may be necessary for individual use, without question
as to loyalty ; but no goods can be sold for purposes of trade in or out of the
city, except by and to persons having the permit to trade, and this will only be
given upon the affidavit above named.
*********** **
WILLIAM P. MELLEN,
Special Agent.
MEMORANDUM. — The foregoing regulations were approved by the Secretary
of the Treasury, July 8, 1862.
No. 44.
Letter to the Secretary of War, embodying the " modus opcrandi" in the trans-
mittal of supplies to places declared by the President to be under blockade.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, June 23, 1862.
SIR : I have the honor to return the letter of George Bent, addressed to this
department, requesting permission to ship a cargo of provisions and other articles
to St. Augustine, Florida, from New York, to which you say you have no
objection.
Since the port of St. Augustin is under blockade, and wholly within the
control of the naval and military authorities, and, by the proclamation of the
President, all commercial intercourse is forbidden at that point, I do not feel
authorized to grant permission for the shipment of articles thither, unless the
War or Navy Department shall certify that they are needed for military or
naval purposes, and request their transmission.
Whether, under the head of military or naval purposes, may be properly in
cluded the furnishing of such supplies or provisions, clothing, and the like, to
the inhabitants, as may be justly thought necessary to insure their tranquility
and, mediately, the success of military operations, is a question for your deter
mination, not for mine.
My jurisdiction in the premises extends no further than to the granting of
clearances for whatever cargoes you, in the exercise of your discretion, may see
fit to certify to be needed as above stated, and to request clearances for.
TESTIMONY. 597
Without such certificate and request, I apprehend foreign powers and prize
courts might regard and, perhaps, justly, coastwise clearances, as annulling the
blockade.
I am, &c., &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
Hon. EDWIN M. STAN TON, Secretary of War.
No. 45.
Additional instructions to the acting collector at Neiv Orleans.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
June 27, 1862.
SIR:
##*####***
Until otherwise directed you will permit no shipments by sea from any point
on the Mississippi river or tributaries, except New Orleans, at which place all
goods will be laden on board under the inspection of the officers of the customs.
##*#######
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
GEORGE S. DENISON, Esq.,
Acting Collector, fyc., New Orleans, La.
No. 46.
Certificates of permission to trade to be granted to loyal parties.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
July I, 1862.
SIR : Referring you to the modifications of the system of issuing permits for
trade with those sections of the country heretofore declared under insurrection
ary control, under the rules and regulations governing internal commercial in
tercourse, adopted on the 29th of March last, you are hereby directed, when
applied to by parties desiring to make shipments of goods to those sections, to
furnish, if satisfied of their loyalty, and of the good faith of the proposed trans
action, certificates to that effect, which will be regarded as sufficient evidence
on those points by the surveyors of customs at the internal ports, to whom ap
plication for permits may be made by the shippers, unless such surveyors shall
be satisfied of disloyal intent on grounds not publicly known.
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
To COLLECTORS of Atlantic Ports.
598 TESTIMONY.
No. 47.
Instructions to special agents of the Treasury Department in view of opening
trade on the Mississippi river, fyc. — Mode of procedure.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
July 10, 1862.
SIR : Whenever any section of the country bordering- on the Mississippi
river, or its affluents, heretofore declared to be under insurrectionary control,
shall come into the possession of the United States forces, such arrangements
should be made for the resumption of trade therewith, under the general regu
lations now in force governing internal commercial intercourse, as will allow all
persons desiring to participate in such trade equal opportunities for so doing.
It is suggested that when, in the opinion of any one of the special agents of
this department, it is proper to reopen trade with any such section, he will
promptly communicate the fact to the other agents of the department having
co-operative supervision, and, if they shall concur in his views, they will fix
upon a day after which shipments, of goods may be made thence, giving public
notice thereof, and advising forthwith this department.
Should they disagree they will submit the facts to the Secretary- of the
Treasury for his consideration.
Very respectfully,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
No. 48.
Instructions to surveyors of customs at Pittsburg and Wheeling, requiring
steamers to take out clearances each trip, fyc.
PITTSBURG, My 18, 1862.
SIR : Hereafter, and till otherwise advised, you will require all boats clearing
at this port for points and places below Cincinnati, to take out regular clearances
for each trip ; and you will also require permits to be taken out at your office
for each shipment of goods to points and places on both sides of the river, below
Louisville.
For clearances you will charge twenty-five cents, and for the permits twenty
cents each.
Very respectfully,
THOMAS HEATON,
Special Agent, Treasury Department.
To , .
The foregoing instructions were approved by the Secretary of the Treasury,
July 25, 1862, with the following construction :
" Provided, that the boatmen and shippers shall not be required to take out
clearances or permits at any other point for the same trip or shipment."
TESTIMONY. 599
No. 49.
Instructions to surveyors in western districts, relative to trading boats.
LOUISVILLE, Kv., July IS, 1862.
SIR: I am satisfied that "trading boats," that have been permitted to go
down the Mississippi river, are guilty of gross violations of the regulations of the
Secretary of the Treasury, and of conveying aid and comfort to rebels, and
that there is no way in which transportation of merchandise by such craft can
be permitted with safety to the public interests.
You will, therefore, please grant no permit to any trading boat whatsoever,
to go down the Mississippi river, no matter what pretences or circumstances they
may present to you, either for purposes of trade by the way or of transportation
to a point named.
In all cases of permitting barges or flatboats, loaded with produce for a desti
nation on the Mississippi, named, you will require bond, in the full value of the
cargo, that no part thereof shall be landed or delivered at any place other than
that named in the permit, as the final destination thereof.
WILLIAM P. MELLEN,
Special Agent, Treasury Department.
The foregoing letter of instructions was sent to all the surveyors in the dis
tricts involved, and the same was approved by the Secretary of the Treasury in
letter to Mr. Mellen, dated July 29, 1862.
No. 50.
Modification of the instructions to the acting collector of customs at New Or
leans, of June 27, 1862.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, August 15, 1862.
SIR : It is represented that strict compliance with the instructions of June
27th last, directing you to permit no shipments by sea, from any point on the
Mississippi river or tributaries, except New Orleans, works injustice to owners
of produce lying below New Orleans, in consequence of the trouble and expense
of transporting it to that point for clearance.
You are therefore authorized, when applied to for clearance by parties under
such circumstances, and when satisfied of the good faith of the proposed trans
action, to detail an inspector to visit the point and supervise the shipment, and
issue a clearance on his certificate ; provided that all expense attending such
special shipments shall be borne by the parties making the same.
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
GEORGE S. DENISON, Esq.
Special Agent and Acting Collector, New Orleans, La.
600 TESTIMONY.
No. 51.
[Act of Congress July 13, 1861, and an act supplementary thereto, May 20, 1862.]
Regulations concerning internal and coastwise intercourse, to which are appended
the accompanying orders of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the
Navy.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, August 28, 1862.
In pursuance of law, and by virtue of the authority conferred upon the Secre
tary of the Treasury by the act of Congress approved July 13, 1861, entitled,
"An act further to provide for the collection of duties on imports, and for other
purposes," and an act supplementary thereto, approved May 20, 1862, and for
the purpose of preventing the conveyance of arms, munitions of war, and other
supplies to persons in insurrection against the United States, the following regu
lations concerning commercial intercourse with insurrectionary States and sec
tions are prescribed.
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
I. No goods, wares, or merchandise, whatever may be the ostensible destina
tion thereof, shall be transported to any place now under the control of insurgents ;
nor to any place on the south side of the Potomac river; nor to any place on the
north side of the Potomac, and south of the Washington and Annapolis railroad ;
nor to any place on the eastern shore of the Chesapeake ; nor to any place on
the south side of the Ohio river below Wheeling, except Louisville ; nor to any
place on the west side of the Mississippi river below the mouth of the Des
Moines, except St Louis without a permit of a duly authorized officer of the
Treasury Department. And the special agents of this department may tempo
rarily extend these restrictions to such other places in their respective districts,
and make such local rules to be observed therein, as may from time to time
become necessary, promptly reporting their action to the Secretary of the Trea
sury for his sanction or disapproval.
II. All transportation of coin or bullion to any State or section heretofore
declared to be in insurrection is absolutely prohibited, except for military pur
poses and under military orders, or under the special license of the Secretary of
the Treasury. And no payment of gold or silver shall be made for cotton or
other merchandise within any such State or section. And all cotton or other
merchandise purchased or paid for therein, directly or indirectly, in gold or
silver, shall be forfeited to the United States.
III. No clearance or permit whatsoever will be granted for any shipment to
any port, place, or section affected by the existing blockade, except for military
purposes, and upon the certificate and request of the Department of War or the
Department of the Navy.
IV. All applications for permits to transport or trade under these regulations
shall state the character and value of the merchandise to be transported, the
consignee and destination thereof, with the route of transportation and the
number and description of the packages, with the marks thereon.
V. Every applicant for such permits shall present with his application the
original invoices of the goods, wares, and merchandise to be transported, and
shall make and file with the officer granting the permit an affidavit that the
quantities, descriptions, and values are correctly stated in said invoices, true
copies of which shall be annexed to and filed with the affidavit; and that the
packages contain nothing except as stated in the invoices; that the merchandise
so permitted shall not, nor shall any part thereof, be disposed of by him or by
TESTIMONY. 601
his authority, connivance, or assent, in violation of the terms of the permit, and
that neither the permit so granted, nor the merchandise to be transported shall
be so used or disposed of by him or by his authority, connivance or assent, as
in any way to give aid, comfort, information, or encouragement to persons in
insurrection against the United States. And furthermore, that the applicant is
loyal to the government of the United States and will in all things so deport
himself.
VI. No permit shall be granted to ship goods, wares, or merchandise to States
or parts of States heretofore declared to be in insurrection, or to places under
insurrectionary control, or occupied by the military forces of the United States,
except to persons residing or doing business therein whose loyalty and good
faith shall be certified by an officer of the government or other person duly au
thorized to make such certificate, or by a duly appointed board of trade therein,
by whose approval and permission only the same shall be unladed or disposed
of. And no permit shall be granted to ship merchandise from any such State
or part of State in violation of any order restricting shipments therefrom, made
for military purposes by the commandant of the department from which such
shipment is to be made.
VII. Collectors or surveyors of customs, before granting clearances or permits,
may require bond, with reasonable surety, in such cases as they shall think ne
cessary, to protect the public interests, conditioned that there shall be no viola
tion of the terms or spirit of the clearance or permit, or of the averments of the
affidavit upon which the same is granted.
VIII. No permit shall be granted to ship intoxicating drinks, or other things
prohibited by the military authorities, into territory occupied by the military
forces of the United States, except upon the written request of the commandant
of the department in which such territory is embraced, or of some person duly
authorized by him to make such request.
IX. In order to defray the expenses under these regulations, a fee of twenty
cents will be charged for each permit granted ; and shipments perrnited to and
from States heretofore declared to be in insurrection shall, in addition thereto,
be charged with the following fees, viz : Five cents on each one hundred dollars
over three hundred dollars on all shipments to such States or sections; fifty
cents on each one thousand pounds of cotton, and twenty-five cents on each one
thousand pounds of sugar permitted from such State.
X. Xo vessel, boat, or vehicle used for transportation upon or south of the
Potomac river, or north of the Potomac and south of the Washington and An
napolis railroad, or to the eastern shore of the Chesapeake, or southwardly on
or from the Ohio river below Wheeling, or westwardly or southwardly on or
from the Mississippi river below the mouth of the Des Monies, shall 'receive on
board any goods, wares or merchandise destined to any place, commercial inter
course with which now is or hereafter may be restricted as aforesaid, unless the
same be accompanied with a permit of a duly authorized officer of the Treasury
Department, except as hereinafter provided in regulation number XIV.
XI. No vessel, boat, or other vehicle used for transportation from eastern
cities, or elsewhere in the loyal States, shall carry goods, wares, or merchandise
into any place, section, or State restricted as aforesaid, without the permit of
the duly authorized officer of the customs, applications for which permit may be
made to such authorized officer near the point of destination as may suit the
convenience of the shipper.
XII. No vessel, boat, or other vehicle used for transportation shall put off
any goods, wares, or merchandise at any place other than that named in the
permit as the place of destination.
XIII. Before any boat or vessel running on any of the western waters south
of Louisville or St Louis, or other waters within or adjacent to any State or
section, commercial intercourse with which now is or may hereafter be restricted
602 TESTIMONY.
as aforesaid, shall depart from any port where there is a collector or surveyor of
customs, there shall be exhibited to the collector or surveyor, or such other
officer as may be authorized to act in his stead, a true manifest of its entire
cargo and a clearance obtained to proceed on its voyage ; and when freights are
received on board at a place where there is no collector or surveyor, as herein
after provided in regulation XIV, then the same exhibit shall be made and
'clearance obtained at the first port to be passed where there is such an officer,
^and such vessel or boat shall be reported and the manifest of its cargo exhibited
to the collector or surveyor of every port to be passed on the trip where there
is such an officer ; but no new clearance shall be necessary unless additional
freights shall have been taken on board after the last clearance. Immediately
oil arriving at the port of final destination, and before discharging any part of
its cargo, the manifest shall be exhibited to the surveyor of such port, or other
officer authorized to act in his stead, whose approval for landing the cargo shall
be indorsed on the manifest before any part thereof shall be discharged ; and the
clearance and shipping permits of all such vessels and boats shall be exhibited
<to the officer in command of any naval vessel or military post whenever such
officer may require it.
XIV. To facilitate trade and guard against improper transportation, " aids to
the revenue" will be appointed from time to time on cars, vessels, and boats,
when desired by owners, agents, or masters thereof, which aids will have free
•carriage on the respective cars, vessels, and boats on which they are placed, and
will allow proper way freights to be taken on board without permit, keeping a
statement thereof, and reporting the same to the collector or surveyor of the first
port to be passed on the trip where there is such an officer, from whom a permit
therefor must be obtained, or the goods returned under his direction. No permit
will be granted for transportation into any insurrectionary State or district, ex-
vcept on cars, vessels, and boats carrying such aids.
XV. All vessels, boats, and other vehicles used for transportation, violating
•any of the above regulations, and all goods, wares, and merchandise shipped or
transported in violation thereof, will be forfeited to the United States. If any
false statement be made or deception practiced in obtaining a permit, such permit
and all others connected therewith or affected thereby will be absolutely void,
and all merchandise shipped thereunder shall be forfeited to the United States.
In all cases of forfeiture, as aforesaid, immediate seizure will be made and pro
ceedings instituted promptly for condemnation. The attention of all officers of
the government, common carriers, shippers, consignees, owners, masters, agents,
drivers, and other persons connected with the transportation of merchandise or
trading therein, is particularly directed to the acts of July 13, 1861, and May
20, 1862, above referred to.
XVI. All army supplies transported under military orders are excepted from
the above regulations. But this exception does not extend to sutlers' goods or
others designed for sale at military posts or camps.
XVII. When any officer of the customs shall find in his district any goods,
wares, or merchandise, which, in his opinion, are in danger of being transported
to insurgents, he may, if he thinks it expedient, require the owner or holder
thereof to give reasonable security that they shall not be transported* to any
place under insurrectionary control, and shall not in any way be used to give
aid or encouragement to the insurgents.
If the required security be not given, such officer shall promptly state the
facts to the United States marshal for the district within which such goods are
situated, or, if beyond the jurisdiction of a United States marshal, then to the
commandant of the nearest military post, whose duty it shall be to take posses
sion thereof, and hold them for safe-keeping, reporting the facts promptly to the
^Secretary of the Treasury, and awaiting instructions.
XVIII. Where ports heretofore blockaded have been opened by the procla-
TESTIMONY. 603
mation of the President, licenses will be granted, by United States consuls, on
application by the proper parties, to vessels clearing from foreign ports to the
ports so opened, upon satisfactory evidence that the vessel so licensed will con
vey no person, property, or information contraband of war, either to or from
said ports, which license shall be shown to the collector of the port to which
the vessel is bound, and, if required, to any officer in charge of the blockade.
And on leaving any port so opened, the vessel must have a clearance from the
collector, according to law, showing no violation of the conditions of the license.
Any violation of the conditions will involve the forfeiture and condemnation of
the vessel and cargo, and the exclusion of all parties concerned from entering
the United States for any purpose during the war.
XIX. United States vessels clearing from domestic ports to any of the ports
so opened will apply to the custom-house officers of the proper ports, in the
usual manner, for licenses or clearances under the regulations heretofore estab
lished.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, August 28, 1862.
The attention of all officers and others connected with the army of the United
States is called to the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury concerning
commercial intercourse with insurrectionary States or sections, dated August
28, 1862.
I. Commandants of departments, districts, and posts, will render all such
military aid as may become necessary in carrying out the provisions of said
regulations and enforcing observance thereof to the extent directed by the Secre
tary of the Treasury, so far as can possibly be done, without danger to the
operations or safety of their respective commands.
II. There will be no interference with trade or shipments of cotton or other
merchandise conducted in pursuance of said regulations within any territory
occupied and controlled by the forces of the United States, unless absolutely
necessary to the successful execution of military plans or movements therein.
But in cases of the violations of the conditions of any clearance or permit
granted under such regulations, and in cases of unlawful traffic, the guilty party
or parties will be arrested and the facts promptly reported to the commandant
of the department for orders.
III. No officer of the army or other person connected therewith will seize
cotton or other property of individuals unless exposed to destruction by the
enemy, or needed for military purposes, or for confiscation under the act of
Congress, and in all such cases of seizure the same shall be promptly reported
to the commandant of the department wherein they are made for his orders
therein.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
NAVY DEPARTMENT, August 28, 1862.
The attention of naval officers is called to the regulations of the Secretary of
the Treasury concerning commercial intercourse with insurrectionary States or
sections, dated August 28, 1862.
I. Commanders of naval vessels will render such aid as may be necessary in
carrying out the provisions of said regulations, and enforcing observance thereof
to the extent directed by the Secretary of the Treasury, so far as can possibly
be done, without danger to the operations or safety of their respective commands.
604 TESTIMONY.
II. There will be no interference with trade in or shipments of cotton or
other merchandise conducted in pursuance of said regulations within any of the
waters controlled by the naval forces of the United States, unless absolutely
necessary to the successful execution of military or naval plans or movements.
But in cases of the violation of the conditions of any clearance or permit granted
under said regulations, and in cases of unlawful traffic, the guilty party or par
ties will be arrested and the facts promptly reported.
III. No officer of the navy Avill seize cotton or other property of individuals
within the territory opened to traffic, and subject to the regulations of the Sec
retary of the Treasury, unless the same is exposed to destruction by the enemy
or needed for naval purposes, or for confiscation under the act of Congress ; and
in all such cases the fact, with all attendant circumstances, shall be promptly
reported to the department.
GIDEON WELLES, Secretary.
AN ACT further to provide for the collection of duties on imports, and for other purposes.
~Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That whenever it shall, in the judgment of
the President, by reason of unlawful combinations of persons in opposition to the
laws of the United States, become impracticable to execute the revenue laws
and collect the duties on imports by the ordinary means, in the ordinary way,
at any port of entry in any collection district, he is authorized to cause such
duties to be collected at any port of delivery in said district until such obstruc
tion shall cease ; and in such case the surveyors, at said ports of delivery shall
be clothed with all the powers and be subject to all the obligations of collectors
at ports of entry ; and the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approbation of
the President, shall appoint such number of weighers, gangers, measurers, in
spectors, appraisers, and clerks as may be necessary, in his judgment, for the
faithful execution of the revenue laws at said ports of delivery, and shall fix and
establish the limits within which such ports of delivery are constituted ports of
entry, as aforesaid ; and all the provisions of law regulating the issue of marine
papers, the coasting trade, the warehousing of imports, and collection of duties,
shall apply to the ports of entry so constituted in the same manner as they do
to ports of entry established by the laws now in force.
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That if, from the cause mentioned in the
foregoing section,, in the judgment of the President, the revenue from duties on
imports cannot be effectually collected at any port of entry in any collection dis
trict, in the ordinary way and by the ordinary means, or by the course provided
in the foregoing section, then and in that case he may direct that the custom
house for the district be established in any secure place within said district,
either on land or on board any vessel in said district or at sea near the coast;
and in such case the collector shall reside at such place, or on shipboard, as the
case may be, and there detain all vessels and cargoes arriving within or ap
proaching said district, until the duties imposed by law on said vessels and their
cargoes are paid in cash : Provided, That if the owner or consignee of the cargo
on board any vessel detained as aforesaid, or the master of said vessel shall de
sire to enter a port of entry in any other district of the United States where no
such obstructions to the execution of the laws exist, the master of such vessel
may be permitted so to change the destination of the vessel and cargo in his
manifest, whereupon the collector shall deliver him a written permit to proceed
to the port so designated : And provided, further, That the Secretary of the
Treasury shall, with the approbation of the President, make proper regulations
for the enforcement on shipboard of such provisions of the laws regulating the
TESTIMONY. 605
assessment and collection of duties as in his judgment may be necessary and
practicable.
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That it shall be unlawful to take any
vessel or cargo detained as aforesaid from the custody of the proper officers of
the customs unless by process of some court of the United States ; and in case
of any attempt otherwise to take such vessel or cargo by any force, or combi
nation, or assemblage of persons, too great to be overcome by the officers of the
customs, it shall and may be lawful for the President, or such person or persons
as he shall have empowered for that purpose, to employ such part of the army
or navy or militia of the United States, or such force of citizen volunteers as
may be deemed necessary, for the purpose of preventing the removal of such
vessel or cargo, and protecting the officers of the customs in retaining the cus
tody thereof.
SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That if, in the judgment of the President,
from the cause mentioned in the first section of this act, the duties upon imports
in any collection district cannot be effectually collected by the ordinary means
and in the ordinary way, or in the mode and manner provided in the foregoing
section of this act, then and in that case the President is hereby empowered to
close the port or ports of entry in said district, and in such case give notice
thereof by proclamation ; and thereupon all right of importation, warehousing,
and other privileges incident to ports of entry, shall cease and be discontinued
at such ports so closed, until opened by the order of the President on the cessa
tion of such obstructions ; and if, while said ports are so closed, any ship er ves
sel from beyond the United States, or having on board any articles subject to
duties, shall enter or attempt to enter any such port, the same, together with its
tackle, apparel, furniture, and cargo, shall be forfeited to the United States.
SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That whenever the President, in pursu
ance of the provisions of the second section of the act entitled "An act to pro
vide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions, and to repeal the act now in force for that
purpose," approved February twenty-eight, seventeen hundred and ninety-five,
shall have called forth the militia to suppress combinations against the laws of
the United States, and to cause the laws to be duly executed, and the insurgents
shall have failed to disperse by the time directed by the President, and when
said insurgents claim to act under the authority of any State or States, and such
claim is not disclaimed or repudiated by the person exercising the functions of
government in such State or States, or in the part or parts thereof in which said
combination exists, nor such insurrection suppressed by said State or States, then
and in such case it may and shall be lawful for the President, by proclamation, to
declare that the inhabitants of such State, or any section or part thereof, where
such insurrection exists, are in a state of insurrection against the United States ;
and thereupon all commercial intercourse by and between the same and the citi
zens thereof and the citizens of the rest of the United States shall cease and be
unlawful so long as such condition of hostility shall continue; and all goods and
chattels, wares and merchandise, coming from said State or section into the other
parts of the United States, and all proceeding to such State or section, by land
or water, shall, together with the vessel or vehicle conveying the same, or con
veying persons to or from such State or section, be forfeited to the United
States : Provided, however, That the President may, in his discretion, license
and permit commercial intercourse with any such part of said State or section,
the inhabitants of which are so declared in a state of insurrection, in such arti
cles, and for such time, and by such persons, as he, in his discretion, may think
most conducive to the public interests ; and such intercourse, so far as by him
licensed, shall be conducted and earned on only in pursuance of rules and regu
lations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. And the Secretary. of the
Treasury may appoint such officers, at places where officers of the customs are
606 TESTIMONY.
not now authorized by law, as may be needed to carry into effect such licenses,
rules, and regulations ; and officers of the customs and other officers shall receive
for services under this section, and under said rules and regulations, such fees
and compensation as are now allowed for similar service under other provisions
of law.
SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That, from and after fifteen days after the
issuing of the said proclamation, as provided in the last foregoing section of this
act, any ship or vessel belonging in whole or in part to any citizen or inhabitant
of said States or part of a State whose inhabitants are so declared in a state of
insurrection, found at sea, or in any port of the rest of the United States, shall
be forfeited to the United States.
SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That, in the execution of the provisions
of this act, and of the other laws of the United States providing for the collec
tion of duties on imports and tonnage, it may and shall be lawful for the Presi
dent, in addition to the revenue cutters in service, to employ in aid thereof such
other suitable vessels as may, in his judgment, be required.
SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That the forfeitures and penalties incurred
by virtue of this act may be mitigated or remitted, in pursuance of the authority
vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by the act entitled "An act providing
for mitigating or remitting the forfeitures, penalties, and disabilities accruing in
certain cases therein mentioned," approved March third, seventeen hundred and
ninety-seven, or in cases where special circumstances may seem to require it,
according to regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That proceedings on seizures for'forfeitures
under this act may be pursued in the courts of the United States in any district
into which the property so seized may be taken and proceedings instituted ;
and such courts shall have and entertain as full jurisdiction over the same as if
the seizure was made in that district.
Approved July 13, 1861.
AN ACT supplementary to an act approved on the thirteenth July, eighteen hundred and
sixty-one, entitled "An act to provide for the collection of duties on imports, and for
other purposes."
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United-
States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury,
in addition to the powers conferred upon him by the act of. the thirteenth July,
eighteen hundred and sixty-one, be, and he is hereby, authorized to refuse a
clearance to any vessel or other vehicle laden Avith goods, wares, or merchandise,
destined for a foreign or domestic port, whenever he shall have satisfactory reason
to believe that such goods, wares, or merchandise, or any part thereof, whatever
may be their ostensible destination, are intended for ports or places in possession
or under control of insurgents against the United States ; and if any vessel or
other vehicle for which a clearance or permit shall have been refused by the
Secretary of the Treasury, or by his order, as aforesaid, shall depart or attempt
to depart for a foreign or domestic port without being duly cleared or permitted ,
such vessel or other vehicle with her tackle, apparel, furniture, and cargo,
shall be forfeited to the United States.
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That whenever a permit or clearance is
granted, for either a foreign or domestic port, it shall be lawful for the collector
of the customs granting the same, if he shall deem it necessary, under the cir
cumstances of the case, to require a bond to be executed by the master or the
owner of the vessel, in a penalty equal to the value of the cargo, and with
sureties to the satisfaction of such collector, that the said cargo shall be delivered
at the destination for which it is cleared or permitted, and that no part thereof
TESTIMONY. 607
shall be used in affording aid or comfort to any person or parties in insurrection
against the authority of the United States.
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the Secretary of the Treasury be,,
and he is hereby, further empowered to prohibit and prevent the transportation,
in any vessel or upon any railroad, turnpike, or other road or means of trans
portation within the United States, of any goods, wares, or merchandise, of
whatever character, and whatever may be the ostensible destination of the same,,
in all cases where there shall be satisfactory reasons to believe that such goods,
wares, or merchandise are intended for any place in the possession or under the
control of insurgents against the United States ; or that there is imminent
danger that such goods, wares, or merchandise will fall into the possession or
under the control of such insurgents; and he is further authorized, in all cases
where he shall deem it expedient so to do, to require reasonable security to be
given that goods, wares, or merchandise shall not be transported to any place
under insurrectionary control, and shall not, in any way, be used to give aid or
comfort to such insurgents ; and he may establish all such general or special
regulations as may be necessary or proper to carry into effect the purposes of
this act ; and if any goods, wares, or merchandise shall be transported in viola
tion of this act, or of any regulation of the Secretary of the Treasury, estab
lished in pursuance thereof, or if any attempt shall be made so to transport
them, all goods, wares, or merchandise so transported or attempted to be trans
ported shall be forfeited to the United States.
SEC. 4. And l>e it further enacted, That the proceedings for the penalties
and forfeitures accruing under this act may be pursued, and the same may be
mitigated or remitted by the Secretary of the Treasury in the modes prescribed
by the eighth and ninth sections of the act of July thirteenth, eighteen hundred
and sixty-one, for which this act is supplementary.
SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That the proceeds of all penalties and
forfeitures incurred under this act, or the act to which this is supplementary,
shall be distributed in the manner provided by the ninety-first section of the
act of March second, seventeen hundred and ninety-nine, entitled "An act to.
regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage."
Approved May 20, 1862.
No. 52.
Special order concerning trade on the Mississippi river, below Memphis, pro
mulgated by the Treasury Department, in conjunction with the military com
mander.
HEADUUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
Memphis, Tennessee, September 8, ]862.
Until trade shall be regularly opened with ports and places on the Mississippi
river below Memphis, all commercial intercourse between this city and Helena,
and with intermediate points, will be under joint military and civil jurisdiction,
and be governed by the following regulations, the object being, while guarding
against the conveyance of supplies, of whatever description, to individuals or
bands in armed or other hostility to the government of the United States, not
to deny their usual family and plantation supplies to persons who have refused
or declined to engage in or otherwise promote the existing rebellion.
I. All permits shall be issued by the board of trade in Memphis, and no mer
chandise, which is not so permitted, shall be received on board of any steamboat
or other vessel or vehicle engaged in the business of common carriers, except
army supplies, moving under military authority.
608 TESTIMONY.
II. Merchandise needed for family and plantation supply, (not including arms
and ammunition,) will be permitted by the board of trade to persons residing on
either side of the Mississippi river, between Memphis and Helena, or at Helena
and its neighborhood, who have not taken any active part in the rebellion them
selves, or directly or indirectly, by connivance or assent, aided or encouraged
those who have. Such supplies, however, must go forward from time to time,
in limited quantities ; and before the delivery of the first the recipient will be
required to appear in person at either Memphis or Helena, and make affidavit,
before a proper officer, that no part of the supplies so delivered shall be sold, or
otherwise disposed of, to other parties, or used in any manner or for any purpose
whatever, except for the consumption of his or her plantation laborers.
III. For the purpose of guarding against the abuse of this privilege, and of
detecting attempts to evade or violate its terms, a list of persons of the character
above described, residing or having their plantations within the district of country
named, and who have remained at their usual places of residence, attending to
their legitimate business, will be prepared at as early a period as practicable for
the use of the board of trade. This list will, at all times, be subject to revision,
that proper names Avhich, at first, may be omitted, may be added to it, and im
proper ones, enrolled through misrepresentation, be erased.
IV. For the present, and until otherwise provided, all this special transporta
tion will be committed to a single steamboat, to be selected by the board of trade,
the master of which shall execute bond, with a reasonable security, that he will
not deliver any package of merchandise, or any part thereof, at any place other
than that for which it shall have been duly permitted. And such boat shall
carry, and reasonably remunerate, a revenue aid, to be appointed subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, whose scope of duties shall be the
same as those of similar officers on boats engaged in the St. Louis and Memphis
trade.
V. The bar of this boat, and of all other boats running upon the waters
within the district prescribed, shall carry among its stores no intoxicating liquors
for sale or barter along the coast, and shall be immediately closed upon arriving
at any port or place where the drinking saloons have been closed by either civil
or military authority.
VI. All lots of cotton, horses, mules, or wagons shipped north from the lower
Mississippi must be accompanied by the bills of sale, witnessed by at least two
witnesses, and duly receipted at the time of delivery to the purchaser.
VII. These regulations are at all times subject to change or revocation by the
authority that establishes them.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major General, Commanding 5th Division.
W. D. GALLAGHER,
Special Agent Treasury Department.
No. 53.
Special instructions to collector at Baltimore concerning restrictions on trade.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
September 22, 1862.
SIR : All special permits addressed to you, authorizing shipments of goods to
places in those sections heretofore declared to be in insurrection, are hereby
revoked. Parties holding them will be referred by you to this department.
In your action under the regulations concerning internal and coastwise inter-
TESTIMONY. 609
course, promulgated August 28, 1862, you will pay strict attention to the bound
ary lines therein described, and you will grant no permit or clearance for ship
ments of goods to the sections specified until all parties interested or concerned
in the proposed shipment shall have taken the prescribed oath of allegiance to
the government of the United States. This you will regard as applying to
each individual member of the firm from whom the goods may be bought, or
proposing to make the shipment, whether as principals or agents, and the owner,
master, or agent of the means of transportation proposed to be used, as well as
the consignee or prospective recipient of the goods proposed to be shipped.
In granting permits or clearances for shipments to the eastern shore of Mary
land, you will exercise the greatest vigilance to prevent, either by the frequency
of permission or by the great quantity desired at any one shipment, a larger
amount of goods or supplies reaching any one person than is reasonably pre-
'sumed to be sufficient for home consumption.
Very respectfully,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
HENRY W. HOFFMAN, Esq.,
Collector, fyc., Baltimore, Maryland.
No. 54.
Order imposing additional restrictions on the trade with Kentucky and Ten
nessee west of the Cumberland river.
CINCINNATI, Ohio, September 22, 1862.
SIR : The present condition of the country bordering on the Tennessee and
Cumberland rivers and on the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad renders it
necessary to suspend all permits to trade there at present. You will, therefore,
grant no permits, whatever, for any shipment of merchandise to points or places
upon either of said rivers or down said railroad below Columbus, until notified
of a relaxation of this rule.
You will allow no salt to leave your place for Tennessee or any part of Ken
tucky in the valley of the Cumberland river, or west thereof, for sale, nor
more to any one person than is absolutely necessary for his own use. All other
merchandise that can be used by the rebels you will restrict to very small
quantities at any one time.
Very respectfullv,
THO. HEATON,
Special Agent Treasury Department.
The foregoing instructions were sent to surveyors in the districts under super
vision of Thomas Heaton, special agent, and William P. Mellen, special agent.
They were approved by the Secretary of the Treasury by letter to Mr. Heaton,
dated October 4, 1862.
No. 55.
Order restricting trade on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad.
CINCINNATI, Ohio, September 24, 1862.
SIR : In accordance with the spirit and letter of the regulations promulgated
by the Secretary of the Treasury on the 28th of August ultimo, you will not
Part iii 39
610 TESTIMONY.
allow any goods, wares, or mechandise to be shipped over the Baltimore and
Ohio railroad unless accompanied by a permit issued from your office ; and you
will, in every respect, conform your action to the requirements of the regula
tions referred to ; anything contained in previous orders or instructions to the
contrary notwithstanding.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
THO. HEATON,
Special Agent Treasury Department.
THOMAS HORNBROOK, Esq.,
Surveyor of Customs, Wheeling, Virginia.
Approved by the Secretary of the Treasury October 4, 1862.
No. 56.
Order restricting trade between Parkersburg and Point Pleasant, in Western
Virginia.
WHEELING, Virginia, September 25, 1862.
SIR : As the section of country between Parkersburg and Point Pleasant, in
Western Virginia, is at present under insurrectionary control, you will allow no
goods, wares, or merchandise to leave your city destined for that section, which
are intended for sale; but family supplies in such limited quantities as you
may regard necessary for personal use and consumption may be permitted.
Very respectfully,
THO. HEATON,
Special Agent Treasury Department.
THOMAS HORNBROOK, Esq.,
Surveyor of Customs, Wlieeling, Virginia.
Approved by the Secretary of the Treasury October 4, 1862.
No. 57.
Further instructions to the acting collector at New Orleans, relative to'trade
below the city.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, October I, 1862.
gIR. #####*:*####
You are now further authorized to permit the unlading of vessels, on arrival
at points below the city, on such vessels being duly entered at New Orleans,
exercising the same care as in case of shipments from the points in question,
and detailing an inspector to supervise the discharge of the cargo, in each case ;
provided, that all extra expense consequent upon the unlading at such points
shall be borne by the parties interested.
I am, &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
GEO. S. DENISON, Esq.,
Special Agent and Acting Collector, New Orleans, La.
TESTIMONY. 611
No. 58.
p
Communication to the Secretary of State as to the effect of Treasury regulations
upon trade in and exportation of cotton and other products of the insurrection
ary sections, to which is annexed letter from Wm. P. Mellen, special agent,
of September 26, 1862, in relation to the cotton trade of the southwest, $c., and
the reply of the Secretary of the. Treasury of October 1, 1862.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, October 1, 1862.
SIR: I have carefully reviewed the regulations concerning internal and coast
wise intercourse, to which Mr. Stuart refers, in his "private memorandum" to
which you have invited my attention.
There is nothing in those regulations which conflicts with a very free export
of cotton from all places in which it is grown, through ports of the United States ;
unless it be found in regulation II, which forbids the transportation of coin and
bullion into insurrectionary districts and payments for cotton and other merchan
dise within them, in gold or silver.
This regulation was adopted upon considerations of policy, affecting mainly
citizens of the United States. If abrogated as to subjects of other powers, it
must, of course, be abrogated altogether. It can, at most, occasion but a slight
inconvenience to purchasers, whether American or foreign ; for they can easily
convert gold or silver designed for the purchase of cotton into United States
notes or the notes of banks of the United States, or can deposit it with any
bank or firm in any city of the United States and make their own bills on such
deposits. With these notes or bills purchases may be made to any extent that
military exigencies will permit.
If you are of opinion, however, that any implication has arisen from the acts
of our generals or from assurances of your own, which would make the enforce
ment of this order a ground for the imputatien by foreign powers of any willing
ness, however slight, to disappoint expectations reasonably excited, it shall be
suspended.
To show you how entirely unfounded every suspicion that any disposition
exists in any branch of the government to abridge, beyond actual necessity, the
freedom of purchasing cotton or other products of the rebel States, I enclose a
copy of a letter from Mr. Mellen, one of the special agents of this department,
with a copy of my reply. It is my wish to have just as much cotton, rice, sugar,
and tobacco brought out of the insurrectionary States as possible, without too
sejious injury to the general interests of our own and other countries, by increas
ing the resources of the rebels, and thus prolonging the war.
The regulations and action of this Department are inspired by this wish ; but
the interests involved in the suppression of the rebellion are, of course, para
mount to the temporary advantages to flow from an increase, necessarily limited
until the war shalf be ended, of the supply of the products referred to.
With great respect, &c., &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secrethry of the Treasury.
Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.
Cotton trade in the Southwest.
[Letter from Special Agent William P. Mellen, Esq.]
CINCINNATI, Ohio, September 26, 1862.
SIR : Mr. Gallagher and I do not understand alike as to our duties of inquiring
into the antecedents of cotton offered for shipment at any port with which com
merce is opened.
612 TESTIMONY.
I do not understand that I am to investigate the morals of transactions con
nected with any lot of cotton previous to its shipment from any port where our
official duties are exercised, nor how it got there even, nor whence it came from,
nor who raised or owned it, except, possibly, as far as may be necessary to learn
whether it is liable to confiscation ; and, if even this inquiry be made, it is
doubtful whether much, if any, of the cotton we get, if the title be followed
back to the original owner, will escape liability under the confiscation act.
As strong a case as I know of against my construction of my official duty,
occurred here a short time ago, viz : Five negroes, formerly slaves in Western
Tennessee, who had performed valuable service in a regiment of sappers and
miners, came here with a letter from the colonel of the regiment certifying the
fact, and brought with them, under his certificate of approval, a few bales of
cotton formerly belonging to their masters. It had been shipped from Columbus,
via Cairo, in conformity with the regulations of the Treasury Department. Was
it my official duty to have inquired into the history of that cotton, or how they
had earned or paid for it, or by what means they had become possessed of it ?
It is charged, and possibly true, that negroes and military men about Helena
and elsewhere become possessed of considerable lots of cotton improperly. But
it seems to me that the official duty of those supervising the commerce of the
country does not require them to ascertain whether the negroes take the* money
back to their masters or how military officers become possessed of it. This is
the business of magistrates, or others, it seems to me.
My understanding is, that when cotton is offered for shipment, in a regular
way, if the shipment is proper we have no further official duty.
I hope for your immediate instructions on the subject.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WILLIAM P. MELLEN,
Special Agent.
Hon. S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
Foregoing letter of Mr. Mellen was replied to by the Secretary on the 1st of
October, 1862, q. v.
Morals of cotton transactions anterior to regular shipment not a proper question
for officers of the Treasury Department to determine.
[Reply to letter of William P. Mellen, of September 26, 1862.]
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, October 1, 1862.
SIR : I have received your letter of the 26th ultimo, wherein you state that
Mr. Gallagher and yourself do not understand alike your duties in regard to the
" inquiring into the antecedents of cotton offered for shipment at any port with
which commerce is open," and ask for instructions from this department on the
subject.
I concur, generally, in the opinion held by you, and approve your action.
All cotton, or other produce, arriving under proper authority at ports open to
commerce, will be treated alike, and it is not competent for any officer of this
department to inquire into or decide upon the morals of transactions connected
with it previous to its shipment from any port within the limits of their official
duties.
It is, of course, not within my wishes to countenance any evasion of the
confiscation act, or within my power to exempt any property from its operation.
It is only to caution the officers of the department against unnecessarry inter-
TESTIMONY. 613
ruption of commerce, and unnecessary interference with private business. To
warrant any action against cotton, or other products, as confiscated, there must
be clear and satisfactory evidence of liability.
Should any cases arise involving the detention or seizure of cotton, or other
produce, so arriving, they will be promptly reported to this department.
I am, &c., &c.,
S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
WILLIAM P. MELLEN, Esq.,
Special Agent, Cincinnati, Ohio.
No. 59.
Rules governing trade in Tennessee, adopted by Major General Grant, upon
the suggestion of Wm. P. Mcllen, esq., special agent Treasury Department,
October 4, 1862.
1st. All district and post commanders are to observe the order of the War
Department of August 28, 18G2, and not to interfere with any shipment or
transportation of cotton or other merchandise moving under regulations of the
Treasury Department.
2d. Under Section VIII of treasury regulations, the commandants of the
posts at Memphis, Jackson, Corinth, and Bolivar, are authorized to recommend
parties in their respective districts for permits to ship liquors, &c., for general
purposes.
3d. All post commanders may recommend persons within their commands to
receive liquors, &c., for their individual use.
4th. All packages for soldiers or officers within any post command, to be for
warded to the commandant thereof for delivery.
5th. No military goods or other thing intended for sale to officers and soldiers
of the army are to be permitted to go into any military post except under
permits to sutlers.
*********
WILLIAM P. MELLEN,
Special Agent.
The foregoing rules were approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, by
letter dated October 13, 1862.
No. 60.
Additional rules restricting trade in the west and south.
The following rules or instructions were addressed to all the surveyors in the
western collection districts on the 23d October, 1862, adopted by all the special
agents, and were approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, by letter to
William P. Mellen, esq., dated October 28, 1862.
CINCINNATI, Ohio, October 23, 1862.
SIR : On and after the first day of November next you will please observe
the following rules in addition to those now in force as to shipments from your
port, viz :
614 TESTIMONY.
1st. The restrictions upon internal commerce, under the regulations of the
Secretary of the Treasury of August 28, 1862, are extended so as to embrace
all the counties on the north side of the Ohio river, bordering thereon, below
Evansville. All shipments of merchandise to any place in the counties named
must be subject to permits under the same regulations as if made to places on
the south side of the Ohio river.
2d. No goods shall be permitted to go to Ford's Ferry or Cave in Rock, nor
to the vicinity of those places, for sale there, except upon the recommendation
of John Mitchell.
3d. No goods shall be permitted to go to any place on the south side of the
Ohio river, Jbelow Henderson, except upon the satisfactory evidence that the
person to whom they are permitted to go is a reliable friend of the government
of the United States.
4th. No goods shall be permitted to go to any place in the valley of the
Cumberland river, nor to any place in Kentucky or Tennessee west of the river,
for sale, except to Smithland, Paducah, Columbus, and Hickman, except as
follows, viz: permits may be granted for snipments for purposes of sale to
Maysfield, Kentucky, upon the recommendation of the surveyor of Paducah,
and subject to his supervision upon arrival thereof at Paducah ; to Jackson,
Tennessee, and Trenton, Tennessee, upon the recommendation of the respective
commandants of those posts, whose personal signatures to such recommendation
shall in all cases be required before permit can be granted.
5th. Shipments of boots, shoes, leather, salt, hats, caps, ready-made clothing,
woollen goods, blankets, tanner's oil, lard oil, or other material that can be used
for lubricating purposes, to any place or section where there has recently been
or is in danger of being a rebel raid or robbery must be restricted to such small
quantities as are necessary for the immediate use of the loyal people of the
neighborhood to which the shipment is to be made, and in no case amounting
in the aggregate to over three hundred dollars ($300.)
6th. All shipments to military posts of military goods, or other things intended
for sale to the soldiers and officers, may duly be permitted upon the certificate
of the respective commanders thereof that such shipment is desired by them.
* * # * # * * # *
WILLIAM P. MELLEN,
Special Agent Treasury Department.
No. 61.
Regulations restricting trade north of the Potomac.
PHILADELPHIA, Pa., November 3, 1862.
SIR : After the receipt hereof you will please to observe the following rule,
in addition to those now in force, as to shipments and transportation from your
port:
The restrictions upon internal commerce, under the regulations of the Secre
tary of the Treasury of August 28, 1862, are extended so as to embrace all
the counties in Maryland on the north side of the Potomac, bordering thereon,
west of Baltimore, and all that portion of the counties of Adams and Franklin,
in Pennsylvania, south of the parallel of Gettysburg.
All transportation of merchandise to any place in the districts thus restricted
must be subject to permits under the same regulations as if made to places in
Maryland, south of the Washington and Annapolis railroad. Packages sent
to officers and soldiers of the army by their friends are excepted from this
restriction.
TESTIMONY. 615
Shipments of boots, shoes, leather, tanner's oil, salt, hats, caps, ready-made
clothing, woollen goods, and blankets, to any place within the districts above
named should be carefully guarded, and restricted in quantities to the supply of
the neighborhoods to which they are sent for the necessary and immediate use
thereof.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. P. MELLEN,
Special Agent Treasury Department.
The foregoing rules were sent to the various collectors immediately interested
in this trade — Baltimore, New York, and Philadelphia.
The same were approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, by letter of the
5th November, 1862, to William P. Mellen, esq.
No. 62.
Instructions relative to trade on the Kanawha river.
GALLIPOLIS, Ohio, November 8, 1862.
SIR : You will require every steamboat departing from this port for Charles
ton, Virginia, on the Kanawha river, or points above that place, to exhibit to
you a true manifest of its cargo, and obtain a clearance before proceeding on its
voyage.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS HEATON,
Special Agent Treasury Department.
WILLIAM NASH, Esq.,
Aid to the Revenue, Gallipolis, Ohio.
The above instructions were approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, by
letter to Thomas Heaton, esq., dated November 15, 1862.
No. 63.
Restrictions on trade on the north side of the Ohio river.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, November 5, 1862.
gTR: * * * * * * * *
You are hereby authorized to apply such restrictions on trade with points on
the Ohio side of the river as are now imposed on trade with places on the oppo
site side, making such exceptions as you think proper, and sending, for my
616 TESTIMONY.
approval, such specific instructions as you may issue on the subject under this
letter.
I am, &c., &c.,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
THOMAS HEATON, Esq.,
Special Agent, Cincinnati, Ohio.
MEMORANDUM. — These restrictions were modified by Mr. Heaton December
12, 1862, q. v. The above letter was in reply to suggestions of Mr. Heaton in
letter not on file.
No. 64.
Restrictions on trade in Maryland.
The several portions of Maryland, lying on the Chesapeake bay, were
divided into eleven districts, for which "boards of trade" were appointed, and
to each of which the following letter of appointment and instructions was
delivered :
BALTIMORE, Maryland, November 25, 1862.
GENTLEMEN : You have been appointed, by direction of the Secretary of the
Treasury, a " board of trade," for all that part of county, Maryland,
lying south of the parallel of , and north of the parallel of .
You are appointed for the purpose of supervising the trade of the district
named, in such a manner as wih1 prevent supplies going thence to rebels, caus
ing no more inconvenience to loyal citizens, in so doing, than may be necessary
to insure the desired end.
On and after the 15th day of December next, no permit will be granted by
any officer of the customs to ship merchandise to any place in said district,
except on presentation to him of your certificate, or that of a similar board in
an adjoining district, that he has taken the oath herewith enclosed, (usual ;)
and that you are satisfied that no part of the goods to be permitted will be so
disposed of as to give aid and comfort to the enemy.
A memorandum of the articles wanted must be presented to you, stating the
estimated quantities and values thereof. You must write across the face of this
memorandum, " Approved," and sign your names to it, and attach it to your
certificate. You must date your approval, indorsed on the memorandum and
the certificate of the same day, that frauds may not be practiced by attaching
certificates and memorandums that do not belong together.
It does not follow that, because a man takes the oath, he shall be entitled, as
a matter of course, to your certificate ; this is left to your sound discretion ;
you should be satisfied, by his daily conduct, that he is a loyal man, and will
act in good faith.
You should be careful, also, to restrict the amounts which you certify for, so
that there may be at no time within your district more goods than are required
for the proper use and consumption of the people thereof.
You will please notify the people of your district, as soon and as generally
as you can, of your appointment and its object ; and that, after the date named,
TESTIMONY. 617
they will not be permitted to take merchandise there without your certificate
as above.
(Printed blanks for affidavits and certificates will be found at the custom-house
in Baltimore. If you will send for them by some of your neighbors, who are
coming up here, you can get what you need.)
As your office is without compensation, you can charge twenty-five cents for
each affidavit.
All officers of the customs are informed of your appointment and of the pur
pose of it, and will be governed in their action by your certificates.
You will please to communicate with me, from time to time, as to any matters
connected with your duties. You will address me at Washington city, in care
of Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.
Very respectfully,
WM. P. MELLEN,
Special Agent Treasury Department.
MEMORANDUM. — The foregoing boards of trade, each consisted of two per
sons.
The collectors of customs of Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York were
notified of the above rules, and of the appointment of the several Boards of
Trade, and their respective districts.
The restrictions, thus arranged by Mr. Mellen, were approved by the Secre
tary of the Treasury on the 5th December, 1862.
No. 65.
Board of Trade at Memphis dissolved.
NOTICE.
The Board of Trade for the city of Memphis is hereby dissolved. All com
mercial matters heretofore transacted by that board will receive attention, until
the surveyor of the port is duly commissioned, by
THOS. H. YEATMAN,
Special Agent Treasury Department.
MEMPHIS, Tennessee, December 2, 1862.
The foregoing notice of dissolution of Board of Trade of Memphis was ap
proved by the Secretary of the Treasury on the 16th day of December, 1862.
No. 66.
Circular relating to trade below Memphis, issued by Thomas H. Ycaiman, esq.,
special agent.
SPECIAL AGENCY, TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
Memphis, Tennessee, December 12, 1862.
In pursuance of instructions and regulations by the honorable Secretary of
the United States Treasury, August 28, 1862, referring to certain acts of Con
gress approved July 13, 1861, and May 20, 1862, authorizing " special agents
618 TESTIMONY.
of the department to temporarily extend restrictions to places in their respec
tive districts, and make such local rules to be observed therein as may from
time to time become necessary, promptly reporting their action to the Secretary
of the Treasury for his sanction or disapproval."
Now, in accordance with the authority and with the consent of the military
and naval commanding officers, clearances will be granted for steamboats to pass
down the Mississippi river, as far as within ten miles of the mouth of White
river, with permitted goods, not of a contraband character, and intended only
for family supplies ; the delivery thereof to be supervised by the revenue .aid,
and receipted for on oath by the parties receiving the same, that they will not
be used directly or indirectly for any other purpose, and receive in exchange
cotton.
1 In all cases it will be distinctly understood, by parties making such an ad
venture, that no reclamation will be acknowledged, by the government of the
United States, for any loss of boat or cargo by persons in insurrection ; and,
furthermore, boats making the trip will be required to give bond in double the
amount of their value for their return to Helena or Memphis ; and an additional
bond of twenty thousand dollars that no goods, of any kind whatever, shall be
landed from said boat which are not fully set forth on her manifest and bills
permitted by the proper authorities. Aids and other loyal citizens will report
the name of any persons or boats paying out gold, or other articles of contra
band, in exchange for cotton.
THOS. H. YEATMAN,
Special Agent Treasury Department.
No. 67.
Restrictions an trade on the north side of the Ohio river modified.
PITTSBURG, Penn., December 12, 1862.
SIR : The order in regard to restrictions on trade to places on the north side
of the Ohio river is so far modified as not to require permits for shipments to
such places of general merchandise, and imposing restrictions only on shipments
of powder, lead, shot, percussion-caps, or other munitions of war, and also on
quinine, chloroform, quicksilver, and morphine.
Very respectfully, &c.,
THO. HEATON, Special Agent.
Hon. S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
MEMORANDUM. — The foregoing notice of restrictions, &c., was approved by
the Secretary of the Treasury December 19, 1862.
No. 68.
Trade below Helena, Arkansas, prohibited; no trade opened below Memphis.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, December 16, 1862.-
SIR : I have received your letter of the 4th instant, informing me that, with
the consent of certain military officers, you are permitting family supplies to go
below Helena, to be exchanged for cotton.
TESTIMONY. 619
Your action in the premises is not approved. No trade has been opened be
low Memphis with the sanction of this department; and no new sections can
be opened to trade except upon the agreement of all the special agents exer
cising concurrent jurisdiction, or, should they fail to agree, by direction of the
Secretary of the Treasury. You will therefore grant no permission for any
section of country not thus regularly opened to trade.
Respectfully,
S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
THOS. H. TBATMAN, Esq.,
Special Agent, Memphis, Tennessee.
No. 69.
Order suspending trade with points in Kentucky and Tennessee.
CINCINNATI, Ohio, December 22, 1862.
SIR : Until further notice you will not permit any goods to points on the Mo
bile and Ohio railroad south of Columbus, Kentucky ; nor up the Cumberland
river above Southland.
Very respectfully,
DAVID G. BARNITZ,
Special Agent Treasury Department.
WARREN THORNBERRY, Esq.,
Surveyor, Paducah, Kentucky.
Letters of same tenor sent to the other surveyors.
The foregoing order was approved by the Secretary of the Treasury on the
16th December, 1862.
No. 70.
Modification of restrictions upon trade in salt, in Kentucky, directed.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, January 24, 1863.
SIR : It is represented to the department that the restrictions at present im
posed upon shipments of salt into Kentucky are onerous and unnecessary.
You will therefore, as soon as practicable after the receipt of this letter, confer
with Special Agent Barnitz, and ascertain and report to the department, as early
as possible, whether the restrictions now in relation to shipments of salt into Ken
tucky may be removed, and that article placed upon the same footing as other
merchandise ; and to what extent they may, with safety, be removed or modi
fied. Also, whether such removal or modification could apply to the whole
State or only certain portions or sections thereof, which you will please desig
nate.
Very respectfully,
GEO. HARRINGTON,
Acting Secretary of the Treasury.
THO. HEATON, Esq.,
Special Agent, Cincinnati, Ohio.
620 TESTIMONY.
No. 71.
Conditions upon which trade with Helena, Arkansas, is opened.
The only places on the Mississippi, between Memphis and Cairo, to which
merchandise can be permitted to go, for sale, are Columbus, Hickman, and New
Madrid. Permits to all other places can only be granted for strictly family
supplies, upon the personal application of the party who is to use them, and
upon his affidavit that they are for his own use, and shall not be sold or other
wise disposed of to other parties, and that he is loyal to the government of the
United States, and will in all things so deport himself.
It is agreed that trade with Helena, Arkansas, shall be opened from the 1st
of January, 1863, subject to the following conditions, viz :
1. Permits may be granted to ship merchandise to that place only upon the
recommendation of the Board of Trade, to be at once appointed there by the
special agent of the Treasury Department at Memphis.
2. Persons residing on or near the river, between Memphis and Helena, may
have permits for strictly family supplies for their own use ; but all applications
for such permits must be made in person by the party who is to use them to
the surveyor at Memphis or Board of Trade at Helena, and the permits granted
must be subject to compliance with any military orders pertaining to the place
of destination.
The foregoing rules were submitted by David G. Barnitz, esq., special agent
of the Treasury Department, on the 12th day of January, 1863, after having
been agreed upon by the several special agents having co-ordinate supervision
over the trade on the western rivers, and were approved by the Secretary of the
Treasury, by letter to Mr. Barnitz, dated January 20, 1363.
COMMUNICATING COUNTERSIGN TO THE ENEMY.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
February 11, 1862.
Mr. F. A. CONKLING submitted the following, which were adopted :
Whereas, it is asserted, on authority worthy the notice of this House, that
the countersign of the army was in possession of the rebel pickets, on the west
side of the Potomac, before it had been communicated to our men, on the day
the Pensacola ran the gauntlet of the river batteries ; -and whereas it is also
asserted that information of the movement of the national army and fleets is
frequently communicated in advance to the enemy, under circumstances which
justify a suspicion of treachery on the part of persons in the civil or military
service ; therefore —
Resolved, That the joint committee on the conduct of the war be requested,
at their earliest convenience, to investigate these charges and report such action
in the premises as the circumstances shall warrant.
Attest : EM. ETHEEJDGE, Clerk.
TESTIMONY. 621
WASHINGTON, March 4, 1862.
Lieutenant Colonel J^RANK S. FISKE sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. I am Lieutenant Colonel of the 2d New Hampshire regiment.
Question. Where are you stationed ?
Answer. In General Hooker's division, below Matawoman creek, near Budd's
Ferry.
Question. Please state what you know about the enemy obtaining possession
of our countersign on any occasion ?
Answer. I was told by a staff officer, whose name I do not now remember, I
> think about the 8th of February, that the afternoon previous, our pickets had
reported to the officer of the picket that the enemy had cried out the counter
sign to them across the river before they had received it.
Question. What time is this countersign given out ?
Answer. The orders were that the brigade officer of the day should report to
brigade headquarters at four o'clock in the afternoon and receive the counter
sign. The pickets reported to their officers that they had received the counter
sign from the enemy before that time.
Question. So the enemy announced the countersign about the time it was
given out ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; a little before.
Question. What other information did they have ?
Answer. Lieutenant Ellis, the signal officer there, told me that he heard the
enemy give the countersign. He was in my tent the next morning, and said it
was the subject of general conversation among the officers there. He said he
heard the enemy give it.
Question. What was the countersign on that occasion ?
Answer. " Chippeway."
Question. What did the enemy say in regard to it ?
Answer. This was the day when the Pensacola was expected down. That
is another fact. That was one reason why some supposed it might have been
taken from the telegraph wire. The information was telegraphed down to our
division that the Pensacola would come down that night, what they cried out
was : " The Pensacola is coming down to-night, isn't she ? Damn her, we
are ready for her. We have got your countersign — Chippeway."
Question. And both particulars were correct 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What is the mode of giving out these countersigns 1
Answer. The mode now is, as I understand it, that one of the staff of the
brigadier general reports at division headquarters at about two o'clock in the
afternoon, and receives the countersign, and from him it is given to the brigade
officer of the day, and he gives it to the regimental officers of the guard.
Question. From whom does it come at first ?
Answer. When I was with my regiment, alone, at the station, I used to re
ceive a list of countersigns for the succeeding week, one for each day ; for
instance, for Monday, so and so ; Tuesday, so and so, and so on through the
week.
Question. Have you any theory to explain the way the enemy obtained
possession of that information, or have you any suspicion of any person who
might have given it ?
Answer. None whatever. I have always supposed that it came down the
river on the other side. It was impossible for them to get it from our side,
because there was no means of crossing there in the daytime, certainly, and no
one would shout out that information to them, because they would be heard
622 TESTIMONY.
by us. And I think we watched so closely that no signals could have been
made. ^
Question. Where were the enemy situated as from you ?
Answer. Directly opposite from us. In a still day, particularly if the weather
is a little heavy, the sentinels frequently converse across the river.
Question. How wide is the river there ?
Answer. From a mile to a mile and a quarter or a mile and a half.
Question. When did you come up from down there ?
Answer. Last Saturday.
Question. What is the condition of the army there now ?
Answer. I think it is in a very good condition, indeed. We have only one
man sick. There are nine in the hospital who are somewhat ailing, but not so
sick as to need to be taken out of their quarters. But they are in the hospital,
because the hospital is empty, and they might as well be there as in their
quarters.
Question. Have you any evidence to show whether the enemy have left on
the other side ?
Answer. I went up in a balloon the other day, and I concluded that they had
left and that they had returned. Their pickets along the shore were nearly
trebled during last week, and their encampments have reappeared ; some of them
in the same places as before, and some in different localities. They used to be
constantly firing from their batteries, but they have never done any injury at
all. We were calculating the other day the number of shots they must have
fired, and we made it out that they had fired from 8,000 to 10,000 shots since
they have been there, and no person has been injured, and no vessel has been
injured seriously.
Question. Are the ranges of the shots too long ?
Answer. The officer of the gunboats said he thought that they changed their
companies too often ; before one could learn how to manage the guns it was
changed. Another reason was that the quaility of their powder was unequal.
Question. Is there any difficulty in taking those batteries and clearing the
river ]
Answer. There would be no difficulty at all if we could land. But we could
not land near there without being exposed to a very destructive fire of canister.
There is a little promontory there, a semicircle, running out so that they could
fire up and down. They have some very good guns there. If we could once
land a force there I should think, frotn the topography of the country, they
could be driven out.
Question. Could you not land out of reach of their canister ?
Answer. There are a great many marshes and ravines over there. There
would be some difficulty in landing. If they have, as is supposed, 30,000 or
40,000 men there, it would be difficult to land up at Freestone Point, or near
there, and get down to the batteries before they could send a large force down
there to meet us.
Question. The truth is if you could drive out their army from the country
there, their batteries fall of course ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I think if we could have sent over a regiment when their
pickets were not so numerous as now, if you could have landed a regiment in
the night, you could have taken the batteries very easily. It might have been
a sharp struggle, but the result could not be doubtful.
Question. Do you know why that has not been attempted 1
Answer. I do not know.
Question. Where are those batteries located to which you refer ?
Answer. There is one at Cockpit Point, a short distance below Powell creek ;
another on Shipping Point just below Quantico creek; and there are two bat
teries on the same promontory below, which are called the Evansport batteries,
I think.
TESTIMONY. 623
PAYMASTERS, &c.
WASHINGTON, January 2, 1862.
General B. F. LARNED sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. What is your position 1
Answer. I am row paymaster general of the army.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. We wanted to find from you to what extent paymasters are re
quired in the service as it has developed itself during the last four or six months.
We thought the best information we could get would be from you.
Answer. I long since requested the President and Secretary of War to appoint
no more paymasters, for I thought I had enough. As the army is situated now
I have just about enough, but none to spare. They have to work very hard to
meet all the demands upon them, particularly as the troops are scattering.
Question. Our inquiry is in reference to paymasters ranking as majors 1
Answer. I think I have enough now to accomplish the whole payment of the
army. I do not think I have too many.
Question. Do you know how many you have now?
Answer. I think about one hundred and twenty-one additional paymasters,
and twenty-seven regulars. The law would give the President power to appoint
three hundred.
Question. That is one to every two regiments ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Are the whole of these one hundred and forty-eight men now on
duty?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Have you any data from which you can give, or can you give from
memory, how they are divided up ?
Answer. I have six on the Pacific slope ; I have about thirty in Missouri and
Leavenworth ; I have some ten in Kentucky ; about the same number in Illinois ;
and about the same number in Western Virginia; and between fifty and sixty
here, including those belonging to the expeditions.
Question. That does not embrace them all?
Answer. I give these numbers from recollection only, not undertaking to be
specific.
Question. Can you not give us from your office a statement as to where these
one hundred and forty -eight paymasters are posted?
Answer. I could in a little while.
Question. Could you do it in a day or two?
Answer. Yes, sir. We want more paymasters out west, and I am only trying
to get through this payment, which is a very fyeavy one, in order to send more
out west.
Question. From the force you have here ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. In your judgment how much can one paymaster do in the army as
it is situated upon the Potomac?
Answer. He can pay four regiments ; that is double what the law allows.
The States are constantly calling upon me to send paymasters to the regiments
they are organizing, and have organized. I have a call from Massachusetts for
624 TESTIMONY.
them, a call from Vermont, from Wisconsin, from Michigan; hence I have to
send paymasters from here in all directions to meet these demands. And some
times it embarrasses me a great deal, because they are hard at work here.
Question. Your department is so organized that these men can be detailed to
be sent anywhere 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Does each paymaster have a clerk 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What is his salary ?
Answer. They get $700 a year, and 75 cents a day for subsistence.
Question. Do they have mileage ?
Answer. No, sir ; they have their actual expenses when they travel under
orders.
Question. What is the pay of paymasters ?
Answer. I suppose you might put them down at an average of $2,500.
Question. That is exclusive of mileage ?
Answer. Yes, sir. They get mileage when they travel, as any other officer.
Question. Ten cents a mile 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Anything for subsistence 1
Answer. No, sir; except their pay.
Question. The clerks get subsistence as well as their pay?
Answer. Yes, sir; seventy five cents a day. The salary of a paymaster's
clerk is small — is considerably less than the lowest class of clerks in this city.
And it is very difficult ordinarily to get that class of men for paymaster's clerks
which we really need. We want intelligent men — men of great integrity, for
we must trust them.
Question. And men of some clerkly abilities, too, I suppose ?
Answer. Yes, sir. Some clerks are a great deal better than the paymasters
themselves. In many cases they are dependent upon their clerks.
Question. Now, in brief, what are the duties of these paymasters ? What
papers do they have to prepare ?
Answer. Whenever the muster-rolls of the regiments come in, they are placed
in the paymasters' hands. They have then to take blank pay-rolls and draw
off the names, and make up calculations of the amounts due to the men in the
regiments — each company by itself — and they then go and pay them.
Question. Do they make duplicate pay-rolls 1
Answer. Yes, sir; everything is in duplicate. He keeps one pay-roll for
himself, and sends one to my office for examination.
Question. That has to be done for every regiment in duplicate 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And that is done by himself or his clerk ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
By the chairman :
Question. And that is done every payment that is made ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How often is that ?
Answer. The whole of the troops are paid every two months. But in the
mean time a large number of these paymasters are in their offices every day pay
ing, hard at work. For instance, we have particular officers designated so as to
keep the accounts together. We have a paymaster who is assigned to paying
resigned officers. He is paying from twenty to forty and fifty officers a day,
being kept at work until 5 o'clock.
Question. He is connected with your office ?
TESTIMONY. 625
Answer. He is an additional paymaster, and we assign this matter to him in
order to keep his accounts together.
Question. His duties are discharged in your paymaster's department ?
Answer. Not necessarily.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question; Does he have any regiments to pay besides ?
Answer. No, sir; he has no time for that. Another paymaster is assigned to
paying discharged men, which amount sometimes to seventy and eighty a day ;
and you may judge that that is as much as one man can do.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. And then there is another who pays the accounts of prisoners ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
By the chairman :
Question. You say you have none now out of employ1?
Answer. No, sir. There is one man about getting his bonds whom I am ex
ceedingly anxious to send away. He has not yet furnished his bonds. The
President appointed this man — a sort of secret appointment, as I afterwards
learned — and ordered him to report to the Secretary of State.
Question. We are thus minute in our inquiries, because we are told all around
that we had more paymasters than were needed — a great supernumerary number
of paymasters, and that many of them could be dispensed with.
Answer. That is a mistake.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. If there are 160 of them, it is not a, mistake, is it, by your testi
mony here ?
Answer. That would be but one to six.
Question. I do not speak with reference to how many it would be. You say
you have enough, and if there are 160 additional paymasters, that is forty more
than you say you are using.
Answer. That is my mistake. I had got the impression that I had counted
up these officers and found that there were 121 of them; but taking the new
rolls, I think I have more. But I do not think I have 160.
By the chairman :
Question. But, more or less, you employ them all — every man 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And, of course, it is your judgment that you could not dispense
with any without injury to the service ?
Answer. I think not.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. How many regiments can one paymaster pay ?
Answer. There is a great difference in paymasters. One will pay six regi
ments while another will pay two.
Question. I mean a competent man.
Answer. They all pretend to be competent. They are very slow, timid, fear
ful that they are going to make mistakes, and will take a week to do what others
would do in two days.
Question. Then such men are not fit for the service 1
Answer. They are not the best, that is certain ; but they all think they are
competent.
Question. How many men are employed in paying discharged soldiers, offi
cers, &c.? '
Part iii — 40
626 TESTIMONY.
Answer. I am speaking of those around here, for I cannot judge of other
points. Perhaps you may say there are five here, constantly engaged, with as
much as they can do.
WASHINGTON, January 2, 1862.
E. H. BROOKS sworn and examined. (Paymaster General Larned being
present during the examination.)
By the chairman :
Question. What position do you hold ?
Answer. I am chief clerk in the paymaster general's department.
Question. Have you heard the testimony of General Larned ?
Answer. I have.
Question. Do you concur in it all 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. How long will it take a paymaster to pay a regiment 1
Answer. If he is a good one he can do it in three days.
Question. Do all that is necessary to be done ?
Answer. Yes, sir. However, that depends upon where the regiment is situ
ated. In General Hooker's division, it will take the paymaster six day3 to go
down there, pay a regiment, and come back.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Suppose it takes him six days, what has he then to do ?
Answer. In the first place, he has copies of all the allotment rolls to send or
take to the person designated to receive them. By this last law, where he has
to draw a check for every man, he must double his work.
General Larned : Certainly. Where a man could before pay a regiment in
three days, under this allotment law he cannot do it now in less than ten days.
The witness : He must use up eight check-books in paying off one regiment.
Question. If the soldiers make the allotments, how is that ?
Answer. Some of the regiments come in with the allotment rolls full ; others
have only two or three to a company.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Wh^t is a paymaster doing after he pays the regiment ?
Answer. He has just as much as he can do, after paying his regiments, going
around to pay the sick in the hospitals, &c., to make up and close his accounts
in the two months.
Question. How long do paymasters work ]
Answer. Some of them say they work all night. Others, as I see, work as
long as I do, and I leave the office at 5 o'clock.
By the chairman :
Question. You do not expect a decrease of the labor in the future 1
Answer. No, sir. The further the troops are sent from Washington the more
labor there will be. The labor increases every payment. To make the present
payment, some of the paymasters go up as far as Cumberland — go up to Gen
eral Banks's column. We take a four-horse wagon and go up there, and go
from regiment to regiment to pay the men, and it will take a week — some of
them ten days — to get through their payments.
Question. Do you concur with the paymaster general in saying that you have
enough paymasters now ?
TESTIMONY. 627
Answer. I think we could do the work with what we have.
Question. Do you think you could spare any without injury to the service 1
Answer. No, sir ; I do not, because you are increasing the work every pay
ment. But as they become more familiar with their duties they can, of course,
do more. There are certain paymasters who, this last payment, paid six regi
ments, while others could hardly get through three.
General Larned : We could very well exchange some of them ; but that is
not in our power.
The witness : We are about making a payment at Annapolis for this expe
dition that is about getting off. We expect to make that payment by the
end of this week, though we only got the rolls on Wednesday. But that is
done by extraordinary work, and a detail for the duty. We sent off, yesterday,
some eight paymasters to go to that expedition and pay it off before it sailed.
Question. We make this inquiry because we had it from what we considered
very good authority that there was quite an expense to the government, in this
matter of paymasters, that might be dispensed with without injury to the service.
Answer. I don't see it.
Question. Of course you are the one to see it, if it is so.
Answer. If there are any particular persons, we can now find out what work
they are doing. Every man that is here is charged with all the work he does.
Away from here we cannot tell exactly now ; but we can after the accounts
come in. But here we can tell, after each payment, what each man has done.
Question. We had no reference to any one in particular, but as a general
thing. We supposed that perhaps the President had been forced, by the pressure
upon him, to make more appointments than there is any necessity for. "
Answer. A great deal of this comes from men who are disposed to brag of
what they have done. Some of them come in and say: "I have paid five or
six regiments, while such a person has not done anything." Now, they do not
know that, for they do not know what that person has done.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Who appoints the paymaster's clerk 1
Answer. The paymaster himself. And I will remark here that the expenses
of a paymaster's clerk are just as much as the expenses of a paymaster himself.
By Mr. Johnson :
Question. How many regiments are there to be paid off at Annapolis ?
Answer. About seventeen regiments.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. You sent so many paymasters there in order to pay them off
rapidly, I suppose ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; we expect to pay them off in forty-eight hours.
Question. Are these men detailed on special duty, or are they subject to the
orders of the paymaster general to go to and fro as he may order ?
Answer. They are subject to the orders of the paymaster general to go where
he chooses to send them.
Question. Are there paymasters who go with expeditions, and belong to those
expeditions especially ?
Answer. There were three sent with General Sherman's expedition who will
go back again, I suppose.
Question. They came back from there ?
Answer. They have to come back for their money as a matter of course.
General Larned : You refer to using up the time between the payments.
There is one thing to be taken into consideration. We do not get the rolls and
get the money from the Treasury Department to make this payment at the end
628 TESTIMONY.
of December. We shall not accomplish it until within a day or two of the next
month, on the 28th of February. We have to wait to get our money. And we
are going to be exceedingly embarrassed now by the stoppage of specie pay
ments by the government and by the banks. We cannot get the specie to make
our change. What we are going to do I cannot imagine. It is going to em
barrass us exceedingly, unless the men agree, after receiving the even amounts
which we can pay them, to club together for the balances and put them in the
hands of the captain or some one else.
Mr. Odell : I suppose the paymaster could arrange for that by taking a little
change.
General Larned : We cannot get it ; the treasury will not give it, and the
banks will not give it. And I think it will come to compelling Congress to
use small bills.
The witness: Each regiment, at the lowest calculation, takes $1,500 in small
change.
Mr. Odell : They can manage that by four or five men clubbing together to
make an even amount.
General Lamed : They dislike very much to do that.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. (To witness.) Do your paymasters average four regiments ?
Answer. I think they do. I only speak of the army here. I cannot tell ex
actly how it is in other places.
WASHINGTON, January 21, 1862.
Captain WILLIAM WILSON sworn and examined,
By Mr. Covode :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ]
Answer. I am brigade commissary of subsistence, with the rank of captain.
Question. In what division?
Answer. In the fifth division, commanded by General Blenker.
Question. You have opportunities of knowing what is the condition of that
division as regards sobriety, &c.? Go on and state what you know about it.
Answer. I would state this : that I think there must be in that division not
less than fifteen, and probably as many as twenty-five, establishments where
they sell liquor, lager beer especially, and they all have whiskey that they sell
privately' at the same stands. But lager beer is the principal article they deal
in; that they deal out in great abundance. It is all over the division. I do
not think there is a tent in the division but what has more or less of it. All
the sutlers keep it, and the stands are crowded all the while.
Question. To what extent do they drink — so as to make them unfit for ser
vice ] .
Answer. I think if you were to pass through the division any day you will
find from one hundred to five hundred men unfit for duty.
Question. In consequence of drinking 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Officers and men ?
Answer. They are about all alike. They all drink, and drink in great abun
dance. I have occasion very frequently to go to officers to get papers signed,
and documents certified, in connexion with my post, and I frequently have to
wait an hour or two hours, perhaps longer. I have, of course, to go to the in
ferior officers to get my papers presented, and it takes them a considerable
time before they can approach their superior officers, and very frequently I
TESTIMONY. 629
am detained as much as two or three hours to get my papers to transact my
business with the brigade.
Question. Is this dissipation in the army general, or is it confined to particu
lar divisions'?
Answer. I have been a great deal through other divisions, but I have seen
nothing like that existing in any of the divisions but ours. A great many men
from other regiments and divisions come into ours to get liquor. The nine
teenth Indiana regiment is situated about a half a mile from where I am, and
I know a great many men in that regiment. In fact, I know nearly all of them ;
for I was in Camp Morton, at Indianapolis, before I came away, and I know that
many of them come over to our camp and get liquor, and go home intoxicated.
Question. They cannot get it in their own division ?
Answer. No, sir. There are men from other regiments who come there.
There are a great many troops scattered around there, and when the men get
furloughs they come into our division and get what they want.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Is there much drunkenness in the nineteenth Indiana regiment ?
Answer. I do not think they have any intoxicating liquor in that regiment.
I know the man who is the sutler there, and I am satisfied that he is a strictly
temperance man, and keeps nothing of the kind.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Do all the officers in your division keep liquor?
Answer. They all keep their wines and brandies; all of them.
Question. That is, in General Blenker's division ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do they sell liquor!
Answer. They sell it a little on the private ; they keep it and do sell it.
By the chairman :
Question. Do the sutlers make arrangements to go snacks in the profits ?
Answer. It is the presumption that the officers are all connected with the
sutlers, and make a division of the profits. That is only a presumption, how
ever, of those who have observed these things.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Do you state that the number of men thus rendered unfit for ser
vice in this division amount to 500 a day ?
Answer. 1 think it is safe to say that you can go there any day in the week
and find, on an average, 500 men in that division who you would say were unfit
for duty ; enough to put the whole division to flight on the field of battle.
Question. Do you see any remedy for this thing ?
Answer. I know of no remedy in the world that you can devise, except to
cut off liquor from officers and all ; or to break up the division, separate the
brigades and put them in other divisions with good commanders. There are
three brigades, in that division. If you were to separate them, and put them in
other divisions with good commanders, good sober officers, I think they would
make very good soldiers.
By the chairman :
Question. Who know these facts besides yourself?
Answer. There are two other commissaries there who are Americans, and
have been appointed as I have been. The soldiers are all Germans. I do not
think there are 100 Americans in the whole division. J. B. Salisbury and L.
G. Hewling are the other commissaries. They know about these matters. Mr.
Salisbury is a son-in-law of General Jesup.
630 TESTIMONY.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Who is your general ?
Answer. General Bowlin is the general of my brigade. He is a German, and
acts as brigadier general of the third brigade.
Question. General Blenker is in charge of the division ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Who are the brigadier generals 1
Answer. General Bowlin is one ; the other two I cannot give the names of.
The other commissaries can give them, as they serve under them. The briga
dier general of the second brigade, as I am told, is a sober man, and would
tladly see this thing stopped entirely. I do not know that fact myself, but Mr.
alisbury, the commissary of that brigade, tells me so.
WASHINGTON, January 29, 18C2.
Captain THORNTON SMITH sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. What is your rank and position in the army.
Answer. I am quartermaster of the Excelsior brigade, with the rank of
captain; appointed by the War Department.
Question. What do you know with regard to the administration of affairs
under General Sickles ?
Answer. Previous to my taking- charge of the brigade I was told by the
acting quartermaster who had been assigned to that dut}r by General
Sickles that I would have a great deal of trouble with that brigade; that
the general and other officers had been in the habit of getting everything*
they wanted from the quartermaster's department without requisitions. I
told him I should have no trouble at all in that respect, for they could not
have them without requisitions ; that I was going into that department with
sureties entered against me that would make me responsible. The first day
after I got there one of the general's orderlies came down for supplies without
a requisition; I told him I should not furnish them without a requisition.
That was the last of that line, and requisitions always came afterwards.
When I began to look around to find the property that had been captured
there from the rebels, I founcj^that the horse the general was riding, a very
fine white horse, bad been taken from a man of the name of Cox, and never
turned over to the quartermaster's department, as should have been done.
And Doctor Brown, surgeon of the 1st regiment, had got a horse captured
on the same expedition, which he has sold, arid has appropriated the proceeds
to his own use. And the colonel of the first regiment I think beyond a
doubt, sold me a horse for $125 that he traded two government horses for to
an Indiana cavalryman, whose name I do not know. That is the way the
horse was obtained. I paid him $125 for the horse. Lieutenant Colonel
Potter, of the 2d regiment, captured a horse down in Maryland, and sold him
to Captain Bradley, of his own regiment, and the proceeds, I presume, he
appropriated It has never been returned to the department, and I believe,
to the best of my knoweledge, that four-fifths of all the property captured
in lower Maryland has been appropriated by General Sickles and his officers
to their own private uses.
Question. What amount of property has been captured there ?
Answer. I think there was one instance of a store out of which $1,000
worth of property was taken and distributed among the officers, sutlers, &c.
Every man who could get his hand on it took it.
Question. Do you now hold the position of quartermaster there ?
TESTIMONY. 631
Answer. I do not. I was relieved from duty there because General
Sickles had a man of his own choice from New York city that he wished
to be quartermaster. I was told when I was assigned there that I could
not stay; that he would have no man in his brigade that was not pliable
enough to be used for his own purposes.
Question. Who told you that ?
Answer. A member of the brigade.
Question. Were you acting in the capacit}' of quartermaster there when
this property was captured ?
Answer. I was not. There was a person named Gerard who
acted as quartermaster at that time.
Question. Do you know whether any property that was captured has been
returned to the owners ?
Answer. Some of it has been, but a very small part of it.
Question. From whom was this property taken ?
Answer. It was taken from various men. There was one by the name of
Cox, who owns the horse that General Sickles now rides.
Question. Was he a secessionist ?
Answer. There appears to be no evidence to that effect. He still lives
there in Maryland.
Question. How was the property captured — in battle ?
Answer. No, sir; he went there and took it. A farmer will not stand
out in the face of a parcel of officers who ride up and demand these things.
Question. They took this property from the citizens, without capturing it
in battle, or anything of that sort ?
Answer. Certainly. There have been no battles there. There is one case
which I have handed over to General Meigs, of the quartermaster's depart
ment, and also a copy to the military committee of the Senate, of which
Mr. Wilson is chairman. It is the case of a bill of three hundred and odd
dollars, of citizens within three miles of that place, against General Sickles
and Colonel White, for keeping horses and boarding them, they telling him
that the bill would be paid by the quartermaster. That bill has been sworn
to, and was presented to me for payment, and there is no place where the
brigade has been but what the officers have left their individual bills in
that way. That has been the case all through that section of the country,
until the presence of the brigade is dreaded, from the fact that they take
what they want, and their individual bills are not paid. Any of them will
sign a voucher for anything to be paid for by the government. I know of
one instance where I went to get a voucher signed for sixteen cords of
wood where the first brigade was located, which I considered was the
amount of fuel burned. The fences I considered damages which should not
go into the fuel account. The colonel of the regiment, who had not paid
his individual bill, altered it from 16 to 71 cords for the destroying of the
fences, and I do not know but what it may have been to remunerate the
man for his board, which the colonel never paid for.
Question. What do the people say or do when this property is taken from
them ? Do they make complaints about it ?
Answer. They make complaints, but what redress have they ? The War
Department does not recognize or assume the individual bills of officers.
They will pay whatever belongs to the government to pay — whatever is
taken for government supplies. But if an officer or a soldier goes to a citi
zen there and compels him to board him and feed his horse, and then goes
away without paying him, the citizen has no redress as against the govern
ment.
Question. Have they entered no complaints here at the War Department
against this mode of proceeding ?
632 TESTIMONY.
Answer. I know that this man from whom I have sent a communication
here has been working- with General McClellan and the War Department
for the last four months, and he never has received a dollar. He lives at
Good Hope, where the brigade was encamped, I think, from June up to the
first of November.
Question. Do you know any more instances of delinquency on the part of
General Sickles or any of his officers ?
Answer. In this second regiment, Colonel White, who has been in com
mand of tke brigade during General Sickles's absence — and he has been
absent a month — has had charges preferred against him for drunkenness,
and various charges of that kind. The lieutenant colonel has had the same
charge preferred against him. Three of the captains are under arrest upon
various charges, and the result is that that regiment is entirely demoralized
from the fact that there is hardly an officer in it that has not been involved
in one way or another; and when you come to ascertain what the brigade is
made of, what its officers are, you find that the lieutenant colonel of the
second regiment was one of those engaged in the slaver Wanderer; another
colonel was one of those in the Lopez expedition and in the Walker Nica
ragua expedition. That class of men are all through that brigade as
officers. So that their high moral character will not sustain them very far.
Question. Do slaves come into the camp there ?
Answer. There have some come in. What have come in have been gen
erally kept and secreted. There are slaves there now. General Sickles has,
I think, six at his headquarters that he uses for his help. They were cap
tured over in Virginia. A special order came from General McClellan,
through General Hooker, to return them to the government ; but they have
never been returned,,
Question. To return them to the government ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; to send them up to Washington.
Question. Are any of these slaves ever returned to their masters ?
Answer. Not that I know of. I have not seen any that have been re
turned.
WASHINGTON, April 10, 1862.
General DANIEL E. SICKLES sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. What is your rank and position in the army, and where are you
stationed ?
Answer. I have commanded a brigade on the Lower Potomac, in the divis
ion of General Hooker, of the army of the Potomac.
Question. How long have you been stationed there ?
Answer. I have been stationed in Maryland since September last; I have
been upon the Lower Potomac since the 28th of October last. On Monday,
the 6th instant, I was relieved from my command.
Question. We have been directed by the House of Representatives to in
quire into the treatment of contrabands coming within your lines. What
has been the custom of dealing with them in your division, so far as you
know and have observed ?
Answer. I will, if you please, state my own practice first, when not acting
under orders from superior authority. My own practice has been, when con
trabands came into my lines from Virginia, crossing the river, to examine
them and obtain what information that was practicable. When I found them
intelligent and well behaved I have retained them in camp, sometimes in
TESTIMONY. 633
the quartermaster's department, sometimes in charge of suitable persons
near my headquarters, that they might be employed as scouts and gukflss.
When those belonging to, or said to belong to, persons in our own neigh
borhood, or anywhere about Maryland, came into our lines, they have been
subject to a general order issued in September last; an order having refer
ence chiefly to the police of the camp, and the exclusion of persons not em
ployed in the army; under that order they have been excluded from the
camps. Sometimes they would make their way back again, and when no
objection has been made they have been employed, in a few instances, by
officers as servants.
At first there were several applications made by persons claiming them
as their slaves, and when they were identified by their description, applica
tion has been made that they should be surrendered through the action of
officers of my command, which has been declined. Bat orders have been
sent to the commanding officers of the several camps that, if such described
persons were within the lines, they should, under the operation of the gene
ral order to which I have already adverted, be excluded from the camps, and
let whoever might have a claim to them assert that claim before the civil
tribunals of Maryland.
That is, as succinctly as I can state it, the course I have pursued in
my own command in reference to those two classes of cases, and I think we
have had no contrabands within my lines except those' from Virginia and
those from Maryland.
Question. From whence did that general order emanate to which you have '
referred ?
Answer. I will now proceed and state the orders upon the subject of con
trabands that have come from the headquarters of the army of the Potomac,
and those that have come from the headquarters of that division. I have
received no 'orders recently from the headquarters of the army of the Poto
mac. In September and October last, and perhaps as late as November, in
two or three instances orders came from the headquarters of the army of
the Potomac, directing that such and such persons, naming them, claiming
to have slaves within one of my camps, the camp being generally named,
should be permitted to search the camp and reclaim their slaves. I ad
dressed a communication in regard to the most important case that occurred,
five or six persons being claimed, stating that such steps would be likely to
lead to disorder and mischief in the camps; because in several instances
the sympathies of the men have been excited by seeing slaves, reclaimed
under such circumstances, very harshly treated. I recommended to the
headquarters of the army of the Potomac the other practice, which I have
just described as the one pursued by myself; that I should be permitted to
send the descriptions of the persons to the camps with instructions that, as
in the case of all other camp followers not claiming to belong to the army,
they should be put outside of the lines, thus relieving the military authori
ties of any action in the premises, any identification with the surrender. '
That course was acquiesced in, and I was authorized to pursue that course
in the future.
By Mr. Wright:
Question. Was that communication sent to General McClellan ?
Answer. Yes, sir; through his adjutant general.
By the chairman:
Question. How late was that order ?
Answer. I think it must have been in October. I will now pass to the
action at the division headquarters in the division to which I was assigned
634 TESTIMONY,
in October— the latter part of October, I think — since which time I have
had no direct correspondence with the headquarters of the army of the
Potomac upon the subject. When I was assigned to the division of course
my own relation was to the division commander alone. The practice of the
division has been to give to Maryland claimants — Maryland owners — letters,
partaking something of the nature of safeguards and something of the nature
of orders, to the commanding officers of brigades and regiments. I have
one in my pocket now, which will indicate the nature of the practice. The
purport of the last was this, and they are all pretty much alike: Orders
would be given to John Doe and Richard Roe to visit any of the camps in
the division, with direction to the commanding officers of the several camps
to permit those persons to pass freely through the camps to search for their
slaves, with leave, upon their identifying them, to take them away, and
with instructions that if any officer or man interfered he should be reported
to division headquarters. These orders were not promulgated through the
regular military channel, but were placed in the hands of those persons
themselves, and they bore them to the different camps.
Question. From whom did they emanate ?
Answer. From the division commander, General Hooker. My attention
was called to it in the first instance by the commanding officer of the first
regiment in my brigade. I had no official knowledge of the matter before.
It was late in February or early in March that my attention was first
formally called to an order of that kind. I gave directions that if any such
orders again came to camp the persons bearing it should be sent to me
before any steps were taken under it. Some two weeks ago, as I was visit
ing my camps for the purpose, I think, of inspecting the 3d regiment in the
bayonet exercise, as I was approaching the camp of the 2d regiment I
heard a couple of pistol shots, and, upon looking towards the quarter in
which they were fired, I saw a number of persons mounted, and one of them
firing towards the woods. I sent an officer to learn what it meant; and,
observing that a large collection of soldiers had gathered together in the
camp, I put spurs to my horse and hastened up to see what was the cause
of the excitement. As soon as I entered the camp the commanding officer
present, in response to my inquiry, informed me that a party of men were
in the camp hunting for negroes, while another party were waiting outside,
and that there was great excitement in camp in consequence. He reported
to me immediately, before I got the reply from the officer I had sent for
information, that the firing was from some of the party outside upon some
negroes who had left the camp, gone outside of the lines, and flew towards
the woods, and that the soldiers were very much exasperated, as I could
myself see. I asked by what authority these men were admitted within the
lines, and an order from General Hooker was produced, permitting nine of
them to enter the camp for that purpose. There 'were a great many more
than nine present. I should think there were some fifteen or twenty there,
all mounted, but only nine had been admitted within the lines. Three or
four of them were passing up and down the company streets, while the
others had dismounted and were examining the company quarters. I imme
diately directed the commanding officer to give orders to the officer of the
day to expel these men from the carnp, and not again permit them to enter
it; and, upon his calling my attention to the peremptory nature of the order,
and the responsibility which would be imposed upon him, I relieved him
from that responsibility and told him to report that what he did was done
by my orders, so that, of course, whatever responsibility was to be taken
about it would fall upon myself. The order was immediately obeyed, and
the men were put outside of the lines; and I gave directions that if they
should return upon that or any similar mission to say that by my directions
TESTIMONY. 635
they could not be admitted. I have heard nothing further since* that occur
rence.
Question. How long ago was that?
Answer. I should say that it was about a couple of weeks since — some
time in the latter part of March. Then there was another order, the last
one in reference to contrabands. It was a portion of the order for our
embarcation. I was directed on Sunday evening last to embark my com
mand on board transports and there wait marching orders. On Sunday
evening I got three regiments on board. On Monday, while waiting trans
ports for the other two regiments, I received an order relieving me from my
command of that brigade. What has been subsequent to that I do not
know. The part of the order for embarcation to which I refer is as fol
lows:
" Under no circumstances will officers or men having slaves, owned in the
secession States, permit them to embark with the troops, but will direct
that they be left at the depots, where they will be protected. It is in viola
tion of the laws of the land to use them for private purposes. JNor will
those having slaves owned in Maryland, for that is pillage. Commanders
of brigades will see that every part of this order is rigidly observed."
Under that order I directed the quartermaster of my brigade, Captain
Austin, as part of the duty of embarking the troops which was confided to
his superintendence, to be present at the wharf and to see that no negroes
embarked on board the vessels except the private servants of officers;
and in case others should attempt to go on board to detain them, subject to
such orders as might emanate from me or through me; either emanating
from myself, or emanating from superior authority, and communicated
from me.
Question. Who signed that order which you have read ?
Answer. It was from General Hooker, signed "William H. Lawrence, A.
D. C." After rny brigade had commenced to embark, Mr. Posey, Mr. Mason,
and several other persons, residing in that vicinity — men of known sympa
thy with the enemy, one or two of whom, Posey in particular, had been
under arrest — came down and asked permission to go on board the vessels
and search for negroes. I declined to give the permission. They then
asked permission to reclaim such as might be in the quartermaster's depart
ment, stating that they had been sent there for that purpose. But they
showed no written authority to that effect. They were among the persons
whom I had seen at the camp of the 2d regiment, and ordered to be expelled
from the camp I declined to give that permission to them, and referred
them to General Hooker. I told them that I had no orders upon that sub
ject, and could not take any action of my own authority. The following
morning I was relieved from command, and of course know nothing of what
steps may have been taken since in the matter. Captain Austin, I think, is
still at Liverpool Point; at least, my orders were for him to remain there
and see to the embarcation of the two remaining regiments, and the care
of the public property, and then to follow the troops. Perhaps, in order to
give you fully everything that bears upon the subject, I ought not to pass
over some steps and some correspondence that took place in December last,
I think, upon this subject. I had a regiment encamped lower down on the
peninsula, part of the time at Port Tobacco and part of the time at Pope's
Creek — the fifth regiment of my command — under Colonel Graham. I re
ceived several applications from citizens requesting me to issue orders to
that regiment to permit them to go in the camp and search for and take
their negroes. That neighborhood was a very strong secession neighbor
hood. It was the principal point where communication was carried on ^be
tween Maryland and Virginia, by way of Matthias Point. And the object
636 TESTIMONY.
•
of stationing the regiment there was to intercept that communication and
break it off. A number of persons who owned boats there, and were en
gaged in ferrying across, were arrested by my orders and sent to Washing
ton. And a number of negroes, employed by their masters in that business,
were taken by me and detained. Two of those negroes, belonging to Henry
Ferguson, I was directed by General Hooker to return to him. This Fergu
son was himself in Virginia when I took possession of the negroes, had
abandoned his place in Maryland and been in Virginia for some months.
And these negroes, who were very intelligent, had been, according to their
own testimony and the testimony of neighbors there, employed in ferrying
persons and goods over into Virginia from Ferguson's Point, which was
still further down the peninsula. I remonstrated against the order to give
these men up, in a written communication, in which I set forth the facts I
have stated here, and the grounds upon which they had been taken; that
they had been employed by their master in acts of disloyalty, and I thought
they should not be returned. First, because, if they were, I thought they
would be so employed again to our detriment; and, second, that if they
were to be regarded as property, I considered that they were confiscated
as property, having been used in aid of the rebellion. I requested that my
communication should be forwarded to the headquarters of the army of- the
Potomac to be considered there.
In reply, I was informed by General Hooker that his own instructions
from the headquarters of the army of the Potomac left him no discretion in
the premises, but the men must be immediately surrendered to their owner.
The owner, Mr. Ferguson, had called for them, and I had told him that I
could not act in the case at that moment, because I had addressed a commu
nication which I hoped would be forwarded to the headquarters of the army
of the Potomac, and until action was had upon it I should not proceed. , I
received General Hooker's answer, stating that his instructions left him no
discretion. I sent for the negroes, and told them I could protect them no
longer. I gave them a small gratuity, and told them to go their way. They
returned home, as I afterwards understood, and again came to my camp some
ten or twelve days ago. They stated, and their statement was corroborated
by other information that I had from different sources, that Mr. Ferguson
and several other slaveholders in that neighborhood were sending their
slaves over into Virginia to work upon the military works of the enemy on
the Rappahannock and at Richmond. I told my quartermaster to receive
those men and take care of them, and I suppose they are still with him.
Other applications were made to me by citizens in the neighborhood of Port
Tobacco, requesting me to interfere and direct the surrender of contrabands
who were in the camps, that had been, as I had been informed, taken pos
session of lest they might be similarly employed with those I have men
tioned. But I declined to interfere, for the reasons I have given, and also
because one of the residents of that neighborhood, a Mr. Samuel Cox, had
obtained possession of one of his negroes from that camp, not through any
order of mine, but through the action of one of the officers present on duty
in the camp, and had subjected him to very brutal treatment, from which, as
it was stated from very respectable authority, he had died. Those circum
stances produced a great deal of excitement and feeling in the 5th regiment,
which was located in the neighborhood, and it was not safe for any of these
claimants to go into the camps for their negroes.
Question. Do you recollect the name of the contraband said to be abused
in that way by Cox ?
Answer. I do not recollect the name. The matter has been referred to
several times in the newspapers. He belonged to this Samuel Cox, who was
in Virginia when I was first ordered into the lower part of Maryland. I
TESTIMONY. 63?
have been ordered down there twice. When I was myself in command, I
was ordered down by General McClellan to make a very thorough recon-
noissance in person of all the lower part of Maryland. That was in Sep
tember last. At that lime I was informed that Cox commanded a company
of cavalry there, and that a portion of his company had gone with him over
into Virginia.
Question. He was a secessionist ?
Answer. Yes, sir, openly and avowedly one. At that time it was ex
pected that Maryland would take part in the secession movement. The
election had not taken place in Maryland, and especially that part of the
State was in a very unsettled condition, and was there placed under mili
tary occupation. It was before the arrest of the secession legislature, all
f the members of which from that part of the State were afterwards arrested.
Uox and a number of other persons were looked after, and if we could have
found them we should have arrested them and sent them up here.' This
negro in question was one of those who had been employed by him for sim
ilar disloyal purposes as those of Ferguson's. I did not hear anything of
the circumstances of the surrender of this man to Cox until it was reported
to me in connexion with the barbarous treatment he received, and its fatal
consequences. I made inquiries of some of the neighbors, who were reputed
to be Union men, as to the truth of the occurrence, and they denied it ; they
said it was not true ; that one of Cox's men had died. They described him
to be a bad fellow, the one who had died, and said that perhaps he may
have been flogged ; but they denied that it was done by Cox himself ; for
they insisted that Cox was not there. They said that the excitement about
it they thought had proceeded to a great extent from false statements.
My course about it, however, was predicated upon the fact that the men
believed. that it had occurred. I received a sharp communication from Gen
eral Hooker, stating that a number of citizens in that part of Maryland had
complained to him that the officers of the 5th regiment would not permit
them to come within their camp and reclaim their runaways; and express
ing his surprise that any of the officers of his command should be so derelict
in their duty as to refuse them this privilege. I replied in writing, and
stated that this duty was an extremely disagreeable one; that it was very
odious to that regiment; that the men and officers were from eastern States,
some of them from New England, some from New Jersey, and some from
New York; and that the practice, if persisted in, would lead to very serious
and unpleasant events in the regiment. And stating also that under these
circumstances I had declined to issue any orders to the regiment, with the
view to either a surrender of negroes or to permit the owners to go within
the camps; and that if any further, orders were issued upon the subject the
responsibility must be assumed by higher authority than myself. And there
the matter remained from that time.
What few loyal people there were about Port Tobacco united in a written
communication to rne, speaking in the highest terms of the conduct of this
regiment; the protection it had afforded to them; the order that had been
observed about the camp; and assuming that I had authority in the matter
to order the regiment back there — this was after it had been called away —
requesting me to send the regiment back. I had no authority to do so, as I
had recalled the regiment back to Liverpool Point in pursuance to orders
from division headquarters, and there it ended.
Question. Do you remember the name of the officer who surrendered this
man to Cox ?
Answer. He was a lieutenant. This man, as I understood, was employed
as a private servant; his capture, or the possession taken of him, had not
been reported to headquarters. I had no official cognizance of the fact that
638 TESTIMONY.
he was in the camp. That officer resigned soon afterwards; he is not now
in the service. Colonel Graham, at the time, was under arrest and was in
Washington.
Colonel Graham had shortly previous to that time crossed over into Vir
ginia and scoured out Matthias Point pretty thoroughly, and had destroyed
a house there which was occupied by the enemy's pickets — some of his men
had done so. It was a house which the flotilla had shelled several times,
but had failed to set it on fire. It was a house used by the enemy for two
purposes — for the protection of their pickets, and for purposes of signal
ling. Signalling was going on all the time from the Maryland shore. The
destruction of this house was contrary to the orders from the headquar
ters of the army of the Potomac. In his official report, Colonel Graham
failed to state that it had been occupied by the enemy for military purposes,
and that was what led to his arrest. He was in Washington for some days,
arid upon his explanation of the matter he was relieved from arrest and re
turned to duty. It was in his absence that this lieutenant allowed this man
to be taken.
Question. It was stated in the papers that this negro man had given you
information as to where military stores had been secreted by the enemy ?
Answer. I have always found these contrabands very willing to tell all
they knew, and sometimes they told what they thought they knew, but what
they did not know. I could not learn that this man had ever furnished any in
formation to any officers of the 5th regiment. But it is very likely that
when I first went down in the lower part of Maryland and took the 1st
regiment down, he m&y have been one of the persons who communicated
information to the colonel of that regiment. His instructions were to look
after arms. A great many arms had been buried by the secessionists to
escape seizure, which, it was supposed, were intended to be carried over into
Virginia as rapidly as opportunity presented. Many of these arms had
been furnished by the State of Maryland soon after the John Brown affair;
and that part of the State was very thoroughly armed. Those arms were
used afterwards in the organizations got up in aid of the rebellion. Some
companies were organized there with a view to service in the State in case
Maryland seceded. When that proved abortive, as many as possible were
got over into Virginia to swell the Maryland contingent there. We searched
very faithfully for these arms, and we found a great many. Nearly all the
information we got in reference to them we got from negroes. The Union
men there had no knowledge upon the subject, or were under so much terror
that they were afraid to communicate.
Question. You speak of some higher authority in this matter ; do you
refer to General McClellan ?
Answer. The authority to which I w^fe immediately subject of course
would be my immediate commander, General Hooker; when, however, occa
sion would justify it, in a matter of any grave importance, it would be pro
per for me always to apply through him, in an open letter, to the head
quarters of the army of the Potomac, which would be the chief authority
which I could address upon the subject.
Question. Did you ever make these practices known to the headquarters
here, to General McClellan, in any communication ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. You spoke of the barbarous treatment these men had received
sometimes when they had been surrendered ; what can you state about that
more than you have already stated ?
Answer. Lieutenant Colonel Benedict reported to me one or two instances
that had come under his notice, where the Maryland owners had obtained
possession of their slaves, and would immediately set to work flogging them
TESTIMONY. 639
in view of the troops ; and the result would be that the soldiers would go
out and rescue the negro, and in some instances would thrash the masters.
That, of course, would lead to a great deal of excitement, and the result was
that it was impossible to send any communication of the kind to any of the
camps of that regiment. One or two such instances of that kind had oc
curred there. It was a regiment of excellent soldiers, but they were reso
lute, desperate men ; they were all firemen of .New York city — the 2d
'regiment of Fire Zouaves — and they came to the conclusion — without any
efforts on the part of the officers, for I think, even if they had been disposed
to exert their authority, they could not have changed it — they came to the
conclusion that they would not permit any man to come within their lines
upon a similar mission. It was because I had understood from officers and
( others that this was the sentiment of the troops that I was led, at an
"•early day, to study the question very carefully, in order to ascertain as
nearly as I could the exact limitations of my duty, and I came to this con
clusion, and it has governed my own action ever since : I came to the con
clusion that the rendition of fugitive slaves was strictly a civil proceeding.
I have always regarded it as a matter of constitutional obligation, as a civil
proceeding, and to be faithfully obeyed within that limit as a judicial pro
ceeding ; but that the civil authority could take no steps in aid of it, except
in one contingency, and that was in aid of civil process, when in the hands
of the United States marshal. I had determined in my own mind that
whenever the question should arise, so that I could present it in a proper
form, I would take that ground, await orders through the proper military
channel directing me to place an indicated amount of force at the disposal
of the United States marshal; such an order I would not have felt at liberty
to disregard; but in no other case, or under any other circumstances, would
I carry out such orders.
Question. You spoke of some orders of General Hooker directing that
certain men, who were disloyal, should be permitted to go into their camp
and search for their men.
Answer. Some of them were disloyal.
Question. Was any inquiry made as to that matter ?
Answer. No, sir; not that I know of. I know that Posey was under ar
rest in Washington for some time, for using his house as a signal station for
the enemy.
Question. Could not these men obtain all the information they desired for
the enemy, if they were allowed to go into your camps in that way ?
Answer. Yes, sir; that was the reason I assigned to Colonel Toler, and
others, in reference to these persons, that I believed them to be dangerous
as sp:es.
Question. One would suppose that General Hooker must have known that
he could not have prevented information in regard to our condition getting
to the enemy while these things were being allowed ?
Answer. The probability is, that the enemy were never at a loss to know
the exact number of the troops that we had there. The population surround
ing us was so hostile, and the means of •communicating by signal lights
across the river into Virginia, along such an extended peninsula, were so
numerous, that I suppose they were always pretty well informed; and of
course the permission to persons to go in and come out of our lines so fre
quently would be dangerous, if we, for instance, should have just received
marching orders, as we recently had oi'ders to proceed down the Potomac,
to Fortress Monroe, or anywhere else, or if we were about starting an expe
dition, a reconnoissance, or what not. We were always advised to take the
utmost precaution to prevent the enemy obtaining information; and the per-
640 TESTIMONY
mission to disloyal persons to come in and go out of our lines was liable to
very dangerous abuse in that point of view.
Question. Congress some time ago enacted an additional article of war,
making it a penal offence for officers to surrender fugitive slaves — an offence
for which, upon conviction, they were to be deprived of their offices. Has
that order been communicated to your command ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. It never has been ?
Answer. No, sir. I know of it unofficially, only, from having seen it in
the newspapers. To receive it formally I would receive it through division
headquarters.
Question. It would come that way officially?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And it never has come ?
Answer. No, sir.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. It is known in the army ?
Answer. Yes, sir, unofficially, as a newspaper fact; as we read the pro
ceedings of Congress. The regular official way is to communicate such
matters in a general order. We have never been officially notified of any
such article.
By the chairman :
Question. Is it not customary to communicate to the army an order so
important as that, one affecting so vitally the action of the officers of the
army ?
Answer. Yes, sir; promptly. Tae announcement in the public journals
that Congress had passed that article of war was very gratifying to my
command at least, for it relieved us from very great embarrassment — relieved
us from carrying out an order which ran counter to the feeling of our troops,
whose feelings were always keenly aroused whenever any of these scenes
occurred. It was rumored on board the transports where I had put three
regiments that these persons were to be sent on board on Monday with per
mission to search the transports for their people. But my officers were of
the opinion that if they came they would be thrown into the river, and that
no possible exertion of the officers could prevent it. I mention that only as
a fact to indicate the feeling of the soldiers. I have never seen an instance
in which my men failed to obey orders. Perhaps, if they had been ordered
to allow these men to search they would obey orders. But it was the opin
ion of the officers that most serious consequences would follow. At all
events, both for prudential reasons as well as for the execution of what I
regarded to be my duty, the men were not permitted to go on board.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. I was told yesterday that you knew some officers who have
openly declared that they would not execute this new article of war. Is
that so ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I know of one who has said so. But I would rather
not be interrogated on that point, because all that was said upon the sub
ject was said unofficially, was said at dinner table sociably, and it was said
by a person that I dislike, too; and whose behavior at the table was such
that I had to tell him he was impertinent.
Question. What was his rank ?
Answer. That of brigadier general. We had quite a discussion on the
Subject, and it led to some unpleasant words.
TESTIMONY. 641
By the chairman :
Question. Was he a West Pointer ?
Answer. He was reported to be; I do not know myself that he was.
By Mr. Julian :
Question. Will you look at this, and state whether it is a correct copy of
orders from your division headquarters ? [Handing witness a written paper.]
Answer. [Examining the paper.] Yes, sir; I believe it to be a correct copy~
The paper was read, as follows:
" HEADQUARTERS HOOKER'S DIVISION,
" Camp Baker, Lower Potomac, Maryland, March 26, 1862.
:" To the brigade and regimental commanders of this division :
" Messrs. Natty, Gray, Dummington, Dent. Adams, Speake, Price, Posey,
and Cobey, citizens of Maryland, have negroes supposed to be with some of
the regiments of this division. The brigadier general commanding directs
that they be permitted to visit all the camps of his command in search of
their property, and if found that they be allowed to take possession of the
same, without any interference whatever.
" Should any obstacle be thrown in their way by any officer or soldier in
the division, they will be at once reported by the regimental commander to
these headquarters.
" By command of Brigadier General Hooker.
"JOS. DICKINSON,
"Assistant Adjutant General."
The witness: This is the order that the men had whom I ordered out of
camp at the time they fired upon the negroes there. Several of these men
were well-known secessionists. It was my action on this particular order,
I think, that deprived me of my command — at least, I presumed so. And
one of the chaplains of my brigade applied to me for official copies of some
of these orders, which I directed my adjutant to give him; at which General
Hooker was very indignant. Notwithstanding the action of the Senate upon
my nomination as brigadier general, I was still in command, as the senior
colonel of the brigade, and expected to continue as senior colonel commanding
the brigade. But I was relieved from my command on Monday last by
General Hooker. It was the impression of my officers that I was relieved
in consequence of my action on this order. Of course, however, that is
mere conjecture. The reason assigned by General Hooker was that my
nomination as brigadier general had not been confirmed. That would have
been a sufficient reason to relieve me from the command of the brigade if
another brigadier general had been appointed to take command of it. But
until then I was entitled to continue in command of it, as senior colonel.
Question. Do you know the document of which this purports to be a copy ?
[Handing witness a paper.]
Answer. [Examining it.] Yes, sir; this is the official report of Major Toler
to my adjutant of the occurrences to which I have referred.
The paper was read, as follows:
" HEADQUARTERS 2o REGIMENT EXCELSIOR BRIGADE,
" Camp Hall, March 27, 1862.
" LIEUTENANT: In compliance with verbal directions from Brigadier General
D. E. Sickles to report as to the occurrence at. this camp on the afternoon of
the 26th instant, I beg leave to submit the following:
" At about 3.30 o'clock p. m., March 26th, 1862, admission within our lines
was demanded by a party of horsemen, (civilians,) numbering perhaps fifteen.
* Part iii 41
642 TESTIMONY.
They presented the lieutenant commanding the guard with an order of entrance
from Brigadier General Hooker, commanding division, [copy appended,] the
order stating that nine men should be admitted. I ordered that the balance
of the party should remain without the lines, which was done. Upon the
appearance of the others, there was visible dissatisfaction and considerable
murmuring among the soldiers — to so great an extent that I almost feared
for the safety of the slave owners. At this time General Sickles opportunely
arrived, and instructed me to order them outside the camp, which I did,
amidst the loud cheers of our soldiers.
" It is proper to add that before entering our lines, and when within seventy-
five or one hundred yards of our camp, one of their number discharged two
pistol shots at a negro, who was running past them, with an evident intention
of taking his life. This justly enraged our men.
" All of which is respectfully submitted.
" Your obedient servant,
"JOHN TOLER,
"Major Commanding 2d Eegiment Excelsior Brigade.
11 Lieutenant J. L. PALMER,
"Aide-de-Camp and Acting Assistant Adjutant General"
Question. That is a correct copy ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I directed Major Toler to report to me officially what
had occurred, and my adjutant would be the channel through which he would
do it.
By the chairman:
Question. Have you been able to obtain valuable information from these
contrabands who have come into your camp ?
Answer. The most valuable and reliable information of the enemy's move
ments in our vicinity that we have been able to get we have derived from
negroes who have come into our lines, they have been frequently employed
by me as scouts, sometimes singly and sometimes in parties of two or three.
Sometimes they have been sent as guides with our troops when it was not
deemed proper to hazard them unattended; and they have uniformly, whether
employed as scouts or guides, proved faithful. In many instances they have
proved to be persons of remarkable intelligence. I left several of them at
my camp, whose services for the government in the past, and whose means
of usefulness in the future, if we are to operate upon the line of the Rappa-
hannock, in rny judgment, entitle them to the particular care of the military
authorities. Similar services, if rendered by white men, would, according
to the usages of the army, be very liberally rewarded pecuniarily.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. Were these colored men, who rendered you these services, slaves
or free ?
Answer. All of them slaves, I presume. I will mention one instance par
ticularly, where a colored man named Jim, the slave of a Colonel Tayloe
who commands the cavalry outposts in the rebel service on the line of the
Potomac from Evansport to Mathias Point, is a man of remarkable intelli
gence. He was sent on a number of scouting expeditions, both for the arm}7
and the navy, for the Potomac flotilla and for myself. And one duty that he
performed was attended with so much danger, and was performed with so
much fidelity and ability, that I recommended that he should be allowed one
hundred dollars for it. My recommendation was complied with, and he
received that sum. That is but one of twenty services that he has rendered
the government, all of more or less magnitude. That man is in Washington
TESTIMONY. 643
now. I recommended him to Lieutenant Commanding Samuel McGaw of
the flotilla to bring up here with him.
By Mr. Julian:
Question. Do you know of any instance where they have been treacherous
to the Union cause ?
Answer. No, sir; not one. They exhibit the greatest alacrity and pleasure
in showing us in any way in their power. They will submit to any priva
tion, perform any duty, incur any danger. I know an instance in which
four of them recently carried a boat from the Eappahannock river, passing
through the enemy's pickets successfully, to the Potomac and crossed over
to my camp and reported themselves there. They gave us information of
fcthe position of the enemy's force, which was communicated to headquarters;
a service upon which it would be difficult to fix a price. These services
rendered by these men are known to the soldiers, and contribute, I presume,
largely to the sympathy which they feel for them, and to the strong, I may
say the irrepressible disinclination they feel when called upon to witness
their surrender.
WASHINGTON, April 15, 1862.
Lieutenant JOSEPH L. PALMER, jr., sworn and examined.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. What has been your position in the army ?
Answer. First lieutenant of company A 2d regiment of the Excelsior
brigade. I have been detached as aide-de-camp to General Sickles, and
acting as his assistant adjutant general.
Question. What do you know in relation to parties owning slaves coming
into your camps after them; by whose orders has it been done, and what
has been General Sickles's position in relation to that matter ?
Answer. On three or four occasions within my knowledge owners of
slaves have come into our camps. " How often besides I do not know. Gen
eral Sickles has uniformly received them courteously, but has been very un
willing to deliver up the slaves that they claimed.
Question. Were these claimants loyal slaveholders or rebels ?
Answer. The best means of information that we had was very prejudicial
to them as Union men in many cases, particularly in the cases of claimants
living at Port Tobacco and in that vicinity. The slaves they claimed we
always found to be very good and faithful men. We used them many times
as guides and scouts. Colonel Graham, of the 5th regiment, which was
down at Port Tobacco, used them to great advantage, and placed great con
fidence in them, when he went on his expedition across the river to Mathias
Point.
Question. They were reliable ?
Answer. Yes, sir; very reliable. One morning two persons appeared
and claimed some slaves that had come to our headquarters and had served
us there. They had a letter from General Hooker, the terms of which were,
I think, to the effect that if General Sickles was satisfied that these negroes
belonged to the persons who claimed them they should be delivered UD to
the claimants. The letter also stated that there was sufficient evidence that
these persons were good and loyal citizens. Now, General Sickles, and, I
think, every officer in the 5th regiment and at headquarters, and we were
nearest to Port Tobacco where these persons lived, had ample evidence that
these persons had not been good Union men. The general doubted their
sincerity very much. However, there was the order, and he did not know
what to do. He put them off finally, and told them to come the next Sun-
644 TESTIMONY.
day. In the meantime, he sent for these negroes, who had become quite
famous with us as scouts, and told them that he could protect them no
longer; that they must leave the camp. He gave them some money and
some clothes, and told them they better go home, which they did. One of
them came back about a week afterwards, and another one came back some
two or three weeks after that. When the troops left Liverpool Point they
were still in camp. What has become of them I do not know. I think
they have been put in charge of the division quartermaster there, as was
the case with most of the other contrabands.
On another occasion Captain Brunn, of the 1st regiment, was called upon
to deliver up a man whom he had been employing as his servant, I think.
However, I will not be positive about that. I know that the captain knew
of his whereabouts, and he was called upon to deliver him up. There was
some correspondence grew out of that case between Lieutenant Colonel
Farnham and headquarters. What was done in the matter I do not know.
Whether he was delivered up or not is more than I can tell. But I do know
that General Sickles never himself gave up any, although he never positively
refused.
Sometimes, and more often than otherwise, orders would be sent directly
to the commanding officers of regiments, not through headquarters, the
usual channel of communicating orders — orders would be sent through the
slaveholders directly to the regiments. That was the case with the 1st
regiment; and the first we heard of it was from Lieutenant Colonel Farn
ham asking for instructions.
There was one case in the 5th regiment where a man named Cox claimed
some slaves. He was very badly treated by the soldiers. He came there
with an order from division headquarters for two or three slaves. He
pointed out who they were, and undertook to take them away; but the sol
diers pounced upon him and beat him severely, injuring him considerably.
The officers interfered, and saw him safely out of the camp, but not until
he had been considerably injured. He went away without his slaves. I do
not know whether he got them afterwards or not.
The first correspondence that arose on the subject was early in December
last or late in November; I think it was early in December. That was in
relation to some contrabands in the 5th regiment. General Hooker instructed
General Sickles to deliver them over to their owners, and to instruct
the officers of the 5th regiment to aid the owners in every possible way in
recovering their property. At the same time the letter rather animadverted
upon the seeming unwillingness of the officers to perform such a plain duty
without being ordered to do so. The general protested against it in a
letter to General Hooker, and there the matter was dropped; we had no
more correspondence upon that subject until recently, for a long time. We
would occasionally hear through the officers of the various regiments, of
orders being received by them through residents of Maryland, to allow them
to enter their camps and search for slaves. But no such orders came direct
to the headquarters of the brigade after this correspondence had taken
place.
Question. Do you know whether General Sickles was opposed to being
employed to catch and return slaves ?
Answer. I know that was the spirit in which he wrote to General Hooker
on the subject.
Question. What was the feeling among the troops in reference to that
matter.
Answer. With our people, there was a feeling of indignation against it,
from the lowest to the highest; it was the universal feeling. Some of the
officers would turn away, saying to those claimants: "you can take your
TESTIMONY. 645
property if you will, but I will have nothing to do with it," and then walk
into their tents and pay no more attention to them. Sometimes they would
allow their men to treat these people very roughly, until they were obliged
to interpose to prevent their being seriously injured.
Question. What recent transactions have taken place there ?
Answer. There have been some there entirely unexpected. An order waft
sent from General Hooker directly to the commanding officer of the 2d
regiment. Neither General Sickles, or myself, nor any officer at headquar
ters knew a word about it until the general returned. He told me at table,
in the evening, that as he was passing near the camp of the second regi
ment he saw that there was a disturbance there, and that the major of the
regiment came to him in great haste, and with considerable excitement,
and told him that some parties had come there with an order from General
Hooker, that they should be allowed to search the camp and take away
their slaves; that the men were terribly excited, and he feared some evil
consequence. The general ordered the men to be put out of the camp at once.
I think there was no further excitement on that subject. I will remark
that General Hooker visited General Sickles the following morning, paid
him a friendly visit; partly official and partly unofficial. But that subject
was not mentioned at all; not a word was dropped about it on either side.
The only other circumstance bcarin g upon the subject of General Sickles's
conduct in regard to this contraband question, that I now think of, was a little
passage of words that took place between General Sickles and General
Negley one day at dinner. General Hooker, General Sickles, General
Negley, and several other officers were at dinner together. I was not
present myself, but the affair was detailed to me by Lieutenant Hart, who
was present. It became generally known throughout the camp that such
an affair had taken place, in relation to this contraband matter.
WASHINGTON, February 11, 1862.
Dr. BENJ. LIPPJNCOTT sworn and examined.
By tin1 chairman :
Question. Are you a physician ?
Answer. I have been. I have not practiced for some time. I am now located
in Washington. My home is in Philadelphia.
Question. Have you visited the prisons, or the places' in Alexandria where
soldiers are confined for minor offences ? If so, tell us what you saw there.
Answer. I was there between 12 and 2 o'clock last Sunday — day before yes
terday.
Question. Did you visit the places of confinement there 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; in company with Dr. Seltzer, Quartermaster Jones, and
two or three visitors from Philadelphia. We were taken into the slave pen by
Dr. Seltzer — the place where soldiers are imprisoned. I walked around the
pen. I should say it was some 40 or 50 feet square. It is enclosed by a high
wall, with a little shed along on one side of it ; the rest of it with no roof at
all, but all open to the weather. The shed was simply a roof on one side that
afforded no shelter, for it was so narrow that the slightest storm would strike
the wall inside and under the shed. I thought it was a horrible place to keep
men in, and spoke to the doctor about it. I asked him how he got along with
the men — if he did not have a plenty of cases of pneumonia after they got out.
Question. What was the doctor doing there?
Answer. He was the surgeon of the regiment. He said it was a disgraceful
646 TESTIMONY.
place. He showed me where he had had a cellar entrance filled up, where one
man who had been put in there intoxicated had fallen down and broken his back.
The privy there had been open when the men were put in there, and he had
had that covered over. He told me of the depth of the filth that had been in
the pen. He said that at one time there was some two or three inches of mud,
and some two inches of snow and slush on top of that, during that severe spell
of weather, and one of the prisoners who had been put in there during the bad
weather had been found dead in the morning. He had laid down in the slush
there during the night and been frozen to death. I saw in an adjoining room a
man some 50 years of age, who had been exposed in that pen over night. He
was suffering from pneumonia, and looked to me as if he must die.
Question. How many men were in there when you saw it ?
Answer. There were some four or five in the pen. As I went up to the
grating in the door they begged me, for God's sake, to use some kind of influ
ence to have them let out, as they were nearly frozen to death. They had no
covering at all, no blankets, and no place to sit or lay down upon, except the
brick pavement.
Question. What were they put in there for ; what had they done ?
Answer. One said he was put in there because he was a little late in getting
out of town ; he said his pass had expired about a half an hour. He was a
member of one of the Pennsylvania regiments. A soldier of one of the Massa
chusetts regiments said he was put in there for being intoxicated. Another
man there, between 45 and 50 years of age, who looked like a very good fellow,
said he had gone in to church Sunday morning. He had stopped to warm him
self where there was some soldier who had no bayonet on his gun. He asked
why he did not put his bayonet on and be in full rig. The soldier took um
brage at that and arrested him. He showed him the pass he had to come in
town, but the soldier said he did not care for his pass ; he must go to the prison,
and he was put in there.
Question. Who ordered these men to prison 1
Answer. I talked with Colonel McLane, who has a regiment there. The
colonel said he had deputed one of his captains as provost marshal of the town ;
but General Montgomery has the control and ordering of those things. Dr.
Seltzer said he had plead with General Montgomery to take the jail in town for
this purpose, but he could not succeed.
Question. Why did he not remonstrate 1
Answer. He said he had, but he could not do anything at all. He expressed
himself that General Montgomery favored the secessionists considerably, and
seemed to have a great deal of charity for them. General Montgomery was
away at one time on leave of absence for some sickness or indisposition of some
kind. While he was away Colonel McLane was in command. Colonel McLane
said that during that time he had taken, for some use of the army, a house that
belonged to a son-in-law of Reverdy Johnson. But when the general carne
back he had ordered the house to be given up, and had rented a house of a man
then in Alexandria. That man immediately turned around and rented this house
belonging to Reverdy Johnson's son-in-law for some $200 or $300 less than he
got from the government for his own house, thus speculating upon the govern
ment in that way. The owner of the house the government had hired, which
the colonel was occupying, had gone off to the south with the rebels ; and the
colonel thought they better have occupied the house rent free than to have paid
money for it. He said Reverdy Johnston had talked with General Mont
gomery, and got him to order his son-in-law's house to be given up. He told
me furthermore of some minister of the gospel there who had given General
Montgomery a special invitation to attend his church. General Montgomery
did attend, by special invitation. The minister in the service refused to repeat
that part containing the prayer for the President of the United States ; yet
TESTIMONY, 647
General Montgomery sat there and heard and saw it all, and made no opposition
to it. Colonel McLane said he had been anxious for some time to have the
man arrested, but he could get no authority to do so. But on Sunday, while I
was there, the man was arrested in his pulpit. As soon as the prayer was ended
and he commenced the litany, he was arrested and taken out of the pulpit. The
gentleman who reported the case to the colonel, while I was there, said it grew
out of an order from Secretary Seward.
Question. Do you suppose this slave pen is still used there as a prison "?
Answer. I judge it is ; it was on Sunday last. The colonel said that while
lie was in command there, during General Montgomery's absence, people would
come to him with complaints ; secessionists would come with complaints regard
ing their houses, &c. ; and when he would not do as they wanted they would
ask when General Montgomery would be back again, saying that if they could
see him he would assist them. And I was told that the general had given
passes to these secessionists, who had never taken the oath of allegiance to the
government. Some rebels who had been taken prisoners were brought in there,
and allowed to be fed by the secessionists of the city. And eventually the
thing went so for that the secessionists used to invite them out to dinner, and
they went out as invited guests to dinner, with a guard deputed to go with
them and to escort them back to jail.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Do you know anything about any effort being made to get the
bank building there for some purpose connected with the army 1
Answer. The managers of the bank there are all secessionists ; not a loyal
man connected with it. The mother bank is in Richmond, and the greater part
of the stock is owned in Richmond. The colonel said that he had been unable
to get the general to agree to allow him to take that bank building as a hospital.
Question. Do you know anything about General Montgomery affording pro
tection to the property of rebels 1
Answer. They all told me there that the secessionists could do anything with
General Montgomery, if they could get at him.
WASHINGTON, February 12, 1862.
Colonel GEORGE P. McLEAN sworn and examined, (Dr. Seltzer and Quar
termaster Jones being present.)
By the chairman :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army ?
Answer. Colonel of the 88th Pennsylvania volunteers.
Question. Where stationed 1
Answer. At Alexandria.
Question. Will you state in regard to the place where your prisoners are
kept ?
Answer. They are generally, and I believe always, put in the slave pen in
Alexandria.
Question. Is that a fit place for men to be put in during the winter season 1
Answer. In my opinion it is not, and I have so expressed myself frequently.
It is not a proper place from the fact that the prisoners there are exposed to the '
inclemency of the weather. The men coming in from the various camps gen
erally come in without blankets, and very frequently without overcoats ; and
they are put in there without any covering, and have nothing to lie upon except
648 TESTIMONY.
the brick pavement. My opinion is that it is a very unfit place to put the men
in.
Question. Would it endanger the life or health of a man to remain there over
night during this inclement season?
Answer. I think it would endanger, or have a tendency to endanger, his life-
Question. Who is responsible for placing prisoners in such a place as that?
Answer. I could not say exactly who is responsible. I should judge that it
was probably within the power of the commanding general to order it otherwise.
Question. Have you remonstrated with him about it — reported the state and
condition of it to him ?
Answer. I have had inspectors appointed regularly to visit the various quar
ters on Sunday morning, who have reported to me, and I have referred the
report to the commanding general.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. In this report was this slave pen spoken of?
Answer. Yes, sir, and condemned.
By the chairman :
Question. Have these facts come to the knowledge of the commanding gen
eral ?
Answer. Yes, sir; they are within his knowledge. He may possibly imagine
that he has no other place to put prisoners in, and I do not really know that he
has any other place to put them in. But I am free to say that I think it is the
privilege of the commanding officer to take other quarters. I do not know that
he has ever given instructions to do so.
Question. Who is this commanding officer you refer to?
Answer. The commanding general there is General Montgomery.
Question. Has he not power, as a military commander, either to get other and
better quarters, or to repair those now being used ?
Answer. I so understand it.
Question. What do you know of any particular injury resulting to men by
reason of being imprisoned there?
Answer. I do not know anything positively myself, from the fact that it has
never been my duty to be there. I have sent others to inspect it. I have vis
ited the quarters as commanding officer of the regiment, and on one occasion
the surgeon called upon me and I went with him, and saw perhaps some forty
odd men there suffering very much. They were cold and shivering, and I
released some of them, seeing they were perfectly sober, with instructions to
them to go out to their camps. I thought it was nothing more than proper and
right to do, assuming that it was right, as there were orders from the command
ing general that all prisoners should be released the next day at guard mount
ing. Some of them had been there over night, and should have been released
in the morning. I saw that it was not a proper place for men to be in. But, of
course, it is not a very pleasant thing to blame and find fault with the officer
over me, and I have never assumed anything but my own duties.
Question. Is the place clean and neat, or is it filthy and loathsome ?
Answer. It is very dirty at times, as the snow and rain beat in.
Question. For what offences are men put in there ?
Answer. For drunkenness, and for being in the city without passes. The
commanding officers of the various camps have instructed their officers and men
not to visit Alexandria without a pass, and they have called upon us to assist
them in carrying out these orders ; and General Montgomery has also issued an
• order that all soldiers shall leave Alexandria at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and
if they are found there without a pass they are arrested, and there is no other
place to put them in but the slave pen. And if they are found drunk, with or
without a pass, they are arrested by our guards and placed in there.
TESTIMONY. 649
Question. These are what you consider as trivial offences in the army, but
not of a serious character ?
Answer. They are of that character that never can be avoided.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Did you ever exert yourself with the general to get a better place
to keep them in ?
Answer. It would not be a proper thing for me to urge my commanding
officer. I have sent him the reports. We have placed the matter before him
in the shape of reports, containing the opinions of inspectors.
By the chairman :
Question. And of course they condemned that place ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I might remark that I endeavored on one occasion to
secure the jail for that purpose, and I received a censure from my commanding
officer, and, very likely, properly, too. I had no right, perhaps, to move in the
mattter when there was an officer who was my senior.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. What was his objection to the use of the jail for that purpose ?
Answer. I do not know that he gave an objection ; only gave me to under
stand that he was the commanding officer.
Question. What objection is there to taking the jail for that purpose, as a
temporary jail for that purpose ?
Answer. I do not know that I have ever heard any objection.
Question. Does any suggest itself to your mind?
Answer. None. It might be presumed that drunken, crazy men might
destroy the building ; but that might be prevented by proper guards.
Question. Is any man any more drunk and crazy with military clothes on.
than without?
Answer. No, sir.
By the chairman :
Question. Would the jail, in your judgment, be a proper place for this purpose ?
Answer. That is my opinion, and my attempt was to secure it.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. What number would the jail accommodate ?
Answer. I suppose it would accommodate some 200.
Question. Would it meet the wants of that department ?
Answer. Yes, sir. I spoke to the mayor of the city about it, and I got
reprimanded, and made up my mind, of course, that perhaps I was in error.
Question. Did the mayor object to it ?
Answer. No, sir ; he did not.
Question. Did he accord with you as to the propriety of using the jail ?
Answer. He said that he was perfectly willing himself; that he had no
objection.
By the chairman :
Question. Is there anything more you think of that is material ?
Answer. There are little matters that perhaps it would be better for me not
to say anything about.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. How long are these men kept there by your regulations ?
Answer. They are put in there any time during the day, and released the next
morning at nine o'clock.
650 TESTIMONY.
By the chairman :
Question. Those little things you speak of may throw light upon the subject
we are investigating.
Answer. I might state some things that would reflect on my commanding
officer. I do not care to do that. Perhaps he did not mean any injury to the
men.
Question. It may be improper for an officer to speak against his superior
under ordinary circumstances ; but we are here for the purpose of inquiring
into the conduct of any one ; no matter how high or low he may be, he is under
our jurisdiction.
Answer. When I spoke to the general in regard to the slave pen, he decided
that it was a very suitable place, and said the men were better provided for there
than our men on picket were.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Did you inform him that you thought it was not a a suitable place ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And that was the reply you received ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How long ago did you call his attention to it ?
Answer. I have done so frequently. It has' been a subject of conversation.
I cannot remember precisely when the last time was. It was last week, I think,
one day, that the general was talking to me about it, trying to convince me
that it was a suitable place ; but I was not convinced.
By Mr. Covode:
Question. Have you given any passes 1
Answer. In regard to giving passes, when passes were issued, of course, it
was the commanding officer who gave them.
Question. Do you know that he has given passes to parties who have .refused
to take the oath of allegiance?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How do you know that ?
Answer. I was temporarily in command while the general was away on sick
leave, and a number of written passes came to me to be renewed which I
positively refused.
Question. Why did you refuse them ?
Answer. I had passes with the obligation attached to them to be, signed, and
I supposed it was my duty to carry out those orders, and I positively refused
to give passes to any one unless he would sign the obligation. There are a
number of persons there who are strong secessionists who have passes.
By the chairman :
Question. Who gave them 1
Answer. General Montgomery, of course; that he does not deny.
By Mr. Covode :
Question. Gave them to parties who did not take or sign the obligation?
Answer. Yes, sir. They came in to me when I was temporarily in command,
and I refused positively to renew them. Gentlemen would bring others in and
introduce them and recommend them as good citizens and ask for passes for
them. My question was, "Are you a loyal citizen? will you sign the obliga
tion? if so, I will be pleased to give you a pass." A great many refused, and
I told them that stripped me of any privilege or right to give them passes.
Those passes, I told them, were in my hands with the obligation attached to
them to be signed; and it was only in compliance with that regulation that I
TESTIMONY. 651
could issue a pass; that I was there to carry out orders, not to make them
Of course I was not much thought of by that class of people there.
Question. Is it a common thing there to issue passes to persons who do not
sign the obligation?
Answer. An order has recently been issued from Washington to prevent
the general from giving passes anywhere, whether through the lines or any
where else.
Question. Did they get passes by which they went to Baltimore and obtained
goods to take through our lines 1
Answer. I do not know as to which way they went. The passes gave them
the privilege of crossing the ferry over the Potomac from Alexandria to the
city of Washington, &c.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Were any passes given by which these parties could pass through
our lines into the enemy's country?
Answer. Xot positively.
Question. Do you know anything about any other slave pen in Alexandria
than the one used?
Answer. No, sir.
WASHINGTON, February 12, 1862.
Doctor J. H. SELTZER sworn and examined, (Colonel McLane and Quar
termaster Jones present.)
By the chairman :
Question. What is your position in the army ?
Answer. I am surgeon of the 88th Pennsylvania regiment.
Question. Where are you stationed ?
Answer. At Alexandria. ,
Question. What do you know about the manner in which prisoners for minor
offences are punished there ; how are they confined, and where ?
Answer. I presume you want a plain, undisguised, unvarnished statement of
the whole affair.
Question. We want it exactly as it is.
Answer. I have called the attention of the authorities to this matter of con
fining soldiers in that slave pen. I have visited it daily, and seen as high as
150 or 200 (between 200 and 300) men confined in that pen. They are men
who have come in from their camps, and are probably from five to ten minutes
behind their time ; not having a watch, they cannot tell what the time is, or they
may have taken a glass of liquor too much, and our soldiers arrest them and
take them to that slave pen. You know what a drunken man is ; he feels un
pleasant at the idea of going to a slave pen rather than to a guard-house. I have
heard them say that if they were put in the guard-house they, at least, had a
comfortable place to lie on. They are generally pretty roughly handled when
taken to this slave pen, as drunken men usually are, and then they are confined
there. I have called the attention of those in authority to these matters. There
have been at times three and a half inches of snow, dirt, filth, and such truck,
on the pavement, and they had to lie there without any covering at- all ; and I
have seen as many as one hundred men in there when the thermometer was at
twenty-one degrees. The men were wet, were brought in there wet, and they
were forced to lie down there, as there was no other place for them to lie down,
652 TESTIMONY.
except right on the bricks. The place was not fit to put dumb brutes in, let
alone the freemen of the north.
Question. Did you not remonstrate against it ?
Answer. I did.
Question. To whom ?
Answer. I remonstrated with General Montgomery. I made a report to
the colonel, and handed the report to General Montgomery ; and I took the
general himself out there, and showed him the place. I said to him, "General,
when Providence endows us with good qualities and better comforts than our
neighbor is possessed of, should it not prompt us to endeavor to ameliorate
the condition of our fellow men?" He said, "That is very true, and it is very
patriotic in us to come out here to-day." Now, I cannot lie down on my bed at
night and rest with any peace when I have seen my fellow men who lived
alongside of me, and who had come out here to fight for his country, forced to
remain in such a place as that, when the secessionist or disloyal man, upon being
arrested, is sent to the provost marshal, and furnished with a room and fire.
Question. Is that so ?
Answer. Yes, sir ; there is no mistake about that.
Question. What is the effect of this confinement upon the health of the
inmates ?
Answer. It produces pleurisy and pneumonia. Let any -man reflect a mo
ment. If any one of you should go to his room to-night, even if there is a fire
in it, and lay down on the floor and remain there over night, you will wake up
in the morning with a chill. And some of these men have been brought up
with all the comforts of life about them ; and yet I saw a man in that slave pen
the night before last as bare as he came into this world. Out of pity to him I
told them to put him inside. One man was found dead there a few days ago ;
frozen to death. I have expostulated until I thought the authorities would not
listen, and then I said I would appeal to the country, to the public press.
Question. Do you know anything about the jail that has been spoken of?
Answer. No, sir ; I have not been inside of that. Yesterday I went through
the different camps to find out the condition of the guard-houses in the camps
and every one I saw was comfortable. A gentleman of the sanitary commis
sion was down there yesterday to investigate the matter, and I went around
with him. I asked the soldiers why they objected | so much to being in that
slave pen. They all said that the idea of freemen being put in a slave pen was,
of itself, horrible ; and then, if they were put in a guard-house they would have
some comforts ; they could get there blankets to lie upon ; and then there was
not so much feeling about it. This slave pen is in such a condition that a man
broke his back there, and another man, of our regiment, broke his thigh, which
has disabled him for life.
Question. How did that happen ?
Answer. There was an open place in the cellar- way down which the man
fell ; and by almost fighting I have succeeded in having it closed up. The
men put in there, having nothing to sit upon, would pull up the bricks of the
pavement to make a seat to sit on ; and then they would have some drunken
men in there who would get into a fight, and the loose bricks would fly, and,
most generally, some one will be disabled for life.
Question. You have made this known to the commanding general i
Answer. I have taken him there in person and pointed it out to him.
Question. What did he say about it ?
Answer. He said, "What are we to do? I have no power to do anything;
I can't do anything." Said I, " General, take the responsibility, as Jackson
did, and do it."
Question. Do you know anything about the giving of passes ?
Answer. I have seen passes in the hands of the rankest, open-avowed seces
sionists in Alexandria, with General Montgomery's signature, to pass anywhere.
TESTIMONY. 653
Question. Has he obliged them to sign the obligations ?
Answer. There was no obligation signed to those passes. I have myself seen
the general give passes, when I was present, to ladies who defiantly told him
they would not take the oath of allegiance. I remember a gentleman coming-
in who had a pass for himself and family, who is an open and avowed seces
sionist. He lived next door to the colonel's headquarters. He wanted the col
onel to renew the pass, and the colonel told him he would not do it unless he
took the oath of loyalty ; and that he said he would not do, and walked out.
His pass had expired while the general was away.
Question. How long have persons been confined in this slave pen?
Answer. Some have been there for ten days at a time. I have known them
to be in there for three days without a bed or a fire, and they got nothing but a
little water that the parties standing outside, out of compassion, passed in. On
one occasion I appealed to the colonel to go out with me and look at it, and
when we got out there I said to the colonel, " I know you have a commander
over you, but, colonel, just take the responsibility, and let these men go home;"
and he did release some forty of them that afternoon.
Question. Were they confined there during the months of December and
January 1
Answer. They were put in there in January, while the weather was so cold
that it was freezing. A secessionist can get more out of General Montgomery
than a Union man can. If a secessionist is arrested and taken before him, he
is released in half an hour. I will tell you a case in point. There was a man
arrested for declaring open and avowed secessionist doctrines, and General
Montgomery released him, and allowed him to go to Mayor McKensie and stay
all night.
Colonel McLane : I will take occasion to say, for fear there might be some
censure cast upon me, that I have endeavored to stop this matter with what I
conceived to be my duty as an officer there. There were privileges granted to
secessionists. A number of them were selling rum, and demoralizing our army.
1 gave instructions to my guard to arrest all such men, and to arrest, of course,
the soldiers there collected. My guards returned to me, and told me that they
could not carry out my order. I asked them why they could not do so, and
they said that the proprietor of the house, who is a secessionist, showed them a
permit from General Montgomery that he should not be interfered with ; and, if
necessary, they were entitled to call on the guards for protection ; and following
that I received an order from General Montgomery that I should not hereafter
issue any orders to my officers or men, or interfere with the police arrangements
of the city of Alexandria. Of course my hands were then tied. If I had had
the right, I should have made a different arrangement. I only state this in justi
fication to myself, lest I might be censured.
The chairman : Did he know why you had issued your order — that it was to
prevent drunkenness and the selling of liquor by secessionists ?
Colonel McLane : He told me himself that he desired it to be done, and I
supposed I was but cany ing out his orders ; but after we would seize their liquors,
and send them to the mayor, they would go to him and get permission to get
them back.
The greatest evil of all, in my opinion, is the influence there of a man who, I
am free to say, is a traitor. I refer to the assistant adjutant general — J. R.
Freeze. I have been on the eve of asking to be relieved. I did not enter the
service for dollars and cents. I left a business that paid me more than the gov
ernment pays me. But having been connected with the military for some years,
I felt that I might, perhaps, be able to render some service to my country.
This adjutant has interfered with me in the discharge of my duties time and
tune again. He has even come in and sat down in my quarters and issued a
regimental order. I told him I was colonel of my regiment, and demanded the
654 TESTIMONY.
right to issue my own orders, as I was responsible for what my regiment did.
There was a lady there by .the name of Burns, who had been pleading with
tears in her eyes to get possession of her house, which was being occupied by
the wife of a rebel officer. I believe that General Montgomery had consented
that she should have her property. This Freeze interfered, and, having entire
control over the general, prevented it. While I was there, one day she saw
Freeze, who insulted her. As she was returning to her home, one of the senti
nels, who had been frequently kindly treated by her as he passed her door on
his beat, seeing she was in trouble, asked her what the matter was. She said
she had just been to see Captain Freeze, to see if there was any possibility of
her getting her house. They owed her $114 rent then. The last thing her
husband had done in Alexandria was to vote for the Union, and he had done all
he could for that. The sentinel said, " Why don't you go to my colonel ?"
At that time, fortunately, I was temporarily in command there. She came to
me and related her story, and I gave notice to this wife of the rebel officer to
vacate the premises in forty-eight hours, or suffer the consequences. The father
of this lady, who was also in the house, went to Freeze about it. Freeze wrote
to me saying that Mr. Lovejoy — the father of this rebel officer's wife — should
not be interfered with, either by military or civil authority. I ordered the one
who .brought me the note to say to Mr. Freeze that I was then in command ;
that he had about as much to do with the matter as a boy in the street ; that I
had issued my order, and should see that it was carried out. He called in the
evening himself, and told me that it was as much as my commission was worth
to do that thing. I told him my commission did not come from him, and that
if any one interfered with me he should be shot. The result of it was that I
handed the house over to Mrs. Burns.
The chairman:^ You have said that General Montgomery was under the in
fluence of this man Freeze. Explain that.
Colonel McLane : I have always had the kindest feelings towards General
Montgomery, and I desire to believe that the general means to do what is right.
But I am not of the opinion that this Freeze desires to do what is right.
General Montgomery is old, and he is easily persuaded. This Freeze has no
military knowledge whatever, but he is there as his assistant adjutant general,
and whatever Freeze proposes is carried out. I have had to submit as well as
all the rest. And my hands are now so tied that I dare not give an order to
my own officers and men ; and I will not for all the money in the United States
be held in that position long. I conceive that it is my right as commanding
officer of my regiment to issue orders to my own command. My reason for
having hesitated to speak of this was because I did entertain kind feelings
towards General Montgomery, and I do not want to believe that he is not a
loyal citizen. But I have seen very strange things there.
The chairman : What strange things have you seen ?
Colonel McLean : I have seen privileges granted to secessionists that I think
they ought not to enjoy, giving them passes, &c. We have had rebel prisoners
there, and the secessionists there have been allowed to visit them, and enter
tain them sumptuously. That came to my knowledge when I was temporarily
in command, and I issued an order at once that these things should not be per
mitted. Secessionists were inviting out the rebel prisoners to their residences,
and entertaining them at dinners, while our guards were sent to escort them. I
issued an- order to stop that, and not only that, but that the rebel prisoners
should have the same rations as our men did, and why they should be sumptu
ously entertained more than our soldiers is more than I could understand, and I
determined that it should not be while I was in command, and I would not allow
them to visit them ; they were not on exhibition, and we were capable of taking
charge of our prisoners. The result of it was that some ladies called upon me,
and asked me if they could go and see the prisoners. I asked if they were
TESTIMONY. 655
relatives, and they said they were not. I then told them I could not allow it.
They then asked me when General Montgomery would be back. I told them,
that he would be back before long, as his leave of absence would expire in a few
days. Seeing an order to send prisoners to Washington, I took occasion, be
fore General Montgomery returned, to send to Washington every prisoner in
Alexandria. I am free to say that things have occurred in Alexandria since I
have been there that, under my oath, with my disposition to do my duty as a
soldier, my conscience would not allow me to do. This Freeze has been there so
long that he has become familiar with the secessionists, and I am satisfied that he
ought not to be there. He has no military knowledge, in the first place; never
was a soldier, and had no experience, and I do not know why the government
should be paying a man there who can perform nothing.
The witness, (Dr. Seltzer:) If this committee will send to the sanitary board
they will be able to obtain an elaborate report of their investigations in this
matter.
By the chairman :
Question. When were the sanitary board down there ?
Answer. Dr. Parrish left there this morning, and said that he would write out
a report on this slave pen.
WASHINGTON, February 12, 1862.
Lieutenant D. D. JONES sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What is your position ?
Answer. I am quartermaster of the 88th Pennsylvania regiment.
Question. You are stationed at Alexandria ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What do you know about the manner in which soldiers are im
prisoned there ?
Answer. I can say that I concur fully in the testimony of Colonel McLane
and Dr. Seltzer.
Question. You are knowing to the facts, and concur in what they have stated?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know anything about passes having been granted to seces
sionists, or to those who would not take the oath of allegiance 1
Answer. I have seen such passes granted at different times by General Mont
gomery's aid to persons who would not sign the obligation. I saw, what I
term very loosely conducted, in the office of General Montgomery, men receiving
passes there without any obligation being signed by them, and others who simply
stood back and touched the pen without looking at it, under the pretence that
they could not write ; persons, too, who were doing such a business as to natu
rally require them to have some education, and at least to know how to sign
their names. They would hold the pen while the aid made the mark, and turn
their backs to it the while. That I have seen myself. When the colonel was
in command I frequently saw them bring in passes that had no obligation signed,
and ask the colonel to renew them, they having expired. This he positively
refused to do, unless they would sign the obligation. They endeavored to per
suade the colonel to do it, using, as an argument, the fact that General Mont
gomery had not asked it of them. They were secessionists, and known to be
such by the Union people there. You asked the colonel if he knew anything
about any other slave pen there. I would remark that there is a slave pen
€56 TESTIMONY.
further on in the same street. I was in General Montgomery's headquarters
when a captain reported to him the existence of such a slave pen, and he has
visited it. It belongs to a secessionist, and has many comforts in it. He
reported that to General Montgomery about two weeks ago.
Question. Why did he not take that 1
Answer. I do not know.
Question. Do you know anything about the jail there ?
Answer. I know that there is a jail there, and that the colonel has on more
than one occasion spoken to the mayor about using it; to which the mayor con
sented.
Question. Do you know any objection to using the jail?
Answer. No, sir; General Montgomery remonstrated about the colonel inter
fering in reference to the jail. There was an article in the paper some two
weeks ago about this slave pen being used to confine soldiers in. General
Montgomery spoke about officers interfering with his command, and said, "There
is an article in the paper saying that, Colonel McLane is using his efforts to get
possession of the jail for the confinement of these prisoners. I don't see what
he has got to do with that." Those are the words he used.
Colonel McLane : The general put me under arrest for interfering with his
duties.
The chairman: In what particular ?
Colonel McLane : There was a lady called on me and said that she was a
Union lady and that she had two sons who were selling waffles up at the corner
of King and Royal streets, and she desired to have them allowed to remain there.
She said they were driving them off. I was going out at that time in company
with the quartermaster. I turned around to one of my men and asked him to
go out and see that this lady was not imposed upon. During my absence my
adjutant issued an order that these boys should be allowed this privilege. It ap
peared that the general had previously issued orders that they should not be
allowed to sell waffles there. But that I knew nothing at all about. This was
one of the charges against me. Another charge was that I had not issued an
order to my surgeon to vaccinate the men of my regiment. Now, in fact, I had
issued that order ; now, I knew that it was a matter of spite on the part of some
one, for there was no foundation for the charges, and the general voluntarily with
drew them. I told him that if I had committed any breach of discipline I wanted
to be tried and punished ; that I did not want to be excused myself any more
than I would excuse any of my men, He concluded that I had not and with
drew the charges.
INDEX TO PART III.
WESTERN DEPARTMENT, OR MISSOURI.
Page-
Report ot Committee 3
TESTIMONY.
Albert. Colonel Anselm 263
Beard, E. L 270
Blair, jr., Hon. Frank P 156
Blair, Hon Montgomery _. 154
Conant, Horace A 231
Correspondence, Orders, etc 78
Documents. [Report of General L. Thomas, etc. ] 7
Fre'mont, General John C 32,33,43
Harding, jr., Colonel Chester 254
Hunter,, General David 234
McKeever, Captain Chauncey 248
Plummer, Colonel Joseph B 24
Savage, Major James W 194
Sturgis, GeneralS. D 224.231
Woods, Colonel I. C 198
Zagonyi, Major Charles 186
MISCELLANEOUS.
HATTER AS INLET EXPEDITION —
Butler, General B. F 280
PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION —
Saxton, Captain Rufus.' 322
. Sherman, General T. W 291,292,306
BLTRNSIDE EXPEDITION—
Burnside, General A. E
FORT DONELSON, ETC. —
Wallace, General Lewis 337
CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS —
Butler, General B. F 353
INVASION OP NEW MEXICO —
Roberts, Colonel B. S 364-
658 INDEX.
ACCOMACK EXPEDITION —
Bacon, Major Edward
Bean, Colonel S. A
Boardman, Major F. A
Hobart, Captain ^
Knight, Captain John A _
McMillan, Colonel James A — _
Moore, Captain W. P
Paine, Colonel Halbert E .
Warren, Colonel G. K
BATTLE OF WINCHESTER, MARCH 23, 1862—
Harrow, Colonel William.
McAbee, Dr. H. M .'
Mason, Colonel John S
Sullivan, General J. C
MONITOR AND MERRIMACK —
Fox, Captain G. V. [Assistant Secretary of Navy]
PROTECTING REBEL PKOPERTY —
Doubleday , General Abner
Halsted, Captain E. P..
Haupt, Colonel Herman ^ >
McDowell, General Irwin
Morse, B. H
Myers, Captain Frederick „ _.
Trimble, Major James H
BEBEL BARBARITIES —
Bixby, jr., Daniel — . - _ _
Bradbury, Serge tnt Daniel
Bnssey , Colonel Cyrus _
Cameron, Hon. Simon
Denison, Rev. Frederick
Francis, Lewis _
Greely, Dr. James B
Homiston, Dr. J. M
Kane, John _ ._ ,
Kirby , Joseph A
Lawson, John H
Noble, Lieutenant John W _,
Palmer, Nathaniel F
Pancoast, S. A ._ ,
Ricketts, General James B _ _
Scholes, Frederick _
Seeds. James M _ _
Sprague, Hon. William _
Swalm, Dr. William F
WOUNDED FROM FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA —
Burrows,Dr. S. S 513
Cooper, William 532
Documents .. 492
INDEX. 659
WOUNDED FROM FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA — Continued. Page.
Edwards, Dr. Lewis A 529
Gray, Hamilton K - 536
Hammond, Surgeon General William A 515
Hatch, Anselm — - 535
Hays, Dr. David S 494,506
Hewitt, Captain S. L 511
Hilton , Joseph H 520
Johnson, Major John C 510
Kelly, William 523
Kiernan , William 540
Letterman,Dr. J. A 524
Morse, George H - 538
Palmer, James ••- 531
Salter,Dr. Francis 528
Sanford, Colonel E. S - 511
Spilman, Lieutenant Henry C 510
Stidger, Dr. S. B 543
CONVALESCENT CAMP, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA —
Lathrop, Lieutenant Colonel S. H . 549
TRADE IN MILITARY DISTRICTS —
Documents 557
COMMUNICATING COUNTERSIGN —
Fiske, Colonel Frank S 621
PAYMASTERS, RETURNING SLAVES, ETC. —
Brooks, E. H -- 626
Jones, Lieutenant D. D - • 655
Lamed, General B. F 623
Lippincott, Dr. Benjamin - 645
McLean, Colonel George P -. 647
Palmer, jr. , Lieutenant Joseph L 643
Seltzer, Dr. J. H 651
Sickles, General Daniel E - 632
Smith, Captain Thornton 630
Wilson, Captain William - 628
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